Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea [Archive]

Sargent

06-17-2008, 01:38 PM

From "Lost Army Job Tied to Doubts on Contractor," NYT, 17 Jun 08
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/washington/17contractor.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin

Army officials denied that Mr. Smith had been removed because of the dispute, but confirmed that they had reversed his decision, arguing that blocking the payments to KBR would have eroded basic services to troops. They said that KBR had warned that if it was not paid, it would reduce payments to subcontractors, which in turn would cut back on services.

“You have to understand the circumstances at the time,” said Jeffrey P. Parsons, executive director of the Army Contracting Command. “We could not let operational support suffer because of some other things.”

Whether the rest of the content of the article is correct, what Parsons says in the sixth paragraph is truly scary. Essentially, he admits that even if the contractor is screwing the government it has to be overlooked because the contractor is holding the troops hostage. Nice business ethic on the part of the contractors there. But the important thing is that there's almost certainly a yellow flag magnet on the back of their cars and a flag pin on their lapels.

I find it strange that SecDef would have gotten involved in this personnel issue unless there was something much bigger at stake. I also don't much care for the bonuses -- seems like a backdoor way to pay the contractors more than was contracted.

In my humble estimation this problem is way bigger than anything going on with the AF, and Gates would do well to get a handle on it.

Bottom line, can we please relearn that Rev War lesson about contractors not being the right men for the job of handling logistics at war, especially at the front lines? The sooner the better.

An interesting tangent to this. My husband and I were discussing the article, and he said that one of his Marines noted, with pride, that he'd been on three deployments and had never served on a FOB with a DFAC. My husband either. This point of pride will make for an interesting point in the conclusion of my dissertation (on gastronomy and morale). If my thesis is that civilian socio-cultural influences affect the decisions regarding gastronomy for morale, then it is understandable that conspicuous consumption has become a part of logistics effort. It also makes sense that military personnel will potentially bristle at having conspicuous consumption forced upon them. You don't join the military if conspicuous consumption is your objective or your interest.

Regards,
Jill

Old Eagle

06-17-2008, 03:27 PM

Without commenting on the merits of the article, since I haven't read it (I know --doesn't stop some people):D, I ask Jill the same question I have asked on other similar threads -- what's the solution?

I have been on a C-C-C ration cycle and I can tell you that it leaves a lot to be desired.

I have also had my units gutted for "details" back in the day. I know others here have also lived through that era, so feel free to help me here.

06-17-2008, 03:54 PM

jkm_101_fso

06-17-2008, 04:00 PM

We used our cooks on convoys and patrols. I lived on a small Iraqi Army FOB in 05-06. Army cooks only cooked dinner chow and spent the rest of the day on missions or guard duty. I think they enjoyed that more than cooking.

jkm_101_fso

06-17-2008, 04:31 PM

Sargent

06-17-2008, 04:32 PM

JKM wrote: We used our cooks on convoys and patrols. I lived on a small Iraqi Army FOB in 05-06. Army cooks only cooked dinner chow and spent the rest of the day on missions or guard duty. I think they enjoyed that more than cooking.

Last year, when they could not settle the food issue for my husband's unit in Fallujah -- they were stationed at the government center downtown, and given the security situation the contractors refused to go there -- they ultimately sent the only Marine messman at Camp Fallujah out there to cook for them. He did one meal a day, and spent the rest of the time cleaning and prepping -- being the only guy on the job, he was kept busy taking care of that. But yes, cooks, etc., assigned to combat units must be prepared to fight. Providing front line logistical support is dangerous.

I will admit that this issue is my bete noir -- see my recent comments on this issue.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=47399#post47399

However, beyond my peculiar interest in the subject, what caught my attention with this article, and what really gets my blood boiling, is the fact that the contractors basically threatened the troops and DoD caved -- and then gave them a bonus.

This last piece is why I think the practice must end. Management has demonstrated that their bottom line -- not the troop needs, not operational capabilities -- is the priority. And with that priority they have demonstrated that they are not at all suited to support the operational needs of deployed forces. Let them handle the cafeteria's stateside, but in war, you need a reliable system, not just a cheap one. Again, it's time to realize the wisdom of a 200+ year old lesson.

Regards,
Jill

jkm_101_fso

06-17-2008, 04:45 PM

You'd probably find it interesting that during my last tour, there were KBR contractors that worked at the BSB, fixing vehicles. Oddly enough, the BSB soldiers that didn't do combat logistics patrols basically worked for the KBR guys...it was strange. I think one issue is that with the FOB concept (a terrible idea, btw) there aren't enough cooks in a BDE to feed everyone. I think that with the evolution of "irregular warfare", contracted services maybe inevidable. You are absolutely right that the government should put the needs of the Soldier first and not the contractor. I do find myself engaged in a lot of conversations in regards to why KBR gets all of the "no-bid" contracts in Iraq. One reason is probably because not many companies are capable of doing what they do, but another is because we don't have the support elements in the military to do it; short of deploying the entire Army to Iraq, which of course, will not happen.

J Wolfsberger

06-17-2008, 04:46 PM

The NY Times hasn't exactly been completely honest in its reporting on the war.

Whether the rest of the content of the article is correct, what Parsons says in the sixth paragraph is truly scary. Essentially, he admits that even if the contractor is screwing the government it has to be overlooked because the contractor is holding the troops hostage.

I don't think that's what they were saying. It seemed more like they were saying "If you don't pay us, we can't pay them, and they'll stop working."

I also don't much care for the bonuses -- seems like a backdoor way to pay the contractors more than was contracted.

One type of contract vehicle is Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), which bases a portion of the negotiated fee on performance criteria. That's pretty typical for ID/IQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity) contracts. (And leave it to the NY Times to describe a standard method of government contracting so that it sounds nefarious.)

The part about the DCAA role was one I would have liked to have seen more information on. If there's any substance to the issues raised in the article, it will be established there.

However, I agree completely that combat units should have their own mess sections.

(Just to illustrate that there may be more than meets the eye: Years ago, a subcontractor had completed all terms of his contract. The managing civil servant demanded additional, uncompensated work out of the sub. He directed me to withhold payment until the additional work was complete. (He also raised hell with my boss when I ignored his direction, but that's a different story ...))

Sargent

06-17-2008, 04:49 PM

The Marine is proud that can't be associated with FOBs or being a FOBBIT...the worst possible name that you could be called in Combat. The current culture in the Army and Marines is such, "if I'm not on a FOB (with KBR) then I am not a FOBBIT. That's why the Army is converting to sexy names like "Patrol Base Smith" or "Combat Outpost Jones". No one, particularly in the combat arms realm wants to be labeled FOBBIT; although it has nothing to do with you mission or performance, rather than being "spoiled" with KBR chow, movie theaters, basketball gyms and "salsa night" at the MWR facility.

Definitely the anti-Fobbit sentiment is part of it. However, given my diss subject this notion that there can be too much is very interesting to me. It's not what one would expect on a superficial level. It's certainly not what the "Support The Troops" mindset would expect.

Furthermore, I think the reaction against the FOBs reflects something of an innate or subconscious recognition that the conspicuous consumption is not serving our war effort. When the Iraqi civilians are pissed that they cannot get reliable electricity, it doesn't help anything that the American forces are eating ice cream. Hell, a military analyst I met told me he thought the food service at Camp Fallujah was over the top.

This all ties into an idea that has emerged in my mind that there must be parity in suffering between troops and civilians in a war zone. American troops mutinied in the Rev War because they were starving in a land of plenty. In WWII, the sharing that went on between the Allied troops and the liberated civilian populations probably went a long way to assisting the war effort. In Iraq, I doubt our effort is helped by the fact that the vast majority of American troops are living high off the hog while the Iraqis can't even get the basics.

However, I do think that there may also be some valid concerns that such indulgences conflict with operational readiness.

There are always a number of factors at work with any given opinion.

Regards,
Jill

marct

06-17-2008, 05:24 PM

Hi Jill,

This all ties into an idea that has emerged in my mind that there must be parity in suffering between troops and civilians in a war zone. American troops mutinied in the Rev War because they were starving in a land of plenty. In WWII, the sharing that went on between the Allied troops and the liberated civilian populations probably went a long way to assisting the war effort. In Iraq, I doubt our effort is helped by the fact that the vast majority of American troops are living high off the hog while the Iraqis can't even get the basics.

I think that is a really good point. It is probably even more important in the ME where there is a tradition that conquerors live well at the expense of the populace (happened in other places too, but the memory of it goes back a long way in the ME). This is one of those times when the logic of rhetoric is more important that that of reality :wry:.

Ken White

06-17-2008, 05:26 PM

jkm_101_fso

06-17-2008, 08:35 PM

Ken,
Great points; also consider a lot of jobs on military posts (mess hall, range control, MPs, maintenance, etc) used to be manned by the military. Come to any post now and you will see that it's all pretty much been contracted. Mainly because we don't have enough Soldiers to do it. In a 2 million man army, we would see military members guarding the gate, running range control and serving chow. This obviously carries over to theater.

There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D
I've heard that now at LSA Anaconda you MUST have your reflective PT belt to get into the chow hall! You can't eat without it!

Stevely

06-17-2008, 09:41 PM

I'm not sure if it's such a good idea, this reliance on contracting for government services, and if there is a positive effective on retention, I don't think it ultimately makes up for the negative effects in so many other areas.

I remember when the contracting craze got underway in earnest, back in the early 90s. It was supposed to streamline and make more efficient many operations ("let industry do it - they have to make a profit ergo they are more efficient!"), and save the government a lot of money. I think neither goal has been achieved; unfortunately since that time, contracting and outsourcing have grown and grown, giving defense industry great influence and leverage over the formulation and execution of defense policy, and today, I think the department is in a bad shape due to that.

Like Jill, my blood boils hearing that a contractor held the troops hostage to their bottom line, but I am not suprised (just saddened) to see things come to such a pass, out at the front. It already happens here in echelons above reality. I have personally witnessed a dispute between my command and a service that shall remain nameless, where government interest was subverted and a corporate agenda was pushed in the place of legitimate military needs. Said service's training network was actually owned by a major contractor and only leased by the service, and refused to follow proscribed government networking standards and refused to connect their network to ours so that the Joint community could gain access to certain simulation resources there. When we held meetings between the sides to work it out, the service's representatives were actually contractors from the company that owned the network (well the first time; we threw them out and told the service next time to send only military or goverment civilians in the future). A short time later, this company sent its representatives to some installations belonging to another service, and tried to convince them not to use the already-installed Joint network to do Joint training, but to spend government money to buy nodes on their network, if they ever hoped to have access to their host service's training resources in the future. One example of defense contractor shenanigans among many I have witnessed.

I think things started going wrong when contractors shifted from being only providers of equipment to performing services. Performing services makes you a part of the chain of command, full stop; but unlike military/ government members of that chain, companies have a second set of loyalties, that their company's own bottom line. Thus it is impossible to have unity of command, or assurance that your private sector subordinates will do what the boss commands, unless the corporate folks abide by an ethic that the bottom line takes a back seat to the good of the government where those two collide. Example above and from Jill's post demonstrate that is not the case, nor have I ever heard of that happening anywhere else. Conflicts of interest are built in to this.

Over-reliance on contractors to do government business can also lead to a loss of control of government functions, again like the unnamed service no longer really being in control of their training network, and the Army's CSS support cited in the original article. Costs get out of hand - I think that almost goes without saying now, looking at endemic contract cost overruns, and

I haven't really talked about the massive consolidation of defense industry in the 90s but that plays a big role, too. There's really very little domestic competition out there to curb the worst excesses of the few contractors left in the field, often the government has nowhere to turn. This could be mitigated somewhat by using foreign contractors, but then the spectre is raised of the loss of domestic military production capability. The giant contractors are aware of this, and exploit that fact as a license to print money.

Unfortunately I don't see this changing much - too many in politics are beneficiaries of the status quo.

(Of course, I caveat all this with "I have nothing against contractor employees - I used to be one - just some of their corporate masters." Don't want anyone to take this as a slam against the worker bees)

Ken White

06-17-2008, 10:36 PM

I'm not sure if it's such a good idea, this reliance on contracting for government services, and if there is a positive effective on retention, I don't think it ultimately makes up for the negative effects in so many other areas.Wouldn't that depend on the numbers?
I remember when the contracting craze got underway in earnest, back in the early 90s.Actually, it started in the mid 70s as a result of the cessation of the Draft.
... giving defense industry great influence and leverage over the formulation and execution of defense policy, and today, I think the department is in a bad shape due to that.Interesting. in what way do you see them influencing policy (other than in the retirees who work for contractors or the contractors who get appointed to defense positions, something that's been happening since WW II).
I have personally witnessed a dispute between my command and a service that shall remain nameless, where government interest was subverted and a corporate agenda was pushed in the place of legitimate military needs. ... One example of defense contractor shenanigans among many I have witnessed.Stuff like that happens. I have also seen turf battles between commands (and services..) that got worse than that -- and everyone involved was wearing a war suit.
I think things started going wrong when contractors shifted from being only providers of equipment to performing services. Performing services makes you a part of the chain of command, full stop; but unlike military/ government members of that chain, companies have a second set of loyalties, that their company's own bottom line. Thus it is impossible to have unity of command, or assurance that your private sector subordinates will do what the boss commands, unless the corporate folks abide by an ethic that the bottom line takes a back seat to the good of the government where those two collide. Example above and from Jill's post demonstrate that is not the case, nor have I ever heard of that happening anywhere else. Conflicts of interest are built in to this.The US government is one massive conflict of interest -- look at the FAA or the Department of Agriculture; any of them. Life is a conflict of interest. The Company has no loyalty to the government or to the chain of command; their only loyalty is to their bottom line, period. Any contract written without that thoughy firmly in mind will leave loopholes that corporate lawyers will find and wiggle through. Sorry, but to me, that's human nature at work, to be expected (not desired, not nice but expected) and part of the way things work. Better contracts and fewer changes can stop that.

Over-reliance on contractors to do government business can also lead to a loss of control of government functions, again like the unnamed service no longer really being in control of their training network, and the Army's CSS support cited in the original article. Costs get out of hand - I think that almost goes without saying now, looking at endemic contract cost overruns, and
money.

Unfortunately I don't see this changing much - too many in politics are beneficiaries of the status quo.

(Of course, I caveat all this with "I have nothing against contractor employees - I used to be one - just some of their corporate masters." Don't want anyone to take this as a slam against the worker bees)While I don't dispute that the system is far from perfect and that there's graft and corruption in it; I gotta ask Old Eagle's question; Bearing my subject line in mind, what's your solution?

Sargent

06-18-2008, 01:23 AM

With all its flaws -- and it has plenty -- contracting basic services has merit. The troops hate that kind of stuff and the cessation of a lot of grass mowing, rock painting and, yes K.P or Mess Duty plus a lot of other minor annoyances has helped keep folks in all the services. The Navy can't do that on ships and thus, they have a very minor retention problem because of that scut work. Add it back into the Army, Marines and AF and it will cause retention problems. In an era of an aging population and a kinder gentler world where military service is eschewed by many that may not be a good idea.

This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. Sure, use contractors to do the scut work on bases in the states -- maybe they could send a few over to my house to keep it clean while my husband is deployed, I wouldn't complain. But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.

On a side note, every time I see a Navy commercial with aviators or SEALS, I chuckle and imagine the commercial that highlights the scut work -- "Join the Navy, scrape barnacles!"

The the Army and Marines get plenty of enlistees for the combat arms and for both services, the re-up rates in the combat skills are great. Not so in the Combat service support arena. Enlistments are down and reenlistments are far lower than in the combat arms.

It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel. For the former, even if they are in a combat arms MOS, they alternate between A billets (fleet tours, usually, in their MOS) and B billets (office jobs doing some sort of support work -- at MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, recruiting, etc.). The B billets, while not jobs most enjoy, are usually good for down time from deployments, usually have a lighter workload, and are thus pretty good for family time. Sometimes they are a complete waste of time, but again, short days with little to do give a guy or gal a chance to catch up on all of the administrative scut work of their household that they've missed out on while on a strenuous deployment schedule.

Thus, you could increase the number of personnel who can join up in the combat arms MOS's, and get the rest of the work done by cycling them through A and B billets. You could make it nice and organized and efficient by assigning a primary MOS (their combat arms specialty) and a secondary MOS (the type of office work they will be assigned to), that way you'll know that the jobs will get done.

But again, they don't need to be cutting the grass or painting rocks. Unless, of course, they get themselves in trouble -- because that is great work for brig rats.

