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Fuchs
06-25-2008, 09:53 PM
I'm curious about who is being considered being one of let's say 20 top infantry tactics experts/theoreticians in the open domain (=some chance to find articles or books to read his/her ideas).
I am specifically interested in the kinetic aspects when I wrote infantry, else I'd have written "PsyOps" or "MP expert".

Any suggestions?

jcustis
06-26-2008, 12:00 AM
That's an excellent question. I think that much of the theory generation has succumbed to the need to develop COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be employed by infantry.

Some of the other longer trigger puller threads we have here about organization and platoon weapons will show that much of the discussion goes back to things of old.

Perhaps there can be no more new theory :D. Well...in the Marine Corps we've got something about distributed operations, but that cannot be bumper stickered to just the infantry...I think. And I don't think that the concept is especially ingenious. Lately, it has become a boilerplate for technical solutions and justifications for particular gear sets (or at least that is my impression).

patmc
06-26-2008, 02:00 AM
There are many better qualified than I, but I've found a lot of interesting and refreshing stuff in books by H. John Poole. He stresses small unit tactics, and throws in relevant political-historical backgrounds for AO's and threats. Currently reading "Dragon Days," which argues China is causing many of the insurgencies around the world to increase its access to resources and distract other nations (ie: US). "Terrorist Trail" discusses foreign fighters from Middle East and Africa. "Militant Tricks" discusses insurgent tactics. "Phantom Soldier" discusses Eastern style warfare. "Last 100 Yards," "The Tiger Way," and "Last Bridge to Cross" argue for better western infantry and small unit tactics.

Don't know if he would make a top 20, but he does create a lot of relevant and readible products.

jcustis
06-26-2008, 02:50 AM
I've never quite understood the Poole style of researching. That's at least what I took away from the first two books I tried to stomach. I've seen a lot of information compiled there, but not (at least by my perception) much in the way of actual original writing and thought.

Take the Rhodesian tactic of the "drake shoot". It's been posted about here, and would make for good tactical commonsense, but if I slapped it in with about 300 other solid principles, it wouldn't make me a theorist.

I'm not trying to be too much of a naysayer, as I have to admit that I haven't read all of the books. I've heard Poole speak though, and he tends to give me some weird case of the creeps like Grossman does.

Fuchs
06-26-2008, 10:09 AM
Well, to me there's likely no comprehensive theory of war today anymore. It's grown too large for our brains.
I consider the art of warfare instead as a huge mosaic picture; great theoreticians can add some mosaic stones and arrange many in a better grouping to improve the overall perception. A good book is one that adds a couple of mosaic stones to my perception of the art of warfare.
I'm really looking for advances and I don't see many in the open domain.

Poole is obsessed with "Eastern" style and seems to stretch anecdotes and military history to prove his point. His latest obsession seems to be with ninjutsu. He was still useful to tell about infantry combat concepts that don't depend on much material, though. He didn't seem to add much, instead he just illuminated some almost ignored parts of the art. I wouldn't call him "leading", but I would agree that he has succeeded in publishing and attracting attention.


I think that much of the theory generation has succumbed to the need to develop COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be employed by infantry.

That's most likely true for the U.S. and to a limited degree also for UK, Canada and Australia. But we should have lots of theoreticians outside of the English-speaking world. Like France, Russia, India, China, Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, Spain, probably also Brasilia, Ukraine & Poland.
Germany has abandoned the open domain discussion of tactics after 1939, and what I can still see today are very tech-intensive attempts to partially approach the U.S. model. Our infantry is busy with peacekeeping anyway.

Steve Blair
06-26-2008, 12:56 PM
I've never quite understood the Poole style of researching. That's at least what I took away from the first two books I tried to stomach. I've seen a lot of information compiled there, but not (at least by my perception) much in the way of actual original writing and thought.

Take the Rhodesian tactic of the "drake shoot". It's been posted about here, and would make for good tactical commonsense, but if I slapped it in with about 300 other solid principles, it wouldn't make me a theorist.

I'm not trying to be too much of a naysayer, as I have to admit that I haven't read all of the books. I've heard Poole speak though, and he tends to give me some weird case of the creeps like Grossman does.

Poole has always struck me as a major "cutter and paster." He hauls things out of other sources, doesn't always leave them in context, and seems quite smitten with the idea that everyone (especially, as Fuchs points out, 'Eastern' armies) do everything better than we do. I wouldn't consider him a theorist in any major sense. A compiler, certainly, but not a theorist.

Tom Odom
06-26-2008, 02:28 PM
Poole has always struck me as a major "cutter and paster." He hauls things out of other sources, doesn't always leave them in context, and seems quite smitten with the idea that everyone (especially, as Fuchs points out, 'Eastern' armies) do everything better than we do. I wouldn't consider him a theorist in any major sense. A compiler, certainly, but not a theorist.

Agreed. and he takes a single idea and streches it well beyond its elastic capacity. If you recall, I reviewed his book Tactics of the Crecent Moon (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=126&highlight=Poole)with:


Folks,

I said I would order this book, read it, and offer some thoughts so here goes:

Is it worth reading?

absolutely in that it offers an interesting perspective on counter-insurgency set in the context of today's operations.

Weaknesses:
a. Style of writing. The book suffers much from poor editing. it reads in may cases like a power point slide show run rampant. While it is a legitimate technique to repeat key ideas, Poole at times takes repetition to extreme. That also comes across in poor organization; chapters, sections, and paragraphs do not flow. Given the repetition of ideas, I felt like a hamster on a mental ferris wheel going round and round with no progress.

b. Exaggeration of certain key ideas. On this I would point to the role of Hizballah and its sponsor, Iran, especially the Iranian Sepah. Poole states that Hizballah is the main threat to the West and goes to great length to support that contention. Unfortunately his sourcing is poor and not--at least to me and I served in Lebanon and lost friends to Hizballah--convincing. I agree the Hizballah model and method are dangerous and difficult to counter; I don't see them as a universal model. A related issue is his insistence that Asian military culture permeated into the Middle East over the ages. Again it is an interesting idea but one hindered by poor sourcing and superficial analysis.

Strengths:

a. Poole focuses on the root elements of any counter-insurgency, the insurgents and the security forces who fight them. What I really liked about the book was his call for a more capable, more highly trained infantry with offensive infantry maneuver capabilities versus fires dominated thinking.

b. Related to a. is Poole's other key point, that tactical victories based on such a firepower dominated military modely are NOT victories for the forces engaged in COIN. His key point--at least to me--was that civilian collateral casualties in COIN must be given equal or even more weight that friendly casualties. Now this is not something new; the same point has been debated many times. But it is still a point worth considering.

c. Finally I liked the linkages Poole makes between culture and military operations. Some as I have already said were overstated to me. Still he does apply a logic that makes sense in understanding how a diffent culture with a different model for success can develop tactics to achieve that success--and how another culture may foolishly discount that success.

Using an Amazon rating of 1-5 stars, I would give it a 3.

Tom

Fuchs
06-26-2008, 02:34 PM
Come on. We should be able to come up with some names here, not just Poole.

I just looked up the article titles of Infantry Journal 2003-2008 and found only two real infantry combat theory, non-COIN specialized article (Owen's).

I know some books on infantry tactics, but few seem to propose non-technical innovations.

OK, let's assume we don't come up with names. How about hotspots?
Who knows infantry theory publishing or conferencing hotspots?
The infantry-related "conferences" that I know about are rather trade shows.
( http://www.fbcinc.com/infantry/exhibitors.aspx )

Tom Odom
06-26-2008, 02:38 PM
Come on. We should be able to come up with some names here, not just Poole.

I just looked up the article titles of Infantry Journal 2003-2008 and found only two real infantry combat theory, non-COIN specialized article (Owen's).

I know some books on infantry tactics, but few seem to propose non-technical innovations.

OK, let's assume we don't come up with names. How about hotspots?
Who knows infantry theory publishing or conferencing hotspots?
The infantry-related "conferences" that I know about are rather trade shows.
( http://www.fbcinc.com/infantry/exhibitors.aspx )

Certainly

I work at one and publish the results for the Army but the products are FOUO.

Tom

Randy Brown
06-26-2008, 04:47 PM
I am specifically interested in the kinetic aspects when I wrote infantry, else I'd have written "PsyOps" or "MP expert".

I understand your intent, and am just as interested in any ideas/answers generated here. For the good of the cause, I'm going to wonder out loud : Would the civilian tactical law enforcement community might have some thinkers/writers you might find applicable, at least as pertaining to squad-level TTP?

Admittedly, however, this approach might lead to something of an echo chamber, given the revolving door between the military and para-military. Or, it might expose a reality in which "kinetic" philosophy flows only one-way, from "green" to "blue."

Just trying to brainstorm different ways to approach the intellectual problem at hand. Gonna go call some cop buddies now ...

Randy Brown
06-26-2008, 09:05 PM
Charles “Sid” Heal is well-known and respected, says one of my Thin Blue buddies. Heal is with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office. Regarding the question of relevance of his work to your post, a point of entry might be his Sound Doctrine: A Tactical Primer (http://www.amazon.com/Sound-Doctrine-Tactical-Charles-Heal/dp/1930051115/ref=pd_sim_b_38).

On its face, Paul R. Howe’s Leadership and Training for the Fight (http://www.amazon.com/LEADERSHIP-TRAINING-FIGHT-THOUGHTS-OPERATIONS/dp/1420889508/ref=pd_sim_b_1) looks like more of a military/business-leadership-self-help book, but there’s apparently at least one chapter that might get at your topic. Howe was with Delta Force in Somalia, according to my buddy. On-line bios support but do not confirm.

Much of Howe’s thinking may relate more to training on tactics--rather than philosophizing on tactics--although I’d be hard-pressed to distinguish one from the other in works such as CQB: Direct Threat or Points of Domination? (http://www.combatshootingandtactics.com/published/CQB%20July%2006%20Final.pdf) Other writings and writer-contact info contained in the linked PDF.

There is, admittedly, a lot of rip-and-read stuff from Army field manuals that ends up being re-packaged and sold to tactical law enforcement personnel. I'd continue to be interested in finding out, however, whether any of the philosophical and/or TTP stuff flows the other direction ...

jcustis
06-26-2008, 09:26 PM
Kilcullen has written some interesting pieces. Call it theory or TTP-centric, I don't know, but it is good stuff and it isn't all COIN. I made a big-to-do about his support vs. assault ratio somewhere here a few months ago.

