MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility

[William F. Owen]

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,


They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).


YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

[Fuchs]

A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,


They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).


YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

"better", "less" - in comparison to what?


The cross-country mobility of MRAPs has to be poor on all soft or hard but uneven terrains judged by the mean maximum ground pressure and the running gear.
Such vehicles only provide road mobility. They can negotiate difficult terrain sometimes, but not reliably enough to be used off-road regularly.

The protection is highly specialized against blast, crude EFP and obsolete RPGs. I bet that these vehicles don't have bomblet protection.

The costs are much higher than the costs of unprotected trucks and trucks with protected cabins.

MRAP is huge, even the "smaller" versions. These vehicles cannot easily be hidden against competent enemies with modern sensor technology.


But let's ignore the technical aspects for a while. The focus on armour to enhance survivability seems to me as an outgrowth of LI warfare. It worked because the opponents have only very limited lethality.
An opponent with modern lethality would easily destroy such vehicles despite their armour. There's a reason why so many people demand equal protection of IFVs and MBTs - even IFVs are not really survivable enough in a HIC.
Survivability in HIC requires to keep one's position unknown. Vehicles need to be easily concealable and if possible be silent and leave no traces offroad.
MRAP-sized vehicles cannot be easily hidden and their protection won't help much against battlefield weapons, so I'd say they're the wrong choice.

In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

[William F. Owen]

In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

[VMI_Marine]

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

Leather cadillacs and e-tools? :D

I had an MRAP for two months on my last tour. Fantastic vehicle for convoy ops - it's like having a Tactical Escalade compared to the Humvee. Useless offroad, though. We couldn't travel more than 10-15 kph offroad, and even then you had better be strapped in tight. I operated with an M113 briefly, until my CoC told me to cease and desist from operating Army vehicles, and in retrospect I loved the mobility it provided me over the MRAP. I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

[Fuchs]

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.
I'd integrate local militiamen into community-embedded platoons/companies anyway; the locals would create a safe environment and warn of dangers more thoroughly with some of them on every "foreign" vehicle anyway.
Soldiers could also use local transport vehicles on raids and intelligence missions.


For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)

- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts)

Such a truck would survive indirect HE fires less well, but it would be much less likely under such and other fires. The small signature to enemy reconnaissance would increase the uncertainty for the enemy.
Imagine an infantry company occupies a community close to a major city to block an important road nearby. It's no rural community, so there's no barn. MRAPs cold be parked under gas stations , but most of them only in the open.
An enemy 5 lbs drone makes a fly-over and the enemy knows almost all truck positions and the defender strength. 320mm MRL and 142mm SPH flatten the community with HE, a mech company approaches combat-like and clears the ruins.
Imagine a company occupying the community with my light truck design; you could send much better recon assets, even drive through with some recon AFVs and would still not become aware of the occupation.

In high intensity warfare you need to defeat their sensors, not their munitions for survivability.
Some people believe that "stealth" doesn't work on the ground. They think too much of Arab deserts imho.

[William F. Owen]

I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

I think that long fast road moves are going to become increasingly important. That means putting tracked APCs on low-loaders and that takes a lot of time and then you are road bound anyway.

I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

It's worth just taking a look at this,
http://www.defense-update.com/products/w/wildcat.htm

It costs about 1/3rd of what Stryker does, and to my mind is more capable, in that given a choice, I would select this over Stryker.

[Randy Brown]

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

...

YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

I'm not sure whether I've unpacked your last paragraph correctly, but I am curious as to why your "MRAP and JLTV" query did not also mention the Stryker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker_(vehicle)) family of vehicles, as well as the Armored Security Vehicle (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/asv.htm). I recently attended a short briefing on the former, and was struck by some tactical and organizational advantages in its current use. For example:


Tactical: Moving quietly (http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/07/08/iraq_duty_sells_soldiers_on_quiet_stryker.html) on the battlefield.
Organizational: Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) are organized one battalion "heavier" (http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/10/02/stryker_brigade_101.html) than other BCT types.

Regarding the ASV, I note that some U.S. infantry with which I am affiliated deployed to OIF Security Force (SECFOR) missions were issued ASV, rather than armored Humvees. I don't know whether this was in order to make them provisional Military Police in all but name, but it did have implications for how they moved and fought.

I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

[William F. Owen]

I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

I tried not to mention Stryker but the points raised sort of forced me into it for the sake of clarity - something i guess I should try harder for!! :D -

Both Stryker and ASV seems to have very poor levels of protection. I think technology, operational reality and threat have all left Stryker far behind, but it's here now so folks will have to deal with it.

