Ousted Air Force chief cites dissension in Pentagon

[Galrahn]

Not sure who has been watching, but In From the Cold (http://formerspook.blogspot.com/) has been putting together an investigative report on the nuclear weapon mishap at Minot last year. The blog has published two in the three part series. It is a very interesting read and the kind of investigative journalism more common in the new media than in the old.

I thought it was interesting that today the Air Force blocked the blog. There is a lot talk regarding "new media" of which blogging qualifies. I think it is noteworthy the day after blogs discuss the Air Force declaring war on the other services in the upcoming budget year, the Air Force decides to declare war on what is probably the most popular Air Force blog in the states. It is obviously not a big deal, but I do get the impression it is a sign of the mindset:

When you hate the message, attack the messengers.

I have to say I continue to be underwhelmed by the Air Force PR machine. They have some of the best commercial advertisements you can find for recruiting purposes, but the service seems to trip when dealing with domestic criticism and challenges.

[selil]

The story reads much like you would expect.

This is classic though, "When you have a difference of philosophy with your boss, he owns the philosophy and you own the difference," Michael Wynne said.

GovExec Story (http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0608/062008ap1.htm)

[Norfolk]

I have to admit to some sympathy for the former Air Force Secretary and the Chief of Staff on their point of not risking the U.S. Air Force's Command of the Air.

Now, I do not believe that Secretary Gates would take an unjustified risk of losing command of the air by holding F-22 procurement to the currently planned 187 aircraft, instead of the figure that the Air Force was seeking (and publicly and aggressively advocating for). It seems beyond doubt that Mr. Gates was correct in insisting upon the resignations of the Air Force's very top leadership, as the Air Force leadership seemed intolerably indifferent to present and foreseeable military and operational needs and requirements, but indeed it failed to address let alone rectify serious institutional problems as well as embarking upon a very consciously zero-sum effort to gain the resources it sought at the complete expense of the other Services.

But, in so far as Command of the Air may potentially be put at risk in the longer-term by limiting the procurement of the F-22 (and letting the line go cold), the Air Force leadership has a point that this is something that should not be put at even slight risk. Is there a peer competitor now or in the foreseeable future to oppose the Air Force (or Navy) in the Air? The short answer is No. The long answer may not be so comforting. Both Russia and China produce aircraft that are quite the equal or in some cases even the superior of the F-15/-16/-18s, and these aircraft as often as not have much newer airframes. And in the case of PLAAF pilots, 160-180 flying hours in elite fighter regiments and divisions are becoming the norm - approaching or roughly comparable to their U.S. counterparts. Additionally, more advanced aircraft continue in both development and production - and will exceed F-22 production by rather large margins.

However, the biggest threat to the F-22 may not be so much in the air as on the ground; not only the F-22's unique capabilities but the hand-picked men who fly them should allow the F-22 to dominate the air at least as well as the IDF's F-15s did over Lebanon in the 80's. The problem is, with a relatively modest, even small force of F-22s based at only a relative handful of locations, the F-22 force's vulnerability to missile attack or sabotage is heightened. That vulnerability increases from slight or modest to substantial if the F-22's have to redeploy to forward bases much closer to, or in even inside, an Area of Operations. Attrition is still la bete noir of Airpower, even if it were to take place on the ground instead of in the air. F-15Es (whose aircrew have to split their time between training for bomber and fighter tasks/missions) and F/A-18's (even the SuperHornet) are not necessarily so superior to Su-27/30/35 and J-10/11, etc. as to remove the possibility of an aerial war of attrition between them.

Furthermore, both the American Way of War, as well as the planning assumptions of both the U.S. and its Allies, tend to take US Air Superiorty for granted, and this has all sorts of consequences and implications all over the place. To paraphrase the old 19th Century ditty about the Maxim Gun, so much of Western military planning at least implicity assumes or relies upon more or less unchallenged American dominance of the sky that said planning assumptions could be characterized by saying, "Whatever happens, We have got, American Airpower, and They have not."

As such, it is unsettling that F-22 procurement and deployment will be so limited, especially considering both growing doubts over the actual capabilities of the F-35, when it is finally ready for production, and the gfact that the F-22 is barred by U.S. law from export (again, partly the fault of security lapses of some American Allies). Truth is, many (perhaps most) American Allies do not really believe in the F-35, but for them the alternatives are either the Super Hornet, the Typhoon, or the Rafale; put another way, the enthusiasm for the F-35 tends to be less than overwhelming. Especially as the costs may be getting quite out of control. American Allies may be able to stomach the expense and delay (partly their own fault) of the F-35 programme as long as it turns out something along the lines of the how the hi-lo mix of the F-15/F-16 twin track in terms of relative cost and capability; they may just plain drop the entire F-35 programme in dismay and frustration if it turns out to be another F-14/F/A-18, where the ultimate expense and capability of the latter largely negated the point of the two-track effort in the first place.

If conditions within the US Air Force in particular, and resource constraints within DoD in general, have forced the SECDEF to make a decision to place at even slight or modest risk beyond the foreseeable future the American Command of the Air, then conditions must be fairly serious indeed.

Edited to Add:

Sorry for the long post, but this is something that's been bugging me for a while now, and I hadn't really gotten the words to express my concerns. Not sure that I have even now. My apologies.