I'm not sure that a reversion to the WW II / Korea / Viet Nam era Army (all effectively the same; little changed) is a good idea. Having been a part of it, there was a lot of crookedness and corruption, petty and major theft by people in uniform. There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D

This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first. This is why Marines really want Marine aviators to be there for CAS -- [and why they hate that the Air Force wants all air assets under a single control, because this means they might not get their guys flying the really hairy missions] -- because those aviators have gone to TBS and know a bit about what the guy on the ground is going through. If you have an infantryman running a support service, he'll likely do it with gusto and integrity, because it's his buddies up at the front that he's supporting. It's why my husband was so aggressive at SYSCOM -- because the system he was deploying was for the artillery community, and the guys getting it were his colleagues, and one day he'd be using it as well.

The Revolution was a long time ago, so was the Civil War which had the same 'contractor' problems.

The Rev War wasn't so long ago that the lesson doesn't bear remembering. And, if my recollection serves, the guys charged with actually delivering the food to the troops were soldiers, not contractors. (Contractors may have provided the food, and that's probably where the problems came in.) That's why there's a memorial to McKinley the soldier at Antietam for delivering a hot meal and coffee to the battle weary soldiers.

No easy solutions to this one...

No, but if we don't even bother looking for one, then there are no solutions.

Cheers,
Jill

Ken White

06-18-2008, 01:33 AM

...I've heard that now at LSA Anaconda you MUST have your reflective PT belt to get into the chow hall! You can't eat without it!I'm sure there's some logic in that somewhere but I'm certainly having a hard time figuring out what it might be. :wry:

Ken White

06-18-2008, 02:01 AM

This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. ... But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.True, to an extent; you'll always find a few but they'll cost big bucks -- that's why I say the key is to design our systems, organizations and equipment to minimize the contractor requirement * .
..."Join the Navy, scrape barnacles!"It was paint that got scraped and the Navy got smart and bought a better quality of paint that needs replacement less often -- so the contractors in the Yards do it when the ship cycle through (as in * above)...
It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel.That's done to an extent but it doesn't answer the CSS dirty work problem. My bet is that if you offer a lot of combat arms NCOs the unrefusable option of alternating between a CA and a CSS job; they'll leave the service. I would have. :D
This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first...I agree -- unfortunately, the Air Force and Army personnel folks don't; "inefficient" they say. As if there were anything more inefficient than a war. Even bigger problem is my guess would be about half (+ or - 10% or so) the CA enlistees wouldn't go for the CSS rotation. NCOs as a body differ from Officers in a number of respects. Most do not want to be generalists or multi spectral.
The Rev War wasn't so long ago that the lesson doesn't bear remembering.True -- and WW II, Korea and Viet Nam with all their systemic ineffectiveness, logistic cock-ups, outright failures (which got covered up by the brass and didn't make the papers as contractors did and do -- but the Troops affected knew) crookedness and black marketing by folks in uniform were even less long ago. Balancing both lessons and applying them to tomorrow is the problem.
No, but if we don't even bother looking for one, then there are no solutions.Agree. See above *. ;)

jcustis

06-18-2008, 02:04 AM

There's a picture I have of a Marine, a tub of lard wearing a glo-belt, and a moral somewhere in between. I'll save it though, as most of you all have already seen it. :D

Schmedlap

06-18-2008, 02:40 AM

Count me among those who can proudly proclaim that in three deployments to Iraq, I did not partake in the madness that was the FOB lifestyle. For me, being in Iraq did not include Pizza Hut, Subway, Green Bean, a PX, a gigantic DFAC full of overweight Soldiers, salsa night, or paying for sex. That said, I would also point out that I did occasionally travel to FOBs for logistical issues - thankfully I never had to stay more than 8 hours. But I had zero bad experiences with contractors. In fact, they were far better than their Army counterparts, from what I observed.

Here is one example (I could give many more): weapons repair. My supply sergeant brought weapons in need of repair to the nearest FOB during OIF III. For the first half of the deployment, it was run by Army personnel. They were great at making excuses for why they could not fix the weapons or why they would not fix them and they were great at showing up late, leaving early, taking extended lunch breaks, and making excuses for why the work order paperwork was incorrect and precluded any further action until the following week when my supply sergeant would make another futile attempt. As soon as those yahoos were replaced by big, fat contractors with bushy white beards, our weapons got immediately fixed on the spot, almost every time. The longest turn-around was a matter of hours. It was a day and night difference. Their "hours of operation" were longer, their work ethic was better, they were faster, more efficient, more effective, easier to work with - I could go on.

This was representative of my experiences with weapons repair, supply warehouses, 30 level mechanical repairs, and more, both in Iraq and in Kuwait. I loved it when Brown & Root took over more functions of our logistics, because I knew that instead of some slugabed E-4, supervised by a lazy E-6, and commanded by a lackluster O-2 or O-3 (or worse), either I or my supply sergeant was going to be dealing with someone who could be fired if too many Soldiers complained about his performance, someone who was earning $80K per year and thus did not want to lose his job. It made a world of difference.

Uboat509

06-18-2008, 02:45 AM

This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. Sure, use contractors to do the scut work on bases in the states -- maybe they could send a few over to my house to keep it clean while my husband is deployed, I wouldn't complain. But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.

That's not that much of an issue as most of the contractors (unarmed I mean, not Blackwater et all) work on the FOB and actually many of them are specifically forbidden to leave the FOB. That said there are quite a few contract drivers out doing convoys and they are definitely out where the bullets are flying.

It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel. For the former, even if they are in a combat arms MOS, they alternate between A billets (fleet tours, usually, in their MOS) and B billets (office jobs doing some sort of support work -- at MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, recruiting, etc.). The B billets, while not jobs most enjoy, are usually good for down time from deployments, usually have a lighter workload, and are thus pretty good for family time. Sometimes they are a complete waste of time, but again, short days with little to do give a guy or gal a chance to catch up on all of the administrative scut work of their household that they've missed out on while on a strenuous deployment schedule.

Thus, you could increase the number of personnel who can join up in the combat arms MOS's, and get the rest of the work done by cycling them through A and B billets. You could make it nice and organized and efficient by assigning a primary MOS (their combat arms specialty) and a secondary MOS (the type of office work they will be assigned to), that way you'll know that the jobs will get done.

That will never work for a variety of reasons with the biggest one being that most CA and CSS soldiers joined CA or CSS specifically because they did not want to be the other. Tell the average support guy like a cook, a clerk, a mechanic or a tanker that he has to do a tour in combat arms and he is going tell you to get bent and he will get out and go find a job somewhere else. Tell the average infantryman that he has to do a tour as a support guy and his response will be somewhat more profane but the end result will be the same. This system works for officers because they will spend a great deal of their career in staff jobs anyway.

This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first.

The Army has been trying to do this since Schoomaker and it hasn't worked all that well. The problem is partially cultural, supporters don't really have much interest is being CA first and partially practical, supporters don't really have the time, knowledge or resources to build and maintain those skillsets.

While I don't dispute that the system is far from perfect and that there's graft and corruption in it; I gotta ask Old Eagle's question; Bearing my subject line in mind, what's your solution?

I agree with this completely. Lots of people don't like that we use so many contractors, me neither but what is the solution? We don't have enough servicemembers to do everything that contractors do now and we aren't going to anytime soon.

SFC W

Andrew Steimer

06-18-2008, 04:40 AM

First, to Schmedlap, the problem of paperwork rigamarole never should have happened to your unit, as a current loggie, and former infantryman (even if I was a dirty nasty leg), I always hate hearing about the utter laziness of certain Soldiers in my branch, and guaranteed that we never turned down a job (within reason). The only reason loggies have jobs is to make sure the door-kickers have all the ammo, food, and working equipment they need, and any leader who doesn't understand that deserves a relief for cause
--END RANT--
Contractors are a touchy subject, and I think the Army misuses them, both in theater and otherwise. Obviously, the military manpower shortage plays a major role in this, but, as stated in other threads, I think part of this is due to a short-sighted view when writing contracts. I know quite a few peers in my branch who deployed only to find KBR, or a subcontractor, conducting their wartime mission, leaving the unit to perform some other function, sometimes completely wasting resources (MWR support, etc.)
As far as CSS serving in CA roles, it has already happened in multiple BCTs, and will continue to happen. While training time is limited in most CSS units due to workload while state-side, if a unit expects to do something in theater, they will find the time to train. As far as the argument about CSS Soldiers only joining the Army to do their specific MOS, there are quite a few Soldiers in my unit reclassing into MFE MOSs or going to SFAS because of experiences they had while deployed. The Soldiers are willing to do the job, and if they're not willing to be a rifleman (or riflewoman) first, they should leave the Army. I disagree with the Marine A/B Billet idea for the Army, to echo Uboat, if you want to piss off a young Infantryman, tell him to go work in the DFAC.

Sargent

06-18-2008, 01:09 PM

Uboat wrote: That's not that much of an issue as most of the contractors (unarmed I mean, not Blackwater et all) work on the FOB and actually many of them are specifically forbidden to leave the FOB.

And since not everyone lives on a FOB, and since there are not many options on how to support those who don't, then it seems nearly criminal to have put most of the CSS assets in their control. Does it seem right to anyone to send troops into harm's way with no reasonable means to support (feed) them?

We will not always be able to fight based on a FOB concept, where contractors can live and work in nice, safe conditions to support the troops. What happens when troops have to operate in a truly expeditionary manner?

It may require that we have to fight against our natural way of war, per Weigley -- that is, we rely too much on being able to throw money at a problem. It may be that we have to go back to a people solution, specifically a people in uniform solution.

Regards,
Jill

Sargent

06-18-2008, 01:28 PM

As regards the responses to the concept that one way to get around the contractor issue in CSS is to have personnel assigned primary and secondary MOS's, so that they can serve in A and B billets, such that more of the CSS can be handled by military personnel:

I have to say, I am not impressed with the picture of soldiers that has emerged from those responses. My son is 5, and he's already learned that he can't always expect to get everything he wants -- and he knows better than to complain when he doesn't. He also knows that the correct response in those cases is "Yes mom," full stop, in a tone of voice that doesn't betray any whining or complaint. I don't know whether to be more disappointed with the state of parenting in this country or the state of leadership in the Army. From what you all have said, it seems to me as though "soldier" has become synonymous with "prima donna" or "spoiled brat." What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants? In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.

Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.

However, if you are truly correct, and you can't teach these old dogs new tricks, then the simple answer is that the system applies to those who will enter the service in the future.

If you don't believe there is a problem with contractor-provided CSS, then there is no reason to contemplate such a solution. However, if you think that CSS may have to be returned to those in uniform, then something is going to have to give.

Pardon me for being blunt.

Regards,
Jill

Schmedlap

06-18-2008, 01:46 PM

I understand the concern that an argument was put forth stating, basically, that if the contract were cancelled then troops would be without food. However, that is an exaggeration of a statement that was false to begin with. There would be a delay in transferring back from contractor-provided logistics to Army-provided, but the troops would not go hungry. They would simply eat MREs in the interim.

Any FOB or other type of base in Iraq always has enough MREs to be a buffer against a stoppage in food flow. I know this because I have seen it occur. Certain FOBs have had their food supply cut short due to certain routes being shut down to logistics convoys. During those times, the FOBbits ate MREs. The issue is not that troops would go hungry. The issue is that they would be eating MREs. And if you do not cringe at the though of troops eating anything less than gourmet food prepared in a 4-star dining facility, 3 to 4 times per day, everyday, then you do not support the troops (that was sarcasm). That's right - there is a political angle.

It is important to remember that FOBs are Division/Brigade types of areas. The most significant change at issue here is not one of outsourcing logistics to contractors, so much as that our small units are co-habitating with the higher echelons. As a result of this change, we are observing the logistics activity at the DIV/BDE areas, seeing the co-habitation with the companies, and assuming that companies are now conducting contractor-driven logistics. That is simply not the case.

Our increasing outsourcing of logistics is borne more of choice than need and it is only occurring in any significant fashion at high echelons. And it is not borne so much of necessity as from a quality of life stance. The FOBs dole out lots of cash for $35 plates of KBR gourmet extravaganza because someone early on in this war made the determination that we were weak, soft, fragile little things that would bend under the pressure of doing what we signed up to do, if we did not eat three belly-busting meals of steak, bacon, pizza, red bull, and doughnuts every day. When necessity rears its ugly head, units are perfectly capable of doing logistics old-school style. And they do.

For example, my battalion was located away from a FOB and my company was located away from the battalion. The food at our company patrol base and the food consumed at the battalion mini-FOB (for lack of a better term) were prepared and cooked by our battalion's cooks. There were no contractors at our company PB or at our battalion's mini-FOB. The battalion mini-FOB's ration cycle was A-M-A. Our weekly ration cycle at the company level was M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-A, M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-A, repeat.

Before being picked up at a large FOB by our support platoon, the food was shipped from Kuwait to the large FOBs by contractors (with US Army Military Police escorts). But, so what? This makes sense. The fact that we are outsourcing does not mean that we are incapable of the logistics. It just means that outsourcing makes more sense, given the intent. We could switch back, but why? It would be less efficient. If Iran comes across the border, then maybe reverting back to military logistics will make sense. Until then, have another doughnut.

John T. Fishel

06-18-2008, 01:53 PM

guy who really respects the Marines (I never met a dumb Field Grade Marine officer - they could all do the dumb Marine act brilliantly however:D) it is well to remember that the USMC is NOT the Army writ small. Neither is the Army the USMC writ large. They are different organizations whose missions sometimes overlap but often do not. So they will and should do many things differently although they can certainly learn from each other.

Break

I'm with all of you who think that we have gone too far in contracting out services - even in the vast majority of the cases where the contractors are honest and competent. There is no easy or short term solution. But the beginning is to clearly identify what is a government function and stop contracting for that function as we build the capacity to perform it back into the government/military. We didn't get to this point overnight - as Ken says, it began in the 70s with the AVF - and we won't reach a new desired equilibrium in a year or two. Hopefully, it won't take us 35 years!:eek:

Cheers

JohnT

Schmedlap

06-18-2008, 02:05 PM

From what you all have said, it seems to me as though "soldier" has become synonymous with "prima donna" or "spoiled brat." What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants? In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.

... if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers... to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers.

Jill,

That is a very good question and it could be a thread of its own. It is a question that I grappled with when I decided to leave the Army. Had my option been to be a platoon leader or company commander for the next 20 years, then I would have happily continued to sacrifice my social life and risk my mortal life to do it. But I left the Army because I recognized that, as a Captain, the remainder of my career would be about a 5 to 1 ratio, or worse, of staff time to command time. All of that risk and sacrifice, just to do PowerPoint slides, run a TOC, or otherwise do work that a mediocre Soldier with a permanent profile could do. It did not make any sense to me. But then I also thought, "what about selfless service?" My decision making process sounded highly selfish. And maybe it was. Or maybe I am too self-critical. I don't know. My decision boiled down to my recognition that if I hated my job, then I would not have the self-discipline to give it the full attention that it merited. That was how I rationalized it. It is something that I still think about.

Stevely

06-18-2008, 02:14 PM

The US government is one massive conflict of interest -- look at the FAA or the Department of Agriculture; any of them. Life is a conflict of interest. The Company has no loyalty to the government or to the chain of command; their only loyalty is to their bottom line, period. Any contract written without that thoughy firmly in mind will leave loopholes that corporate lawyers will find and wiggle through. Sorry, but to me, that's human nature at work, to be expected (not desired, not nice but expected) and part of the way things work. Better contracts and fewer changes can stop that.

I don't have a problem in principle with the way businesses work in trying for government contracts, but I think it is a problem when contractors are integrated into the government workforce. You get personnel who serve two masters in one organization, and that's trouble.

You could mitigate some problems with more careful contract writing, but there are a lot of problems with that, I think. Contracted workforce is now pretty common throughout the department, so we're going need probably more lawyers than what we have currently, or rely less on them, or allow contracts with very broad statements of work. Where I work, we've got close to 1000 contractors, who have all been unified under one big contract. We (my boss and me and his other minions) spent the better part of a year combing through the task order to ensure that we closed all the little loopholes, but we still get conflicts over "that's not in the task order, so pay us more or go away." We have a big and technically diverse mission, you really just can't cover it all and I don't believe we could write a foolproof contract to cover the mission, if we have specify all the things the contractor must do (and we do). Squabbles with the contract over what is legitimate work are common here, and depressing.

This is not good in a COCOM HQ, would be much worse out in the field. Do we want contractors parsing their statement of work on the battlefield? I think the obvious solution is that we need more troops, then we wouldn't have a need to push contractors out to do jobs that have traditionally been done by soldiers, or reduce our commitments to the level that can be supported by the numbers we have in uniform. Failing that, fill the billets with GS (make that NSPS) personnel.

