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View Full Version : The relationship between the CSA’s message on advising & Key Ldr Development PT 1



Rob Thornton
06-19-2008, 10:04 PM
Given the thrust of the CSA’s recent message about advising FSFs, and the emphasis placed on it by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the CJCS, and the Secretary of Defense, its worth considering how we assign value to “key” leadership developmental assignments. When we think of the path to command what comes to mind? Why do we hold command above all else? These are not easy questions; nor are they accusatory. They simply are. It might be said we hold command highest because it is the recognizable manifestation of value to one’s efforts and professional life. It is recognition in a way that is far beyond increased prestige and financial worth, it is a recognition founded on the trust of lives, acumen of skill, worth to a cause greater then one’s self. Even though we know that the majority of time for most will be spent in some other job besides command, command at its various levels is still the apex for most. Undoubtedly there is also a darker human side to command, the attraction of authority, the sublime energy that accompanies it, the need for recognition, etc. – but publicly and privately we fight to eschew those darker qualities and emphasize & reinforce those positive qualities. How is the CSA’s message the first positive step toward the Army institutionalizing SFA and the advisory mission? How does it relate to what we value most? Why was the CSA explicit in his reference to the future of relevant Land Power? First we need to consider what we assign value to and why.


Developing our Sense of Value

We seek to promote based on demonstrated potential and suitability for increased responsibility and authority? However, because those are somewhat subjective, we have a value system that takes the form of evaluations and assignments. This is a personal history that indicates why that person should be advanced as someone whose character espouses what we value. The two go hand in hand, and drive current performance and future assignments. At an early age in their professional career a LT learns that among the most sought after jobs he or she competes for amongst their peers in their first assignment is to specialty platoon leader – for a Combat Arms officer, those goals are along the lines of Scout PL, Mortar PL, and Support PL(before modularity). The first – Scout or Recon PL comes with a healthy amount of independence and trust – the perception is your platoon is providing the basis of the intelligence which will drive the BN’s operations. The Mortar Platoon is the BN CDR’s organic fire support – slightly less sexy then the Scout PL, but still a specialty platoon with a healthy part of the BC’s combat power – your range gives you a different perspective and impact on the course of operations. The Support Platoon (and I understand that with modularity we’ve changed the MTO&E but stay with me because this is just as much about those leaders who grew up under that MTO&E as those who are growing up modular) was less sexy still, but among the most important functions as it was the BN CDR’s logistics and sustainment lifeline. From there, these LTs would become company XOs (if they were not already) or an “A” in the staff – “S3A” being among the most important to them as it was about operations.

It is worth considering our perception of how we advance, and what are the other things that occur as a result? How many times do we hear a higher echelon CDR refer to when they were a “this” or when they were “that”? There is also the consideration of what development occurred within that LT as a result of what assignments he was given. How does that shape their perception of what to assign value? These are not qualifications of good or bad, just of relevance. However it does get to the issue of how we institutionalize value. As a LT you learn that there are some jobs that have more value then others, and you start to understand why and what qualities make the assignment of those jobs or missions more likely. You also begin to notice things about the leaders above and around you, and you begin to enquire about what jobs they had, and construct a theory about how they advanced. You make decisions about what kind of leader you intend to be and construct a plan on how to get there. There are variables and ripples that occur before and after, but it is usually not too far off the mark.

As a CPT we yearn for command (for us Army types it’s usually the first time we get to put commander in our job description). Usually we are assigned to a staff position first – probably on either a BN or BCT staff, but it is not unheard of to get “stuck” on a higher echelon staff. This gives us time to season, but also time to be evaluated by those BN and BCT commanders who want to ensure they put round pegs in round holes and don’t place a guy in command before they’ve done all they can to develop that leader. In rare cases, it may be that the doubts are so high as to that CPTs ability, the higher echelon commander wants to see if the faults are such that they are unsuitable for command – but this is unusual as the developmental experiences have developed the CPT’s abilities as to do good enough.

As a staff CPT we learn about the personalities in the organization and we further refine our values that we began as a LT. We consider the advice of our immediate boss, that of the BN CDR, and to varying degrees, that of serving commanders. I say that because at this point we usually are critiquing the guys whose jobs we want, and our perspectives are subject to staff and self bias – it always looks easier until you have to actually go out and do it while hewing on the responsibility that comes with it. We are further planning out how things will go. We know which commanders are rotating when, we learn about their companies, sit through their QTBs, hear about the things they did right and the things they did wrong and we convince ourselves that it can be done better. We also assign value to those over us, some of which is based on where they come from, what they have done, and how they are to work for. We associate and infer – often inaccurately attributing a flaw or strength to an assignment vs. the character of the leader.

As commanders, we learn the value of a second command – in much the same way we leaned the value of specialty PL or trusted XO. However this time, we associate more “command time” with future potential for command at higher level. It may be as an HHC/HHT/HHD, or it may be in the Old Guard, or some other formation – the important thing is it’s a “command”. Again, it is neither good nor bad, just a matter of relevance.

Following command there are several options. However we learned some important things from command. We learned the BDE S3 job is the “king maker” so to speak (we also learned its allot of hard work and a family time killer – as well as often pissing off damn near everybody because there is no way to make everyone happy) – we learn that just by observing. We may not like the BDE 3, but we generally respect the position and the potential it brings. We also get exposed to the BCT CDR as our senior rater. We start to ponder how he does his job, and how did he get his job? What is his background? What did he do? How well did he do it? We learn about the relevancy of resident war college, SAMS and a host of other developmental schools and assignments. Not good or bad, but relevant here in that we have to make decisions about our viability for future command. Hopefully the BN and BCT CDR come forward, and tell you during your OER counseling (and informal or formal periodic counseling throughout). This is where guys and gals need to make life changing decisions, there will be other factors – family, age, ambition, competing priorities, interests, etc.- but most folks I know make significant decisions here.

The years between command and a KD job as a FG also matter. One of the best jobs to prepare you for doing well as an “S3” or “XO” was to go and be a CTC OC (Observer Controller). There you could benefit by the experiences of many units and leaders who came to the CTCs in preparation for deployment - or before the war as an indicator of that unit’s readiness to deploy (I list both because our point of reference for how we use the CTCs varies with our age and experience). As company commanders we knew many BN & BDE S3s and BN and BDE CDRs who at some point had been an OC at a CTC. In our OER counseling we were often gratified to hear our rater or SR tell us they’d like to see us at a CTC as it would improve our ability to be good BN and BDE CDRs. As an OC (most of us have done OC duty somewhere either at home station, as an OC augmentee, or at a CTC) you get immersed in tactics, a chance to consider how doctrine works, and most importantly the chance benefit from “observing” and thinking about how a multitude of leaders and units conducted their selves under a variety of conditions. You get to do this without having to take on the responsibilities associated with those positions.

It is another “key developmental” experience afforded by the Army because the need for useful feedback to the unit is combined with the opportunity to step outside and look from a unique perspective. That “value” is demonstrated down the road because as “3”, “XO” or “CDR” that experience can be leveraged to make better decisions. Since not everyone can or should be an OC at a CTC, the value is increased. The same is true with other assignments or experiences we assign the value of “key developmental” experience to.

part 2 posted below

Rob Thornton
06-19-2008, 10:05 PM
The “Value” assigned to Advising

This gets to the question of where does an assignment as an “advisor” fall out in terms of being ascribed as “key developmental” or KD toward future assignment and promotion. This is a question as to if the “value” is such that it has persistent and future value, vs. its being just an assignment that must be endured temporarily or tolerated until such time as we can return to what we have institutionalized and demonstrated as having value through our actions. It gets beyond the CSA’s making it a KD assignment and giving CSL credit; it is about how we perceive its worth.

There are three parts to this I think. The first part is recognition and acceptance by the institutional leadership that there is a persistent requirement for both quality and quantity. In this case OIF and OEF have changed our (the USG’s) thinking to include accepting and expressing that working by, with and through FSFs is an undeniable and critical part of our strategy. I say that because while many may have expressed it for some time, it was not until it physically manifested itself and exposed our gaps in capabilities and capacities that we were forced to address it – preparation for war, and the conduct of war were and will remain different. The institution has officially recognized and accepted this need in the form of the CSA’s, CMC’s and SECDEF’s verbal and written communications. This sets the conditions for the second part, reconciling recognition with actions.

How the institutions go from articulating value to demonstrating it matters. To borrow from Dave Kilcullen (first place I heard it) – it is about matching our actions to our narrative. If the Army does what is laid out in CSA’s note in spirit as well as in letter by advancing those who have taken on his guidance in the next round, it will demonstrate immediate value. Two other actions the Army might take is to:

- One, follow the Joint lead and designate an Army proponent for SFA (Security Force Assistance) that reflects its value to big Army – not just a special slice. That is not a swipe at Army Special Forces – but it’s a recognition that when you make something “special” you may also isolate its level of institutionalization – since this as much a capacity issue as a capability issue it is a GPF issue, and if institutionalization in the GPF is what is required then designating a proponent that only affects a special slice or creating a specialized corps of advisors jeopardizes that. At its heart this is about how we perceive and view the employment of “Land Power” which why I think the CSA is explicit in mentioning it in his email.

- Two provide commanders a powerful tool for organizing their formations to the tasks associated with working with FSFs, we need to assign some type of ASL or personnel code to all soldiers, not just officers. We have many soldiers working in some advisory capacity who not only should get some credit for their work, but whose skill sets might get lost. These soldiers could become unit trainers, etc. and when the unit gets assigned the mission may prove invaluable in an advisory position vs. their primary MOS. This is not about identifying them for unit taskings, its about empowering commanders with critical tools to the benefit of the mission.

The third part and I think the most institutionally enduring, and also the most difficult is how its value translates to big Army. When a LT or CPT looks to a successful BN or BDE S3, or his BN CDR or BCT CDR and attributes that leader’s success to a tour as an advisor, it is truly institutionalized. When that BCT CDR pulls off something and that CO CDR says, “Damn Sir – where did you learn that?”, and the BCT CDR says “I picked it up advising foreign security forces in ……” and then follows with, “ you know Bill, you should consider a tour as an advisor when you leave command, it will round you out in ways no other job can.” we’ll have made it a part of our culture. When its recognized as part of the path to higher command because its value to the challenges of command at those levels is not only viewed as enhancing, but is undeniable it will be part of our culture. At that point value is established because its credibility is manifested in what we value most. At that point it is not a painful forcing function which must be endured, but it is an attractive function which is desired. We resist those things which take us away from our goals, but we find ways to those things which lead us to our goals.