[slapout9]

Norfolk, don't worry to much Uncle Bob (SEDEF Robert Gates) was a Missile man when he was in the Air Force so he understands what is going on. Air power is guided missiles!!! launched from airframes (any will do) until we get something better. With that in mind it is a bad move to put alot of money in Super Dupper Airframes. Like I have said many times before all you need is a platform to launch a missile. Only the warhead needs to get to the target not the entire airframe:eek: Even if we had the money to spend it is a poor choice to risk airframe and pilot over hostile area or air space when all you need is a missile. Many in the Air Force understand this and if Uncle Bob hangs around long enough you may see some of them come to power and you will see a more powerful Air Force that is more useful and costs less. Aviation Week article from 2002 with quotes from Colonel Warden on how Air Force will become 90% Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles....http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw070854.xml

[Fuchs]

Air superiority won't nearly mean as much in the future as in the past.

You can destroy a bridge or an airfield up to 300 km deep with guided missiles.
You can interdict railway or road movements with killer drones a.k.a. loitering munitions.
You can do meaningful reconnaissance and ECM missions up to 50 km deep using cheap, quantity-produced drones.

Some air forces try to adapt to the TBM threat at least against the upper end, but Western armies seem to fail to prepare against heavy MRL and small drone threats (not the least because of small wars attract much of their energy, budget and imagination away from conventional wars).

An F-22 would probably be helpless like a raptor in a bee swarm.

The missile/drone technology will not address all requirements and it's not completely new, but it will be able to fulfill a wide range of air power roles even against enemy so-called air supremacy.

If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

[slapout9]

If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

Hi Fuchs, that is a very good point!!

[wm]

Air superiority won't nearly mean as much in the future as in the past.

You can destroy a bridge or an airfield up to 300 km deep with guided missiles.
You can interdict railway or road movements with killer drones a.k.a. loitering munitions.
You can do meaningful reconnaissance and ECM missions up to 50 km deep using cheap, quantity-produced drones.

Some air forces try to adapt to the TBM threat at least against the upper end, but Western armies seem to fail to prepare against heavy MRL and small drone threats (not the least because of small wars attract much of their energy, budget and imagination away from conventional wars).

An F-22 would probably be helpless like a raptor in a bee swarm.

The missile/drone technology will not address all requirements and it's not completely new, but it will be able to fulfill a wide range of air power roles even against enemy so-called air supremacy.

If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.

[Steve Blair]

It doesn't even have to be a missile threat....

People forget sometimes that the majority of aircraft lost over NVN were knocked down by anti-aircraft guns. SAMs drew a great deal of attention, but AA was impossible to jam and could be harder to knock out. And in CAS you can spend a fair amount of time down in the AA zone (unless you're using expensive standoff munitions...something that might not always be possible). While an A-10 can survive multiple hits, I don't think it's really clear that an inherently unstable fly by wire aircraft like the F-22 or F-35 could. And if not, will the AF (and other services) be willing to risk those high-dollar assets for a mission that they're not too crazy about to begin with?

Fuchs, the lack of attention by the AF to drones has more to do with the pilot culture than it does a focus on small wars. They don't like the idea that they could be replaced by some guy in a trailer with a joystick. It's been a fairly long haul for them to get where they are now, which is arguably below where they should or could be.

[Fuchs]

I know such statements about pilot-dominated culture, but somehow I doubt them.

Instead, I see rather a case of "last-war-itis". They never experienced cruise missiles and long-range artillery against themselves (after 1945). They seem to be moderately open to the abilities of drones as friendly tools, but seem to degrade possible opposing drones to PR jokes and stuff for civilian scaremongers (remember the "Saddam's MiG-23-turned-into-drones-with-WMD" story?

Imho drones and unmanned systems in general have their most obvious advantages in very small vehicles.
Fighter fleets like F-22's might dominate the sky, but does this matter whether 20 F-22 are on CAP with 80 AIM-120 when a wave of 100 TBMs, 500 loitering munitions and 200 short-range photo recce drones are launched by 200 enemy trucks and parked truck trailers?
An AIM-120 will probably cost more than most of its targets.

That's why I call for low ammunition cost air defenses.
That would in fact be rather an army than an air force job - but our armies focus (somewhat) on small wars today, where our enemies aren't even capable enough to fire with a D-30 against us.

These small wars a.k.a. adventures/expeditions can ruin our conventional war preparedness, and I believe we are in a similar situation as in early 20th century. We had no modern war for decades and don't know #### about how modern conventional war looks like. Our tactics, training & equipment lack the necessary experience base.

Those USAF guys were right to insist on modern conventional war capabilities - I only disagree because of their their last-war-itis.

[Ken White]

When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.think of A-10s and Apaches? Or M1A2s in movement to contact? Or a column of infantry moving to another position?

Low, lower and lowest tech -- and all subject to interdiction by SU-25s (~ 600 + serviceable worldwide) or other even simpler aircraft. To make sure they can mess with your day, there are about 400 SU-27 / SU-30 variants out there or on order.

Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot... :D

[wm]

think of A-10s and Apaches? Or M1A2s in movement to contact? Or a column of infantry moving to another position?

Low, lower and lowest tech -- and all subject to interdiction by SU-25s (~ 600 + serviceable worldwide) or other even simpler aircraft. To make sure they can mess with your day, there are about 400 SU-27 / SU-30 variants out there or on order.

Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot... :D
I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

As to M1A2s in a movement to contact, I can see Hannibal's elephants at Zama being easily avoided by Scipio's flexibile formation; or Rommel's ability to be quickly establish local superiority against the British during Operations Battle Axe and Crusader but his inability to win due to logistics shortages; or more recently, the Israeli armored counterattack against dug-in Egyptians with AT-3s in the Sinai on 8 October 1973. And, during the same 1973 period, Egyptians with SA-7s remind me of what could happen to our A-10s and Apaches. Consider 11th AHR during its 23 Mar 2003 raid on the Medina Division:

Neither of the regiment’s battalions had any appreciable effect on the Medina Division before they withdrew in the face of withering ground fire, and they both suffered significant damage. All 30 Apaches were hit, with one battalion’s helicopters “[o]n average . . . sporting 15-20 bullet holes each.” One Apache was lost in action and its crew captured.http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG405.1.pdf

The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.
In 1940, the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H39 were probably at least as good as the German Mk I and II's and the British A9 and A10 cruisers were probably better--but Gamelin, Weygand and Lord Gort were no match for Guderian, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, et. al., and the Germans always seemed to have the numbers at the right time and place.

[Ken White]

one trick ponies do not win in the long run. Thus the desirability of having a "detachment of mounted forces," "Scipio's flexible formations" or such like as well as avoiding the ill conceived and stupid attacks like that of the 11th AHR in 2003. As you aptly illustrate, one trick fighting is not ever a good plan.

That's probably why the AF needs F-22s for air superiority AND some strike ability, F-35s for strike missions AND the ability to swing to air to air, A-10s for tight, heavy combat CAS and C17s and C130s for hauling people and things and why the Army and the AF need C-27s for the same thing. Not to mention why the Army needs Apaches AND M1A2s AND Infantry. All to avoid the one-trick bit and all suitably and sensibly employed. I think, BTW, that the latter point may be the real rub as it was in your examples.

I'm always appreciative when someone with whom I'm discussing anything corroborates my points, particularly when they use well known to us all historical examples...

Thanks... ;)

[wm]

one trick ponies do not win in the long run. Thus the desirability of having a "detachment of mounted forces," "Scipio's flexible formations" or such like as well as avoiding the ill conceived and stupid attacks like that of the 11th AHR in 2003. As you aptly illustrate, one trick fighting is not ever a good plan.

That's probably why the AF needs F-22s for air superiority AND some strike ability, F-35s for strike missions AND the ability to swing to air to air, A-10s for tight, heavy combat CAS and C17s and C130s for hauling people and things and why the Army and the AF need C-27s for the same thing. Not to mention why the Army needs Apaches AND M1A2s AND Infantry. All to avoid the one-trick bit and all suitably and sensibly employed. I think, BTW, that the latter point may be the real rub as it was in your examples.

I'm always appreciative when someone with whom I'm discussing anything corroborates my points, particularly when they use well known to us all historical examples...

Thanks... ;)

I suspect we may have beaten this horse about as much as we have a right to. My parting point is that the closest thing to an Affirmed or a Seattle Slew that we can deploy is a force composed of competent troops with extremely capable leadership--and that comes from spending a lot more on effective training and development than we have for a lot of years. But I know I'm preaching to the choir with this point. Too bad that we find too many in positions of authority who have the characteristics of what one find's under a ponytail :D

[Ken White]

But then, I'm old... :D

We an agree on all that last post of thine...

[Norfolk]

slap wrote:


Norfolk, don't worry to much Uncle Bob (SEDEF Robert Gates) was a Missile man when he was in the Air Force so he understands what is going on.

Verily, Uncle Bob must be the most popp-yue-larr man on every ACC base these days.:eek:



Air power is guided missiles!!! launched from airframes (any will do) until we get something better. With that in mind it is a bad move to put alot of money in Super Dupper Airframes. Like I have said many times before all you need is a platform to launch a missile. Only the warhead needs to get to the target not the entire airframe

I am reliably informed that pilots exhibit a rather strong aversion towards that last bit...;)


If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

Indeed Sven; sadly though, you're not head of the USAF, and your Luftwaffe roots might just serve as the spark for a little nostalgia in certain quarters about the way it was back in the day when the USAAF actually had to face a more or less peer competitor. As you and Wayne point out, the Air Force has allowed tech to more or less eclipse leadership and tactics.


Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot...

Ken! Your Toad origins are showing here!:eek: (there's already far too many of them here as it is, and I just don't have enough mix for enough Molotovs to, uh, handle them all...:))

[Ken White]

...Ken! Your Toad origins are showing here!:eek: (there's already far too many of them here as it is, and I just don't have enough mix for enough Molotovs to, uh, handle them all...:))Actually, I came from the Newt side... :D

That, BTW, was not a brag -- it was a complaint. Us old guys do that a lot; complain, that is (see Paragraph 3-41.a (11) (c) of the Curmudgeon Position description).

Recall also that I tried to tell you; you cannot drink all the Vodka the Bronfmans produce to empty the bottles and have enough go-line to fill 'em all. Not at today's prices. Revert to your store of Gammon Grenades. ;)

[Norfolk]

Actually, I came from the Newt side... :D

That, BTW, was not a brag -- it was a complaint. Us old guys do that a lot; complain, that is (see Paragraph 3-41.a (11) (c) of the Curmudgeon Position description).