Another interesting vehicle is the Australian Bushmaster (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushmaster_IMV)

[Fuchs]

I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

Mostly correct.
But consider this; how much would the infantry travel on roads? Let's assume a road speed of only 50 km/h. A five-hour move would certainly be an exception for infantry, happening only once in some weeks. The average truck might be moving less than one or two hours per day (logistics vehicles would move much more).
That's 22-23 hours per day without movement (albeit possibly waiting on or next to a road). Do you want a huge protected but difficult-to-conceal truck (an invitation to concentrate the squad in the vehicle especially in cold climate) or a smaller, easily concealed vehicle?

Concealed vehicles wouldn't need to be guarded as much and the lower weight and fuel consumption reduce maintenance and logistical requirements.
Some off-road capability is required for many tasks. Engineering vehicles for earthworks and lower echelon supply vehicles as well as vehicles for ATGM or mortar crews need to be off-road capable.

Furthermore; the armour employed in MRAPs is not quantity production material. Even if they used simple RHA we would still have a supply shortage in the event of a major war that requires ten thousands, not only about 2,000 vehicles per year. What's our equipment good for if you cannot produce it in wartime quantities, if you cannot equip your mobilized army?


Israel is a special case. It has rather high force densities in the event of a war, hard ground surfaces in many areas, many hilly terrains (Negev, Sinai, Lebanon, Golan) that don't permit much off-road activity anyway and its possible opponents cannot expect to achieve much with their reconnaissance or artillery.

[Surferbeetle]

I enjoyed using the HMMWV before all the armor hit. The stryker looks interesting but I have never been in one during a combat tour so I can't say.

What have/do our allies use(d)?

From Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler_Dingo) the Dingo

The Daimler Scout Car, known in service as the "Dingo" (after the Australian wild dogs), was a British light fast 4WD reconnaissance vehicle also used in the liaison role during the Second World War.

From Defesanet (http://www.defesanet.com.br/afv/kmw_apc_e.htm) the Dingo 2

The DINGO 2 is a consistent upgrade of the DINGO 1 all-protected carrier vehicle transport vehicle introduced into service in the year 2000 and proven in many foreign missions. For as many as eight crew, it currently affords the highest level of protection against modern hand-held weapons, artillery fragments, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as well as against NBC combat agents. With its highly mobile off-road chassis, it reaches maximum speeds of more than 90 kph and a radius of action of approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the DINGO 2 is air-transportable on C160-Transall, C130 Hercules and the future A400M aircraft.

[Fuchs]

Try this one for Dingo 1 / ATF:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ATF_Dingo
The protection levels are not fully known, of course. I remember that it's small arms and single or even double stacked blast AT mine resistant.

Dingos are armored Unimogs (light standard 4x4 truck).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unimog

This is another German 4x4 (partially) armoured vehicle, designed to fit into CH-53G, IIRC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mungo_ESK

The Bundeswehr also uses different armoured cabs for medium and heavy trucks and a 4x4 armoured observation vehicle (Fennek). Boxer/GTK, a huge wheeled APC, is another program.

A new program for a new vehicle generation is underway. This includes the Grizzly (and other vehicles)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KMW_Grizzly
http://193.158.125.14/images/91_KMW-GFF4.jpg

A design from a blank sheet on is the GeFaS. It's modular and again huge.
http://www.rheinmetall.de/index.php?lang=2&fid=1698

We have I think about six to eight different Mercedes G class jeep versions with armour protection. The protection escalated as the anticipated missions evolved from MP vehicle to Afghanistan road patrols.
I've recently heard that no lesser protected vehicles than Dingo 1 are used for Afghanistan patrols and convoys anymore our contingent had luck some months ago when mines did much less damage and caused less severe casualties than possible.
Sometime early in the ISAF mission we had lots of KIA when a bus (a bus!!!) got hit.
The first patrols in Kabul were done with sandbagged open Unimogs mostly (with the appropriate spin about barrett-wearing friendly soldiers and intentionally no intimidating armour...but in the background they were hastily buying more armoured Dingos ASAP).



I dislike the Bundeswehr's apparently uncoordinated procurement of many different wheeled armoured vehicles in the past ten years. I believe it exposes a poor planning capability and a lack of clear understanding of one's own requirements.
The end result is far away from the successful Family of vehicles" maintenance- and logistics-friendly approaches like our old 2nd medium/light truck generation and the French ACMAT VLRA had.

