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View Full Version : DO is dead, hail Enhanced Company Operations!



Fuchs
06-26-2008, 07:37 PM
from somewhere else:

Discussion on Military.com on Distributed Ops Concept Evolves into Enhanced Company Ops (http://forums.military.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/6261946761/m/7340074781001)

jcustis
06-26-2008, 07:41 PM
What is perhaps more interesting Fuchs, is the statement I remember reading about earlier that said the platoon was the smallest element for independent level operations.

I think that when the price tag came in for the gear required to outfit everyone in a DO fashion, it was simply too much.

Ken White
06-26-2008, 08:07 PM
Sure, there's a cost -- but the operative phrase was, as Fuchs pointed out "not comfortable with." That's partly a matter of trust, partly a matter of perception and tradition, partly (mostly?) a fear of what could go wrong. Anyway you slice it, it is, IMO, a regression. A really sad one I hate to see at that...

I think that anyone who said "the platoon was the smallest element for independent level operations" was stating their preference, not a fact. I'd also suggest that appears to me to be a very cautious, even over-cautious, approach to warfare.

Long ago on a galaxy far away, I worked with a unit in combat that refused to go anywhere or do anything in less than Company strength. After a few months I went to another unit that routinely operated at Platoon level and never hesitated to kick out Squads or even Fire Teams (and also to ignore the directive that one could not operate out of range of US Artillery) The only two firm rules in that unit was that one could not stay in one place for 24 hours, you had to move even if it was only tens of meters; and never to do the same thing twice. Other than that, Units were left alone to do their jobs. No doubt in my mind which was the more effective unit. Surprisingly -- or not -- the latter unit had lower casualties overall...

jcustis
06-26-2008, 08:56 PM
A regression indeed. Maybe it is brought on in part by the same concerns that leave us encumbered with too many "pillows" that prevent us from outmatching the mobility of the current crop of bad guys.

Maybe it is because folks choose to ignore the solid lessons that line our collective history of modern war, from the LRDG, LRRPs, RLI, and on and on. We are talking about some brave men who faced daunting odds, and not always because the enemy was tough to find, but because if he found you he could bring in airpower to hunt you down, or he was also very adept at moving and fighting light.

Maybe it's because we'd need to get a whole lot better at training to the basics, which you and I agree is something not done well. The basics are so, so critical to the business of indpendent operations.

I'm not sure the highers ups can stomach another Lone Survivor scenario.

Ken White
06-26-2008, 09:12 PM
sum it up pretty well. We'll see. One can always hope a change will occur and trickle down...

Norfolk
06-26-2008, 09:58 PM
Glad the Death Certificate has been written for DO; sad that the USMC has found it easier to go to "Enhanced Company Operations". Granted, the USMC has perhaps the best Rifle Company layout in the business, and there are a lot of (other) Infantrymen out there who experience a noticeable Pavlovian response to Marine Infantry TO&E's. But I just don't understand why the USMC doesn't feel comfortable using Platoons to go out and whack the enemy; use your Squads to find em', then bring in the rest of the Platoon to finish 'em. And if things go really wrong, you've got a Platoon (or at least the remnants thereof) to fight your way out, not just a Squad.

But using an entire Company? The enemy will see (or hear) you coming long before you can get to grips with them. Enhanced Company Operations or not (whatever that is) still ends up tending to sacrifice or at least compromise the most important tactical attributes that small-units require (and should exploit to the max when possible) - surprise and agility.

Before I finish, I just want to to make clear that this wasn't a swipe at the Marines, or any other Army that prefers to use Companies where Platoons will do. As anyone can see in places from Fallujah to Garmser, the Marines are unsurpassed at getting it right at the tactical level, combining as they do all Arms right down to Battalion/MEU-level in a way that noone else does, and giving them a battlefield superiority that few can match at that level. I'm just saying that given all this, it does not make any sense that the Marines would see fit to be satisfied with this and not go whole hog to achieve tactical superiority and dominance at all tactical levels, from Battalion all the way down. Something just doesn't fit here. Why?

slapout9
06-26-2008, 10:59 PM
Sad day for me. I have often said that the closest thing to General Gavins's Air Cavalry division was the Marine Air Ground Task force. Gavin's concept of Amoeba warfare was very close to DO operations and I hoped the Marines might prove this out. It is a double loss in a way because it would not just work in LIC but HIC it was the closest thing to one universal theory of combat that would work anywhere, anytime that I have ever seen or read about. General Robert Scales wrote a nice piece about how this might have worked but he didn't call it DO. General Van Ripper seems to have written something too can not remember but I think it went under the name of Precision Maneuver. Looks like it dosen't matter anymore:(

Fuchs
06-26-2008, 11:07 PM
"precision engagement"

I don't know its details, though.

Crusoe
06-28-2008, 04:44 PM
Do not read into this article. My take is the focus will be for Companies to start taking over many of the functions usually reserved for battalions. In my experience in Iraq company FOBs operated semi-independently from Battalion HQ. They relied upon the battalion for logistical support but had all the requirements in place to handle operations. Even to the point of conducting limited targeting.

The effort to place intel cells at the company level just reinforces this effort. Put the tools to accomplish the mission at the lowest level.

Just my two cents.