Recall also that I tried to tell you; you cannot drink all the Vodka the Bronfmans produce to empty the bottles and have enough go-line to fill 'em all. Not at today's prices. Revert to your store of Gammon Grenades. ;)

:eek:!!!

Sniff...Snuffle...[Norfolk procedes to drown his sorrows in bourbon - and saves the empty bottle for "future" use ].;)

[Ken White]

for Plan C...;)

[Eden]

I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

As to M1A2s in a movement to contact, I can see Hannibal's elephants at Zama being easily avoided by Scipio's flexibile formation; or Rommel's ability to be quickly establish local superiority against the British during Operations Battle Axe and Crusader but his inability to win due to logistics shortages; or more recently, the Israeli armored counterattack against dug-in Egyptians with AT-3s in the Sinai on 8 October 1973. And, during the same 1973 period, Egyptians with SA-7s remind me of what could happen to our A-10s and Apaches. Consider 11th AHR during its 23 Mar 2003 raid on the Medina Division:


The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.
In 1940, the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H39 were probably at least as good as the German Mk I and II's and the British A9 and A10 cruisers were probably better--but Gamelin, Weygand and Lord Gort were no match for Guderian, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, et. al., and the Germans always seemed to have the numbers at the right time and place.

It would be good to remind everybody, I think, that 5 of the 6 examples of tactical excellence listed above were displayed by the side that eventually lost the war. And even Hannibal's defeat at Zama came at the end of a long and desperate war that left him bereft of any meaningful tactical, operational, or strategic choices.

More important, the point is that combined arms wins battles. I don't believe in the ultimate demise of the manned air superiority fighter any more than I believe in the obsolescence of the tank, which has been on its death-bed since at least 1973. Cheap, man-packed AT missles were supposed to make it go the way of the buffalo, but it hasn't happened yet. Just as the Israelis learned (very quickly) in 1973, proper use of the supporting arms restored the utility of armor. I believe that similar intelligent development of technology and tactics will allow the fighter to retain a useful - if not dominant - place on the battlefield.

I'm no air historian, but haven't folks been predicitng the end of the fighter for four decades or so? Or has it been longer? I seem to remember the old mantra "the bomber will always get through". And didn't we have to re-install machine guns on fighters in the early days of Vietnam when we discovered that air-to-air missles hadn't actually ended the dogfight?

[wm]

It would be good to remind everybody, I think, that 5 of the 6 examples of tactical excellence listed above were displayed by the side that eventually lost the war. And even Hannibal's defeat at Zama came at the end of a long and desperate war that left him bereft of any meaningful tactical, operational, or strategic choices.

More important, the point is that combined arms wins battles. I don't believe in the ultimate demise of the manned air superiority fighter any more than I believe in the obsolescence of the tank, which has been on its death-bed since at least 1973. Cheap, man-packed AT missles were supposed to make it go the way of the buffalo, but it hasn't happened yet. Just as the Israelis learned (very quickly) in 1973, proper use of the supporting arms restored the utility of armor. I believe that similar intelligent development of technology and tactics will allow the fighter to retain a useful - if not dominant - place on the battlefield.

I'm no air historian, but haven't folks been predicitng the end of the fighter for four decades or so? Or has it been longer? I seem to remember the old mantra "the bomber will always get through". And didn't we have to re-install machine guns on fighters in the early days of Vietnam when we discovered that air-to-air missles hadn't actually ended the dogfight?

I would not disagree with anything said above. However, it is instructive to ask why the Carthaginians, English, Germans, and Egyptians ended up losing. Part of my point was that we are making a mistake to look for a silver bullet from technology. Another part was that having great machines is not much use without having well-trained people to use them and quality leaders to direct their use. And, finally, the logistics support for any military must be robust enough to meet the demands of combat in a timely manner. Without all of the above, one may view any armed force and ask Pinkley's great question from The Dirty Dozen: "Very pretty Colonel, but can they fight?"

[Ron Humphrey]

I would not disagree with anything said above. However, it is instructive to ask why the Carthaginians, English, Germans, and Egyptians ended up losing. Part of my point was that we are making a mistake to look for a silver bullet from technology. Another part was that having great machines is not much use without having well-trained people to use them and quality leaders to direct their use. And, finally, the logidstics support for any military must be robust enough to meet the demands of combat in a timely manner. Without all of the above, one may view any armed force and ask Pinkley's great question from The Dirty Dozen: "Very pretty Colonel, but can they fight?"

The more High tech you get the more the enemy will focus on how to unplug, unload, undo what youve done. Their not gonna try to compete, their focused on trying to win (no matter what). We do seem unbelievably able to forget all about that whenever we get on a WOW tech trip.

We all have those assigned to work on our vehicles, the better the tools we provide them with the more effective they can be. The problem is too often it seems that one side with less tools is at least using mechanics while the other side with all the newest gadgetry is asking its cooks to fix the truck.

