View Full Version : Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons From Iraq and Afghanistan
Jedburgh
03-04-2006, 01:18 AM
Just published, by USIP: Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons From Iraq and Afghanistan (http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks56.pdf)
In Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in countless other hotspots around the world, religion has been a major factor in matters of war and peace. Since religion often plays a significant role in conflicts, it also needs to be one of the factors addressed in mediating conflicts. Yet, because the United States separates religion from political matters to a greater degree than many other areas of the world, Americans frequently have difficulty understanding the crucial role religion can play in conflict transformation.
As this study demonstrates, military chaplains, as clergy and officers, occupy a unique space that blends a secular status and a religious one, making them well suited to serve as intermediaries between military and religious leaders in areas of conflict and postconflict stabilization. While chaplains are not positioned to take on such major conflict mediation tasks as healing historic wounds in ethnic and sectarian conflict, they are positioned to communicate with religious leaders in discrete areas of conflict and contribute toward improved dialogue, trust, coordination, problem solving, and localized violence reduction. By drawing on the experiences of fourteen chaplains who had substantial interaction with religious leaders in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, or who supervised other chaplains involved in such activities, the author provides an exploratory study of the important mediating role chaplains can play in overseas military operations.
After briefly examining the military guidelines that provide the basis for chaplains to act as liaisons with religious leaders, the author examines the chaplain’s dual standing as a clergyperson and a military officer and the boundaries of the chaplain’s potential role as liaison. Specifically, the author unequivocally states that the primary mediating focus of chaplains should be on establishing communications and building relationships with local religious leaders on the ground—not on attempting to negotiate the resolution of broad historical problems. In harvesting the accounts of the fourteen chaplains whom he interviewed, the author next offers key peacebuilding principles and lessons that are informed by a sound reading of conflict resolution literature. For example, he finds that all chaplain outreach efforts must be balanced with security concerns to ensure not just the chaplains’ safety but also that of the local religious leaders with whom they meet. Further, he finds that chaplains who wish to serve in such a manner must have a willingness and ability to interact with religious leaders of other faiths and must not be theologically and personally inclined to view those of other faiths as enemies. Ultimately, the accounts he offers are meant to provide real-world examples of successful civil-military relations and to provide crucial guidance for chaplains to follow when serving as liaisons between the military and local religious leaders in overseas conflict zones.
While the primary role of military chaplains is to minister to the troops, as this study powerfully illustrates, chaplains can do much to not only mediate conflict on the ground but also help win the hearts and minds of local populations in support of U.S. combat and postconflict stability operations throughout the world.
Martin
03-04-2006, 05:29 PM
I haven't read more than the excerpt above, but I think it is a good idea.
My dad is a bishop and from what I've heard and witnessed of/on many trips, that can open doors. Also, being a priest not only serves as a diplomatic authority that people will look to and see as our "front people" (bad wording, and whether or not they are can be discussed, but from an alien perspective) and who can show our side of the story of a very important part of their lives. It may, too, grant a way of connecting closely with the people, and that they see that coming from a higher level of society. It gives credence to good nature. (unless they believe you are satan...)
Specifically thinking of Zimbabwe right now, although the situation should be similar in some other places: it's harder to twist statements of a priest. It's harder to touch him without angering the people. And people may tend to misinterpret positively rather than negatively.
Just a few immediate thoughts...
Martin
Reid Bessenger
03-17-2006, 01:22 PM
I read the piece, and from the limited exposure I have to the Navy Chaplain Corps regarding military training and education, I think that the tone here may be too optimistic.
To function in this unique role as a liaison for religious issues in the culture confronted in an operating environment, it seems to me that much education would be necessary. This would be an endeavor in which a well intended person could easily damage a force's access and the perception of that force in its operating area. I expect that there are exceptional individuals who would find the role within their capability. For instance, I've known a few chaplains who were serving line officers prior to becoming chaplains, and a subset of them may have the knowledge and perspective of the operating requirements for the force, the diverse cultural sensitivities in a particular area, and the role they can play. However, institutional solutions don't successfully leverage the exceptional individual. There are very real current issues confronting employment of chaplains that don't appear to be approching resolution without seeking this massive expansion of capability at an individual level.
Jedburgh
06-20-2007, 10:34 PM
Here's a rarity for those with AKO access - an interesting, substantive discussion on AKO:
Religious Support in COIN Operations (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal.do?$p=forums.threadList&forumId=26616)
Ken White
06-21-2007, 12:13 AM
Particularly so as it was started by an NCO and has more Chap asst input than Chap input. :confused:
Aloo interesting that the "save the Corps" statement appears...
Sigh.
Tom Odom
06-21-2007, 12:46 AM
This issue has been a continuing issue of debate in the Chaplain Corps and between it and the rest of the Army. You can find some on it at CALL.
Tom
120mm
06-21-2007, 04:05 AM
If it's any consolation, "Big Army" is having us write chaplains into the non-kinetic fight at the major CTCs. I don't know what impact it is having "down-range," but the scenarios are...intriguing, to say the least.
Bill Moore
06-21-2007, 04:04 PM
Let's not forget the primary purpose of the Chaplain is to provide spiritual support to the unit and Soldiers, which is a full time job. I support the operational concept, but I think these should be specially trained Chaplains that are attached to the unit for this purpose, so the assigned Chaplain can still do his primary job.
marct
06-21-2007, 06:58 PM
Hi 120,
If it's any consolation, "Big Army" is having us write chaplains into the non-kinetic fight at the major CTCs. I don't know what impact it is having "down-range," but the scenarios are...intriguing, to say the least.
Don't tell me they are finally thinking of setting up the US Magi Corps (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1745) :eek:!
Bill's comment about their primary mission being to provide "spiritual support to the unit and soldiers" is bang on. Although, I suppose it all depends on just how you define "spiritual support"...
Marc
Gian P Gentile
02-07-2008, 12:16 PM
I think the Army is making a huge mistake by using chaplains and the chaplain's corps in an operational setting (by operational I mean ops in Iraq that are tied to the people, culture, and ENEMY). The link to an AKO discussion on this issue had one posting mentioning the UMT's involvement in the "targeting process." I am not sure exactly what the poster was getting at but even mentioning UMTs and targeting in the same clause makes me squeamish.
For me there are clear ethical and moral lines that keeps a combat unit chaplain away from any sort of engagement with the locals (beyond incidental hand-shaking and hellos while on a patrol or ops with soldiers) because even in the most subtle and indirect way that engagement could produce relationships that end up in the killing of the enemy. To consider it in any other way is not to understand the nature of operations in a counterinsurgency fight.
I like to think of it in the same way that this same problem was posed in the classic World War II movie on combat leadership "Twelve O’clock High" when the commanding officer of the bombardment wing discovered his chaplain had stowed away on one of the B17s on a bombing mission. The commander respected the chaplain's desire to be with the men on a mission but then rebuked him by stating that his duty was not toward the engagement of the enemy but on "sin." By that he meant the Chaplain’s focus was on his own troops; and that only.
I had a superb combat chaplain with me in Baghdad in 2006. He often went out on patrol and on ops but only to be with the soldiers to experience what they did; not, not to influence operations in any way.
I think this a further example of how our all-consuming fetish with Coin is pushing us in directions that we should not be heading.
gg
marct
02-07-2008, 02:08 PM
Hi Gian,
I can certainly understand your reticence in having chaplains involved in operations. You post crystallized a couple of things that have been running around in my head for a bit.
First, what is the "role" of Chaplains? Right now, the US military recognizes many religions other than Christianity, which provided the basic role. Given the diversity of religions represented in both the US military and the Chaplains corps, it would be useful to a) reconsider their role and b) reconsider the use of the term "chaplain". Generically, the term would be "religious specialist" since, technically, a "chaplain" is a person who holds office in a chapel, although I have no doubt that they will keep getting called "chaplain" :D.
Second, whose orders are they under? This is a tricky one for a number of different religions, and it has a direct bearing on operational use. For example, the idea that Chaplains will not be armed comes out of the Peace of God movement in 10th century France. But many religions do not bar their "chaplains" from fighting. How would the chaplains corps deal with a priest whose religion demanded s/he be armed (and I can think of two right now that do)?
Marc
Cavguy
02-07-2008, 03:34 PM
I'll try to get the MSG (Chap Assist) here at Leavenworth who is the proponent of placing chaplains in the operational role - I started with the position of Gian but have begun to come around to the MSG's view - somewhat. I wouldn't have used my BN chaplain in that role, but that was mainly because he wasn't cut for it. The infantry BN chaplain mentioned in the CALL IIR on 1/1 AD was a superb stud, and did great things with religious engagement. To wit "Rank is nothing, talent is everything".
His main point is that we need to engage religious leaders, and the chaplains are suited for that and have the doctrinal role of advisor on religious issues. If he jumps in here, he'll explain further.
marct
02-07-2008, 03:47 PM
Hi Cavguy,
I'll try to get the MSG (Chap Assist) here at Leavenworth who is the proponent of placing chaplains in the operational role.... His main point is that we need to engage religious leaders, and the chaplains are suited for that and have the doctrinal role of advisor on religious issues. If he jumps in here, he'll explain further.
I hope he does jump in. Personally, I am in favour of chaplains being involved in, for want of a better term, "dialogic operations".
Cavguy
02-07-2008, 03:57 PM
Hi Gian,
I can certainly understand your reticence in having chaplains involved in operations. You post crystallized a couple of things that have been running around in my head for a bit.
First, what is the "role" of Chaplains? Right now, the US military recognizes many religions other than Christianity, which provided the basic role. Given the diversity of religions represented in both the US military and the Chaplains corps, it would be useful to a) reconsider their role and b) reconsider the use of the term "chaplain". Generically, the term would be "religious specialist" since, technically, a "chaplain" is a person who holds office in a chapel, although I have no doubt that they will keep getting called "chaplain" :D.
Second, whose orders are they under? This is a tricky one for a number of different religions, and it has a direct bearing on operational use. For example, the idea that Chaplains will not be armed comes out of the Peace of God movement in 10th century France. But many religions do not bar their "chaplains" from fighting. How would the chaplains corps deal with a priest whose religion demanded s/he be armed (and I can think of two right now that do)?
Marc
I don't have chapter and verse (no pun intended) , but the Chaplain basically serves following official functions:
- Advisor to the commander on morale and spiritual health of the troops
- Conducts services appropriate for his religious background and ensures all troops have access to appropriate services for their denomination
- Acts as counselor and support to troops, regardless of religion
- Helps support families and soldiers through programs like marrage enrichment, single soldier activities, etc.
- Procures and coordinates morale items for troops (packages, movies, goodies, etc.)
- As a member of the staff, provides input to the MDMP process on religious issues in the operational plan.
- Coordinates memorial services and ministers to wounded.
I may have missed a few, but that is most of it. The chaplain is a non-combatant under the Geneva convention, and prohibited from carrying a weapon. Hence, his Chaplain's assistant is also his "bodyguard". I hadn't thought through the legal implications (if any) of participating on something like a targeting process and its effect on his Geneva status. Have to ask a lawyer.
Gian P Gentile
02-07-2008, 05:54 PM
not me; but i have already stated my position. I would like to hear an argument for doing it by an army chaplain that goes beyond doctrine and into the moral and ethical realms.
gg
marct
02-07-2008, 08:14 PM
Hi Gian,
not me; but i have already stated my position. I would like to hear an argument for doing it by an army chaplain that goes beyond doctrine and into the moral and ethical realms.
Agreed. Personally, I see nothing wrong with it IFF they see nothing wrong with it. Again, speaking purely personally, I find the restrictions imposed on non-Christian "chaplains" to be somewhat at odds with other religions, and I would like to see some discussion on that area as well.
Marc
Gian P Gentile
02-07-2008, 09:21 PM
Hi Gian,
Agreed. Personally, I see nothing wrong with it IFF they see nothing wrong with it. Again, speaking purely personally, I find the restrictions imposed on non-Christian "chaplains" to be somewhat at odds with other religions, and I would like to see some discussion on that area as well.
Marc
Hello Marc:
Well if I were king for a day i would not leave the decision up to the individual chaplains if they wanted to be part of coin operations. As I said before in my mind the role of the chaplain in combat is the spiritual and moral well being of the unit, and should not be involved in engagement operations with local religious leaders. There is enough to do for chaplain in the unit itself.
I would not have cared one bit if the Army had given me a Muslim chaplain, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, whatever since his/her role is not to proselytize but to use his/her own faith as a medium to assist in the spiritual and moral well being of the unit; which in combat can be quite a demanding job.
gian
marct
02-07-2008, 09:39 PM
Hi Gian,
Well if I were king for a day i would not leave the decision up to the individual chaplains if they wanted to be part of coin operations. As I said before in my mind the role of the chaplain in combat is the spiritual and moral well being of the unit, and should not be involved in engagement operations with local religious leaders. There is enough to do for chaplain in the unit itself.
I have no problem with that as one role of religious specialists. But let's pull this apart for a minute if you don't mind, since I really think it is germaine to he discussion. What would you think of a chaplain performing an exorcism on UBL? What are your opinions about "Spiritual Warfare" as practiced by a large number of evangelical Pentecostals in the US? To my mind, if you believe in the existence of a spiritual realm then a) there will be some form of conflict in it and b) "religious specialists" (whether we call them priests, ministers, chaplains, imams, etc.) are already on the frontlines.
Let me back off for a minute and point out that I really am not trying to be a #### over this. What I am trying to point out is that if you hold a religious seriously, then the "spiritual wellbeing" of a unit may well involve "combat operations" in the spiritual realm. If this is the case, then it strikes me that the operational limitations imposed by the Chaplains' Corps may be limiting the effectiveness of individuals operating within the field.
At the same time, this is, for want of a better phrase, a matter of individual conscience. I have know priest who would not engage in this type of conflict and, also, those who would. I don't think that either state can be required since it is a matter of individual "conviction" as it were. That was why I said that it had to be left up to the individual consciences of the "chaplains". BTW, I should have noted that if they did choose to so engage, that should not abrogate them from their primary duty of guarding the spiritual and moral wellbeing of the unit under their care.
I would not have cared one bit if the Army had given me a Muslim chaplain, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, whatever since his/her role is not to proselytize but to use his/her own faith as a medium to assist in the spiritual and moral well being of the unit; which in combat can be quite a demanding job.
I really don't think that proselytization comes into it, except amongst those chaplains who are so insecure that they must proselytize. Also, I would never advocate religious proslytization as a tactic. First, it will backfire, and second it is unethical. Let me toss out an hypothetical at you - what if the Army had given you an Asatruar Priest or a Gardneran Witch who provided you with targeting information?
Marc
Cavguy
02-07-2008, 10:34 PM
I've been unsuccessful in contacting my Chaplain Corps contact, he picked today to be off the net. Let me clarify before the thread spins into stereotypical and extreme worse case scenarios -
The Army Chaplain understands the requirement not to attempt to "convert" either the soldiers or the local populace. The Chaplaincy is a command assist to the soldiers, not an opportunity for a denomination to seek new adherents.
Again, not sure of policy, but I believe all chaplains must be certified by a recognized religious denomination. Yes, the Army "certifies" what these are, and the Chaplains must be graduates of a recognized seminary or ordaining institution for the religion, which must have certain educational and credentialing standards, such as training in counseling, etc. I believe Wiccans were recently certified, but most of the true fringe organizations don't make the requirements for qualification as a Chaplain.
The example you cite of some crazy chaplain trying to exorcize UBL would never happen.
What the discussion IS talking about is using the chaplain to conduct interfaith dialogue and outreach to local religious leaders, as MarcT suggests in the above. Some units in Iraq have had great success in establishing rapport between the local religious leaders and the Chaplain, which can then be used to help further stability in their area of operations. I agree that not all Chaplains are comfortable with that, or suited for it. What my MSG friend argues is that the Chaplain corps should train for it, and is ducking responsibility by not training preparing/directing chaplains to conduct religous outreach. (NOTE: not conversion - speaking of dialogue)
The Chaplain is also paid/trained to be a source of religious insight into other religions. Being a military officer is a profession - and Chaplains are professionals. Being able to describe and provide educated insight into other religious practices and their influence upon operations is one of the key contributions a good chaplain can make.
I have had very few "excellent" chaplains in the past eleven years, but have never had one I would consider a wingnut or unprofessional. There are lines, and they obey them. Otherwise they are gone quick.
William F. Owen
02-08-2008, 01:48 AM
I've stayed out of this till now, cos, like the Middle East Forum, I have problems being objective... but what they hey....
IMO.
1. Unless it is for the spiritual sustenance of your own men, Padres should be kept as far away from an enemy of a different religion as possible.
2. The presence of religious personnel only rarely, have the potential to calm things. They need to be used with extreme caution. Try deploying a Rabbi to a future or past war-torn Croatia and see how far that gets you. I suspect the utility of this idea is very Christian-centric.
3. If religion is a factor in the conflict, then you will find extremists in the forefront. Historically religion only creates atrocity and blood shed. Nearly all peace making is done by secular and thus generally rational people.
Sorry to swim against the flow folks, but this seems like one of those good ideas that can only make things more complicated. Stick to the military mission. Protect the people. Kill the enemy.
Ron Humphrey
02-08-2008, 02:24 AM
I have had the opportunity to be a part of several of the discussions on this in which CavGuys MSG was a large part and there are a host of points to be made. I am however going to wait until he gets to post before jumping in.
In the meantime I will simply ask two questions.
If the responsibility of a chaplain is the mental, emotional, spiritual well being of the soldier, wouldn't helping to keep them alive fullfill that obligation correctly?
If so who within a unit is most competent and experienced in understanding the nuances of faith and its effects on people?
Gian P Gentile
02-08-2008, 02:36 AM
Well I guess i will have to agree to disagree with most of the postings on this issue; to restate my position I don’t think chaplains have any business other than the spiritual and moral welfare of their units and the soldiers within them. I think it morally and ethically wrong to place a chaplain in the position of being used by a commander to "engage" a local religious leader like an imam to establish a relationship with him simply because he is a man of the cloth. In the first place commanders and junior leaders who patrol and op everyday in coin are much more able to relate to an imam than a chaplain simply because they know the ground and the people better. Moreover if a commander puts a chaplain in a position to help with engagements in subtle and indirect but still relevant ways the chaplain has become an operator and that to me has crossed a line we should not cross.
gg
Cavguy
02-08-2008, 03:04 AM
Well I guess i will have to agree to disagree with most of the postings on this issue; to restate my position I don’t think chaplains have any business other than the spiritual and moral welfare of their units and the soldiers within them. I think it morally and ethically wrong to place a chaplain in the position of being used by a commander to "engage" a local religious leader like an imam to establish a relationship with him simply because he is a man of the cloth. In the first place commanders and junior leaders who patrol and op everyday in coin are much more able to relate to an imam than a chaplain simply because they know the ground and the people better. Moreover if a commander puts a chaplain in a position to help with engagements in subtle and indirect but still relevant ways the chaplain has become an operator and that to me has crossed a line we should not cross.
gg
Sir,
Great points. Agree with many. Mainly trying to fill in the other viewpoint. :D
Ken White
02-08-2008, 03:09 AM
Chaplains should stick to their job -- get them involved elsewhere and the potential for regret is high.
Not least because the Chaplain should not and cannot negotiate for the command yet he will be presumed by those in the ME to be doing so. Dangerous road, IMO.
Sponsoring an orphanage in Korea or Viet Nam is one thing, a Chaplain other than a Muslim doing that in a Muslim nation is a whole different ball game and anything more than that will be hazardous. There may be minor exceptions on rare occasions but that's what they should be -- exceptional.
Cavguy
02-08-2008, 07:00 AM
For those with CALL access, here is the document behind the discussion - lesson came from an army infantry BN attached to a USMC regiment and the employment of its chaplain by the commander in the town of Hit to affect the battlespace.
Link Here (https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=3476) - Section 7
I wish I could quote it here but it is FOUO. :( Topic 7.1 directly addresses the above discussion.
an assistant gunner on your Ma Deuce? I don't think so.
Asking your chaplain to do anything other than minister to units' faith needs, or as Gian noted, their spiritual and moral welfare, is tantamount to using an ambulance as an ammunition resupply vehicle IMHO.
Gian P Gentile
02-08-2008, 01:45 PM
an assistant gunner on your Ma Deuce? I don't think so.
Asking your chaplain to do anything other than minister to units' faith needs, or as Gian noted, their spiritual and moral welfare, is tantamount to using an ambulance as an ammunition resupply vehicle IMHO.
Well said and exactly my point; unfortunately many in the Army do not see it that way and they blur the line that a Chaplain (in my mind) must stay on the right side of by an indulgence with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine that focusses on the people to the point where we justify the use of Chaplains in an operational mode. So your MCO analogy although in the extreme is very fitting for driving this point home.
Well said and exactly my point; unfortunately many in the Army do not see it that way and they blur the line that a Chaplain (in my mind) must stay on the right side of by an indulgence with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine that focusses on the people to the point where we justify the use of Chaplains in an operational mode. So your MCO analogy although in the extreme is very fitting for driving this point home.
In our current use of chaplains, they are force multipliers (Didn't Napoleon said the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1?) but they are not weapons systems. We need to be able to keep a clear distinction between the pastoral duties of the military's clergy and any other role that someone might think is applicable to them because of their specialized background, education, and training. It may very well be the case that we could have someone in the Chaplains Corps who is not filling a position as a staff chaplain. (I once worked with an Army chaplain whose primary function was acquisition duties--developing the prototype "chapel in a box"--just add holy water :D). Were a chaplain assigned to something like a CA team to do direct coordination with local religious leaders as a CA outreach effort, that would be a very different thing than the prohibition we seem to agree on. I would strongly urge against such a use of military chaplains however. Were one to pursue this option, I would prefer that it follow along the lines of the HTT model, using civilian, rather than military, clergy as the SME.
Tom Odom
02-08-2008, 04:25 PM
Chaplains should stick to their job -- get them involved elsewhere and the potential for regret is high.
Not least because the Chaplain should not and cannot negotiate for the command yet he will be presumed by those in the ME to be doing so. Dangerous road, IMO.
Sponsoring an orphanage in Korea or Viet Nam is one thing, a Chaplain other than a Muslim doing that in a Muslim nation is a whole different ball game and anything more than that will be hazardous. There may be minor exceptions on rare occasions but that's what they should be -- exceptional.
I have been an onlooker and participant in the evolution of this idea and I strongly agree with Gian, Ken, and Wilf. The risk of things going wrong in a region like the Middle East is so much larger than the gain. We have intelligence officers, FAOs, and leaders for this sort of thing. As a FAO for this region as well as AFrica, I did not feel qualified to "engage: local religious leaders directly. I would further say that indirect through HN contacts is the way to go.
Best
Tom
120mm
02-10-2008, 01:06 PM
3. If religion is a factor in the conflict, then you will find extremists in the forefront. Historically religion only creates atrocity and blood shed. Nearly all peace making is done by secular and thus generally rational people.
And that's a patently false stereotype. Which is taught as dogma in modern schools.
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/december_2003/12_03_2.html
War and Religion: Is Religion to Blame? MAJ John P. Conway
It has often been commonly stated, "People have been killing each other in the name of religion for centuries." There is more than enough superficial evidence to support this assertion. After all, personal values, culture and belief systems are great motivators for an individual and a group. A key aspect of waging war is "justification" in the mind of the population.1 Religion is often introduced to justify actions and motivate the masses. While this may be truly endemic of a misguided worldview of one's religion, it is never the less a true statement regarding the human condition. Justifiable or not, religion motivates. Religion, as a motivator and catalyst to garner popular support for waging war, may or may not be rooted in justifiable purpose. Most times, it can be argued that religion may play a key and significant role in the conduct of warfare on a psychological and cultural level, but is it the cause of warfare? Do nations, states and kingdoms wage war over religion? Is religion a primary cause of conflict between governments? Many have argued that it is. Another popular statement is, "Religion has been the cause of more wars than any other factor throughout history." This is commonly accompanied by "people have been killing each other in the name of God for centuries." Upon closer examination, these statements exude an element of mythology versus fact. The point of this essay is not to announce that religion has never been the cause of war, but rather to highlight the necessity for close study and thorough scrutiny when assigning religion as the actual cause. A fundamental analysis of past wars commonly attributed to "religion," as the causal factor, may reveal an uninformed and reactionary misjudgment. Throughout the course of history, the cause of warfare between sovereign states, kingdoms, and governments is attributable to many factors, but can rarely be attributed to "religion" as is so often the assertion.
More at the link...
William F. Owen
02-10-2008, 03:04 PM
And that's a patently false stereotype. Which is taught as dogma in modern schools.
.
I disagree and stereotypes exist for a reason. I am very aware of the difference between, teaching, doctrine, and dogma, as well a concepts such as discourse.
I did not say religion starts wars. I said, that wars are made worse by religion, in the same way war makes politics extreme. If you can show me a conflict that peacefully resolved, or ameliorated by religious extremists, I would certainly learn something.
Ron Humphrey
02-10-2008, 09:12 PM
Inherent to Chaplains Corp is an understanding of Human Terrain which allows for understanding beyond that which can be seen. I speak not of magical powers but simply of the sixth sense of sorts which comes with the territory.
This has become more and more necessary as the environments in which our forces operate become
more urban terrain oriented and is a key capability on which our defenses must call.