[Surferbeetle]

Fuchs,

Thanks for the references. Here is one that might be of interest with regards to South African designs (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-blast-resistant-vehicles-2.htm).

Regards,

Steve

[jcustis]

For the sake of our discussion here, let's not forget that "protection" is not simply a function of armor alone. Speed is security, thus all- round mobility, coupled with firepower slaved to good sensors, can work equally well at preventing that RPG from being lit off in the first place. If you treat the platform like nothing more than a taxi, you will always die easily.

[Surferbeetle]

J,

Preach on. During OIF 1 no armor meant me and my team had the doors off, weapons outboard, good visibility, and good speed. One day, being a bit on the tired side I missed the initial signal, but rapidly got with the program when all of the Iraqi's bailed from both sides of the road around me & my team. Gotta love them HMMWV's, they are tough & maneuverable and we all cleared the zone.

The current war is a different one than OIF 1 however, and it would appear that armor has it's place.

Regards,

Steve

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

Thanks for the references. Here is one that might be of interest with regards to South African designs (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-blast-resistant-vehicles-2.htm).

Regards,

Steve

I've read a copy of "Taming the land mine", a book entirely about Rhodesian/South African anti-mine AFV designs of the 70's. I recommend it.

The V-shaped bottom was adopted by the modern designs, but the easily repairable wheel suspensions away from the hull ('monocoque design') was not. Some designs also have their cabin over the front axle or very close, also not very smart against pressure-fuzed AT mines.
I asked the Force Protection representative on Eurosatory 2008 about it and he evaded the hard questions. But he claimed that his company has "THE" experienced designer from South Africa with 30 years experience in mine-protected trucks.

[Ken White]

... and it would appear that armor has it's place.It also has the significant and far too often overlooked disadvantage of lulling the unwary into a false sense of being protected. That's a pernicious and dangerous affliction.

No matter how good the armor -- or the active countermeasures in lieu of ever more of it -- it can and will be defeated. Tactical agility OTOH can easily compensate for a lack of 'protection.'

The old saw is wrong; speed does not kill, incompetence does. Speed is good...

[patmc]

My unit received ASV's in late OIF IV to supplement our humvees and Mad Max trucks. It had better armor than our other vehicles, was faster, and had the turret with optics and protected crew-served weapon. It was hard to get in and out, and took more maintenance time when it did break.

I liked the ASV for Convoy Security, but for missions requiring constant dismounting, it would work for overwatch, but not troop transport.

The only people with MRAPs during my tour were EOD or "special," so we saw them out there, and thought, "be nice to have that." Speaking with a MSG currently on a MiTT that uses MRAPs, he is a big supporter. He just reiterated, make sure you buckle up.

[Randy Brown]

The only people with MRAPs during my tour were EOD or "special," so we saw them out there, and thought, "be nice to have that." Speaking with a MSG currently on a MiTT that uses MRAPs, he is a big supporter. He just reiterated, make sure you buckle up.

Roger your earlier points on the ASV. I'd also be interested to find out if they were ever used in mixed tracked-and-wheeled formations, or used to overwatch dismounted troops in urban settings.

My only (indirect) experience with MRAP is with a couple of engineer units performing route-clearance missions. Given the intent of GEN Petraeus's Rule No. 4 "Get out and walk--move mounted, work dismounted" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3177)--I'm curious if you could shed any non-OPSEC skinny on how the MRAP worked in the MiTT mission.

(And, in a possible corollary to Petraeus, I swear I once heard SECSTATE Rice make an MRAP-related on-air comment to National Public Radio in late-2007. It was something about how "sometimes, you have to get out of the Buffalo." Haven't been able to find the cite since. It's part of an ongoing research project, if anyone else can point me to the original quote.)

I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.

...

For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)

- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts).

I liked how Fuchs started to break the intellectual problem down as a wish-list for equipment capabilities, as well as the rationale behind each of his criteria. Granted, he prefaces his comments in terms of High-Intensity Conflict (HIC), rather than Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), but I like the approach. In fact, I originally thought that's where this thread might be headed: Using a couple of existing platforms as conversation starters and examples, what would you want out of a future mobile infantry platform?

(Of course, remember the Alamo--and remember the painful developmental process of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (http://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Wars-Reformers-Challenge-Guard/dp/1557500819/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1215456700&sr=8-2).)

It's an interesting question, and one that forces a horse-and-armored-cart dilemma, the parallel being "how-do-you-want-to-fight" vs. "how-your-current-equipment-constrains/enables-you-to-fight."