(By the way not a slam on cooks just a somewhat screwy analogy. ;))

[Entropy]

Norfolk, don't worry to much Uncle Bob (SEDEF Robert Gates) was a Missile man when he was in the Air Force so he understands what is going on. Air power is guided missiles!!! launched from airframes (any will do) until we get something better. With that in mind it is a bad move to put alot of money in Super Dupper Airframes. Like I have said many times before all you need is a platform to launch a missile. Only the warhead needs to get to the target not the entire airframe:eek: Even if we had the money to spend it is a poor choice to risk airframe and pilot over hostile area or air space when all you need is a missile. Many in the Air Force understand this and if Uncle Bob hangs around long enough you may see some of them come to power and you will see a more powerful Air Force that is more useful and costs less. Aviation Week article from 2002 with quotes from Colonel Warden on how Air Force will become 90% Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles....http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw070854.xml

I have to disagree with almost everything in this comment. "Airpower" is certainly not guided missiles and no, not any airframe will do. Missiles cannot do everything. There are limitations imposed by the laws of physics (particularly for air-to-ground weapons) that limit the utility of missiles or necessitate the utilization of tactics to employ them properly - tactics which are highly dependent on the capabilities of the airframe. In the Air-to-Air arena, the F-15 and the F-22 can utilize the exact same missiles, yet the F-22 handily beats the F-15 every time despite the fact that all other factors (training, starting positions) are equal. One might suggest, therefore, that airframe capabilities matter.

As for UCAV's there are many technical hurdles still to go, particularly with the comm link which must be completely secure, redundant and immune to jamming and interference (aircraft falling out of the sky like predators sometimes do is a bad thing). UCAV's would depend on either satellite or LOS comm links which introduce vulnerabilities that manned aircraft do not have. These challenges and others which will go unmentioned probably will be solved at some point, but I don't think the 90% figure is coming anytime soon.

In my mind (and I would love CAVGUY's opinion on this), making tanks unmanned would be much easier than a fighter aircraft. Without the necessity to protect a four-person crew, an unmanned tank would be smaller , lighter (and hence more deployable), possibly cheaper and expendable. An unmanned fighter would put one less pilot at risk, but an unmanned tank would put four fewer soldiers at risk.

Fuchs,


If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

What is this mystery weapon that you speak of that is cheaper than a Manpad? MANPADS have limitations which is why they are cheap, but even here the AF takes the manpad threat very seriously and continuously upgrades its IR-missile countermeasures - much more than the other services, in fact, except for the special ops aircraft.

As for your other points, yes fixed targets are very easy to destroy - it's the mobile targets that have been vexing air-to-ground planners for two decades now and is a big reason persistent ISR platforms were originally created. Drones like predator work great in permissive environments, but they cannot operate without air supremacy (See here (http://video.aol.com/video-detail/dogfight-between-mq-1-predator-drone-and-mig-25-foxbat/2597553261)and here (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/04/video-russian-m.html)).

WM,

When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.

I'm not sure why you would think that, but then again I think the comparison is fundamentally flawed to begin with.


I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

Assuming the F-22 is a "one trick pony," which it is not, why is that inherently bad?


The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.

That is undoubtedly true in mostinstances to a point, but there comes a time when technology trumps training. Additionally, the argument against having better technology than our adversaries seems to carry the assumption that our side will always have superior training, tactics and leadership.

Steve,


People forget sometimes that the majority of aircraft lost over NVN were knocked down by anti-aircraft guns. SAMs drew a great deal of attention, but AA was impossible to jam and could be harder to knock out. And in CAS you can spend a fair amount of time down in the AA zone (unless you're using expensive standoff munitions...something that might not always be possible). While an A-10 can survive multiple hits, I don't think it's really clear that an inherently unstable fly by wire aircraft like the F-22 or F-35 could. And if not, will the AF (and other services) be willing to risk those high-dollar assets for a mission that they're not too crazy about to begin with?

Today's CAS ain't your daddy's CAS. I don't understand the myth that persists that CAS is something that inherently is best delivered at low altitude from a slow aircraft. One only needs to look at what's currently going on in theater to put that myth to rest. CAS is both more effective and more accurate when delivered from medium altitudes utilizing precision weapons and sensor technology. This is out of the envelope of most AAA and at the edge of the MANPAD threat which is not only safer, but also allows the pilot to to place more concentration on what's happening on the ground.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

What is this mystery weapon that you speak of that is cheaper than a Manpad? MANPADS have limitations which is why they are cheap, but even here the AF takes the manpad threat very seriously and continuously upgrades its IR-missile countermeasures - much more than the other services, in fact, except for the special ops aircraft.

Starstreak costs much less than a Stinger and has some secondary utility against LAFVs, for example. It's completely immune against known countermeasures (its operator could be deterred with counter fire, though).

But I thought more of autocannon-based systems like 35/1000 with ABM and RWR/IIR/UV/(LL)TV/LRF-based FC.
To date there's no system in use in the U.S.Army or U.S.A.F. that is useful against a 5 kg photo recon UAV at 500 m altitude. The marines at least have their 25mm gatling on some LAVs.

[wm]

When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.

I'm not sure why you would think that, but then again I think the comparison is fundamentally flawed to begin with.


I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

Assuming the F-22 is a "one trick pony," which it is not, why is that inherently bad?

If the 100 Years War analogy isn't appealing, perhaps a better comparison would be the hi-tech ME-262 flying against the mid- to low-tech B-17s of the 8th Air Force. The numbers just weren't quite there for the Luftwaffe to gain victory from its wonder weapon's advantages.

As to the one trick pony being bad, consider the owner of the carnival where you go see that one trick pony perform. If he doesn't have concession stands, rides, games, and other acts, he's not going to survive very long especially when the crowds leave right after seeing the pony's one trick. Of course, ticket prices could be set pretty high to make some money, but then the size of the crowds will be much lower because a lot of potential customers won't be able to afford the price of admission; this is a short term view that, on its own, has little or no long term sustainability.