The " fear " as it has been called may come in many different forms and may or may not always be understandable but the truth is that it is time to press forward in this area regardless.
The battles we fight now are not only regional
but ideological and for this it requires both physical forces but even more importantly those whose specialty lies in the realm of Ideas/Faith.
It is no longer a question of what to do but more what not to. This is the arena in which leaders of faith answer their calling.
I posted this in July of 2007 as part of an ongoing discussion on this very thing.
The concerns expressed here by others are more than just valid they are key considerations in how or when the chaplains corps should or might be involved in the overall operations. That said we can grab all the anthropologists, sociologists, and whomever else you like and still have HTT teams which are short one key component. The people person. Yes Psychologists might fill the role somewhat but I would think we would see that just as logical understanding between men and women, or one lifestyle and another can completely change the logic depending on which your are and where you are from, so is the difference among cultures.
The learning curve for someone who from a completely secular, non religious, non-partisan perspective wish to understand and work with humans who are in their most basic being the exact opposite of all the aforementioned is so great that one would expect to fail far more often than to succeed. This is where understanding of people in the environment which is quite often more similar throughout the spectrum would seem to offer its benefits.
A Chaplain doesn't carry a weapon for a reason, the underlying premise is they are there to tend to and care for the souls of their charges.
I guess the real question may be from a faith perspective who are their charges and what is their mission. EBO, Targeting, Operational analysis, information collection, I think we all generally agree are outside of their charter and should remain so. They can however help establish better communication amongst their soldiers and the populous within which they are serving.
Not sure I did a good job of presenting the opposing position to many of those presented here but I tried :rolleyes:
Gian P Gentile
02-10-2008, 09:48 PM
They can however help establish better communication amongst their soldiers and the populous within which they are serving.
Ron:
I disagree with the notion that chaplains, because they are men/women of the cloth will have a natural ability to bond with imams in places like Iraq. What enables leaders to bond and establish relationships with religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan is deep knowledge of the terrain, human terrain, the culture, and the enemy. A chaplain by nature can’t even come close to the knowledge that a good nco who has been operating in the battlespace for a couple of months will have. I hate to harp on this point but i think the fascination of having chaplains become operators by being used to conduct engagements with local religious leaders comes from the hyper-dominance of coin thinking and its population centric approach in the American army. Since our doctrine tells us that the people are everything in Coin and we must protect them we then end up with these kooky ideas like putting Chaplains on patrol to engage with the local imams; in my mind not smart and ethically and morally wrong too.
gian
Ron Humphrey
02-10-2008, 10:13 PM
Ron:
I disagree with the notion that chaplains, because they are men/women of the cloth will have a natural ability to bond with imams in places like Iraq. What enables leaders to bond and establish relationships with religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan is deep knowledge of the terrain, human terrain, the culture, and the enemy. A chaplain by nature can’t even come close to the knowledge that a good nco who has been operating in the battlespace for a couple of months will have. I hate to harp on this point but i think the fascination of having chaplains become operators by being used to conduct engagements with local religious leaders comes from the hyper-dominance of coin thinking and its population centric approach in the American army. Since our doctrine tells us that the people are everything in Coin and we must protect them we then end up with these kooky ideas like putting Chaplains on patrol to engage with the local imams; in my mind not smart and ethically and morally wrong too.
gian
I don't disagree with you on the point of on patrols / operator I think however that the conversation in this area may be talking past itself. In any given environment there is a certain way things are done or run. In Iraq in particular we a talking about a populous who by a large recieve most if not all of their information, direction, and guidance from the local religious leaders. The key to successfully interacting with those leaders is that they must respect / accept the interaction from our end. I remember reading about something a while back and it kind of stuck with me. When those in Muslim countries watch TV they see speeches from politicians and from religious leaders. Which one do you suppose they are most likely to see as telling the truth in their eyes. For a majority politics are inherently filled with lies and propoganda. They will see it as such and in the end you may end up with the enemy being able to use some religious leaders ferver to prove to the populous that it is a war against Islam rather than for liberty. This is regardless what talking heads say.
By allowing our chaplains to be a communications value-add through interactions with religious leaders you allow for what is a standard in that society to be utilized to the benefit of all. They don't and shouldn't be on patrol, they don't and shouldn't plan or be a part of operations in the physical sense. They are already the one person in your group an Imam might see as trustworthy until they prove themselves otherwise. That's a bonus considering how long it may take that NCO or officer to develop even a semblence of that same respect quotient.
The Imam generally doesn't order the protection / wars forces to take actions he recommends to those in power what they should do. Why does it make any less sense that our chaplains who fulfill basically the same role within our force be just as important to the process when it comes to non-lethal interactions.?
Norfolk
02-10-2008, 10:30 PM
By and large, having Chaplains go out to meet with local religious leaders is an extremely bad idea. It's one thing for a unit Catholic Chaplain to go visit his counterpart in the local Catholic Parish or Mission if time and circumstances permit or make it advisable; it is both a moral and a practical no-no under almost any circumstances for said Chaplain to attempt the same with a local imam. In the social and cultural environment of places like Asia and North Africa, that's very likely just going provoke sectarian tensions and even an outright explosion. And that's not even addressing the morality of sending said Chaplain out on said endeavour in the first place. The Chaplains are there to perform their Ministry, not to participate in the war effort itself, even if in a non-combatant role. This is something that should not even be questioned, let alone raised in the first place. The moral and political matter and consequences are exceptionally grave.
marct
02-10-2008, 10:57 PM
Hi Norfolk,
The Chaplains are there to perform their Ministry, not to participate in the war effort itself, even if in a non-combatant role. This is something that should not even be questioned, let alone raised in the first place. The moral and political matter and consequences are exceptionally grave.
This is where I completely disagree with you - it must be questioned, even if no changes are made. You are quite correct when you say that "[t]he moral and political matter and consequences are exceptionally grave" and that is exactly why their role must be questioned.
On another note, Ron mentioned earlier that
A Chaplain doesn't carry a weapon for a reason, the underlying premise is they are there to tend to and care for the souls of their charges.
and this is actually incorrect. Chaplains don't carry weapons because priests weren't allowed to carry weapons during the middle ages. It was a major sin to kill a priest and the act of doing so put people in a real quandary when the priest was trying to kill them. Originally, the prohibition was on Priests using edged weapons (which is when Gary G. got the idea for D&D), but that was latter extended to all weapons. The modern prohibition comes from that. It has absolutely nothing to so with priests being there "to tend to and care for the souls of their charges" and everything to do with ritual impurity after killing a priest.
Marc
Ron Humphrey
02-10-2008, 11:14 PM
First I must thank Marc for informing my ignorance thereby allowing this to be yet another fruitful endeavor for myself :D
By and large, having Chaplains go out to meet with local religious leaders is an extremely bad idea. It's one thing for a unit Catholic Chaplain to go visit his counterpart in the local Catholic Parish or Mission if time and circumstances permit or make it advisable; it is both a moral and a practical no-no under almost any circumstances for said Chaplain to attempt the same with a local imam. In the social and cultural environment of places like Asia and North Africa, that's very likely just going provoke sectarian tensions and even an outright explosion. And that's not even addressing the morality of sending said Chaplain out on said endeavour in the first place. The Chaplains are there to perform their Ministry, not to participate in the war effort itself, even if in a non-combatant role. This is something that should not even be questioned, let alone raised in the first place. The moral and political matter and consequences are exceptionally grave.
I see what your saying but I actually don't see that being the format in which our chaplains are used within the force already. If PC considerations are allowed to inform a chaplain as to what they say and how they say it, if it is expected that they follow the rules in the forces regardless of what their own faith teaches than why would it be any different to expect them to use their skill set for purposes which benefit the mission. We can and do expect a christian chaplain to minister to the needs of various faiths within their command, (fill in the blank) and I don't see anyone saying thats not acceptable or illogical, or at undooable.
If a Chaplain with all their training and background cannot effectively work with someone of another faith then how exactly is it that so many of our soldiers who have verrry strong faiths of their own have to or are supposed to.
That particular argument to me just seems to be somewhat off the mark.
marct
02-10-2008, 11:40 PM
First I must thank Marc for informing my ignorance thereby allowing this to be yet another fruitful endeavor for myself :D
To quote my mother, my mind is a cesspool of useless trivia :D.
If a Chaplain with all their training and background cannot effectively work with someone of another faith then how exactly is it that so many of our soldiers who have verrry strong faiths of their own have to or are supposed to.
That particular argument to me just seems to be somewhat off the mark.
I agree with you on this, Ron. I do see the other side, represented by Gian et al., but I have great difficulty with the idea that chaplains qua chaplains must be considered as incapable of engaging in a dialog with other local religious leaders. There is certainly sufficient evidence from a number of cases that an interfaith dialog can form the basis of a peace building effort. For example, a number of imams in Baghdad recently showed up at a local church in support of their community.
I do not advocate that chaplains should be used in such a manner, only that they should be allowed to conduct such a dialog if they believe they are called to do so.
Marc
Norfolk
02-11-2008, 01:21 AM
Chaplains, or at least Christian ones, are there for the needs of whoever comes to them - whether they are Christian or not, Catholic or not. And it should go without saying that dealing with the sick, wounded, dispossessed, and the like is a moral obligation for everyone, clergy or not. But to expect them to go against their own consciences in deference to orders that, if they are thereupon required to violate their moral obligations, is to go beyond the pale.
It also has to be born in mind that sending a Christian clergyman to visit a local imam when local Christians (and especially clergy, if they even exist in the locality) are themselves the object of local sectarian hatreds, may have the effect of tossing a hand grenade into an ammo dump. If, on the other hand, there is a deliberate effort by local religious figures to reach out to our Chaplains, then within discrete limits, that's fine. But you must not go looking for trouble if no-one is reciprocating.
In the Balkans, where sectarianism between Catholic and Orthodox Christians, not to mention Muslims, went very deep, even the false rumour, let alone the appearance, of fraternization between individuals or small groups from opposing sides could provide the pretext for unrest and violence. The ME is no more tolerant. In the West, most Christian, and even many non-Christian, clergy, can have personal contacts and even close friendships with those of other religions. In much of the East, that is often either possible only with the utmost discretion, even secrecy, or not at all.
This also supposes that there is a basis for commonality and compromise between clergy of different religions in places such as the ME. Much more often than not, the reality is a zero-sum game; members of one religion openly and often with impunity persecute, or worse, members of other religions. It took the West centuries to more or less get past that, but in the East, it is still the order of the day. We are not going to change that by sending Chaplains to seek out imams and ayatollahs, particularly when some of them actively promote the persecution of other religions, or Muslims of other sects, and while many others remain silent about the same. The conditions for inter-faith dialogue in many places like Iraq and Afghanistan are effectively non-existent in many, even most, places.
And sending unit Chaplains, especially if they are Christian, to treat with their Muslim counterparts is to assume commonalities and bases for mutual exchange that simply do not exist. And it is all the worse when such attempts would likely be seen as an attempt to insinuate Western religious influence into their societies. The conditions that are more or less operative in the West that may allow for inter-faith dialogue are not, for the most part, generally operative in places like the ME. What would be considered something like paranoia in the West is often, practically speaking, not just the "norm" but a means of survival in the East. The Balkans is like that, and many people believed what seem to Westerners the most outrageous things; but countless outrageous things did occur there that were completely beyond the expectations of Westerners. You're not paranoid if people really are out to get you, and in the ME, just as in the Balkans, there's no shortage of those.
The Chaplains, especially if they are Christian should not and must not be expected or required to seek to establish things like inter-faith dialogue with religious figures who cannot, or will not, meet them even part way. The chaplains will simply become targets for abuse and assassination, and it may only seem to confirm local suspicions that the West really is engaged in an attempt to impose Christianity upon Islam. Not true of course, but from the ME perspective the burden of proof would lie upon us, and they are not willing to grant us the benefit of the doubt in particular.
Ken White
02-11-2008, 03:12 AM
points here. First, in the ME Christian clergymen are bogeymen to a good many. That is not to say they cannot ever be used to facilitate dialog, it just means one has to be extremely careful and that is particularly true in any Muslim nation and even more so in the ME where a more rigid version of Islam exists.
Second, the Chaplain has his principal duty to his faith; then to his flock. Is it right to take him away from those responsibilities to put him in the minor diplomat role? I suggest the answer is rarely.
Thirdly, that 'flock' may look at THEIR Chaplain treating with potential bad guys in an unfavorable light and that may affect his ability to deal with said flock (and let me assure you, that has occurred in less volatile regions over less important things than we're discussing here). The question arises are you perhaps compromising your Chaplains ability to do his primary job -- to the detriment of your unit?
Lastly, you are involving a religious entity in a military matter -- and make no mistake, if the Army or Marines are there, it is a military matter. Some of the organized religions have difficulties with that and you may put your Chaplain in a bad position.
Hate to state the obvious but I think the philosophy is starting to obscure reality. :wry:
Edited to add:
That doesn't even address the fact that all Chaplains are not equal. I can recall a couple who would do well, many more who might and a couple; one a hard core Jesuit who'd argue with a Lamp post and another who was so conciliatory and afraid of offending that he'd be dangerous.
Consider also that Chaplains are protected under the Geneva Conventions (plural). use them for non-pastoral duties and you run the risk of that protection being discounted.
US Chaplains are not armed by regulation, not by tradition or the Geneva Convention. It is a matter of policy, not of law and it has been known to be disregarded. The guy in WW II who served as a Tank Gunner was a bit much and he was released from the service. :D
All in all, using Chaplains as negotiators has far more potential adverse impacts than beneficial ones.
Gian P Gentile
02-11-2008, 12:08 PM
...All in all, using Chaplains as negotiators has far more potential adverse impacts than beneficial ones.
Ken:
agree with you on this posting and also with Norfolk. I dont want to sound elitist here but with experience on our side it does appear that in this thread the ones who are most stridently against the use of chaplains in operational, military matters (yes, having them engage to establish relationships with imams in a Coin fight is an operational task) are those of us who have had acutal experience in these matters. As a squadron commander in west-baghdad in 2006 i had a chaplain on my special staff. I had no business for him whatsoever with meeting local religious leaders to establish relationships. He did of course go out on patrols and on ops so that he could be with soldiers and understand what they did outside of the wire, but other than that his duty was the Squadron and its spiritual and moral well being. No small task in a combat environment.
gian
marct
02-11-2008, 02:33 PM
Hi Guys,
First, in the ME Christian clergymen are bogeymen to a good many. That is not to say they cannot ever be used to facilitate dialog, it just means one has to be extremely careful and that is particularly true in any Muslim nation and even more so in the ME where a more rigid version of Islam exists.
That is a good point, Ken, although it might be more apropos to say it as foreign Christian clergy since there are Christian congregations and clergy in every ME country already. However, let me just note that I was talking about "chaplains" in general, not Christian clergy. Doesn't the US Chaplains Corps have any imams who get deployed?
Second, the Chaplain has his principal duty to his faith; then to his flock. Is it right to take him away from those responsibilities to put him in the minor diplomat role? I suggest the answer is rarely.
Hmmm, I'd phrase it somewhat differently, a chaplain's first duty is to his/her deity, but that's me being pedantic ;). First off, I would never suggest that a chaplain be put into that position, but I would suggest that if their duty to their deity leads them to do so and the situation is not "shoot on sight", they be allowed to do it.
Thirdly, that 'flock' may look at THEIR Chaplain treating with potential bad guys in an unfavorable light and that may affect his ability to deal with said flock (and let me assure you, that has occurred in less volatile regions over less important things than we're discussing here). The question arises are you perhaps compromising your Chaplains ability to do his primary job -- to the detriment of your unit?
That's a very good point. Just out of interest, would the situation be the same if it was an imam rather than a Christian chaplain? Do you think that in such a case the unit would be concerned over his potential ties and he wouldn't be able to function properly?
Lastly, you are involving a religious entity in a military matter -- and make no mistake, if the Army or Marines are there, it is a military matter. Some of the organized religions have difficulties with that and you may put your Chaplain in a bad position.
True, but somewhat of a red herring. If they are a chaplain and assigned to a unit, they should have already dealt with this issue. Again, please note that I am not suggesting that they be put in a position where they could be ordered to do anything operational, only that in certain situations they be allowed to do so.
Hate to state the obvious but I think the philosophy is starting to obscure reality. :wry:
Always does - which is why it's a really good idea to test out philosophy in reality :D.
That doesn't even address the fact that all Chaplains are not equal. I can recall a couple who would do well, many more who might and a couple; one a hard core Jesuit who'd argue with a Lamp post and another who was so conciliatory and afraid of offending that he'd be dangerous.
Oh, quite true - I've know a number of priests who could best be used as fertilizer seeing as that was their main product, others who were complete and utter raving lunatics, and still others who were absolutely amazing at establishing common ground between different religious traditions. As a note, I do have a bit of experience in that area having spent a year and a half on the Ottawa Inter-Faith Council a while back.
Consider also that Chaplains are protected under the Geneva Conventions (plural). use them for non-pastoral duties and you run the risk of that protection being discounted.
I have to wonder if that's not also a red herring since a number of the operational groups don't subscribe to the Geneva Conventions. I do agree that requiring them to go operational would quite possibly abnegate their protection, but I don't really know if that signifies much. Would you consider Mqtada al Sadr to be covered?
I dont want to sound elitist here but with experience on our side it does appear that in this thread the ones who are most stridently against the use of chaplains in operational, military matters (yes, having them engage to establish relationships with imams in a Coin fight is an operational task) are those of us who have had acutal experience in these matters.
Sure, and that's why it's a great idea to have you shoo holes in our ideas, Gian :D. Goes back to Socrates....
As a squadron commander in west-baghdad in 2006 i had a chaplain on my special staff. I had no business for him whatsoever with meeting local religious leaders to establish relationships. He did of course go out on patrols and on ops so that he could be with soldiers and understand what they did outside of the wire, but other than that his duty was the Squadron and its spiritual and moral well being. No small task in a combat environment.
And you don't consider this to be going "operational"? It does strike me that he would be seen to have gone out on these patrols and ops and, in being seen to do so, would have been interpreted as being operational.
Marc
120mm
02-11-2008, 02:55 PM
I disagree and stereotypes exist for a reason. I am very aware of the difference between, teaching, doctrine, and dogma, as well a concepts such as discourse.
I did not say religion starts wars. I said, that wars are made worse by religion, in the same way war makes politics extreme. If you can show me a conflict that peacefully resolved, or ameliorated by religious extremists, I would certainly learn something.
The American Revolution was ended, at least in part, by religious "extremists" in England who objected to the war on the grounds of "natural law".
The Treaty of Westphalia was brought about, at least in part, by religious "extremists" who helped force the war-weakened principles into declaring peace, in order to cease the suffering of the civilians throughout Europe.
The Viet Nam war was ended, at least in part, by religious "extremists" who actually allied themselves with politically-motivated and diametrically oppositional anti-war movement.
On would hope you would learn something. My list was limited mainly because those are the three conflicts in which I actually "know" there was a religious "extremist" main force opposition.
Tom Odom
02-11-2008, 03:37 PM
Quote:
A Chaplain doesn't carry a weapon for a reason, the underlying premise is they are there to tend to and care for the souls of their charges.
and this is actually incorrect. Chaplains don't carry weapons because priests weren't allowed to carry weapons during the middle ages. It was a major sin to kill a priest and the act of doing so put people in a real quandary when the priest was trying to kill them. Originally, the prohibition was on Priests using edged weapons (which is when Gary G. got the idea for D&D), but that was latter extended to all weapons. The modern prohibition comes from that. It has absolutely nothing to so with priests being there "to tend to and care for the souls of their charges" and everything to do with ritual impurity after killing a priest.
Marc,
True enough in that time.
Today is a different matter. we don't wear red crosses on white tuinics either.
Chaplains today do not carry weapons and they cannot command as a matter of law. And sorry, it has every thing to do with why we have chaplains in the first place--taking care of the troops.
best
Tom
Ken White
02-11-2008, 05:06 PM
...That is a good point, Ken, although it might be more apropos to say it as foreign Christian clergy since there are Christian congregations and clergy in every ME country already. However, let me just note that I was talking about "chaplains" in general, not Christian clergy. Doesn't the US Chaplains Corps have any imams who get deployed?There are a few Muslim Chaplains, not enough -- not enough of any faith, actually, there's always a significant shortfall in numbers. In the ME, the present Christian clergy do not interface with their Islamic counterparts and have not since just after WW II. I'm comfortable saying Christian clergy without the foreign qualifier.
Hmmm, I'd phrase it somewhat differently, a chaplain's first duty is to his/her deity, but that's me being pedantic. First off, I would never suggest that a chaplain be put into that position, but I would suggest that if their duty to their deity leads them to do so and the situation is not "shoot on sight", they be allowed to do it.I'll avoid a religious argument here and just say we can differ on that point. Not least because I've known a couple who were quite willing to shoot on sight (and carried a weapon so they could do that...) :D
That's a very good point. Just out of interest, would the situation be the same if it was an imam rather than a Christian chaplain? Do you think that in such a case the unit would be concerned over his potential ties and he wouldn't be able to function properly?Heh. That's not a very good point. Given the relatively small number of Muslims in the Armed Forces of the US, the critical mass of disaffected parishioners almost certainly wouldn't exist. Good try, though...
I'd also suggest that would be a case where your 'foreign clergy' issue from above would apply; my guess is that such a Chaplain would be highly suspect in the eyes of most in the ME.
True, but somewhat of a red herring. If they are a chaplain and assigned to a unit, they should have already dealt with this issue. Again, please note that I am not suggesting that they be put in a position where they could be ordered to do anything operational, only that in certain situations they be allowed to do so.Not at all fishy; they have dealt with the issue of the Chaplain serving his faith and a flock -- you're asking them to further deal with operational matters, a different thing and outside the Chaplains purview.
We can continue to disagree over the advisability of such usage. ;)
Always does - which is why it's a really good idea to test out philosophy in reality.Perhaps you can afford that in your world, having spent a number of years where that, fortunately or unfortunately, wasn't a good idea, I suggest that it's not always a good idea.
I have to wonder if that's not also a red herring since a number of the operational groups don't subscribe to the Geneva Conventions. I do agree that requiring them to go operational would quite possibly abnegate their protection, but I don't really know if that signifies much. Would you consider Mqtada al Sadr to be covered?Boy, you're into fish today and it's not even Friday. :wry: Obviously some of our current opponents have no interest in the GC. There will be other opponents who do adhere. Precedent is precedent.
No, I would not consider Mokey to be covered, he is not an Ayatollah (though he is studying on the fast track to attain that status), merely a self appointed Imam. Further, he's abrogated any religious protection he might have by being politically and militarily involved -- which is the point of not allowing Chaplains to do that...
Oh -- and:
And you don't consider this to be going "operational"? It does strike me that he would be seen to have gone out on these patrols and ops and, in being seen to do so, would have been interpreted as being operational.Observing troops doing their jobs and participating in negotiations are discernable as quite different activities by even the kids in the ME.
marct
02-11-2008, 05:20 PM
Hi Ken,
Always does - which is why it's a really good idea to test out philosophy in reality.
Perhaps you can afford that in your world, having spent a number of years where that, fortunately or unfortunately, wasn't a good idea, I suggest that it's not always a good idea.
Hmmm, I think I should have worded that differently, say "to test out philosophy against reality" in the sense of checking it out with people who know the reality, rather than the implication of experiment.
Boy, you're into fish today and it's not even Friday. :wry: Obviously some of our current opponents have no interest in the GC. There will be other opponents who do adhere. Precedent is precedent.
No, I would not consider Mokey to be covered, he is not an Ayatollah (though he is studying on the fast track to attain that status), merely a self appointed Imam. Further, he's abrogated any religious protection he might have by being politically and militarily involved -- which is the point of not allowing Chaplains to do that...
Well, the fish on Fridays isn't part of my religious baggage ;).
I find it interesting that you say he has already abrogated his religious protection by his actions. I have to wonder if that is a view held by many in the Muslim world. BTW, I'm not disagreeing with you per se, I just find that I don't ave any data on it. Also, as far as being self-appointed, that is a fairly common thing in many religions including numerous strands of Christianity.
Oh -- and:Observing troops doing their jobs and participating in negotiations are discernable as quite different activities by even the kids in the ME.
Okay, you, Gian, Tom et al. would know better than I do on that score. Just out of interest, how are the chaplains perceived by most people in the ME?
Marc
Tom Odom
02-11-2008, 05:50 PM
how are the chaplains perceived by most people in the ME?
As an independent operator, I never had a chaplain--I had guys like Stan.
But I can relate that American Iraqis--Christian and Muslim--at DLI were very suspicious of Army Chaplains at DLI, especially a LTC rabbi who insisted on coming over and discussing religion and regional politics. He was very much viewed as a spy.
Best
Tom
Ken White
02-11-2008, 06:04 PM
...
Well, the fish on Fridays isn't part of my religious baggage ;).Nor mine; just seemed to be an inordinate amount...:wry:
I find it interesting that you say he has already abrogated his religious protection by his actions. I have to wonder if that is a view held by many in the Muslim world.I suspect the reverse is true, his embroilment in politics is expected of the Imams. East is east and west is west, etc.
BTW, I'm not disagreeing with you per se, I just find that I don't ave any data on it. Also, as far as being self-appointed, that is a fairly common thing in many religions including numerous strands of Christianity. I'm sure it is and I'm equally sure that some of those use that self-appointment for personal or political gain just as Moqtada has. Wasn't a major issue, just an aside, the point was that by assuming the religious mantle and then by indulging in political games, he will have in the eyes of many have lost some of his religious cover. Even in the ME where the attitudes are different.
