Robert Kaplan - What Rumsfeld Got Right

[jonSlack]

From the July/August issue of The Atlantic: Robert Kaplan - What Rumsfeld Got Right (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/rumsfeld)

A description of Donald Rumsfeld's latest tenure as SecDef and a discussion of what he did right and wrong from the author's perspective.

[Fuchs]

“Rumsfeld got war and transformation only half-right,” says Richard H. Shultz Jr., the director of international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy near Boston. “He was right that the lethality and speed of a military advance could be transformational, but he didn’t realize that the enemy might have an answer to that in the form of a war after the war.”

American experts confuse me again and again.
How can this person be cited (obviously implying that he's an expert on the matter) if he is so clueless?

Manstein advanced 300 km in the first three days of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, with tanks that did at most 40 km/hour and Soviet opposition that was decidedly more serious than the Iraqi appeared to be. The terrain was much more complex and much more often a closed one. The availability of air support was much smaller, as his corps was only one of dozens.
Other examples of advances like 80-110 km/day existed throughout 1940-1942.

So if the advance speed of the U.S./coalition forces in 2003 was decidedly inferior to a 1941 advance speed - wouldn't his comment imply that the transformation would be a "Back to the past" move at best?

No, this Mr. Shultz is just clueless.
He's talking about the obvious without sufficient background to value the achievements correctly. Don't ask lawyers about anything else than law...

[Tom Odom]

American experts confuse me again and again.
How can this person be cited (obviously implying that he's an expert on the matter) if he is so clueless?

Manstein advanced 300 km in the first three days of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, with tanks that did at most 40 km/hour and Soviet opposition that was decidedly more serious than the Iraqi appeared to be. The terrain was much more complex and much more often a closed one. The availability of air support was much smaller, as his corps was only one of dozens.
Other examples of advances like 80-110 km/day existed throughout 1940-1942.

So if the advance speed of the U.S./coalition forces in 2003 was decidedly inferior to a 1941 advance speed - wouldn't his comment imply that the transformation would be a "Back to the past" move at best?

No, this Mr. Shultz is just clueless.
He's talking about the obvious without sufficient background to value the achievements correctly. Don't ask lawyers about anything else than law...

Fuchs

If you expect "experts" to know history, especially military history, then you are going to be sorely disappointed. Look at how all the experts (their self-annointed title, not mine) did in offering what have become classics in the realm of off-target predictions in 2002 and 2003.

It was transformational to Mr. Schultz because he wanted it to be...

Tom

[Fuchs]

In Germany we have three types of military affairs experts who are being interviewed:

1)
Active officers, colonel and higher = buzzword fountains, news content probably one line per interview (if three column layout), no commenting, spineless loyalists

2)
Retired generals = statements and comments on operations and strategy, possibly also about conscription or major procurement projects

3)
Peace researchers and international law experts, almost always critical of political decisions (operations)


We don't have lawyers making statements about military art/technology revolutions (I don't doubt that they could be qualified, but that would be an extreme exception).

[Old Eagle]

Unnecessarily calling Dick Schulz "clueless" is an ad hominem attack, not a reasoned analysis. Prof. Schulz is a respected member of the security academia. Just because you don't have non-military security experts doesn't mean that other countries can't.

I would also point out that the faculty at Fletcher are by and large not lawyers. Schulz certainly is not. Furthermore, as a proud graduate of Fletcher, I consider myself neither a lawyer nor a diplomat. :D

It also appears to me that you glommed on to a part of his quote without considering it in its entirety.

[Schmedlap]

This quote, in particular, stuck out:


... just because Donald Rumsfeld believed something, didn’t mean it was wrong.

That conveys a pretty good point about the attitude toward Rumsfeld while he was in office. The media did such a horrible job of questioning the run-up to the war in Iraq. Instead, they were focused on simply observing it and being the first to announce the latest hurdle being cleared in the race to war. There was little to no critical reporting. Did anyone regard Colin Powell's testimony at the UN to be convincing? Once things did not go as swimmingly in Iraq as the initial invasion of Afghanistan, then the media jumped on the public opinion pendulum and rode it all the way to the opposite extreme. Rather than passively reporting, they became overly criticial without reason. Nothing that Rumsfeld did could be right.

This quote also stuck out.