By the way, has the AF resolved the F-22 comms issues yet?


Due to security considerations, the access to information provided by some of the most advanced sensors currently available in theater is highly restricted. For example, intelligence and situational picture generated by F-22 Raptors cannot be transferred to F-15s, F-16 or AWACS even if both units are participating in the same operation. As stealth aircraft, F-22s are not equipped with conventional datalinks such as Link-16 which can be easily spotted by enemy SIGINT. Instead, they use a unique stealth-qualified, narrow-beam Intra-Flight Data-Link (IFDL) designed to relay data and synchronize a situational picture only among the Raptors. As this stealth datalink is incompatible with all other communications devices, Raptors cannot communicate with any friendly aircraft.

[slapout9]

Entropy wrote:
I have to disagree with almost everything in this comment. "Airpower" is certainly not guided missiles and no, not any airframe will do. Missiles cannot do everything. There are limitations imposed by the laws of physics (particularly for air-to-ground weapons) that limit the utility of missiles or necessitate the utilization of tactics to employ them properly - tactics which are highly dependent on the capabilities of the airframe. In the Air-to-Air arena, the F-15 and the F-22 can utilize the exact same missiles, yet the F-22 handily beats the F-15 every time despite the fact that all other factors (training, starting positions) are equal. One might suggest, therefore, that airframe capabilities matter.

As for UCAV's there are many technical hurdles still to go, particularly with the comm link which must be completely secure, redundant and immune to jamming and interference (aircraft falling out of the sky like predators sometimes do is a bad thing). UCAV's would depend on either satellite or LOS comm links which introduce vulnerabilities that manned aircraft do not have. These challenges and others which will go unmentioned probably will be solved at some point, but I don't think the 90% figure is coming anytime soon.

In my mind (and I would love CAVGUY's opinion on this), making tanks unmanned would be much easier than a fighter aircraft. Without the necessity to protect a four-person crew, an unmanned tank would be smaller , lighter (and hence more deployable), possibly cheaper and expendable. An unmanned fighter would put one less pilot at risk, but an unmanned tank would put four fewer soldiers at risk.


OK to disagree, I am at my day job now so I will respond in full later.

[Fuchs]

(aircraft falling out of the sky like predators sometimes do is a bad thing)

That's a feature.
UAVs don't have a pilot's life at risk, so they can be built cheaper and lighter, with less redundancy of safety-critical components.
An UAV with a perfect safety record would be a poor design.

[Steve Blair]

Today's CAS ain't your daddy's CAS. I don't understand the myth that persists that CAS is something that inherently is best delivered at low altitude from a slow aircraft. One only needs to look at what's currently going on in theater to put that myth to rest. CAS is both more effective and more accurate when delivered from medium altitudes utilizing precision weapons and sensor technology. This is out of the envelope of most AAA and at the edge of the MANPAD threat which is not only safer, but also allows the pilot to to place more concentration on what's happening on the ground.

I understand that....but I also understand that things don't always go as planned. We've run short of munitions before. And there will always be times when a lower approach may be mandated for one reason or another. But...<shrug>

[slapout9]

That's a feature.
UAVs don't have a pilot's life at risk, so they can be built cheaper and lighter, with less redundancy of safety-critical components.
An UAV with a perfect safety record would be a poor design.


Exactly! it is the ultimate guided missile. A kamakzie (can not spell:) plane without the pilot! it can attack any target air ,land or sea. Should be our answer to the suicide bomber.

[Ken White]

By the way, has the AF resolved the F-22 comms issues yet?A sensible one at that; Link 16 is too easily intercepted and that's been known for a while. The F-35 (US Version only) will close that loop...

[Entropy]

Starstreak costs much less than a Stinger and has some secondary utility against LAFVs, for example. It's completely immune against known countermeasures (its operator could be deterred with counter fire, though).

Well, starstreak is command guided which does make it immune to most countermeasures, but this has been the case with command-guided systems for decades. Command guidance has its own set of limitations, however.


That's a feature.
UAVs don't have a pilot's life at risk, so they can be built cheaper and lighter, with less redundancy of safety-critical components.
An UAV with a perfect safety record would be a poor design.

It's not a feature when a potential enemy can exploit vulnerabilities to make all your aircraft fall out of the sky. That was the point I was trying to make. The potential to jam or hack the signal, or destroy the centralized relays (be they satellite or land-based) could eliminate your entire unmanned fleet from the battle. Even temporary disruptions at critical periods could prove disastrous. Those issues are not insignificant and so I don't think we'll be seeing unmanned aircraft in the most important mission areas until they are addressed.

WM,


As to the one trick pony being bad, consider the owner of the carnival where you go see that one trick pony perform. If he doesn't have concession stands, rides, games, and other acts, he's not going to survive very long especially when the crowds leave right after seeing the pony's one trick.

Sure, but no military system operates in a vacuum. There are always "concession stands, rides" etc. that provide mutual support. And often, the creative use of new tactics create new "tricks" for that pony that weren't previously considered.

The datalink issue is vexing and more complex than first appears and is really the result of the generational differences in aircraft capability. This article has a good rundown (http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2007/December/12132007/12132007-18.htm) on many of the technical issues and I would further note that many of these issues apply in equal measure to transitioning to a large unmanned aircraft fleet (think satellite bandwidth). Also, the article you cite fails to mention that Raptors can receive both link 11 and link 16 - they just cannot transmit - so it's not like the aircraft are completely isolated or dependent on radio calls. Although I don't follow FCS closely, I would not be surprised that it will have similar issues integrating with legacy systems.