Past my few suggestions, I don't have any schemes to solve this current impasse. Though if I do find some clever solution to it all, I will start my own consultancy and go hunting contracts to sell my wisdom to Uncle Sam. :D

Stevely

06-18-2008, 02:23 PM

First, to Schmedlap, the problem of paperwork rigamarole never should have happened to your unit, as a current loggie, and former infantryman (even if I was a dirty nasty leg), I always hate hearing about the utter laziness of certain Soldiers in my branch, and guaranteed that we never turned down a job (within reason). The only reason loggies have jobs is to make sure the door-kickers have all the ammo, food, and working equipment they need, and any leader who doesn't understand that deserves a relief for cause
--END RANT--

I feel your pain :wry:. I am a former QM, dealt with my share of this. A fair few soldiers in CSS join the Army for the wrong reasons, and are perennially surprised (and become surly) when they are required to be soldiers and do their mission. Some of that can be fixed by good leadership example (when I was in Support Squadron, 11th ACR, all the log troops were pretty highly motivated, not so much in the FSBs I was in later). It is grating though, because the bad ones smear everyone else's reputation.

I know quite a few peers in my branch who deployed only to find KBR, or a subcontractor, conducting their wartime mission, leaving the unit to perform some other function, sometimes completely wasting resources (MWR support, etc.)

(repeating what Jill said)

This I can't understand. What happens if we have a higher intensity conflict, or are in an environment where we don't have the luxury of sprawling FOB complexes with all the comforts of home? Who will do the logistics then? If CSS soldiers aren't doing their jobs, they won't be ready to do them when there is no alternative to using soldiers.

VMI_Marine

06-18-2008, 03:04 PM

Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.

I don't know that we so much accede to it. We're either relieved to escape from an infantry or artillery battalion environment for a few years, or we're drug off kicking and screaming. I would have been in the latter category, but my XO experience shifted me to the former.

If you have an infantryman running a support service, he'll likely do it with gusto and integrity, because it's his buddies up at the front that he's supporting.

I think rotating combat arms officers into CSS jobs would be a mistake. I had the (mis)fortune of pulling a collateral duty as team embarkation officer while doing my company XO time on a MEU deployment. My complete lack of knowledge about embarkation, logistics, or even what an M1123 HMMWV is (come to find out, it's the one that I had always been taught to refer to as a "highback") was a major hindrance. A trained logistics officer would have done a much better job (but try telling my battalion XO that - I did, and he didn't care). Ultimately, I am a much smarter MAGTF officer for having suffered through that; but I think if we were to rotate guys between CA and CSS across the board, it would turn out to be a disaster. My saving grace in that job was being surrounded by guys who were trained in that field, and could help me figure it out.

Keep in mind, what you are describing is not a B billet, per se. It is a CSS billet in the operating forces. Yes, there are combat arms officers that do a turn in CSS billets in the opfor as a B billet, but they are few and far between. B billets are typically in the Supporting Establishment, like your husband's job at SYSCOM.

I like the point that Ken and some others are making. Defense contracting is here to stay for some time. A similar thing happened in Europe in the Middle Ages - it was easier to hire trained men to do their fighting than to train and maintain their own armies. The way to maintain some quality control is to word the contracts carefully, and enforce the contractual obligations.

I never met a dumb Field Grade Marine officer - they could all do the dumb Marine act brilliantly however:D

That, sir, is premium signature line material. :D

Stevely

06-18-2008, 03:22 PM

I like the point that Ken and some others are making. Defense contracting is here to stay for some time. A similar thing happened in Europe in the Middle Ages - it was easier to hire trained men to do their fighting than to train and maintain their own armies. The way to maintain some quality control is to word the contracts carefully, and enforce the contractual obligations.

Yes, but in those times you are talking about fielding mercenary fighting forces. Arguably we do that now, and it seems to me we are sliding toward that end, but our society is politically much different than Europe in the Middle Ages - we have a citizen army, still, even if not a conscription army any more. It is politically meaningful that the citizenry have a share in the fights that the government of, by and for the people pick. Fighting wars is one of the most serious and profound things a government can do; contracting it out to private industry would, I believe, alter the political character of the country over the long term. I'm not sure that's a road we want to go down.

Uboat509

06-18-2008, 03:37 PM

I am wondering why the majority of this discussion seems to be about the transport of class I as if that is all that these convoys carry. The attitude of some here seems to be that if we just start feeding the FOBBITs MREs then the need for contractors will dry up. That is simply not the case. First of all, all classes of supply are carried on those convoys. Even if you eliminate the hot meals on the FOBs, you will still need those convoys to carry everything else that is needed both on and off the FOB. Second, the military loggies aren't sitting on their hands and letting the contractors carry everything for them. There are plenty of military logistics convoys but there simply are not enough to haul everything that needs to be moved. Our military is not manned or equiped to support this type of long term mission.

SFC W

J Wolfsberger

06-18-2008, 04:38 PM

... is that the transition to contractors was driven by authorized end strength, the Congressional limit on the number of people in the active duty components.

The authorized end strength of the Army is 512,400 (authorized for 2009). The Army wants to get maximum combat power out of that number. The brass has decided (correctly, in my opinion) to identify areas where they can hire civilians to perform certain activities, and free up another troop slot for combat power.

That is the reason every company doesn't have its own mess section. Its the reason so much of the higher echelon maintenance/repair is performed by contractors. It's the reason a lot of the logistics (i.e. transport) is done by contractors. Having contractors do a lot of that work frees authorized slots for combat power.

A second consideration is pay. As an exampole, the Navy's electronics tech schools are (or at least used to be) the best to be found anywhere, military or civilian. They last(ed) about 18 months. Add 36 months for service in a unit, and the sailor is at the end of his enlistment. At which point, he can get a job at SCI Sanmina, Rockwell-Collins, Harris, etc. at two or three times the pay, company paid education to get a BS EE, etc. At this point, the Navy has exactly one avenue to pursue if it wants to retain the expertise: go to the contractor and pay them for the work.

Jill, a lot of your points and ideas are very well taken. But the problem isn't with what the services want. The problem is with the constraints imposed by Congress.

Ken White

06-18-2008, 04:51 PM

...I have to say, I am not impressed with the picture of soldiers that has emerged from those responses. My son is 5, and he's already learned that he can't always expect to get everything he wants -- and he knows better than to complain when he doesn't....Do not take umbrage but allow me to point out that your son is not a relatively mature 18 or 19 year old who volunteered to do a particular for remuneration. That guy volunteered to do a job that he thought he would like or at least tolerate for some reason. Two generally distinct personality types go into the CSS and CA spectrums and it was my observation during my service in both the Corps and the Army that this was true and pretty non-negotiable in the eyes of most (not all, a few don't care that much). Officers and EM differ in attitudes on a lot of things and as John said, the Army and Marines differ. I'll also note that I have seen a number of both Army and Marine officers who were able to avoid some jobs they didn't like... :D

Even know some of both who got all the way to Colonel while avoiding service in DC...

Both services have at times reclassified EM from CSS to CA to fill shortfalls (none the other way to my knowledge, though a few guys get tired of combat and voluntarily switch to CSS); most accept it and adapt. However, if they have less than ten years, they tend to get out at the first opportunity; more than ten they mostly stick around -- and then tend to retire at 20 and not stick around for 30. Different people are attracted to different things and I'm not at all sure that's indicative of indiscipline or lack of motivation. You'd be surprised by the number of folks offered commissions in wartime and turn them down.
What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants?Essentially, yes -- the Enlistment contract is pretty specific. Could it be modified? Sure -- but right now it offers the kid what he thinks he wants as a job and that job offer is fairly specific and pretty much by MOSC.
In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.That is the case and I think you inadvertently maligned a lot of Marines and Soldiers. Joe can be hard for many to understand...
Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.Having some experience of Marine Officers and other various service types, IMO, your statement is correct with respect to some but not all Marine Officers. I'm not sure but suspect your knowledge of other communities that are every bit as Gung Ho -- some even more inclusively so -- may be limited. They're out there.
However, if you are truly correct, and you can't teach these old dogs new tricks, then the simple answer is that the system applies to those who will enter the service in the future.Could be tried; my belief is that it wouldn't succeed. All the services today are filling combat arms slots with little problem but are having difficulty filling CSS slots. Short a return to the draft, I suspect that will continue because the average enlistee for a CSS job can make more money with less hassle on the outside -- the kid who wants to get in a fight has to go combat arms or be a cop, he cannot do that on the outside -- and the CA Army or Marine route offers more pizazz. As your 5 year old gets older, you'll see what I mean on a couple of levels... ;)
If you don't believe there is a problem with contractor-provided CSS, then there is no reason to contemplate such a solution. However, if you think that CSS may have to be returned to those in uniform, then something is going to have to give.

Pardon me for being blunt.I thought we were supposed to be blunt? Not a problem. However, I don't think anyone disagrees with you that some CSS contracting is problematic or that in some circumstances, contracting isn't going to work. Seems to me we're in agreement on that and that comments offered to you and to Stevely have been in the vein "it's not as bad as you seem to think" and "that's a good idea but..." and we still end up at the same place -- What, really, is the solution? One that will actually work? How do you get people to volunteer for low paying scut work that comes in an environment filled with petty hassles and regimentation. A guy who wants to fight will put up with all that; one who doesn't want to fight will not.

John T. Fishel

06-18-2008, 05:00 PM

(there's always a "but") Congressional manpower constraints are not the sole source of the problem. Clearly, they are part of it and aleviation will require more people in uniform. Obviously, there is a legitimate role for contractors but there are roles they play that should be government business. Among those, I submit, are training foreign militaries for the USG and educating/training ROTC cadets and midshipmen. When you remove the contracts from functions that are inherently governmental, you still have the problem of making sure the contract is written well and then its terms are enforced. One should never have to go to the contractor for the expertise to write a good contract but it is sad how often that happens. The positive side is that many of those contracts are written properly and protect the public interest because the contractors are often prior service who supervised similar contracts while on active duty. In many cases, their patriotism trumps corporate profit. Unfortunately, sometimes greed does win out. Some functions that are now performed by contract can and should be performed by civil servants - to make this effective requires a reform in the ability to expand civil service positions and making hiring easier. This, too, requires legislation but some things can, in fact, be done administratively.

It is, indeed, a complex problem but not chaotic (entirely).:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

Tom Odom

06-18-2008, 05:16 PM

... is that the transition to contractors was driven by authorized end strength, the Congressional limit on the number of people in the active duty components.

As we stand today that is correct

The authorized end strength of the Army is 512,400 (authorized for 2009). The Army wants to get maximum combat power out of that number. The brass has decided (correctly, in my opinion) to identify areas where they can hire civilians to perform certain activities, and free up another troop slot for combat power.

Yes again

That is the reason every company doesn't have its own mess section. Its the reason so much of the higher echelon maintenance/repair is performed by contractors. It's the reason a lot of the logistics (i.e. transport) is done by contractors. Having contractors do a lot of that work frees authorized slots for combat power.

Not exactly. The removal of mess sections, and maintenance sections to create light infantry divisions was all part of AOE as described below:

Army of Excellence (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/aoe.htm)
The centerpiece of the reorganization, the light infantry division was a 3-brigade organization with 9 battalions of straight foot-infantry, with a strength eventually set at 10,800 men. Deployable in approximately 550 C-141 airlift sorties, it was oriented specifically to contingency actions worldwide where response in the first days of a crisis was critical. Lacking armor and heavy howitzers, the division was structured on shock tactics rather than sustained firepower. Based on the historical lessons of World War II, force designers incorporated "corps plug" augmentation forces into the scheme to make up for the lack of firepower and logistical capability. By concept, an early-arriving light division could buy time for heavier forces to follow. The light division had a secondary mission of reinforcement of heavy forces in scenarios and terrain where it could be more effective than those forces - in cities, forests, and mountain areas. Many light infantry division capabilities were austere. The division - contingency focused - was conceived and approved as a hard-hitting, highly trained, elite light force, with high esprit and cooperation essential to its success. The design went through a successful certification process in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, supported by the TRADOC test organizations, during 1984-1986.

There are two trends here: one was to reduce tail by either removing the function and replacing it with a partially technological fix as in MREs with T-rations served via micro waves. Or maintenance with so-called plugs from above; we all wondered what would happen when the supply of said plugs was expended.

This was going on well before then SecDef Cheney put the use of contractors into hyper-drive; see Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Deborah C. Kidwell. Paper #12. (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf) for a pretty good discussion of that.

The other trend was reduction of the military and removal of those functions in favor of "teeth". As you say, fewer troops means keep the shooters.

A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort.

Tom

Ken White

06-18-2008, 06:20 PM

...A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort.Creighton Abrams as CofSA was the real initiator of that AC to RC move of CS/CSS units in 1973, it was desinged so that future Presidents would have to mobilize the guard and Reserve to got to war. It worked -- and works today.

The moves were well in place by the time Meyer and Weinberger appeared on scene (in 79 and 81, respectively). Abrams plan was the basis of (and in support of) the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984 even though he long preceded Cap. The AOE plan was on the right track but a change of civilian leadership meant that it fell by the wayside before it got fully implemented. That happens a lot.

I'll add that all this proves yet again that the Weinberger and Powell 'doctrines' were idealistic to an extreme and thus flawed...

Probably also proving that concrete structural plans and efforts as opposed to 'doctrine' can work and last. Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.

John T. Fishel

06-18-2008, 06:23 PM

Tom Odom

06-18-2008, 06:41 PM

what you are driving at in your third trend:

"A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort."

Tom

One of the consequences of both the Gulf War decision to call up RC personnel using derivative UICs and the subsequent Rumsfeld understaffed Army was to require the call up of all sorts of RC (USAR and NG) units - CA, CS, and CSS for multiple tours well beyond what they thought they were signing up for. Can you clarify?;)

Cheers

JohnT[/QUOTE]

JohnT
Agreed Gulf War I required the call up; per the Powell Doctrine that Ken loves so much :D

Gulf War 2 (OIF) required call ups but Rumsfeld view if a transformational military was built on the theory of short war. That means contractors. You supposedly did not have to disrupt the American life style and you could exercise greater executive control of foreign policy and military force. Remember all the hype about transformation in 2001 pre-9/11? It was all about projecting power quickly without any increase in actual force structure.

Where that "vision" (my use of quotes is plain sacarsm) failed was that there would be a need for repeated call ups of those forces on top of all those contractors. In other words, you paid both ways: you paid for high contract costs because you had stripped capacity to sustain the force from the actiual force and you still needed call ups for the long haul

From Ken:Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.

Absolutely!

Tom

06-18-2008, 06:55 PM

Probably also proving that concrete structural plans and efforts as opposed to 'doctrine' can work and last. Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.
Could not agree more that keeping contractor logistics support (CLS) out of fielded systems is a desired end state. However, with the trend these days going to ever more COTS procurement as a way to do rapid fielding to bridge perceived capability shortfalls, we are more and more stuck on the CLS horns with the systems we are currently fielding.

The institutional training base is not geared up to provide the kind of rapid response needed to produce uniformed maintainers to sustain equipment fielded using rapid fielding initiative processes (but I think ken and I have had these discussions about the "issues" in the military, at least TRADOC, training design and development process before :)).

Ken White

06-18-2008, 07:14 PM

from Viet Nam and as CofSA almost immediately set out to move the bulk of the CS/CSS to the Guard and Reserve for two reason. First, to insure that no future President could go to war without calling up the RC and secondly, to put those kinds of unit -- even then having problems recruiting -- in the RC where they could better recruit and could allow unit members to work in their trade in civilian life as well as in training, thus enhancing their skills if they needed to be called up. To that end, some thought was put into what units went where in an attempt to locate units where there were likely locally required skills that would enhance the effectiveness of the unit.

Unfortunately, in the 80s, politics took over and two things happened. first, the ArNG got agreement to take over all CA units in the RC (bad decision on the part of DA) and the USAR picked up the majority of the CSS (read: all that the ArNG did not want) while both components shared CS elements. There was also some movement of unit locations based on politics and not on what native to the area skill pools might contain. Both of these actions were detrimental (IMO) to the concept, to the Army and to the RC.

Come Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Vouno tried to go to war without calling up the RC CS/CSS pool -- he couldn't do it. He and Benny Peay tried every trick in the book and couldn't make it work so the CS/CSS package had to be called up, thus units tabbed Capstone to VII and XVIII Corps had to be activated. Third Army's down trace was mostly RC, they had to be called up. Congress also insisted on ArNG Brigades being called up and sent (they paid for 'em and they and the Guard wanted to put 'em to work). So three Bdes were activated over loud protests from DA. The DA plan was to stall and not deploy them in order to justify a couple of full up, all AC deployable Corps so they decided the RC refresher training would entail a trip to the NTC. One Bde, the 48th from GA, went through that and completed it just about the time of the ceasefire in Kuwait. It never got certified for deployment by DA (a statutory requirement) on the basis "the war's over..." Fun and games the DA way...

Come this one, Tom's got it right plus the need for for more troops due to a rotation policy drove the deployment of ArNG Bdes -- all of whom have done pretty good. 278th from TN did exceptionally well.