... Just out of interest, how are the chaplains perceived by most people in the ME?Can't speak for today but when I was last there; with politeness and reserve for the most part. For the more religiously or fundamentally inclined -- with out right hostility. My suspicion is that has changed little if any.
MSG Proctor
02-28-2008, 11:20 PM
ALCON:
I just returned from a site assistance visit to the MNF-I HQs. This issue is relevant. I will provide a few facts and then some analysis on the feasability of utilizing chaplains in counterinsurgency operations.
1. DoDD 1304.19 (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130419p.pdf) requires all military chaplains to serve as the principal advisor to the commander on the impact of religion on military operations. This requirement is developed in JP 1-05 (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf) and FM 1-05 (http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/Garrison/chaplain/References/fm1_05.pdf).
2. In order to provide that advisement, religious support teams (RSTs which include enlisted personnel) must participate in the MDMP in support of operational planning and execution.
3. In Stability Operations (and COIN specifically), the MDMP is usually modified to prosecute lines of operation which include non-lethal targeting. RSTs are required to serve as advisors on targeting boards and other work groups and cells dealing with religious subject matter.
4. In the ITO, commanders are often spending as much as 50% of their time conducting leader engagements.
5. According to the CIA, religious leaders, clerics and religious scholars have filled the void created by the collapse of the Baathist regime. Religious influence is at a zenith unprecedented in Iraq during the modern era. For example, when Muqtada al Sadr communicated the tactical freeze for JAM for 6 more months, the message was delivered not by press conference, but through the Friday mosque sermon channels.
6. AQI and other rogue elements engage religious clerics. Without engagement from CF, the religious opinions of mosque preachers usually default to theological/religious arguments stridently hostile to CF/GOI objectives.
7. Commanders and civil affairs officers frequently engage religious leaders but are usually not prepared nor suited to a cleric-to-cleric dialogue. These engagements may achieve the opposite effect, ie, clerics get the idea that CF are godless secularists bent on curbing the influence of Islam. Islam allows for no delineation between civil and religious life. Islam is a civilization, not merely a religion as understood in occidental thinking.
8. In OIF I, TF 1st AD conducted over 500 religious leader engagements (RLE) with Chaplains as the principle participants. From these highly successful RLEs, religious councils and regional councils were formed in support of CF objectives. In the fall of 2003, CF were ordered off the streets and out of the villiages in order to consolidate combat power in super FOBs, thus severing many key leader relationships dependent on proximity and accessibility. During the RIP/TOA to OIF II, many of these cleric relationships were discarded or dropped.
9. The 2004-2006 rotations were focused on killing insurgents and pushing immature ISF out in the lead. Leader engagement was not a high priority throughout the ITO.
10. In Anbar in 2006-2007, units from 1 MEF and 1st BCT, 1st AD employed counterinsurgency operational design in prosecution of efforts to defeat AQI. Part of their success was due to Sunni cleric support for the concept of tribal participation in the IP, ISF and GOI. From there sprang the concerned local citizens phenomena. This turn of events was promulagated by COIN imperatives such as protecting the population and engaging key leaders.
11. A chaplain with TF 1-36 IN conducted 99 RLEs in Anbar; this included engaging members of the regionally influential Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq. This became a tipping point in the Anbar Awakening.
12. Chaplains in TF 134 were instrumental in enlisting orthodox Imams to retrain/re-educate reconcilables inside the theatre detainment facilities for suitability for release back into the population. This COIN TTP resulted in a wholesale rejection of the AQI version of Islam.
13. Iraq's clerics are more open, amenable and willing to unify, reconcile and deal with each other than at any time since 2003. Engaging these clerics is extremely vital to the long-term prospects of success in Iraq. Without cleric buy-in, it is doubtful that the GOI can sustain its gains.
14. According to US Army doctrine, engagement of local leaders is a Civil-Military function. Chaplains hold a long-standing tradition of involvement in CA activities such as humanitarian assistance, cleric engagement, NGO liaison, etc...
Conclusion: There are no restrictions legally nor doctrinally that stand in the way of RSTs supporting their commander's COIN efforts. If clerics in Iraq feel that their religious concerns are being heard and incorporated into CF/ISF/governance decision cycles, there is much greater likelihood of success in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
MSG Proctor
Cavguy
02-28-2008, 11:32 PM
MSG Proctor,
Thanks for finally weighing in. So the audience has your background, post an intro here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=26).
Council,
The reason for his delayed appearance was that he was at MNC-I to discuss the above issues. I'm sure you all will enjoy his passion on the subject.
MAJ S
marct
02-28-2008, 11:55 PM
You mentioned "cleric to cleric dialogue" and I was wondering if you could expand on that a bit. Is the goal along the lines of "inter-faith" dialogue or is it more situationally targeted (or both or something else)?
Marc
ps. I have to head off in a couple of minutes for the evening so no time pressure ;).
MSG Proctor
02-29-2008, 03:17 AM
You mentioned "cleric to cleric dialogue" and I was wondering if you could expand on that a bit. Is the goal along the lines of "inter-faith" dialogue or is it more situationally targeted (or both or something else)?
Marc
;).
Marc:
There are several important themes at work with RLE. Hopefully without becoming tedious, I'll explore some of these themes (themes will be in italics).
1. Democracy portends to secularism, and hence, a loss of religious identity, culture and connection to the Transcendant Good. When a non-cleric engages an indigenous religious leader, he usually rehearses the IO themes developed in the joint campaign plan (JCP). These typically revolve around ideas of individual rights and liberties, concepts somewhat foreign to Islam which focuses on group identity and religious values. Any conscienteous Muslim cleric is bound by conscience to resist that which he deems threatening to his way of relating to God. With democracy comes a train of attendant social and moral scourges (abortion, promiscuity, divorce, homosexuality, pornography, economic exploitation, etc...) - at least that is a theme that many conservative Islamic leaders are able to convey with conviction. We ought to respect these legitimate concerns.
A cleric-to-cleric dialogue very naturally affirms many of the same concerns. A Chaplain can, by thoughtful engagement, draw out his peer across the table into a discussion of the importance of religion in establishing a just society. The chaplain can confirm the Imam's concerns about the spread of injustice and moral decay - he too, is concerned about those very same things. This level of dialogue is neither forced nor contrived - unless the chaplain is not practicing fidelity to his own religious tradition. Most chaplains are very concerned about the cultivation and prosperity of faith communities. This is a level of connection that few commanders can enter into through no fault of their own.
An amazing take away from the Anbar Awakening is that Sunni scholars regarded US Army chaplains as fellow religious scholars - not merely prayer leaders, but scholars - as all Army chaplains possess advanced degrees in theology. Moreover, Iraq's long established Christian minority earned HUGE credibility for chaplains as the reputation of Christians in Iraq is impeccable when it comes to fidelity and integrity.
Therefore, enormous potential exists for engaging Iraqi clerics on this other plane of the religious, the transcendant, the righteousness of religious action.
2. All the Americans want to discuss is business. The pious Muslim begins all activities in the Name of the All-Merciful and punctuates them with a submissive "In Sha Allah" (as God wills). Negotiations with Islamic clerics in Iraq that do not acknowledge God up front and with deep reverence end up convincing the Imam that all we care about is the Yankee bottom line/dollar.
3. Shrill rhetoric = call to arms for Jihad. This is ill-understood on a cultural as well as a religious level. Bluster can be an important embellishment of religious preaching among Arabs - and is rarely an explicit call to violence. It takes an in-depth appreciation for Islamic preaching to ascertain the real threat posed by what would appear to our ears as inflammatory rhetoric.
4. A Muslim cleric is a Muslim cleric. Basically they're all the same. This theme is a deadly error fraught with all manner of dangers. The Shiite cleric and the Sunni prayer leader/preacher indeed share the same religion, but among the sects the relationship between clerics and congregations is starkly different. It is beyond the scope of SWJ blog to fully develop this significant consideration, but careful religious analysis (such as that offered by religious support teams) ought to be applied to RLE before, during and after the engagement.
I could go on, but the basic idea is that a chaplain, as a fellow scholar/practitioner offers a more genuinely religious dialogue with a fellow man of God who is very sincerely and conscienteously concerned about the long term effects of the new GOI on his people and their faith. Moreover, a commander may inadvertantly expect an Imam to make concessions or compromises on issues that may be immutably established in Koranic teaching and tradition. Chaplains are far more likely to seek out, identify and respect those religious non-negotables and assist the commander in operationalizing this understanding.
RLE is NOT a panacea nor a silver bullet. It is a neccessary component of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq that is routinely bungled or worse, ignored.
MSG Proctor
marct
02-29-2008, 01:46 PM
Hi John,
1. Democracy portends to secularism, and hence, a loss of religious identity, culture and connection to the Transcendant Good....
A cleric-to-cleric dialogue very naturally affirms many of the same concerns. A Chaplain can, by thoughtful engagement, draw out his peer across the table into a discussion of the importance of religion in establishing a just society.... This is a level of connection that few commanders can enter into through no fault of their own.
Agreed, and I have a suspicion that that is a crucial problem facing many Muslims; the classic problem of modernity. You comments about the IO lines ring true as well, with all of the sideband connotations of the dangers of individuality.
An amazing take away from the Anbar Awakening is that Sunni scholars regarded US Army chaplains as fellow religious scholars - not merely prayer leaders, but scholars - as all Army chaplains possess advanced degrees in theology. Moreover, Iraq's long established Christian minority earned HUGE credibility for chaplains as the reputation of Christians in Iraq is impeccable when it comes to fidelity and integrity.
Now that is intriguing! It certainly ties back to many discussions I've had with friends here in Canada about the dangers to Christianity of being in a majority (way too long to get into here).
Therefore, enormous potential exists for engaging Iraqi clerics on this other plane of the religious, the transcendant, the righteousness of religious action.
Just for information, are there any non JCI clerics in Iraq involved in this type of dialogue?
2. All the Americans want to discuss is business. The pious Muslim begins all activities in the Name of the All-Merciful and punctuates them with a submissive "In Sha Allah" (as God wills). Negotiations with Islamic clerics in Iraq that do not acknowledge God up front and with deep reverence end up convincing the Imam that all we care about is the Yankee bottom line/dollar.
A view that is also pushed by certain western academics and conspiracy theorists :wry:.
3. Shrill rhetoric = call to arms for Jihad. This is ill-understood on a cultural as well as a religious level. Bluster can be an important embellishment of religious preaching among Arabs - and is rarely an explicit call to violence. It takes an in-depth appreciation for Islamic preaching to ascertain the real threat posed by what would appear to our ears as inflammatory rhetoric.
I have suspected that, but my study of religious rhetoric hasn't included Islamic preaching.
4. A Muslim cleric is a Muslim cleric. Basically they're all the same. This theme is a deadly error fraught with all manner of dangers. The Shiite cleric and the Sunni prayer leader/preacher indeed share the same religion, but among the sects the relationship between clerics and congregations is starkly different. It is beyond the scope of SWJ blog to fully develop this significant consideration, but careful religious analysis (such as that offered by religious support teams) ought to be applied to RLE before, during and after the engagement.
Some form of a structural analysis would, I suspect, be quite useful here - on the blog rather than in the council. It is the type of information that would prove very useful and is not readily available. If such an analysis has been done, and it is open source (unclassified) it would be worthwhile linking to it. The best way to expand from the "Us-Them" dichotomy is to educate people, and I think that this is one of the key pieces that has been missing.
I could go on, but the basic idea is that a chaplain, as a fellow scholar/practitioner offers a more genuinely religious dialogue with a fellow man of God who is very sincerely and conscienteously concerned about the long term effects of the new GOI on his people and their faith. Moreover, a commander may inadvertantly expect an Imam to make concessions or compromises on issues that may be immutably established in Koranic teaching and tradition. Chaplains are far more likely to seek out, identify and respect those religious non-negotables and assist the commander in operationalizing this understanding.
Really good point. Also, if memory serves me, there are different schools of Islamic law some of which come to opposing solutions to any given problem. This would mean that a properly constructed argument could achieve a similar effect without breaching Islamic traditions.
Marc
Tom Odom
02-29-2008, 01:46 PM
MSG Proctor,
I have read youir pieces elsewhere and I will accept some of the ideas--the problem lies in execution and perception. Execution problems rest with preparation of the Chaplain's Corps to do what you propose. Perecption rests with the recieving audience. After nearly 2 decades as a Middle East and sub-Saharan FAO, I would say that your proposals, doctrinely rooted or not, offer greater risk than possible gain.
I would also say to the greater audience is that the debate inside the Chaplains arena over these concepts is far from over.
Tom
MSG Proctor
02-29-2008, 02:21 PM
Just for information, are there any non JCI clerics in Iraq involved in this type of dialogue?
Marc
Marc, I'm not clear by what you mean with non JCI clerics ? Can you explain?
BTW, thanks for all your insightful comments. I appreciate that.
marct
02-29-2008, 02:25 PM
Hi John,
Marc, I'm not clear by what you mean with non JCI clerics ? Can you explain?
Sorry, shorthand from my comp. rel. background JCI = Jewish, Christian, Islamic. Basically, non-JCI clerics means priests / religious leaders / etc. from any other religion.
BTW, thanks for all your insightful comments. I appreciate that.
No worries - this is an area near and dear to my heart as it were :wry:.
Marc
MSG Proctor
02-29-2008, 02:26 PM
MSG Proctor,
I have read youir pieces elsewhere and I will accept some of the ideas--the problem lies in execution and perception. Execution problems rest with preparation of the Chaplain's Corps to do what you propose. Perecption rests with the recieving audience. After nearly 2 decades as a Middle East and sub-Saharan FAO, I would say that your proposals, doctrinely rooted or not, offer greater risk than possible gain.
I would also say to the greater audience is that the debate inside the Chaplains arena over these concepts is far from over.
Tom
Tom:
I will not contest either point. I will say on the issue of risk, we have tried NOT engaging the clerics with our own mustashar ad deeny (religious consultant), and the results are what they are. There is no monolith body of Iraqi clerics - they are as diverse and unique as our own religious landscape. Some clerics will admit to the benefit of RLE, others will not, or perhaps will milk the opportunity for advantage.
Per the discussion within the Chaplain Corps, you are correct - the controversey is heated and often emotional. However, the current momentum is shifting in favor of at least attempting to execute our doctrinal mandate.
The capability (RLE) is historically effective early in phase IV operations, humanitarian assistance missions or Stability Ops/OOTWs - this is the first time it has been attempted in COIN.
MSG Proctor
02-29-2008, 02:37 PM
Hi John,
Sorry, shorthand from my comp. rel. background JCI = Jewish, Christian, Islamic. Basically, non-JCI clerics means priests / religious leaders / etc. from any other religion.
No worries - this is an area near and dear to my heart as it were :wry:.
Marc
Oh yes - early on in OIF our primary contacts were with Christians and Shia clerics. Unfortunately this led to a perception that the Christians were 'collaborators' and exposed them to constant danger. This I regret deeply as I was personally on point for liaison to many Christian leaders in the Al Rashid district Baghdad. Today the Christian community in Baghdad is gradually returning to some semblance of normalcy (those few intrepid souls that remain) but any contact with CF is strictly clandestine.
It has taken a long, long time for me to acclimate to the various strains of Islam practiced in Iraq - I wish I knew in 2003 what I know now. What we did not calculate was the ascendance of the clerics in the vacuum created by the Baath Party melt down.
Still, thanks to Providence, we have a second window of opportunity to engage the clerics today - how narrow/wide that opportunity is, I do not know. It won't last forever. But its here now, and I pray the clerics feel that they have been heard, affirmed and included in the decision cycles of the new GOI.
Ken White
02-29-2008, 05:57 PM
...
2. In order to provide that advisement, religious support teams (RSTs which include enlisted personnel) must participate in the MDMP in support of operational planning and execution.I believe the word 'may' should be substituted for 'must.' That's the Commander's call.
3. In Stability Operations (and COIN specifically), the MDMP is usually modified to prosecute lines of operation which include non-lethal targeting. RSTs are required to serve as advisors on targeting boards and other work groups and cells dealing with religious subject matter.That sort of contradicts this:
FM 1-05, Appendix A, says:
"UMTs are reminded that CMO support is a secondary responsibility and
that the personal delivery of religious support is always the UMT’s imperative.
and:
A-2. Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following:
· Direct participation in negotiations or mediations as sole participant.
· Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition."
Admittedly, you say participate which is a lesser included offense than the FM's usage of 'sole' but I suggest your use of 'required' is a significant overreach. That again is the Commander's call.
7. Commanders and civil affairs officers frequently engage religious leaders but are usually not prepared nor suited to a cleric-to-cleric dialogue. These engagements may achieve the opposite effect, ie, clerics get the idea that CF are godless secularists bent on curbing the influence of Islam. Islam allows for no delineation between civil and religious life. Islam is a civilization, not merely a religion as understood in occidental thinking.I agree with all that but would point out that the Chaplain should absolutely not engage in such dialog with no command presence.
11. A chaplain with TF 1-36 IN conducted 99 RLEs in Anbar; this included engaging members of the regionally influential Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq. This became a tipping point in the Anbar Awakening.Good for him. The use of the Chaplain in such a role may be helpful, it's very much situation (and personality) dependent. Such use should not be ruled out but it must be very carefully done and will not always be an applicable use for many reasons. METT-TC always applies.
Conclusion: There are no restrictions legally nor doctrinally that stand in the way of RSTs supporting their commander's COIN efforts...That statement is at best arguable; the key is support in what way?
... If clerics in Iraq feel that their religious concerns are being heard and incorporated into CF/ISF/governance decision cycles, there is much greater likelihood of success in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.Probably true and that can be achieved by using the Chaplain in the mode envisioned in DoD Instr 1304.19: "4.1. Are established to advise and assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed by the Constitution, to assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs (DoD Directive 5100.73 (reference (e)), and to serve as the principal advisors to commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations." (Emphasis added / kw)
As well as heeding the guidance in JP 1-05; "(2) Advise Regarding Religion and Religious Support. The JFCH should develop and maintain proficiency regarding the religious issues in the operational area and be prepared to provide relevant information on those issues. Extreme care must be taken to ensure that the chaplain’s status as a noncombatant is not compromised..(Emphasis added / kw)
Per the discussion within the Chaplain Corps, you are correct - the controversey is heated and often emotional. However, the current momentum is shifting in favor of at least attempting to execute our doctrinal mandate.I'm unsure that your "doctrinal mandate" encompasses the expanded role you seem to wish -- I have not been able to find it.
The capability (RLE) is historically effective early in phase IV operations, humanitarian assistance missions or Stability Ops/OOTWs - this is the first time it has been attempted in COIN.Depends on what you mean by attempted in COIN. It was done, though not on a theater wide or organized basis in Viet Nam. It was successful generally in a Catholic Chaplain to Catholic Priest in a predominately Catholic area, sometimes so with a Protestant Chaplain. Such efforts were less successful with the Cao Dai and much less successful with the Sangha or the more fanatical Bonzes. It was resoundingly rejected if there was the slightest hint of condescension or proselyting
Chaplains have a role to play -- but their use in an operational mode should be very carefully considered and should be aimed at tactical success, not role enhancement.
MSG Proctor
02-29-2008, 07:55 PM
I believe the word 'may' should be substituted for 'must.' That's the Commander's call.That sort of contradicts this:
FM 1-05, Appendix A, says:
"UMTs are reminded that CMO support is a secondary responsibility and
that the personal delivery of religious support is always the UMT’s imperative.
and:
A-2. Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following:
· Direct participation in negotiations or mediations as sole participant.
· Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition."
Admittedly, you say participate which is a lesser included offense than the FM's usage of 'sole' but I suggest your use of 'required' is a significant overreach. That again is the Commander's call.I agree with all that but would point out that the Chaplain should absolutely not engage in such dialog with no command presence.Good for him. The use of the Chaplain in such a role may be helpful, it's very much situation (and personality) dependent. Such use should not be ruled out but it must be very carefully done and will not always be an applicable use for many reasons. METT-TC always applies.That statement is at best arguable; the key is support in what way?Probably true and that can be achieved by using the Chaplain in the mode envisioned in DoD Instr 1304.19: "4.1. Are established to advise and assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed by the Constitution, to assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs (DoD Directive 5100.73 (reference (e)), and to serve as the principal advisors to commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations." (Emphasis added / kw)
As well as heeding the guidance in JP 1-05; "(2) Advise Regarding Religion and Religious Support. The JFCH should develop and maintain proficiency regarding the religious issues in the operational area and be prepared to provide relevant information on those issues. Extreme care must be taken to ensure that the chaplain’s status as a noncombatant is not compromised..(Emphasis added / kw)I'm unsure that your "doctrinal mandate" encompasses the expanded role you seem to wish -- I have not been able to find it.Depends on what you mean by attempted in COIN. It was done, though not on a theater wide or organized basis in Viet Nam. It was successful generally in a Catholic Chaplain to Catholic Priest in a predominately Catholic area, sometimes so with a Protestant Chaplain. Such efforts were less successful with the Cao Dai and much less successful with the Sangha or the more fanatical Bonzes. It was resoundingly rejected if there was the slightest hint of condescension or proselyting
Chaplains have a role to play -- but their use in an operational mode should be very carefully considered and should be aimed at tactical success, not role enhancement.
Sir:
US Code Title X is often referred to in attempting to define or limit chaplain activity in the Armed Forces. The FM you quoted ascribes properties to Title X that are not there - Title X simply states:
(a) Each chaplain shall, when practicable, hold appropriate religious services at least once on each Sunday for the command to which he is assigned, and shall perform appropriate religious burial services for members of the Army who die while in that command.
(b) Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities, including necessary transportation, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the chaplain in performing his duties.
Not a word about negotiations, targeting or intelligence.
FWIW, my statements are adressing cababilities, not preroggatives; I assume our readers understand that final decision-making authority rests with commanders.
Advising the commander on indigenous religions in the operational area without actually meeting any religious leaders? :confused:
Engagement does equal negotiation. Please review my remarks; I am not advocating chaplains negotiate anything, although some of our senior leaders are highly capable of doing that as a member of a bi-lat team.
Please explain where I advocated role enhancement. The roles are already there. As a member of TF 1st Armored Division in Baghdad in 2003-2004, the chaplain teams were participants in over 500 RLEs - I was active in about 60 of those. I respect the arguments from theory, but I also contend from the position of experience that chaplain involvement in [this] counterinsurgency is practicable and even desirable when done circumspectly.
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 02:03 AM
The above post should read,
Engagement does NOT equal negotiation.
Guess the edit feature times out?
:confused:
Ken White
03-01-2008, 03:25 AM
Sir:
US Code Title X is often referred to in attempting to define or limit chaplain activity in the Armed Forces. The FM you quoted ascribes properties to Title X that are not there - Title X simply states:
(a) Each chaplain shall, when practicable, hold appropriate religious services at least once on each Sunday for the command to which he is assigned, and shall perform appropriate religious burial services for members of the Army who die while in that command.
(b) Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities, including necessary transportation, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the chaplain in performing his duties.I didn't refer to Title 10, I referred to the US Army Field Manual which is a doctrinal publication -- it refers to Title 10 but it doesn't need to do so, the writer just did put in his desired interpretation -- and the Army agreed and published it.
Not a word about negotiations, targeting or intelligence.Of course not -- but the FM does mention those. Title 10 is not your operational guidance; the FM is.
FWIW, my statements are adressing cababilities, not preroggatives; I assume our readers understand that final decision-making authority rests with commanders.Most of 'em, some civilians here who do not and your method of advocating your position -- which is perfectly acceptable and fine with me -- could lead the uninitiated to think that a broader role than is doctrinally stated or logically expected (IMO) is to be encouraged and is totally acceptable to most. My suspicion is that such acceptance is not universal by any means.
Advising the commander on indigenous religions in the operational area without actually meeting any religious leaders? :confused:Didn't say that; did say they should not meet them without a command presence; i.e. someone in the unit chain of command who is the negotiating representative of the commander. The Chaplain should under most circumstances should not be the acceptor of a negotiated solution for the command because he's not in the chain. Even in meetings where no negotiations are expected, there should be a combatant present; as you know, haggling in the ME is a blood sport. They're quite adept at seizing unexpected opportunities
Please explain where I advocated role enhancement...Again, I didn't say that -- that you were so advocating. However, the position you espouse is effectively a far more involved role and is effectively role enhancement. My greatest concern is that it will detract from his primary duty -- which is pastoral care for the unit. In a more intense war, that job will transcend any other role very quickly and in the US Army building new habits for added visibility is a way of life -- the problem is that those things get embedded and some of them do not work in many situations other than the one they were designed for. In a flexible organization, such developments wouldn't be a problem. The US Army is NOT a flexible organization.
The roles are already there. As a member of TF 1st Armored Division in Baghdad in 2003-2004, the chaplain teams were participants in over 500 RLEs - I was active in about 60 of those. I respect the arguments from theory, but I also contend from the position of experience that chaplain involvement in [this] counterinsurgency is practicable and even desirable when done circumspectly.I accept that it can be desirable when done circumspectly and when the personalities (Commander, Chaplain, local Clerics) are all in favor of it. It's been done in other wars in other places but circumspect is a good word and should always apply and IMO, such effort should be the exception rather than the rule. I base that on the status of the Chaplain as a noncombatant under the GC and on his primary duty.