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 04:47 PM
Do not read into this article. My take is the focus will be for Companies to start taking over many of the functions usually reserved for battalions. In my experience in Iraq company FOBs operated semi-independently from Battalion HQ. They relied upon the battalion for logistical support but had all the requirements in place to handle operations. Even to the point of conducting limited targeting.

The effort to place intel cells at the company level just reinforces this effort. Put the tools to accomplish the mission at the lowest level.

Just my two cents.

That's a valid approach as long as resources are not seriously limited. It's likely effective but not very efficient, though.

Ken White
06-28-2008, 05:25 PM
trumps efficiency. Totally. Unless one can safely remain a theorist...

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 05:31 PM
trumps efficiency. Totally. Unless one can safely remain a theorist...

It seems as you (as American?) didn't quite get the "resources" thing in my post.

Ken White
06-28-2008, 06:24 PM
It seems as you (as American?) didn't quite get the "resources" thing in my post.I just ignored it... :D

Priorities are priorities. Effectiveness is the priority, efficiency will ALWAYS be second... ;)

Other than in theory, of course. :rolleyes:

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 07:46 PM
And so the KingTiger was born...

Ken White
06-28-2008, 08:44 PM
mission of defense versus little or none in the primary mission of offensive maneuver isn't truly effective? :wry:

Got to admire the efficiency of production in spite of obstacles though.

Fuchs
06-28-2008, 08:58 PM
No, the Tigers are just a standard negative example for use on people who prefer effectiveness over efficiency.

Under condition of scarce resources, there's no greater foolishness than to prefer effectiveness over efficiency, as effectiveness at one point without efficiency costs a lot elsewhere.
To have intelligence and other support personnel at all combat companies is fine as long as it can be afforded, but a terrible idea if this needs to be bought with inefficient cuts elsewhere.
It's a classic limited field of view problem. Most people just look at the reinforced point and don't understand the costs.

Even if the army can afford it - can the nation afford to have an army with such behavioral patterns?
Or maybe the state's going broke meanwhile, and the nation has a balance deficit larger than its defence spending because military macro-economic consumption replaced much macro-economic investment?

But efficient force structure is already off topic, far away from DO.
(Actually it isn't, but it is off topic like we discuss it.)

Crusoe
06-28-2008, 09:29 PM
This has been a process tested in theory and on the ground. Take a look at the past few years in Iraq. The type of combat we face requires increased resources at lower levels. This is done as an adjustment from previous force levels and the competing demands are managed. The decision is made to reduce structure somewhere to increase it somewhere else. I would argue that the past few years has seen an increase in effectiveness and efficiency during our operations in Iraq.

As for behavioral patterns, I am lost on that comment. Are we (Americans) not trying to maximize are current structure? Dare I say it, trying to be more efficient:)

Ken White
06-28-2008, 10:16 PM
No, the Tigers are just a standard negative example for use on people who prefer effectiveness over efficiency.Since it wasn't fully effective, it was obviously inefficient as well...
To have intelligence and other support personnel at all combat companies is fine as long as it can be afforded, but a terrible idea if this needs to be bought with inefficient cuts elsewhere.METT-TC applies. Always. Currently it is affordable, it is effective and it is certainly not a permanent, embed it in the TOE thing -- and I don't think anyone's seriously suggesting that. No need for it in full scale conventional combat for example.
Even if the army can afford it - can the nation afford to have an army with such behavioral patterns?It has for the past 233 plus years (some of our habits pre-date the departure of the British). Whether that will be true in the future remains to be seen though I suspect your children's children will be the ones who see it, not you or I.
Or maybe the state's going broke meanwhile, and the nation has a balance deficit larger than its defence spending because military macro-economic consumption replaced much macro-economic investment?Perhaps or maybe we've just outsmarted ourselves again. We do that frequently... :D
But efficient force structure is already off topic, far away from DO.(Actually it isn't, but it is off topic like we discuss it.)Not necessarily...

Rifleman
06-29-2008, 05:59 AM
Sad day for me. I have often said that the closest thing to General Gavins's Air Cavalry division was the Marine Air Ground Task force.

I'm not sure. If I understand the proposal correctly, it sounds sort of like an attempt to push the MAGTF concept down to company level.

Did anyone else get that impression?

VMI_Marine
06-30-2008, 10:58 AM
Maybe in some ways it is the MAGTF concept, although I don't see the "air" piece of the task force being incorporated at a company level. I'm think DO was a bit of a reach at this point, so the decision to focus on company level operations is a good one. It seems like more of a natural progression to develop the enhanced companies before working on distributed platoons and squads. After all, a company HQ with better embedded logistics and intel support and its an operations capability would be better able to support distributed operations in the future. I know MCCDC said DO was dead, but I really can see it being a natural outgrowth of ECO.

Where can I find more info on TSULC? Sounds like it would be a great course to push some of our ANGLICO NCOs through, but this is the first I've ever heard of it. We've been trying to get slots to the Army's RSLC as a substitute.