There are a number of lessons in this for many, from Congress to DA to the RC to Defense contractors. Let's see how smart everyone is... :D

Ken White

06-18-2008, 07:34 PM

Could not agree more that keeping contractor logistics support (CLS) out of fielded systems is a desired end state. However, with the trend these days going to ever more COTS procurement as a way to do rapid fielding to bridge perceived capability shortfalls, we are more and more stuck on the CLS horns with the systems we are currently fielding.Sadly true, in fact -- but that's the Army's fault for just reacting and not thinking ahead. That and skewed priorities that put big ticket items ahead of must have items of little glamor. Yes, I'm aware that the US Congress is a BIG part of that problem, as is DoD and our civilian 'leadership' (scare quotes advised on that one).

Still, the capability to plan ahead, to rationalize and procure the right things has always existed -- the Army has not been willing to put the energy into doing that. That's a senior leadership failure. They are the Stewards of the Institution in their view and I submit they have not done a particularly good job. I'll fault all of the services for being a tad arrogant and not explaining what they need and why they need it very well -- sadly because I think in many cases, they don't know. However, I also believe they've all been guilty of not really thinking ahead and getting a really good handle on their own roles and missions. I am fully aware that is very easy for me to say when I have no responsibility but there was a time when I did have a little and I think I exercised that better than I see with respect to rational and sensible efforts to prepare for combat -- because that is really what it's all about.

It will come as no surprise to many that I blame a lack of common sense and full training in the basics, the personnel system and DOPMA for much of this...:D
The institutional training base is not geared up to provide the kind of rapid response needed to produce uniformed maintainers to sustain equipment fielded using rapid fielding initiative processes (but I think ken and I have had these discussions about the "issues" in the military, at least TRADOC, training design and development process before :)).True, it is not -- nor do I think it should necessarily be. A better process would be to more carefully select what is bought and buy stuff that is low maintenance; LRUs, swapouts, reliability requirements and so forth. Add to that better and more comprehensive training of new entrants, Officer and Enlisted to include maintenance at above the 'call a mechanic' level and life could be better.

Personally, I'm not giving the Army a bye on any of that -- nor am I holding my breath on any of it....:rolleyes:

J Wolfsberger

06-18-2008, 08:16 PM

... That and skewed priorities that put big ticket items ahead of must have items of little glamor. ...

... However, I also believe they've all been guilty of not really thinking ahead and getting a really good handle on their own roles and missions. ...

... A better process would be to more carefully select what is bought and buy stuff that is low maintenance; LRUs, swapouts, reliability requirements and so forth. Add to that better and more comprehensive training of new entrants, Officer and Enlisted to include maintenance at above the 'call a mechanic' level and life could be better.

When the Army moves to all the wonderful "net-centric" capabilities that are going to completely change the nature of war ...

[/Sarcasm] Sorry. :mad:

Whatever I think of it, and I personally believe it has been dramatically over sold, the Army is becoming increasingly information centric. The technical specialists necessary to keep those systems up and running, and especially to keep the bad guys from knocking them down, won't be in uniform. The sad truth is that once they're trained, they make way more as civilians. Which means they get out, go to the contractor, who puts them back in the same duty station as a civilian at 4 or 5 or more times as much pay. I really don't think that could be solved by making them officers, either.

And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.

Ken White

06-18-2008, 08:51 PM

My mom told me. I think she was right and I think we've forgotten that...

Whatever I think of it, and I personally believe it has been dramatically over sold, the Army is becoming increasingly information centric.Too true -- and that has one driver. Over centralization. :mad:

That, in turn is driven by the lack of willingness to trust subordinates induced by the experience in the last few years of Viet Nam where Bn Cdrs found out that instant NCOs and 2LTs were wonderfully willing and dedicated but didn't know much and required constant supervision. A partial solution to that is far better training and a better personnel system. Until those very significant problems are fixed, we will over rely on technology and pay the CLS price. Seems dumb to me but what do I know....
And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.IF we keep edging reliability and and simplicity out for sophistication -- which the industry wants to sell, it's got a bigger markup -- and if we keep insisting on trying to solve human problems with mo' better machinery...

OTOH there may be other, less expensive and more reliable ways to do things.

Not to mention that in my experience, reliance on electronic systems is dicey at best. They have the annoying habit of working well for months on end for unimportant things and then failing when you need them most... :rolleyes:

J Wolfsberger

06-18-2008, 08:56 PM

OTOH there may be other, less expensive and more reliable ways to do things.

Not to mention that in my experience, reliance on electronic systems is dicey at best. They have the annoying habit of working well for months on end for unimportant things and then failing when you need them most... :rolleyes:

I have this persistent vision of the next highly kinetic war beginning with a three or four day orgy of destruction of multi-million dollar systems ...

... followed by weeks, months and years of old fashioned infantry slug fest. :wry:

Ron Humphrey

06-18-2008, 09:23 PM

I have this persistent vision of the next highly kinetic war beginning with a three or four day orgy of destruction of multi-million dollar systems ...

... followed by weeks, months and years of old fashioned infantry slug fest. :wry:

Something to the effect of ( Not sure about wwIII, but WWIV ; sticks and stones):eek:

Ken White

06-18-2008, 09:47 PM

We can't afford to fight $7M Tanks... :D

06-19-2008, 12:00 AM

The technical specialists necessary to keep those systems up and running, and especially to keep the bad guys from knocking them down, won't be in uniform. The sad truth is that once they're trained, they make way more as civilians. Which means they get out, go to the contractor, who puts them back in the same duty station as a civilian at 4 or 5 or more times as much pay. I really don't think that could be solved by making them officers, either.

And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.

Bingo. The Army already had that problem back in the 70's with the troops it spent 12-18 months training to maintain its SIGINT/EW systems. I/EW system maintainers left the schoolhouse for their first assignment with civilian job offers already in hand.

Sargent

06-24-2008, 02:48 PM

Pardon the delay in responding. I was thinking.

Schmedlap wrote:

I understand the concern that an argument was put forth stating, basically, that if the contract were cancelled then troops would be without food. However, that is an exaggeration of a statement that was false to begin with. There would be a delay in transferring back from contractor-provided logistics to Army-provided, but the troops would not go hungry. They would simply eat MREs in the interim.

Any FOB or other type of base in Iraq always has enough MREs to be a buffer against a stoppage in food flow. I know this because I have seen it occur. Certain FOBs have had their food supply cut short due to certain routes being shut down to logistics convoys. During those times, the FOBbits ate MREs. The issue is not that troops would go hungry. The issue is that they would be eating MREs. And if you do not cringe at the though of troops eating anything less than gourmet food prepared in a 4-star dining facility, 3 to 4 times per day, everyday, then you do not support the troops (that was sarcasm). That's right - there is a political angle.

I did not mean to suggest that the contractor refusing to do his job meant that troops would starve. Rather, I do not think that folks with that sort of an attitude ought to be in the government contracting business. Alternately, I'm not sure that the government contracting model works because, at the end of the day, the profit motive is at odds with the needs of national security. There is a fundamental conflict between interests and objectives.

As to the MRE point, it should be remembered that the MRE is not formulated for long-term consumption. It's a stop gap, it's a means to provide interim caloric and basic nutritive needs, but it is not an answer to the subsistence needs. On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group. How we eat is as important as what we eat. (I am a believer in the small intangibles in the military effectiveness equation.)

It would take a lot more explanation than is feasible here, but I think the biggest problem is the lack of balance. FOBs with steak and lobster and five flavors of ice cream contrasted with small units outside the FOB with very little is not a particularly good set up. If I were in charge of logistics, I would start with the pointy end and work my way back -- nobody gets steak and lobster until everyone can get a decent meal. For the guys at the very edge of that pointy end, the best answer is for military personnel to handle the food preparation.

I do like your point about the "political issues." You've basically made the entire point of my dissertation, that the gastronomy for morale calculus is determined to a greater degree by the larger societal-cultural needs than the morale needs of the troops.

Ken White wrote:

Do not take umbrage but allow me to point out that your son is not a relatively mature 18 or 19 year old who volunteered to do a particular for remuneration. That guy volunteered to do a job that he thought he would like or at least tolerate for some reason.

If that relatively mature 18 or 19 year old had learned the lesson earlier in life, that might not be the attitude. The point of childhood is to develop the skills and tools that will be necessary and useful for adult life.

And I did not inadvertently -- or otherwise -- "malign" anyone. You all provided a set of facts regarding the average combat arms soldier. I drew a conclusion from those facts -- perhaps a harsh one, but certainly a defensible one. It may not be anything anyone wants to hear or contemplate, but I can't help that. If you want to change the facts that you assert, then I can arrive at a different conclusion. But if you provided that set of descriptors about a generic individual or group, I doubt anyone would come to a different conclusion. Let's not allow our thinking to be clouded by a false loyalty.

For the record, I am just this harsh with my husband whenever he starts complaining when he shouldn't be. I'm blunt. Live with it. Learn to love it. I have no doubt it will prove valuable one day.

===

As to my use of the Marine officer as an example... I am aware that the Marine Corps and the Army are different institutions and comparisons are made at one's peril. I was not comparing the institutions, I was comparing attributes of individuals. As such, I do think that if it's possible to achieve such an end with Marine Corps officers, there is certainly room to consider that it's possible to achieve the same thing with enlisted soldiers.

As to how the A/B billet rotation works, I was not intending my idea to be an exact copy of how the Marine Corps runs it, but rather was suggesting a model from which to build a similar system with different specifics and ends.

Finally, please remember that I did suggest that such a program would best work with new enlistees.

Regards,
Jill

Schmedlap

06-24-2008, 03:15 PM

As to the MRE point, it should be remembered that the MRE is not formulated for long-term consumption. It's a stop gap, it's a means to provide interim caloric and basic nutritive needs, but it is not an answer to the subsistence needs.
In OIF I, we ate nothing but MREs, T-rations, and occasionally some food from local restaurants in Baghdad. In 12 months, during OIF III, at least 90% of my meals were MREs. The rest were a mix of T-rations (either mystery meat or General Tso's chicken) and an occasional brown-lettuce salad or a piece of rotten fruit. It was completely random in OIF V - MREs, occasional DFAC meal, eating with locals, etc.

On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group. How we eat is as important as what we eat.
We lived in pretty tight confines, so eating indoors did not push anyone apart. The same was true of eating in the back of a Bradley in the field - very tight confines. I suspect that the same is true on a FOB. Soldiers are going to eat their MRE in an air-conditioned hut or huddle together to take up refuge from the sun in whatever shade exists. The only time that I recall MRE consumption to be a solitary event was in Ranger School, when you moved toward the center of the patrol base to devour your meal while your buddy pulled security.

Steve Blair

06-24-2008, 03:26 PM

As to the MRE point, it should be remembered that the MRE is not formulated for long-term consumption. It's a stop gap, it's a means to provide interim caloric and basic nutritive needs, but it is not an answer to the subsistence needs. On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group. How we eat is as important as what we eat. (I am a believer in the small intangibles in the military effectiveness equation.)

Eating has always been a pretty social activity in the field army, going back quite a ways and no matter the type of rations. Old Army accounts stress small units (sets of four, platoons, squads) sharing food and cooking gear in the field. The transition to C-rats didn't change this dynamic much. If the tactical situation allowed the troops to get together to eat, they seem to have done so with great regularity. Ken and others could speak to actual field conditions in Vietnam, but most accounts I've read stress the "C-rat chef" in just about every small unit and the pooling of rations to make better (or at least more varied) meals out of the rations. This also tended to make units eat at more or less the same time (as allowed by the tactical situation). I'm not sure that this is necessarily recreated at the mess hall unless units march there in formation and eat in a similar manner. Again, based on anecdotal accounts (and plenty of civilian experience at campus dining facilities, which in some ways are mess halls....:)), an open mess tended to allow people to go in small groups based on friendship and not necessarily unit organization. You'd also get those who preferred to eat on their own and thus avoided the whole mess hall "experience."

But, as with most things like this, YMMV.

Sargent

06-24-2008, 03:34 PM

We lived in pretty tight confines, so eating indoors did not push anyone apart. The same was true of eating in the back of a Bradley in the field - very tight confines. I suspect that the same is true on a FOB. Soldiers are going to eat their MRE in an air-conditioned hut or huddle together to take up refuge from the sun in whatever shade exists. The only time that I recall MRE consumption to be a solitary event was in Ranger School, when you moved toward the center of the patrol base to devour your meal while your buddy pulled security.

Other people have noticed different effects in field exercises and deployments -- especially when compared with other feeding models (hot chow/tray rats).

Again, I suggested that "one could be concerned..." with the second and third order ramifications of how things are done. Perhaps it didn't happen in your case. In has happened in others. It is something to consider, something to keep in mind, a possible tool to keep in one's kit -- that is, using how you feed to affect the demeanor of a unit. Furthermore it's not a one way proposition -- bringing people together is not always the objective, it may also useful to consider how to give people a chance to separate and go their own ways. It could be the one flap of that mythical butterfly's wing....

Finally, that you ate MREs for a long period does not mean that this was how they were meant to be used or that they were, in fact, suitable to that usage.

Regards,
Jill

Ken White

06-24-2008, 03:43 PM

...On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group...Not generally correct. Sometimes providing security or other requirements can do that but a unit eating MREs is more inclined to grouping and cohesion than one using a mess hall where multiple units tend to intermingle and table size tends to disrupt cohesion.

Added Comment:
Finally, that you ate MREs for a long period does not mean that this was how they were meant to be used or that they were, in fact, suitable to that usage.Reality again intrudes. You are correct in what you say is the goal. The same was true of the old C Ration. However, most line units as opposed to CS and CSS units frequently exist or existed on one or the other for weeks at a time with only rare hot meals. IIRC, my record was 27 days without a hot meal and that was in the Corps. My Army max was about two weeks plus or minus a day or two. What should be and what is often differ...

Back to our regularly scheduled program:
I do like your point about the "political issues." You've basically made the entire point of my dissertation, that the gastronomy for morale calculus is determined to a greater degree by the larger societal-cultural needs than the morale needs of the troops.I believe that's called reality? Having spent many days in the field in both the Marines and the Army when there were plenty of uniformed cooks; the lobster in the rear and the societal-cultural needs were a fact of life in Korea and elsewhere. "Suck it up" is not a new phrase (though it used to be "take two salt tablets..." ;) ).
If that relatively mature 18 or 19 year old had learned the lesson earlier in life, that might not be the attitude. The point of childhood is to develop the skills and tools that will be necessary and useful for adult life.Totally true. Every Mom is not a Jill and every Dad is not a Ken :wry:. The system has to live with what is, not with what we both agree should be.
And I did not inadvertently -- or otherwise -- "malign" anyone. You all provided a set of facts regarding the average combat arms soldier. I drew a conclusion from those facts -- perhaps a harsh one, but certainly a defensible one. It may not be anything anyone wants to hear or contemplate, but I can't help that. If you want to change the facts that you assert, then I can arrive at a different conclusion. But if you provided that set of descriptors about a generic individual or group, I doubt anyone would come to a different conclusion. Let's not allow our thinking to be clouded by a false loyalty.No false loyalty to it, simply a question of knowing and understanding the demographic versus forming a conclusion about it based on the written word in a less than perfect communications venue. I would suggest you are judging a quite large group of people with little understanding of their motivation and rationale based on your perception of what should be as opposed to their knowledge of what is in the environment under discussion. I do not believe it's as simple as you would like.
For the record, I am just this harsh with my husband whenever he starts complaining when he shouldn't be. I'm blunt. Live with it. Learn to love it. I have no doubt it will prove valuable one day.Blunt is good, got no problem with it at all. I didn't perceive your comment as harsh, idealistic, yes -- but not harsh. Many accuse me of being excessively frank, outspoken, opinionated and so forth; probably correctly and this is a forum that lends itself to misunderstanding -- so, IMO, blunt is good.

However, I'd point out that you were the one complaining, not the rest of us -- we merely suggested a couple of counterpoints to your observations based on our experience that contravene or question your conclusions and a few of us asked for a realistic as opposed to an idealistic solution to the problems.

Said problems being, simply (1) From where do we obtain the numbers of people required to do this considering (2) it's a volunteer force and not enough young people want to be cooks and (3) many -- not all -- who do join for combat jobs are quite unwilling to do logistic, maintenance, custodial and kitchen work. That may be sociologically and militarily undesirable but it is reality and will remain so short of an existential war and a draft.

Uboat509

06-24-2008, 06:25 PM

It would take a lot more explanation than is feasible here, but I think the biggest problem is the lack of balance. FOBs with steak and lobster and five flavors of ice cream contrasted with small units outside the FOB with very little is not a particularly good set up. If I were in charge of logistics, I would start with the pointy end and work my way back -- nobody gets steak and lobster until everyone can get a decent meal. For the guys at the very edge of that pointy end, the best answer is for military personnel to handle the food preparation.