My concern in addressing the issue is that I have seen good ideas to adapt to particular situations get adopted locally and in specific operations or wars. that's what should happen and I'm all for that. The problem that arises is that the inflexible US Army tends to get target fixation and take what should be a temporary, this operation, adaptation and embed it in the doctrine and that many such adaptations do not work well other times in other operations. It's sort of a 'be careful what you wish for, you may get it' thing.
Gian P Gentile
03-01-2008, 01:28 PM
Dear MSG Proctor:
Welcome home and thanks for spending time writing articulate responses on this important thread. In a previous posting of a few days ago you said:
Conclusion: There are no restrictions legally nor doctrinally that stand in the way of RSTs supporting their commander's COIN efforts. If clerics in Iraq feel that their religious concerns are being heard and incorporated into CF/ISF/governance decision cycles, there is much greater likelihood of success in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
What about moral and ethical restrictions on the part of chaplains becoming in effect operators when used in the manner doctrine suggests? What is your sense of how chaplains have confronted the moral and ethical implications of them becoming an operator for their commander?
By implications of being an operator here is what I mean? Lets say in a hypothetical scenario an infantry battalion chaplain is used by his commander to engage (talk to, establish relationship) with an imam of a mosque that the commander has yet to meet. The chaplain spends time at the mosque getting to know the imam through bonding due to shared eperiences as a man of the cloth. Through this bonding the chaplain develops a relationship with the imam and so does the battalion commander. One day the imam calls the commander and says hey, I know where three alqueda militants are hiding right now. Since the commander is still getting to know the imam and is not too sure of his credibility the commander then goes to his chaplain and asks, can I trust the imam? The chaplain says yes, the commander puts together an op to get the militants, and in the course of the operations the three alqueda militants are killed. In this scenario are there not clear violations of a chaplain having crossed the moral and ethical line by becoming an operator for the commander and assisting him in his operational and environmental understanding of his area that at certain points contributes to his ability to kill the enemy?
I thought through the option of using my chaplain in such ways while training-up for deployment to baghdad in 2006. I chose to use my chaplain the way i thought was right and that was the spiritual and moral well-being of my outfit; and that was it.
Would it be possible for you to get a senior chaplain to weigh in on this discussion?
again thanks so much for your time and thanks for your important service.
gentile
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 06:04 PM
Ken:
Your comments are entirely reasonable and I have heard them echoed through hundreds of disinterested observers, stake holders, senior trainers, etc... There are two things I would like the readers to keep in mind.
1. In Stability Ops, and most especially COIN, everyone is doing something other than "their" job. How is it that we expect the 22 year old 2nd LT to 'negotiate' with tribal shiekhs wielding thunderous levels of lethal means? What specialized training does the LT have to support governance, infrastructure development, commerce development, law enforement, domestic interventions, etc? I actually took my convoy down a street in Doora and broke up a car-jacking. How much training did I have for that? Zero. The reality is, in COIN, E4s and LTs are doing all kinds of things that would fit your definition of role enhancement. Look at the Field Artillery community; they are performing as motorized rifle battalions, FSTers are performing as Company-level INTEL analysts(!), and FSOs are IO coordinators. Food service specialists are serving (very effectively) as PSDs. I could go on and on. The RST is not exempt from the demands of COIN. Especially when they have a unique value to add, which leads to my 2nd point.
2. The moral, ethical and spiritual duty of the chaplain is always humanitarian, including in COIN. The fact is, religious leaders have replaced the Baathist leaders as the most influential spheres of influence (SOI) in Iraq. The fact is, Shiite clerics control most of the GOI by a whole 'nuther chain of command that most of our operators do not (and some not want to) understand.
Therefore, is it a morally acceptable position that a chaplain applies his unique capabilities only in a reactive posture? Does the chaplain exist merely to treat spiritual, physical and emotional casualties? Is he a clerical rabbit's foot to provide last rites in case of mortal injury to Joe? Is his relevance merely to provide spiritual guidance to the 10% of the unit that attends his religious services on the FOB? Or does the chaplain also have a prophetic responsibility to mitigate hatred, foster positive relations and build bridges with these SOIs that can either help or hurt the mission?
Or as an eloquent preacher once put it, "Is it better to invest in a hospital at the bottom of a cliff, or in a fence at the top?"
Again, please indulge me here a moment, this is not mere theoreticals - I have seen this work time and time again in OEF and OIF. Is it for all chaplains? No. Will it help in all situations? Maybe not. But one thing is absolutely sure: Iraqis are Muslims and religion is very important to them. Everything we do creates some effect in the AO. The problem I see is no one is measuring the 'religious effects' in the operation. This is mainly because RSTs are only doing half their job (minister to troops) and no one is minding the store when it comes to religious atmospherics. Yes, the INTEL community has the data, but is not equipped for providing the religious analysis. DoDD 1304.19 lays that responsibility squarely at the feet of the Chaplaincies of the US Armed Forces.
So Ken, somebody needs to engage these SOIs. And to not engage them IS a message. To engage them without religious analysis is dangerous. AQI engages the Imams. JAM engages the Imams. This is not speculation - this is the reality on the ground. The Friday mosque sermon is the #1 most important venue of IO in Iraq today. Since late 2003, we have largely marginalized the clerics on a religious level.
Per a senior Chaplain perspective: Here's a link to an interview (http://www.defenselink.mil/home/blog/docs/Hoyt_Transcript.pdf)with the MNF-I Command Chaplain on this very issue. I can provide dozens more.
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 06:58 PM
GP Gentile:
Thanks for the welcome and the encouraging remarks.
I certainly don’t want to judge the way you utilized your RST during a particularly brutal phase of OIF. Employing your RST in a ministry-only capacity is the default position taken by most Joint Force commanders. The problem with that is there is no one else on your staff qualified to provide religious analysis to the running staff estimate.
JP 1-05 provides guidance on how much effort chaplains should provide on direct ministry support and staff support to the commander. At the tactical level, about 75% of the chaplain’s efforts should be spent on traditional ministry functions and 25% or so on advising the commander. That flips at the strategic level to the opposite percentages. The optimal utilization of a religious support team is both/and, not either/or. This is all the more critical if the unit is a maneuver formation that owns terrain and is conducting effects-based operations in a religious environment.
Religion is part of the "human terrain" in COIN, and we need analysis and advisement on it at every level.
Per your question: chaplains can provide intelligence (ever Soldier is a sensor) but should not be directed to collect it. Chaplain Assistants, on the other hand, are combatants and are not restricted in any way from intelligence activities. Moreover, all chaplain assistant NCO positions E6 and above are coded in TO&Es with the "2S" additional skill identifier (for battle staff NCO training requirements) - identifying the chaplain NCO as a battle staff contributor. It is the NCO that should be attending the work groups, targeting boards, effects coordination meetings, CMO planning, etc... That leaves the chaplain with plenty of time to do ministry to troops. An in depth look at these capabilities can be explored here (https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=3932).
Here (https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=4027) is a CALL handbook that provides detailed policy and doctrinal parameters for RST utilization in the GWOT.
Ken White
03-01-2008, 07:16 PM
Ken:
Your comments are entirely reasonable and I have heard them echoed through hundreds of disinterested observers, stake holders, senior trainers, etc... There are two things I would like the readers to keep in mind.
1. In Stability Ops, and most especially COIN, everyone is doing something other than "their" job. How is it that we expect the 22 year old 2nd LT to 'negotiate' with tribal shiekhs wielding thunderous levels of lethal means? What specialized training does the LT have to support governance, infrastructure development, commerce development, law enforement, domestic interventions, etc? I actually took my convoy down a street in Doora and broke up a car-jacking. How much training did I have for that? Zero. The reality is, in COIN, E4s and LTs are doing all kinds of things that would fit your definition of role enhancement. Look at the Field Artillery community; they are performing as motorized rifle battalions, FSTers are performing as Company-level INTEL analysts(!), and FSOs are IO coordinators. Food service specialists are serving (very effectively) as PSDs. I could go on and on. The RST is not exempt from the demands of COIN. Especially when they have a unique value to add, which leads to my 2nd point.We disagree on your assessment. Far as I'm concerned, all those other people you cite are doing what they're supposed to do. Been there and done that myself. Done the COIN thing in a couple of places, lived and worked on the economy in the ME for two years -- all that admittedly more years ago than I care to recall but war is war, COIN is COIN and the ME is the ME, none of it has changed that much.
That 2LT is doing what he should be doing, so are the Food Service types. I just suggest the Chaplain should be doing what he should be doing, no more and no less -- that means interfacing carefully with the local religious leaders when and where appropriate and advising the Commander on the issues. Where we disagree, I'll get to below.
2. The moral, ethical and spiritual duty of the chaplain is always humanitarian, including in COIN. The FACT is, religious leaders have replaced the baathist leaders as the most influential spheres of influence (SOI) in Iraq. The FACT is, Shiite clerics control most of the GOI by a whole 'nuther chain of command that most of our operators do not (and some not want to) understand. Therefore, is it a morally acceptable position that a chaplain applies his unique capabilities only in a reactive posture? Does the chaplain exist merely to treat spiritual, physical and emotional casualties? Is he a clerical rabbit's foot to provide last rites in case of mortal injury to Joe? Is his relevance merely to provide spiritual guidance to the 10% of the unit that attends his religious services on the FOB? Or does the chaplain also have a prophetic responsibility to mitigate hatred, foster positive relations and build bridges with these SOIs that can either help or hurt the mission?I understand all that and if you'll recall, I have not said the Chaplain should not be engaged, merely that said engagement be very discrete and cautious. I said that because if we're not careful, we'll build a model that will not translate to another war in another place. I have no problem with doing what works and adapting to the situation -- I have big problems with building in a capability and a process that are not universally applicable
I'd also suggest that the Chaplain has a responsibility to the entire unit and not just to those that attend religious services
Or as an eloquent preacher once put it, "Is it better to invest in a hospital at the bottom of a cliff, or in a fence at the top?"Most preachers are eloquent. So are most lawyers. Both bear considerable watching. ;)
Again, please indulge me here a moment, this is not mere theoreticals - I have seen this work time and time again in OEF and OIF. Is it for all chaplains? No. Will it help in all situations? Maybe not. But one thing is absolutely sure: Iraqis are Muslims and religion is very important to them. Everything we do creates some effect in the AO. The problem I see is no one is measuring the 'religious effects' in the operation. This is mainly because RSTs are only doing half their job (minister to troops) and no one is minding the store when it comes to religious atmospherics.If that's the case, it's a function of personality and AO I suspect. Ministering to the troops is not half their job but it is their primary job; they need to be involved and advising -- IMO they should not be primary participants in MOST cases and never the sole participant in meetings with local entities where there is the slightest chance of a negotiation occurring.
Yes, the INTEL community has the data, but is not equipped for providing the religious analysis. DoDD 1304.19 lays that responsibility squarely at the feet of the Chaplaincies of the US Armed Forces.We agree on the analysis portion, we agree that means interface with local religious types -- we disagree, I think, on how much more involvement there should be.
So Ken, somebody needs to engage these SOIs. And to not engage them IS a message. To engage them without religious analysis is dangerous. AQI engages the Imams. JAM engages the Imams. This is not speculation - this is the reality on the ground. The Friday mosque sermon is the #1 most important venue of IO in Iraq today. Since late 2003, we have largely marginalized the clerics on a religious level.Sigh. One more time. I have no problem with engagement, I do believe it should not be done at any expense to the Chaplain's primary mission and I do believe, particularly in the ME, it should be done discretely and cautiously. I am concerned that too much stock be placed on the effort as a result of a specific set of circumstances and a a situationally dependent effort will get converted to doctrinal precept that is not generally applicable in other wars and in other theaters.
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 07:35 PM
OK Ken, we agree on 95% of the issue. Please allow me to summarize some points here.
1. Religious Support IAW Joint and Army doctrine comprises BOTH ministry to troops and families AND advising the commander. DoDD 1304.19 does not prioritize these capabilities. They are dependent on METT-TC and the commander's intent.
2. Religious support teams (RST) comprise both commissioned officers and enlisted support personnel. The enlisted side are the primary operators/integrators of the advise-the-commander capability. They receive battle staff NCO training and manipulate products in support of operational planning.
3. The culture within the Joint community has not embraced these capabilites fully. Most of the resistance is interior to the chaplaincies themselves.
I am trying to act as an agent of change in order to leverage much-needed religious analysis capabilities in support of battle command. Proper utilization of chaplain assistant NCOs is critical to delivering this capability in full spectrum operations. As an agent of change, I advocate for cultural acceptance in the military community of these emerging capabilities.
My personal belief is that one of these two COAs must be selected:
1. The Joint service chaplaincies should extricate themselves completely from advising the commander and recommend the MI community hire some theologians, ministers and clergy;
2. The Armed Forces (particularly Army) should grow force structure commensurate with the capabilities described in our discussion.
Per doctrine: The environment in TRADOC today is 180 degrees from where it was just 3 years ago. Doctrine is a snapshot in time. Lessons learned drives everything today. Doctrine provides the view from 70,000 feet; lessons learned drives actions. This is a radical departure from the old Legacy Force, AirLand Battle, TRADOC way of developing doctrine. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are far more important today than the field manuals. The religious support FM is 5 years old and badly out of date. Lessons learned in the contemporary operating environment are far more essential to mission accomplishment than the basics provided in the FM. The FM should always be consulted as the start point, but COIN is too dynamic to expect the FMs to provide the kind of detailed guidance required. All this requires wisdom and highly competent, adaptive leadership.
I am trying to act as an agent of change in order to leverage much-needed religious analysis capabilities in support of battle command. Proper utilization of chaplain assistant NCOs is critical to delivering this capability in full spectrum operations. As an agent of change, I advocate for cultural acceptance in the military community of these emerging capabilities.
My personal belief is that one of these two COAs must be selected:
1. The Joint service chaplaincies should extricate themselves completely from advising the commander and recommend the MI community hire some theologians, ministers and clergy;
2. The Armed Forces (particularly Army) should grow force structure commensurate with the capabilities described in our discussion.
Quite early on in this thread, (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39692&postcount=30) to be exact) I argued that there was a role for religious advisors as part of the human terrain/supportt element or something like a CA team. This seems to be pretty much what MSG Proctor proposes in his recommendation above.
If you bring in the "pro's from Dover" to do the religious support role (and make that their full time job) and let staff chaplains do the, primarily, pastoral kinds of things that they have been traditionally expected to do, I suspect that the animosity WRT using Chaplains for the RSE mission might disappear, or at least abate rather significantly.
Surferbeetle
03-01-2008, 09:16 PM
...... I argued that there was a role for religious advisors as part of the human terrain/support element or something like a CA team. ....
"If we don't care of the customer someone else will."
WM,
I agree with the above and would say that the resulting knowledge needs to integrated into the commanders daily common operational picture. Friday Sermons are just a small snapshot of how the religious community influences things:
1) Religion is a huge component of the Iraqi battlespace that we do not address sufficiently. Unlike most of the west, Iraqi's are immersed in religion all day everyday. When we got rocketed or mortared it usually started before first prayer. Religious folks are key leaders and regular engagements need to be scripted for them just as we do with other key leaders. This is still a pick-up game in theater from what I can see.
2) MSG Proctor has it right when he recounts that everybody downrange pitches in to get things done. Sometimes I would scam folks from the S1 shop to beef up my security number for some of my CA missions. Sometimes I would bring my team to beef up the Chaplain on his missions. Sometimes it was Combat Camera or the Historians.
3-0 lists religion once, 3-24 has 19 entries, 3.05-40 has 17 entries.
Ken,
When I work Latin America we always incorporate opening and closing ceremonies for our projects. In Iraq I was outside the wire 7 days a week all day for the first half of 'my war' and 6 days a week for the second half. 99% of my nights were behind the wire. I have to defer to your 2 years on the economy, however I was struck by the power of religion to influence daily and long term events during my tour. I don't think this sphere of the 'human terrain' has been engaged effectively and I believe we have paid a price for that lack of effective engagement.
Regards,
Steve
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 11:00 PM
...I was struck by the power of religion to influence daily and long term events during my tour. I don't think this sphere of the 'human terrain' has been engaged effectively and I believe we have paid a price for that lack of effective engagement.
Regards,
Steve
Steve:
Bless you. That is all I have been trying to say. We have not done a good job of factoring religious analysis into our operational planning and I heartily concur, in your words, "we have paid a price".
As of now, the commander's primary advisor on religion is his chaplain section. I will speak for myself only - I believe we have neglected that duty and that it has probably cost friendly lives. It is in order to save life and promote peace that I am speaking out on this issue; certainly that is in keeping with the spirit of religious support to our Armed Forces.
As an insider, its difficult for me to be objective. I blame this situation on 3 things, not necessarily in order:
1) Leadership within the Chaplaincies of the Armed Forces;
2) Close-minded commanders who are dismissive of religion's influence in the AO;
3) Strident secularization in our own culture which has ghettoized religion for us and blinded us to the primary and foundational role of religion in Iraq and Afghanistan.
MSG P
MSG Proctor
03-01-2008, 11:10 PM
Quite early on in this thread, (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39692&postcount=30) to be exact) I argued that there was a role for religious advisors as part of the human terrain/supportt element or something like a CA team. This seems to be pretty much what MSG Proctor proposes in his recommendation above.
If you bring in the "pro's from Dover" to do the religious support role (and make that their full time job) and let staff chaplains do the, primarily, pastoral kinds of things that they have been traditionally expected to do, I suspect that the animosity WRT using Chaplains for the RSE mission might disappear, or at least abate rather significantly.
WM:
The problem with that is that bringing in a ringer from outside the formation may not result in the kind of street cred we look for in a RLE. The chaplain in uniform is viewed by Iraqi clerics as:
1) A scholar - Chaplains possess advanced graduate degrees, usually 96 hours worth (Master of Divinity)
2) Mustashar ad deeny - "religious consultant to the commander"
3) Christians in uniform - Iraqi Christians have impeccable reputations for integrity among Muslim Iraqis; this purchases a great deal of credilibility for staff chaplains as 'one of the Soldiers'.
My personal conviction is that we need to expand chaplaincy force design to provide both capabilities to the commander (pastoral care and religious analysis). This type of warfare is probably not going away anytime soon.
Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. IW depends not just on
our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as
tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. People,
not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success. The joint
force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local
relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW.
- Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 2007
WM:
The problem with that is that bringing in a ringer from outside the formation may not result in the kind of street cred we look for in a RLE. The chaplain in uniform is viewed by Iraqi clerics as:
1) A scholar - Chaplains possess advanced graduate degrees, usually 96 hours worth (Master of Divinity)
2) Mustashar ad deeny - "religious consultant to the commander"
3) Christians in uniform - Iraqi Christians have impeccable reputations for integrity among Muslim Iraqis; this purchases a great deal of credilibility for staff chaplains as 'one of the Soldiers'.
My personal conviction is that we need to expand chaplaincy force design to provide both capabilities to the commander (pastoral care and religious analysis). This type of warfare is probably not going away anytime soon.
While my referenced post suggested using civilian members of the cloth on the teams, that membership need not be exclusively civilian. As to the 3 points in your response, I think pretty much any ordained mainstream minister or priest must have graduated from a seminary, hence holds a M. Div, D. Div, or perhaps a Doctor of Theology. (I was going to write Th.D. but I had flashbacks to the Scarecrow's Doctor of Thinkology from the "Wizard of Oz.") Having such a degree could easily be a condition of hire on the team.
On point 2, I am not clear how a uniform conveys "advisor to the commander" status. Please elaborate.
And on point 3, again I fail to see how the difference between being a Christian and being a Christian in uniform adds status. I have visions of the Knights Templar and Hospitalier during the Crusades, who were "clerics in uniform" and pretty roundly hated by their Moslem opponents.
Ken White
03-02-2008, 12:30 AM
OK Ken, we agree on 95% of the issue. Please allow me to summarize some points here.Perhaps but the glaring 5% is that I think the unit Chaplain should not exceed his doctrinal advisory role.
1. Religious Support IAW Joint and Army doctrine comprises BOTH ministry to troops and families AND advising the commander. DoDD 1304.19 does not prioritize these capabilities. They are dependent on METT-TC and the commander's intent.We can totally agree on that. Hopefully to the point that if the Commander elects not to use the Chaplain other than minimally in the advisory role, that ends the discussion and the Chaplain does not get recourse through the tech chain to overrule that Commander.
3. The culture within the Joint community has not embraced these capabilites fully. Most of the resistance is interior to the chaplaincies themselves. I can believe that and hopefully, that is acceptable to all. No Chaplain should be forced, coerced or even nudged into a role which he believes for whatever reason he is not suited or should not perform. Nor should any Commander be forced to use his Chaplain in a way he does not believe suitable.
My personal belief is that one of these two COAs must be selected:
1. The Joint service chaplaincies should extricate themselves completely from advising the commander and recommend the MI community hire some theologians, ministers and clergy;
2. The Armed Forces (particularly Army) should grow force structure commensurate with the capabilities described in our discussion.I disagree with COA 1, agree with COA 2 -- and believe that those capabilities should not come from unit ministry teams but should use the Bde and higher level Chaplians. Even that does not negate my belief that Chaplains should not engage in negotiations without a representative of the Chain of Command present. I say that because, as you said:
"The moral, ethical and spiritual duty of the chaplain is always humanitarian, including in COIN."That is a potential disconnect between the Commanders intent and the Chaplains beliefs and attitude. That possible difference should be judged very carefully.
Per doctrine: The environment in TRADOC today is 180 degrees from where it was just 3 years ago. Doctrine is a snapshot in time. Lessons learned drives everything today. Doctrine provides the view from 70,000 feet; lessons learned drives actions. This is a radical departure from the old Legacy Force, AirLand Battle, TRADOC way of developing doctrine. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are far more important today than the field manuals. The religious support FM is 5 years old and badly out of date. Lessons learned in the contemporary operating environment are far more essential to mission accomplishment than the basics provided in the FM. The FM should always be consulted as the start point, but COIN is too dynamic to expect the FMs to provide the kind of detailed guidance required. All this requires wisdom and highly competent, adaptive leadership.I accept and agree with all that. However, I've been in, part of or have watched this Army for well over 50 years and I know how 'doctrine' gets prostituted, morphed and just plain screwed up and I know all too well how things get embedded and that many of those things, predicated on one war at one point in time do not translate well to other wars and other places.
FYI, TTP have ALWAYS been far more important than doctrine, always will be. Unfortunately, the TTP do not drive TOE design or staffing, the doctrine does. We should be more flexible. We are not. As I said earlier, be careful what you want, you may get it...
I submit in this case that the system is working and that people are adapting and the job is getting done. It may not be done the way you'd wish -- but it doesn't have to be your way to work.
WM said:
If you bring in the "pro's from Dover" to do the religious support role (and make that their full time job) and let staff chaplains do the, primarily, pastoral kinds of things that they have been traditionally expected to do, I suspect that the animosity WRT using Chaplains for the RSE mission might disappear, or at least abate rather significantly.
Exactly! Though to be knowledgeable locally, they probably ought to be the Bde Chaplains.
Steve said:
...In Iraq I was outside the wire 7 days a week all day for the first half of 'my war' and 6 days a week for the second half. 99% of my nights were behind the wire. I have to defer to your 2 years on the economy, however I was struck by the power of religion to influence daily and long term events during my tour. I don't think this sphere of the 'human terrain' has been engaged effectively and I believe we have paid a price for that lack of effective engagement.I'm well aware of the depth and pervasiveness of religion and it does drive many things in the ME. It is an exceptionally powerful force there. That is precisely why I say use of Chaplains in an operational or negotiating mode as opposed to pure advisory effort must be done cautiously and discreetly anywhere -- that is particularly true in the ME.
I think it has not been engaged simply because we eschewed COIN and related stuff for 30 years and a lot of older knowledge got lost due to that. As I pointed out earlier, Chaplains were used in the negotiating role in Viet Nam and they served as advisors to the commanders; we just had to reinvent the wheel.
Consider that the first 18 months in Iraq, we were totally out to lunch -- almost nothing was done logically or sensibly with rare exceptions for some units. That's not a smack on the units or commanders there at the time -- it IS a smack at the senior leadership of the Army from 1975-2001 who allowed a critical part of total spectrum warfare to be ignored. The troops in those early days were thrown in to a situation for which they had received no training at all.
Over the next 18 months, we figured it out and then it took another 18 to get the processes and TTP down and embedded. Now we're clicking pretty good. It took seven years to turn around things in Viet Nam, this time it only took us three -- we're getting better! :cool:
As I said, the system is working -- now -- so any further 'fixes' need to be watched very carefully. Like the man said, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'
MSG Proctor
03-02-2008, 12:54 AM
On point 2, I am not clear how a uniform conveys "advisor to the commander" status. Please elaborate.
And on point 3, again I fail to see how the difference between being a Christian and being a Christian in uniform adds status. I have visions of the Knights Templar and Hospitalier during the Crusades, who were "clerics in uniform" and pretty roundly hated by their Moslem opponents.
I didn't say the uniform conveyed "advisor to the commander" but the title mustashar ad deeny does. The uniform identifies the chaplain as a Soldier under the commander's authority. It also conveys the message that CF care about religion. Some AQ IO messages attempt to cast us as godless secularizers. We must counter those IO themes. Any perception that we are a threat to Islam will energize the powerful clerics against us.