It is also worth discussing the issue of making some advisory positions “KD” and thus on par with other relevant jobs. While the job of S3 or XO has value in preparation for command, what of the comparative value of the Advisor if a guy or gal can only do one or the other? I think here it comes down to two things. First, we need to get beyond valuing the quality of the assignment to the exclusion of the quality of the man. An assignment does not qualify someone for increased responsibility and authority – I’ve known at least one FG who served as both a BN 3 and a BN XO, and got BN CMD only to fail – a good guy, but we all knew he should not have been a BN CDR even if the Army did not. I’ve also known a few folks that did not have the resume but their actions could not be more in keeping with increased responsibility and authority – the Army missed them to our detriment. We’ve got to get more invested in how we assess those we advance. Second we need to consider what we think we’re going to be doing in the future, since nobody can do everything, maybe having a balanced team vs. a one size fits all is healthier for our organization. If having relevant land power in the future is at least partially contingent on our ability to work by, with and through, then having that experience resident in the BN and BCT senior leadership would seem critical. I’d argue that there are things you will learn as an advisor that you will not learn elsewhere – so maybe its value to the future of land power was worth making it a KD job. However, if we have leaders that when a guy shows up the first question out of their mouth is not oriented on finding out what do they bring to the table, but where were they an S3 or XO, then we really did not institutionalize it as “KD”, we just gave it a wink and a nod, and we failed.


Conclusion (what it means more broadly)

I think this is one of the reasons why I think BCTs should be the basis for a good chunk of our Army SFA efforts. Not only do we require full spectrum forces in order meet the commitment to our national security, and not only do we have some incredibly talented folks in the BCT, but to really effect cultural change we must change some part of what we value most, not create an alternative value structure which is in competition. When we do the latter we weaken one at the expense of the other. I think we can in fact leverage existing structures such as the BCT and the JTF to meet most of our needs. While the BCT does in fact have a ceiling with regards to its functionality, we might consider building a CJIATF around something like a TMAAG, but inclusive of a heavy JIIM (Joint Inter-Agency, Inter- Governmental and Multi-National) assessment team, and then based on the initial assessment and follow on re-assessments build the capabilities and capacities required to meet the policy goal.

I bring this up in the conclusion because in my view it’s a related issue. Creating new permanent organizations does not necessarily change the organizational culture. It is really about relevance and perspective to a frame of reference. We have assigned both relevance and value to the BCT and to the JTF; where possible we should show the increased value with respect to established frames of reference. In the case of using the CJIATF structure on which to build the means for sustained engagement, it would require a CJIATF CDR who understood how to work with foreign security forces. To get there we need to institutionalize the value at the lower echelons first. The CSA’s directive may not in and of itself assign the level of value that gets instant institutionalization, but its an important first step, and one we can build on.

Best, Rob

selil
06-19-2008, 10:29 PM
This should be on the SWJ Blog. Good stuff sir.

Ken White
06-20-2008, 12:05 AM
Well said.....

Shek
06-20-2008, 01:12 AM
Rob,

Great post. As I thought about the following excerpt from GEN Casey's message, my first take was that it was placing a TT position into the "soft" KD.


I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc).

However, after thinking about it some more, I think it was the right initial step. First, if an S-3/XO position weren't explicitly guaranteed, then you'd simply create a larger incentive to avoid a TT assignment. With this guarantee, it will create more of an incentive to serve on a TT assignment since it won't prevent you from getting the "hard" KD jobs, and your performance in your BN S-3/XO job will drive whether you continue on the "Iron Major" path to the coveted BDE S-3 job.

My question would be how do we provide additional incentives that demonstrate seriousness about TT time in the interim before you have a generation of officers who can mentor captains as BN CDRs and BDE CDRs and state through their own experience that it helps your career?

Do we change the ORB to make TT, IA, and joint time more explicit than what the job assignment section may be able to do? Is there a way to create some nominative assignments so that we can 1) direct talent to where it's needed the most within the effort, 2) identify officers who might not otherwise admit that they wouldn't mind doing a TT job and 3) create the perception that it really can be a job where you can set yourself apart from the field for promotions/selections since the selection can't be considered a fog on the mirror = you're hired! selection. I think that may draw some of the pool of talented officers who do "more of the same" in a second command, which isn't necessarily bad, but it certainly doesn't broaden one's experience as much as some other opportunities.

MikeF
06-20-2008, 03:07 AM
Here's one suggestion on incentives:

We'll call it a fellowship.

Combat Company Commanders compete for a 30 month tour to Monterey, CA. 18 months acquiring masters degree in defense analysis at NPS followed with 12 months in DLI for training in arabic, farsi, etc.

Immediately following, newly promoted majors deploy for twelve months as advisors- preferably in the AOR they commanded in so they can foster established relationships. Families can opt to stay in monterey.

After deployment, off to leavenworth.

Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.

Sargent
06-20-2008, 03:17 AM
Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.

Well, you have to force the families not to live on Fort Ord, because everyone who does hates Monterey, because the weather sucks there. They need to set up special housing for the fellows at Del Monte Beach, which is the "guaranteed best weather" strip in Monterey. Plus, life is always better when you are "steps" from the beach -- it's a bear to pack kids into a car to go to the beach, much better to be able to hoof it.

Otherwise, it's a neat idea.

Regards,
Jill
Former Resident of the Surfside Apartment Complex

Ken White
06-20-2008, 04:01 AM
Had quarters at Ord while attending DLI. Always fascinated me that coming back from San Francisco, you could tell how much further you had to drive by estimating the range to the cloud that always hung over Ord... :wry:

wm
06-20-2008, 11:19 AM
Here's one suggestion on incentives:

We'll call it a fellowship.

Combat Company Commanders compete for a 30 month tour to Monterey, CA. 18 months acquiring masters degree in defense analysis at NPS followed with 12 months in DLI for training in arabic, farsi, etc.

Immediately following, newly promoted majors deploy for twelve months as advisors- preferably in the AOR they commanded in so they can foster established relationships. Families can opt to stay in monterey.

After deployment, off to leavenworth.

Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.

Hate to be a wet blanket, but the impact of these folks being in the training account for 30 months may well be nigh impossible to overcome. A main driver in the reduction of Army institutional training course lengths in the past was that all of the folks in the training account apply to end strength numbers but are producing no "bang for the buck" at the pointy end of the spear.

If the "numbers game" can be solved, I do like the idea of a grad and language school train up as an incentive, but it might be better to allow selectees to pick from a number of institutions across the country or the world for that matter. (BTW, housing in the Monterey area could be tough to come by. Seems to me we closed Fort Ord and gave it away quite a few years ago ,and I doubt housing on the Presidio would be sufficient to support the program--another reason for having multiple venues available.)

Tom Odom
06-20-2008, 12:19 PM
Here's one suggestion on incentives:

We'll call it a fellowship.


Immediately following, newly promoted majors deploy for twelve months as advisors- preferably in the AOR they commanded in so they can foster established relationships. Families can opt to stay in monterey.

After deployment, off to leavenworth.

Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.


Good idea but use the established National Security Affairs curriculum and use the appropriate area studies section. They have one of the bset programs out there, bar none.

Tom

NPS Masters Nat Sec Affairs--Middle East 1981
DFLIC Modern Standard Arabic 1982 (with Abu Buckweat and Adm Eric Olsen)
DFLIC French 1983

Veteran of Seaside, resident of Monterey, and hunter of Fort Ord and Hunter-Ligget fauna

Jill is correct: the weather sucked and the water was frigging cold. It was pretty though. The food was excellent.

patmc
06-20-2008, 12:24 PM
Gentlemen,

Great ideas to motivate Majors to volunteer for MTT, but the reality is, for a BN MTT, there is only 1 MAJ. The others are generally CPTs right out of the CCC, and senior NCO's with dwell time. They have no incentive, other than service. Assigning KD to the MAJ slot is good for Majors, but how will the Army continue to find CPTs and senior NCO's for the other slots. I know 7 guys on MTT right now. 1 volunteered as 1LT bc he wanted combat experience after spending his last deployment in a mayor cell. He now regrets that decision. 5 graduated CCC and went straight to Riley. The 7th was a MSG, and his dwell time got him. Its a numbers and personnel issue, and the Army is still only putting a band aid on the problem.

The basic fact is, majority of people do not want to live and work with Iraqis or Afghans. Those who do, wear different color berets. If the Army's future is in advising, it needs to accept that many people do not want to do it, and will likely not sign up or stick around. CPT's bonus round 2 is again showing that people are not happy with the Army's direction.

Sargent
06-20-2008, 02:34 PM
The basic fact is, majority of people do not want to live and work with Iraqis or Afghans.

Now there's a comment that displays a remarkable willingness to be honestly self-critical. Also, if true it reflects a terribly dismal state of affairs.

To the extent that it's true... I think that such a position reflects more ignorance and familiarity with stereotypes than any real sense of what it actually means to live and work with them. I also have a suspicion that such a mindset has influenced the tone of the COIN mission -- if you don't much like folks, you aren't going to take their protection very seriously, are going to be more likely to take an aggressive approach to those suspected of "enemy" activity, and so forth -- whether that suspicion is ultimately warranted.

I've argued elsewhere that COIN must proceed from a place of care and concern akin to that which a parent demonstrates for a child. Inasmuch as the training of foreign forces is part of an overall COIN strategy, then you can't expect to succeed if you are starting with the deficit of your people being unwilling to live or work with them.

-----

Oh, and Tom, you would have thought differently about the weather in Monterey if you had lived at Del Monte beach -- seriously, you could look at the entirety of the area, and that little strip would be the only portion bathed in sunlight -- maybe it's the way the hills were arrayed behind it. And yes, the water is cold, but that's what wetsuits are for -- I did some great boogie boarding there -- me and the 14 year old boys always had a grand old time.

Regards,
Jill

jkm_101_fso
06-20-2008, 02:49 PM
patmc,

To be honest, the TT job I had was the best ever in the Army...as far as deployments go. Advantages:

1. Away from the Flagpole!!! No COLs looking over my shoulder injecting their "wisdom" or CSMs enforcing silly uniform standards.
2. Scope of work allows for max creativity and initiative
3. Plan our own (IA) OPS; collect our own intel
4. Challenging and rewarding (when the IA succeeds)

DISADS:
1. Lack of Life Support (TT not on FOBs, which was fine by me)
2. In some cases, lack of U.S. combat assets (CCA, Rt. Clearance, CAS)
3. IA determines work schedule..."But CPT, It's FRIDAY!"
4. Lack of funds (CERP, CDRs discretionary, etc)
5. Lots of reporting req. to higher HQ.

There are so many different experiences out there for TTs, I don't want to generalize mine as the standard. But I did love it.

-jkm

wm
06-20-2008, 03:19 PM
Gentlemen,

Great ideas to motivate Majors to volunteer for MTT, but the reality is, for a BN MTT, there is only 1 MAJ. The others are generally CPTs right out of the CCC, and senior NCO's with dwell time. They have no incentive, other than service. Assigning KD to the MAJ slot is good for Majors, but how will the Army continue to find CPTs and senior NCO's for the other slots. I know 7 guys on MTT right now. 1 volunteered as 1LT bc he wanted combat experience after spending his last deployment in a mayor cell. He now regrets that decision. 5 graduated CCC and went straight to Riley. The 7th was a MSG, and his dwell time got him. Its a numbers and personnel issue, and the Army is still only putting a band aid on the problem.