The issue is not that someone has made a decision to feed to feed the CSS guys before the CA guys. It is a matter space and facilities. The big dining facilities are on the FOBs because that is where there is space and facilities to put them. That also happens to be where the majority of the CSS guys are. Ergo, they get the good dining facilities. Those same FOBs have at least some CA guys and they eat at those same facilities. Many of the CA guys are not on the FOBs now, however. They are at smaller posts such as combat outposts and the like. Small posts like that have neither the room nor facilities for dining facilities. Often they barely have room for the troops that they house. That is just the reality.

And I did not inadvertently -- or otherwise -- "malign" anyone. You all provided a set of facts regarding the average combat arms soldier. I drew a conclusion from those facts -- perhaps a harsh one, but certainly a defensible one. It may not be anything anyone wants to hear or contemplate, but I can't help that. If you want to change the facts that you assert, then I can arrive at a different conclusion. But if you provided that set of descriptors about a generic individual or group, I doubt anyone would come to a different conclusion. Let's not allow our thinking to be clouded by a false loyalty.

I disagree completely. I think that you have drawn the conclusions that best fit your idea of how things should be. Comparing men who have voluntarily chosen to do the most demanding a dangerous jobs there are to petulant children is not "blunt," it's insulting.

As to my use of the Marine officer as an example... I am aware that the Marine Corps and the Army are different institutions and comparisons are made at one's peril. I was not comparing the institutions, I was comparing attributes of individuals. As such, I do think that if it's possible to achieve such an end with Marine Corps officers, there is certainly room to consider that it's possible to achieve the same thing with enlisted soldiers.

As to how the A/B billet rotation works, I was not intending my idea to be an exact copy of how the Marine Corps runs it, but rather was suggesting a model from which to build a similar system with different specifics and ends.

I would also point out that you can't really make these kinds of comparisons between officers and enlisteds. Officers in the Army do similar rotations called branch detailing. That does not work for enlisted. As ken stated, officers are generalists. They are concerned with the employment of the unit as a whole. It is the enlisted who work the many parts that make up the whole that the Officers employ. I doubt very much that Marine Corps CSS units are staffed with 0300s on two year rotations. They are staffed with the guys who's career has been spent in that MOS. Just like the Army, or virtually any organization for that matter. Take the auto industry for example. You can take the manager for the welders and make him the manager for the electronics section and there will be a short adjustment period but he will pick it up fairly quickly. Management is management, to a degree. On the other hand, you are not going to take a a trained welder and throw him into the electronics section. He will have to be completely retrained, as will his replacement in the welding section, and he may have neither the interest nor aptitude for the job. This is an imperfect comparison but I think it illustrates the point well enough.

SFC W

Sargent

06-24-2008, 07:44 PM

I disagree completely. I think that you have drawn the conclusions that best fit your idea of how things should be. Comparing men who have voluntarily chosen to do the most demanding a dangerous jobs there are to petulant children is not "blunt," it's insulting.

Anybody who threatens to quit a job -- even the most heroic of jobs -- if they are asked to anything that exceeds their comfort zone is vulnerable to a degree criticism. If you think that is insulting, well I can't do anything about it. Go back and read the descriptions of the soldiers offered up as evidence for why such an idea as I presented would not work -- none of them are particularly flattering. Perhaps you could share the joy and direct some of your ire at those who wrote the unflattering comments to begin with. They were, after all, the sine qua non of my conclusions.

Bottom line, "PFC Schmuckatelli will quit because he didn't sign up for that" is a bad argument against the idea, for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that it does not reflect well upon PFC Schmuckatelli -- and I think this last part is important (hint -- that ought to suggest that I am not altogether keen to insult the good PFC to begin with). The bureaucratic, work specialization, and others are better. None of them are deal breakers, but they require additional thought.

Regards,
Jill

Uboat509

06-24-2008, 07:57 PM

Old Eagle

06-24-2008, 08:06 PM

OK, so how many cooks and other CSS folks you want to replace w/non-contractors does it take to sustain a force of 160k? Oh, and another 30k in OEF?

Now where do they come from?

1. Additional duty for each deployed unit. Just keep x% of your folks out of the fight to do sustainment activities. Been there, done that, and it hurt last time.

2. Find that number of folks lounging around the States on "dwell time" and send them over. Make sure you plan for a rotation cycle.

3. Replace the new BCTs coming into the force structure with CSS units. If we have held up under this PERSTEMPO so far, I'm sure we can do it for another decade or so.

4. Bring back the draft and plus up the armed forces to VN levels. Get back on a 3:1 rotation schedule.

Ken White

06-24-2008, 08:29 PM

Anybody who threatens to quit a job -- even the most heroic of jobs -- if they are asked to anything that exceeds their comfort zone is vulnerable to a degree criticism.That may be your opinion and you're certainly entitled to it. Others may not agree but that's really irrelevant in both cases. What's possibly relevant is that the issue isn't a comfort level on the part of those who want to do a particular thing, it's whether you can attract the numbers to do some things. As several stated above, we aren't doing too well at that in part because civilian industry pays better for the good stuff and not many really want to do the bad stuff.
If you think that is insulting, well I can't do anything about it. Go back and read the descriptions of the soldiers offered up as evidence for why such an idea as I presented would not work -- none of them are particularly flattering. Perhaps you could share the joy and direct some of your ire at those who wrote the unflattering comments to begin with. They were, after all, the sine qua non of my conclusions.Unflattering? Unappealing to you perhaps but not necessarily unflattering, it's simply reality. Personally, I see nothing wrong in a person wanting to hew to a particular line of work -- because that's what's at issue. You see it as being a Marine -- he may see it as being a Grunt, period. I don't think either of you are wrong but you do have different perspectives and unlike you, he has to live with his.
Bottom line, "PFC Schmuckatelli will quit because he didn't sign up for that" is a bad argument against the idea, for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that it does not reflect well upon PFC Schmuckatelli -- and I think this last part is important (hint -- that ought to suggest that I am not altogether keen to insult the good PFC to begin with).Schmuckatelli will not quit -- he signed a contract and will do what he's told until his enlistment is up. The issue is not that, it's whether he will reenlist or not if you do that to him. You say he should or it will not reflect well on him. Frankly, I don't think he gives a hoot what others think. He's got to live with himself and by the time he comes up for reenlistment, he's old enough to have figured out that the opinions of others merit some consideration but cannot -- should not -- be a determinant for what he does.

There are a lot of combat arms NCOs in both the Marines and the Army who are perfectly capable of getting a commission -- and they opt not to do so simply because they know they'd have to 'generalists' and do desk things (and social things, for some... :D ) -- and they'd really rather not. As mentioned above, many CSS guys get reclassified to the combat arms when numbers get tight, most adapt pretty well to that switch but that is not true in reverse. My guess is that a healthy majority of combat arms guys would not reenlist if they were to be reclassified or had to serve in CSS positions. I would not have and as a Navy junior, I got a reasonably good grounding in responsibilities and duties. People are different...

None of which addresses the real issues -- raw numbers of persons available and the number who will enlist to do the CS/CSS jobs.

selil

06-24-2008, 09:00 PM

Tell a cop that he has to spend two years stocking the shelves at Safeway or a firefighter that he has to spend two years as a frycook and you are going to get the same answer.

Most California sheriffs offices required patrol to do 2 years in the jail before going to the street and then 1 year in five after that in the jail. Of course that was the late 80s early 90s.

Sargent

06-24-2008, 09:09 PM

Tell a cop that he has to spend two years stocking the shelves at Safeway or a firefighter that he has to spend two years as a frycook and you are going to get the same answer. For that matter, tell the average stockboy at that Safeway that he has to risk his life to spend two years arresting criminals or a frycook that he has to risk his life putting out fires and you will get a similar answer. Few people are suited to the types of jobs that CA entails and fewer still are willing to do them. I hardly think that it is unreasonable for those individuals to expect to be allowed to do those jobs. I would take a guy who wants to to the job over a guy who has been forced to do the job. This is precisely why the draft is a non-starter.

SFC W

The better comparison is to how firefighters live while on duty: during that time they all take turns at the stove and the sink. None of them quit because that is part of their jobs and lives. In fact, as far as I can tell, they quite enjoy it -- it builds camaraderie amongst the personnel, they know the importance of a good meal, etc.

I might also point out that, until recently, such self-support was the norm in the army. Troops arranged themselves in messes, were given food, and prepared it themselves. Again, from what I've read, most enjoyed this setup.

The fact of the matter is that even for the trigger puller at the pointiest end today, most time is not spent engaged in combat. Most of the time is spent in a variety of tasks that are akin to housekeeping duties -- ie, not things for which anyone signed on the dotted line.

Finally, if folks enlisted knowing that this was the set-up, their expectations would not be a problem.

Regards,
Jill

Uboat509

06-24-2008, 09:32 PM

Cavguy

06-25-2008, 02:40 AM

The better comparison is to how firefighters live while on duty: during that time they all take turns at the stove and the sink. None of them quit because that is part of their jobs and lives. In fact, as far as I can tell, they quite enjoy it -- it builds camaraderie amongst the personnel, they know the importance of a good meal, etc.

I might also point out that, until recently, such self-support was the norm in the army. Troops arranged themselves in messes, were given food, and prepared it themselves. Again, from what I've read, most enjoyed this setup.

The fact of the matter is that even for the trigger puller at the pointiest end today, most time is not spent engaged in combat. Most of the time is spent in a variety of tasks that are akin to housekeeping duties -- ie, not things for which anyone signed on the dotted line.

Finally, if folks enlisted knowing that this was the set-up, their expectations would not be a problem.

Regards,
Jill

Jill, lots of respect for you and your husband.

Most Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and engineer guys have zero desire to become CSS types.

Where you get the idea that combat guys helped in the mess is beyond me - KP was eliminated in the AVF by 73, and as Uboat said, we have had specialized cook sections since (and during) WW II.

Sometimes junior combat arms guys are detailed to BN support platoons, where they often work in the fuel/ammo resupply platoon under soldiers who have that MOS. Their PL is usually a combat arms type as well, though that is changing in the modular units. Often each staff section has combat arms augmentees, such as the S1 (personnel) and S4 (supply) sections to round out the supply types.

Officers and NCO's in the army do get "B" type billets, we just don't call it that. Post command, a CPT may work as an observer/controller, reserve component trainer, ROTC instructor, recruiter, branch school instructor, trainer/mentor, senior staff (generating force), or a host of other options.

Most E5's and above get an assignment in the training base as instructors or as recruiters at some point. Most E7's wind up in RC training, garrison staffs, senior instructors, drill sergeants, observer/controllers etc. after their PSG time. It works because in each they apply their combat lessons in the generating force.

Officers also rotate through staff assignments between troop duty - I was a BN S1, AS3, and S4, and BCT asst S3 (twice). Now I have my "B" job here at Leavenworth in the COIN center, applying my 29 months of OIF time to better the army.

I don't see what is to be gained by making combat guys pull KP, wash laundry, or any other service that outweighs the above. Ken and Uboat are also right - some jobs (like being a NCO cook - really a DFAC manager) are actually highly trained specialties. A good mess daddy is a true treasure, and I wouldn't want it any other way. I had additional duty as the Food Service Officer for awhile, and it's eye opening how complex it can be. Same with most other support MOS's.

The fact that we use contractors is a value decision that we can contract our short term need for lots of food service in Iraq, and don't need it in garrison. as I explained to SFC Hoh in another thread - it can be long term cheaper for the military.

Regarding your complaints about the fobbits getting steak and lobster and the guys in the COP's not, that's just whining. I venture I've spent as much time in COP's or remote locations as anyone else, and it's just the nature of the beast. You can't mermite lobster to COP's because it becomes unsafe in the 4-6 hours between it being cooked and delivered via LOGPAC to the field. We usually got steak though. The selection was much more limited than on the FOB, but hey, what do you expect? My guys did enjoy their platoon rotation back to the fob for maintenance/rearm/refit, where they enjoyed the bounty provided for about 48h every two weeks.

My company got 1 hot daily during OIF 05-07 in our COP, occasionally two, brought out by my 1SG and HQ det daily. Guys on the FOB got 3x hots a day. Lots of people here can talk about the M-M-M and M-M-A from OIF1. I know of no one who would prefer to do that again. (WOW! General Tso chicken! for breakfast!)

You seem to be deginerating the army guys as whiners, but you're doing just that regarding your perceptions from your husband. You seem to percieve injustice or poor leadership because CSS types live better than the line dogs. That's just reality, and all combat arms soldiers know it. We also may bitch about it occasionally, but I haven't met a motivated combat arms soldier who would trade it for the steak and lobster life. In fact, my soldiers during their rotations back generally got off the FOB whenever possible, and back to the COP where the tip of the spear stuff was done. The only time they complained was when they heard someone on the fob complain about some luxury not being available. Generally, most FOB soldiers know they have it well, and don't speak such things around those not living there. (Could bring a beating!)

I also served in MNF-W under I and II MEF during the latter half of my last OIF rotation, and the MLG guys had it good while the regimental guys and TT's out in sector lived spartan. It's simply the fact of life in the military, and not only in the army. I really don't see what is gained by your proposal, and strongly disagree that it's unique to the army.

Niel

Schmedlap

06-25-2008, 04:15 AM

Just a few points...

- My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

- Leaders can handle cohesion in their own way. We don't need a designated time, place, or manner of feeding. Using that justification for revamping some aspect of our CSS makes no sense to me. Sounds like a rationalization for a conclusion already reached.

- While I agree with the comments about Soldiers likely opting to ETS if tasked with being a cook instead of an infantryman, I think it is more important to point out that it would simply be a bad idea, regardless of how enthusiastic Soldiers are about it. Specialization of skills helps to make us more effective. Every nervous system has a certain threshold of tasks that it can be trained to perform well in a given period of time. We've already got enough training requirements and time constraints. Adding in a duty completely unrelated to the skills or knowledge of a combat arms Soldier for a significant period of time does more harm than good. I have never heard a Commander or First Sergeant object to a tasking on account of morale. It was always due to it depriving the Soldier of training or depriving the unit of his exertions. It is tough enough to develop our future leaders. Swapping out a rifle for a ladle doesn't help - especially if it is for a year or more.

Sargent

06-25-2008, 01:39 PM

And CA guys also do that, but there is world of difference between picking up some unpleasant duties at the unit level and moving to to a place where you ONLY do those duties.

Well, the model need not be so absolute. Furthermore, returning to such a way of doing things might argue for a lighter logistical footprint that did not require a level of work such as you described. Maybe you could make it part of a rotation out of the line for some period, to give a unit a rest while they do some easy work for a while. Since it's obvious that the troops can live on well less than what is found on the average FOB, such a reduction ought not be a problem.

"- Live among the people. You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents."

One might also infer from this that the FOB-centric model is not going to work for a significant portion of the deployed population. Thus, a change is going to have to come in CSS.

How recent are you talking? Units have had sepparate mess sections at least since the '40s. In any case that does not solve the problem of all the other support activites that CSS takes care of.

Well, I'm an historian -- "recently" is last century, especially when there's several thousand years of military history against which the comparison is being made. Many of my colleagues call me a "wonk," because I do 20th century history. So I apologize for the confusion -- you and I just have a way different sense of time.

True. Many of them would simply not enlist.

You can be as inclusive or exclusive as you wish to be in defining the infantryman's job. And throughout history, how that was done never really stopped men from joining the armies of the world. The Roman Legions dug ditches and build roadways when they weren't fighting. You might get a slightly different enlistment mix. That may be a good thing right now -- I could imagine that an enlistment profile that included a degree of increase in interest in such matters might be useful in COIN.

Furthermore, this is what we are asking the Iraqis to do -- all the CSS comes out the battalions. It seems like we are making a pretty significant mistake in not providing a working model for how the job gets done. The IA can't just throw money at the problems. I would say we could make a lot of headway getting the IA on track with American units showing them how to do such things by example. Imagine that, the entirety of the American military in Iraq as a giant, CSS MTT.

Cavguy wrote:

Jill, lots of respect for you and your husband.

Gee, nobody ever complimented me for doing my doctorate.

Regarding your complaints about the fobbits getting steak and lobster and the guys in the COP's not, that's just whining. I venture I've spent as much time in COP's or remote locations as anyone else, and it's just the nature of the beast. You can't mermite lobster to COP's because it becomes unsafe in the 4-6 hours between it being cooked and delivered via LOGPAC to the field. We usually got steak though. The selection was much more limited than on the FOB, but hey, what do you expect? My guys did enjoy their platoon rotation back to the fob for maintenance/rearm/refit, where they enjoyed the bounty provided for about 48h every two weeks.

I am not so concerned about complaints -- although, given the history of attitudes towards REMFs, it's not something that ought to be dismissed too easily. What I am wondering about is simply best exemplified by the insanity of having steak and lobster on the FOBS when you don't have a decent system for those outside the wire. It is a very wierd set of priorities. When you hear from a defense consultant that the bounty on a FOB is excessive, you really have to wonder at what is going on.