William F. Owen
06-30-2008, 12:42 PM
Glad the Death Certificate has been written for DO; sad that the USMC has found it easier to go to "Enhanced Company Operations". Granted, the USMC has perhaps the best Rifle Company layout in the business, and there are a lot of (other) Infantrymen out there who experience a noticeable Pavlovian response to Marine Infantry TO&E's. But I just don't understand why the USMC doesn't feel comfortable using Platoons to go out and whack the enemy; use your Squads to find em', then bring in the rest of the Platoon to finish 'em. And if things go really wrong, you've got a Platoon (or at least the remnants thereof) to fight your way out, not just a Squad.


I broadly concur. Having read and corresponded extensively on DO, I saw nothing in DO that conceptually ruled out the use of Squad, Platoon, or Company. It just wasn't a very well thought out idea in the first place, and it was further challenged (at least in what was written) by seemingly flawed execution.

https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/FeatureTopics/DO/A%20Concept%20for%20Distributed%20Operations%20-%20Final%20CMC%20signed%20co.pdf


Distributed Operations constitutes a form of maneuver warfare. Small, highly capable units spread across a large area of operations will provide the spatial advantage commonly sought in maneuver warfare, in that they will be able to sense an expanded battlespace, and can use close combat or supporting arms, including Joint fires, to disrupt the enemy’s access to key terrain and avenues of approach.

Considering how many things there are wrong with that statement, it's incredible the idea ever got as far as it did!!

Fuchs
06-30-2008, 02:01 PM
The traditional infantry could be used for dispersed forms of infantry combat, but changes in equipment and training would be necessary and organizational changes would enhance the effectiveness a lot.

DO kept confusing me because the statements about it were quite contradictory.
Sometimes it was about 6-man teams, in other documents it was about platoons covering huge gaps between each other with indirect support fires.

VMI_Marine
06-30-2008, 09:03 PM
From what I've heard, the DO platoon in Afghanistan was very successful. I doubt our capability to field more than one or two of these platoons per battalion, however. For one, the DO concept calls for a JTAC per squad. That's 27 JTACs per battalion, not including the air shop in the S-3. The EWTGs can't meet that sort of demand for trained JTACs.

I think the Marine Corps is making the right call to focus on developing company-level operations. We've trained for years to fight as battalions, and only as independent companies as absolutely necessary. Now we move to "Enhanced Companies". I'll be interested to see what capabilities develop out of this, and how exactly my company will be enhanced.

Either way, it looks to be an exciting time for me to take command of a company of Marines.

Fuchs
06-30-2008, 09:22 PM
From what I've heard, the DO platoon in Afghanistan was very successful. I doubt our capability to field more than one or two of these platoons per battalion, however. For one, the DO concept calls for a JTAC per squad. That's 27 JTACs per battalion, not including the air shop in the S-3. The EWTGs can't meet that sort of demand for trained JTACs.


I'm rather clueless about all those acronyms, but I remember that the USA raised a multi-million men army out of a tiny army in World War II in about three years.
DO has been around as DO and as predecessor forms for more than ten years now.
Any training bottlenecks are wrong excuses imho.

jcustis
06-30-2008, 10:02 PM
Interestingly enough, there is a certain appeal to me regarding DO, but an almost equal aversion, because I am in the USMC's LAR community, where we have coys of 25 vehicles apiece. Each vehicle, regardless of variant, is crewed by less than 8 Marines, yet the company commander has two forms of high power VHF communications to the vehicle.

If I remember correctly, the structure of DO elements was based around a team riding inside of some JLTV-esque vehicle, which no doubt had the requisite communications and could move about nimbly acoss the battlefield in a mobile role, or presumable slow down to 3.5 mph when dismounted tactics were required.

LAR platoons are currently operating with great depth and width between themselves, and even during the "march up" we did not always operate in mutually supporting (by means of direct fire) elements. The LAV-25's greatest asset is it's sensors, whether it be the stabilized thermal sight, or a vehicle commander with a set of binoculars. I remember being slightly caught off guard during my first field exercise, when I had communication with every one of the other 24 vehicles, and out to a great range. Compare that to my days when the platoon HQ had one VHF radio, and my surprise comes into context.

I think DO has merits, but it was thought out by folks who didn't have any practical experience in any distributed operations outside of the historical constructs they used to explain DO. I am probably wrong and will gladly stand corrected if someone from the Marine Corps comes aboard and sets the record straight. As a result, I think DO bankrupted itself with the gear requirements, and became tough to swallow.

These initiatives often die hard, because during the xperimentation phases, a lot of gucci gear is procured and pushed down - and used well in most cases - for employment because it is just how we do it. Then when it comes time to look at pushing gear sets across the Marine Corps, tough bedgetary choices have to be made. This may be an oversimplification, but I am always ready to eat a little crow.

William F. Owen
07-01-2008, 05:56 AM
I think DO has merits, but it was thought out by folks who didn't have any practical experience in any distributed operations outside of the historical constructs they used to explain DO. I am probably wrong and will gladly stand corrected if someone from the Marine Corps comes aboard and sets the record straight. As a result, I think DO bankrupted itself with the gear requirements, and became tough to swallow.
.

Without breaking any confidences I can say that I was informally consulted as to my opinions of DO by one of the men responsible for the concept. As outline to me at the time, it seemed to make sense.

About a year later I got to talk to one of the men involved in actually making it happen and it then made very little sense compared to what I had discussed and the written papers did not impress me.

I think DO became "new and clever". - and the more I work on and study this area, the more I believe we need to keep things "iron-bar-simple."