You are completely mistaken about the opinion of Christians in Iraq. They are fellow Arabs, Iraqi patriots, and they have a marvelous reputation for integrity, honesty and fidelity among their Muslim neighbors. The Chaplain's appearance as a Christian mustashar ad deeny affords tremendous credibility to the RLE process. Here's (http://amyproctor.squarespace.com/blog/2007/11/18/muslims-in-iraq-call-for-christians-to-come-home.html) what Iraq's Muslims think of their Christian neighbors.
skiguy
03-02-2008, 01:23 AM
Can't contribute much, but what an incredibly interesting discussion.
3) Strident secularization in our own culture which has ghettoized religion for us and blinded us to the primary and foundational role of religion in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Amen to that! Although I don't have personal experience I would imagine #2 plays a large role as well.
MSG Proctor, I'm agreeing with just about everything (that I understand anyway) you're saying. If religion has such a big role in Islamic culture, and no doubt it does, then we need to have religion play a larger role as well in our interactions with them. JMO. Surprised no one's really brought up faith-based NGO's and their place in COIN operations. Can they or do they work with the military Chaplains currently in Iraq or Afghanistan?
MSG Proctor
03-02-2008, 01:56 AM
Consider that the first 18 months in Iraq, we were totally out to lunch -- almost nothing was done logically or sensibly with rare exceptions for some units. That's not a smack on the units or commanders there at the time -- it IS a smack at the senior leadership of the Army from 1975-2001 who allowed a critical part of total spectrum warfare to be ignored. The troops in those early days were thrown in to a situation for which they had received no training at all.
Over the next 18 months, we figured it out and then it took another 18 to get the processes and TTP down and embedded. Now we're clicking pretty good. It took seven years to turn around things in Viet Nam, this time it only took us three -- we're getting better! :cool:
As I said, the system is working -- now -- so any further 'fixes' need to be watched very carefully. Like the man said, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'
Whoa! Not so fast there, Ken. I know what you are trying to say and there is strong merit to your argument but a little history is in order here.
I have provided the below quoted passages from the 22 FEB 08 CRS Report (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf) on OIF in response to the substantial level of repudiation some of us vets of OIF 1 have encountered when making comparisons to the current COIN efforts in the ITO.
This comparison may appear gratuitous at first, however, I beg your indulgence if for no other reason than the following:
1. RLE was piloted in (what is now) the MND-N AO (Mosul) by then MG Petraeus as part of his OIF I COIN strategy;
2. This TTP was adopted by MG Sanchez and BG Dempsey in (what is now) the MND-B AO and over 500 RLEs were executed in Baghdad through January 2004;
3. The "FOBization" of CF described in the 2nd paragraph below coincided with the end of comprehensive RLE and the enemy-centric focus of OIF from 2004-2006;
4. The current COIN focus implemented under GEN Petraeus' leadership is very much based on successful TTP, best practices and lessons learned from OIF I.
Hopefully we can take advantage of this grace period of relative securiy and avoid the tragic mistakes of post OIF I strategies.
================================================== =======
Quotes from the CRS Report
388 Coalition military “governance” efforts in 2008 are very similar to those in 2003. In 2003, faced with a very limited civilian presence, commanders “leaned forward” and worked with Iraqis to form provincial and local councils, to help Iraqis articulate, prioritize, and represent their concerns.
Another key set of population security approaches involved troop presence —
including not only increasing the number of troops but also changing their footprint. From late in the formal occupation through 2006 — including Operation Together Forward — coalition forces in Iraq had been consolidated at relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Surge strategy called for getting troops off of the FOBs and out into local communities, to live and work among the population. As Major General James Simmons, III Corps and MNC-I Deputy Commanding General, stated: “You have to get out and live with the people.”
This thinking, though new as the premise for U.S. Iraq strategy, was not new.
Some practitioners on the ground in Iraq had suggested as early as 2003 that substantial political and economic progress could not be expected, absent basic security conditions that allowed Iraqis to leave their homes, and civilian coalition personnel to engage with local communities.173
Ken White
03-02-2008, 02:23 AM
Whoa! Not so fast there, Ken. I know what you are trying to say and there is strong merit to your argument but a little history is in order here....
I said for all practical intents and purposes. Some units 'got it' in OIF 1. So did some in OIF 2 and some in OIF 3, etc. etc. I had friends and acquaintances in all of them except 4, my son was in OIF 2 and his unit did it right. The bottom line is took THE ARMY over three years to get its act together. Sort of, anyway.
That's the point I've been trying to make -- I agree with you that UNITS are flexible and will do what it takes to get the job done and that's great. However,the Army is not flexible and seemingly new ideas (as I also said, this has been done before, we just forgot how to do it) are frequently a double edged sword. What can be and is done in some units at a point in time may not be the ideal solution for everyone or everywhere. Be careful what you try to get the system to buy.
There be Dragons... :eek:
You are completely mistaken about the opinion of Christians in Iraq. They are fellow Arabs, Iraqi patriots, and they have a marvelous reputation for integrity, honesty and fidelity among their Muslim neighbors. The Chaplain's appearance as a Christian mustashar ad deeny affords tremendous credibility to the RLE process. Here's (http://amyproctor.squarespace.com/blog/2007/11/18/muslims-in-iraq-call-for-christians-to-come-home.html) what Iraq's Muslims think of their Christian neighbors.
I was not addressing what Iraqis thought about other Iraqis. What Iraqi Muslims may think about their fellow Iraqis who are also Chrisitians is a non sequitur. By not being Iraqis first, Coalition Forces Christians are in quite a different category. Tribalism and long-time local connection (produced simply by the fact that one's family/relatives have lived in the same place for generations) are rather tough obstacles to overcome, even in the US.
MSG Proctor
03-02-2008, 05:43 PM
Can't contribute much, but what an incredibly interesting discussion.
Amen to that! Although I don't have personal experience I would imagine #2 plays a large role as well.
MSG Proctor, I'm agreeing with just about everything (that I understand anyway) you're saying. If religion has such a big role in Islamic culture, and no doubt it does, then we need to have religion play a larger role as well in our interactions with them. JMO. Surprised no one's really brought up faith-based NGO's and their place in COIN operations. Can they or do they work with the military Chaplains currently in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Skiguy:
There have been Islamic NGOs (such as the Red Crescent) in OIF and there may have been some western NGOs operating under the UN umbrella - not sure about that. The main issue I think has been providing security - conditions where its safe enough to operate as NGOs. That may be a next step. As the Iraqi economy opens up to foreign investment, I would hope that international NGOs/PVOs would also be able to share benevolence with the Iraqi people.
On a cultural level, not sure how feasible it is to present Arabs with charity. Its better to arm the tribal elder or mosque leader with the benefits and let him distribute the assistance. That is sound COIN principle (them doing something tolerably is better than us doing it with excellence). For example, it is better to enhance the local village's physician/clinic by providing him with medical supplies and presenting the appearance that he is in charge of our medics as we assist. That way we build up Iraqi infrastructure and we receed into a supporter role.
The Catholic Near East Welfare Association (http://www.cnewa.org/default.aspx)supports projects in the ME and in Iraq. My family contributes to the Iraqi Church through this oustanding organization. I'm sure there are others, but this is the NGO I am most acquainted with.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 03:16 AM
http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_hassner.pdf
Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground
Ron E. Hassner
"The religious implications of military operations at mosques are notoriously
complex, often vague or contradictory, always perplexing, and yet also
significant. The most obvious means of navigating this religious-legal minefield
is by eliciting the assistance of qualified guides. Religious leaders at all levels
from the imam of the mosque in question or a neighboring mosque to a leading
religious actor at the state level to a religious expert in another Muslim
country or even in the United States can provide key facts about the targeted
site, its meaning to worshippers, existing restrictions on access and behavior,
and crucial information about sensitive times and dates.
Although religious leaders should not be expected to cooperate enthusiastically
with military commanders who are plotting assaults on their mosques, the leaders
should be willing to provide information that can help minimize damage to
its most important elements, keep believers out of harm’s way, and reduce
the risk of sacrilege and desecration.
If Iraqi religious leaders are willing, their cooperation with U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts can provide far more than factual information. Religious leaders’ power lies
in their ability to span both religious knowledge and religious action. Because of
their expertise, they are capable of applying and interpreting formal religious rules
to changing circumstances. Cooperative religious leaders are therefore even
potentially capable of redefining the rules that govern behavior and access to sacred
places in a manner conducive to counterinsurgency efforts. Although there are limits
on religious leaders’ abilities to stretch the boundaries of the sacred, the reach and
ingenuity of these limits can be surprising. At the same time,
religious leaders who are left out of the decisionmaking process are likely to hamper
efforts to conduct successful operations (emphasis mine) in or near
sacred sites. Influential imams can enhance the value of a sacred site that is under
attack, expand its boundaries, or increase the insurgents’ freedom of operation within
its confines."
Expectation Management 101
I see nothing more than common sense "stakeholder management" in this article's 18 pages. Its focus on including religious leaders in discussions before conducting operations in and around their "neighborhood" ought to be intuitively obvious. I suspect that you could replace the word "mosque" and "religious leaders" with "village" and "tribal leaders" and have an equally true claim.
Here is a much less dramatic case in point by way of example: I am preparing to cut down a tree that is close to one of my neighbors houses/property line in order to put up a fence. Would it not be prudent, and just generally "the right thing to do," to advise my neighbors of what I plan to do? Or would I rather have to deal with angry neighbors who call city inspectors, environmental regulators, etc, ad nauseum because I did not bother to let the neighbors know I had considered them in my planning and its possible impacts on them? To parapharase MSG Proctor's emphasized passage from the article, "At the same time, neigbors who are left out of the decisionmaking process are likely to hamper efforts to conduct successful operations . . . ."
http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_hassner.pdf
Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground
Ron E. Hassner
"The religious implications of military operations at mosques are notoriously
complex, often vague or contradictory, always perplexing, and yet also
significant. The most obvious means of navigating this religious-legal minefield
is by eliciting the assistance of qualified guides. Religious leaders at all levels
from the imam of the mosque in question or a neighboring mosque to a leading
religious actor at the state level to a religious expert in another Muslim
country or even in the United States can provide key facts about the targeted
site, its meaning to worshippers, existing restrictions on access and behavior,
and crucial information about sensitive times and dates.
Although religious leaders should not be expected to cooperate enthusiastically
with military commanders who are plotting assaults on their mosques, the leaders
should be willing to provide information that can help minimize damage to
its most important elements, keep believers out of harm’s way, and reduce
the risk of sacrilege and desecration.
If Iraqi religious leaders are willing, their cooperation with U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts can provide far more than factual information. Religious leaders’ power lies
in their ability to span both religious knowledge and religious action. Because of
their expertise, they are capable of applying and interpreting formal religious rules
to changing circumstances. Cooperative religious leaders are therefore even
potentially capable of redefining the rules that govern behavior and access to sacred
places in a manner conducive to counterinsurgency efforts. Although there are limits
on religious leaders’ abilities to stretch the boundaries of the sacred, the reach and
ingenuity of these limits can be surprising. At the same time,
religious leaders who are left out of the decisionmaking process are likely to hamper
efforts to conduct successful operations (emphasis mine) in or near
sacred sites. Influential imams can enhance the value of a sacred site that is under
attack, expand its boundaries, or increase the insurgents’ freedom of operation within
its confines."
marct
03-03-2008, 02:33 PM
Hi Skiguy,
MSG Proctor, I'm agreeing with just about everything (that I understand anyway) you're saying. If religion has such a big role in Islamic culture, and no doubt it does, then we need to have religion play a larger role as well in our interactions with them. JMO. Surprised no one's really brought up faith-based NGO's and their place in COIN operations. Can they or do they work with the military Chaplains currently in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Just a quick comment to add on to what John said. There have been a number of incidences where faith based NGOs have been used as a front for conversion (I'm thinking right now of the Southern Sudan, but there are lots of other instances). Even the rumour of such will be used as an IO platform, so if you are going to allow them in field, there has to be a fair amount of discrimination and, for want of a better term, "moderation". This would, in turn, be a hard sell politically back in the US where many of these groups are based.
selil
03-03-2008, 02:36 PM
I'm still not convinced that a sectarian United States Military should be employing internal support mechanisms in chaplains as external dependencies in a relatively hostile religious tainted war. It would seem that the stain of radical right wing christianity would instantly permeate the process whether it was obvious or not. When considering the stabilization process, the fact that internal mechanisms of support for soldiers are strained, and that the political ramifications are horrendous. I can't see a substantive benefit in "advisor chaplains". I can see chaplains training and assisting forward facing trigger pullers, but to put another non-combatant into the field seems unwise. Unless the chaplains are trigger pullers? Then that adds another entire dynamic to the idea.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 02:39 PM
Expectation Management 101
I see nothing more than common sense "stakeholder management" in this article's 18 pages. Its focus on including religious leaders in discussions before conducting operations in and around their "neighborhood" ought to be intuitively obvious. I suspect that you could replace the word "mosque" and "religious leaders" with "village" and "tribal leaders" and have an equally true claim.
I respectfully submit that wm may have inadvertantly made a subtle yet essential point. He conflates religious leaders with tribal leaders and in his allegory, compares the actions affecting Islam with a tree felled in his yard that may affect his neighbor.
Nothing wrong with those comparisons in and of themselves; however, it demonstrates our proclivity as secularized westerners to enumerate religion as one of many competing factors and not what it is to a Muslim: the hub from which all life's spokes radiate.
This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.
Its not common sense as defined by western secular paradigms; its more like an old episode of the the original series of Star Trek where the crew lands on a strange planet and must quickly acquire knowledge about who their hosts are and what they want.
The article is focused narrowly on military action involving mosques in Iraq; however, I beg our readers to widen the lense to a more comprehensive appraisal of our actions in respect to Islamic perceptions on the whole.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 02:47 PM
I'm still not convinced that a sectarian United States Military should be employing internal support mechanisms in chaplains as external dependencies in a relatively hostile religious tainted war. It would seem that the stain of radical right wing christianity would instantly permeate the process whether it was obvious or not. When considering the stabilization process, the fact that internal mechanisms of support for soldiers are strained, and that the political ramifications are horrendous. I can't see a substantive benefit in "advisor chaplains". I can see chaplains training and assisting forward facing trigger pullers, but to put another non-combatant into the field seems unwise. Unless the chaplains are trigger pullers? Then that adds another entire dynamic to the idea.
Again, more objections based on theoreticals and not actual experience. I respectfully ask Mr. Selil to review post #51. This tack has been utilized with tremendous success in OIF. It has not provoked the kind of damage his post suggests; and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man. I acknowledge that conclusion is a common-sense type caution, but upon the scrutiny of everyday business in the ITO it does not hold up.
Steve Blair
03-03-2008, 02:49 PM
This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.
And I suspect that they would be equally alarmed if Western clergy began showing up in greater numbers in an advisory capacity. Crusading armies always have their priests close at hand. That's certainly an IO disaster in the making.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 02:54 PM
And I suspect that they would be equally alarmed if Western clergy began showing up in greater numbers in an advisory capacity. Crusading armies always have their priests close at hand. That's certainly an IO disaster in the making.
Again, your post posits theoreticals not grounded in current operational realities. Christians are a known (and mostly welcomed) commodity in Iraq; secularists are regarded with the utmost resistance. If you knew how AQI defined our efforts in religious and theological terms, you would see that the threat of secularism is far more ominous than having a Christian clergyman in the combat formation.
Steve Blair
03-03-2008, 03:02 PM
Perhaps it's being spun that way now, but I do suspect that if you increased the visibility of Christian leaders (or people who could be portrayed as leaders) you'd see a shift in the propaganda. Please don't assume that I don't know the current spin...you'd be mistaken. But it's also very possible for that spin to change...reverting to the crusader stuff that came out in the early stages of the conflict.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 03:28 PM
Mr. Blair:
I won't speculate about what you know, but what you post here. I invite you and our readers to see that many influential Islamic clerics are very open to mediation from Christian chaplains and other Christian leaders here (http://www.defenselink.mil/home/blog/docs/Hoyt_Transcript.pdf).
Part of our western, secular baggage includes a general dismissal of clerics as key influencers and a particularly pernicious stereotyping of Islamic clerics. Our default position should afford them the opportunity to define themselves. I have had many interactions with Shiite, Sunni and Christian Arabs in Iraq and found most of them to be very sincere, sensitive, well-educated and not at all lacking in any intellectual sophistication. Like American clergy, they are a mixed bag (surprise!) but low-balling them with coarse, unrefined stereotyping is usually not helpful.
Steve Blair
03-03-2008, 03:38 PM
MSG Proctor,
I don't think you'll find me dismissing the ability of religious leaders to influence situations (although I am a very secular person). My comments center more on the potential for an increased public presence of Western clerical leaders to be used by those who wish us (and the people of Iraq) ill. Those individuals are not necessarily within Iraq, and there is a coarse segment of the ME population who would listen to their message (not unlike similar segments in any population who listen to messages that reinforce what they already believe or are open to believing). I also share some of Ken's concerns regarding the use of US military religious personnel in roles they may not feel comfortable taking on.
Being secular does not mean automatically dismissing the influence of religion on peoples' lives and social interactions. That level of coarse stereotyping seems to be common, and does no one any favors. I recognize the potential of increasing the contact between our religious leaders and those of the local Iraqi communities, but I also recognize the potential for that contact to be misread or misused by those outside the immediate framework who have agendas we do not share.
I respectfully submit that wm may have inadvertantly made a subtle yet essential point. He conflates religious leaders with tribal leaders and in his allegory, compares the actions affecting Islam with a tree felled in his yard that may affect his neighbor.
Thanks for the left handed compliment. My point was made quite explicitly, not inadvertently. I did not, however, conflate religious leaders with tribal leaders. I was trying to point out that religious leaders are not the only stakeholders that ops planners (or anyone else thinking about acting in some way) need to consider when doing their jobs in Iraq, or any place else in the world.
Nothing wrong with those comparisons in and of themselves; however, it demonstrates our proclivity as secularized westerners to enumerate religion as one of many competing factors and not what it is to a Muslim: the hub from which all life's spokes radiate.
This may be true for some Moslems, but I doubt it is true for all Moslems, based on my experiences with Moslems (mostly Turks and Egyptians). I submit that your description is as much a caricature/strawman as those you have suggested are making the same mistake.
This is why religious analysis is so critically needed. We cannot really sustain the cleric buy-in in OIF with casual attitudes toward religion. Suppose wm had said in his illustration that he was going to build a mini-mall across the street from his next door neighbor's house of worship. And that the mini mall would have a porno theatre and a 'men's entertainment' strip club. This is closer to the alarm we often cause among the Islamic clerics in our COIN operations in the ME.
The value of the article is that it points out, as MSG Proctor's more grandiose example shows a little more poignanatly, folks' proclivity to adopt a NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitude toward things that upset their traditional way of behaving. As I previously indicated, this is something that folks with a clue, regardless of their ethnicity, nationality, etc, have known for a long time:
"Before you rock the boat, let the passengers know a big wave is coming. They can get ready for the attendant seasickness, and you may not have to spend so much time swabbing up the spewed chunks."
Its not common sense as defined by western secular paradigms; its more like an old episode of the the original series of Star Trek where the crew lands on a strange planet and must quickly acquire knowledge about who their hosts are and what they want.
The article is focused narrowly on military action involving mosques in Iraq; however, I beg our readers to widen the lense to a more comprehensive appraisal of our actions in respect to Islamic perceptions on the whole.
What makes it appear not to be common sense is the mapping of it on to a frame (operations around a mosque) that is outside the common expereince of most Americans. I find this to be very poor method of informing/teaching/training/pedagogy (pick your favorite). Starting with a known and moving to an unfamilair, showing how they are similar, rather than using an unfamiliar example from the "git-go," tends to be a more efficacious explanatory method from my experience as an educator, trainer, and parent.
Ron Humphrey
03-03-2008, 04:16 PM
One of the reasons I discontinued my feedback to this particular discussion, other than not being a SME, was that it became apparent to me that for all intensive purposes there may be little point nor long term accomplishment through addressing it to any other than those it directly refers.
For most anyone outside of the religious field there will almost always be not only a lack of comfort with this type of interaction in relation to operational environments but as Ken and others have stated there is a high probability of over regulation. This of course would result in not only the predictable issues associated with those who don't know telling those who do how, but also the IO and external public relations issues.
That said I really do think it is important that it be understood that what MSG Proctor and others seek more than anything else is for their leadership not to stand in the way of productive and effective actions by educated and well thought out approaches to operational requirements. It seems to be a common sense statement to say; don't make people do what their not comfortable with; however isn't it just as important to make sure long standing cultures of communities don't stand in the way of effective work in the areas we are discussing. I would find it difficult to believe that anyone here could say that such restrictions have not taken place, or even more importantly that lives may have been lost which might not have had some things been addressed differently.
I highly appreciate everything that the MSG has done over the last years in efforts to deal with this and I truly hope at some point we will be able to move past our overt avoidance of whats uncomfortable and instead work towards whats doable within the exceptable limits.
This is simply how I feel.
The opinions stated are soley mine and do not reflect the opinions of SWJ, The US Govt, or anyone else who might be offended by them :wry:
selil
03-03-2008, 04:22 PM
Again, more objections based on theoreticals and not actual experience. I respectfully ask Mr. Selil to review post #51. This tack has been utilized with tremendous success in OIF. It has not provoked the kind of damage his post suggests; and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man. I acknowledge that conclusion is a common-sense type caution, but upon the scrutiny of everyday business in the ITO it does not hold up.
I don't see anywhere in post #51 where anything I said was disputed. The fact is the first half dozen or so points support that a chaplain is an adviser to a combat commander. Further it suggest further down in that post (#51) that it is an advisory capacity that is untested. Except in singular exceptional instances (specificity fails to illuminate generalities) I fail to see where turning a secular conflict into a religious war of ideologies is a good idea. Most of the same tools a chaplain brings to the table are going to be fully within the capability of sociologists and anthropologists without the political baggage.
Also it appears that there is an inherent failure to understand that involving a chaplaincy on the front lines may be wholly accepted by the insurgency only to see a substantial public relations debacle on the home front when one gets popped on the front lines. Further there is an inherent and substantial bias that assumes the chaplaincy is going to be providing Christian faith chaplains. What about Hindu's, Buddhism, or even Jewish faiths? If the chaplains aren't "plug and play" then there is an inherent issue and I'm having a difficult time perceiving that being the case.
Turning a secular conflict into a religious war is the tipping point for Middle Eastern populations, and as a rarity should we impose any form of forced religious interaction. There is a little benefit I can perceive in creating a high value target in a chaplain, exposing political sensitivities, and further eroding the political capital we've built up.
I can see where the United States political machinery founded in the religious right would be slathering to expand a religious war against Islam. A chaplain being assassinated might give them that political capital for further expansion. Though I usual categorize such abject suppositions as offal and ignore as appropriate.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 04:31 PM
All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.
Here (https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=4027) is a CALL handbook that provides detailed policy and doctrinal parameters for RST utilization in the GWOT (requires AKO log in credentials).
[/URL].
All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.
Here (https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=4027) is a CALL handbook that provides detailed policy and doctrinal parameters for RST utilization in the GWOT (requires AKO log in credentials).
[/URL].
The guardians of the secret, sacred gnosis (AKA wisdom for those not members of mystery religions/cults) are hard at work. Seeking to follow your link yields the following:
Only Active Duty Military/Uniformed Services Members, Reservists, National Guard, USMA and ROTC (contracted) cadets, and Direct Hire Appropriated Fund DA Civilian Employees may gain access to CALL's DoD restricted website.
Ken White
03-03-2008, 05:18 PM
All due respect Mr. Liles, but smarter people than us have already decided on this issue.I doubt that the 'deciders' are all that much smarter than any of us -- and I'd submit it hasn't been decided or this thread wouldn't exist. It's still alive because it has not been decided.
NOTE: Edited to delete inappropriate reference. Some context is lost but the items listed below constitute concerns about the issue:
(1) The latitude given the Chaplain in meeting religious leaders -- I submit that a representative of the chain of command must be involved as the Chaplain is not in that chain.
(2) The degree to which the Chaplain's perception of his moral and religious scruples can affect his negotiations. I submit that is very much individual specific and the Commander has an obligation to consider that in determining how and when to use a particular Chaplain.
(3) Placing the Chaplain in an at least quasi warfighting role unless great care is exercised.
(4) Potential fear of proselyting or an overtly 'Christian' approach to a problem by leaders from other religions, a problem in any case but one which requires careful thought in intercourse with Muslims. That is not to say there should be no interface, just that it has to be done quite cautiously.
(5) The Chaplain's personal moral dilemma of how much is he aiding a war effort.
Two additional thoughts:
- What works in one theater in one type of war and in specific circumstances may not adapt well to other situations; while most people and many units are quit flexible, that is not true of the Army as a whole. One should be cautious in what one wishes to embed in the bureaucracy.
- You state:
and the argument that it takes away from troop care is an easily disprovable straw man.I believe it can be disproven in rhetoric, anything can. I am not at all convinced that is untrue in practice and I believe that statement is very much questionable on the probability of considerable variance from unit to unit.