Our resident savant Jedburg may know the thread off the top of his head.

Bill Moore
06-26-2008, 10:49 PM
I remember a few good books during my younger years, but most were were short historical "my story" type books, but they still captured the tactics used. When you get down to the muddy boot, fixed bayonet level, how to level there are very classic books out there. I agree that Poole's books are a too mystic and are largely cut and paste.

However, some of the Field Manuals are excellent such as FM 7-8, as was the older version of the Ranger handbook (the new one is basically FM 7-8) and the 50's vintage individual rifleman FMs were also outstanding. Not what you were looking for, but still worth a read.

Again not books, but there are a few outstanding papers/handouts out there on small unit tactics, such as the project B50 tips from Vietnam (informal, but well done), with great tips on rigging individual equipment to small unit tactics behind enemy lines. South Africans published quite a few books on small unit tactics, as did the Israelis.

Of course, best of all was the valued instruction I received from my Vietnam Vet Team Sergeants and platoon Sgts. Not only were they legends, they were great instructors who taught by example and constantly mentored us when we were in the field. Unfortunately, they were not too much into writing how-to classics.

Fuchs, great question. I'll see what I can find stowed away in the boxes in the garage. This one shouldn't be hard to answer but it is. Did anyone read "Steel my Soldier's Heart" by Hackworth? Did it fall into this category?

VMI_Marine
06-27-2008, 12:46 AM
I'm not trying to be too much of a naysayer, as I have to admit that I haven't read all of the books. I've heard Poole speak though, and he tends to give me some weird case of the creeps like Grossman does.

At least I'm not the only one, then. My battalion CO invited Poole to speak to the officers and SNCOs before our OEF deployment in 2003. My platoon sergeant was excited, being a big fan of Poole's Last Hundred Yards. We all walked out a bit wide eyed after that one. My SSgt looked rather deflated.

I asked him, after his presentation about the Eastern way of fighting, why the Fedayeen had fared so poorly against our Soldiers and Marines in the invasion of Iraq, since he thought the "Eastern" way was superior. I can't remember his reply, but I do remember that it was dripping with condescension since I was a "mere lieutenant". I walked away completely offended, and have not been able to stomach anything by him since. I'm well aware of the prevailing opinion of lieutenants with regard to matters of tactics and strategy, but at this point I was a 1stLt with a combat deployment under my belt, and his refusal to seriously consider my question and make an honest attempt to discuss my point forever damaged his credibility in my eyes.

Ken White
06-27-2008, 01:02 AM
four or five years ago; that entailed talking to him on the phone for about 30 minutes. Interesting listening... :rolleyes:

Got the book, read it, passed it on to the Son and suggested he take it with a dumptruck load of salt. Haven't wasted any more money on 'em.

Norfolk
06-27-2008, 01:18 AM
Fuchs, Kilcullen's main piece in this regard was "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/aaj_june_2003.pdf)" (Australian Army Journal). It more or less mirrored at Company-Level what General DePuy wrote about at Platoon-Level in "One Up and Two Back? (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/swain3/swain3_pt4.pdf)"(scroll down to Pages 295-302 of "Selected Papers of General Wiliam E. DePuy (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#select)", and yes, I'm plugging for my boy here). Both approaches are focused upon the primacy of suppression in the Attack, of course, and our own Tom Odom as you know (along with his two co-authors) based some of his publicly accessible work upon Gen. DePuy's: see "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/odom.pdf)", in Military Review from a few years back. McBreen especially emphasized suppression in his articles for Marine Corps Gazette. Obviously it takes some digging to get a hold of his best two, but they don't say too much different than others who base their work upon DePuy's. Besides them, there's Wilf of course, and Wigram (http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/Wignam.txt), whom some of Wilf's work derived from. And a number of us who admire the RLI (http://www.therli.com/)'s Fire Force (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp) (not to mention Drake Shooting (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rhodesian-cover-or-drake-shooting.pdf)); See jcustis' "Interview With an RLI Vet", too, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=10587&postcount=11) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=10588&postcount=12). The RLI's Platoon and Brick organization and tactics, along with Wilf's work, provide some insight into what Infantry tactics of the future may look like.

Edited to Add:

Get a hold of the original 1981 edition of On Infantry by John English (the 1984 edition with Bruce Gudmundsson as co-author is also good), and Virgil Ney's work is generally considered as good or better than even English's (but it's harder to get a hold of).

slapout9
06-27-2008, 02:20 AM
The Killing Zone : A Professional's Guide To Preparing or Preventing Ambushes by Gary Stubblefield and Mark Monday. The best book I ever read on the subject and it applies to both Infantry and a lot is useful for Law Enforcement. Some of what is in the book I can vouch for from personal experience.

Also Bill Moore talked about lessons from Vietnam Vets I was exposed to a lot of that myself and it was a shame that the Army never did something to debrief and record those lessons.

Ken White
06-27-2008, 02:29 AM
...Also Bill Moore talked about lessons from Vietnam Vets I was exposed to a lot of that myself and it was a shame that the Army never did something to debrief and record those lessons.Get Tom to dig into the CALL archives -- not the current stuff, the old stuff; there should be tons there. Lord knows it was all over Bragg in the late 60s; li'l white books, li'l green books from the brand new C.A.L.L. and blue ones from Benning, too...

We did it then -- but I suspect most of it got tossed in the 70s and 80s so we could relearn lessons the hard way; to do less would be un-American. :mad:

Jedburgh
06-27-2008, 12:07 PM
The Virtual Vietnam Archive (http://www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/virtual/vva/servlet.starweb?path=virtual/vva/virtual.web) at Texas Tech is a tremendous resource. But it is not as user-friendly as it could be, so you have to really dig if you're looking for something specific. On the other hand, I usually manage to pull up some very interesting items when I'm really searching for something else.

Fuchs
06-27-2008, 12:22 PM
The language barrier must be terribly powerful.

Every time I ask in English-language forums for expert names, I get minimum 90% US/UK/CAN/Israel replies as if there was no innovation in other languages.

Come on, we're in an alliance. There should be lots of innovators in other countries as well. Doesn't NATO have some institution to distribute new ideas?

Tom Odom
06-27-2008, 12:46 PM
Get Tom to dig into the CALL archives -- not the current stuff, the old stuff; there should be tons there. Lord knows it was all over Bragg in the late 60s; li'l white books, li'l green books from the brand new C.A.L.L. and blue ones from Benning, too...

We did it then -- but I suspect most of it got tossed in the 70s and 80s so we could relearn lessons the hard way; to do less would be un-American. :mad:

Not just CALL; yes we have some but remember CALL stood up in 1985. The Military History Institute has a good bit and some of what the Center for Military History offers gets down in the weeds. But the reality is that prior to 1985, efforts to retain and archive records amd lessons were uneven, depending on unit leaders and interest in what they were doing.

And you must always consider who did the archiving and what they were seeking to do. As an example, according to official records for Op Support Hope, Stan and I were not at Goma in 1994. Some in JTF-A did not like admitting they needed our help. Big surprise....:wry:

Bottom line, Ken, I fear you are correct on lessons being tossed.

Best

Tom

Randy Brown
06-27-2008, 01:55 PM
The language barrier must be terribly powerful.

Every time I ask in English-language forums for expert names, I get minimum 90% US/UK/CAN/Israel replies as if there was no innovation in other languages.

Come on, we're in an alliance. There should be lots of innovators in other countries as well. Doesn't NATO have some institution to distribute new ideas?

Merci! Great question and point! We Yanks remain quite indebted, of course, to the work and writings (http://www.amazon.com/Baron-Steubens-Revolutionary-Drill-Manual/dp/1602061068) of Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin von Steuben (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Wilhelm_von_Steuben). It can't have been all downhill from there, could it?

I notice the thread is trending toward identifying sources for "lessons" vs. your original question of who might be out there capturing/generating infantry theory. While I'm sure these are interlocking fields of fire, I got the feeling you were originally looking for sources who might one day gun for the title of "21st century infantry intellectual grand-daddy," someone along the lines of Heinz Guderian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian) ("Achtung-Panzer!") for armor, or Billy Mitchell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell) ("Winged Defense") for air power. Am I wrong?

marct
06-27-2008, 03:23 PM
The language barrier must be terribly powerful.

Every time I ask in English-language forums for expert names, I get minimum 90% US/UK/CAN/Israel replies as if there was no innovation in other languages.

LOLOL - well, it IS a major barrier since very few native English speakers speak (or read) other languages. I'm certain that he innovations are there, but they aren't accessible to most English-only speakers. BTW, the problem isn't limited to the military by any means - it's pandemic across all disciplines.

Marc

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 10:34 AM
Maybe I should refresh my French and look there as well.

But even more interesting might be the Russians. A feeling of defeat and very low budget should sponsor creativity amongst their officers since the early 90's.
I bet they had a new Tuchashevsky in these years and I don't know about him...

Norfolk
06-28-2008, 01:57 PM
Maybe I should refresh my French and look there as well.

But even more interesting might be the Russians. A feeling of defeat and very low budget should sponsor creativity amongst their officers since the early 90's.
I bet they had a new Tuchashevsky in these years and I don't know about him...

Fuchs, you can pretty much forget about any Russian material - it's practically a given that so much as an aide memoire would be considered a state secret; similarly, no Russian officer or soldier would be permitted to publish even their own work on the matter. If you haven't seen this (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/docrepository/FM100_2_3.pdf) already, the Soviets were very close to the Bundeswehr's organization for infantry (though I expect that you are more than well aware of this).

I'll e-mail you re the French stuff.

Bill Moore
06-28-2008, 03:07 PM
Infantry Attacks by Erwin Rommel

On Infantry by John English

Bear Went over the Mountain

Numerous Chechnya combat articles by Russian officers with excellent insights on boots on the ground tactics.

Norfolk
06-28-2008, 03:18 PM
Infantry Attacks by Erwin Rommel

On Infantry by John English

Bear Went over the Mountain

Numerous Chechnya combat articles by Russian officers with excellent insights on boots on the ground tactics.

My mistake.:o Forgot about those; FMSO (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm) (especially) has many of them.

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 03:27 PM
Fuchs, you can pretty much forget about any Russian material - it's practically a given that so much as an aide memoire would be considered a state secret; similarly, no Russian officer or soldier would be permitted to publish even their own work on the matter.

Not quite
http://www.amazon.com/If-War-Comes-Tomorrow-Contours/dp/0714643688/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214666644&sr=8-1
It's somewhere in the internet in e-book form, but I lost the link.