The basic fact is, majority of people do not want to live and work with Iraqis or Afghans. Those who do, wear different color berets. If the Army's future is in advising, it needs to accept that many people do not want to do it, and will likely not sign up or stick around. CPT's bonus round 2 is again showing that people are not happy with the Army's direction.

Thanks for touching the trunk of the elephant in the room that the CSA message may have introduced. (Maybe I ought to follow the ostensibly Arabic fable and call it the nose of the camel that the CSA has introduced into the tent. :))

I fear that instead of a two "thread" Army--conventional ops and unconventional ops/heavy forces & light forces/special forces and conventional forces (pick your favorite nom du jour)---this initiative will result in a three thread Army--the two previously cited plus the Army advisor corps that has been mentioned on other threads, particularly this one (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3154&highlight=Army+Advisor+Corps). The US already seems to have problems making ends meet with just the dichotomy in force orientation. What happens when we get to a "trichotomy"?

By the way, I suspect we've probably had a dual nature/two dimensional outlook regarding at least our land forces for as long as we've had land forces. Not wishing to seem to be too parochial here, I presume similar debates exist in the naval power(e.g.: deep water vs littoral/surface vs sub surface/big guns vs navair) and air power (e.g., bomber vs fighter/CAS vs deep strike/missile vs manned aircraft) components. Over the long haul, we seem to have reached some stasis, equilibrium, or consensus as to an appropriate division of labor. (Admittedly we continue to wobble or oscillate back and forth, but so does the Earth turning on its axis everyday.) I am not so confident about developing a similar balance when the spectrum becomes three dimensional.

Thoughts???
__________________________________________________ ____________
Re Monterey weather--if you don't like it in Monterey, you can always drive south over the ridge and out into Carmel Valley. In about 20 minutes, you move from a temperate rain forest climate into semi-arid grasslands (and by driving a little further, you can warm your weary bones with the Zen monks at Tassajara Hot Springs).

patmc
06-20-2008, 03:38 PM
I agree that negative assumptions, stereotypes, and sadly in some cases, racism, negatively influence some perceptions of Iraqi/Afghan forces.

While a Convoy Commander, we mainly escorted Third Country Nationals (TCN's) from Turkey. We received no language or culture training, and were basically told, get them from A to B. When there were breakdowns or problems, we used universal hand gestures to get points across. Over time, the Soldiers grew weary of dodging IEDs every night just to escort cargo trucks, and especially grew frustrated with the TCN's. I would not tolerate any blatant racist comments, but in a theatre where everything is referred to as "haji", it was hard to remind everyone that these were human beings.

My Soldiers (and myself included) did not trust the IA in our AO at all, because we usually hit IEDs in immediate vicinity of their CP's. If we had been tasked to go work with an IA unit, we definately would have assumed the worst and not had the right attitude.

I would argue that if you told a dozen officers and NCO's, you are going to go live and work with a local army in a 3rd world country, they would be pretty hesitant, so this is just not an Iraq or Afghan thing. That said, I've read many accounts of great experiences working MTT, but none of my friends has recommended volunteering for it. Its more of a, "It sucked but I learned a lot."

JKM, those pros were the main thing I liked about my convoy mission. Once out on the road, we did what we had to do as we moved base to base. We had a lot of freedom once we punched the trip ticket. I'm glad you had a good experience as well. If told to do it, I will, but I don't see myself volunteering for it.



To the extent that it's true... I think that such a position reflects more ignorance and familiarity with stereotypes than any real sense of what it actually means to live and work with them. I also have a suspicion that such a mindset has influenced the tone of the COIN mission -- if you don't much like folks, you aren't going to take their protection very seriously, are going to be more likely to take an aggressive approach to those suspected of "enemy" activity, and so forth -- whether that suspicion is ultimately warranted.

Ken White
06-20-2008, 04:13 PM
Wm with this:
"...A main driver in the reduction of Army institutional training course lengths in the past was that all of the folks in the training account apply to end strength numbers but are producing no "bang for the buck" at the pointy end of the spear.'The statement of course is totally correct but I railed against that 'logic' for over 30 years. It is so incredibly short sighted and "current quarter" oriented that it is scary. An Army is people. That's where the investment needs to be made; not in toys.

Patmc also hit one:
"The basic fact is, majority of people do not want to live and work with Iraqis or Afghans. Those who do, wear different color berets. If the Army's future is in advising, it needs to accept that many people do not want to do it, and will likely not sign up or stick around."I can't speak to that with respect to the current nations of interest but based on my observation of KMAG in Korea (in both war and the later peace) and MACV in Viet Nam as well as the old Armish-MAAG in Iran, he's totally correct. I'd go a step further and say that among those who want or are willing to live and work with indigenous forces, it should also be borne in mind that not everyone is really effective as an Adviser for many reasons.

Sargent said
"To the extent that it's true... I think that such a position reflects more ignorance and familiarity with stereotypes than any real sense of what it actually means to live and work with them. I also have a suspicion that such a mindset has influenced the tone of the COIN mission -- if you don't much like folks, you aren't going to take their protection very seriously, are going to be more likely to take an aggressive approach to those suspected of "enemy" activity, and so forth -- whether that suspicion is ultimately warranted."I'm not sure that's a correct assumption. It may apply to some but I've seen too many who went into the job with an open mind and later became either disillusioned or just totally frustrated at an apparent lack of progress. I believe the acceptance or not of the other culture is quite complex, hard to predict and infinitely variable among people. Lot of factors at play from food to sleeping arrangements to combat capability and most things in between. Probably best not to try to judge until one has been there. I know one retired Colonel who was an Adviser in KMAG and loved the job and the Koreans; he was later a Province Adviser in Viet Nam and he was not a happy camper, not at all. Know another guy who was an Adviser in Viet Nam and hated it and later was a happy and good Adviser to the Iranian Army. It's a quite complex thing, I think...

jkm_ said:
"To be honest, the TT job I had was the best ever in the Army...as far as deployments go."I think that's great and I'm glad he did enjoy it -- and I've known many others who enjoyed the job elsewhere. My son was not an Adviser in Afghanistan in either of his two trips to OEF but he likes them and would be willing to do that, OTOH, with an OIF 2 tour, he would rebel if he got assigned to do it in Iraq.

It's like anything else; some people like it, some do not and as we all know, some people do some things better than others do them -- the process needs to accept that as reality. It probably also should be cautious in judging those that do not want to be Advisers because it's very much dependent on the individual and how he sees the nation and the people concerned.

Not that DA cares but I'm opposed to an Advisory Corps for several reasons and that factor is one of them. I think it's a bad idea on several levels as I said in a SWJ Blog Post some months ago. :mad:

Lastly, for wm -- I agree on Carmel and the valley. Probably why my wife and I are much more familiar with that area than we are with Monterey, Seaside and Ord proper. :D

Eden
06-20-2008, 06:13 PM
I found myself in total agreement with Ken, so I had to go lay down for a bit. Having recovered, let me add my two cents.

I don't have any problem with Gen Casey's directive, though I am skeptical it will do much to attract the best and brightest to TTs.

What does cause my gut to clench is the implicit appeal to careerism. Bottom line of the message is "hey, this assignment will still get your ticket punched!" With promotion rates to major and lieutenant colonel approaching the 100% mark and an evaluation system that, to put it charitably, doesn't work, your job history and your network of mentor/rabbis becomes more and more important for future success. This type of 'incentive' only contributes to the careerist mindset by lending it official imprimatur.

Maybe I'm old-fashioned, but if the Army wants to send the best and brightest to TTs, why not just order them to go? The CSA can easily get a list of the top 25% of majors in any particular year group - the branches keep track of that. Send 'em! Then make them S3/XOs when they get back!

If we object that such a progression will not work within the constraints of our current professional development and promotion system, then you've identified the real problem. Let's not let the tail wag the dog

Ken White
06-20-2008, 06:43 PM
Now the question is which of us is ticking??? ;)

Seriously, good point on the careerism angle. I knew there was something else that bothered me but couldn't put a finger on it. It does sort of pander to that...

As to just assigning people to do it, you're correct, I think. I got assigned as an Adviser in Viet Nam and for a variety of reasons, did not take to the job at all -- mostly because I believed I was wasting time and accomplishing nothing and a significant personality clash with the second Bn Sr Adviser didn't help. So I left and went to a US unit tromping the boonies looking for Clyde and lived happily ever after. Later, as an Adviser in Iran, I believed I was more productive and that I was accomplishing something -- even if it was little and painfully slow (nature of the beast). My observation has been that the majority of folks so assigned did their best and did some good; a few gifted or lucky ones did great things, in fact.

I hope we are not overdoing the well known American pendulum over swing thing...

patmc
06-20-2008, 09:57 PM
This morning, after PT, my buddy walked in and told me, "At 1330 we're meeting General Casey, so be ready to go." Myself and several Soldiers from my unit were voluntold to attend a Town Hall Meeting with GEN Casey and his wife at Fort Bragg.

I asked him if there were any plans for changes in MiTT team selection, training, and compensation.

He mentioned the MAJ KD change, and stated that they were looking at moving away from the individual replacement method, and looking at using BCTs, either attaching teams, or building within. No mention of Polk, extended training, advisor corps, etc... My buddy asked me what I meant by my question, and when I explained, he responded, "Oh, he didn't really answer you then." Later, after the meeting, another CPT approached me, thanked me for asking the question and told me he had just come off a MiTT. He agreed that my question was not answered, and complained that he was still trying to recover from the MiTT assignment.

More food for thought.

Crusoe
06-21-2008, 12:13 AM
The issue is getting folks who want/desire/volunteer to work with foreign militaries. No silver bullets for the problem.

The USMC is looking at unit based MTTs as a way to mitigate some of these issues. Not sure how they would do it but potentially something like....You are assigned to a unit, serve in the respective battalion billet then deploy as part of the battalion detachment for a MTT tour. This makes the billet description (battalion/detachment CO/OIC/S-?) easily recognizable by the wider Marine Corps. This would translate better to promotion/command selection boards.

Of course there will still be required IA requirements for multiple MTT requirements but at least this makes the assignment part of an operational force unit.

Not the perfect solution to the problem but at least they are being addressed.

Crusoe

Rob Thornton
06-21-2008, 12:39 AM
Probably a few ways to get it "mo better" using the BCT as the organization around which to build. I think it starts by defining far enough out where that BCT will be going so they can:

- consider the current conditions and start building information on the environment early

- figure out what their shortfalls are based on who they need to partner with e.g. is a 1:1 BCT to IA BDE partnership, or is it a 1:1 BCT, 10 police stations, some CLC/SoI types, and a National Police BN - along with the need to either fill some slots on the PRT or to provide a senior LNO who can synch ops, and some security for their movement and other life support issues.