As an aside and appropos of little or nothing, I believe the CAC commander's wife is a Methodist Minister so one would expect some support for the RST handbook. That is NOT by the way, an accusation of any wrongdoing no matter how slight, I have no questions on integrity, merely noting that we are all colored by our experiences; you by yours, me by mine and so forth...
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 05:31 PM
The guardians of the secret, sacred gnosis (AKA wisdom for those not members of mystery religions/cults) are hard at work. Seeking to follow your link yields the following:
Sorry wm, but the mods nailed me for posting FOUO quotes - and they are right - I shouldn't leak even 'harmless' text.
Suffice to say that while discussion on this important topic invites many theoreticals, what ifs and conjecture, there are concrete actions taking place that involve members of the Chaplain Corps in innovative ways.
I want to say that many of our military Chaplains are incredibly brave, selfless and deeply spiritual leaders and that their example in battle has inspired many Soldiers, Airmen and Marines. Their willingness to assume the same risks as their troops frequently results in access to our Soldiers on a profoundly personal level. Our motto is "bringing God to Soldiers and Soldiers to God". Chaplains (and their enlisted assistants) deserve recognition for their intrepididity, sacrifice and exemplary care for Soldiers.
In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.
For a scholarly treatment of this subject on open source, this War College monograph (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil150.pdf) provides much more lucid thinking than anything I could offer.
Gian P Gentile
03-03-2008, 06:39 PM
In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.
I am sorry my friend but I disagree with this type of use of chaplains on moral and ethical grounds. In so leading to peace as you say by making chaplains operators they indirectly even if in the most subtle ways can very likely be involved in killing, which is why I oppose this on moral and ethical grounds. I paste below here a scenario that I posed from a previous posting on this thread. I ask you not dismiss it as a simple what "if" but an actual scenario that will play out by making chaplains operators:
Lets say in a hypothetical scenario an infantry battalion chaplain is used by his commander to engage (talk to, establish relationship) with an imam of a mosque that the commander has yet to meet. The chaplain spends time at the mosque getting to know the imam through bonding due to shared eperiences as a man of the cloth. Through this bonding the chaplain develops a relationship with the imam and so does the battalion commander. One day the imam calls the commander and says hey, I know where three alqueda militants are hiding right now. Since the commander is still getting to know the imam and is not too sure of his credibility the commander then goes to his chaplain and asks, can I trust the imam? The chaplain says yes, the commander puts together an op to get the militants, and in the course of the operations the three alqueda militants are killed. In this scenario are there not clear violations of a chaplain having crossed the moral and ethical line by becoming an operator for the commander and assisting him in his operational and environmental understanding of his area that at certain points contributes to his ability to kill the enemy?
Sorry wm, but the mods nailed me for posting FOUO quotes - and they are right - I shouldn't leak even 'harmless' text. I wasn't blaming you, just letting others know that many would not be able to access the data at the link.
In counterinsurgency operations where religion is a primary operational consideration, the unique capabilities of uniformed clergy teams have provided an effective option for some commanders that mitigates anti-CF hostility, promotes understanding, and fosters conditions that lead to peace. All activities by chaplain teams are inherently humanitarian. Involvement in civil-military activities such as religious leader engagements is closely monitored for any appearance of combatant activity. Chaplains are noncombatants and the overwhelming majority of commanders circumspectly safeguard their chaplains from embroilment in combatant-type activities.
What concerns me about this is the "closely monitored" point. I suspect that we are dealing with an endeavor that is much more perilous than many other advisory roles that folks undertake. And without speaking for him, I suspect that this is a real concern of Ken White's as well. As we used to say, one "aw sh1t" wipes out a hundred "attaboys."
I accept your contention about the extreme mismatch between what one normally considers as religious connectedness for the majority of Westerners with that which applies to our fellow beings in SWA and the Middle East. And, because of this mismatch, were I to do a risk matrix on the use of military chaplains in a role as an emissary to the religious leaders in the AOR, I would estimate both likelihood of occurence and seriousness of impact as high as one can go.
Recall that in an earlier post I called on us to use the pros from Dover--I sincerely meant that--the role you are advocating is not for just any old religioso. Even though he is an MD, you wouldn't go to a dermatologist for triple bypass surgery, would you? We've already seen what a misguided overzealousness produced at Abu Ghraib.
I do not think that "l'audace, toujours de l'audace! " applies here. (BTW, this is actually a 1792 quotation from Georges Danton of France, misattributed to Frederick the Great by many as a result of George C. Scott's portrayal in "Patton.")
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 06:51 PM
I am sorry my friend but I disagree with this type of use of chaplains on moral and ethical grounds. In so leading to peace as you say by making chaplains operators they indirectly even if in the most subtle ways can very likely be involved in killing, which is why I oppose this on moral and ethical grounds. I paste below here a scenario that I posed from a previous posting on this thread. I ask you not dismiss it as a simple what "if" but an actual scenario that will play out by making chaplains operators:
Sir, before I do that, have you seen my reply to your previous question in post #70?
Respectfully,
MSG P
Ken White
03-03-2008, 07:02 PM
and you expressed it more succinctly than I.
Much as I dislike matrices and metrics, I have to agree with you on that probability.
More importantly, you ably characterized my shorthand using the word 'personality' applied to the Chaplain(s) with the far better
"...Even though he is an MD, you wouldn't go to a dermatologist for triple bypass surgery, would you? "Just as some Commanders are better at certain things than are others, all Chaplains are not created equal and we should avoid embedding any process that may work well with some people at a point in time as THE way to do business.
Thank you...;)
and you expressed it more succinctly than I.
Much as I dislike matrices and metrics, I have to agree with you on that probability.
More importantly, you ably characterized my shorthand using the word 'personality' applied to the Chaplain(s) with the far betterJust as some Commanders are better at certain things than are others, all Chaplains are not created equal and we should avoid embedding any process that may work well with some people at a point in time as THE way to do business.
Thank you...;)
"No," he said in his best Alphonse and Gaston imitation, "Thank you."
All joking aside, in the name of expediency, our representatives open up Pandora's Boxes every day out there in the AOR. This is one that I would prefer that we keep carefully lidded. As Gian pointed out in his protest (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=41441&postcount=104), sometimes, the ends do not justify the means. I would argue that whenever one tries to use "ends justify the means" argumentation, some very shady stuff is going on.
We are here faced with what some might call an instance of the "dirty hands problem" (when government employees have to do things in carrying out their public responsibilities which are morally unacceptable or illegal from a private point of view). I reject that characterization out of hand. There is no physical, logical, or moral necessity to use chaplains in this role.
Ron Humphrey
03-03-2008, 08:01 PM
Is the real answer here to count on Dover or whomever to provide the necessary knowledgeable personnel or do we need a subset within INT with greater awareness and training of said battlefield in order to do what needs to be done without involving those who need not be involved?
And on that note I will once again leave the fray
Ken White
03-03-2008, 08:36 PM
Okay, I'll quit now...:D
There is no physical, logical, or moral necessity to use chaplains in this role.True. I'd suggest there are several reasons in all categories to avoid so using them. When it is done, it should be very carefully thought out and applied.
Is the real answer here to count on Dover or whomever to provide the necessary knowledgeable personnel or do we need a subset within INT with greater awareness and training of said battlefield in order to do what needs to be done without involving those who need not be involved?
And on that note I will once again leave the fray
Intel helps prepare the operator to engage on the battlefield. Intel does not do the engagement. Chaplains serve a similar function to we Intel weenies in my opinion.
To return to my medical metaphor, doctors can get in serious trouble when they perform functions outside their scope of practice. Radiologists are some of medicine's intel guys. They may tell the surgeon where the suspected problem is, but the surgeon still wields the scalpel, deciding where and when to cut as well as how deep. Anesthesiologists are like the chaplain. They help the surgeon by preparing the patients to be operated on, getting them ready for the upcoming trauma, and monitoring them during and after the trauma as well. Let's not conflate intel guys/radiologists with Info warfare/nuclear medicine specialists--the first finds the cancer, perhaps using radiation; the second treats it with radiation therapy. Let's also not confuse chaplains/anesthesiologists with civil affairs officers/neurosurgeons--the one enables treatment by sedating the nervous system; the other treats problems with that nervous system.
skiguy
03-03-2008, 08:53 PM
Hi Marc,
so if you are going to allow them in field, there has to be a fair amount of discrimination and, for want of a better term, "moderation". This would, in turn, be a hard sell politically back in the US where many of these groups are based.
Completely agree with you that there has to be moderation..and a lot of it. I think a well-trained, well-educated, and religiously well-mixed group of people can pull it off effectively. And, my own opinion (sorry MSG Proctor) I don't think this is a job for the military. A chaplain could be there, but I'm not so sure the military should initiate this. They should use it where or whenever they can, but they should not lead it. (would that help with selling the idea politically?)
I also agree with what selil said about the extreme Christian right infiltration. Keep them out of there! And, personally, I don't know of many who would be interested in getting involved in inter-faith dialogue anyway.
My thinking is based solely on peacekeeping moreso than intel gathering, if that makes any difference.
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 08:55 PM
There is no physical, logical, or moral necessity to use chaplains in this role.
Umkay.
I was invited here by one the Combined Arms Center's Counterinsurgency experts as a subject matter expert on religious leader engagements in counterinsurgency operations.
I respect the members of the SWJ Council and their rights to argue pro/con on this and any other issue that the moderators deem fair game.
However, there is just too much data that forcefully makes the case that religious support teams have been, are and will be contributors to the Joint Force's counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, my own extensive experience in this arena as well as the hundreds of interviews I have conducted in researching this issue will not allow me to concede to arguments like that quoted above.
While deployed in southern Baghdad my unit encountered issues like this one (http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/oct2003/a102303c.html) too many times. This is my unit featured in the article.
Here (http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks56.pdf) is another scholarly treatment of the subject matter from USIP.
I have probably said all that I can say here. Not sure who the readership of SWJ actually comprises, but I know my boss appears here from time to time. He is a big proponent of STRATCOMs (telling our story) but I'm not sure about the value of debating whether or not something is a viable operational tack when its actually already been done and is ongoing.
Thanks to all who have dignified my posts with a response.
In my perception of this thread, no one is arguing against the value of religious support teams in the theater. I think the focus has been on who ought to be members of such teams and what limits, if any, ought to be set on their missions.
To borrow from the world of sports, the folks who can be successful as a double or triple threat are few and far between. When we try to make a guy a place kicker and a running back, the threat of failure is not too great (unless you wagered your whole life savings on the game's outcome with some bookie in Vegas).
Given the persuasive case you have made for the the ubiquitousness of religion in the lives of natives in the current AORs, we cannot make the same correlation to a miscue by our multi-tasked chaplain.
To repeat, RST are good, but they are not a panacea to go chasing willy nilly. We need to be careful whom we task to man them and what missions we have them perform.
Umkay.
I was invited here by one the Combined Arms Center's Counterinsurgency experts as a subject matter expert on religious leader engagements in counterinsurgency operations.
I respect the members of the SWJ Council and their rights to argue pro/con on this and any other issue that the moderators deem fair game.
However, there is just too much data that forcefully makes the case that religious support teams have been, are and will be contributors to the Joint Force's counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, my own extensive experience in this arena as well as the hundreds of interviews I have conducted in researching this issue will not allow me to concede to arguments like that quoted above.
While deployed in southern Baghdad my unit encountered issues like this one (http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/oct2003/a102303c.html) too many times. This is my unit featured in the article.
Here (http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks56.pdf) is another scholarly treatment of the subject matter from USIP.
I have probably said all that I can say here. Not sure who the readership of SWJ actually comprises, but I know my boss appears here from time to time. He is a big proponent of STRATCOMs (telling our story) but I'm not sure about the value of debating whether or not something is a viable operational tack when its actually already been done and is ongoing.
Thanks to all who have dignified my posts with a response.
Ken White
03-03-2008, 09:13 PM
I respect the members of the SWJ Council and their rights to argue pro/con on this and any other issue that the moderators deem fair game.pI suspect everyone here respects your right to believe in and fight for your position.
However, there is just too much data that forcefully makes the case that religious support teams have been, are and will be contributors to the Joint Force's counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, my own extensive experience in this arena as well as the hundreds of interviews I have conducted in researching this issue will not allow me to concede to arguments like that quoted above.Perhaps I missed something but I don't think anyone is disputing that it has been done and that it works. Nor do I recall anyone saying it absolutely should not be done -- though some have come close, mostly on moral grounds (and all are entitles to their own version of those; there is no 'right' or 'wrong') -- all most are espousing is caution and common sense. I'm at a loss to understand why that is offensive.
I have probably said all that I can say here...but I'm not sure about the value of debating whether or not something is a viable operational tack when its actually already been done and is ongoing.Again, I'm unsure anyone has questioned to viability. My impression was that most who demurred simply espoused caution, were concerned for the Chaplains themselves or had moral reservations (everyone's prerogative).
Since my wife say I have no morals, I'm obviously not one of the latter. :o
MSG Proctor
03-03-2008, 09:49 PM
Here's more evidence (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/02/13/wirq13.xml)from actual combat that chaplains are key contributors.
""Our first priority is to the American troops," he explains. Though he doesn't spell it out, the implication is clear: Just by joining Moheburahman for lunch, Fisher is stepping outside the traditional role of ministering to troops and advising command. Yet in so doing, he is also affirming the value of the chaplaincy."
Chaplain Engages Afghan Clerics (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1120/p20s01-usmi.html)
"From there I met with the local head Imam [the Muslim equivalent of a Pastor or Priest]. I said to him, 'For me everything has to do with relationships and all I'm here to do today is to meet you and see what we can do, so that in the long run — long after I leave — we have a relationship built on faith."
From that day on, it was win-win; there were no attacks on our guys in that region, there was only support, more support from them, and more money came from us to rebuild their roads and bring them water. So all of a sudden they were helping us understand them and they would meet with me, and the Imam would say, "Explain Christianity to us, we don't have a clue."
CH(MAJ) Paul Madje of the 101st AASLT DIV (http://www.goarmy.com/chaplain/stories_changing.jsp)
"The U.S. military's lack of understanding about Iraqi culture helped create the conditions for the insurgency that U.S. forces face there, according to a military adviser who has written a new book about the insurgency."
U.S.'s Cultural Ignorance Fuels Iraq Insurgency (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5366677)
Nor do I recall anyone saying it absolutely should not be done --
Originally Posted by wm
There is no physical, logical, or moral necessity to use chaplains in this role.
;)
Ken White
03-04-2008, 12:05 AM
"There is no physical, logical, or moral necessity to use chaplains in this role." with 'absolute?' Different definition, I guess. To me saying there's no necessity is not the same thing as saying 'this should not be done. Ever' which sounds kinda absolute to me. Seems as though he's saying there are alternatives... :cool:
And, of course, there always are alternatives; doesn't have to be your or my way to work... ;)
marct
03-04-2008, 12:55 AM
Hi John,
I was invited here by one the Combined Arms Center's Counterinsurgency experts as a subject matter expert on religious leader engagements in counterinsurgency operations.
And I, for one, am glad you are here. This is, in my not so humble opinion, the core issue of warfare for the next 100 or so years.
I respect the members of the SWJ Council and their rights to argue pro/con on this and any other issue that the moderators deem fair game.
Good :D! Now, speaking as the moderator for this forum, let me say a couple of things. First, while I personally dislike the FOUO category, it still does have to be respected. Personally, I consider it to be the embodiment of psychotic bureaucrats, but.....
Seconds, we need someone here who has been operational in the field dealing with religious issues. Issues of "religion" and "identity" will be the crucial ones for quite a while, and we need to have them on the table. I think that it bis crucial that we realize that religion will play a major role and that the capacity be built for dealing with religious issues.
However, there is just too much data that forcefully makes the case that religious support teams have been, are and will be contributors to the Joint Force's counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, my own extensive experience in this arena as well as the hundreds of interviews I have conducted in researching this issue will not allow me to concede to arguments like that quoted above.
Personally, and I have been involved in inter-faith issues for almost 20 years, I have no problem with religious support teams. I do have major problems with the military being used by psychotics to further their own religious agendas and also have problems with requiring chaplains to engage in actions they consider to be morally and ethically wrong. As a side note to Gian, I have no problem with priests killing people -they've done it in the past and they will do it in the future. My only concern is whether or not the killing is justified.
I have probably said all that I can say here. Not sure who the readership of SWJ actually comprises, but I know my boss appears here from time to time. He is a big proponent of STRATCOMs (telling our story) but I'm not sure about the value of debating whether or not something is a viable operational tack when its actually already been done and is ongoing.
The readership is quite varied and from all over the world. Somehow or other, we got the reputation of being a "graduate seminar in COIN", and that is pretty accurate. But let me note one key point - "seminar". SWJ is an ongoing seminar; we rarely come to a unanimous conclusion on anything. A large part of our role is to raise awareness of questions surrounding issues, and this thread is certainly a case in point.
We will, in all probability, continue to debate the role of chaplains and of religion in general for the next century. This shouldn't be looked at as a failure in any way - it isn't; it is a success ;).
;)
Great cut of Charlie Heston, a heavy hitter for the absolutist NRA lobby in his later life as I recall (wonder if he picked up that complex after playing at Moses in the movies). If it is meant to portray my position then I think you have it just backwards. I submit that your claim that RSE must include chaplains seems much more of the absolutist sort epitomized at Exodus 32's portrayal of Moses' reaction when he returned with the 10 Commandments to find the people of Israel worshiping the golden calf at the foot of Mount Sinai.
I was using the word "necessity" as a philosophical term of art, as in a necessary condition or a sufficient condition. By way of definition, to say Y is a necessary condition for X is to say if there is no Y, then X cannot be. I took you to be arguing that this was the case for your RST membership--it required military chaplains or it would not work. I have yet to see you prove that point in all of your examples and anecdotes.
Do you have any evidence to show that using non-military members on RSTs has failed? How about conducting something like a double blind test? Right now I feel like I'm watching the ad that says, "90% of dentists surveyed recommend Trident for their patients who chew gum." What do all the other dentists recommend? What do the surveyed dentists recommend in an unqualified way to all of their patients, not just the ones who chew gum? What would the Iraqi clerics prefer as a counterpart in their dealings with the coalition? Without exposing them to alternatives, it would be pretty tough for them to tell us, wouldn't it?
I have been trying to point out that all of the functions you were urging upon us as responsibilites of an RSE/RST did not necessarily require that they be performed by a military chaplain, particularly by a military chaplain who also happens to be a staff chaplain in a troop unit. It could quite as easily be the case that our religious support team membership be derived from the faculty of Union Theological Seminary or the Harvard Divinity School, to name just a few place with religious scholars who could easily be seen as representatives of the commander when they presented their credentials/bona fides to their counterparts in the Iraqi mosques. Maybe we should deploy the Chief of Chaplaind and his staff to man these teams. Golly gee, maybe we could even get our Turkish allies to contribute some imams to act as RST members. Wouldn't they be even better at bridging the religious gap than a bunch of Christian prelates who just got off the airplane in BIAP after spending most of their lives in places that have a strong affinity to Tikrit or Basra, places like Lafayette, Louisiana, York, Nebraska or Boise, Idaho? One of my church's ministers is a great pastoral caregiver to our congregation who I would welcome as my unit chaplain to minister to my troops, but I would not want this person advising me in Iraq on how to deal with the Islamic aspects of the AO--this role just would not be a good fit, IMHO.
It is my turn to thank Ken White for making my point much more eloquently than I did:
And, of course, there always are alternatives; doesn't have to be your or my way to work...
Ken White
03-04-2008, 02:31 AM
"...psychotic bureaucrats...":D
Moving beyond that to this:
"I have no problem with religious support teams. I do have major problems with the military being used by psychotics to further their own religious agendas and also have problems with requiring chaplains to engage in actions they consider to be morally and ethically wrong. As a side note to Gian, I have no problem with priests killing people -they've done it in the past and they will do it in the future. My only concern is whether or not the killing is justified." (Emphasis added / kw)I strongly agree with all that.
"We will, in all probability, continue to debate the role of chaplains and of religion in general for the next century. This shouldn't be looked at as a failure in any way - it isn't; it is a success"Well said and hopefully correct.
MSG Proctor
03-04-2008, 03:30 AM
Great cut of Charlie Heston, a heavy hitter for the absolutist NRA lobby in his later life as I recall (wonder if he picked up that complex after playing at Moses in the movies). If it is meant to portray my position then I think you have it just backwards.
No. Moses = prophet/visionary. Your position seems quite limited IMHO.
I do not need to make the case for RST involvement in RLE; you need concrete (and not mere abstractions/theoreticals) counter-arguments. Since I entered this thread I have provided example after example of how RSTs are contributing to COIN efforts in the ITO. Nearly everything I have heard to the contrary (even from recent vets) is conjecture/what ifs?.
I would need to go to classified information to provide more compelling evidence - and I can't do that. Most of the links and vignettes I have provided have been either ignored or shrugged off.
The reality is that RSTs are providing multiple-level religious support in a complex operating environment and are NOT sacrificing ministry to troops in order to deliver it. If you opened the link I have twice provided for the interview with the MNF-I chaplain, he says that the clerics wanted to meet with US Army chaplains.
marct
03-04-2008, 03:47 AM
Hi John,
I do not need to make the case for RST involvement in RLE; you need concrete (and not mere abstractions/theoreticals) counter-arguments. Since I entered this thread I have provided example after example of how RSTs are contributing to COIN efforts in the ITO. Nearly everything I have heard to the contrary (even from recent vets) is conjecture/what ifs?.
I would need to go to classified information to provide more compelling evidence - and I can't do that. Most of the links and vignettes I have provided have been either ignored or shrugged off.
And that is part of the problem - sigh. Of course, another part of the problem is that we don't get much of the counter side. How many chaplains have refused to engage in this type of work? Have there been career repercussions from that decision? I don't know - we lack data. How about non-Christian chaplains? Are any deployed? Are they engaged in this type of work? What was their reception? Again, we lack data.
The reality is that RSTs are providing multiple-level religious support in a complex operating environment and are NOT sacrificing ministry to troops in order to deliver it. If you opened the link I have twice provided for the interview with the MNF-I chaplain, he says that the clerics wanted to meet with US Army chaplains.
Hmmm. As a social scientist who specializes in qualitative research, let me just note that one interview is not a statistically valid universe :wry:. Leaving that issue aside, however, do we have any open source information on training for this type of action?
Ken White
03-04-2008, 03:50 AM
topic and we should be able to disagree without being disagreeable.
I do not think I've seen anyone say that the process is not working. You can say that concerns about Chaplain involvement are abstractions / theoreticals yet you personally acknowledged up thread that some Chaplains had concerns with the process.
Why don't we sort of cool it until tomorrow; I see no sense in any of us getting hostile.
MSG Proctor
03-04-2008, 03:53 AM
Seconds, we need someone here who has been operational in the field dealing with religious issues. Issues of "religion" and "identity" will be the crucial ones for quite a while, and we need to have them on the table. I think that it bis crucial that we realize that religion will play a major role and that the capacity be built for dealing with religious issues.
;).
Thank you, Marc. Just about everything I have read indicates that this type of warfare is here for a while. I commend you for your attitude on this subject; it is far from universal. Thanks for your encouraging remarks and supportive comments.
Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. IW depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. People, not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success. The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW.
- Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 Sep 07 (http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf)
marct
03-04-2008, 03:54 AM
Why don't we sort of cool it until tomorrow; I see no sense in any of us getting hostile.
And, by way of ending off the day, here's an amusing monologue (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/barnicle/stanley/sounds/sam%20drummed%20out.mp3)by Stanley Holloway linked by a friend of mine (an Anglican priest) on facebook.
SWCAdmin
03-04-2008, 03:57 AM
I would need to go to classified information to provide more compelling evidence - and I can't do that. Most of the links and vignettes I have provided have been either ignored or shrugged off.
OK. Stop there. A few feathers have already fallen off Icarus' wings.
You've brought plenty of info, and a little controversy, to the discussion. Controversy is good as it challenges group think. To a point. It wears when it is re-hashed.
All -- the "seek to understand, then agree to disagree point" is right up on us, if not already in the rear view mirror, on some of these dimensions here. But there are many fascinating angles to this to continue to explore. Game on. Unclass.
selil
03-04-2008, 04:18 AM
Somehow or other, we got the reputation of being a "graduate seminar in COIN", and that is pretty accurate. But let me note one key point - "seminar". SWJ is an ongoing seminar; we rarely come to a unanimous conclusion on anything. A large part of our role is to raise awareness of questions surrounding issues, and this thread is certainly a case in point.
Some of us have been highly trained and educated (two different concepts) to question everything, accept very little, and continue to question that.
Surferbeetle
03-04-2008, 05:15 AM
Let's also not confuse chaplains/anesthesiologists with civil affairs officers/neurosurgeons--the one enables treatment by sedating the nervous system; the other treats problems with that nervous system.
Ack!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_the_Cat
marct
03-04-2008, 01:29 PM
Hi Sam,
Some of us have been highly trained and educated (two different concepts) to question everything, accept very little, and continue to question that.
Yup, the essence of the scientific method. Of course, there is another reason to not come to conclusions per se, which has to do with OPSEC :D.
MSG Proctor
03-04-2008, 03:21 PM
Hi John,
And that is part of the problem - sigh. Of course, another part of the problem is that we don't get much of the counter side. How many chaplains have refused to engage in this type of work? Have there been career repercussions from that decision? I don't know - we lack data. How about non-Christian chaplains? Are any deployed? Are they engaged in this type of work? What was their reception? Again, we lack data.