@Bill:

"Infanterie greift an!" is about World War One, not modern.

"On infantry" has almost no innovative content, it's a kind of military history overview on infantry since the Boer wars.

Lester W. Grau's works on WW2 till late 20th are valuable, but not much about infantry iirc.

slapout9
06-28-2008, 03:31 PM
Hi Fuchs, what are your ideas and recommendations of books and infantry thinkers from other counties?

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 04:21 PM
Hi Fuchs, what are your ideas and recommendations of books and infantry thinkers from other counties?

That's the problem. I believe I missed too much.
It's in the nature of the problem that many great thinkers keep their ideas reserved for their own army and secret.
Most innovations are certainly incremental changes made by many different persons that add up to big changes.
Other ideas are easily found in many thousands of master's thesis done at military-related colleges.
The only convenient sources are the public domain books (and FMs), with everything compressed into just a couple volumes.

I remember MG Franz Uhle-Wettler as an infantry innovator, but he was active 20+ years ago and his works were about how to slow down or stop the Red army with decentralized territorial infantry battalions that fight guerrilla-like without fronts (not much unlike the Jagdkampf concept).

Few innovators seem to really become famous.

edit:
Wilf once sent me a paper of "Yedidia Groll-Yaari, Vice Admiral (Ret.) and Haim Assa". They were certainly not advocating traditional infantry, but instead they were too much on the extreme of DO/RMA. Their focus was on employing sensors and killing.
I wouldn't rate their paper as a good contribution to military art.
("Diffused Warfare - The Concept of Virtual Mass", 2007)

I personally consider the Finnish infantry as excellent since at least the 30's. I wonder whether they had major innovations on their own since WW2.

Rifleman
06-29-2008, 05:42 AM
As far as influencing TTPs for small wars, COIN, LIC, etc. goes.....

Major E. James Land: I believe the standard of sniper training today in both the USMC and the Army is due to Maj. Land's efforts to establish a permanent Scout/Sniper instructor school at Quantico after Vietnam.

Colonel James N. Rowe: What Maj. Land did for sniping Col. Rowe did for SERE.

David Scott-Donelan: The importance of combat tracking (and likely some other lessons from the Rhodesian bush wars) is starting to make it's way into certain segments of the US Military through the efforts of David Scott-Donelan.

And least we forget.....The US Army's Ranger Department and 75th Ranger Regiment has raised the standard of light infantry throughout the US Army.

Arguments? Rebuttals?

William F. Owen
06-29-2008, 07:58 PM
. Besides them, there's Wilf of course, and Wigram (http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/Wignam.txt), whom some of Wilf's work derived from.


I can't even hide in Wigrams shadow. It is a great shame that so little of his work survives in it's original form. A true, troubled and also flawed genius. The BAR published my article on him and Tim Harrison Places book on WW2 Infantry training in the UK is good, as is "To Reason Why" by Foreman.

Liddell-Hart did some good infantry work, (The 1919 Infantry manual) as did Ivor Maxse. I think you could also look Carlson as a good thinker and practioner.

I know H. John Poole and we used to talk a lot, but some of his stuff is just too off base. "The Last Hundered Yards" is however, excellent.

On the down side, I think SLA Marshall did more harm than good, and I don't have much time for Rommel's Infantry Attacks. I think it's over rated.

...but by and large, infantry doctrine is massively neglected, compared to other areas. Strange, because you can have an army without tanks or arty, but not without infantry.

Fuchs
06-29-2008, 09:15 PM
"Infanterie greift an" by Rommel was more about extremely disciplined and high morale troops being led by an extremely lucky junior officer who was a master at exploiting weak spots of the enemy and to demoralize the enemy with surprise and superior positioning.

It was nice (I still don't believe that he really moved several companies at night through a gap only 50 m wide), but no theoretical masterpiece.
It certainly offered the promise of successful offense under certain circumstances to depressed infantry officers in the inter-war years.

William F. Owen
06-30-2008, 04:32 AM
"Infanterie greift an" by Rommel was more about extremely disciplined and high morale troops being led by an extremely lucky junior officer who was a master at exploiting weak spots of the enemy and to demoralize the enemy with surprise and superior positioning.

It was nice (I still don't believe that he really moved several companies at night through a gap only 50 m wide), but no theoretical masterpiece.
It certainly offered the promise of successful offense under certain circumstances to depressed infantry officers in the inter-war years.

Exactly! I cannot understand why people think the book important. "Storm of Steel," by Ernst Junger is actually a better book, and has more useful things to say.

"Infanterie greift an" should have been called "Aren't I clever! Make me a General." :D

- acid test. Having read the book, how would you change, training, doctrine, or equipment?

Randy Brown
07-02-2008, 01:18 PM
I'm curious about who is being considered being one of let's say 20 top infantry tactics experts/theoreticians in the open domain (=some chance to find articles or books to read his/her ideas).
I am specifically interested in the kinetic aspects when I wrote infantry, else I'd have written "PsyOps" or "MP expert".

Any suggestions?

My earlier musings as to whether the civilian tactical law enforcement community might have anything to offer in this area--despite your stipulations against "MP experts"--was based on two assumptions/suspicions. The first was that tactical LE TTP might have some (limited) application for infantry-work within a population, particularly if that population was limited in scale, such as a building, a complex, a block, etc. ... Can't say that line of inquiry or thought worked out, but it was an idea.

The second was that there might be some gendarme/peacekeeper theorists out there, which would blend infantry and police (small "p") thought and practice. An SWJ article on "expeditionary law enforcement" (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/expeditionary-law-enforcement/) this morning captures the spirit of latter possible research direction, in my opinion. I offer it here for your consideration.

William F. Owen
07-02-2008, 01:45 PM
My earlier musings as to whether the civilian tactical law enforcement community might have anything to offer in this area--despite your stipulations against "MP experts"--was based on two assumptions/suspicions. The first was that tactical LE TTP might have some (limited) application for infantry-work within a population, particularly if that population was limited in scale, such as a building, a complex, a block, etc. ... Can't say that line of inquiry or thought worked out, but it was an idea.

The second was that there might be some gendarme/peacekeeper theorists out there, which would blend infantry and police (small "p") thought and practice. An SWJ article on "expeditionary law enforcement" (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/expeditionary-law-enforcement/) this morning captures the spirit of latter possible research direction, in my opinion. I offer it here for your consideration.

I think you are broadly correct and I share your interest in that thought. The challenge is the blend, AND the distinction. There's a time for the LE type TTP and a time to be more aggressive/kinetic approach. You must be able to do both.

I have spent a great deal of time studying a lot of US LE-SWAT minor tactics, most of which make no sense and promote process over effect. All seem to focus on dancing around in rooms in very complicated ways, so there is still some considerable human, rather then technical or even tactical challenges in this area.

Ron Humphrey
07-02-2008, 01:48 PM
I have spent a great deal of time studying a lot of US LE-SWAT minor tactics, most of which make no sense and promote process over effect. All seem to focus on dancing around in rooms in very complicated ways, so there is still some considerable human, rather then technical or even tactical challenges in this area.

Welcome to Form over function in it's many splendored glory:wry:

PhilR
07-03-2008, 06:03 AM
I'm not sure if it isn't too limiting to be discussing only infantry. The modern battlefield, and the advances made, are about combined arms, or at least combined arms principles. I would recommend Robert Leonhard's Art of Maneuver and offer his discussion of combined arms theory (complementary principle, dilemma principle and Alcyoneus principle) as a good theoretical lens for discussing tactics (the attached link provides a decent summary: http://www.operations.dns2go.com/ops8/Theory%20of%20War%20Maneuver%20Warfare%20and%20the %20Wargamer%20Part%203%20Combined%20Arms.htm).
It seems to me that the history of infantry tactics through the 20th century has been to give smaller and smaller infantry units an organic combined arms capability (LMGs, suitcase ATGMs, marrying up with APCs, etc.). The new paradigm, call it distributed or whatever, is to increase those small units combined arms capabilities through greater reachback via networking to firepower and support (UAVs, JTAC training, blue force tracker, etc.). Additionally, the recent emphasis on COIN and Stabilization is about bringing more civil-military skills and tools down to the lower levels. The "strategic corporal" concept merits recognition here, along with Special Forces Unconventional Warfare theory. I would also add VADM McRaven's Spec Ops book as good theory for special operations as they apply to raids and direct action.

William F. Owen
07-03-2008, 06:42 AM
I'm not sure if it isn't too limiting to be discussing only infantry. The modern battlefield, and the advances made, are about combined arms, or at least combined arms principles. I would recommend Robert Leonhard's Art of Maneuver and offer his discussion of combined arms theory (complementary principle, dilemma principle and Alcyoneus principle) as a good theoretical lens for discussing tactics (the attached link provides a decent summary: http://www.operations.dns2go.com/ops8/Theory%20of%20War%20Maneuver%20Warfare%20and%20the %20Wargamer%20Part%203%20Combined%20Arms.htm).

I would offer that Combined Arms is only relevant in that it is about supporting the infantry. Infantry remains a critical and mostly under studied area of tactical thought. Correctly trained and equipped infantry is the basis for the vast majority of land combat power. My personal opinion is that Manoeuvre Warfare provides nothing useful to infantry theory and science. I would recommend Robert Leonhards "Principles of War for the Information Age" in that regard.

Fuchs
07-03-2008, 02:05 PM
Quick-firing guns with contact-fuzed shells and machine guns enforced a tactical revolution in infantry tactics early in the 2th century.

Now we know about comparable changes; extremely scary sensor capabilities approaching to "Star Trek" levels, enormous wireless communication capabilities, artillery shells that can hit a single field observation post from 40 km afar with a single round and small arms so powerful that being seen for a couple of seconds almost equals being dead against a competent foe.

The tactics generation born in WW1 and updated for APCs, IFVs, anti-tank infantry weapons and assault rifles CANNOT be up to date under these circumstances.

There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.

Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.
Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months.
He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.

So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.

I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.

The camouflage efforts that I see in Western armies are like placeholders, signals that camouflage was not forgotten entirely. Electronic combat is in my opinion vastly under-rated, battlefield sensors are not available in the necessary quantities, software-defined radio development is too slow, TO&E are still pretty close to the 50's, hard-kill defenses for heavy combat teams are not widespread yet, experiments in the field are rather rare.

Our armies should be busy with experiments and professional ideas exchanges even beyond the language barriers.
We should have tenders for idea development just like we have tenders for hardware development.