-Is their a need build up other parts of the infrastructure such as provide TF 134 type support to help the partner build cases? Are there any prisons which need to be developed in order to support security sector reform and development (this one is often over looked and we've paid for it - most recently at Badush in Iraq 07 and Kandahar this month). How about partnering with local clinics and hospitals - not only a developmental issue, but also a security issue. How about other emergency and public services?

This could make for a very pregnant BCT (vs. a pyramid), but that does not mean we should shy away from it if it supports the mission. Just as we'd planned modularity for other environments, with a good lead in time to figure out what they need, the additional personnel and equipment and the authority and resources to get soldiers the right training, I think a BCT could do it better then sending in an ad-hoc package that arrives at different times. As it goes through its deployment it can help the follow on unit make its assessment as to what it needs next year, and what it does not.

If the BCT does the mission and lays out its capability and capacity gaps - then the various providers can figure out how fill them. It may not be perfect, and they may not get them all, but at least under unity of command the BCT CDR would have a better idea of where he's coming up short and then be able to decide where to accept risk.

Down the road some:

At some point we would not necessarily have to have a centralized TT training site for them either. At the point where those skills became institutionalized at that level - there might be enough "master trainers" and former advisors resident in the BCTs to run their own programs. This was my point about ASIs (Additional Skill Identifiers) that classified what type of training and experience a soldier had so it could be built into the MTO&E at various echelons. MTO&Es are an important part of training and readiness to perform what missions we give to units. The are derived from the same process that drives UMRs, school slots, funding, priorities, CL V allotments. In this case having the ASIs on the MTO&E means that this is an at least semi-permanent feature of the BCT and in line with the issue of future relevancy to land power.


On PME:

We might have a specialized school for advising FSFs that we could send those identified in their units as having the most compatible personal skills, traits and attributes. This is not a pre-deployment school, or a in country academy (although it might accommodate some who needed a crash course), but a 3 month course that was focused on advising FSF - with no time on those skills the unit should develop. In other words none of the pre-deployment which eats up so much time - rather the school would focus on how to build relationships, how to advise on core competencies that were already developed on an individual and unit level, etc. It could be run by the service, or it could be run by the Joint Proponent for SFA.

We already have some other relevant skills for SFA - those that deal with contracting, foreign military sales, etc. for those leaders who will work in those related areas in order to ensure mission success - program those requirements into the MTO&E and expand the existing schools to meet the demand (or send out mobile training teams) - hell send the CHEMO:D - I jokingly say that - in fact I've known some incredibly competent CHEMOs - however my point is that if we determine the BCT or 2 star HQs needs X amount of SAOs, FAOs, IO, what have you to support the core mission, then change the MTO&E and send them to the schools.

How about partnering with local universities to come into post and teach a variety of languages on a sustained basis. Let DoD pay the bill and send soldiers during the duty day. Extend the program and teach the same languages in on post schools to our soldier's kids - hell open it up to the spouses. Don't make it just straight language proficiency - but like getting a minor in a foreign language in a university - teach the culture, politics, history, literature and art that goes with the language skill so guys can be conversant and build relationships and interests. DoD might even foot the bill for soldiers with doing well in the course to go on a 2 week study abroad with the university and have cultural immersion.

What are we teaching in our BNCOC, ANCOC, SGM ACAD, and the assorted officers courses from the most basic to the War Colleges, to include the BN and BCT level command courses? Some of these courses are in fact offering related electives- but what should be changed in the core curricula? How we consider the nature of the problems we will encounter matters.

In that way I get LTC Nagls point about the "advisor tab". Why do we expect new LTs to show up to a 18th ABN Corps IN BN with a tab? Because its a cultural expectation. Ranger school is an institution in that regard, in the same way that AASLT school is at the 101st, jump master qualification at the 82nd, EIB for all Infantry units, EMB for medics and all the other tabs and badges we place value on - they represent the institutionalization of something. I may not agree with it (remember I got my foundation in the Marines:D), but I recognize the value of such things to the institution - they represent far more then the cloth or metal and enamel stuck on the uniform.

That is my point about institutionalization - when we see something as a core part of "Land Power" we have institutionalized it. At that point it is woven into the broader tapestry who we believe we need to be in order to meet our institutional obligations to the nation. In my view the CSA's message is pointing us in the direction that our civilian leadership says we must go to meet our commitments to the future security of the country. Nobody said don't still be the Land Power that can compel others to our will by taking and holding ground - that is a part of who we are as well. What I think is being said is that along with what we've always done, we need to make room for "by, with and through" because its both a key part of our future security, and because the size and scope of the mission is such that our GPF land power must take it on to be successful.

Best, Rob

jcustis
06-21-2008, 01:04 AM
A few observations, which may or may not have real relevance to the discussion at hand. The thoughts come from someone who always saw himself as a good and willing candidate for the advisory role. I'll probably volunteer for one someday should the opportunity arise, but just about everyone I've talked to with MiTT experience has recommended I run for the hills.

-It has taken a long, long time for RIPs to get better. In the beginning, and out to about early 2006, they were atrocious for some.

-Personality dynamics on MiTTs/BiTTs can be brutal. Unlike service in a Bn/RCT/BCT/Div where there are natural pressure relief valves, if your MiTT lead is a glory-hound jackass who marked time to his current rank, you can't escape the crap. It's akin to how baboons relate in captivity vs. the wild. In the zoo, baboons fight more often because they can't run away like their wild cousins can. In larger organizations, the pain brought on by a mouth-breather is spread around more easily.

-Those most willing to be placed on a MiTT have already found a way to do it, so incentives only go so far. The danger of careerism now poses the risk of making it easier for marginal performers to pass what vetting there is. Not only do they have the potential to make life a PITA for teamates, they now have the chance to screw up our best chance of leaving OIF/OEF.

-MiTT training still seems to be uneccessarily haphazard, as demonstrated by experiences from at least one of our members. I commented as much a while back, after seeing the holes in a 2006 work-up schedule. I can only hope that the means of staffing, training, and resourcing these efforts has gotten better and become standardized.

-Someone needs to force a cultural change on the reporting requirement, as virtually every after-action and comment I read from MiTT bubbas makes mention of the partner unit and HHQ layering too many reports on them. We have to get our hands around that, whether it be through PME, HHQ staff in briefs, etc. Some of the metrics are indeed important, but we aren't bean counters, so ease up a little. Burn a little bit of gas and do the BUB in person and see firsthand what is being accomplished. Heck, the violence is going down after all...right? I guess that could work against you if you didn't want outside "wisdom" or the glare of the senior flat black club member on you.

-We've made strides in changing the way advisory duty is viewed in the Marine Corps, but I'm not so sure that the influence will stick. The push for us to get back to our conventional and amphibious roots, get back into the tougher fights (OEF vs. OIF), and shape our Corps for tomorrow. Unless the new Vision and Strategy document (pending release next week) lays out something very concrete and new about how we will build and sustain our cultural and language capabilities in support of advisory roles, I'm not sure the culture will shift appreciably.

-The fact that the CSA and Commandant have had to place this emphasis out there already speaks volumes about the darker side of the mission. The guys out there already know, and it doesn't come out too much in AARs...it pops up when you reconnect with your buddy at the O' or staff club.

jkm_101_fso
06-21-2008, 05:40 AM
Ok, if you want TTs to be filled with the "best and brightest", you have to make it a job that people desire and are rewarded for. Until all ranks are given proper credit for TT assignments, no one will do it. If TT is "pointy end of the spear"---at least that is what I was told...then "big army" will find a way to make it desirable and beneficial to careers. I considered that maybe it should be an Functional area; when not advising, you are teaching stateside, but not sure the personnel logistics would work out. I bet there are guys who become pros at this that aren't wearing Green Berets.
Anyway, if this is a mission for the forseeable future, then we gotta figure something out. Right now, it is, for the most part, a dreaded assignment. I think that deploying BCTs with "out of hide" TTs maybe the wave of the future, as opposed to RFF...especially if our footprint in Iraq starts to diminish. Instead of an entire BDE, we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever. It reduces the number of B.O.G., but maintains that relationship with IA, IP, etc. Just a thought. Then there is no "search" or wait for "volunteers" b/c the TT will come out of hide from the BDE and will probably at the discretion and selection of BN and BDE commanders. That is how you get the best and brightest. It is a critical job and our way out, eventually. Not everyone is geared for it. It takes patience, trust me.

jcustis
06-21-2008, 12:45 PM
For a large part, "out-of-hide" has been a Marine Corps modus operandi. I have been told the story of at least one point in the rotation timeline when all of the XOs and S-3s from 1 MARDIV units headed over were locked in the Division CP conference room and told to carve out X number of MiTTs, BiTTs, and PiTTs before they could go home.

It proved to be a late night, but those folks tried to do a good job of balancing the requirement of their own unit needs against the mission needs (e.g. not sending marginal performers).

Was it ever this way with the USA?


we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever. It reduces the number of B.O.G., but maintains that relationship with IA, IP, etc.

Does anyone think that our overall BOG footprint will influence who volunteers? That is, will the prospect of having fewer QRFs that are further away influence some of those otherwise willing few to decline? Do we know if solid reactionary force plans are being put in place, rehearsed, and resourced, to respond to unforeseen threats to these folks?

John Nagl
06-21-2008, 01:38 PM
"I think that deploying BCTs with "out of hide" TTs maybe the wave of the future, as opposed to RFF...especially if our footprint in Iraq starts to diminish. Instead of an entire BDE, we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever."

There are huge advantages to building MTT's from within BCT's--integral chain of command, soldiers who know each other already, and increased operational effectiveness. The Brits and USMC rely on this method to a certain extent for just these reasons.

However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.

This is why I've recommended the creation of standing Advisor units, which would be more effective than our current manning technique for TT's, but would be far less costly for the Army as a whole. Centrally selecting TT leadership is a huge step in the same direction--that is, creating more effective TT teams at a relatively low cost in a resource constrained environment.

As the war in Iraq becomes increasingly an advisor-based effort for us (see the great NYT front-page story on increasingly effective Iraqi units today), the importance of advisors will only increase as the number of deployed US BCT's diminishes. Anything we can do to build the Army we need for today's wars--an Army that fights "by, with, and through" our allies rather than doing the heavy lifting ourselves--will shorten the wars and make success more likely. I applaud GEN Casey's recent decision as being likely to do just those things.

MikeF
06-21-2008, 01:45 PM
Was it ever this way with the USA? jcurtis

Last year, I worked with four different Army battalions throughout the Diyala Province. Additionally, when an IA Battalion was sent from Ramadi to reinforce the Diyala River Valley, the Marine MTT followed.

The Marines were exceptional, hand-selected. The LT working directly for me was post PL/XO enroute to Force Recon.

On the Army side, I observed a mixture. The Officers coming "outta hide" from the BCT's were typically post-command captains who had excelled in command. The RFF guys varied- I met many young motivated captains/majors and NCO's. In one odd situation, the MTT major was an Apache pilot who did a phenominal job. Whenever I worked a new area, I would establish contact with them to build relationships- just like anything else in the Army.