I am also concerned at the costs and resource usage of our logistics tail. For how much longer will we be able to be profligate in the use of fuel to truck all of this stuff around? Or how about all of the generators that are running? Something is going to have to give soon, because we won't be able to afford this much longer -- just as Vietnam had to end because we couldn't sustain the dollar outflows anymore. This, though, could be a much bigger shift -- it won't just end a war, it will force a change in the way we do everything.

Look, here's the point -- I look at the contractor/cs/css issue, and for a variety of reasons I see a problem. If I haven't hit the nail on the head with a solution, well, forgive me, this isn't my day job. I may be wrong about the solution, but I don't think I'm wrong about the problem.

Schmedlap wrote:

My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

I could read this and say that the problem is that the contractor system is not meeting the needs and the units are not really well-prepared to deal with it. I would venture to say that such episodes will become more frequent and more ridiculous. Again, I may not have hit upon the right solution, but I think the problem is there. You can fight with me over tactics, but that doesn't change the strategic situation.

Leaders can handle cohesion in their own way. We don't need a designated time, place, or manner of feeding. Using that justification for revamping some aspect of our CSS makes no sense to me. Sounds like a rationalization for a conclusion already reached.

I've never heard of a great leader tossing a tool out of his kit. Most that I've read about and met will use anything at their disposal, will disdain very little that might give them an edge.

Consider that the most frequently offered advice on building a better family and enhancing relations between members is to sit down together for dinner. What is a small unit if not a family of sorts?

And if you think it too minor an issue to bother with, I would counter with the wisdom of Earl Wavell and others, who have argued that the daily, mundane things in the life of a soldier -- the "actualities" of the soldier's experience -- are important and should be studied. It's why I settled on the subject, because I had never read a memoir or work on the experience of war that did not discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly of food-related experiences. They gave me the idea that this was important, they pointed out what was valuable and why, and what were huge, terrible mistakes.

If you wonder why I have such a bee in my bonnet over the contractor issue, blame General Washington -- his appointment of one of his best combatant commanders, Nathanael Greene, to the position of QM, and the two hundred years of subsequent history that followed his example, is the reason I question the current system. Greene didn't like the new job -- and he made Washington promise that after a year he could get back into the fight -- but he knew the importance to the war effort of what was being asked of him.

Regards,
Jill

Steve Blair

06-25-2008, 02:29 PM

Actually the push for designated cooks began in the US Army in the mid-1800s (if not sooner)...mainly to improve the quality of food and cut down on wastage (as the position used to be rotated among men in a company and as a result quality was uneven at best). It's also worth remembering that one of the most frequently identified reasons for desertion in the Old Army was the number of construction and other work details piled on the troops. Many said they joined to be soldiers, not to build forts or dig ditches. Officers at the time complained loud and long about this, to no result.

Food is, of course, important. I'm surprised no one mentioned Napoleon's maxim about armies marching on their stomachs...:D At the combat small unit level, units do tend to eat together (unless they have serious internal problems), and those patterns have never shown many changes. Likewise, soldiers will always complain about the food. It's in the contract somewhere....:D

Cavguy

06-25-2008, 02:39 PM

Well, I'm an historian -- "recently" is last century, especially when there's several thousand years of military history against which the comparison is being made. Many of my colleagues call me a "wonk," because I do 20th century history. So I apologize for the confusion -- you and I just have a way different sense of time.

You can be as inclusive or exclusive as you wish to be in defining the infantryman's job. And throughout history, how that was done never really stopped men from joining the armies of the world. The Roman Legions dug ditches and build roadways when they weren't fighting. You might get a slightly different enlistment mix. That may be a good thing right now -- I could imagine that an enlistment profile that included a degree of increase in interest in such matters might be useful in COIN.

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

Gee, nobody ever complimented me for doing my doctorate.

There's a saying - being a military spouse is the hardest job in the Army (Corps). Somwehat exaggerated, but certainly some major truth.

What I am wondering about is simply best exemplified by the insanity of having steak and lobster on the FOBS when you don't have a decent system for those outside the wire.

Here we disagree. There is a difference between "luxury" and "decent system". We had a decent system in both my tours. Our guys received 1-2quality hot meals, laundry service, mail, and other services daily in the COP. No one was deprived. All it took was a little effort on the part of the chain of command. If someone's not getting that, it's not a logistics/fairness issue, but a leadership issue. We got everything except for the shellfish that the guys on the FOB did.

And the steak and lobster is exaggerated, it happens once every few weeks.

It is a very wierd set of priorities. When you hear from a defense consultant that the bounty on a FOB is excessive, you really have to wonder at what is going on.

Depends on excessive. Yes, there was some amount of overboard. That said, why live badly if you don't have to? I will also say the "bounty" is greatly appreciated by guys rotating off the line.

I am also concerned at the costs and resource usage of our logistics tail. For how much longer will we be able to be profligate in the use of fuel to truck all of this stuff around? Or how about all of the generators that are running? Something is going to have to give soon, because we won't be able to afford this much longer -- just as Vietnam had to end because we couldn't sustain the dollar outflows anymore. This, though, could be a much bigger shift -- it won't just end a war, it will force a change in the way we do everything.

Separate argument. One can argue the main argument FOR the FCS system is that it will reduce the supply tail requirements immensely - common parts, smaller crews, better engines, and more reliability all will significantly reduce logistics tail if they work as advertised (different thread).

Look, here's the point -- I look at the contractor/cs/css issue, and for a variety of reasons I see a problem. If I haven't hit the nail on the head with a solution, well, forgive me, this isn't my day job. I may be wrong about the solution, but I don't think I'm wrong about the problem.

It's also valid to point out an MCO war in the modern era cannot last beyond a few weeks/months - no one quite simply has a war-sustainable industrial base capable of supplying the munitions and equipment a la WW II, or the density of equipment. Therefore, the Army has assessed it only needs organic food support to sustain a 45-60 day war, and anything longer gets contracted. Almost all army "Class A" field rats are now "heat and serve" and not made from scratch, and the MRE is a constant process improvement.

One can argue no one (organizationally) thought Iraq would last this long, and recruiting extra CSS to support what were envisioned as short term demands would carry higher cost than contracting someone to do it.

Consider that the most frequently offered advice on building a better family and enhancing relations between members is to sit down together for dinner. What is a small unit if not a family of sorts?

Units do eat together at the team/squad level often. Especially in a COP. You also seem to assume that there's a lack of bonding going on - trust me, the main thing soldiers desire is often a little privacy from their unit for awhile. However, operations are ongoing 24/7, so an imagined BN mess all happily passing the gravy is a little dream-worldish.

And if you think it too minor an issue to bother with, I would counter with the wisdom of Earl Wavell and others, who have argued that the daily, mundane things in the life of a soldier -- the "actualities" of the soldier's experience -- are important and should be studied. It's why I settled on the subject, because I had never read a memoir or work on the experience of war that did not discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly of food-related experiences. They gave me the idea that this was important, they pointed out what was valuable and why, and what were huge, terrible mistakes.

Food is certainly not a minor issue - I could argue it's one of the most key components of morale. That's why I don't agree with your assessment of the problem or the solution - ensuring the guys get the best quaility of food possible in adquate amounts immensely contributes to morale. Nothing saps a deployment worse than constantly eating bad food. I never (organizationally) ate better than I ate while deployed to Kosovo in 2000-2001. Better than most all inclusive resorts. I know it significantly impacted my perceptions of the deployment, and made it much more bearable (back when I thought six months was a long deployment). Having high quality food is a morale multiplier. I wouldn't want to go to Army A's.

If you wonder why I have such a bee in my bonnet over the contractor issue, blame General Washington -- his appointment of one of his best combatant commanders, Nathanael Greene, to the position of QM, and the two hundred years of subsequent history that followed his example, is the reason I question the current system. Greene didn't like the new job -- and he made Washington promise that after a year he could get back into the fight -- but he knew the importance to the war effort of what was being asked of him.

I'm confused why you don't think we have the same ethos today - assigning a combat general to oversee a problem area just happened - look at Walter Reed. They took BG Tucker (a tanker) and made him DCO of WR to clean up the mess, which he did. Now he's headed back to the force that the WTU's and other reforms are underway. Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

selil

06-25-2008, 03:00 PM

Sargent, what ever you do.... DO NOT GIVE UP....

Sargent

06-25-2008, 03:02 PM

Steve Blair wrote:

Likewise, soldiers will always complain about the food. It's in the contract somewhere....

Oh, but they don't always complain -- there is probably more about what they thought was good, valuable, what made a difference at just the right point. Paul Boesch opened his memoir of fighting in the Huertgen Forest with a description of an artillery barrage so intense that the author felt “as if Satan himself urged the gunners on,” and then recalled the following: “From a dirty pocket I pulled a package of Charms, the fruit-flavored candy drops that came with some of our rations. Very slowly and deliberately I unwrapped one and popped it into my mouth – it tasted good.”

I've spent a lot of time thinking about those three little words, "it tasted good." Perhaps more than a normal person ought to, but that is the nature of the dissertation. But if you imagine that war itself is an assault on the senses, then it doesn't seem quite so strange to contemplate the meaning of a positive sensory experience amidst all that.

Jill

Ken White

06-25-2008, 03:26 PM

Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.I think that's what several of us tried to say albeit less eloquently.

Interesting that you mention Nathaniel Greene who was indeed one of Washington's better Generals. I could say that his most successful battle at Guilford Court House was that simply because he copied another of Washington's best generals, Daniel Morgan's (arguably an even better General...) earlier and even more successful tactic at Cowpens. The interesting fact about both battles is that the Generals knew and understood the strengths and weaknesses of their various troops. I think there's a strong message in that...

I'm not a Historian but I am a student of war and an avid reader. History can teach us much, no question but one must be careful of the message one absorbs. One thing stands out over the millenia IMO. It's notable that all the good Generals understood the strengths and weaknesses of their troops and planned accordingly. They also were willing to adapt to the mores and technology of the time.

While there will always be occasional aberrations like the picture below, essentially, the use of the horse in warfare is sorta passé.

http://www.geocities.com/futuretanks/sfhorsesoldier.jpg

I'd be willing to bet big bucks that the guy shown would rebel at being told he had to go turn wrenches in the motor pool.

So, lacking a major war and a draft, is a heavy troop based CSS effort passé. All things considered, that's a good thing because the number of people who want to join the Armed Forces to do that is small and declining. Yes, some changes need to be made in the process -- and some are working; Armies change slowly -- but regression is not a good idea.

Nor is it beneficial. Getting elephants through the Alps today would arouse the Environmentalists... :D

selil

06-25-2008, 03:27 PM

Old Eagle

06-25-2008, 03:42 PM

I think that you, s a historian, would have a difficult time substantiating that the end of the Vietnam War was due to an "outflow of dollars".

It also appears to me that you have developed your conclusion and are now looking for data to support it.

Steve Blair

06-25-2008, 03:42 PM

Steve Blair wrote:

Oh, but they don't always complain -- there is probably more about what they thought was good, valuable, what made a difference at just the right point. Paul Boesch opened his memoir of fighting in the Huertgen Forest with a description of an artillery barrage so intense that the author felt “as if Satan himself urged the gunners on,” and then recalled the following: “From a dirty pocket I pulled a package of Charms, the fruit-flavored candy drops that came with some of our rations. Very slowly and deliberately I unwrapped one and popped it into my mouth – it tasted good.”

I've spent a lot of time thinking about those three little words, "it tasted good." Perhaps more than a normal person ought to, but that is the nature of the dissertation. But if you imagine that war itself is an assault on the senses, then it doesn't seem quite so strange to contemplate the meaning of a positive sensory experience amidst all that.

Jill

Of course they don't always complain. But if you look back on it, complaining about the food during quiet times has always been an honored passtime.

Perhaps I should explain something...I don't have ANY problem with having soldiers as cooks. Far from it. I think it's a good idea, especially when the cooks are linked to specific units. There used to be a time-honored tradition (or at least a good myth that had more than a small shade of truth to it) about the field kitchens looking after "their boys." Good for morale. Always has been. Problems usually started when the cooking duties were rotated or (as happened in some cases) when they were neglected or contracted out by default (as in local businessmen and women filling in with "pies and delicacies" that they sold for a nice profit when the rationing systems broke down).

Sam, the debate about soldiers being soldiers or laborers has been around in this country for some time. I have to admit I'm mixed on it in some ways. There are certainly functions that SHOULD be performed by soldiers (base guards, critical projects, bunker construction), but there are others that may be better contracted out. Have we gone too far with the contracting? Yes. I really think we have. Vietnam and the standard of living that was considered necessary in the rear areas (although not always in the field...or in all areas of Vietnam) accelerated this trend, along with other organizational changes.

You're quite right to bring up the festering backlash this could all cause. Especially when you have people working 2-3 jobs just to feed their families and keep a roof over their heads. The last thing they want to hear are stories about lobster and steak (that they feel they're paying for) in a combat zone. I actually think that the lack of understanding on the part of many about the actual military has kept a lid on some of this, along with the things you mentioned. How long that lid will stay on is anyone's guess.

Ken White

06-25-2008, 03:49 PM

Actually I strongly disagree with this Cavguy. The human being has not substantially changed and whether we use Maslow or others the basic requirements for the care and feeding of the soldier have not changed. The accessories may have changed (ipods versus harmonicas) but the actual human interactions are pretty stable.And I strongly disagree with that -- in one aspect -- while you're correct that the the human hasn't changed, his or her expectations (environmentally dependent) certainly have. That affects the culture and the training as you noted.
That doesn't make the points of fixing what appears to be a brittle logistics path any less important.I'd say that "appears" is the operative word with the caveat that the log system is a governmental function and our government has become broadly dysfunctional. Which is why this:
...the stories of lobster thermidor, and movie night in the combat zone will not play well in Peoria.is IMO not a significant problem -- Peoria has other things on its mind right now.
Associations in the story of combat played out as soldiers staying in the former palaces of Saddam eating luxurious meals and serviced by concierge services will back fire on the military.We can agree on that -- using those Palaces (and former Iraqi Army compounds) was bone stupid.
Some will get their backs all up and get pissed to the gills saying "but it's not that way". To true. But, the information and political motivations in an unpopular war that is tightly controlled feed the furnace of this firestorm. Just wait. I thought Black Water would be the one to tip the balance but it is sounding more like KBR. The USAF/Boeing KC136 tanker deal looked like it might break this open, but it didn't. Every soldier talking about FOBBITS, every story about steak, every story about contractor profiteering, paints a picture that the soldiers are complicit with the contractors using war as an excuse to live high on the hog.There is a segment of the population that will do that; they would do it no matter what. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, most will pay little attention to the majority of the things you cite -- that generally dysfunctional government thing again...
I know let the recriminations begin. I would just point out that a WaPo reporter was hanging out here looking for evidence of malfeasance about the use of funds by soldiers for rebuilding.I think that makes my point about a certain segment...
How is that for busting the echo chamber?I'll go about four on a scale of ten???? ;)

Not at all sure it's an echo chamber; maybe some disagreement on approaches -- and that's good -- and some disconnects about what was then and what is now. :D

Cavguy

06-25-2008, 04:01 PM

Selil,

You say it won't play in Peoria. I actually think it plays well.

In all my travels in the USA, I have yet to hear one US Civilian complain that a soldier deployed for 15 months in a combat zone didn't occasionally deserve a nice meal, an occasional movie, or other luxuries. In fact, people often suggest that the Army isn't doing enough. If the American people were actually sacrificing anything for this war directly the case might be different, but they're not.

Let me dispel the notion, since it comes up often. The "Lobster Thermidor" (actually which are small frozen lobser tails, often dry) soldiers are eating is a special event every few weeks. By far the norm.

It only becomes a problem IMO is the soldiers are just relaxing and not accomplishing anything, or if it is exceedingly wasteful, which it is not. This is not the case.

Ken White

06-25-2008, 04:04 PM

...Sam, the debate about soldiers being soldiers or laborers has been around in this country for some time. I have to admit I'm mixed on it in some ways. There are certainly functions that SHOULD be performed by soldiers (base guards, critical projects, bunker construction), but there are others that may be better contracted out. Have we gone too far with the contracting? Yes. I really think we have. Vietnam and the standard of living that was considered necessary in the rear areas (although not always in the field...or in all areas of Vietnam) accelerated this trend, along with other organizational changes.I'm inclined to disagree to an extent on the 'base guard' aspect (very much base type dependent) but broadly agree on the others.