Randy Brown
07-03-2008, 04:26 PM
There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.

Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.

Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months. He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.

So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.

I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.

I don't disagree with your observations and arguments, but I think there are a couple logic-tripwires somewhere down this trail:

If your premise is that we're in danger of "fighting the last war," what with all of the current focus on Counterinsurgency and Small Wars and the like, and are in danger of intellectually disarming ourselves for any potential High-Intensity Conflict, roger and amen. (Although, as a user, it seems to run philosophically askance of the SWJ website mission (http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/about/). Perhaps it's more of a question for a notional Big Wars Journal?)

To say that Low-Intensity Conflict lessons are 180° wrong, "simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent," seems to invite the same criticism, however. The operational military-political realities faced since the 1960s and for the conceivable future (25 years?), dictate that most theory and practice be focused on LIC, not HIC. To this amateur historian, lessons from the likes of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq prove that: You can pick your friends, and you can usually pick your fights, but you can't pick your enemies--or how they fight.

That may mean that the infantry now works in a theoretically/tactically topsy-turvy world, but it doesn't mean it's wrong. Consider the following anecdote shared by Schmedlap (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=1605) in a current SWJ thread on defining Information Operations (IO).


Someone gave an example H&I fires and asked, "is this PSYOP?" I don't know if it is PSYOP, but purely kinetic operations can and do have effects that many normally assume to be IO. My favorite example occurred in OIF III when residents actually complained that we were too soft and weak because we took well-aimed shots, rather than firing indiscriminately at insurgents. They were truly angry with us, claiming that the insurgents were humiliating us and showing their strength. The support for their argument was that Kent the insurgent was slinging an entire magazine at us, while Stan the rifleman was only firing back with 3 well-aimed shots. We explained that we were trying to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but this did not resonate with the city-folk.

Soon thereafter, we adopted a slightly different approach: we returned fire with 40mm, AT-4's, and 25mm, as appropriate. Hellfire strikes became more common, as did the occasional visit from an M-1. The effect was that we killed/captured no more insurgents than we were killing/capturing before, but the PERCEPTION was that we were routing them. Suddenly the city-folk were expressing satisfaction with our work. One man said, "thank you for fighting back." We weren't before? Thereafter, IEDs and direct fire attacks began to plummet and we got significantly more intelligence and cooperation from locals. No IO annex required.

Bottom-line: We've gotta keep our collective heads in the current fight, stay intellectually flexible, always do the right thing (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097216/quotes), generate theory from practice*, vaccinate ourselves against next-war-itis (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/secretary-gates-on-nextwaritis/), all while keeping the proverbial Big HIC Stick in our back pockets.

* Yes, got my own intellectual tripwire there. File under "schoolhouse vs. lessons-learned world-views"; cross-reference under "religious conflicts."

Rifleman
07-04-2008, 04:28 AM
I would offer that Combined Arms is only relevant in that it is about supporting the infantry. Infantry remains a critical and mostly under studied area of tactical thought.

Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?

Fuchs
07-04-2008, 09:33 AM
Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?

The Boers were really well-studied before 1914, in fact even more so than the Russo-Japanese war 04/05. Their tactics preceded modern (classical) guerilla tactics and light infantry tactics (they ceased to wage conventional war after a while).

William F. Owen
07-04-2008, 03:54 PM
Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?


Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .

slapout9
07-04-2008, 04:04 PM
Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .


Wilf, Rifleman,Anybody, I am not an expert but were they not more like Dragoons (Mounted Rifleman) than anything else??

Fuchs
07-04-2008, 04:12 PM
Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .

Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah?

Surferbeetle
07-04-2008, 08:09 PM
Fuchs,

My library is light on tactics and heavy on macro issues. I am not aware of a single 'go-to-guy' for the answer that you are looking for.

"Infanterie Greift An" by Rommel was a fun one. Unlike many here I enjoyed Poole's Tactics of the Crescent Moon. Rommel's Greatest Victory by Mitcham (ISBN 9-780891-417309) was bone dry. Makers of Modern Strategy by Paret (ISBN 0-691-02764-1) is a good reference that I return to often. I have not yet finished Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (ISBN 0-521-79431-5) but portions of it are useful. The Savage Wars of Peace by Boot (ISBN 780465-0077219) is informative. I am a huge fan of most anything by Robert D. Kaplan; Imperial Grunts (ISBN 1-4000-6132-6), Balkan Ghosts (ISBN 0-679-74981-0), Soldiers of God (ISBN 1-4000-3025-0), & The Coming Anarchy (ISBN 0-375-70759-X). Merchant of Death by Farah & Braun (978-0-470-26196-5), and Licensed to Kill (ISBN 1-4000-9781-9) are light reading. Battle Ready by Zinni/Koltz (ISBN 0-399-15176-1), Imperial Hubris by Scheurer (1-57488-862-5), and Fiasco by Ricks (ISBN 1-59420-103-X) are worth the read.

The hard lessons I learned from a ranger captain who taught me as a young cadet, long distance running, using MILES gear, reading ARTEP 7-17-10 Drill (Battle Drills for Light Infantry, Infantry, Airborne, & Air Assault Platoon & Squad), negotiation skills, a certain amount of judicious ruthlessness, and a fair amount of luck kept me & my guys alive in Iraq.

Bottom line, I am not sure that a book can capture what you are looking for. IMHO it has to be more of an apprenticeship and a trial by fire experience.

Regards,

Steve

Rifleman
07-04-2008, 08:57 PM
Wilf, Rifleman,Anybody, I am not an expert but were they not more like Dragoons (Mounted Rifleman) than anything else??

slapout9,

I think that's correct. They were mostly horse mobile but didn't usually fight from horseback like cavalry. That's my understanding, but I've not read extensively on them.

Jedburgh
07-05-2008, 12:10 AM
Wilf, Rifleman,Anybody, I am not an expert but were they not more like Dragoons (Mounted Rifleman) than anything else??
slapout9,

I think that's correct. They were mostly horse mobile but didn't usually fight from horseback like cavalry. That's my understanding, but I've not read extensively on them.
Thomas Pakenham's The Boer War (http://www.amazon.com/Boer-War-Thomas-Pakenham/dp/0380720019) is excellent - highly recommended.

However, Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War, by Deneys Reitz, was also a very good read - although more of a personal memoir than a history or study. (I've got an old 1930 paperback edition sitting on my shelf, but it was republished (http://www.amazon.com/Commando-Boer-Journal-War/dp/1417925841/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1215216315&sr=1-2) just a couple of years ago)

William F. Owen
07-05-2008, 05:24 PM
Wilf, Rifleman,Anybody, I am not an expert but were they not more like Dragoons (Mounted Rifleman) than anything else??

Well, mounting infantry on horses doesn't not make them infantry. By 1900, the line between infantry and Cavalry had become very blurred. As Rifleman points out Cavalry fight from horse back, and this is an excellent distinction.

There is also the distinction of role, which is critical and overlooked. For which I suggest you read Ardant Du-Picq, for a one of the best explanations. (sorry don't know where to link - but google away and you'll come up with his posthumous work "Battle Studies.")

William F. Owen
07-05-2008, 05:27 PM
Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah?

I submit they are not even close. Today we'd be looking at someone like Blackwater, able to operate at a formation level. As concerns equipment and training the Boers were almost on a par (and even better than) with the British.

Fuchs
07-05-2008, 05:44 PM
I submit they are not even close. Today we'd be looking at someone like Blackwater, able to operate at a formation level. As concerns equipment and training the Boers were almost on a par (and even better than) with the British.

Hezbollah fought Israel during the 2006 Lebanon war in a comparable style as the PLA did against the UN forces in the static phase of the Korean War.

The Tamil Tigers are quite on par with the Sri Lankan military.

The Boer were never on par with the British Army in terms of artillery, numbers, logistics or organization as well. Their "training" was no training, but hunter's and land folk's civilian experience. IIRC their "large unit" organization wasn't much above typical tribe war band level.
Their famed superior "marksmanship" was besides civilian shooting practice in large part a result of positional advantage and not so great anyway.
I remember battle accounts where Boers shot for very long time at exposed (not entrenched, but fully exposed) Englishmen (clearly visible due to uniforms) from a higher altitude position and inflicted depressing, but considering the circumstances quite small casualties.

William F. Owen
07-06-2008, 05:55 AM
Hezbollah fought Israel during the 2006 Lebanon war in a comparable style as the PLA did against the UN forces in the static phase of the Korean War.

Except Hezbollah, never counter-attacked successfully (i know of only one attempt), and can't manoeuvre. The Boer lay siege to Mafking and Ladysmith.


The Boer were never on par with the British Army in terms of artillery, numbers, logistics or organization as well. Their "training" was no training, but hunter's and land folk's civilian experience. IIRC their "large unit" organization wasn't much above typical tribe war band level.

No, not in terms of numbers and S4, but as concerns equipment, mobility and S2, they were way ahead. So instead of training, say "skills", and their leadership showed considerable skill.



Their famed superior "marksmanship" was besides civilian shooting practice in large part a result of positional advantage and not so great anyway.
I remember battle accounts where Boers shot for very long time at exposed (not entrenched, but fully exposed) Englishmen (clearly visible due to uniforms) from a higher altitude position and inflicted depressing, but considering the circumstances quite small casualties.

I wouldn't call the casualties in "Black Week" small, in terms of defeating fielded British Formations. Low in numbers and high in results.

reed11b
08-20-2008, 12:15 AM
While he is not exactly a theoretician, John A. English's book "On Infantry" is an important read and a good start point
Reed

Ken White
08-20-2008, 12:40 AM
wants to stick with the triangular organization. :(

(in the original, have not read the revised edition)

However, you're right, he's more than a theoretician. That, as Martha Stewart would say, is a good thing...

reed11b
08-20-2008, 01:52 AM
in my conviction that the span of control is larger then three??
Reed

Ken White
08-20-2008, 02:38 AM
managed at Co / Bn / Bde level. I think the Div should disappear (except for Artillery Divisions for HIC ;)) and Corps should control (lightly) up to 9-10 Bdes plus the spt package, an Avn Bde and that Arty div.

Four of every maneuver element is better than three, enables better bounding overwatch and rotation off line. Also allows for mix of 2 Tk Co and 2 Mech Inf Co at Bn. Allows one element for Assault and three for breakthrough and follow up. Four Firing Batteries allow two to be ready to fire no matter how much you move. All sorts of advantages. The triangular setup was a German invention to force unbalanced formations and defense -- same thing can be achieved by better training.