Ranger94
07-01-2008, 07:26 PM
Without breaking any confidences I can say that I was informally consulted as to my opinions of DO by one of the men responsible for the concept. As outline to me at the time, it seemed to make sense.

About a year later I got to talk to one of the men involved in actually making it happen and it then made very little sense compared to what I had discussed and the written papers did not impress me.

I think DO became "new and clever". - and the more I work on and study this area, the more I believe we need to keep things "iron-bar-simple."


William Owen (and anyone else),

Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?

Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.

Norfolk
07-02-2008, 12:48 AM
Without breaking any confidences I can say that I was informally consulted as to my opinions of DO by one of the men responsible for the concept. As outline to me at the time, it seemed to make sense.

About a year later I got to talk to one of the men involved in actually making it happen and it then made very little sense compared to what I had discussed and the written papers did not impress me.

I think DO became "new and clever". - and the more I work on and study this area, the more I believe we need to keep things "iron-bar-simple."

What is almost amazing, considering how much time and effort was put into DO, starting with Project METROPOLIS, and through the various "Hunter"-series of experiments, and finally to DO itself, is that DO was even "killed-off" at all. It might have turned into another V-22; too good a concept to give up on, but too hard to get just right, yet still dragging on year after year, decade after decade.

DO as originally envisaged is indeed too good to let go of; but DO as it mutated into a sort of shiny-kit monster in reality was a beast that had to be slain. Otherwise, at the very least it would have placed intolerable pressures upon budgets, resources, and training, and have produced something that might not have been terribly applicable outside of an LIC environment - at least for some of the roles in which it was being proposed or implied - except of course for reconnaissance and certain other special units. It may well be organizationally and technologically possible to equip regular infantry as DO. It might even be argued that DO was more or less duplicating what some specialist units already do, just with the latest technology; but we do not normally expect said specialist units to perform regular infantry tasks. So, for other than reconnaissance and certain other missions and tasks, how practical is DO outside of an LIC environment?

It seems that the original DO gave way to something like conceptual and technological hubris; whatever its reputed effectiveness on the COIN battlefield, it seemed to try to go too far too fast, and for practical purposes may not be applicable to the ground force as a whole. But like I said, DO in principle is too good conceptually to completely let go of. If it is not preserved in some limited form somewhere, it will almost certainly return in the future in another guise.

Ranger94 wrote:


William Owen (and anyone else),

Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?

Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.

Without going into details, it is my (and very possibly poorly informed) understanding that non-DO units resorted to the 6-man "team/squad" out of practical necessity as the 4-man Fire Teams just weren't cutting it (for different reasons), and that in certain instances such teams were also employed in a sort of ad hoc DO manner for certain purposes. It seems it may have worked well enough that DO itself seemed unnecessary, even excessive, by comparison. Probably the right decision to give DO the axe, then, at least for the foreseeable future.

Fuchs
07-02-2008, 01:18 AM
Well Norfolk, you know my take on DO. I believe that a familiar concept would make a great niche force, an economy of force screening/delaying force that would be in one league with other specialist light units like mountain, airborne, marine (actually, I think airborne and mountain should be one branch, but that's another topic).

The technological challenges for Do can't be too great - most necessary equipment will be/was developed for the U.S.Army (FCS subsystems) anyways.
I believe that the personnel selection, training & morale effort is much more a problem.

But I'm pretty sure that this didn't "kill" DO either.
I remember very well the report about how an entire 4-man sniper detachment was found slain in Iraq.
DO is probably politically not feasible.

William F. Owen
07-02-2008, 06:21 AM
William Owen (and anyone else),

Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?

Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.

Well I'm not sure I am more qualified than anyone else on this matter, and no, I can't site anything written that specifically relates to the decision to abandon DO. ...but.

a.) I don't think the USMC ever really wanted to do it. With Rumsfeld gone, they got let off the hook, so jumped. - and as a concept it was poorly explained and reasoned - at least is some material. The USMC wanted to avoid saying "we need to be better infantry," - and all armies are avoiding grasping this nettle.

b.) I don't think the concept writers had any idea of how much support 6-8-12 men need. Look at what happened with Op Anaconda and Redwing. Even in Northern Ireland, a very benign environment, a 4-man covert O.P. needed an entire Platoon on QRF.

c.) I think the number of men in a "team" is a distraction. It's who is on the end of the radio and who close enough to help, that makes the difference.

Wildcat
07-07-2008, 03:49 PM
It seems that the original DO gave way to something like conceptual and technological hubris; whatever its reputed effectiveness on the COIN battlefield, it seemed to try to go too far too fast, and for practical purposes may not be applicable to the ground force as a whole. But like I said, DO in principle is too good conceptually to completely let go of. If it is not preserved in some limited form somewhere, it will almost certainly return in the future in another guise.