[Fuchs]

Well, starstreak is command guided which does make it immune to most countermeasures, but this has been the case with command-guided systems for decades. Command guidance has its own set of limitations, however.

It's not a feature when a potential enemy can exploit vulnerabilities to make all your aircraft fall out of the sky. That was the point I was trying to make. The potential to jam or hack the signal, or destroy the centralized relays (be they satellite or land-based) could eliminate your entire unmanned fleet from the battle.

Starstreak is NOT command controlled. It is a laser beam rider.
LBR SAM technology has rarely been applied, only the British and Canadians use such missiles in significant quantities.

The passive laser sensors face backwards, so there is physically not soft defense possible unless you can blind the operator in the few seconds of flight.

The time of flight would typically be about five to seven seconds with no UV or IR exhaust trail after one or two seconds, so there's hardly any hard kill chance as well (especially as a single Starstreak launches three darts).



UAVs are not RC model planes. UAVs can easily return to base and make an automated landing if designed to do so. That ability was possible since the 50's at the latest, probably even in the 40's.
A well-designed UAV might crash because of component failures (that's when the possible lower redundancy that I mentioned kicks in), but because of a simple loss of radio contact (unless it was designed really stupid or is a very lightweight design of few pounds).

[slapout9]

Hi Entropy, to continue Colonel Warden wanted to change how Air Force Wings were organized he thought they should be composite wings. More like Army combined arms forces. There would not be any F-16 Wings or F-22 wings there would be combined Aircraft Wings with all differant kinds of aircraft assigned to them in order to acomplish their mission. This would allow newer aircraft to be bought in fewer numbers but would still allow the overall capability of the Wing to still accomplish their mission. To see how this works and how the Army is exploiting it go to John Robb's website and read about ODIN. It is a composite Air wing combined with ground forces and they are giving the bad guys a rough time. John Robb believes this is the future of the Air Force and he may be right about this. Missiles can sustain a lot more G-forces than pilots can so they may not be able to do everything...but then again maybe they can.
Here is the link.
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/

[Entropy]

Starstreak's guidance system is technically a semi-automatic command line of sight (SACLOS) system. The operator has to illuminated the target with the laser, which the individual munitions home in on. This is fundamentally different, and far superior, to beam-rider guidance. Although there is not counter to this weapon currently (beyond tactics like terrain masking, obscurants, ect.), the fact that it relies on a homing sensor and logic means that a countermeasure for it can probably be developed. Regardless, this system is manufactured by a friendly state and is not in the hands of potential enemies, so, for now at least, the point it moot.

As for UAV's, I think I've lost your point somewhere along the way.

[Entropy]

Slapout,

Thanks for your response. The problem with combined wings is maintenance, aircraft support and unit-level training, so it's not realistic to have these wings collocated on a conus base. Even the Navy, which has been doing expeditionary ops for far longer than both the AF and Army, consolidates airframes at one or two bases for maintenance and other reasons while deploying "combined" airwings on carriers. The AF is similar in that individual airframes are organized into expeditionary wings when deployment comes around, but, unlike the Navy, there isn't as much combined coordination and training like a Navy airwing would receive. This allows the Af to be more flexible as far as deployments go, but at the cost of combined training and interoperability. This isn't a huge sacrifice today because the air ops in theater are not all that complex.

Still, I would like to see the AF adopt the Navy model with administrative wings based on airframe while at the same time belonging to, on a semi-permanent basis, "operational" or "expeditionary" wings which would train and deploy together.

[Fuchs]

Starstreak's guidance system is technically a semi-automatic command line of sight (SACLOS) system. The operator has to illuminated the target with the laser, which the individual munitions home in on. This is fundamentally different, and far superior, to beam-rider guidance. Although there is not counter to this weapon currently (beyond tactics like terrain masking, obscurants, ect.), the fact that it relies on a homing sensor and logic means that a countermeasure for it can probably be developed. Regardless, this system is manufactured by a friendly state and is not in the hands of potential enemies, so, for now at least, the point it moot.

As for UAV's, I think I've lost your point somewhere along the way.

Starstreak is not semi-active laser-guided.
It IS a laser beam rider.


Each dart is guided independently using a double laser beam riding system.
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/starstreak/


High precision laser beam riding guidance which
is immune to all known countermeasures
Thales' Starstreak HVM product brochure

Even SACLOS does NOT illuminate the target. Only SAL and SAR guidance does so.

Repeat: Starstreak = LASER BEAM RIDER
And it's cheaper than Stinger, btw.

[Ken White]

Whatever semi active means...

Starstreak is not semi-active laser-guided.
It IS a laser beam rider.True and the operator has to keep that laser beam on the target, thus the Semi-Automatic Command to Line Of Sight (SACLOS) guidance system that Starstreak uses.
Repeat: Starstreak = LASER BEAM RIDERTrue, you just left out out the SACLOS.
And it's cheaper than Stinger, btw.Does that measure the effectiveness? :D

[Entropy]

...I think Fuch's is correct on this starstreak tangent. Course corrections are not calculated in the launcher and sent to the warheads, so it cannot be a command system. From Jane's:


At a safe distance from the gunner, the main second-stage rocket motor cuts in to accelerate the missile to an end-of-boost velocity which is in the region of M3 to M4. As the motor burns out, the attenuation in thrust triggers the automatic payload separation of the three darts which, upon clearing the missile body, are independently guided in a fixed formation by their individual onboard guidance systems using the launcher's laser guidance beam.