Span of control as currently defined is engendered more by lack of trust and fear of failure than by practical considerations -- unless you want to count peacetime manning and personnel management problems as practical (which I don't). Better training can overcome that. Not mixing branches is not maintenance or training driven, it's branch parochialism driven (which again is affected by peacetime manning and personnel management practices...).

Rifleman
08-20-2008, 04:37 AM
Having four combat/manuever/line/base elements before adding in the combat support elements seems to make good sense. I know that's the organization of the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment: four companies of four platoons of four squads, before adding the combat support/heavy weapons units.

A related question for those in the know: why is it that the pentomic battlegroup proved hard to manage, yet several WWII light infantry/raider type units had six small line companies per battalion and were not unmanagable for their commanders?

Examples: British Commandos, US Ranger Battalions, 2nd Marine Raider Battalon, and the "regiments" of the First Special Service Force all had six smaller line companies.

I'm sure that for starters W. O. Darby, Evans Carlson, Lord Lovat, et al, were way more talented as combat commanders than the average battlegroup commander in the late '50s, but was anything else going on that enabled them to be successful with their seemingly "unwieldy" battalions when the pentomic army experienced control problems?

Ken White
08-20-2008, 05:18 AM
...
A related question for those in the know: why is it that the pentomic battlegroup proved hard to manage, yet several WWII light infantry/raider type units had six small line companies per battalion and were not unmanagable for their commanders?
. . .
I'm sure that for starters W. O. Darby, Evans Carlson, Lord Lovat, et al, were way more talented as combat commanders than the average battlegroup commander in the late '50s, but was anything else going on that enabled them to be successful with their seemingly "unwieldy" battalions when the pentomic army experienced control problems?Well, maybe not -- I was in the first one that formed, the 327th Abn Inf Cbt Gp, later the 1st Abn BG 327th Inf. Was in another in Korea 59-60 and yet another at Bragg later. ROCID and ROTAD would coulda worked but...

They weren't that hard to manage though that was one of the ostensible reasons stated for their disappearance. I was fortunate in having several good BG commanders who had no problems with it at all -- the real problem was that the Cdrs were COLs, many but not all of whom believed that commanding five companies (plus HHC and a Mortar Battery) was just commanding a big Battalion, therefor beneath their dignity. A number of them objected strongly and forced the change. A second problem was that the forerunner of todays personnel problems insisted that any Inf COL could effectively command an organization that was (a) different than their experience set catered for; and (b) required real flexibility and trust of subordinates due to the great dispersal envisioned for the Cos. The old Airborne heads had no problem with that last, the standard Inf types did (most of them were also older and really did have problems keeping up physically).

Two other factors were that the equipment that the BGs were supposed to have did not arrive until about the time they were inactivated and that the log and maintenance systems were not changed to cope with the new requirements.

It was an idea before its time.

An interesting follow on is that initially, the ROAD plan of 1964, doing away with the BGs and returning to Bns with three Bns in a Bde, was initially to have rotating Bns working for the Bdes -- the Colonels also killed that, they did not want to chance being held responsible for failures by Bns for which they had not had training oversight. They insisted on permanently assigned Bns. Progress can be stopped dead if the right people want it to be stopped...

Gonna be interesting to see, in peacetime, how the plug and play BCTs work today. Folks are already complaining about the lack of continuity (read: control; people tread softly when they have OpCom or OpCon of elements from a different Div -- and they don't like that) caused by using the plug and play concept...

VMI_Marine
08-20-2008, 01:20 PM
Gonna be interesting to see, in peacetime, how the plug and play BCTs work today. Folks are already complaining about the lack of continuity (read: control; people tread softly when they have OpCom or OpCon of elements from a different Div -- and they don't like that) caused by using the plug and play concept...

Interesting point, Ken. I wonder if the Army can make that change in mindset. On our side of the house, regiments have very little to do with the training of their subordinate battalions, since our battalions are used to working independently or as part of a MEU. Thus, when we went to our OIF arrangement of deploying RCT headquarter and then assigning various battalions from different regiments to those RCTs, it wasn't a big deal. I think it's been good for us, allowing us to better tailor our forces to the needs in each AO; I hope the Army is able to make the modular BCT idea work. It might sacrifice some of our ability to fight as divisions in major "conventional" warfare, but it enhances flexibility for ops like Iraq and A-stan.

Ken White
08-20-2008, 02:37 PM
also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth :D) maneuver Bn and the RSTA Sqn needs a lot more thought but it's definitely the way to go. They also need to be called Bdes -- because a BCT was a Battalion Combat Team a long time before some smart guy reinvented the wheel. ;)

The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branch :mad: ). Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

Ron Humphrey
08-20-2008, 02:45 PM
also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

..

That was originally the idea but aside from other things the personnel issues both in higher ranking positions and the requirements for what actually needs to be expanded at BN and below would probably have to be agreed on and implemented before it went much of anywhere.

reed11b
08-20-2008, 03:13 PM
also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth :D) maneuver Bn and the RSTA Sqn needs a lot more thought but it's definitely the way to go. They also need to be called Bdes -- because a BCT was a Battalion Combat Team a long time before some smart guy reinvented the wheel. ;)

The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branch :mad: ). Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken. :eek: One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT. DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?
Reed

jkm_101_fso
08-20-2008, 03:26 PM
This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken. :eek: One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT.

I think the ARNG has BG command "large" Brigades; I've seen that before, but don't know how common it is. When TF Olympia replaced 101st in Mosul in 2004, it was commanded by then-BG Carter Ham. He had one stryker BDE, plus attachments, but the Stryker BDE had their own Commander, as well. As for me, I am nostaligic about the old regimental system...how cool would that be?


DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?

I think we've had this discussion in a thread; there are a lot of guys on here with more expertise than me on RSTA, but from what I've seen in Iraq, we generally just use them as Manuever...but the same could be said for FA BNs.

I don't see the RSTA changing, I just wish they had more 11Bs and 19Ds assigned to the organizations. MikeF, Cavguy and RTK could probably lend more to this than I can. RSTA has 2 Cav troops (A&B) and one infantry company (C troop) which is basically task organized as 2 scout platoons, IIRC. The RSTAs are commanded by Infantrymen, from what I've seen. I'll look for the thread we had on this all ready...I think it was titled "Transformation" or something.

Ken White
08-20-2008, 04:10 PM
This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken. :eek:You can get accused of mutiny and sedition for that... :D
One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT.I don't agree with Macgregor on a lot of things, including that -- for the current sized and organized Bdes. IF they were at four maneuver Bns plus a Cav Troop AND a Scout / LRS (Jr) Co AND a STA Co (all separate), an ADA By and a full up FA Bn, which they should be, I'd agree.

The one problem with a GO commander is that unless carefully selected, hidebound and excess caution to protect the institution can creep in; COLs will generally be more flexible. With the Bde as large as I think it should be, the Bde Cdr will have to do what the CG of the 1st Bde of the 101st in 1966 did -- in sharp contrast to most of his contemporaries -- and tell the TOC when he sacks out "Wake me if ALL the battalions are in heavy contact."
DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?Since my opinion is that we do not nowadays do the Cav thing well and since you need both mounted and dismounted recon elements -- and never the twain shall meet or work together well -- plus a Svlnc / TA element (also a separate and different thing which doesn't get along well with the other two), all three should be separate Co sized units I think. We need to get Cav back to be being Cav instead of a light and frequently misused maneuver force.

Dismounted Scouts need extra training and time to do their job properly and they need time to do the mission without being rushed (or asked if they're sure when they report something...) and the STA thing is tech heavy. Three very different philosophies and techniques at work that mesh poorly in training and in operation except at the level where the information they produce is collated and analyzed.

I could make a case for a Cav Sqn in a heavy Bde but I think light, medium and heavy Bdes all need all three types of intel gatherers, the light and medium guys only need a Cav Troop IMO (and the heavy can get by with a Scout Platoon which should still be separate). The Cav element should not be considered another maneuver element except in rare cases. In any case, the missions and techniques are so different that to combine them in one Sqn really makes little sense except for peacetime admin purposes -- and that should NOT be the organizational determinant.

Snipers are both a combat and an intel asset, are needed and both the Cav and Scout elements should have some; the Cav probably with .50s and the Scouts with .338 (or .300 Win magnum, a much better anti personnel round).

The fighting organization should be the TOE, the ad-hoc stuff should be for peacetime support. We do that backwards because it makes it easy on the Per folks so instead of the Per system supporting the force, the force is supporting the Per system...

Ken White
08-20-2008, 04:22 PM
That was originally the idea but aside from other things the personnel issues both in higher ranking positions and the requirements for what actually needs to be expanded at BN and below would probably have to be agreed on and implemented before it went much of anywhere.exemplifies what's wrong with the system today... :(

Why "agreed?" I know that's the way we work today, committees and consensus -- and look where that's gotten us.

IMO, agreement should not be required; an assessment of the combat -- not peace time, combat -- requirements should be made and a decision announced and implemented. We have ceded too much day to day running of the Army to Congress, DoD, POMs, PBACs, branch parochialism, GO steering committees and to Councils of Colonels. Not one of those things is in sight when combat occurs... :mad:

Peacetime, ideally, should be the norm for Armies -- but they absolutely should not organize and operate as peacetime entities. You do indeed go to war with the Army you've got -- and if it is totally peacetime oriented, you are going to have problems.

We kill people unnecessarily due to that crass stupidity.

VMI_Marine
08-20-2008, 07:04 PM
The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor.

But then what would all of the MGs do? :D


Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.

I think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.

Ken White
08-20-2008, 07:27 PM
But then what would all of the MGs do? :DWe have the same number of flag officers we had in 1946 for a 12 plus million person force. That high and excess number is retained -- wrongly IMO -- to provide flags in event of a required mobiliztion. I agree with the need, disagree with the method.

Secondly, that number helps the up or out and DOPMA regimens to work. Both of those have their flaws.

Still, unlikely to change, I know. They ought to be able to find something for them to do; we've invented several jobs for three and four stars; how hard can it be to develop other jobs? :D
You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.Roger that -- but one of our many strengths. ;)
I think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.Absolutely, though I'm not as sure it's so much being removed as it is a fear of loss of control. That and a lack of trust of subordinates which IMO is partly control-freakitis and partly a bona fide lack of trust due to tacit knowledge or at least a gnawing fear that we do not train people as well as we should. Some favorable exceptions, I know -- and more every day; which is one of several good things that's come out of all this

On the training issue, the Corps does a better job with the Basic School but the Army initial entry training, while better than its ever been, is still inadequate due to false time and money pressures. LTs need about a year, peons about six months...