Hmmm. As a social scientist who specializes in qualitative research, let me just note that one interview is not a statistically valid universe :wry:. Leaving that issue aside, however, do we have any open source information on training for this type of action?
I dare not air any dirty laundry, but the short answer is yes, some chaplains have refused to perform this type of work. As far as repercussions, I don't know. If the commander supports his chaplain in the refusal, it becomes not too much of an issue with that Division. There are extenuating circumstances however to those types of decisions, which in the eyes of some, is defacto policy setting.
Muslim and Jewish chaplains have also engaged Iraqi clerics.
As far as training, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has stood up a phenomenal program called Engagement University. These articles will not provide very much detail but you may get the idea.
SIMULATING SHEIKHS (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_training_and_sims.html) (scroll down about half way)
ARMY SIMULATES SHEIKH ENCOUNTERS (http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,101172,00.html) (requires free membership in Military.com)
marct
03-04-2008, 03:34 PM
Hi John,
I dare not air any dirty laundry, but the short answer is yes, some chaplains have refused to perform this type of work. As far as repercussions, I don't know. If the commander supports his chaplain in the refusal, it becomes not too much of an issue with that Division. There are extenuating circumstances however to those types of decisions, which in the eyes of some, is defacto policy setting.
I wouldn't want you to :D. 'sides that, I'm sure someone in the press would do so. Anyway, it's something to look for in future data.
Muslim and Jewish chaplains have also engaged Iraqi clerics.
Okay. So no Buddhists, Sikhs, etc. then.
As far as training, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has stood up a phenomenal program called Engagement University. These articles will not provide very much detail but you may get the idea.
SIMULATING SHEIKHS (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_training_and_sims.html) (scroll down about half way)
ARMY SIMULATES SHEIKH ENCOUNTERS (http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,101172,00.html) (requires free membership in Military.com)
Thanks, John, I'll look through them when I get a chance (too much work going on today <sigh>).
Marc
MSG Proctor
03-04-2008, 09:50 PM
Opinion Leaders
Individuals play a variety of roles in the social system and one crucial role is that of the opinion leader. Opinion leadership is “the degree to which an individual is able to informally influence other individual’s attitudes or overt behavior is a desired way with relative frequency.” (84) The leadership pattern is undoubtedly the most significant element of any local culture to work through in presenting new ideas (innovations). (85) There is probably no way to ruin the chances for an innovation more quickly than to ignore the traditional leaders or to choose the wrong ones. (86) Opinion leaders are usually members of the culture in which they exert their influence.
Generalizations on Opinion Leaders
1. The change agent’s success is positively relate to the extent that he works through opinion leaders. (93)
The success of the political career of Gamal Abdul Nasser as a change agent seems to have been related to his use of opinion leaders. Early in his career he attributed his disappointments to a dependence on the mass media alone. Then he decided to seek the views of the leaders of opinion, such as the intellectuals, the elite, the large landholders, and the politicians. But they seemed to be more concerned with their own personal desires. Then Nasser turned to what proved to be the two strongest forces of influence in the society: the army and the ulema (Muslim preachers). (94) The position of the ulema and the Friday sermon had high credibility in the Muslim society, and the legitimacy of the sermon made traditional people more willing to listen to it and comply with the modern messages communicated through it. (95)
2. Opinion leaders are more accessible. (106)
This is because they have greater social participation than their followers. Borthwick’s study of the role of the ulema (Muslim preachers) supports this characteristic because they are very accessible to the people. (107) Abu-Lughod’s study also confirmed that those who interacted the most with the people were the ones who were the opinion leaders, not the government officials who were outsiders to the community. (108) Dawn identifies the bureaucrats and the businessmen as being much more likely candidates for being effective opinion leaders than are the intellectuals. (109)
Reaching the Arabs, by Tim Matheny, © 1981 by William Carey Press
Mosque Leaders as Spheres of Influence
Middle Eastern cities have historically relied on the religious teachings and restraint of Islam and the Islamic community leaders, located in the mosque, to regulate society at the local level. For much of history this alleviated the need for fully developed city administrations and bureaucracy. It also facilitated totalitarian government because government behavior was only informally checked by Islamic law and by the popular power invested in the mosque’s religious leadership.3 A mutual accommodation between the city government and urban religious leaders is the traditional bedrock of successful Middle Eastern city government. Islam, as a religion and as a culture, sees no inherent taboo in closely integrating church and state.4
Typically, the city’s Friday Mosque hosts the main Friday prayer ritual that is usually attended, and sometimes led by the political leadership of the city. It serves to reinforce the bond between the secular leadership and the population and, to an extent, to legitimize the secular leadership. Other smaller mosques, with their associated local religious leadership, serve the daily needs of local neighborhoods throughout the city and are similarly aligned with the local secular leadership, if such exists.
At the local level, the mosque’s religious leadership is often the neighborhood leadership. In this manner the mosque and its associated ulema help bond the city’s secular leadership and the neighborhood with the population, while at the same time reaffirming the ulema’s leadership role in the neighborhood’s social structure. At the national level, virtually every nation in the Middle East, with the exception of Turkey and Israel, acknowledge Islam in its constitution. Even Syria, which places little official emphasis on religion, acknowledges that “the laws of the state shall be inspired by the Shari’a.”6 Thus, the mosque, as the center of Islamic prayer and activity, cannot avoid involvement, direct and indirect, in the politics of Middle Eastern cities.
- Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/9667078)
Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. DiMarco, US Army
Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
120mm
03-06-2008, 09:08 AM
Some of us have been highly trained and educated (two different concepts) to question everything, accept very little, and continue to question that.
Which is, in itself, a series of (possibly) unacknowledged assumptions. To accept the scientific method is to "accept" the assumption that everything must be questioned.
One of the mistakes I would suggest that "secularists" make, is that they are somehow "neutral" in the eyes of religionists. Or at least superior to opposing religious views.
In a way, it becomes a "two brothers squabbling" paradigm. You may see me and my brother fighting, but the instant you, as an outsider, step in to stop it, I will see you as not a peacemaker, but as someone attacking my brother.
Secularists most definitely fall into the "I can beat on my brother all I want, but if you try to beat on my brother, we will defend each other" category.;)
marct
03-06-2008, 02:08 PM
Hi 120,
You know I'm not going to let this one pass without comment :D!
Some of us have been highly trained and educated (two different concepts) to question everything, accept very little, and continue to question that.
Which is, in itself, a series of (possibly) unacknowledged assumptions. To accept the scientific method is to "accept" the assumption that everything must be questioned.
You're right that this is an often unacknowledged assumption made by many people. It is not, however, a necessary condition of applying a scientific method (ref to Popper). In the "classic" (16th-17th century) form, the scientific method draws a solid distinction between that which can be tested and that which cannot. Sometimes that line is arbitrary, but much of the time it is based on how far we have extended our sense via either technology or perceptual categorization (aka theory). In that realm that can be questioned, everything should be taken as "conditional" and subject to re-questioning as our perceptions, tools and techniques evolve. In the realm on the other side of the line, the scientific method, in the sense of experimentally testing truth claims again observed reality, doesn't apply by definition since we can't test it. In effect, the epistemological base of science breaks down once you are over the line.
One of the mistakes I would suggest that "secularists" make, is that they are somehow "neutral" in the eyes of religionists. Or at least superior to opposing religious views.
Yupper, and sometimes we find fundamentalist extremist forms of secularists; Richard Dawkins The God Delusion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_God_Delusion) is a good example of that. What bugs me is that this is a moderately recent split - the split between "science" and "religion" that is that really came to the forefront during the 19th century and, especially, during the Evolution debates (e.g. Huxley, Spencer, etc.). This fight has led to the creation of an amazing mythology within science that has little to do with the actual events.
For example, Galileo is often held up as a martyr for science. Hah! He was a plagiarist who delighted in attacking any of his colleagues and his trial was not about practicing science and contradicting the Roman Catholic Church but, rather, because he did not adequately prove his argument (he didn't understand the math he used since he stole most of it anyway).
While the "split" between science and religion his popular culture with the evolution debates, there wee other strands that caused problems as well well before that. The scientific method was applied by a number of people to the spiritual world during the 16th - 18th centuries, but the schools that developed (and I'm using "schools" in Kuhn's sense) were viewed by most established churches as being in direct professional competition with their own areas of expertise. Think about Alchemy, Hermeticism, the School of Night, etc. The same did not happen in other places. For example, Buddhism, especially Vajrayana Buddhism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vajrayana), is a good example of the scientific method in operation.
In the West, we have this almost culturally psychotic split between science and religion where each takes on in turn the worst habits of the other. It is as if the Mandaean Dualism that seeped into the west in the first couple of centuries c.e. has transformed itself into the current conflict. < /rant>
Sorry 'bout that, but it is an issue that really gets me going ;).
Marc
MSG Proctor
03-07-2008, 08:36 PM
Gentlemen:
In response to the subject of chaplains engaging indigenous religious leaders and advising the commander, I would like you to consider the on-the-ground realities at the tactical (battalion) level. I urge you to read the entire article quoted from below in this quarter's Military Review. In it, we can see the absolute necessity of engaging local leaders and providing battalion level commanders and staffs with relevant religious analysis for their COIN operations.
Excerpts from Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight
by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Major Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; and Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army
Link to entire article (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/MarrEngMarApr08.pdf):
"Patrols were organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. The three major tasks were security, IR gathering, and relationship-building. As the composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some augmentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to gain a firsthand look at his AO. The company fire support officer (FSO), acting as the company’s intelligence officer, accompanied the commander on every patrol. This enabled the staff to build a framework to address the three critical tasks. The commander focused on building relationships with key individuals, his FSO(augmented by part of the platoon) sought answers to IR, and the patrol’s platoon leader concentrated on security.
As units moved through the various villages and towns of AO Dragon, they con*sistently found local citizens who had been hesitant to call the task-force tips hotline or go to its combat outposts, but were more than willing to provide information if engaged at a personal level.
Human Terrain Mapping—A Necessary Process
Although the value of the map itself was obvi*ous, in retrospect, the physical process of doing the mapping might have been even more beneficial. If the type of information gathered had been avail*able upon arrival (in a database, for example), the task force might have accepted an abstract, and perhaps false, sense of the environment. It would have done so while depriving itself of firsthand knowledge gained from building the map. By way of analogy, having a ready-made database would have been like learning to do math problems on a calculator instead of the hard way, via reasoning. [Proctor comment: this is why engaging religious leaders is the best way chaplains can advise commanders on religious dynamics in the OE]In conducting HTM, the battalion learned how to square ethnographic data the hard way, a method that provided maximum benefit via direct analysis of particulars within the situation at intimate levels. From this perspective, the advantages of having Soldiers do HTM themselves appear numerous. Besides gaining greater knowledge of the AO, some of the more salient benefits follow.
● The number-one tenet of the 3d Infantry Division’s COIN handbook states, “It’s all about the people.” Building a trusted network means creating personal relationships between coalition tactical leaders and the leaders of the population they secure. Once those relationships were built, task-force units were better able to deliver and assess the effects of IO messages and PSYOP products, better able to determine if local governments were talking to their constituents, and—when necessary—better able to minimize unrest among the population through consequence-management procedures.
HTM provided ground-level insight into local politics, motivations, and differences—and this served as the start point for reconciling Sunni with Shi’a. Understanding the differences between the two sects’ areas was easy; finding a nexus for reconciliation was not. However, once a unit met and befriended leaders in both areas, those lead*ers had something in common: a partnership with coalition forces. In one particular area, Sunni and Shi’a families lived together with different sheiks leading each sect. Unfortunately, these sheiks were not eager to work with one another to reconcile their differences. To add to the area’s problems, Al-Qaeda in Iraq often attacked both groups as a means to keep their foothold. After working numer*ous HTM patrols in those areas, the local company commander earned the trust of both the Sunni and Shi’a. This enabled him to initiate discussions between the two sheiks based on the common goals of security and economic development.
Nothing can replace personal reconnaissance in importance."
Opinion leaders are more accessible. (106)
This is because they have greater social participation than their followers. Borthwick’s study of the role of the ulema (Muslim preachers) supports this characteristic because they are very accessible to the people. (107) Abu-Lughod’s study also confirmed that those who interacted the most with the people were the ones who were the opinion leaders, not the government officials who were outsiders to the community. (108) Dawn identifies the bureaucrats and the businessmen as being much more likely candidates for being effective opinion leaders than are the intellectuals. (109)
Reaching the Arabs, by Tim Matheny, © 1981 by William Carey Press
Ken White
03-07-2008, 09:04 PM
is good, saves pixels. If one is going to do that a very brief extract, a good sized paragraph should suffice. The more length one provides in the post, the less likely others are to pursue the link.
The use of red type to highlight passages deemed important is a method but generally, unless one has a particular purpose, just repeating the article or linked text without annotation is better. The use of alternate colors or text styles is a valid technique, however it works best, they say, when used minimally. That's particularly true of alternate colors which can be distracting.
Merely suggestions.
Thanks, BTW, for the link and article.
Jedburgh
03-13-2008, 03:11 PM
Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995–2005 (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/lawson.pdf)
.....Providing religious support to US soldiers in the Balkans was a challenge to Army chaplains. Beginning with minimal resources or supplies, chaplains met the religious needs of soldiers in both formal and informal settings. Chaplains conducted religious services, counseling, prayer meetings,
family reunion meetings, and morale enhancing lectures in often austere and humble situations and circumstances. As the years went on, more and better chapels were constructed in the Balkans; these buildings became the focal point for religious activities for soldiers. Chaplains also led or participated in humanitarian or nation-building missions related to developing friendships with the local populations. Army chaplains delivered huge amounts of donated supplies from religious and other groups in the United States to the destitute of the Balkans. Further, Army chaplains led the way in creating opportunities for discussion of religious and social issues with indigenous clergy, these groups often composed of Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox Christian groups that have been antagonists for centuries.....
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Background: A War-torn Region of the World
3. The Bosnia Theater of Operations
- Events Leading to US Military Activity in Bosnia
- Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to Arrive in Bosnia, 1995
- Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Bosnia, 1996
- Developing Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 1996
- Expanding Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia and Surrounding Areas, 1996–97
- Chaplain Accounts of Ministry in Bosnia, 1997
- Diverse Chaplain Ministries in Peacekeeping in Bosnia, 1998
- Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Bosnia, 1999–2000
- Army Chaplain Ministries in Bosnia, 2001–2002
- Chaplain Activities During Military Downsizing in Bosnia, 2003–2005
4. The Kosovo Theater of Operations
- Background to Contemporary Hostilities in Kosovo
- Preparations for the First US Army Chaplains to Arrive in Kosovo
- Initial Chaplain Activities and Ministries in Kosovo, 1999
- Ministry to Displaced Kosovar Refugees
- Developing Chaplain Issues in Kosovo, 2000–2001
- Chaplain Duties in Maintaining the Peace in Kosovo, 2002–2004
- The US Army Chaplaincy and Downsizing in Kosovo, 2004–2005
.....US Army chaplains serving throughout the Balkans from 1995 to 2005 were essential in the reconciliation process for the diverse religious populations. Clearly, the role of the chaplain as a religious adviser to commanders, long an expectation in the military, was solidified and enhanced by Army chaplains serving in the Balkans. Army commanders in the Balkans did not face a forceful and well-armed professional Army, but rather regional militias and paramilitary forces that thrived off ethnic racism and religious hatred. Army chaplains networked with local clergy and political leaders, brought rival religious factions to clergy events, promoted harmony among rival groups, and encouraged forgiveness and acceptance by long-standing belligerents.....
MSG Proctor
03-17-2008, 02:50 PM
Great post, Jedburgh. Pretty much dispels chaplain-as-pastor-only paradigm in small wars.
Whether a chaplain does it or the 'experts from Dover', the clerics are a force to be reckoned with in today's COIN operations in Iraq.
Iraq, once secular now dominated by religious parties (http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/191436,iraq-once-secular-now-dominated-by-religious-parties--feature.html)
MSG Proctor
08-02-2008, 10:11 AM
An Inside Perspective on Religious Peacemaking in Iraq (http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0103/maki/maki_godpol.html#Anchor_top)
"After a slow and painful learning process, U.S. government civil and military authorities in Iraq came to the conclusion that they must engage with religion. Since then, they have been very supportive and began funding the process from the beginning of 2007. What is unique about this reconciliation initiative is that the U.S. military has participated directly in the entire process by working through the religious dynamic. By using the Office of the Command Chaplain, the engagement has military involvement and reports directly back to Commanding General David Petraeus. Relying on a shared identity as religious leaders, the Command Chaplain is able to work with Canon White's FRRME and the senior Iraqi religious leaders to help advise the process in support of U.S. military campaign objectives in Iraq. "
Chaplains and Religious Support Teams can be a part of the peacemaking solutions in counterinsurgency operations without violations of military regulations or denominational requirements. This conference may not have grabbed the headlines, but this council is the heart, arteries and veins of the new Iraq and its best hope for reconciliation.
DiveMaster
08-08-2008, 05:36 AM
The articles and comments displayed here are truly impressive...this is my first time so try to be gentle with me! I will speak critically and offer a few original thoughts on the subjects emerging here, but I begin by registering a note of thanks for the effort and time given to these thread discussions. It is my view that we must continue to orient the Joint Force Chaplaincy toward any kind of peace building engagements if those engagements prove productive and help prevent an eschalation of conflict. If Chaplaincy engagements with any kind of religious leader saves American lives, then keep engaging. From what I read in the references, published papers and interviews of this forum, religious leader engagements saves lives and builds meaningful relationships with indigenous people through their religious leaders. The practice to use our Chaplain units as Liaisons for the Command will continue if the the ends justifies the means. The Army tends to follow Consequentialism.
MSG Proctor
02-24-2010, 07:32 AM
Its been a while since this thread was active, but since then I was asked to compile a Short History of Religious Leader Engagements in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The FOUO version is here (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/17973009) (AKO/DKO password required.
The open source version is being published in the Old Crows Association's IO Journal and the FOUO is published on the Center for Army Lessons Learned website. I'll add the link when it becomes available.
John
marct
02-24-2010, 05:51 PM
Hi John,
Thanks for posting the links it's appreciated!
Cheers,
Marc
MSG Proctor
02-25-2010, 02:01 AM
Were you able to open it?
Let me know - OK?
jp
marct
02-25-2010, 01:21 PM
Were you able to open it?
Let me know - OK?
jp
No ako access, John :wry:. I'll have to wait wait for the IO Journal version to come out.
Cheers,
Marc
Hacksaw
02-25-2010, 02:58 PM
Hi John, hope all is well in the land of the morning sun
MSG Proctor
02-26-2010, 12:15 PM
Oh, things are wonderful in Korea. I fully expect the regime to collapse very, very soon.
The Ceaucescu moment (http://www.metacafe.com/watch/401462/ceausescus_execution/) could be closer than it seems.
Angry citizens burned piles of old bills at two separate locations in the eastern coastal city of Hamhung on Monday, the Daily NK, a Seoul-based online news outlet that focuses on North Korean affairs, reported late Thursday, citing an unidentified North Korean resident.
It quoted the resident as saying he saw graffiti and leaflets criticizing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in and around a college in Hamhung - a rare move in a country where the totalitarian government keeps tight control over its 24 million people. link (http://http://www.seattlepi.com/national/1104ap_as_nkorea_currency_reform.html)
Dictatorships rarely end well. I was there when this one (http://http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=9099423) did.
The collapse of Pyongyang will feature similarities to both Romania and Iraq but will in its own way be worse than both - it will be seen as the failure not only of a state, but of a religion. Adherents.com ranks Juche (http://http://www.adherents.com/largecom/Juche.html), the state ideology of the DPRK as the 10th largest religion in the world. May the stench of Juche’s burning corpse forever remind us of the misery spread through idolatry, materialism, statism and personality cults.
ptamas
02-26-2010, 01:07 PM
Iraq, once secular now dominated by religious parties (http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/191436,iraq-once-secular-now-dominated-by-religious-parties--feature.html)
In fragile states circles there is a lot of talk about disaggregating the state...pulling apart all the different functions, practices and belief that make up a sovereignty. This seems to be part of the understanding all the bits of humpty-dumpty so that we can figure out how to put him (back) together again. The discussion is very useful because it has produced a whole bunch of language to talk about the bits and pieces that we find lying around in the places we work..fragments of the state. Second, it is really useful because it stops transfer of cognitive similarity. That is, it used to be when I said state and a guy from Congo said state, I would assume that we were talking about the same thing. We may not be...so our attempts to make things better may be mutually incompatible. The term state, here, is actually an obstacle to communication.
I'm having the same itch with religion. So, I would like to know what, if any, work has been done to pull apart the term 'religion' when we are talking about this stuff.
second
and I want the doc on AKO that Marc wants...(twiddling thumbs waiting patiently)
third
the entire development business is Catholic (http://www.answers.com/topic/catholic) about its secularism. This is dangerous when it isn't short sighted or just plain ignorant. It is very interesting for me to see how the military is trying to recognize this domain. I suppose it is predictable from an institutional perspective that padres would be tagged for the role. In this the military is in some ways fortunate. Padres are believers trained to care for a diverse flock under dire circumstances who are recognized by their institution as having a legitimate domain of competence. In the development business we tend to have a lot of covert missionaries frustrated by their secular workplaces and atheists who think that religion is quaint who work in a language whose express purpose is to render ideological challenges on technical terms that are amenable to the sorts of intervention strategies that donors find convenient.
finally
I have found this thread enormously rich.
thanks to all of those who contributed.
MSG Proctor
02-26-2010, 02:19 PM
ptamas:
Without insulting you with an anthropology lesson, man is inherently religious whether his religion is Wahabbist Islam or secular liberalism.
Any regime change operation which fails in this calculus is destined to create more martyrs for the causes of religious faith (SEE: In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq (http://http://books.google.com/books?id=-lxks1I41vcC&dq=Nir+Rosen+green+bird&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=FNWHS-OzJoqStgP6uamGAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAw) By Nir Rosen).
The difference being that secular liberals are ultimately overcome by religious adherents not always in war, but always in demographics and sustainability. How else do we explain the fact that 70% of Russians believe in God (http://http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Russia) today?
The highest birthrates in the world are in Muslim 3rd world nations.
Western liberalism and its illegitimate step child Modernism are responsible for the decline of religious faith that is, in the ultimate analysis, the West's greatest liability.
I did not bring that view of life with me to Iraq in 2003. It descended on me like a falling safe, irrespective of my wishes and druthers. War has a way of doing that.
John
ptamas
02-26-2010, 08:03 PM
ptamas:
Without insulting you with an anthropology lesson, man is inherently religious whether his religion is Wahabbist Islam or secular liberalism.
None taken.
The first thing that gets me concerned is when folks think they have a universal truth (today this would be secular liberalism) and act on that basis.
quote from a paper I wrote in '04 never published
Dobkin Hall argues that it is “likely that both the rationales and the methods of bureaucratic and corporate organization [in North America] actually emerged from the domain of religion and spread from there to economic, political and social situations”(Dobkin Hall, 1998 p. 101). Hall continues from this point by mentioning that a major industrial player (‘Pope’ Dwight) and his companions in New England:
became early promoters not only of voluntary organizations with explicitly religious purposes — Bible, tract and missionary societies — but also secular organizations — reform, temperance, education, charitable, and other societies, as well as schools and colleges — which could act on the unchurched masses and move them towards the Light. (ibid., p. 104)
Second,
Where I may differ is in the ease with which you use the term 'religious'. We have a specific notion of 'religious' here. Ours is a history informed both by the wars of religion and the perfusion of Protestant values with, now, an thick overlay of new forms of religious expression most of which are constituted within bounds tolerable to the sort of pluralism that we have snowballed into (there is lots of good work out there on the limits of pluralist states whose conditions of formation did not anticipate and can not accommodate new forms of expression). That is our history.
Other folks have had very different histories and what we call religious may not map tidily onto the world in which they live. I work with the assumption that folks' horizons (secular liberals included) are suffused with the ideological/symbolic/theological/mystical (whatever term works) but I get itchy when folks use our constructs without caveat cause that leads us to think that we can understand their realities.
That conceit has cost many lives.
-peter
marct
02-27-2010, 12:18 AM
Hi Peter,
The first thing that gets me concerned is when folks think they have a universal truth (today this would be secular liberalism) and act on that basis.
LOL - I tend to use terms like "theocrat" or "theologian" (note the red) for that type of person.
Just to be up front about my definition of religion, I use Clifford Geertz' definition:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (
quote from a paper I wrote in '04 never published
Dobkin Hall argues that it is “likely that both the rationales and the methods of bureaucratic and corporate organization [in North America] actually emerged from the domain of religion and spread from there to economic, political and social situations”(Dobkin Hall, 1998 p. 101). Hall continues from this point by mentioning that a major industrial player (‘Pope’ Dwight) and his companions in New England:
became early promoters not only of voluntary organizations with explicitly religious purposes — Bible, tract and missionary societies — but also secular organizations — reform, temperance, education, charitable, and other societies, as well as schools and colleges — which could act on the unchurched masses and move them towards the Light. (ibid., p. 104)
I would argue that it's a bit of chicken or egg situation. Sure, the North American version comes out of religious bases, but they (in turn) came out of the secular, Roman bureaucracy, which came out of the Roman religious bureaucracy, ..... The earliest bureaucratic organizational forms about which we have any information are those furshlinger accountant-priests of the Sumerian city states (ca. 3300 bce). It goes back well before Christianity, although modern bureaucracy, including its secular form (i.e. Scientific Management) was definitely influenced by a mutant 9or degenerate) form of Calvinism.