The majority of the time, they simply wanted to know that they would be supported. Once we established that we were on the same team, everything flowed.

I had nothing but respect for 70% of the MTTs that I worked with.

Once relationships were established, all was well. To me, it was very simple.

The few that I met with that were disgruntled were typically not supported by a parent unit and felt isolated. Regardless, it's all about attitude. In any job, you can decide to make the best of it and complete the mission, or feel sorry for yourself and sulk.


Does anyone think that our overall BOG footprint will influence who volunteers? JCURTIS

I'll volunteer as an advisor, but I certainly don't want to be the last man standing in Baghdad.

Regards,

Mike

Rob Thornton
06-21-2008, 06:06 PM
John Nagl said,


However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.

This is why I've recommended the creation of standing Advisor units, which would be more effective than our current manning technique for TT's, but would be far less costly for the Army as a whole. Centrally selecting TT leadership is a huge step in the same direction--that is, creating more effective TT teams at a relatively low cost in a resource constrained environment.

Sir, thanks for contributing. I think you bring up some valid points we must consider not only as they apply to Iraq and Afghanistan, but beyond toward the context of what is relevant "Land Power" - and what are the required capabilities and capacities we need now and in the future. Both Iraq and Afghanistan must be addressed first as they constitute not only important policy objectives for the moment, but I believe are of a nature that many other existing and future policy objectives are contingent on how we go about pursuing those policies.

One of the things we are considering as we reduce our presence in Iraq in terms of units and the supporting infrastructure, what is required to sustain, and even increase our advisory effort there? There is still allot of the Iraq security forces whose development is critical to sustainable security and is contingent on external advisory assistance. We were providing support to a DoD agency recently for an exercise who thought we only had to put DIV level type TTs and below into their exercise in order to achieve the policy goal.

They had not considered all the things that are currently present in Iraq which took us the last 5 years to build, or which were already there as a result of Iraq being relatively developed in comparison to other locations in the world. They had not considered the cumulative effect of our ad-hoc development, from the support infrastructure we'd built inside Iraq, to the regional infrastructure we'd built over decades, to our use of surplus or "in theater" equipment we'd built up both before 2003 and as a result of operations post 2003. They'd not taken into account the ad-hoc nature of how MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, IAG, CPAT or the various 2 star MND CMDs had grown or changed to keep pace with their responsibilities. They had not considered the depth and breadth of the security sector and how it worked – which is something we are really just now starting to understand in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the need to grow the supporting institutions such as the ministries which regulate the DOTMLPF functions or the laws which govern how a HN employs its forces and to what end. There was little thought given to the issues of oversight and accountability which need to be built into those ministries in order to sustain them. There was only vague understanding about how uneven development disrupts the broader security sector and the HN’s legitimacy and credibility – such as the role the corrections system plays in being able to accept various types of criminals and terrorists and how it facilitates reintegration of that population – or how if done in a slip shod manner might perpetuate or exacerbate social problems by allowing inmate populations to socialize and extend their networks.

All of these types of things that have taken us 5 years to understand were assumed away in their first look because they were treated as if they had always been there. The things which sustain our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan today were treated as if they would come with the initial wave of our assistance. The 1206 and 1207 and all the other funding & authorities were treated as if they would come already available and synchronized with the tools which we might send to do the physical organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising. The possibility that the security situation could change and require greater flexibility in terms of full spectrum operations was not at first considered.

All of this needs to be considered in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness. What is one is not necessarily the other, and there is a difference between preparation for war and its execution. Any solution we put forward must not only consider on, but both. If we unduly sacrifice one for the other because we did not fully account for the scope of the task in a variety of environments, or the range of potential outcomes that may come as a result of our involvement and interaction, then we may unduly risk the policy objective. Whatever efficiencies we may have gained in one area by not acknowledging the nature of the environment and providing a commander with the breadth of tools and unity of command a good assessment calls for may create the ad-hoc conditions which creates sustained inefficiencies as well as marginal effectiveness. The form is subservient to the function, but if the form is not able to accommodate the range of functions required then we get neither effectiveness nor efficiency. That is something we have to account for in the discussion.
Best Regards, Rob

jcustis
06-22-2008, 03:49 PM
All of this needs to be considered in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness. What is one is not necessarily the other, and there is a difference between preparation for war and its execution. Any solution we put forward must not only consider on, but both. If we unduly sacrifice one for the other because we did not fully account for the scope of the task in a variety of environments, or the range of potential outcomes that may come as a result of our involvement and interaction, then we may unduly risk the policy objective. Whatever efficiencies we may have gained in one area by not acknowledging the nature of the environment and providing a commander with the breadth of tools and unity of command a good assessment calls for may create the ad-hoc conditions which creates sustained inefficiencies as well as marginal effectiveness. The form is subservient to the function, but if the form is not able to accommodate the range of functions required then we get neither effectiveness nor efficiency. That is something we have to account for in the discussion.

This is all precisly why I hope the executors (military) and policy planners are thinking long and hard about the OIF efforts of 2012-2020, where this will be absolutely crucial.

Makes me think of Ray Bradbury and "A Sound of Thunder". Who is collaborating and thinking about the butterfly effect and intersection of variables in the Iraqi environment?

Sounds like it's time for a massive TDG! :D

MikeF
06-22-2008, 06:06 PM
Rob- Forgot to begin my last several posts with "good work." I appreciate the thought that you've put into this discussion, and I think you're spot on.

JCUSTIS- Concur with all. From my limited perspective, unfortunately, I would submit that it would take 2-3 "strong" tours actually on the ground in Iraq outside of the FOB IOT have the proper perspective to properly plan long term strategy and efficiences/effectiveness. I do not believe that we're there yet in that regard.

Another COA would be a collaborative study- a SWJ Blog could facilitate that one. A open discussion of experiences and best practices coupled with NGO/academic advice could potentially produce a better product for a working long-term solution than a mere MDMP in a windowless room.

Key discussion points would possibly entail:

1. Security Gap for NGOs. How do you facilitate reconstruction (PRT, NGOs, UN) with proper security?

2. Denied Areas. As CF withdrawals, how do we minimize/curtail "enemy" from regaining denied areas and developing counter-states?

3. Force Protection for Advisors. What QRF/ISR/CAS/AWT assets are required to assists. An assumed planning factor would be a 15 minute reaction time.

4. Political Process. What is our role as GOI assumes more autonomy?

Just some thoughts.

v/r

Mike

jcustis
06-22-2008, 08:41 PM
Mike,

Your mention of the Blog was something I was kicking around, but then I thought long and hard and wondered...so what?

Where does this brainstorming happen? Is it happening at State right now, or at AEI seminars and JFK Center conferences?

It frustrates me to a great degree because I fear that as we make this discernable shift from kinetic to non-kinetic/governance/infrastructure efforts, we are going to see the influence of players who don't have credible experience on the ground. Maybe I'm overly pessimistic, but I will indeed be pissed if we see a repeat of the 2003 CPA drama that fails to spend time thinking about the law of unintended consequences and 2nd-3rd order effects.

We need to start thinking about 2012-2020 right now, so that we can refine and smooth out the various COAs, sequels, and branch plans, and try to break this terribly complex matter down into manageable parts. Call it a QDR of sorts. We also need to be very careful to nest it in with ops next door, because if we cannot get a handle on Afghanistan and move forward with Iran, there will be a definite and significant impact of how Iraq moves forward.

MikeF
06-22-2008, 08:55 PM
Wow, what a great sunday.

I remember being a tank platoon leader in Feb 2003. After the OPORD, I asked the stupid question of what do we do when we actually get to Baghdad?

I was told to quit thinking too much.

Shame on me.

Unfortunately, it is probably not being considered.

An open discussion on this blog would probably be particularly helpful.

From my perspective, it's all about the children now. The secondary and tertiary effects of our occupation could haunt their future. Imagine the recrutiing scheme for transnational terrorist if we inadvertently pulled out or haphazardly continued to occupy.

These concerns haunt my sleep. Despite 4 tours and a TBI, I'll probably redeploy as an advisor to make it right.

Good call, jcustis.

Rob Thornton
06-22-2008, 11:30 PM
that MNC-I, CENTCOM, and others are thinking that far out about the types of questions we bring up regularly here on SWJ, many of those thinking about it exchange ideas ere and in other places - also cool because it allows us to leverage each other. The school houses are also thinking about it - we recently sent one of our folks up who'd served as a LOG advisor to the school house to partner with a BSB SPO who'd done some great work in Ninewa province supporting two IA DIV's worth of TTs, the ISF partner units and the host of other folks up there. They were helping big Army LOG look at the way ahead. PKSOI is also doing some great work in trying to consider what the future footprint will require.

However, I think the questions that Mike F brings up are spot on, and we can all benefit by thinking about it. While the many supporting organizations have the will to help, they may not understand all the issues or challenges. Each area has some unique challenges and may require a different footprint and capabilities then another based on the conditions. A BCT that goes into Ninewa probably looks not only a little different from year to year based on progression of ISF and development in the provincial economy and political areas, and it also probably looks different based on the nature of the province. This is one reason why the MA of the unit going into an area must include the ongoing assessment by units already there - where are things now, where are they anticipated to be 6, 12 and 18 month out? Another challenge is getting the many "onsies and twosies" involved with SFA linked up early on to get synchronized with the MSC. One of our SWC members has a daughter going to Iraq in a ARNG MP unit that has gotten the mission to support IP development, but getting them in synch with the BCT from receipt of mission so they can start understanding the OE and adjust their training is part of the challenge. We (big purple all of us we) are making progress in ensuring service and IA advisor training centers and the folks who man them know what the others are doing and can talk (big hat tip MSG M.B. on his hard work) and share, but identifying who all touches SFA, helping them understand how they touch it, and helping them better prepare to do it are all part of the challenge.

The training and mission prep of the many types of units and individuals involved with SFA mission is only part of the challenge. Ensuring they are supported and sustained is key to helping us get the most out of the time they spend deployed advising, and includes not only MEDEVAC, QRF, Survivability, Maintenance, and other key sustainment issues, but also includes getting the equipment to ISF, authorities to do contracts, etc. Just like any combat operation, this one has a tooth to tail that is critical to the mission and it varies with the environment and over time.

Best Regards, Rob

MikeF
06-23-2008, 12:39 AM
Unfortunately Rob, I served a limited time in MNC-I. Despite their best intentions and enthusiams, they seem to be working on the latest memo.

I've learned more from SWJ than any staff every taught me.

“Mike, I must warn you to believe only half of what I tell you. If you cannot find two independent sources to verify what I told you, then you must discard it. This is Iraq. You must learn our ways.” Sheik Adnon Al-Tamimi, Feast of Ramadan 2006

"Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them." Laurence J. Peter

“The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them." Albert Einstein


You can't learn this on a staff. It takes multiple tours and a lot of additonal reading. Unless you understand the way the Iraqi system actual works (in inputs, processes, function, and outputs) then you will have no regard.