The more I look at DO, the more I agree with what you said here. I remember getting a hold of a PDF or PowerPoint from MCCDC about a year ago when I first heard of the DO concept, and the amount of kit they were hauling, as well as how expensive it looked, made the whole thing look very outlandish, like the British LRDG on steroids. Or maybe "Starship Troopers" (the Heinlein version). It also looked very cool, and I remember thinking how much I wanted to be a part of that, but I didn't even consider how much it would cost the taxpayers to have even one of those units running around (of course, if we could scrap a few F-22s it might all even out). Having a JTAC to coordinate fires from the air means adding even more sophisticated and sensitive gadgetry. And as was pointed out earlier, a unit that small operating with that degree of "autonomy" still requires a great degree of logistical backing, not to mention a QRF or something on standby in case something bad goes down. Not to mention the experienced officers and NCOs you would have to pull from other units that might need them, and the extensive schooling and training they would need to operative effectively. Like all brand new toys and concepts that sparkle and shine, DO just seemed way too expensive, and was definitely blurring the line between conventional units and spec ops (not that that's necessarily a bad thing).

Maybe once ECO starts to put boots on the ground, MCCDC can start looking for ways to streamline those earlier DO concepts, maybe by not pushing as much gucci gear. Either way, I want to see life breathed back into this beast, partly for the sake of my own fantasies about being a part of it, as well as for the sake of seeing its effects on the battlefield.

COMMAR
07-07-2008, 07:51 PM
I think it may have been pushing a little too hard too fast, but I think it was more an of operational decision to shift more emphasis towards Enhancing Company level Operations.

You have to remember DO was not only designed to enhance the squad giving it Plt level influence, but to raise the Plt to Comp-BN level and the Comp to BN to Brigade level influence. But DO was designed to work chain reaction like from the Squad up.

I think the speed of that change was too fast for Old School 3-4 Stars to accept under their tenure. Which is exactly why I think the emphasis has shifted fr/ the Sqd/Plt to the Company.

I think you really understand the extent DO was pushing the USMC towards. I think many you understand the Gadgets & Techs, but I mean the Operational Level the Corps was considering was far beyond simply pushing beyond the traditional front lines.

The Extent that DO was being Developed was pushing more along the lines of self deploying Expeditionary Squads & Platoons. Reinforced Squads & Plts deploying on Navy, Coast Guard, & MPF Shipping & to foreign countries.

The experiments that were conducted showed the Marines could handle the Mission but that the Marine Corps was not Structured to handle it, and that the Generals weren't comfortable with the structural changes that would need to be made to put the emphasis that low.

One of the Experiments, that wrapped earlier this year, involved a Marine Rifle Squad Deployed on a Coast Guard Cutter that Deployed to the Caribbean. They conducted Bi-lateral training w/host nations and Maritime Security w/ the CG.

The change in structure in a short amount of time would've been radical. So I believe the emphasis on the Sqd/Plt was shifted to the Company. A more gradual and logical shift.

Keep In Mind that DO as a tactical capability has gone nowhere its being absorbed and institutionalized and all the gear is still been issued to the BN's.

COMMAR
07-07-2008, 08:57 PM
I think it may have been pushing a little too hard too fast, but I think it was more an of operational decision to shift more emphasis towards Enhancing Company level Operations.

You have to remember DO was not only designed to enhance the squad giving it Plt level influence, but to raise the Plt to Comp-BN level and the Comp to BN to Brigade level influence. But DO was designed to work chain reaction like from the Squad up.

I think the speed of that change was too fast for Old School 3-4 Stars to accept under their tenure. Which is exactly why I think the emphasis has shifted fr/ the Sqd/Plt to the Company.

I think you really understand the extent DO was pushing the USMC towards. I think many you understand the Gadgets & Techs, but I mean the Operational Level the Corps was considering was far beyond simply pushing beyond the traditional front lines.

The Extent that DO was being Developed was pushing more along the lines of self deploying Expeditionary Squads & Platoons. Reinforced Squads & Plts deploying on Navy, Coast Guard, & MPF Shipping & to foreign countries.

The experiments that were conducted showed the Marines could handle the Mission but that the Marine Corps was not Structured to handle it, and that the Generals weren't comfortable with the structural changes that would need to be made to put the emphasis that low.

One of the Experiments, that wrapped earlier this year, involved a Marine Rifle Squad Deployed on a Coast Guard Cutter that Deployed to the Caribbean. They conducted Bi-lateral training w/host nations and Maritime Security w/ the CG.

The change in structure in a short amount of time would've been radical. So I believe the emphasis on the Sqd/Plt was shifted to the Company. A more gradual and logical shift.

Keep In Mind that DO as a tactical capability has gone nowhere its being absorbed and institutionalized and all the gear is still been issued to the BN's.

All the gear that was slated for the DO Plts in a DO trained BN is still planned to be handed out to the BNs. Its part of the IBEP, Infantry Battalion Enhancement Program, at a cost of an additional $19mil per BN.

All the DO Training courses; Combat Hunter, TSULC, T3, etc. are becoming foundational training of all BNs.

Squad Leaders are still being trained to Call in everything up to & including Type II CAS. The training pipeline for JTACs is still being expanded to include Infantry Plt Commanders & Plt Sgts.

If you look at the SC MAGTF construct you'll see that Platoons are still planned on being independently deployed to various countries just under the guidance of there Companies.

Tactically DO is still alive, Operationally its dead and been replaced by a Company centric Mindset. But I believe only temporarily until the Marine Corps can structurally support the full extent Planned for DO.