The 'standard of living' in the base areas in Viet Nam is an interesting phenomenon. The Navy initially had the support responsibility in-country and did a good job without getting too luxuriously inclined. The Army took over that mission in 1966 and actually ramped down a bit. Until mid '67 and then I think two factors coincided to cause the splurge. First, someone came up with the bright idea that by building big base camps, we could help the Viet Namese economy and provide jobs. I thought that was sort of a dumb way to do that and very detrimental OpSec wise but they didn't ask me. Secondly, I think Westmoreland decided he had a no-win proposition on his hands and decided to take the best care of the Troops he could. He had flaws as a commander but he did always take care of his people.
... How long that lid will stay on is anyone's guess.Penalty of being old; seen all that before; it raises several minor media firestorms and most pay little attention to it. My guess has always been the 'wisdom of crowds' effect takes over and most people realize what's important and what isn't. Lobster may be sensational but Red Lobster has insured nationwide that it isn't exceptional.

selil

06-25-2008, 05:29 PM

In all my travels in the USA, I have yet to hear one US Civilian complain that a soldier deployed for 15 months in a combat zone didn't occasionally deserve a nice meal, an occasional movie, or other luxuries. In fact, people often suggest that the Army isn't doing enough. If the American people were actually sacrificing anything for this war directly the case might be different, but they're not.

Unfortunately that isn't how it works. There are two vectors in magnitude driving the direction of public interest at least. The first vector is the tight media control by the pentagon on reporting from OIF/OEF and the stories that are allowed to percolate beyond that control. The second vector is the choice-reporting by that national news media which drives awareness in the public.

There is a third vector which over rides the other two nearly instantly as it is a personal versus national politics. That is the current state of the individual and their economic status. As that degrades (as it has the last four years) the pain threshold will be met and things will become "different" in their perspective.

I really doubt most people are going to look any Iraq war veteran in the eye and say you suck to their face. If the awareness and perceptions are changed by the media by sensationalizing largesse of the military in Iraq they will vote and actively pursue the replacement of decision makers. Unfortunately most of the patriotic drivel engaged in by the general public stops at their wallet.

I have to disagree while agreeing with Ken though. These things do run in cycles and I am sure he can remember the 70s and what Vietnam did to the military. Tipping points in the public can be tripped by a few key key things. Graft, failure, conspiracy, entitlement, and corruption all can lead to rejection of the current path and good or bad changing the course. Regardless of the pandering of the current media the American way is to hold the do'er accountable and replace the decider.

Please don't get me wrong here. I am not advocating that this happen, or that it reflects the reality (luxurious largesse in combat). However, I am surprised to see anybody argue that reality and the media, let alone the American public, have ever let reality intrude on perception. I am especially surprised to see anybody arguing against, "in all things public", anything but perception drives politics.

Didn't say I liked it but it will have to be dealt with sooner or later.

Ken White

06-25-2008, 05:56 PM

...If the awareness and perceptions are changed by the media by sensationalizing largesse of the military in Iraq they will vote and actively pursue the replacement of decision makers. Unfortunately most of the patriotic drivel engaged in by the general public stops at their wallet.For example, I agree with that statement except for active pursuit of replacement; I think the second clause negates that; that and the "Yes but he's my SOB" mentality...
Regardless of the pandering of the current media the American way is to hold the do'er accountable and replace the decider.Agree that's the principle but our caste of permanently elected and quite venal and corrupt Senators and Representatives (the great majority, not all) says actual practice is quite different. I'd also suggest that the current American way is to punish the innocent all too often by enacting stupid laws and regulations in a futile and misguided effort to preclude recurrent wrongdoing -- and too frequently to promote the guilty to insure the Peter Principle is applied...
However, I am surprised to see anybody argue that reality and the media, let alone the American public, have ever let reality intrude on perception. I am especially surprised to see anybody arguing against, "in all things public", anything but perception drives politics.Can't speak for others but that's not at all what I'm saying. Perception does drive the train -- but the wisdom of crowds keeps it from going too fast and frequently overrides the perceptions of some. Your wallet interest also intrudes though not totally, a lot of folks will vote against their economic interests to support a firm belief. As they should.
Didn't say I liked it but it will have to be dealt with sooner or later.Later. Much later. It's the American way... :D

Schmedlap

06-26-2008, 10:04 AM

Jill,

Earlier, I wrote this...

My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

And then you responded...

I could read this and say that the problem is that the contractor system is not meeting the needs and the units are not really well-prepared to deal with it. I would venture to say that such episodes will become more frequent and more ridiculous. Again, I may not have hit upon the right solution, but I think the problem is there. You can fight with me over tactics, but that doesn't change the strategic situation.

Your first sentence there seems to ignore almost everything written on this thread. The problem was fixed, so I am not sure what problem you referred to. We got our KP's back.

My only other guess for what problem you referred to would be that you see a problem in that we are eating lots of MREs? That's not a problem either, so it doesn't need fixing. I know that you have pointed out that MREs are not intended for long-term consumption. Perhaps the objective should be to make MREs that are intended for long-term consumption. Because the simplicity and ease of shipping MREs to a PB/COP is pretty sweet.

Sargent

06-26-2008, 12:01 PM

Steve Blair wrote:

It's also worth remembering that one of the most frequently identified reasons for desertion in the Old Army was the number of construction and other work details piled on the troops. Many said they joined to be soldiers, not to build forts or dig ditches. Officers at the time complained loud and long about this, to no result.

They also weren't be clothed, fed, or paid with any sort of reliability -- and by the 1830s, the Army had eliminated the alcohol ration. So sure, maybe the soldiers said they were quitting because of the fort building, but I'd venture to say that it was more a case of that being the straw that broke the camel's back.

When all else was equal, commanders didn't have such a hard time getting the soldiers to build forts -- offer up a few jugs of whiskey as a bounty and the job got done post haste.

Regards,
Jill

Steve Blair

06-26-2008, 12:52 PM

Steve Blair wrote: They also weren't be clothed, fed, or paid with any sort of reliability -- and by the 1830s, the Army had eliminated the alcohol ration. So sure, maybe the soldiers said they were quitting because of the fort building, but I'd venture to say that it was more a case of that being the straw that broke the camel's back.

When all else was equal, commanders didn't have such a hard time getting the soldiers to build forts -- offer up a few jugs of whiskey as a bounty and the job got done post haste.

Regards,
Jill

Sorry...but there's way too much out there to suggest that especially after the Civil War the fatigue duties had a major impact on retention. It's a concern that you see echoed constantly both in Congressional testimony at the time and in the pages of The Army and Navy Journal, which wasn't known for pulling punches. You saw a huge spike in desertions when Congress reduced base pay in about 1870, but I don't think that eliminating the whiskey ration drove many over the hill. Sutlers still sold whiskey on post (and continued to do so until the 1880s).

I'd also submit that the threat of being bucked and gagged or standing the barrel had much more to do with motivating soldiers to build posts than the possible promise of whiskey. Besides, there's a good chance that the officers themselves would have consumed the whiskey before it ever made it to the laborers. Troops would suffer a great deal if they thought there was an objective behind it (just witness the trials that anyone who served with Crook went through...), but most didn't see the point in building quarters for officers (or certainly didn't seem to).

Anyhow...we're off track now.:o

Sargent

06-26-2008, 01:14 PM

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

I didn't compare anything. I simply offered an example of an alternate model where infantrymen were expected to do more than just the infantry tasks.

However, I do agree with Selil and think you're giving short shrift to what was expected of the Roman Legions as compared to what they had.

Here we disagree. There is a difference between "luxury" and "decent system". We had a decent system in both my tours. Our guys received 1-2quality hot meals, laundry service, mail, and other services daily in the COP. No one was deprived. All it took was a little effort on the part of the chain of command. If someone's not getting that, it's not a logistics/fairness issue, but a leadership issue. We got everything except for the shellfish that the guys on the FOB did.

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

Depends on excessive. Yes, there was some amount of overboard. That said, why live badly if you don't have to? I will also say the "bounty" is greatly appreciated by guys rotating off the line.

And it should be there for the folks rotating off the line. But nobody has touched the subject of the folks for whom this is the daily experience.

Separate argument. One can argue the main argument FOR the FCS system is that it will reduce the supply tail requirements immensely - common parts, smaller crews, better engines, and more reliability all will significantly reduce logistics tail if they work as advertised (different thread).

Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

One can argue no one (organizationally) thought Iraq would last this long, and recruiting extra CSS to support what were envisioned as short term demands would carry higher cost than contracting someone to do it.

It doesn't make me feel any better to know that military planning starts from the premise that everything will work out just as we want it to. I'm sorry, I just don't have a lot of sympathy or patience for that argument. It suggests that there is a large deficit in professional competence in those running things. So, why should I feel particularly good about the ancillary decisions they've made?

On the other hand, it seems that there was always an intention to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq. So I'm not sure that I buy the argument that this was "just how it worked out when it had to be settled on the fly."

Units do eat together at the team/squad level often. Especially in a COP. You also seem to assume that there's a lack of bonding going on - trust me, the main thing soldiers desire is often a little privacy from their unit for awhile. However, operations are ongoing 24/7, so an imagined BN mess all happily passing the gravy is a little dream-worldish.

I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

Food is certainly not a minor issue - I could argue it's one of the most key components of morale. That's why I don't agree with your assessment of the problem or the solution - ensuring the guys get the best quaility of food possible in adquate amounts immensely contributes to morale. Nothing saps a deployment worse than constantly eating bad food. I never (organizationally) ate better than I ate while deployed to Kosovo in 2000-2001. Better than most all inclusive resorts. I know it significantly impacted my perceptions of the deployment, and made it much more bearable (back when I thought six months was a long deployment). Having high quality food is a morale multiplier. I wouldn't want to go to Army A's.

1. Yes, food (and dining) are important to morale -- that's the whole point of my dissertation. How it works is where it gets very interesting. I've got my President Bush Thanksgiving 2003 action figure to remind me of that.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

I'm confused why you don't think we have the same ethos today - assigning a combat general to oversee a problem area just happened - look at Walter Reed. They took BG Tucker (a tanker) and made him DCO of WR to clean up the mess, which he did. Now he's headed back to the force that the WTU's and other reforms are underway. Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

Regards,
Jill

Schmedlap

06-26-2008, 01:55 PM

This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations?

That could be a question not only about food, but just about anything in this war...
- Inflated awards (Bronze Stars for everyone!)
- Cushy accomodations (air conditioned huts with actual beds and mattresses)
- Outlandish amenities (PX, restaurants, movie theaters, KBR DFAC with Baskin Robbins sundaes made to order, etc)
- Misusing the supply system to order "nice to haves" rather than necessities (take a look at what you can order in a GSA catalog; it's insane, but many units order the stuff)
- Misappropriation (building bus stops, party patios, and saloons have become the standard uses for lumber in Iraq - lumber that we purchase and ship there at a heavy premium)
- Umpteen gazillion other examples

I just figured I'd toss that out there, in case you're looking for more research material. There is a vast, fruitful plain of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement deserving attention.

Back to the original thread, I still say that the solution is not to revamp the logistics system that delivers food. The solution is to reinvent MREs, or MRE-like meals, that are designed for long-term consumption. The delivery of MREs is highly efficient for the logistician and makes life very simple for the company level folks.

Ski

06-26-2008, 02:03 PM

I was one of those few Combat Arms officers lucky enough to become a Support Platoon Leader in an Armor Battalion. It was one of the most difficult - and rewarding- jobs I;ve had in uniform. I learnt how logistics works at the BN and BDE level, and have become a much better officer because of it.

Now - getting to the issue at hand - there are too many contractors in the military today. I agree with those that use the post-Cold War declining endstrength as a factor. The Army leadership wanted to keep the same culture associated with a large standing Army in place, so the easiest way was to hire contractors to perform certain services. Whether that was wise or not is a discussion for another time.

Where my beef comes in is that we have contractors in all theaters performing duties that should be allocated to the uniformed services. Case in point - there was a retired 06 working in the Future Ops cell in the command I was in Afghanistan - at the strategic level. Was he competent? Certainly. Would it have been better for an Army or Marine Officer to be in his position and gain the knowledge and experience required for professional development? IMO, yes indeed.

I was stunned when I deployed to Afghanistan - lobster and steak on Friday's? Jesus Christ, I ate better there than I do in CONUS. I do not expect that kind of treatment, nor do I want it. I enjoy the Spartan experience associated with military service, and the chow halls in theater were so over the top and disassociated with reality it blew my mind. Did it help morale? I suppose so at an individual level. But it became a very sore point to me travelling through certain sections of Afghanistan, and seeing people who could barely scratch out an existance, and there we were getting effing steak, crab legs and lobster every Friday. It made me ashamed to be quite frank.

Ken White

06-26-2008, 04:10 PM

'Dueling Opinons'

Because that's what it's degenerated to. On the one hand we have the Spartans, on the other the sybaritic Persians... :D

I guess I'm a Persian, I got Steak every now and then in a couple of wars; I thought it was a good idea even as I ached for the kids who later scuffled through our garbage for something edible.

For Jill: If you believe that the original intent was to remain in Iraq long term, you may want to delve into that in more depth.

For Ski: You enjoy the Spartan existence -- does every other soldier you know believe in the same standard? How would our enlistment rate look were your view to prevail?

Seems to me to be a lot of "If I were God..." and that valid points made by folks who were there are sort of overlooked. The most egregious overlooking being in the area of how (to include methods and times), even if you dispense with contractors and the troops do the CSS jobs, you are going to feed the guys outside the wire in the COPs the same meals you are able to feed in the base camps. That doesn't even get into how you're going to retain, in a volunteer force, those Fobbits and / or REMFs if you forced them to eat like the line guys.

No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that.

06-26-2008, 04:53 PM

That could be a question not only about food, but just about anything in this war...
- Inflated awards (Bronze Stars for everyone!)
- Cushy accomodations (air conditioned huts with actual beds and mattresses)
- Outlandish amenities (PX, restaurants, movie theaters, KBR DFAC with Baskin Robbins sundaes made to order, etc)
- Misusing the supply system to order "nice to haves" rather than necessities (take a look at what you can order in a GSA catalog; it's insane, but many units order the stuff)

It isn't just this war I'm afraid. In 1974, I worked in the Makiminato Service Area (MSA) on Oki, a major transhipment point for "stuff" being retrograded from Viet Nam. All the warehouses were crammed full; so, a lot of the "stuff" was stored outside. During breaks, I used to walk around and see what was in the MSA. My favorite find was a 10x10X10 (1000 cubic feet) crate from Transportation Officer, Cam Ranh Bay that was labelled "Skis, Arctic." The amount of crates full of high end office furniture (couch, leather for example), steam tables, refrigerators, ice cream makers, etc was amazing to me.

I think we recognize that being out there is tough . We try to palliate the suffering as and where we can. We probably do as much Class VI kind of stuff as we think we can afford to do for those that we can get to. Of course opinions will vary about that. But I think we need to remember what opinions are like. :wry:

Cavguy

06-26-2008, 05:34 PM

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

Can't disagree more. It's called LOGPAC. It is simply not possible (or wise) to supply a guy on the line to the same level that is possible in the rear. You can arbitrairly reduce what is available in the rear to the same level, but to what end? Also, rear areas are for refit. If you're talking about Transition Teams, they are a special case, and may be embedded far away from coalition largesse. Comes with the territory.

Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

I agree that some of the level is a bit much, and could be reduced. But I disagree that it's an argument against using contractors or that soldiers should go back to pulling KP. All that requires is a re-write of the contract as to what food is provided. There are valid arguments against contractors, but in the end they provide the food requirement that is contracted for. That's not their fault, it's DoD's.

I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

I still fail to see where you think cohesion has been impacted in the current environment by food issues. Where is the basis behind the assertion that there is a cohesion issue in the force due to either KBR chow or MRE's? Some examples so I understand where your position comes from?

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

Which is done regularly by units, at the end of field exercises and our formal occasions.

I guess I am primairly confounded as to what is driving your problem assessment and some of the assertions that have been made, along Old Eagle's comment. It seems you have an opinion and are looking for evidence that fits it.

For example:

1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals
2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.
3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.
4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this
5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS
6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.
7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

Each point can be argued, but you argue with enough vigor that I am curious to the data backing your arguments. My data comes from my experiences at varying levels in the army for 11 years.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

We have plenty of MRE and UGR-A support, especially heat and serve. So there isn't a "gap", the army has solutions. I also want to know why MRE's are sustainable long term. We ate MMM and MMA for the first five months of OIF without health or nutrition issues. When it became possible, the larger DFACS were set up. Contracting is usually cheaper than the long term costs of carrying the infrastructure. However, I haven't seen a cost/benefit data from a reliable source comparing the cost to the Army (short and long) of reestablishing its food service corps to do what contractors are doing now. I'm prepared to be persuaded on the economic cost.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

Show me how having steak and lobster on large FOB's affects mission effectiveness? Again, I'm looking for evidence (not anecdote) that combat performance or service support has been affected because of having an abundance of food. Or that having Baskin Robbins in the DFAC with the CSS creates a decrease on the performance or morale of line troops. Some complaining about REMF's, maybe, but I'm talking measurable impact. You can make an entirely reasonable argument that large FOB's are not helpful in COIN from an attitude standpoint, but that is not what is being argued.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

No real disagreement here - but soldiers adapt. In 2003, we ate crappy food over and over for months. We got over it. We liked it when KBR became available. Yay. Combat effect as long as bellies were full = zero.