[Distiller]

MRAP - just another word for a heavy, truck-shaped APC? Or re-inventing motorized infantry with super-heavy trucks instead of ACMATs?

I still fail to understand the fascination with MRAPs, especially since most of them are a far cry from the original - and in their ops environ - valid idea. When they were invented by the Rhodesians (mines, embargo), they were infantry taxis with widely seperated wheels, mine bottom, protection against rifle bullets and provided an elevated shooter platform.

But the latest MRAPs try to become APCs plus IFVs plus a dash of CFV - all in one vehicle. And that is just wrong. MRAPs are funny shaped, fashionable APC, taxis for light infantry, pax hauler. To actually fight, the infantry gets out. They are not supposed to be in there when the shooting starts. In infested territory they should get out and clean, not ignore and safely drive by. And besides the fact, that MRAPs can't really go offroad, they also can't swim. And with the proliferation of EFP know-how the MRAP will face a threat it can't defuse.

Leaves the medium (4x4) MRAP the role as urban riot control vehicle (people with too much money can glue some reactive armor onto them). And for the heavy (6x6) MRAP the niche as engineering and mine clearing vehicles.
The propsed heavy German MRAPs (GFF4) are just nonsense. For transport duties something like a SISU or MAN SX with a protected cabin is more suited. Convoy protection by APCs or JLTVs.

Basically there is no reason why APCs shouldn't get more protection, learning from MRAPs, but keeping the good parts of the APC concept. The proposed Marine MPC already goes that way.


On the JLTV: Good as liaison and scout cars, esp when not heavier than e.g. the MOWAG Eagle IV. Here to stay, something I have a hard time seeing the MRAP.

[patmc]

He did not give me any real specifics, other than that they replaced their humvees for force protection. They still did mix of mounted/dis-mounted, with face to face interaction and advising. We didn't get deep into the TTPs or SOPs.

My only (indirect) experience with MRAP is with a couple of engineer units performing route-clearance missions. Given the intent of GEN Petraeus's Rule No. 4 "Get out and walk--move mounted, work dismounted" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3177)--I'm curious if you could shed any non-OPSEC skinny on how the MRAP worked in the MiTT mission.

[William F. Owen]

Basically there is no reason why APCs shouldn't get more protection, learning from MRAPs, but keeping the good parts of the APC concept. The proposed Marine MPC already goes that way.


...and how long and how much funding will that require? The USMC MPC may have some merit but it risks same technology dead end that came to light in the UK FRES trials with Boxer, VBCI and the mythical Piranha V - the vehicle that won the trial despite not being there to take part!

If the well understood APCs designs had such potential, how come commercially derived and configured vehicles are now offering lower acquisition cost, (even with reactive armour and APS) great protection, and lower cost of ownership? All this has been achieved in less than 5 years, in most cases, while the cold war APC designs seem to offer less and less, in terms of flexibility across the missions being encountered.

Yes, you do have to make physical compromises. Size is one, but for the more mature designs they are no bigger than an average commercial truck. Some are C-130 transportable and Wildcat is possibly Cargo 747/C-33 transportable. Yes they are not good at crossing north German ploughed fields on rainy winter nights and they could not follow same cross country routes taken by tracked armoured vehicles.

Food for thought, as the result of some discussion in France recently. A generic MRAP based battle group can theoretically move 1,000 dismountable infantrymen, 500 km in 12 hours, (assuming a convoy planning rate of 41-45kph) to a tactical dismounted task of 24 hours and recover them back 1,000km, in 12 hours, using <150 well protected vehicles, based all on the same chassis, with no external logistic support.

I am still crunching a few numbers to confirm this, but in basic form it is, in itself, is an intriguing capability.

[jcustis]

The problem you have Wilf, is that you could do the same with MTVR trucks, and many Marines would prefer to do so.

I guess that's not really a problem though.

[William F. Owen]

The problem you have Wilf, is that you could do the same with MTVR trucks, and many Marines would prefer to do so.

I guess that's not really a problem though.

Agreed. You could do the same thing in Bedford MK trucks and the UK used to move infantry companies from one side of the BAOR Corps Area in hours, but Bedford MKs had all the protection of a family car. MTVRs are much better, but MRAPs are even better protected, and can possibly deliver troops in better condition.

What I am trying to do with this thread (and I am extremely grateful for ALL the input) is error check a very simple concept that I can use to demonstrate a line of thinking to judge the usefulness of an idea. -

...and why would many Marines would prefer to do so? Comfort? Protection? Simplicity?