Rumsfeld reduced the more than $3 trillion of improperly recorded, unaudited Pentagon transactions to hundreds of billions. He created a defense business board, and reformed the national-security personnel system to take into account considerations of merit.

If true, that is pretty remarkable. The DoD bureaucracy is a force to be reckoned with. He might have slayed a few dozen dragons.

[Tom Odom]

Rumsfeld reduced the more than $3 trillion of improperly recorded, unaudited Pentagon transactions to hundreds of billions. He created a defense business board, and reformed the national-security personnel system to take into account considerations of merit.

Given the track record of Pentagon transactions in the past 6 years that is certainly debatable, especially when considering contracts for support in Iraq and eslewhere.

As for NSPS (the reformed system), that is not a done deal either. The AF has gone to it in total. The Army is partially through it; as one looking at it for my future--and working with folks already under it--such laudatory comments are superficial and premature at best, rather like his "transformational efforts.".

Tom

[Ranger94]

The U.S. military, mainly Army Special Forces, trained the Filipinos, helped gather intelligence, and conducted humanitarian relief, even as the Filipinos did the actual fighting. By using the indirect approach, the operation raised the stature of the U.S. military in the Filipino media for the first time since the 1992 closure of American bases there, opening the door to a new bilateral defense relationship.


Rumsfeld did achieve a measure of redemption in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The concept of the “long war” elaborated in the QDR was less a sign of Rumsfeld’s warmongering than of his belated realization that the indirect approach exemplified by the strategy in the Philippines pointed a way forward.

Doesn't the Constitution of the Philippines limit the direct action abilities of foreign armies on their land? If so, why does Rumsfeld get credit for the "indirect approach"? In any case, FID missions reflect the forward thinking of JFK, right?

[Stevely]

As for NSPS (the reformed system), that is not a done deal either. The AF has gone to it in total. The Army is partially through it; as one looking at it for my future--and working with folks already under it--such laudatory comments are superficial and premature at best, rather like his "transformational efforts.".

Tom

Unfortunately we went into it whole hog at JFCOM. I would call it a reformed system, if by "reformed" one means "worse." At least the way it has been implemented here, there is no real change over the old system, except that you must generate much more paperwork than before. There's a big Kabuki theater made of generating detailed performance plans, measureable and "SMART-aligned" objectives with metrics, and close counseling with your raters through the rating cycle. Then, your highly measurable performance can be compared and properly weighted against your peers in the command, and finally you can reap the big financial rewards due a hard worker (or nothing but punishment if you are a slug) that you couldn't get under the old system. That was how it was sold to us - the new system would reward the good and punish the bad, and if you are good and ambitious, you can gain much greater rewards than under the old GS system.

Unfortunately, you spend loads of time writing and re-writing and re-writing some more your SMART objectives, all of which get ignored as you see yourself getting exactly the same rating as all the other 400 or so civilians in the command, and everyone getting the same payout at the pay pool.

A lot of money and effort spent, a lot of buzzwords and hazy ideas thrown around (many from the business world), frenetic activity and confusion sown in the ranks, all for a questionable and likely non-existent real result at the end. It has Donald Rumsfeld's fingerprints all over it.

Edit: All things considered, I like my job and am certainly thankful to have it - just consider NSPS to be a colossal waste of time and money. The GS system was fine. Just had to get this in here... don't want to leave the impression that next I will complain about sharing rental cars on TDY ;)

[wm]

. . . "'nother stupid personnel system"


Unfortunately we went into it whole hog at JFCOM. I would call it a reformed system, if by "reformed" one means "worse." At least the way it has been implemented here, there is no real change over the old system, except that you must generate much more paperwork than before. There's a big Kabuki theater made of generating detailed performance plans, measureable and "SMART-aligned" objectives with metrics, and close counseling with your raters through the rating cycle. Then, your highly measurable performance can be compared and properly weighted against your peers in the command, and finally you can reap the big financial rewards due a hard worker (or nothing but punishment if you are a slug) that you couldn't get under the old system. That was how it was sold to us - the new system would reward the good and punish the bad, and if you are good and ambitious, you can gain much greater rewards than under the old GS system.

unfortunately, you spend loads of time writing and re-writing and re-writing some more your SMART objectives, all of which get ignored as you see yourself getting exactly the same rating as all the other 400 or so civilians in the command, and everyone getting the same payout at the pay pool.