The darts ride the laser beam projected by the aiming unit which incorporates two laser diodes, one of which is scanned horizontally and the other vertically to produce the required 2-D information field. Each dart then uses its onboard guidance package to control a set of steerable fins so as to hold its flight formation within this information field. Separation of the darts also initiates arming of the warheads.

All the operator has to do after the launch is to continue to track the target and maintain the sight aiming mark on it. Maximum effective range is around 7 km which is the maximum distance at which the darts can retain sufficient manoeuvrability and energy to catch and penetrate a modern 9 g manoeuvring target.

I'm quite amazed, actually, at the amount of misleading and outright wrong information on this system on the internet (wrong information on the internet! Shocking, I know! :D ).

[Ken White]

target; gunner or system derived it's still command directed and line of sight.

Semantics, admittedly -- really immaterial, too as he acknowledged that the Gunner being blinded would negate the missile as would any significant distraction that caused the Gunner to lose the lock. One wonders at a UAV with a dazzle laser to blind gunners... :D

On another irrelevant topic, the US Army does have weapons -- a lot of them -- that are extremely effective against any size air vehicle (other than perhaps an A-10 or SU 25 but to include a 5kg UAV) at 500m. They're all over the place, too...

[Entropy]

On another irrelevant topic, the US Army does have weapons -- a lot of them -- that are extremely effective against any size air vehicle (other than perhaps an A-10 or SU 25 but to include a 5kg UAV) at 500m. They're all over the place, too...

A ubiquitous Army weapon that can engage at 500m? Whatever could that be! :D

[Fuchs]

"Engage" is not enough.
A small UAV at 500 m altitude moves at the speed of a car and most of it can be penetrated by a bullet without achieving a kill.
Furthermore, it won't be heard even at night, and even at daylight it would be extremely difficult to spot without dedicated anti-air sensors.
Manually controlled machine guns are no solution.
If you disagree; simply double the altitude. That's little challenge for UAV design, but disqualifies machine guns without doubt.

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

Again, I think I've lost the point of your argument on UAV's. Yes, our enemies are sure to have them and will use them to the best of their ability, but it seems as if you're arguing that the US has no capability to counter the threat they pose. If that's the case, then I heartily disagree.

[Ken White]

"Engage" is not enough.
A small UAV at 500 m altitude moves at the speed of a car and most of it can be penetrated by a bullet without achieving a kill.
Furthermore, it won't be heard even at night, and even at daylight it would be extremely difficult to spot without dedicated anti-air sensors.
Manually controlled machine guns are no solution.
If you disagree; simply double the altitude. That's little challenge for UAV design, but disqualifies machine guns without doubt.of two aircraft with only .30 caliber weapons and having seen what one of these http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/csi/samk93.jpg

will do at 1,000m, I think you're way wrong. However, I'm easy; you don't like that, there's this:http://www.army-technology.com/projects/avenger/images/avenger1.jpg with it's slewing and tracking system for the .50.

[Cavguy]

of two aircraft with only .30 caliber weapons and having seen what one of these http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/csi/samk93.jpg

will do at 1,000m, I think you're way wrong. However, I'm easy; you don't like that, there's this:http://www.army-technology.com/projects/avenger/images/avenger1.jpg with it's slewing and tracking system for the .50.

Without operational details, most UAV's above 3000'. UAV's at 3000' are audible but not visible to the naked eye, making manual AA hard.

I don't know enough about whether it produces enough heat for a MANPADs to shoot down.

Obviously, a radar gun system or laser/radar SAM could shoot one down, although they are quite small (<2-3m)

Agree with Entropy, countermeasures from enemy UAV are readily available.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

Again, I think I've lost the point of your argument on UAV's. Yes, our enemies are sure to have them and will use them to the best of their ability, but it seems as if you're arguing that the US has no capability to counter the threat they pose. If that's the case, then I heartily disagree.

It's important to keep in mind their low price. A competent administration could oder quantity produced tactical UAVs at prices of below 1,000 USD.
Hundreds could be launched to prepare for a specific fight and even if only half a dozen came back, it could still provide excellent recon results on a brigade area.
The cost would be comparable to a single monkey model MBT.

[Ken White]

Without operational details, most UAV's above 3000'. UAV's at 3000' are audible but not visible to the naked eye, making manual AA hard.True but most .50s have optics nowadays. A sheet of fire directed aloft in the general direction has brought down many an aircraft and I know of one small UAV downed with 5.56 fire 'accidentally.' (Jill's recurring Ca/REMF battle, in this case between an MI UAV and the parent Brigades LRS Company :D). I'll also reveal my age by saying that I along with many others was trained to produce (and practiced) Anti-Aircraft fire by a rifle company just firing every weapon rapidly in the general direction and have seen target sleeves with a lot of punctures. We quit that due to the air superiority we have enjoyed since 1951.
I don't know enough about whether it produces enough heat for a MANPADs to shoot down.It doesn't but that doesn't affect the M3M .50 cal on every Avenger, a system with great optics and an excellent tracker.