William F. Owen
08-21-2008, 07:45 AM
You can get accused of mutiny and sedition for that... :DI don't agree with Macgregor on a lot of things, including that -- for the current sized and organized Bdes. IF they were at four maneuver Bns plus a Cav Troop AND a Scout / LRS (Jr) Co AND a STA Co (all separate), an ADA By and a full up FA Bn, which they should be, I'd agree.
.

I've talked to Doug a great deal about his "super groups" as I dubbed them. One of the biggest problems I have with BG/BGD (unit/formation) organisation debates is that the vital supporting structure is rarely taken into account. EG:

A Coy or 100 or 200 men has one CSM. In a 200 man company he has double the work load, then it comes to administration. or:-

A BG of 4-5 sub units requires far more logistics, and admin than one of 3. It also has poorer traffic-ability, and greater problems when static. Bigger deployed organisations may be more "efficient," but I don't see how they can be as "effective". Yes they save money, but I can't see many other benefits.

The more I study, read, and talk (and SWC is a vastly important resource) the more I am concluding that small iron-bar simple organisations are the ones that triumph. Adding capability means adding complexity and than is not always good. In fact it seems that it is rarely is ever good.

Just an opinion, only slightly supported by data... :wry:

Fuchs
11-21-2009, 06:16 PM
I dare to revive this because of a lasting interest in hints at modern infantry theory.

Kiwigrunt
11-21-2009, 10:23 PM
Let me be the first to bite then.

Just reread Wilf’s last post here and think he makes some good points which can be reinforced with some Falklands history. Brigadier Thompson was very appreciative of the additional combat capabilities that the two attached Para battalions brought to his three-battalion commando brigade. However, he also stated quite clearly in some of his writings that his HQ was stretched to the limit, partly for logistical reasons. There was no way he could have added another battalion to it, even if it would have been available.

When 5 brigade came with another three battalions, a division HQ came with it, and 5 brigade took one of the two Para battalions off Thompson’s hands.

Kiwigrunt
11-21-2009, 10:55 PM
So I just read back a bit further and can add two points to my last post:

1.) Ken’s post 61 can be seen as an interesting counter to my last.

2.) We have been off topic for a number of posts here as Fuchs named the thread:

‘Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today’

Fuchs
11-21-2009, 11:06 PM
Grrrr, OK, let's discuss such organizational stuff for a while.

I see absolutely no reason why you couldn't attach 10 battalions to a single brigade.
The reason is simple; I think in great war terms.
The brigade would simply enter the battlefield with four or five battalions and keep the others in garrison. The units could rotate.

Disadvantages:
No short-term maximum combat power available.
'Few staff slots for officers'.

Advantages:
An initial relative weakness would enforce efficient use of force from day one, keep the losses moderate and lure the enemy into an exhausting offensive behaviour.
THEN, later on, the brigades would rotate out exhausted battalions for reforming them in garrison (or more closely to the hot zones on easy rear security missions) - the strength could be maintained, the brigade would not burn out quickly.

- - - - -

About modern infantry tactics:
I see/hear more and more outraged voices in the context of Afghanistan battle reports.

- Outposts in the valley, surrounded by dominating and not secured heights.
- Overloaded infantry unable to move faster than walking pace and unable to negotiate altitude differences in a useful time span.
- Predictable movements/routes
- Infantry inability to fix, flank or counterambush the enemy.
- Apparently pointless missions (like defending an outpost that shall be given up just days later)



I'm quite sure that the publicly discussed combat reports are not representative (the bad news advantage over good news), but they seem to reveal weak spots that should nevertheless concern us.

I recall a remark about combat in some "green zone" somewhere - infantry was supposedly barely able to clear the area because it offers so much concealment to the enemy.

Such remarks provoke always the same thought in me:
WTF? These troops are supposed to be able to do the job while carrying anti-tank munitions, fearing competent (tank) counterattacks, fighting an enemy who could call for accurate mortar/artillery fire and who's supplied with adequate AP cartridges.

No matter how much is being talked about the quality of the Taliban; battles against them are supposed to be a very simple kind of tactical combat.
It is comparable to stragglers of crushed enemy formations. Combat against such irregulars is akin to mopping up the remains of an enemy force after the real battle.


So if this enemy causes that many tactical problems (on top of the interstellar-sized problem of target identification during the sitting war), then it should be a LOUD WAKE-UP CALL.

My bet is that modern infantry tactics kept pace with other developments about as well as infantry tactics did in 1890-1914.
The absolutely scary problem is that in the above mentioned period we had a rally for infantry tactics modernization based on Boer War experiences.

This should HORRIFY us for two reasons;
* the Boer Wars on very open terrain with low force density were terribly misleading, as are potentially the Bush wars as well.
* we don't even have that much infantry tactics modernization.

We modernize the infantry equipment instead - that's akin to the introduction of Grey and Brownish uniforms post-1900 at best.


So I'm basically going to panic if we cannot come up with good modern infantry theories/theorists/reform movements.

(Just in case that you don't want to tell about someone or something for OPSEC reasons; just drop a number or a line about your confidence in modernization.)

jcustis
11-22-2009, 03:36 AM
We modernize the infantry equipment instead - that's akin to the introduction of Grey and Brownish uniforms post-1900 at best.

Well let's talk about that though. What if, through modernization and weight savings, an OICW-type weapon with an integrated 20 - 25mm airbust HE munition COULDbe developed and deployed? Assuming a trajectory that supports 500 - 700m engagements with near-pinpoint air burst accuracy, that could be a potential fight-breaker in a lot of situations where an enemy may be behind hasty cover, or light concealment.

How would infantry tactics change if that capability were to come into use, and troops carried a combat load of 60 - 120 rds of 5.56mm, and 24 rds (4 magazines of 6 each) HE or flechette rounds?

I've been a naysayer of the concept for a long time, like many others, because developments so far are just too big.

Perhaps we do not need as precise an effect as a laser range finder and adjacent air burst results, but rather effects like the PAW-20 (where terrain permits):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eu87AxzBf3Y

slapout9
11-22-2009, 07:41 AM
Well let's talk about that though. What if, through modernization and weight savings, an OICW-type weapon with an integrated 20 - 25mm airbust HE munition COULDbe developed and deployed? Assuming a trajectory that supports 500 - 700m engagements with near-pinpoint air burst accuracy, that could be a potential fight-breaker in a lot of situations where an enemy may be behind hasty cover, or light concealment.

How would infantry tactics change if that capability were to come into use, and troops carried a combat load of 60 - 120 rds of 5.56mm, and 24 rds (4 magazines of 6 each) HE or flechette rounds?

I've been a naysayer of the concept for a long time, like many others, because developments so far are just too big.

Perhaps we do not need as precise an effect as a laser range finder and adjacent air burst results, but rather effects like the PAW-20 (where terrain permits):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eu87AxzBf3Y


jcustis,man that hing is wicked. How come they put the pistol grip on the side of the weapon? Does it add to it somehow?

jcustis
11-22-2009, 08:02 AM
Although the weapon is ambidextrous, the pistol grip location is awkward for that reason, as well as being so high in relation to the bore. Seems accurate enough though.

You want to talk about suppression, that thing looks like it puts it down well! I can only imagine what it feels like to be within the effective casualty radius of that 20mm round. There's a ton of history behind use of 20mm HE against enemy in bush wars, where impacts against hard surfaces like a boulder could increase the casualty effect of the fragmentation.

Fuchs
11-22-2009, 09:36 AM
]The Koreans actually introduced an OICW-type weapon (no automatic for the 20mm, that's the sole relevant difference) this year, which is obviously being ignored because the South Korean Army isn't the U.S.Army.

Such a weapon may be advantageous in certain situations, disadvantageous in others - but it's still only about firepower. Firepower hasn't been in short supply since '44.


- - - - -

Survivability, Mobility, sustainability and leadership are the other key areas:

Survivability - camouflage, concealment, deception, cover/armour, ability to detect a contact in time

Mobillity - fitness, over-snow equipment, equipment weight, ability to leave a kill zone

Sustainability - water&food reserves/supply/generation, ammunition reserves/supply, energy reserves/supply (electrical power!)


- - - - -

The small war lessons ruin the attitude towards camouflage/concealment.

The optimal armour compromise in small wars is very different than the optimal compromise for great wars.

Ability to detect a contact in time - still not satisfactory despite thermals, air support.

ability to leave a kill zone (=break being fixed) = marginal due to a casualty aversion that would be excessive in great wars.

equipment weight - medieval full plate knights would qualify as today's light infantry

So overall I think we need a new way of how to solve tactical infantry problems. New tactics, different compromises (equipment, loss aversion, organization), different expectations.

Rifleman
11-22-2009, 08:13 PM
Brigadier Thompson was very appreciative of the additional combat capabilities that the two attached Para battalions brought to his three-battalion commando brigade. However, he also stated quite clearly in some of his writings that his HQ was stretched to the limit, partly for logistical reasons. There was no way he could have added another battalion to it, even if it would have been available.


Then could the USMC expeditionary brigade template be good to emulate? It's broken down into command, ground, aviation, and logistics elements. This allows for a regimental combat team commander (colonel) between the brigadier and the the manuever battalion commanders (ground element).

jcustis
11-22-2009, 10:31 PM
]The Koreans actually introduced an OICW-type weapon (no automatic for the 20mm, that's the sole relevant difference) this year, which is obviously being ignored because the South Korean Army isn't the U.S.Army.

Such a weapon may be advantageous in certain situations, disadvantageous in others - but it's still only about firepower. Firepower hasn't been in short supply since '44.

Based off of a comparative weight slide, the K11 is slightly lighter than a M4 / M203 combo.


Survivability, Mobility, sustainability and leadership are the other key areas:

Survivability - camouflage, concealment, deception, cover/armour, ability to detect a contact in time

My boss is currently working to shift the emphasis that our vehicle's Program Manager organization has placed on survivability, in the aim to gain better lethality. Our community has always proposed that speed and our weapons system are prime components to security, but then again we gained over 3,500 lbs of armor with virtually zero gain in horsepower, torque, etc. to stay fast and agile. The cycle began with the first casualties from IEDs, and hasn't seen an end in sight. So beginning there, we used technology to beat the threat, when we probably should have spent a lot more time walking...and walking...and walking, along those stretches of terrain that warranted that TTP. Perhaps it start with a look at the definition of patrolling. We haven't discussed it here at the SWC from what I can tell, but what is presence patrolling? One of the most significant complaints concerning OIF that I had and saw was the fact we commuted to work and ran patrols that accomplished very little outside of putting eyes on a certain patch of dirt for that particular period of time. We lost way too many good men and women while they drove to work.