When it does I believe the USMC will transist fr/ Expeditionary DO Sqd/Plt Operations to Exped. Enhanced Company Ops to Higher as fluidly as it does Comp/SPMAGTF to BN/MEU to MEB operations of today; which is using the capability that best suits the mission.

I believe the ultimate goal will be to have Infantry Squads w/a Reborn CAP, Combined Action Platoon like ability, but on an Expeditionary Scale. Giving the USMC the ability to conduct Expeditionary Operations on all levels.

jcustis
07-07-2008, 09:17 PM
You reference a lack of proper structural support, but I'm not sure I follow what support is required.

As for the new courses, call me a doubting Thomas, but they are just making up for years of willfully ignoring basics and not structuring training well IMO.

I'm not hopeful that we will take proper care of the new gear. Repair/replace is going to be an interesting headache in short time.

COMMAR
07-07-2008, 10:20 PM
Tactically DO is still alive, Operationally its dead and been replaced by a Company centric Mindset. But I believe only temporarily until the Marine Corps can structurally support the full extent Planned for DO.

When it does I believe the USMC will transist fr/ Expeditionary DO Sqd/Plt Operations to Exped. Enhanced Company Ops to Higher as fluidly as it does Comp/SPMAGTF to BN/MEU to MEB operations of today; which is using the capability that best suits the mission.

I believe the ultimate goal will be to have Infantry Squads w/a Reborn CAP, Combined Action Platoon like ability, but on an Expeditionary Scale. Giving the USMC the ability to conduct Expeditionary Operations on all levels.


For those unfamiliar w/ the CAP Program or what the Plts were capable of or why I believe the USMC's ultimate goal is for CAP like Expeditionary Squads, here's some background info.

The CAP was one of the most successful programs of the Vietnam war. It consisted of a Reinforced 15 man Marine Rifle Squad lead by an E5/Sgt. They were attached to 1 or more S. Vietnamese Villages and Hamlets & a PF Army Plt.

What made these Reinforced Squads unique was not only were they charged w/raising and training the local Militia & giving guidance to the PF's Army Plt, similar to an ETT, but they were given Company like Responsibility over their assigned AO.

They conducted Offensive Operations, developed Intelligence networks, & conducted their own Humanitarian Ops independent of, but under the Guidance of their HHQ.

Its this type of Independent Operating ability I believe the USMC is looking into eventually Creating in its Expeditionary Rifle Squads which is the ultimate goal of DO. Independent in ability but ultimately part of a larger construct able to fluid move fr/ one Expeditionary MAGTF Construct to the next depending on the need.

Also the creator and architect of the DO concept as well as Combat Hunter & other programs, Gen Jim Mattis, is a huge fan the CAP Plt concept of Vietnam and has always found ways to incorporate their capabilities into Marine Infantry.

He is presently Commander of Joint Forces Command, but is rumored to be 1st in line to be the 35th Commandant if he chooses to accept and not retire.

If so he will be in the driver's seat of the Transformation that he initiated. Transformation that he says began in his mind after he led the first Marine forces into A'stan in 2001.

jcustis
07-07-2008, 10:40 PM
Interesting points COMMAR. I will say that the concept of the small unit leader is maturing, but I still say DO simply overshot its landing a bit. Would you be so kind as to post an intro in the introductions thread?

COMMAR
07-07-2008, 10:58 PM
You reference a lack of proper structural support, but I'm not sure I follow what support is required.

I'm not hopeful that we will take proper care of the new gear. Repair/replace is going to be an interesting headache in short time.


Logistics for one, not to mention C4ISR support that would need to be brought to the Sqd/Plt level to make DO work at the extent planned.

Running a few Squads or Plts from a MEU construct fr/ ship 100mi out thats possible today. However Running a few Expeditionary Platoons or Squads thru-out a Theater fr/ a Home base in say Rota, Spain or Sao Tome is a different matter.

Thats the extent DO was being pushed. Giving Plts OpCon of whichever areas they were sent. Under the Guidance of an overall command. That would have called for alot of assets that can't be brought down to the Plt level at this time.

Thats not what the ECO concept provides, it puts OpCon the the hands of the Company. And in the SC MAGTF construct the Company has OpCon but is under the Guidance of the SC MAGTF Command.

The ECO Construct puts the C4ISR, Logistics, & Support at the Company level. The Company has Operational Control over the various AO's the Plts & Sqds will operate in.

Like Company Level Intel Cells, UAV, Engineering, Data Networks, Resupply all at the Company Level w/the ECO. Under DO's Exp. Sqd/Plt alot of that would reside in the Exp. Plt which is not possible at this time.

The Squad sized Deployment w/the CG thru the Caribbean showed the Squads if trained can operate on their own in various cases the problem would be supporting X-number of Squads & Plts operating Independently and Dispersed thru-out a whole Theater.

Presently it can't be done, but a halfway solution is to deploy Independently Operating Companies under the Guidance of HHQ & place the support w/ them. You let them design the missions & disperse the Support as necessary, 'Enhanced Company Operations'.

COMMAR
07-07-2008, 10:59 PM
Interesting points COMMAR. I will say that the concept of the small unit leader is maturing, but I still say DO simply overshot its landing a bit. Would you be so kind as to post an intro in the introductions thread?

Whats that?