A lot of money and effort spent, a lot of buzzwords and hazy ideas thrown around (many from the business world), frenetic activity and confusion sown in the ranks, all for a questionable and likely non-existent real result at the end. It has Donald Rumsfeld's fingerprints all over it.

You must not be in a NAGE bargaining unit. Aren't the union employees still exempt from NSPS reorg? :confused:
Things are much easier now trying to figure out where you stand in the grade hierarchy and you don't have to wait for years to get a step increase. Seems like a great boon to mankind, especially when you consider how many other hours of possibly productive time were lost attending mandatory training to learn how to write performance objectives and figure out how to apportion "bonus" money across a pay pool. (At my location, they detailed a GS-15 [or is that a YC-3?] for over 2 years just to make sure all the training got done--contractors conducted the training; he just monitored the attendance reports--good thing he didn't have real job to do before that.):rolleyes:
Last time I checked on this program, it is still just as hard to get rid of a substandard performer as it always was. :eek:
Sure is great to be a contractor instead of a civil servant. :p

[Ken White]

...it is still just as hard to get rid of a substandard performer as it always was. :eek:It's almost impossible. Had an employee miss 76 days work out of 180 with no excuses; only took three letters and 18 months to get the firing completed. Then she appealed it. That took another year. We finally won but I'm not sure it was worth the hassle.

Sigh. Congress is so-o-o- helpful... :mad:

[max161]

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Quote:
The U.S. military, mainly Army Special Forces, trained the Filipinos, helped gather intelligence, and conducted humanitarian relief, even as the Filipinos did the actual fighting. By using the indirect approach, the operation raised the stature of the U.S. military in the Filipino media for the first time since the 1992 closure of American bases there, opening the door to a new bilateral defense relationship.

Quote:
Rumsfeld did achieve a measure of redemption in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The concept of the “long war” elaborated in the QDR was less a sign of Rumsfeld’s warmongering than of his belated realization that the indirect approach exemplified by the strategy in the Philippines pointed a way forward.

Doesn't the Constitution of the Philippines limit the direct action abilities of foreign armies on their land? If so, why does Rumsfeld get credit for the "indirect approach"? In any case, FID missions reflect the forward thinking of JFK, right?Doesn't the Constitution of the Philippines limit the direct action abilities of foreign armies on their land? If so, why does Rumsfeld get credit for the "indirect approach"? In any case, FID missions reflect the forward thinking of JFK, right?

Ranger 94:

Ironically, Rumsfeld was adamently opposed to our support to the Philippines in 2001-2002. President Bush had to overrule him because of the promise he made to GMA in November 2001. And to answer your second question the Philippine Constitution does not prevent US combat operations (that is somethign oppositopn groups and the press like to spout - a thorough reading of the constitution actually reads much differently, in fact, combat operations are permitted if there is a treaty and a mutual threat - Note that the Philippines is the US longest standing treaty ally). There are two reasons why US forces do not conduct direct combat operations. First as you correctly point out doctrinally this is a direct FID operation and second it would undermine Philippine military and government legitimacy if US forces conducted direct or unilateral combat operations. While it would feel good to many people if US forces conducted their own combat operations the 2d and 3d order effects would be cost prohibitive from an IO perspective. The Southern Philippines is a classic (and very complex) COIN environment and US forces are supporting an ally in its fight against insurgency and the terrorism caused by those insurgents. Again, it would be counterproductive for US forces to conduct direct combat operations which is why we are limited to advising and assisting (in a myriad of ways but behind the scenes).

Dave

[Ranger94]

max161,

Thanks for the clarification. I supported one Balikatan in '91 with 1st/1st and was unsure of what was said at the time regarding DA missions or if my memory had been replaced with news reports. Another detail that is in the article says that bases were closed in '92. I was in Angeles City the Friday after the flag was lowered at Clark in late '91. (Subic stayed open though)

I guess the point that I am working towards is that as history takes over judgment of Rumsfeld and others involved with the current situation, small details will matter when attempting to change peoples perception of them. I could be wrong though.

thanks again

[max161]

max161,

Thanks for the clarification. I supported one Balikatan in '91 with 1st/1st

You are welcome. I was with 1/1 in 2000-2002 when we went to Basilan the first time.

Dave