Mobillity - fitness, over-snow equipment, equipment weight, ability to leave a kill zone

We have adequate battle drills in these areas, but we often fail to employ them well. We see it in youtube videos of troops reacting to contact and showing terrible fire discipline and lack of movement, of overloaded Marines conducting aerial envelopment into Taliban territory (which speaks to your area of concern below), and patrols who break contact AWAY from an apparently limited enemy attack.


Sustainability - water&food reserves/supply/generation, ammunition reserves/supply, energy reserves/supply (electrical power!)

I think I remember a photo essay about Operation Khanjar where plenty of canals were around and water was reasonably available. Assuming we made the rational decision to draw water from those sources AND use the in-line filters that we are issued along with our hydration bladders/carriers, water shouldn't be much of a problem, but it is...and lessons learned in Iraq and past conflicts have long been forgotten. As a case in point, we could freeze a lot of water and get it into the fight, as proposed here: http://www.captainsjournal.com/category/logistics/ but unless someone does something with it once it arrives (as opposed to letting it lie in the sun), the water will get back to coffee pot temps very quick. Anyone remember water bags? They used to be mandatory for survival at CAX rotation in 29 Palms...were is the modern water bag?


The small war lessons ruin the attitude towards camouflage/concealment.

The optimal armour compromise in small wars is very different than the optimal compromise for great wars.

Perhaps this will be where the next revolution in thinking has to come from, and until we get back to finding this balance we won't progress further. Ken, as I know you will likely read this, what were the METT-T considerations your experienced about body armor in your various campaigns? I have seen photos of Marines at Khe Sanh with flak jackets, but Soldiers sans flak jackets at LZ X-Ray. We fought that conflict with apparent different choices in wear and use available armor (USMC M-1955 vs. M-1952 and M-1969 vests), so I scratch my head along with you Fuchs and wonder what the hell happened that we would risk heat casualties and combat fatigue over improving our capability. I know the answer lies in many more variables than can be discussed in this thread alone, but until we vanquish risk aversion, we are going to be saddled with some sort of armor package and its wear and use will be controlled at 4-star general officer levels.


Ability to detect a contact in time - still not satisfactory despite thermals, air support.

We typically fail to integrate these enabling assets into maneuver effectively. As a case in point, who controls unmanned aerial systems? In the Marine Corps, through either previous training or familiarization, the intelligence folks are predominantly involved in their employment, tasking, routing, etc. I have never seen a period of instruction for the commanders, regarding integration of UAS into maneuver. UAS usage isn't rocket science, nor is vertical envelopment, yet infantry commanders don't get smart based off of what the helo pilots alone tell them. Why is it any different with UAVs?


ability to leave a kill zone (=break being fixed) = marginal due to a casualty aversion that would be excessive in great wars.

I'm not certain I follow your point here Fuchs. Are you saying we've grown less inclined to go full-tilt bozo against an ambush because we are currently trying to practice more restraint in OIF/OEF?


So overall I think we need a new way of how to solve tactical infantry problems. New tactics, different compromises (equipment, loss aversion, organization), different expectations.

I will always prefer to die on my feet or at least at a full charge while in the saddle, than from the overpressure impinging on a box I find myself cocooned in, or from heat stroke due to wearing body armor that will save me in X number of circumstances, or from the IED I might have spotted if I lived right beside the farmhouse, as opposed to some distance from it because it might be the traditional answer in terms of defense.

Fuchs
11-22-2009, 10:53 PM
I'm not certain I follow your point here Fuchs. Are you saying we've grown less inclined to go full-tilt bozo against an ambush because we are currently trying to practice more restraint in OIF/OEF?

I meant that troops get too easily pinned (fixed) by the enemy. The enemy doesn't seem to suppress counterfire, but he seems to suppress movements.

The minimal casualties attitude seems to be the cause for troops seeking cover and then only returning fire / calling in for fire. (I cannot prove that with data, but it's the picture that formed itself based on many small sources.)


It doesn't need to be like that.

jcustis
11-22-2009, 11:04 PM
The minimal casualties attitude seems to be the cause for troops seeking cover and then only returning fire / calling in for fire. (I cannot prove that with data, but it's the picture that formed itself based on many small sources.)

I can agree with that. I'm seeing a lot of fire and not enough maneuver in footage of contacts. It's an armchair view, I know, but supported IMO from the differences between the LFAM range and the two-way range.

Fuchs
11-22-2009, 11:21 PM
It's difficult and often not promising at all to maneuver while in contact if the movement to contact was done poorly.

I see two obvious remedies to solve the 'fix' problem; smoke (mortar fire support=smoke=concealment for movement) and separate marching.

The enemy is less likely to fix two squad-sized patrols at once than to fix/pin one platoon-sized patrol. The movement through valley instead of along ridge lines or from mountain top to mountain top (with security element on the last top) also adds to the chance of getting pinned down. I've yet to read about an infantry force on mountain top that got fixed by up hill fire.

jcustis
11-23-2009, 07:50 AM
The enemy is less likely to fix two squad-sized patrols at once than to fix/pin one platoon-sized patrol. The movement through valley instead of along ridge lines or from mountain top to mountain top (with security element on the last top) also adds to the chance of getting pinned down. I've yet to read about an infantry force on mountain top that got fixed by up hill fire.


The Marine Corps' distributed operations concepts tried to move in this direction. I can't recall why it died off, but there were many well-founded concerns over the effort. The mindset behind DO has merit, but it too was headed down technology road and that proved difficult.

Firn
11-23-2009, 12:12 PM
The distributed coordinated movement is one of the reason why attached and yet seperate elements like snipers were are also often very successful in offensive warfare in WWI and WWII. Observing and attacking out a movement-to-contact which was not suppressed is a key ingredient to success. This applies in a similar way to every other seperate element. A third squad may be able to maneuver, the mortars to support, the AFV may be able to do both.

The key problem is that the fighting ability of the sperate squad may lack enough depth of manpower to survive a short and violent direct encounter. In Afghanistan the difficult terrain, the small manpower, the lack of helicopters, the burden of the infantry, the casuality awerness and the watchful eyes of the enemy and his supporters seem all to make the good coordination of a distributed operation difficult.

Firn

Fuchs
11-23-2009, 12:33 PM
The key problem is that the fighting ability of the sperate squad may lack enough depth of manpower to survive a short and violent direct encounter. In Afghanistan the difficult terrain, the small manpower, the lack of helicopters, the burden of the infantry, the casuality awerness and the watchful eyes of the enemy and his supporters seem all to make the good coordination of a distributed operation difficult.

Firn

A platoon in a trap is simply a richer target than a squad in a trap.

DO went for very small teams - good for area observation, not so good for assault. A counter-ambush assault (instead of just a team in a position to chase the enemy away with firepower) would be necessary, so DO (as I understood it) would have gone too far in regard to the present problem (unless the distributed, not fixed teams unite quickly for a combined assault).

I would want the enemy on the run, not just attempt to shoot him into pieces. The latter is quite difficult.

A rout usually infects previously not discovered positions while aimed fire doesn't.


The key in the specific restrictions of AFG mountain terrain should be the adherence to a tactic known even by Xenophon: Don't march through valleys before you control the mountain tops around it.

The infantry needs to be fit and lightly loaded, so it can move along ridge lines and from top to top at least in the most dangerous area.

That's again one such point at which I doubt that heavy plate armour is a wise choice.


Oh, and most important: You shall not break contact against irregulars. Instead, you should press for their destruction once they drop their disguise and open fire. Such an aggressiveness might eradicate the small arms ambush problem in short notice.


The irregulars have the advantage of civilian disguise 99.999% of the time, but it should nevertheless be possible to defeat them without helicopter and CAS support once they drop their disguise.
More resources may be an answer to a problem, but it's no tactic. More resources is a primitive brute force approach. We assert that we're superior, so we should demonstrate it. That would improve our conventional deterrence and therefore our national security in general.

Firn
11-23-2009, 04:05 PM
To get a bit more down to earth I post this video and a some very armchairish comments to it. Perhaps others with experience in Afghanistan can join in. I was out of the military before my country comitted to operations in Afghanistan.

Afghanistans Gray Line: The Education of "Combat Platoon" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SkUE_6XxwQ)

I will focus on tactics used in the first encounter but will add later some comments on the rest.


Terrain and Weather

Here we have a typical landscape:

a) Satellite (http://maps.google.at/?ie=UTF8&ll=35.224307,71.544342&spn=0.021771,0.054932&t=h&z=15)

b) Relief (http://maps.google.at/?ie=UTF8&ll=35.22336,71.544342&spn=0.023664,0.054932&t=p&z=15)

Mostly sunny, mild or cool days and cold nights.


The outpost

On a hill overlooking the rather narrow valley. Most visible population centers are in or along the valley which is partly covered by terraced fields. The nearby forests and hills are used for pasture and forestry. Mountain tops and ridges dominate the landscape, the vegetation is sparse with thin forests, meadows and rocky ground.

It is fortified with makeshift stone walls, protected by wire and has a mortar. I do not see any observation point or equipment, but that doesn't mean that they aren't there.


The mission

Meeting the locals to implement the overall startegy. The surprise character of the visit should reduce the likelyhood of a premediated ambush.

The enemy

Unknown amounts of enemy fighters and suppoter in unknown locations. Some in the villages, some in the countryside. Some armed and ready to fight, others observing or doing something else. Light weapons only, with the spport of RPGs and possibly mortars and recoilless rifles.

Troops and support available

Looks like about a platoon of American soldiers on the ground supported by Afghan forces. Some of them will have to guard the outpost and provide mortar support. Scout helicopter and Apache helicopter seemingly available for a specific time frame as well as a air assault group.

Time available

Not hard time restrictions. A long movement to the objective. Time constraints due to the sparse allocation of specific assets (UAV?, helicopters? Air assault team?). The preferred start to the mission would be at night to reach the village very early in the day.


Civilian considerations

Any civilian casualities must be avoided and the villagers should not be affronted by the operation. Some friction with military considerations is however almost inevitable, like the choice to send no notice of the operation to the village. Prior contact with civilians will most likey compromise the element of surprise.