Ken White
07-07-2008, 11:24 PM
resume of sorts -- you can go to this LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=50785#post50785), scroll up and see what some others have written. Then add your own intro.

jcustis
07-07-2008, 11:55 PM
I don't know about the whole range of C4ISR limitations, but I do know that until we can squeeze out more bandwidth and satcom channels, we won't be doing DO or too much ECO. Is anybody taking on those problems?

Baguba
07-08-2008, 01:17 PM
From Vol. 21, No. 27, July 7, 2008 of www.InsideDefense.com’s: Inside the Navy.

"The Marine Corps calls the idea of dispersing Marine companies throughout a battlefield and equipping them to maneuver independently “enhanced company operations” (ECO). The concept was approved by senior service officials in April. It is the next iteration of the distributed operations concept, which called for breaking up units into much smaller groups for the same type of decentralized warfighting. “Our enemies will use large forces if it’s to their benefit in a certain area, but for the most part it’s going to be irregular warfare. And our companies, through enhanced company operations, will be trained and equipped better to fight both,” Murray said. “They can be distributed -- fight in a small, distributed unit -- or they can come together and fight in a more traditional manner.”

I would argue with around $630 million dollars of congressional funds allocated to DO as a concept and its related equipment and training, it is not dead. I doubt the Marine Corps wants to give all that money back.
What has DO influence so far?
1) ALL 36 Battalion T/E's have had a DO/IBEPP increase.
2) There has been an increased throughput at SOI(W), SOI(E) and 3d Marine Regimental Schools for Infantry Squad Leaders Course (ISLC).
3) MTT’s are traveling around the Corps teaching the Bn's leadership T3 so they can run their own Tactical Small Unit Leaders (TSULC) course [read fire team leaders course at Bn level].
4) Combat Hunter is being implemented from all entry level training (TBS, MCRD) to career level Schools in a building block approach.
5) Increase funding for new optics, OTH amphib vehicles, and tilt rotor planes has be allocated.
6) Enhanced Company Operations has been developed as a parallel course for the Marine Corps to get to DO, once technology, training and manpower can catch up.
7) DO is not a unit, it is a capability. This is not the Army's 10th Mountain that doesn't train in the mountains. It is a type of operation, a distributed one.
8) This evolution from the Sea Dragon experiments in the 90’s that have continued to be improved and transformed into DO, to the platoon that tested out some of the capabilities in Afghanistan, to ECO is a natural evolution to a level of proficiency we want our forces to get to in the near term.

So gents, I would argue it is not dead, we are still working on it. However, as administrations, change and CMC change the troughs and peaks of interest for DO vary, but the DO wave is still moving along

jcustis
07-08-2008, 01:43 PM
It would seem that you happened upon this thread via a google string on your work, or have been lurking all along. What Quantico command might you be out of, and what aspects of DO are you working on? It helps readers put things in context.

And please humor me a bit. Is DO simply a term for employing good common sense across tactics, training, and equipping? I ask because it seemed that in 2006 there was the DO faddishness, as if we had no historians within our ranks anymore. It made me shrug my shoulders and ask "so what?"

Baguba
07-08-2008, 01:48 PM
I actually did happen upon this thread by a Google search as I was looking for information on ECO. I have been following this concept since I saw Marines running around with PDA in Pendleton in 96' to being immersed in LOE1 from MCWL and following the conferences and papers since.

COMMAR
11-04-2008, 03:06 AM
I don't know about the whole range of C4ISR limitations, but I do know that until we can squeeze out more bandwidth and satcom channels, we won't be doing DO or too much ECO. Is anybody taking on those problems?

Limitations in C4ISR as in reference to DO, presently, sure there are.

You have to think everything thru to its logical conclusion. When you think about 1 Sqd fr/ 1 Plt dispersed gathering Intel, running simple surveillance, or basic recon maybe taking pics etc etc. Sure simple easily handled for 1.

But KIM 1/3's DO Plt that was in A'stan in '06 said they often split into as many as 9 to 11 seperate elements concealed & miles apart constantly feeding the 10th Mtn Intel (and they were under tight restrictions).

Multiply that by a whole BN of Plts that can go fr/1 to 11 & back at any given time. The Intel pipeline turns fr/a facet to a firehose but still draining out of the same sink.

The proper filters are not in place to syphon off, process, and pass on then feedback all that Info. Thats really where the ECO Concept kicks in, to handle & kickback as much Intel as possible at the Lowest Possible Level.

Coldstreamer
11-12-2009, 03:40 PM
...my battalion ran Distributed Ops in the Defence against a superior armoured force on a TESEX last year, which worked very well. Distributed, highly dispersed light role infantry operating as small groups of determined men, with cached CSS, autonamous aufragstaktik guidance, clearly delineated & simple battlespace management and C2 redundancy. It was a great success. By the same token, 'multiples' or 3 x fire teams of 4 men (about the same size as an ODA...) can routinely conduct all sorts of useful activity on operations if connected to the right ISTAR enablers. As ever, it all needs to be J2 led, and this pushed down to Company level. Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm, or on a front gate doing fatigues when PMCs could stag on and guard the camp for a fraction of the price. With embedded specialists at the right level, you can get a far greater return on your investment by making your operations meaningful (and I don't just mean CT Strike - J2 led ops apply to EVERYTHING).
Tiger and King Tiger analogies are all great sport, but inappropriate for this. J2 specialists are 'inefficient' if you're trying to resource a clanking great industrial age nation-state army. But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all.