"In Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problem," Dr. Jeff Conklin suggests ten symptoms that can potential identify wicked problem territory.
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-false, but good-bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that maybe incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong.

It is what it is.

I sincerely hope that I haven't spoken outside of my rank or position. I'm a mere captain in grad school; however, my life has been absorbed in this war. I simply want to see it to completion. I want to see a reasonable solution for our children.


v/r

Mike

Rob Thornton
06-23-2008, 11:13 AM
Hi Mike,
I don't think you are out of bounds:D. They are some big staffs, while we (JCISFA) are the gang of 25. The reason I brought it up is because we recently sent somebody over to help facilitate a discussion between some of the participants on what happens further down the pike. That said, hard to say how much energy is put toward the task, but it is nice to know that within the various "-I" commands they are thinking beyond the 75 meter some. My feeling is the community (supporting commands and agencies) is being leveraged some because I'm starting to hear the questions come up in different ways - which is good.

That said, SWJ is a great place to help out because it gets others thinking about problems, and because we can leverage a wide base of experience (consider Ken White who has seen the good and the bad on a range of issues (sometimes more then once). The folks on those staffs, and within a range of other commands, agencies, organizations, etc. get to leverage that experience for free and see where it fits.

Like you and J.C. brought up, maybe we consider a working thread on the challenges of sustaining TTs (generic - of any flavor)& PRTs (where they have not transitioned to an AID effort over time) in the future. I think such a discussion can help folks in the "-I" staffs, as well as those back here in support who have to forecast resources. If you only help the number of people who come to SWJ or who leverage someone who does, then its worth the effort.

Maybe we take it from the angle of what is being provided currently by the scope of the U.S. presence in terms of the WFFs (war fighting functions for out non-mil folks), what is not being provided - but could be to make the mission more effective. We can consider what will happen as those pieces are withdrawn, contracts run out, etc. A valid concern I think is that you don't always know how critical something was until you need it, or until its gone. An example might be the various level of medical care in sufficient capacity to meet the surge demand. The HN medical infrastructure has along way to go to be able support an environment where a MASCAL is less frequent but still possible (and in some cases probable) - not only from war related incidents, but from natural disasters, etc. The question is not just about supporting our remaining forces then, but the support required to assist Iraq with continuing to move forward so we don't put the policy objectives at increased risk.

From sustainment BDEs to the Intel and C4 functions architecture that make it all possible - we've built an Ad-Hoc structure where new things have been built over the top of existing ones, if you just remove something without knowing what it touches you may not know you have a problem until its too late. This is just the nature of what we do I think, new commands come in and they take the work that has already been done and they make it better if they can. Systems get built on the top of systems then handed off - the problem is that some of the original pieces get lost over time, and the chain of continuity gets broken - people may not know what the original reason for doing something or doing it a certain way was.

As we go forward we've got ensure that the critical links are exposed as being critical, and then preserved, and in some cases strengthened as some of the supporting ad-hoc stuff that has been built around it and currently helps support the weight its taken on over the years is peeled away. The weight on those critical pieces may not diminish, it may actually increase - particularly if you remove the ancillary things that may have been indirectly providing some support. We have to got to do a thorough by province "self-assessment" that looks at not only the units, but the environment.

We've got to take time to learn about the house we've built so to speak because we've done it relatively fast and more then a few builders have had their hands on it at different levels each with a slightly different understanding of what they thought it should look like. My guess is that has created a house where everything functions OK, but you can't say take th door from one end of the hallway and put it at the other, it just won't fit. It may be that the door had to be built that way based on how the ground sat at that end of the property, but that still does not change the physics at the other end. Being 76" tall (at least I used to be:D) I've got some good stories about Iraqi buildings.

One of the things we're looking at is the need for robust CIV-MIL assessment teams who can over a year's time get out and look across the breadth and depth of the OE (wherever it may be) and come back with recommendations that look up to 5 years out (Surfer Beetle sent me a link to a Rand study that a pretty good model - Steve if you are out there you might put up th link). There would certainly be a degradation of quality in the assessment the further out they'd look, but by doing so you might not only help feed the future requirements on the ground with a more suitable / tailored force better in tune with the needs of the OE, but you might also feed force development (think GDF) and help programming an budget analysis to better anticipate and keep pace. Just understanding ourselves is often a challenge, understanding how we will interact with the OE adds great complexity.

I like Conklin's list - thanks for putting it up.

Best, Rob

Schmedlap
06-23-2008, 01:11 PM
The more that I think about it, the more I agree that a standing advisory corps of some type is appropriate. The reason being is that our current professional education system and the informal professional development within units is not geared towards fostering the skills and knowledge appropriate for a MiTT. It is geared towards creating commanders and staff officers who have lots of Soldiers who all speak the same doctrinal language, share the same SOPs, exist within the same bureaucratic mold, and are subject to the same UCMJ. Nothing could be more different from serving in a maneuver battalion than to serve as an advisor. It should come as no surprise that not only do many Soldiers not desire to serve on a MiTT, but that it is also highly unlikely that commanders can even identify which Soldiers would best fit the role of an advisor. It does not fit neatly into the organizational culture of the BN that officers are raised in (but, perhaps, fits a little neater into a BCT where there is more of a melting pot of MOS's).

From a personal perspective, I enjoyed working with Iraqis when my infantry battalion was standing up and training an Iraqi battalion in OIF III. Eventually we had a MiTT (and a "SPTT" too?) who lived with them and it appeared to be a good experience for all involved. I would have had no problems with living with those Iraqis, but only if I could have picked my MiTT members or if I felt reassured that they were not duds. But upon redeployment, when I pondered my next PCS, I did not volunteer to serve on a MiTT simply because I knew that many individuals being assigned to them were not volunteers and I suspected that they did not have great attitudes about doing it. There were lots of stories about Captains being plucked from their career course for MiTT duty. I also keenly recalled that were it not for me and my supply sergeant going out of our way to help our attached MiTT logistically, then they would have been extremely ineffective, since they had no DODAAC, class II or IX accounts, or other basic admin and logistics necessities.

I hope that my perception of the general motivation of individuals tagged for MiTT duty was completely inaccurate - and in hindsight it was probably a bit pessimistic - but nonetheless that perception did not arise out of thin air. I did not want to attempt to train and mentor an Iraqi unit with Soldiers who were no more motivated than the Iraqis were. That, again, reinforces my belief that a standing advisory corps is worthwhile. If such an organization were setup, and its ranks were filled with individuals who clearly wanted to do the job, then it would be much more desirable. And, on somewhat of a sidenote, I think it would be wise to forego the combat advisor tab. Keeping it a small a group of quiet professionals who need no distinctive uniform accessories would help to underscore that they are motivated by professional ideals of selfless service. It could help in assuring that the right people are drawn, rather than people who like to smother their uniform with Clothing & Sales novelties.

Schmedlap
06-23-2008, 01:38 PM
I remember being a tank platoon leader in Feb 2003. After the OPORD, I asked the stupid question of what do we do when we actually get to Baghdad?

I was an Infantry PL at that time. I was even more naive. Rather than asking what we would do, I just assumed that we were going to make a smooth transition into SOSO. But maybe that is because I had just done a deployment to Bosnia 10 months prior. Stupid me.

I usually managed to sneak to our battalion HQ in Baghdad on the days that they were doing their BUB/C&S meetings. I usually sat behind the CA guy. He was a smart guy who had the right idea, but had no resources or guidance to go on and basically did what he could. I remember looking over his shoulder at his notepad during one meeting and the only thing written on it was:

"CMO Plan: no plan."

That basically summed up the whole time that we spent in Baghdad from late April 03, onward. It was small unit leaders doing what they could, with zero guidance or support, while the Division built a Burger King and MWR building at the airport, the BDE worked overtime to set up mini-internet cafes to email home, and BN tried to strike a balance between dealing with the absurdity going on at BDE and above and trying, in vain, to leverage small units who meant well but had no resources. If I had $50,000 in 2003, my AO in the Rusafa district would have been salvagable. But we can't trust people with that much money. They might waste it. Better to spend it on a KBR DFAC. Instead, everyday, I informed my CO and S-2 that our neighborhoods were getting worse, that we could do little more than slow the inflow of armed gangs from surrounding neighborhoods and that we needed money and some assistance. Sorry - all available troops are playing soccer and tag football at the Olympic Stadium. Rather than reinforce us, they just pulled us out and sent us to do route security outside the airport so that shipments of Doritos and twinkies would not get ambushed on Route Irish. Our 1990s safety-first, train-later, risk-averse, mission-neutral mindset paid some real big dividends in 2003.

I'm not saying that anyone was playing the fiddle while Baghdad burned, but they were eating their fair share of ho-hos and watching a lot of VCDs, oblivious to the inferno gathering around them.

Eden
06-23-2008, 03:57 PM
I don't believe an advisory corps would be as effective as hoped for two reasons.

1. Like FAO - which many would find fascinating, fulfilling work - a standing advisory corps would have trouble attracting the kind of people you want because they will be unlikely to forego a shot at command down the line. And I don't see the brass ring of command losing its allure any time soon.

2. Unlike FAO, the role of advisors is likely to become less important in the long run. The strategic environment and the nature of the threat have a pesky habit of changing over the space of a decade or so. Do we want to spend ten years creating all the infrastructure and overhead that goes with a 'corps' of advisors, when in fifteen years the need for them is reduced to insignificance. Or, and perhaps more likely, the armed forces are reduced to the point that a separate advisory corps becomes too much of a luxury?

Can anyone comment on the Vietnam experience? Did we have trouble 'attracting' qualified men to the advisory positions? Or did that become a problem only after we had significant combat forces in-country and the best and brightest wanted to operate with our own units and not the South Vietnamese?

In other words, was the allure of advisor slots higher when it was the only way to get involved ina shooting war?

Ken White
06-23-2008, 05:03 PM
in my observation, it was sort of a mixed bag. My overall impression was that the pipeline just did its thing; thus you got everything from stellar to cellar. The post-1969 CORDS period was after my time but knowing some folks that were advisers at the time, I don't think the process had changed much.

In the early days, a lot of upper half folks volunteered, it was the only war in town. After US troop commitments rose, that dropped due to the Command possibility in a unit but my impression was that unit advisers were generally pretty sharp, the Provincial advisory team guys less so though obviously there were exceptions to both sides of that.

There were undoubtedly a lot of folks who might not ordinarily have gone to Viet Nam in any capacity or who might have had only one tour due to a low number of branch requirements in country who went and / or got second (or more) tours by volunteering or getting tapped to serve as Advisers. I can think of an MP, an Ordnance and an Armor guy who fit in that category -- all Majors at the time and all served on Provincial rather than unit advisory Teams. IMO, the MP was average (non-vol), the Armor guy above (vol) and the Ord guy (non-vol) below so it was sort of a mixed bag post 69, I think. I'll ask around.