Where I may differ is in the ease with which you use the term 'religious'. We have a specific notion of 'religious' here. Ours is a history informed both by the wars of religion and the perfusion of Protestant values with, now, an thick overlay of new forms of religious expression most of which are constituted within bounds tolerable to the sort of pluralism that we have snowballed into (there is lots of good work out there on the limits of pluralist states whose conditions of formation did not anticipate and can not accommodate new forms of expression). That is our history.
I've often found a similar problem when talking about "religion" in Canada. In many ways, our history is almost the antithesis of the European experience. As an illustration, did you know that Canada was the only place where there was a witch hunt that was stopped by popular protest (1610, Isle de Montreal)? An incredibly large part of our "national culture" (and I happen to hate that term but, in this case, it is appropriate) is cebtered around a rejection of a "one true path" expression of religion.
Other folks have had very different histories and what we call religious may not map tidily onto the world in which they live. I work with the assumption that folks' horizons (secular liberals included) are suffused with the ideological/symbolic/theological/mystical (whatever term works) but I get itchy when folks use our constructs without caveat cause that leads us to think that we can understand their realities.
Really good point, and one that is often forgotten. Personally, I have a tendency to use two constructs - via negativa and via positiva - as descriptors of "religious" symbol systems (in Geertz's terminology again). The positiva form comes out as "God (reality, nature, etc.) is...", while the negativa form is "God (reality, nature, etc.) is not...". Personally, I believe that these are more mental (psychological, philosophical, metaphysical) "stances" towards however individuals choose to express their symbolizations of "reality / meaning"; certainly there are behavioural correlations between those stances and social actions.
Can "we" understand "their" realities? We, I tend to follow Ginzberg on that one. In short, we can never wholly understand the reality of the other, but that doesn't mean we should not try :D.
MSG Proctor
02-27-2010, 04:19 AM
Geertz's definition of religion is nakedly Modernist as his verbs render: "establish", "formulating", "clothing." This definition precludes the possibility of revealed religion, that is, truth communicated to men from a source external to themselves by the Divine Creator.
For those of us who adhere to the Hebraic-Christian Tradition of monotheism, our religion cannot be contained, described, apprehended or even meaningfully criticized using Modernist technical terms.
This is an impasse that cannot be abridged by simple broadmindedness or goodwill. It is a conflict of cosmologies that cannot be reconciled in any abstract way although political reconciliation is always achievable when we accept the limits of our present conditions as finite beings in an imperfect world.
The only long-term experimentations with antireligious social constructs have completely collapsed (USSR) or have yielded to the impetus of religious ascendancy (PRC). And it may be forcefully argued that Stalinism and Maoism were in practice religious constructs, as is North Korea's bizarre compulsory adoration (http://http://www.rickross.com/reference/nkorea/nkorea46.html) of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
If man is inherently religious then Truth matters. If we are to engage the Other in our academic, social and political (not to mention military) engagements, it is disingenuine to exclude the possibility of revealed religion at least as a sincerely held belief.
Modernism, naturalism, Darwinism, materialism, liberalism, etc.. are practiced as cosmologies and to the religious believer on the other side of the table are engaged as such.
marct
02-27-2010, 09:38 PM
Hi John,
You know, this is getting a touch weird (in the very old sense of the term) conducting parallel discussions on this :D.
If man is inherently religious then Truth matters. If we are to engage the Other in our academic, social and political (not to mention military) engagements, it is disingenuine to exclude the possibility of revealed religion at least as a sincerely held belief.
First, I'll note that this is not specifically excluded from Geertz' definition. Let me further point out that all of the "revealed religions" in the Abrahamic tradition warn about testing continuing revelation against scripture, so your point is only immediately valid when it concerns the direct recipient of direct revelation (like Joseph Smith?).
Second, and it follows from the first, is that all religious systems are a) symbolic and b) constantly subject to re-interpretation by individuals who profess them. How an individual professes their individual interpretations, even if they have "historical backing" (or scriptural for that matter), is still an individual choice and, hence, subject to this definition.
Third, I could find your position to be equally disingenuous in that it denies the validity of a non-received, exploratory religion that has recognized that all deities are mere illusions (i.e Vadrayana Buddhism or Taosism).
Finally, let me point out that Geertz' definition of religion is a via negativa definition of religion in that it maps out broad boundaries, but actually does not exclude belief systems that are usually not considered to be "religious" such as Marxism.
Modernism, naturalism, Darwinism, materialism, liberalism, etc.. are practiced as cosmologies and to the religious believer on the other side of the table are engaged as such.
And do you seriously believe that they do not fulfill the same function as more formally recognized "religions" :wry:? I *think* (not sure, but...) I spelled out some of the arguments against this position in my two-part comments today (for those of you wondering what I'm talking about, the exchange is over here (http://marctyrrell.com/2010/02/17/418/)). As far as them being treated as cosmologies, of course they are! Exactly as formal religious systems are treated as cosmologies.
What is critical, IMO and getting back to the origin of this entire thread, is for people to see other people as a) holding their beliefs sincerely and, b) using that system to promote "the Good".
Cheers,
Marc
MSG Proctor
02-28-2010, 04:22 AM
And do you seriously believe that they do not fulfill the same function as more formally recognized "religions" ? I *think* (not sure, but...) I spelled out some of the arguments against this position in my two-part comments today (for those of you wondering what I'm talking about, the exchange is over here). As far as them being treated as cosmologies, of course they are! Exactly as formal religious systems are treated as cosmologies.
I think we are in violent agreement here, Dr. Marc.
A short vignette. While assigned to the US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), one of my duties was to provide enlisted advice to the CAC Command Chaplain for input to CAC's arm of TRADOC. TRADOC CAC-Training Directorate was mass producing laminated cards for distribution to Soldiers on how to behave culturally in Iraq. The 2nd bullet on the front side said "never discuss religion."
This blunder illustrates the blindness that accompanies so much of what passes for 'cultural awareness training' in the US DoD. A short taxonomy of assertions:
1. Islam makes no distinction between religious and political life.
2. There was little or no religious freedom in Iraq under Saddam's Baathist government.
3. Iraq's clerics filled the void created by the Baath Party government's dissolution.
4. The Friday Mosque speech/sermon is the #1 most trusted IO transmission in Iraq.
5. AQ infiltrated Iraq's government through Mosque channels.
6. Iran infiltrated Iraq's government through Mosque channels.
7. Iraq's constitution names Islam as the basis for Iraqi jurisprudence.
8. IO messages using words like takfiri and irhabi are promulgated by Soldiers and Marines on the streets and villages of Iraq.
Now, add to this equation that in this COIN fight for legitimacy you should never discuss religion with Iraqis.
salam alechems, the Iraqi, who punctuates references to anything future with In sh'Allah, says something that touches an Islamic or Christian concept. The young Lieutenant abruptly shows the Iraqi the hand and says, "stop! We can't discuss religion with you." What is this Iraqi opinion maker going to take back to his Mosque, neighborhood or tribal council?]
(BTW, substitute Afghan for Iraqi and you get the picture for another application.)
The whole idea that our regime change mission would bring a separation of mosque/state is anathema to every version of Islam. Yet that is exactly what we set out to do whether by declaration or example. This inflamed the clerics, emboldened the extremists, and painted bull's eyes on anyone 'collaborating' with CF and the new government.
I am sure the TRADOC developers assured themselves that this 'nonreligious, apolitical approach' was the safest way to navigate the human terrain they were trying to protect. In fact, because that is a worldview being expressed, it comes across to many as Yankee cultural imperialism.
This is one of the reasons why our RLEs (religious leader engagements) were so effective in OIF I. Christian chaplains cleverly disguised as Christian chaplains sat across the table from Islamic scholars, Imams, and Sheikhs and represented a (largely Protestant) Christian worldview well-known to the Umma leadership. Iraqi Christians were seen as honest, trustworthy, courageous, patriotic and reliable partners. When we shoved everyone into FOBs in the fall of '03 and focused on government, government and government, we marginalized the clerics and basically handed them over to the nascent insurgency. AQ picked up on this immediately and began promulgating Sayyid Qutb's (http://http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayyid_Qutb)Salafist rhetoric which sharply condemns the West for its division of religious and political life. The Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ams.htm)was split over the legitimacy of AQ's theology until the Anbar Awakening - which could never have succeeded without buy in from the AMS.
So we see that the secularist liberals (here represented by the TRADOC developers) secure in the conceit that they were above or outside of making religious statements in fact reinforced a 'religious' worldview that is far more antithetical to Muslims than Christianity ever has been or could be.
Lastly, my problem with Geertz's definition is that it emerges from a school that considers nonreligion to be outside the domain of faith/dogma and therefore a judge of all religions. Modernism, materialism, et al as we agree on are indeed 'religious' perspectives inasmuch as they rely on philosophical presuppositions informed by belief of some kind. It is the height of arrogance to refuse acknowledgement of this. We see this vividly in the intolerance of the 'science-by-consensus' community who crush all dissent on issues like moles-to-man macroevolution or (more recently) climate change theory.
To take a position like this in foreign policy (which is what that US Army Sergeant and his M4 Carbine Rifle represent) is obviously problematic. It is as though a Methodist, refusing to admit to Wesleyan inspiration, sits down to criticize and reform a Lutheran Church based on his 'unbiased' Methodism.
Yes, we all interpret through our subjective filters, however - there are objective expressions of dogma that are not subject to modification. This is an orthodox Catholic viewpoint (full disclosure).
Thanks for the spirited colloquy.
john
ptamas
02-28-2010, 08:14 PM
I am sure the TRADOC developers assured themselves that this 'nonreligious, apolitical approach' was the safest way to navigate the human terrain they were trying to protect. In fact, because that is a worldview being expressed, it comes across to many as Yankee cultural imperialism.
and
So we see that the secularist liberals (here represented by the TRADOC developers) secure in the conceit that they were above or outside of making religious statements in fact reinforced a 'religious' worldview that is far more antithetical to Muslims than Christianity ever has been or could be.
and
Lastly, my problem with Geertz's definition is that it emerges from a school that considers nonreligion to be outside the domain of faith/dogma and therefore a judge of all religions.
About 10 years ago I was at a conference on religion and development at the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa sponsored by a retired Jesuit who was then the Vice President. A Thai lady stood up at the plenary and stated that 'you are all guilty of blind theological imperialism.' The wiggling in chairs was audible. The comment was left entirely untouched. The assembled authorities on religion and development could not or would not engage the challenge that their secular, their technical, their universally good intervention was of the same order as those troubling religions they studied.
I'm going to go out on a limb here...
It is this conceit, I believe, that you pick up in the academic study of religion. Religion is held to be an effect of culture. There is no room in this theorizing for the possibility of Revelation, through either (M)manifestation or (E)existence. Whether or not somebody is an expert on religion, if they are not of Faith, that changes the manner in which they engage with counterparts who are of Faith (whatever form that takes).
Put differently, even if you are of a different faith, perhaps even one with radically different tenets, you are peers. You stand similarly in a relationship of submission, of contingent existence, to something external to yourself. This common position provides a ground for communication that is not available to those who do not see their existence as contingent.
If I'm not entirely off base on that much, I would be very curious to know how inter-faith engagement plays out between the faithful in COIN environments when the parties present acknowledge that the content of their and their peers' beliefs are in part the effect of all to human interference in their canon...and that a portion of the violence witnessed can be attributed to this meddling. What I'm particularly interested in here is the disposition, in this case, of Padres towards the difficulties to which they are witness in their work (e.g. compassion, commiseration, condescension) and what relationship their disposition has with their perceived (self and other) and actual effectiveness.
-peter
MSG Proctor
03-01-2010, 01:24 AM
If I'm not entirely off base on that much, I would be very curious to know how inter-faith engagement plays out between the faithful in COIN environments when the parties present acknowledge that the content of their and their peers' beliefs are in part the effect of all to human interference in their canon...and that a portion of the violence witnessed can be attributed to this meddling. What I'm particularly interested in here is the disposition, in this case, of Padres towards the difficulties to which they are witness in their work (e.g. compassion, commiseration, condescension) and what relationship their disposition has with their perceived (self and other) and actual effectiveness.
-peter
Peter, perhaps these cartoons would explain what I think about your question. I hope you also had a chance to look over the PDF I sent you a link to in a PM.
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y44/32582ndABN/Slide1.jpg
This image depicts the shared area of religious concern that can be operationalized by political, government and social institutions because the interreligious dialogue has produced a clear understanding of the religious objectives of both parties (in this case, CF and Iraqi indigenous religious leaders).
MSG Proctor
03-01-2010, 01:29 AM
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y44/32582ndABN/Slide2.jpg
This graphic depicts the ways the knowledge of religious objectives can be applied to counterinsurgency operations. This method gives legitimacy to the COIN operation by acting in support of OBJs identified by the host nation religious leaders. The primary method for identifying those religious OBJs is the religious leader engagement operation (RLEO). The cleric-to-cleric colloquy is the vehicle for ascertaining religious OBJs. Note: not all religious OBJs can be agreed to by CF or the GOI. But as a start point, it is important to know what the clerics think of as most important.
Religious leaders are the most trusted leaders in Iraq today and the mosque is the #1 most credible IO transmitter.
kotkinjs1
03-01-2010, 02:47 AM
I think the “secularist liberals” who you continue to bash intended something much different than the simple interpretation you choose. “[Y]ou should never discuss religion with Iraqis” is not intended to get the Iraqis, or Afghans for that matter, to adopt a Western model of separation of church and state, but rather to keep some jackass from getting into a religious debate with the host nation populace about his jeezus being better than the other guy’s allah. Its designed to keep morons from proselytizing and passing out bibles. Its designed to keep us from playing into AQ’s IO campaign.
Your example of: “The young Lieutenant abruptly shows the Iraqi the hand and says, "stop! We can't discuss religion with you" is a feeble strawman you’re using to push your own agenda. I would fully expect any soldier when meeting with a local leader, be he the qariya dar (village leader) or imam, to respectfully discuss the issues important to those people. Without his gear, without his Oakleys, and without his M4 at the ready. Nobody says we need to try and get them to adopt our view of religion and that’s not the message which TRADOC is trying to get across. If the qariya dar elects the imam to speak for the village, or if the leader himself discusses his needs through a religious lens (which of course he probably would because, as you pointed out, it is the central theme that everything else stems from), the US soldier will do his job as it relates to the COIN mission and not “wave off” because of your perceived interpretation of doctrine. If he did, that soldier is obviously unfit for such duty.
Thanks, but I think most of us have taken a few classes by now and understand that Islamic Republics such as Iraq and Afghanistan operate under different sets of rules and concepts than we do in the West. I also think that a soldier can perform his COIN mission without needing a uniformed chaplain to bridge any gaps and put said chaplain in any situation outside of seeing to the needs of his own troops. Anything else gets into a moral and legal über gray area that is begging for AQ or the Taliban, or the US press for that matter (and rightfully so), to pick up on. As long as that soldier uses the respect, honor, an open mind, and intelligence which dealing with local leaders requires in today’s wars, he can earn the trust and partnership of the imam or elder just as easy as a US chaplain. The qariya dar or imam doesn’t need a US chaplain to be able speak religion with; he needs the responsible US soldier to talk with about what his village needs, how best to provide security, and how to ensure the village swings to the CF side and not the Taliban’s. That takes a culturally aware, respectful, and intelligent soldier. Not an ordained minister bridging religious gaps. It’s not about religious street cred, it’s about not acting like a bunch of door-kickers during a COIN mission.
Cheers,
A secularist liberal and damn proud of it. Its what makes our nation strong and unique throughout a world history full of theocracies and monarchies.
marct
03-01-2010, 03:31 PM
Hi John,
Lastly, my problem with Geertz's definition is that it emerges from a school that considers nonreligion to be outside the domain of faith/dogma and therefore a judge of all religions. Modernism, materialism, et al as we agree on are indeed 'religious' perspectives inasmuch as they rely on philosophical presuppositions informed by belief of some kind. It is the height of arrogance to refuse acknowledgement of this. We see this vividly in the intolerance of the 'science-by-consensus' community who crush all dissent on issues like moles-to-man macroevolution or (more recently) climate change theory.
I think you misunderstand where Geertz' definition came from. Discursively, yes, it is part of the modernist school, but philosophically it isn't. Hmmm, how to explain this.....
Anthropology, and especially the Anthropology of Religion post, say, J. G. Frazer, has been the home of some of the, hmmmm, "weirdest" (in the old, Anglo-Saxon meaning of the term!) people in the discipline. Please believe me when I say that pretty much everyone in the field is fully aware that "non-religions" are "religions". I suspect that the attacks on Geertz' definition of religion from inside the discipline, mainly the the post-modernist crowd, are for precisely that reason; they don't want to be "recognized" as a religion :cool:.
Personally, I've never heard of the moles-to-man macroevolution but, speaking as someone who has taught evolutionary theory, I find it somewhat silly :wry:. As for "climate change theory", at least in its modern version, I'm not sure if we really want to get into that debate at all.
Yes, we all interpret through our subjective filters, however - there are objective expressions of dogma that are not subject to modification. This is an orthodox Catholic viewpoint (full disclosure).
The existence and general properties of dogma (singular dogmata from the Gr. Dokein) operate regardless of the religion, ranging from the axiomatic assumptions of the symbol system through to certain, hmmm, let's call them "tentative Truths" (in Catholic theology, these are sometimes referred to as "virtual revelations" as opposed to formal and explicit and formal and implicit revelations).
At the social, discursive level (like, you know, when we are talkin' about stuff ;)), dogmata can show up either as a formal constraint within a person who accepts the system or by, hmmm, "viral" exchange (i.e. it's part of the person's popular culture without being a subscriber to the formal system). Technically, and remember I'm speaking as an Anthropologist right now, they are "objective" only in as much as they are an artifact of the system that holds them to exist. Their actual objectivity, in terms of the entire species, is much more limited and, even for people who operate within the system of which they are a part, is subject to interpretation. That, too, is a part of Roman Catholic doctrine BTW (if you want an example of it, check out the actual reason for Galileo's trial rather than the mythologized one).
Thanks for the spirited colloquy.
Always fun :D!
Cheers,
Marc
MSG Proctor
03-03-2010, 10:55 AM
Technically, and remember I'm speaking as an Anthropologist right now, they are "objective" only in as much as they are an artifact of the system that holds them to exist. Their actual objectivity, in terms of the entire species, is much more limited and, even for people who operate within the system of which they are a part, is subject to interpretation. That, too, is a part of Roman Catholic doctrine BTW (if you want an example of it, check out the actual reason for Galileo's trial rather than the mythologized one).
As a practicing and believing Catholic, you must know I reject this Geertzism. Dogmas are for the faithful Catholic, the immutable and incontrovertible Universal Truths, whether accepted outside 'our system' or not. I do appreciate the full disclosure of anthropologese - an excerpt from a Papal Encyclical promulgated by Pope St. Pius X is in order:
26. To finish with this whole question of faith and its shoots, it remains to be seen, Venerable Brethren, what the Modernists have to say about their development. First of all they lay down the general principle that in a living religion everything is subject to change, and must change, and in this way they pass to what may be said to be, among the chief of their doctrines, that of Evolution. To the laws of evolution everything is subject - dogma, Church, worship, the Books we revere as sacred, even faith itself, and the penalty of disobedience is death. The enunciation of this principle will not astonish anybody who bears in mind what the Modernists have had to say about each of these subjects. Having laid down this law of evolution, the Modernists themselves teach us how it works out. And first with regard to faith. The primitive form of faith, they tell us, was rudimentary and common to all men alike, for it had its origin in human nature and human life. Vital evolution brought with it progress, not by the accretion of new and purely adventitious forms from without, but by an increasing penetration of the religious sentiment in the conscience.
Pascendi Dominici Gregis
john
marct
03-03-2010, 02:11 PM
Hi John,
As a practicing and believing Catholic, you must know I reject this Geertzism. Dogmas are for the faithful Catholic, the immutable and incontrovertible Universal Truths, whether accepted outside 'our system' or not.
Sure, I know that you are compelled to reject it. I will point out, however, that the process discussed by it is, however, recognized by a Papal Encyclical - Humani Generis (Pius XII) - which, while arguing that there both are absolute truths and specific routes towards them, also argues that the process I was describing exists and needs to be guarded against. As a practicing Baconian scientist, i.e. with a via negativa stance, you need to remember that the models I discuss and work on are a) contingent and b) refer to processes that are observable. I'm not making value judgements per se about their desirability, only about their existence.
Shifting topic somewhat, I think that our discussions here and elsewhere show some of the limits of religious engagement. I happen to agree with kotkinjs1 interpretation that the TRADOC policy is "to keep some jackass from getting into a religious debate with the host nation populace about his jeezus being better than the other guy’s allah." How do you think it could be modified to avoid that problem?
Cheers,
Marc
MSG Proctor
03-04-2010, 11:59 AM
I was assigned to TRADOC/CAC when called by MNF-I to the contingency work group on religious leader engagements in the ITO in 2008 (earlier in this thread).
My work A Short History of Religious Leader Engagements in Operation Iraqi Freedom is footnoted and referenced to real events, situations and leaders that make the case for religious understanding in a COIN operation among Muslims. Mr. kotkinjs1's oversimplification of the realties briefs real well but does not seem to admit that our COIN operations in OIF are an intervention in a largely Islamic internicine conflict and require more savvy than just "respect, honor, an open mind, and intelligence..." Case in point (http://http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hB09Ap04vifdna_ATBZFbbox5a2A).
To answer your question directly, most of TRADOC's cultural education products (especially those uploaded to CALL's website) are pretty sound and getting better. The laminated card I referred to above is symptomatic of the radical secularizing attitude that played right into the hands of the multitude of insurgent groups animated by religious impulse in Iraq and Iran.
The best way to tackle the problem is by weaponizing cultural knowledge (GEN Petraeus' phrase, not mine) and applying the same energy towards knowing human terrain on the COIN battlefield as we would the physical terrain in a kinetic, conventional linear operation. Square one is dealing with the 'religion doesn't really matter' attitudes within our own ranks.
“These are three of the most important political figures in Iraq today. Their edicts and counsel go out to millions of Iraqis every Friday at the mosques, and to members of the national government and parliament throughout the week. In short, if there is to be reconciliation in Iraq it must be led by these men… clearly the most authoritative word in Iraq comes from its most respected institution, religion.” Voices from Iraq (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120649298824364057.html?mod=googlenews_wsj), Wall Street Journal 26 March 2008 by Robert McFarlane
“The policing of corruption, the work of the rule of law, the acceptance of the Iraqi government and its credibility among the people, a willingness to lay off violence—none of those things could progress forward without mosque permission.” CH(COL) Mike Hoyt, Religion a Major Player in Recent Iraq Success (http://http://www.frrme.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=110&Itemid=151), by Jane Cook
marct
03-04-2010, 01:25 PM
Hi John,
The best way to tackle the problem is by weaponizing cultural knowledge (GEN Petraeus' phrase, not mine) and applying the same energy towards knowing human terrain on the COIN battlefield as we would the physical terrain in a kinetic, conventional linear operation. Square one is dealing with the 'religion doesn't really matter' attitudes within our own ranks.
I still find myself in two minds on on both of these issues.
First, the idea of "weaponizing cultural knowledge" makes my guts churn. I don't really care if it is discussed in (supposedly) neutral terms such as "cultural terrain", it is the very concept of converting cultural knowledge into a "weapon" that makes me shudder. That, BTW, doesn't come from some fuzzy, neo-liberal idealization of "culture" as "sacred"; it comes from a very real fear that once you weaponize any symbol system
it can be used by any player;
it will be turned back on its "inventors"; and
historically, it destabilizes the culture / society that uses it.
Second, the supposedly "neutral" terminology of "cultural terrain" contains within it an ontological predisposition towards hubris: "we" can analyze "their" culture (and "fix" it), therefore "we" are "better" than "them". Proverbs 16:18 captures this concern nicely: "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall". When coupled with "weaponization", there is an implication of an engineering "solution" which, if it was ever found, would open the door to cultural engineering in other venues including the US (not that this isn't already happening, but the playing field is roughly level right now).
Third, while I do believe that religion matters and religious engagement of certain types is quite beneficial as well as being useful (your article shows some of the potentials), there is also a danger of over-reaction and misinterpretation (vide the case you point to amongst many others).
MSG Proctor
01-15-2015, 04:27 AM
I was looking over this old (and very stimulating) discussion tonight and saw where I referred to an FOUO document that I had downgraded to unclassified back in 2009, but I don't think I ever linked to it.
Since this thread has gone dormant, I have deployed to Afghanistan in Regional Command South and took my thesis a step further by integrating with the CJ7 (Military Information Support Operations or MISO) with positive results in COIN Ops there.
The document referred to in earlier posts is A Short History of Religious Leader Engagements in Operation Iraqi Freedom (http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/JEDQ0409/index.php?startid=23#/22) published by the IO Journal. As of now I have uploaded an unclassified reports of activity in OEF which you can download here (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxP9eUAZ6ABTTURtaEw5UVVCQVE/view).
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