The operation

The approach is be later in the day than the commander hoped.

a) The MGs and the sniper team? form a base of fire and observation on dominating terrain in the south.

b) The tea-party elements move down the mountain. On a single path or distributed?

c) When the enemy initiate the combat the Apache is called in which was possibly replaced by a Kiowa later on.

d) The enemy runs away with possible casualities. Perhaps some melt into the population of the village.

e) After some consideration an air assault gets launched. AFVs may have been part in the push into a suspected hiding place.

f) The elusive enemy can not be found or identified as such.

The end is unknown.

Firn

davidbfpo
11-25-2009, 11:10 PM
Firn,

A "good catch" the news report from Kunar Province. I noted that alongside the US Army were ANA, ANP and ABP. Plus the FOB was on high ground, not the highest.

jcustis
11-28-2009, 06:36 AM
Fuchs,

To get back to the very first question you posed, have you researched the writings of CWO5 Jeffrey Eby? I think he is the closest personification of what you are looking for. He has spent a lot of time in the kinetic realm, observing and making note of those observations.

Much of his writing can be found in Marine Corps Gazette articles, pretty easily.

JC

William F. Owen
11-28-2009, 01:34 PM
To get back to the very first question you posed, have you researched the writings of CWO5 Jeffrey Eby?

I think I might have read everything Eby ever wrote on the SAW v the LSW argument, and I'm impressed with his reasoning. We seem to agree, but for slightly different reasons.

What leaves me shaking my head is the utterly bizarre field and range trials described in the Marine Corps Gazette. I can only conclude they were designed by an OA weeny who did not understand the question.

Fuchs
11-28-2009, 07:39 PM
I recall those articles, but they're not easily accessible any more.
He was writing mostly about infantry equipment instead of how to solve tactical problems IIRC.

jcustis
11-28-2009, 10:28 PM
He has at least one concerning two-man buddy pair tactics, and also spends a lot of time talking about the concept of the LSW as it relates to team and squad tactics. That came from his study of German squad tactics, IIRC.

I agree though, that it is difficult to get them without paying for the download at the Marine Corps Gazette.

Fuchs
11-28-2009, 11:01 PM
It's actually even worse.

Credit cards are very uncommon in Germany (just as cheques), I couldn't even pay for I have none. ;)

We pay by paypal or money transfer from account to account.


Well, judging by his article titles and my memory of his articles he has no answer for the problem of infantry being pinned (fixed) and no mortar SMK available?

That's the #1 infantry tactical problem in my area of interest.

jcustis
11-28-2009, 11:24 PM
http://2ndbn5thmar.com/

Although he is not widely cited. McBreen has written profusely on the matter of suppression and night fighting, and might have some material on smoke employment.

The bulk of his writing came at a time, when there wasn't much going on except training and unit deployment program rotations to Okinawa, so it was detailed and very well-thought out. Much was common sense that we simply were not applying.

if we get pinned, however, we simply call in an airstrike to break the fight.:D

Fuchs
11-29-2009, 12:29 AM
http://2ndbn5thmar.com/

Although he is not widely cited. McBreen has written profusely on the matter of suppression and night fighting, and might have some material on smoke employment.

The bulk of his writing came at a time, when there wasn't much going on except training and unit deployment program rotations to Okinawa, so it was detailed and very well-thought out. Much was common sense that we simply were not applying.

Interesting, but he oversimplifies a bit.

His infantry defence would fail against a good or his own infantry attack, for example; the defence plan is only a defence against an assault element - a mere ambush.

His attack pattern is an attack on a point defence. This is a logical follow-up to his incomplete infantry defence pattern.


A more complete defence plan would attempt to counter suppressive fires either by smoke or by having a separate team that covers probable suppressing fire base locations from an advantageous position.

That in turn leads to a requirement for additional security in the attack pattern. The assault team isn't the only one that may be in great danger. The suppressive fires team may be flanked. It requires security measures.

And of course you may always encounter a defence that's not a point defence, but a network of defences.

He is furthermore not much into advising for dispersion to reduce the effectiveness of enemy support fires.


Overall, he seems to be quite orthodox, close to standard doctrine.

jcustis
11-29-2009, 12:41 AM
In McBreen's defense, simplification is precisely his point, and it is woven throughout his writing, especially if you grind through this document that was at one time published for every junior NCO and SNCO distance education program package. he spent the majority of his time, from what I can tell, focusing on those weaker areas of our training and doctrine, not the ones he felt were sufficient.

http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/dm/CCMWorkbookMcBreen2002.pdf

And with regard to your concern about a network defence, I am reminded of something a wise Major said relating to infantry attacks: "At some point, every attack at the company level and below becomes a frontal assault. It's just a matter of orientation."

Tukhachevskii
03-28-2010, 12:50 PM
Four of every maneuver element is better than three, enables better bounding overwatch and rotation off line. Also allows for mix of 2 Tk Co and 2 Mech Inf Co at Bn. Allows one element for Assault and three for breakthrough and follow up. Four Firing Batteries allow two to be ready to fire no matter how much you move. All sorts of advantages. The triangular setup was a German invention to force unbalanced formations and defense -- same thing can be achieved by better training.
.

Far be it for me to resurrect a thread (I am no necromancer) but it appears E. S. Johnston in his “Field Service Regulations of the Future” published in 1936 would agree with the desirability of four manoeuvre elements. His view and that of others (such as Leslie McNair) is discussed in Major Glenn M. Harned, The Principles of Tactical Organisation and their Impact upon Force Design In the US Army ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA167707&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) originally published as a monograph for the US Army Command and General Staff College (1985). The monograph is rather good at getting to the nuts and bolts of unit organisation (“force design”) through the analytical lenses of two principles of war (Unity of Effort and Economy of Force) and seems to me at least to be as relevant today as it was in 1985 or, for that matter, in 1936;

(According to E. S. Johnston...) Two subdivisions provide one to fix and one to manoeuvre, while three also provide a reserve. "Four subdivisions provide an organization yet more flexible, there being sufficient elements to manoeuvre around both flanks as well as for fixing and for the reserve. This organization is also useful in penetrations, in which case the entire unit may be used in a deep narrow column, in a square or similar figure, or in a T-shaped formation. A unit of four subdivisions in particularly flexible [because] the "four subunits may be combined into three or two, according to the situation and the ability of the commander." A unit with four subdivisions is also more economical, requiring little more overhead than a unit with only three.(p.6)

The paper also has a rather interesting “take” on the principle of Unity of Command which, according to Johnston, should actually be Unity of Effort or (Co-operation as per The Principles of War in UK JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine ( http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CE5E85F2-DEEB-4694-B8DE-4148A4AEDF91/0/20100114jdp0_01_bddUDCDCIMAPPS.pdf) p.2-6);

According to Johnston, "Organization is the mechanism of control. Its purpose, therefore, is unity of effort". Thus, tactical organization is a mechanism of control, which produces unity of effort, which results in the economic expenditure of combat power. In the 1923 Field Service Regulations, as in FM 100-5 today, the US Army recognized Unity of Command as a principle of war, but Johnston argued that the principle should be Unity of Effort, not Unity of Command. He wrote, “Wellington and Blucher [at Waterloo] succeeded by reason of cooperation; they had no unified command ... Unity of command, then is merely a method of obtaining unity of effort ; cooperation is another method ... The real problem is where to provide for unity of command and where to depend on cooperation”.(p.3)

Furthermore, in terms of Economy of Force the monograph quotes LtGen. Jacob L. Devers (in a letter to Gen. Marshall c.1941) who criticised McNair’s economising/pooling of resources efforts (i.e., attaching CS and CSS units as and where needed rather than having them organic to the subunit in question);

Economy of force is not gained by having a lot of units in a reserve pool where they train individually, knowing little or nothing of the units they are going to fight with. It is much better to make them part of a division or corps, even to the wearing of the same shoulder patch., If they are needed elsewhere in an emergency, they can be withdrawn easily from the division or corps and attached where they are needed. Economy of force and unity of command go together. You get little of either if you get a lot of attached units at the last moment. Team play comes only with practice.(p.9)

JMA
03-28-2010, 03:51 PM
Fuchs, Kilcullen's main piece in this regard was "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/aaj_june_2003.pdf)" (Australian Army Journal). It more or less mirrored at Company-Level what General DePuy wrote about at Platoon-Level in "One Up and Two Back? (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/swain3/swain3_pt4.pdf)"(scroll down to Pages 295-302 of "Selected Papers of General Wiliam E. DePuy (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#select)", and yes, I'm plugging for my boy here). Both approaches are focused upon the primacy of suppression in the Attack, of course, and our own Tom Odom as you know (along with his two co-authors) based some of his publicly accessible work upon Gen. DePuy's: see "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/odom.pdf)", in Military Review from a few years back. McBreen especially emphasized suppression in his articles for Marine Corps Gazette. Obviously it takes some digging to get a hold of his best two, but they don't say too much different than others who base their work upon DePuy's. Besides them, there's Wilf of course, and Wigram (http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/Wignam.txt), whom some of Wilf's work derived from. And a number of us who admire the RLI (http://www.therli.com/)'s Fire Force (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp) (not to mention Drake Shooting (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rhodesian-cover-or-drake-shooting.pdf)); See jcustis' "Interview With an RLI Vet", too, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=10587&postcount=11) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=10588&postcount=12). The RLI's Platoon and Brick organization and tactics, along with Wilf's work, provide some insight into what Infantry tactics of the future may look like.

Edited to Add:

Get a hold of the original 1981 edition of On Infantry by John English (the 1984 edition with Bruce Gudmundsson as co-author is also good), and Virgil Ney's work is generally considered as good or better than even English's (but it's harder to get a hold of).

Greetings all, I served as an officer with the RLI during the time when the Fire Force concept was being refined and came into its own. The unidentified ex-RLI member who says he joined in 1980, which was after the cease fire, is not your best source on the Rhodesian Fire Force concept.

Fuchs
01-31-2012, 09:16 AM
I'm curious about who is being considered being one of let's say 20 top infantry tactics experts/theoreticians in the open domain (=some chance to find articles or books to read his/her ideas).
I am specifically interested in the kinetic aspects when I wrote infantry, else I'd have written "PsyOps" or "MP expert".

Any suggestions?

*bump*

Any news on this?

(And I can't believe that I really wrote "kinetic" back then. That must have been a concession to this place!)