Tom Odom
06-23-2008, 05:14 PM
I don't believe an advisory corps would be as effective as hoped for two reasons.

1. Like FAO - which many would find fascinating, fulfilling work - a standing advisory corps would have trouble attracting the kind of people you want because they will be unlikely to forego a shot at command down the line. And I don't see the brass ring of command losing its allure any time soon.

2. Unlike FAO, the role of advisors is likely to become less important in the long run. The strategic environment and the nature of the threat have a pesky habit of changing over the space of a decade or so. Do we want to spend ten years creating all the infrastructure and overhead that goes with a 'corps' of advisors, when in fifteen years the need for them is reduced to insignificance. Or, and perhaps more likely, the armed forces are reduced to the point that a separate advisory corps becomes too much of a luxury?

Can anyone comment on the Vietnam experience? Did we have trouble 'attracting' qualified men to the advisory positions? Or did that become a problem only after we had significant combat forces in-country and the best and brightest wanted to operate with our own units and not the South Vietnamese?

In other words, was the allure of advisor slots higher when it was the only way to get involved ina shooting war?

Excellent historical sources on this issue are the two companion papers done by LTC (ret) Bob Ramsey at CSI. I used them in a history lesson in 2006:


"In advisory and counterinsurgency efforts, Thomas Carlyle’s warning that “nothing is more terrible than activity without insight” is particularly appropriate. As a former MILGROUP commander wrote, “the problem is, and has always been, to get the analysis right before prescribing cures.”8 Analysis requires situational understanding, not awareness. Even in peacetime, under normal conditions, situational understanding can prove fleeting. In wartime, for an advisor in a foreign country, it is almost impossible. At a minimum, an advisor needs to understand the local language, the local culture and values, the local military institutional ethos and how it works, his counterpart as a person in that foreign culture and constrained by that military institution, the local capabilities and limitations, and the specific local situation to comprehend what is going on around him and to preclude misunderstandings. Then, it may be possible to offer advice suitable to the situation; acceptable both to his counterpart and to his US superiors; and feasible given time, resources, and the capabilities and limi¬tations of host nation forces."

This installment of the JRTC BiWeekly History Lessons deals with a topic that does not pop up on the screen when the subject of military history is "googled" on the web. Even inside US military circles, military advisors and advisory efforts--as in the study of military history--is not a subject of common interest.

That is rapidly changing, driven by operational needs. In the past few months, I have briefed several times on counter-insurgency operations. Every time, I have asked the question, "how many of you have served on a transition team....yet? My pause in asking that question was deliberate: given the needs of our efforts in operational theaters, many if not most career soldiers--active duty, reserve, or National Guard--will face the challenges of an advisory tour.

For this lesson I offer the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper # 18, (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey.pdf)Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, by Mr, Robert D. Ramsey, III. Bob Ramsey is a friend and colleague. He surveys three relatively high profile advisory efforts and measures their successes and failures as individual case studies. Most importantly, Ramsey draws the three examples together, extracting the salient lessons in his concluding chapter, entitled simply, "Observations." The following essay offers some of those conclusions and my own thoughts introducing them to you.


The second is:
Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, Robert D. Ramsey III. Paper #19 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_op19.pdf)

That is probably more history than you ask for but they are worth looking at.
As for who wanted to be an advisor and who did not, my read was the same dynamic applied in that the main stream route was through duty with US forces while lesser beings served as advisors. That was driven by a promotion system that rewarded duty with US forces over advisors. As you put it "attracting the kind of people you want" remains in play;indeed I would say that mindset was likely the main driver for the CSA message in the first place.

In this regard, I would say the Army needs to heed what the SecDef told the US Air Force: focus on the fight we are in and do what is necessary. I think the CSA's message speaks to that.

Tom

jkm_101_fso
06-23-2008, 06:55 PM
[QUOTE=John Nagl;50499
However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.[/QUOTE]

Sir,
I certainly see your point and concede it. What about "choosing" a BN from a BCT for this mission? A perfect unit to conduct this would be the Fires BN; of course, the first choice would be IN, AR or RSTA, but they could be better utilized for the Afghanistan fight. The BN could Troop to Task itself into TTs and utilize the rest of the BN for security, log, med, etc. That way, the BCT is still eligible for deployment to Afghanistan, just minus one of its' BNs. By utilizing the Fires BN, the BCT still has all of its manuever BNs available. Just an idea. I did read your article in the FA Journal (July 06), which essentially recommends the same thing...not sure the FA brach should be the key proponet for all TTs...but we are a great asset for that mission. By the way, the photo in your article is of MAJ Mike Oeschger, who was my TT chief at the time in Tuz Kharmatu with 3-2-4 IA. I'm sure I was on the ground somewhere when the picture was snapped!!! Small world!!! The 'terp in the picture was "Jack"...an awesome Kurd and Iraqi.
The TT question is a hard one to answer. I don't think RFF is the best way to go, compared to the "out of hide" option. Eventually, as BCTs drawn down in Iraq, the TTs will remain, I think that is a foregone conclusion. Gen Casey took the right step in making TT a KD job for MAJs, but what about junior officers and NCOs? As we refine this process, we have to make TT a desirable and rewarding assignment. I'd argue it's already rewarding, professionally and personally, but "big Army" has to make it a competetive environment; how that will happen, I don't know. But making it KD for MAJ is certainly a step in the right direction.
I enjoyed "soup with a knife" very much, sir. I'm still in the long process of getting through the COIN FM. I'm sorry to see the Army is losing you to CNAS. I was hoping to see you in command of a BDE at some point. Best of luck at CNAS.

nascar88
07-01-2008, 07:18 PM
BLUF: Leave the advisory role to SF.

If we have to resort to having SMs volunteering for multiple deployments to get what they want or need, then we have an issue. We aren't considering mental health, emotional health, and family stability. Most SMs over in both theaters are on 3rd, some 4th deployments when we still have senior leadership with "slick sleeves." So, in a sense, we'd rather just go ahead and make Major's "KD." And make it a command for LTCs?? What???!!!

Coming from a BN MiTT in Diyala, the team chief Major's position is simply a SSG Squad Leader. Bottom line. My team chief was a SF guy and he'll be the first to say it. So, my team chief already had an ODA and did the advisory role, and now we're saying he doesn't need to command an SF company? Even though he did a Captain's job? Come on.

The LTC position on a BDE MiTT has only 10 personnel to include the LTC. Again, Squad Leader. The team chief is only in charge of nine personnel, and has no command authority over HN forces. The team chief and the team only ADVISE, not command. No UCMJ authory over anyone except for their team, they can only get THTs involved to have HN leadership removed.

Moving on...a lot of MiTT guys have already been accepted to SFAS and been told they cannot report until after the MiTT. Why not send these guys to SFAS, then the Q-Course and get them properly trained in HN advising? From FT Riley, to Kuwait, to the Phoenix Academy in Taji were we ever told to read FM 31-20-3. My team chief made us read it, and it is the best piece of literature for the job besides the COIN manual.

Training...most SF ODA commanders are all the same, have the same goals and set their successor for success through area studies. Of course, again, our team was the only team to do this and it helped our incoming team understand the AO, intelligence, etc. Big difference between their team chief and mine. Incoming team chief wanted to save the world, while my team chief knew it would take time and had to be smart about it. We ran intel, we ran sources, and we did all we could to advise, but no one ever read his daily sitreps. They were more concerned with timeliness of reporting than what was in the report. It takes a special person to advise, someone who is patient and doesn't do the, "well, when I was in Baghdad," and not everyone can do advising. Going back to what I said before...let the guys go to SFAS, Q Course and get trained.

And lastly...our IA battalion was on their SIXTH MiTT. Why? With each MiTT the BN should get better, right? I bet if area studies had been done that wouldn't be the case. SF cancels ODAs if the HN Army gets better. Am I making sense? Sending more MiTTs with no analysis continues the vicious cycle.

jkm_101_fso
07-01-2008, 10:01 PM
BLUF: Leave the advisory role to SF.

If we have to resort to having SMs volunteering for multiple deployments to get what they want or need, then we have an issue. We aren't considering mental health, emotional health, and family stability. Most SMs over in both theaters are on 3rd, some 4th deployments when we still have senior leadership with "slick sleeves." So, in a sense, we'd rather just go ahead and make Major's "KD." And make it a command for LTCs?? What???!!!

Coming from a BN MiTT in Diyala, the team chief Major's position is simply a SSG Squad Leader. Bottom line. My team chief was a SF guy and he'll be the first to say it. So, my team chief already had an ODA and did the advisory role, and now we're saying he doesn't need to command an SF company? Even though he did a Captain's job? Come on.

The LTC position on a BDE MiTT has only 10 personnel to include the LTC. Again, Squad Leader. The team chief is only in charge of nine personnel, and has no command authority over HN forces. The team chief and the team only ADVISE, not command. No UCMJ authory over anyone except for their team, they can only get THTs involved to have HN leadership removed.

Moving on...a lot of MiTT guys have already been accepted to SFAS and been told they cannot report until after the MiTT. Why not send these guys to SFAS, then the Q-Course and get them properly trained in HN advising? From FT Riley, to Kuwait, to the Phoenix Academy in Taji were we ever told to read FM 31-20-3. My team chief made us read it, and it is the best piece of literature for the job besides the COIN manual.

Training...most SF ODA commanders are all the same, have the same goals and set their successor for success through area studies. Of course, again, our team was the only team to do this and it helped our incoming team understand the AO, intelligence, etc. Big difference between their team chief and mine. Incoming team chief wanted to save the world, while my team chief knew it would take time and had to be smart about it. We ran intel, we ran sources, and we did all we could to advise, but no one ever read his daily sitreps. They were more concerned with timeliness of reporting than what was in the report. It takes a special person to advise, someone who is patient and doesn't do the, "well, when I was in Baghdad," and not everyone can do advising. Going back to what I said before...let the guys go to SFAS, Q Course and get trained.

And lastly...our IA battalion was on their SIXTH MiTT. Why? With each MiTT the BN should get better, right? I bet if area studies had been done that wouldn't be the case. SF cancels ODAs if the HN Army gets better. Am I making sense? Sending more MiTTs with no analysis continues the vicious cycle.