It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

And that is different from my WR example how? Mostly contractors were failing their job, the military assigned to support was also failing, and the SecDef/Chief of Staff appointed a high quality combat leader to fix the issue. Also, we were creating an army from scratch then, so I think the comparison may be weak when infering the performance of KBR to the performance of the private revolutionary contractors. What I resented was the implication that our leaders are somehow not measuring up, and the constant barbs on the "quality of our leadership" as if it's some monolith. We have good and bad leaders, and I wouldn't say any of the above is representative of anything culturally relevant to the force. We have much bigger fish to fry than food sevice, IMO.

Sargent

06-26-2008, 07:36 PM

1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals

No, my point regarding MRE vs. hot chow is that the two can have very different effects the unit. Commanders should be aware of this so that they can use the two effectively to deal with the cohesion need at the moment.

As for the FOB dining system, there has historically been morale issues between the line and the rear elements, in terms of what each gets vs. what each does. Be aware of that.

2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.

In certain circumstances, yes, that is the case. See my response to 1 to why this can become a problem.

Furthermore, to the extent that contractors take care of the food, you will always have a problem supporting those who are in dangerous locations. Getting food to the guys on the front line is always going to be perilous. Who is more likely to take on that responsibility -- contractors or other soldiers/Marines?

3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.

No, that's not what I have said. I have argued that the priority should start with the line folks, with those outside the wire and work backwards. If you can only manage to get the guys in peril one hot meal a day, don't go overboard with those behind the lines.

4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this

I've never said that. There's a -- I don't know, is it adoctrinal, strategic, budgetary, personnel, philosophical, etc. -- problem, probably within DoD as a whole, with how CS/CSS is viewed. I worry that a system that served well for two centuries was discarded not for effectiveness reasons but for fiscal reasons. But I don't think we're spending much less. And if money is the problem, I think it might be better to figure out how to reduce the demand rather than changing the system of delivery.

5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS

I think it bears considering whether troops might not be better suited to the tasks, particularly as you get closer to the fight. How you want to fill those billets creates another set of questions.

6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.

I suggested the use of CA personnel in response to the argument that supply/log soldiers didn't care about the front line guys any more than contractors did. So, I thought about a comparative situation -- how Marines feel about their own aviators, that they trust them because the latter have gone through TBS and know soomething about what the guys on the ground are doing -- and that's why I floated the idea about using combat arms personnel in CS/CSS functions, especially those functions at the front lines.

7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

Response to part one -- all historical evidence suggests that such a situation will breed discontent. It also breeds a bit of a swagger and a degree cohesion amongst the "downtrodden." Paradoxical, but the guys who do the fighting are really an interesting bunch. Which becomes more influential depends on a variety of factors, probably paramount among them is the extent to which they feel they are successful and effective in the mission.

Response to part two -- do you really want to run the risk of creating a set of expectations that you may not be able to meet in the future? I don't know what will happen to the rear troops if you spoil them too much -- I don't know enough about that particular niche. But I do know that, generally speaking, too much of a good thing reduces the enjoyment of the good thing.

Regards,
Jill

Uboat509

06-27-2008, 12:27 AM

As for the FOB dining system, there has historically been morale issues between the line and the rear elements, in terms of what each gets vs. what each does. Be aware of that.

Bitching about the REMFs is a cherished, time honored CA tradition. It has been going on as long as there have been REMFs. The guys who do the fighting are always going to complain about the guys who do the supporting, no matter what. It is not going to go away. I can remember being in the field as a young soldier and complaining because we thought that the REMFs were keeping the "good" t-rats and giving us the bad ones (in retrospect I have no idea what the difference between a good and a bad t-rat is:)). There is an old saying in the Army, "If joe ain't bitchin', joe ain't happy."

Furthermore, to the extent that contractors take care of the food, you will always have a problem supporting those who are in dangerous locations. Getting food to the guys on the front line is always going to be perilous. Who is more likely to take on that responsibility -- contractors or other soldiers/Marines?

Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors? I don't know about the Marines but there are plenty of Army log convoys traveling all over Iraq. If there is a place where the contractors won't go because it is too dangerous then we have military log guys to carry supply to those areas. Just because we have contractors carrying a lot of the stuff does not mean that our log don't carry any. Presumably it is the same with the Marines.

No, that's not what I have said. I have argued that the priority should start with the line folks, with those outside the wire and work backwards. If you can only manage to get the guys in peril one hot meal a day, don't go overboard with those behind the lines.

As Cav pointed out we are generally supporting the frontline guys as well as circumstances and a facilities allow. Some of the COPs I have been on don't have enough room for a decent sized latrine, never mind an MKT and a mess section.

I think it bears considering whether troops might not be better suited to the tasks, particularly as you get closer to the fight. How you want to fill those billets creates another set of questions.

As I stated above, troops are still doing this. Contractors have augmented but not replaced troops, with some exceptions.

As per SOP Ken cuts to the heart of the whole argument.

Seems to me to be a lot of "If I were God..." and that valid points made by folks who were there are sort of overlooked. The most egregious overlooking being in the area of how (to include methods and times), even if you dispense with contractors and the troops do the CSS jobs, you are going to feed the guys outside the wire in the COPs the same meals you are able to feed in the base camps. That doesn't even get into how you're going to retain, in a volunteer force, those Fobbits and / or REMFs if you forced them to eat like the line guys.

No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that.

SFC W

Ski

06-27-2008, 12:35 PM

Ken - my biggest gripe with the chow halls is that the food we were given was beyond the pale in comparison with what the locals ate. They probably had no idea what we were eating - and the seafood was off limits to most of the Afghans anyway- but there was a serious disconnect in my reality box when I was sitting in a mess hall in Afghanistan getting better food than what I would get at home.

Understand the spartan way is not for all and that the meals were intended to boost morale. Just seems like a case of cognitive dissonance to me.

Sargent

06-28-2008, 12:32 AM

Uboat wrote:

Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors? I don't know about the Marines but there are plenty of Army log convoys traveling all over Iraq. If there is a place where the contractors won't go because it is too dangerous then we have military log guys to carry supply to those areas. Just because we have contractors carrying a lot of the stuff does not mean that our log don't carry any. Presumably it is the same with the Marines.

I can send you specific details in a private message, but I don't want to get into it on the open list.

But generally, I understand full well that, in combat, front line logistics are a bear. I know that at times supply and support can be severely constrained, and troops must make do with very little. I also know how powerful the urge to give the troops as much as possible can be -- so much so that commanders have at times unnecessarily risked the lives of their troops to do so. I do not, however, have much tolerance for a system that can leave some out in the cold when but a few miles away guys are eating ice cream -- all the while, the contractor is still paid. That's just ridiculous.

Now it's your turn. Explain for me and Ski how the sort of quality of life efforts being made on behalf of the vast majority of Americans deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is not harming our COIN effort. Can you justify generators being run non-stop to keep the lobsters and ice cream on ice while most Iraqis are still without a reliable electrical system? How do you propose for the Iraqi Army to learn how to DIY their own logistics at the battalion level when they have no model from which to learn?

Regards,
Jill

Ken White

06-28-2008, 01:56 AM

...I do not, however, have much tolerance for a system that can leave some out in the cold when but a few miles away guys are eating ice cream -- all the while, the contractor is still paid. That's just ridiculous.The guys out in the heat in OTOH may well want Ice Cream -- unlike you, they understand why they can't have it (as has been repeatedly explained by several others above) and they don't get too wrapped around the axle about luck of the draw REMFs eating better (as has also been repeatedly stated).
Now it's your turn. Explain for me and Ski how the sort of quality of life efforts being made on behalf of the vast majority of Americans deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is not harming our COIN effort...Good try. Hard to prove a negative. :D
...Can you justify generators being run non-stop to keep the lobsters and ice cream on ice while most Iraqis are still without a reliable electrical system?Sure. Those generators are running lights, computers, defensive systems and hospitals -- and the vaccines, serum and blood the treatment facilities need. The lobsters and ice cream are only a microscopically small part of the mass of food it takes to feed the troops. Most of that food is cheap stringy contract beef, pork and chicken plus vegetables. Most of it also doesn't taste that great, the steak and lobster can be tough and stringy too but at least they make up for Chili Mac and Roasted Chicken.

The Iraqis have more electricity now than they had in 2002 and they know it. They are unlikely to ever have the relative luxury the US does and takes with it where ever it goes.That may offend some but it's a fact of life and has been true in every war we've been in during my lifetime. I doubt it will change. Even if we get a Spartan for CJCS... ;)
How do you propose for the Iraqi Army to learn how to DIY their own logistics at the battalion level when they have no model from which to learn?One should expect them to resurrect the previous logistic system they had, copied from the British and that worked for them through a pretty big war in the 1980-88. That's a fact of history. They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be.

We do BTW, have log systems at Bn level to include cooks. It's cheaper and easier to use the contract mess to cook huge quantities and the Bn picks up and distributes it to the Outposts (not the contractor, the Bn and the units in that Bn).

Doesn't have to be your way, Ski's way or my way to work...

And I'm still waiting for this:

"No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that."

Schmedlap

06-28-2008, 05:10 AM

Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors?

There is no such case for one very simple fact: contractors do not fill out the LOGSTAT. The Company XO does. Had my company run out of food when I was an XO, assuming that I were not relieved or that I did not get throttled by my CO and BN XO, then I doubt that anybody would have taken me seriously if I attempted to blame it on a contractor. Even if "front line" folks were getting food cooked, delivered, and served by contractors, there would still be no excuse. MRE's have an NSN and they're abundant. There are pallets of them all over Iraq. Jot down MRE x 96 BX on your LOGSTAT and even a support platoon that is half asleep and has 8 deadlined vehicles can get you 2 pallets of MREs by tomorrow. I'll trade you my orange poundcake for your raspberry applesauce.

Sargent

06-28-2008, 04:02 PM

Ken White wrote:

One should expect them to resurrect the previous logistic system they had, copied from the British and that worked for them through a pretty big war in the 1980-88. That's a fact of history. They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be.

This is a most bizarre comment given the number of threads and comments on strengthening our advisory capability. According to your logic, there is no need for the advisors, because the Iraqis had an army that could fight -- all they need to do is resurrect the previous operational capability they had, copied from [and often educated by] the British and that had worked for them through a pretty big war in 1980-88. That's a fact of history as well.

Otherwise, if it is believed that the Iraqis need help with the trigger pulling, then it must be accepted that they will need help with the other stuff, because we ought to realize it's much easier to build up a good fighting capability than a good logistics capability.

Jill

Ken White

06-28-2008, 05:05 PM

...According to your logic, there is no need for the advisors, because the Iraqis had an army that could fight -- all they need to do is resurrect the previous operational capability they had, copied from [and often educated by] the British and that had worked for them through a pretty big war in 1980-88. That's a fact of history as well.I'll just repeat this part:"...They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be."

Don't agree that building up a good fighting capability is all that much easier than building the Log capability -- but I certainly acknowledge that the Log piece is not easy. All of which has little to do with US practice and capabilities...

Fuchs

06-28-2008, 05:15 PM

I just figured I'd toss that out there, in case you're looking for more research material. There is a vast, fruitful plain of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement deserving attention.

In other words: There's a war.

It's always been like that since the invention of the state as far as I know.

Surferbeetle

06-28-2008, 05:32 PM

the Italian Army fascinated me when I was a young soldier; red wine, real pasta, and naps for lunch out in the brush of the Po River Valley and cappuccino and pasticcini's for afternoon breaks in hills and mountains of the Veneto region (apparently there are mobile versions of the cappuccino machine). I would always mentally compare and contrast what I had read about the history of the Romans with what I observed in modern times.

In general my take on things is that 'lighter is righter'. That outlook helps to keep me mentally and physically sharper out in the field and it helps with building rapport with the local populace; they are in fact very aware of how we fight and live.

As an 'Economics' data-point the 2008 Pocket World in Figures published by the Economist (http://www.economist.com/) notes that 49.1% of the US population is employed, 29.3% of the Syrian population is employed, and 33.5% of the Turkish population is employed. The percentages for Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq & Iran are not given and the Cayman Islands is listed as number one with 68.9% of the populace employed. 'Global Competitiveness' rankings were built on 259 different criteria, with the US being listed as number one.

Tooth to tail ratios over the years and over various campaigns for different armies would be interesting. Does anybody have any insights?

Just started in on this Rand (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/OP23.pdf) study on US Forces (OP 23 The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations)...

McGrath’s study finds that the tooth-to-tail ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have both increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors.

Schmedlap

06-28-2008, 06:27 PM

In other words: There's a war.

It's always been like that since the invention of the state as far as I know.

Very true. But until very recently in history, suffering significant losses from disease, poor sanitation, and poor medical care could also be characterized as "it's always been like that." But instead of just dismissing the problem, we fixed it. Now death due to disease is rare, sanitation is adequate, and our wounded have incredibly high survival rates. One would think that we could have made similar headway in the fraud, waste, and abuse department, what with all the new IT capabilities, intense media oversight, and our newfound focus upon Army Values.

The "it's always been that way" attitude that many have towards the issue is generally borne of a belief that the problem is too complex to solve (not saying that is necessarily your view). The real problem is that such issues are often incredibly simple to solve, but it is leadership and labor intensive. It requires leaders - usually the 2IC's of an organization - to get off of their butts and maintain a heavy presence and significant supervision of their subordinates and, dare I say it, hold people accountable for their actions. Some do it. Some don't. The ones who don't seem to make up for those who do. How tough is it to prevent your unit from using lumber to build a party patio on the FOB, when an infantry company is begging for lumber to build overhead cover at their PB/COP? How long does it take to periodically check your DCR to make sure your supply sergeant is actually ordering the stuff that you need and not ordering televisions and mailing them home?

Fuchs

06-28-2008, 08:24 PM

Waste in wartime is no technological challenge, but a motivation & sanction problem.

Extreme forms of motivation are employed to mobilize the necessary national resources for war. This does not allow to care for the finer points, like wasteful bureaucrats and war profiteers, as long as these don't oppose the general idea (often, they even claim to be an essential part of the effort).

Many social scientists see warfare as a social phenomenon first, and they are right.
It's easy to ignore that because the social aspects seem so self-evident and reliable, but an attempt to fight corruption and waste equals an assault on the foundation for warfare, the motivation.
Most people would find it extremely difficult to be united against a foe while in the same matter being against some of themselves, although these claim to contribute to the common effort against the external opponent. It's simply too complicated and confusing.

And wartime puts more stress on institutions than peacetime anyway, so there are few resources to fight that minor problem in addition to all those other problems.

Fraud and waste has always associated warfare, it's not as simple to defeat as pox.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

06-29-2008, 09:36 PM

and the steaks were usually too overdone.

While the grunt/line doggie will always bitch and moan about the REMF, it is after all a prerogative of the position ;) , they also almost universally understand that without those folks in the rear with the gear and the beer there wouldn’t be somewhere to rotate back to for some decent hot chow, real showers, etc.

It isn’t that you cannot live on Cs/MREs for quite a long period of time; it is they just get a bit mundane. The REMFs just get to enjoy the American largess daily because they happen to work there, but if they are not there then no one gets any perks. As has been noted here, and elsewhere, if you do not have to live in misery then why do it?

Having quality small unit time during chow is important and in my experience that time is mostly when you are eating field rats in a remote area. Everyone huddles up to horse trade items and often we just combined all the meats into a hash so all could enjoy the repast (especially relevant when the early MREs had the nutritious and delicious dehydrated beef patty, mmmmm). Seems to me that chow halls, rather than bringing folks together, tend to facilitate folks splitting up.

As to Surferbeetle’s experience with the Italians I would also say the French Foreign Legion is not lacking in the mastery of field epicureanism. The 2 REP seemed to have some marvelous scroungers and the cook (not his MOS just an additional duty) was always in fine form when “la soupe” was served in the western reaches of Djibouti. :D

Norfolk

06-29-2008, 09:58 PM

The Canadians sure could have used the culinary talents of that ad hoc "soup" chef when they were next door in Somalia in '93. Instead, they got to subsist on hard rats (1980's MRE's left over from Germany, you know, the ones whose only luxuries were the chocolate bars that had gone pure white from age, and those even luckier fellows who got that tiny bottle of Tabasco sauce in their MRE) for six straight months. Not even hay boxes n' mystery meat:eek: to break up the monotony. No wonder some of the lads were feeling a little hostile.

Meanwhile the Task Force Headquarters was aboard ship in the Red Sea, and in between occasional ports of call, at least one of the most senior officers was able to get by on the creations of his personal (and real) chef - no kidding.:wry:

Edited to Add: All that said, if there had been resources to provide a true and full contingent of third-line log types, then perhaps some of the suffering that had to be endured could have been better alleviated from time to time.

120mm

07-21-2008, 06:54 PM