What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation. If we (the West) had grasped this and adapted to the emerging AQ/non state threat in the 90s (numerous clarion Agency warnings, all unheeded), rather than configuring for Desert Storm Ultra, perhaps we'd be a few pages ahead in history than we are today.

Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....

Ken White
11-12-2009, 05:09 PM
...Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm...But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all...What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation.

Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....Yes -- but please do it before you're promoted to Brigadier or above -- they seem to often lose the bubble...:D

My belief is that's due to having carpets on the floor in their offices. There's something about carpet fibers... :wry:

Excellent points all.

PhilR
11-12-2009, 05:33 PM
At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried to a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating. One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table. Just as he had finished, in rushed an aide-de-camp, shouting - 'Is General Clement here?' Clement, hearing him, sat up and exclaimed: 'No! but Colonel Clement is.' 'Oh, mon general' cried the aide-de-camp, embracing him, 'the Emperor was overwhelmed when we heard of your gallantry, and has promoted you on the field of battle to the rank of General.' Clement rubbed his eyes, got off the table, clapped the top of his skull on his head and was about to leave the farm, when Larrey shouted after him: 'Mon general - your brains!' To which the gallant Frenchman, increasing his speed, shouted back: 'Now that I am a general I shall no longer require them!'

From Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure

Coldstreamer
11-12-2009, 08:39 PM
Yes -- but please do it before you're promoted to Brigadier or above -- they seem to often lose the bubble...:D

.


Little danger of that!

Xenophon
11-13-2009, 01:47 AM
I was under the impression that DO was not dead, it just became ECO. The only difference being that the Company level gets the equipment and manpower to run an operations center and an intelligence cell. I believe independent fire team operations is still a mainstay.

tankersteve
01-17-2010, 01:14 AM
Any new developments on this thread? I am very interested in the 6-man fire team as a basis of any maneuver unit.

Just curious how this is developing.

Tankersteve

jcustis
01-17-2010, 06:25 AM
TS, did you catch the SW Blog post about new company experimentation here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/marine-corps-experiments-with/

A recent Marine Corps Gazette article in .pdf form is at the Potomac Institute link and lays out the structural changes envisioned.

William F. Owen
01-17-2010, 06:27 AM
Any new developments on this thread? I am very interested in the 6-man fire team as a basis of any maneuver unit.

I don't know about DO, but 6-man fire team has been done and works well. - it's about as big as a so-called "fire team" can get.
More important is it usually depends how many 6-man fire teams you have, and what they do rather than it being 3,4,5 or 6 men in the team.

jmm99
01-17-2010, 07:42 PM
which (http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/466_Goulding%20Rifle%20Company%20Experiment.pdf) shall reside in that part of my harddrive titled "New USMC Concepts".

Many years ago, a futurist (joking a bit) said that the key to future miniturization of machines was to create a machine that would make clones of itself in the next smaller scale - and so on, until the desired degree of miniturization was reached.

So, now we (it seems) have a new level in the MAGTF, from:

1. Extra-Large (the Corps)

2. Large (GCE - Div)

3. Medium (GCE - Regt)

4. Small (GCE - Bn)

5. Mini (GCE - Coy)

All dependent on the individual Marines who compose the units.

Regards

Mike

jcustis
01-17-2010, 07:56 PM
All dependent on the individual Marines who compose the units.

Absolutely!

All of the re-org is great...to a point. Even given the most optimized and efficient setup, I have become increasingly convinced that without an incredibly strong training and professional military education roadmap that develops leaders at the section leader, platoon sergeant, and platoon commander level, it means absolutely nothing.

We haven't gotten there yet, though the efforts put forward ARE helping.

Ken White
01-17-2010, 08:36 PM
Well trained leaders, NCO and Officer, will successfully adjust the organization according to METT-TC. The untrained cannot do that and thus will wrongly use organizations designed for one mission for another with quite predictable results...

Fuchs
06-08-2012, 06:46 PM
Does any<body remember the other titles and acronyms used for distributed operations and similar concepts?

I remember there were at least some titled experiments, but cannot remember the titles. "dragon something" or so (not the Dragonfire auto mortar).

TT
06-08-2012, 09:30 PM
I believe you are thinking of the USMC Warfighting Laboratory's series of experiments. The overarching process of experimentation, named ‘Sea Dragon’, was a Five-Year Plan of advanced concept-based war-fighting experiments.

The principal Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) were Hunter Warrior (1996), Urban Warrior (1999), and Capable Warrior (2001). Hunter Warrior was the AWE that first experimented with the concept of distributed operations.

Fuchs
06-08-2012, 09:44 PM
Thanks, I think that's it.
The details escaped my memory after a decade...

Fuchs
06-27-2013, 06:56 PM
For the archive; a 2009 presentation on Enhanced Company Operations.

http://ismor.cds.cranfield.ac.uk/26th-symposium-2009/analytical-support-to-the-emerging-concept-of-operations/@@download/presentation/Bailey.ppt

from http://ismor.cds.cranfield.ac.uk/26th-symposium-2009