Of course, you bring up some valid points; I have some issues with a few:
1. When do you propose these "slick sleve" senior officers go to combat? Wouldn't a MTT be a good opportunity for them?
2. For some branches, making MTT "KD" makes sense, because of the high numbers of Majors and low numbers of KD jobs available. Supply and Demand.
2. YOU ABSOLUTELY DO NOT NEED TO BE SF QUALIFIED TO BE A QUALITY, FUNCTIONAL MEMBER ON A MTT. Although I'm sure that SFAS and Q-course could be helpful, it is not logistically feasible with the high number of MTT members needed. Although, it's a nice suggestion. Do you really think we should send LTCs, MAJs and senior NCOs through SFAS at this point in their careers? Probably not a good idea.
3. If your MTT chief simply acted as a squad leader, then he didn't do his job. I don't think he would agree with you in that capacity. Leading the MTT is not the priority, nor the qualifier for KD...that's where the "advising" comes in. Many MTT chiefs pursue different roles; some basically become DCOs of the HN force, some stay more at a distance. Simply "taking care" of the members of the MTT isn't the focus of the job. MTTs are the "ticket" out of Iraq to mitigate the egregious amount of deployments that you so vigorously highlighted in your intro. Majors should get credit for leading the effort at the "pointy tip of the spear".
4. Again, having UCMJ authority over the HN force has nothing to do with this as a KD job. It's arguably more challenging that you don't have any authority over the HN force, thus forcing a MTT chief to be that much more effective as an ADVISOR. The IA BN's performance will reflect the effectiveness of the MTT chief. Because of the importance of the IA's continued improvement, I'd argue a MTT chief has more responsibility, than say, a BN Commander with a mission of FORCE PRO on a FOB, COB or LSA. Just think about it, who's job is more difficult?
5. As a MTT member in Saladin, my MTT chief didn't use THT to remove the original IA BN CDR. He simply told the IA BDE CDR that he needed to be removed and it happened. I'm sure that's not the norm, but THT was nowhere in the picture, thank God.
6. I'm not sure "a lot" of MTT guys are already accepted to SFAS. In my BDE, I can think of one. Maybe that's changed. Because of the array and diversity of the MOS req. on the MTT, I doubt SFAS-selects are the majority. Maybe your team was the exception.
7. You should contact the trainers at Riley or Taji and suggest FM 31-20-3 as req. reading. I'm sure it would help.

None of this meant as too judgemental or harsh. I think your post was more out of emotion, than rational thought. It's OK, I've done it, too.

Ken White
07-02-2008, 12:20 AM
I'm still trying to figure out what the UCMJ has to do with anything... :wry:

CommoChief
07-06-2008, 07:09 PM
My previous assignment was on the MTT for 1/1/7 IA BN in Ramadi from Oct of 06 - Nov 07. Comming into our AO my BN had no idea we would be providing a MTT 'out of hide'. Fortunetly the BN CDR didn't just draw straws or throw darts at the alpha rosters. He chose those of us who had at least one deployment and in most cases two. He also made sure that most of us had at least some experience in previous deployments working with the old ING from the OIF II experience pool. He made his decisions and we were on a bird to the Pheonix Academy within 72 hours. Twelve days later we began our RIP. I would have to say the assignment was an incredible learning experience. We grew as a team and thankfully complemented each others strengths and weakness. Would I volunteer to be a BN level MTT again? Only if I knew, respected and had confidence in the Team Chief.

As to whether we need a standing advisory corps:
Yes, but a very limited one. This might consist of MTT/PTT vets who could get a letter of reccomendation from their Team Chief. These would be the cadre for training base and would at some point in a three year cycle, deploy as BDE or DIV level MTT. Then these Soldiers would return to the wider Army at the station if not assignment of choice. This has the benifit of retaining the expeience base and making sure that experience is utilized at decision making levels. Both BDE level MTT we worked under were less than steller performers. They both had two or three superstars but the remainder of their Team was more interested in counting off the calander than leaning forward and getting the mission completed. The talent and experience pool is deep enough to ensure that BDE and DIV MTT are staffed by Soldiers with relevent and successful experience as a MTT / PTT. The BN level MTT should come from the BCTs, two per BN. This will require a shifting of some low density MOS to these BN. However this allows the BDE and BN CDRs to select the best qualified by experience and, equally important, tempremant. It gives the BCT and BN CDRs trust and confidence in that the MTT in their AO are dependable, afterall they selected them. It makes it more likely that the BN level MTT will be supported logistically and with augmentees.

This has the effect of keeping the institutional memory of advising alive and, if the CSA has his way, respected as another career enhancing assignment. It keeps the knowlege of what the advisor does within the BCT and BN level and in a few years at the DIV level as well.

Advisor Tab - I am really not sure on this one. Nor am I comfortable with the ASI. Reason is purely selfish in that if we don't take some of the steps mentioned in this thread toward correcting the assignment of 'duds' to the MTT role then I and every other Soldier with MTT experience is going to be easily targeted for assignment over and over and over.

Advising is not the exclusive domain of SF. The role of the MTT is primarily to develop BN Staff. That doesn't mean you sit in the compound and drink cha and play chess all day. You still go on the missions and the patrols to provide combat multipiers/ effects but the goal is to get the IA to do planning that works, not to US Army Standard but one that gets the job done that fits their culture and mindset.

Interested in thoughts from previous MTT on this post.

Multi-skilled Leader
07-07-2008, 01:05 PM
Advising is not the exclusive domain of SF. The role of the MTT is primarily to develop BN Staff.... You still go on the missions and the patrols to provide combat multipiers/ effects but the goal is to get the IA to do planning that works, not to US Army Standard but one that gets the job done that fits their culture and mindset.

I would like to see a middle ground where the 18 series/SF community were large enough to provide support with cadre at the training facilities (Riley & Phoenix).

Less Rice Bowls and Stove Pipes between conventional & unconventional communities. The true advantage to TT/PRT experience is the broadening and leadership development that goes on in this truly unique mission set. It takes versatile leaders to adapt and be successful in this environment. SF Soldiers are selected and trained to excel in this mission. A generation of leaders retired from the Army with Vietnam advisory experience. The only evidence remaining are the few 4-star Generals, those such as Wallace (TRADOC), Campbell (FORSCOM), and Dan K. McNeill that began their careers advising in Vietnam. GEN McNeill served in an advisory role and most likely completed some type of SFAS/Qcourse enough to earn an SF tab. Upon returning to the conventional side he went on to become Commander, 82d, 18ABC, FORSCOM, CINC Korea, and recently NATO-AFG CINC. So isn't there a middle ground of allowing advising to become a combination of the conventional and unconventional. If we chose a "Center of Excellence" for advising, where would it go? Ft. Riley or Bragg?

Concerning advising, I believe the SF community used this "mission" to grow their community through the 70's&80's and now they've abandoned the larger advising mission for the Army for a number of reasons.

1. Lack of autonomy. Giving one 18 series to each "conventional" MTT does not give them control over the mission. It's the same apprehension the US gets when Soldiers go under limited or figurative UN or NATO flags for missions. When the intervention is on a small scale, such as the Philippines, they have taken on significant missions, but on their own OPTEMPO schedule which leads to the second point...

2. Higher OPTEMPO. The SF community has a great model of deploying for shorter duration (4-6 months). They have created a great culture of "when you're home, you're home" and "when you're gone, you're not gone for long" mentality. Contributing personnel to 15 month commitments would simply kill their culture.


Back to training advisors and being the SMEs for the Army, I believe the SF community could really become the cadre for training conventional advisory capacity. I believe it would grow their career field, ease recruiting once Soldiers knew more about what they did, and most importantly, break down barriers between the separate institutions of the Army.

Thanks for a great discussion thread.

patmc
07-07-2008, 03:49 PM
But the conventional Army is ok with "their culture" of 12-15 month deployments? It's OK to "kill" the conventional force, but protect SF?

If SF can advise 4-6 months, why not do the same with MTT?



2. Higher OPTEMPO. The SF community has a great model of deploying for shorter duration (4-6 months). They have created a great culture of "when you're home, you're home" and "when you're gone, you're not gone for long" mentality. Contributing personnel to 15 month commitments would simply kill their culture.

jkm_101_fso
07-07-2008, 06:31 PM
I would like to see a middle ground where the 18 series/SF community were large enough to provide support with cadre at the training facilities (Riley & Phoenix).

Riley or Bragg?


Did anybody else hear that the MiTT training at Riley was going to be come "an institution" at Fort Polk by 2010? I'm assuming located in or around JRTC? Maybe a nasty rumor. Probably a question for LTC Nagl.

Tom Odom
07-07-2008, 06:43 PM
Did anybody else hear that the MiTT training at Riley was going to be come "an institution" at Fort Polk by 2010? I'm assuming located in or around JRTC? Maybe a nasty rumor. Probably a question for LTC Nagl.

Fact not fiction

max161
07-08-2008, 10:56 AM
I would like to see a middle ground where the 18 series/SF community were large enough to provide support with cadre at the training facilities (Riley & Phoenix).


2. Higher OPTEMPO. The SF community has a great model of deploying for shorter duration (4-6 months). They have created a great culture of "when you're home, you're home" and "when you're gone, you're not gone for long" mentality. Contributing personnel to 15 month commitments would simply kill their culture.

.

First of all, SF group rotations are 7 months in and 5 months out when you look at the RIP/TOAs. Mission dependent but for the most part the SFODAs return to working with the same indigenous forces when they go back after 5 months out (and during that 5 months out they remain tuned into what is happening in the area they will be returining to). This is very important for long term continuity. Currently US SFODAs are advising and assisting some 97 battalions or national level CT forces on a near permanent basis around the world (but of course the majority in Iraq and Afghanistan). For the MiTTs to operate the same way they would have to become permanent organizations and contnue to rotate the same teams. Keeping a MiTT in country for 6 months and then replacing it with a new one, and then a new, etc would not be the same rotation model as SF.

Also, and what most people do not realize is that during those 5 months back and the one off cylce rotation out of 3 for one of the battalions in the Group, the SF ODAs are deploying to their assigned region to continue US engagement. US SF are conducting many operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan in other Mid East nations but throughout Africa, Central and South America and the Asia-Pacific region. While most of the overall US military commitment remains in Iraq and Afghanistan the same US SF operating there are rotating to other parts of the world. I think this is important to keep in mind. And of course in addition to this the members SF ODAs still have to attned professional development schools and advanced training.

patmc
07-17-2008, 11:59 PM
Looking around HRC website, and the branch manager message to MFE lists that MTT will move to Polk by end of next year. No details other than that they're building a unit up for the training. You will PCS to Kuwait or Polk if assigned. Nice options.


Did anybody else hear that the MiTT training at Riley was going to be come "an institution" at Fort Polk by 2010? I'm assuming located in or around JRTC? Maybe a nasty rumor. Probably a question for LTC Nagl.

Hacksaw
07-18-2008, 01:54 PM
PATMC

"You will PCS to Kuwait or Polk if assigned. Nice options."

Riley was better, you need to get out more young man

jkm_101_fso
07-18-2008, 02:11 PM
Riley was better, you need to get out more young man

...especially if you've been to Rusty's Last Chance in Aggieville; GO STATE!

patmc
07-18-2008, 07:25 PM
i completely agree. I've at least heard some nice things about riley, can't say the same about polk.


PATMC

"You will PCS to Kuwait or Polk if assigned. Nice options."

Riley was better, you need to get out more young man