[jcustis]

I think the answer lies in a mix of all three. I know several logistician types who would probably prefer to move such a force MTVR pure, as the vehicle (once uparmored) offers protection, good firepower(even if only using Mk 1eyeball sensors), while it has decent C2 ability with Blue Force Tracker for the convoy commander.

This is in use in Iraq today, and my current complaint with post-2003 Lieutenants is that some might think they can get away with this routine on all battlefields. Big vehs don't offer good "fighting" mobility, and I wouldn't want to be caught in a contact without HMMWVs for more nimble and lower profile support.

For daily support runs in W. Al Anbar, MTVR-pure has made in-roads.

[J Wolfsberger]

They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).



Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

[jcustis]

I must have missed those points previously, but JW is dead on methinks.

[William F. Owen]

Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

Sure. The sources generally come from wide variety of documentation as well as talking directly with the manufacturers of both MRAPs and APCs. The reasoning is basically as follows.

a.) They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)

I can't find an data for an existing and in service APC/MICV meets STANAG 4569 level 3 and/or 4, for both direct fire, fragmentation and under wheel and chassis mine detonation. I can find APCs (M113 variants) that can meet STANAG 4569 level 4, for direct fire, but not under-wheel mine detonation. I think Boxer may, meet both (ARTEC won't say) but it's 32 tonnes compared with 18 tonnes for some MRAPs. - which is why I caveated the statement with "in general overall terms."

b.) They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs. This is from manufactures and pure extrapolation from those designs using COTS technologies and those requiring or that have already incurred extensive development costs. Compare the costs of developing Boxer to that of even the better MRAPs. Running costs is based on the same assumptions. Wildcat and costs the same to run as a commercial TATRA truck.

c.) They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
Four wheels produce less mechanical noise and surface disruption than eight or six.

...but I am not claiming these as absolute or categoric statements in support of some argument. Data indicates that MRAP examples show very good levels of ALL-ROUND protection versus a WEIGHT and COST argument that I do not see APCs readily matching right now.

I am not attempting an MRAP versus APC argument. Mobility alone assures APCs bright future

If you have open source data that shows any of these assumptions to be flawed, I'd be extremely and genuinely grateful. As a Clausewitzian, I am far more comfortable clinging to orthodoxy, than I am wrestling with innovation and all the attention it attracts!

[jcustis]

The clarity makes sense.

[VMI_Marine]

...and why would many Marines would prefer to do so? Comfort? Protection? Simplicity?

Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.

The only advantage MRAPs confer, by design, is protection. I liked my MRAP in Iraq solely because of the comm suite (ok, the TC seat was a lot more roomy and comfortable than an M1114 :D), which was superior to most Humvees. It had 3 multiband radios, which was vital since I had typically had to work LOS and SATCOM nets at the same time. This not specific to MRAPs, however, during the period that the Army loaned me that M113 I had the same capability. The MRAP just made it look sexier.

I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.

[Ken White]

...I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.Add to that the cost difference (initial plus more parts and fuel due to excessive weight) and range limitations due to that extra weight; the MRAP advantages do not offset the disadvantages and the cost isn't justified.

A convoy of MRAPs under air attack -- or in a well planned ambush -- will fare little if any better than a convoy of MTVRs or FMTVs.

Sounds to me like a defense contractor is proposing this idea in order to replace his current swimming pool with an Olympic sized pool...

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.


I think it is I who should apologise if I am not making myself clear! - but that said, I don't have really have a point. It's more a question, and I am getting some answered.

More over, if MRAPs are as limited as their detractors imply, then why have they evolved in the way they have, with the capabilities we see today. They are almost of the purest form of functional military equipment I have ever seen, so seeing that they fulfil a clear operational need, my basic suspicion is that the better designs may have utility beyond they theatres and conflicts we currently see them in.

...and I come from a tradition of going to war as 8-10 men inside an FV-432, or 8-6 men in a Saracen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvis_Saracen), and when push came to shove, 4 men in Land Rover or 16 men in a 4 tonne truck. Only the Saracen ever impressed me!

[jcustis]

As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

Heck, from what I hear, some of the designs first fielded to Iraq didn't even tow points. Go figure.

[William F. Owen]

As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

[J Wolfsberger]

So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

I think so, for its purpose. And thanks for the clarification.

[Uboat509]

I have not yet worked with the MRAP so I do not have first hand knowledge of them. What I do know is that the biggest killer among IEDs in Iraq is the underbody explosion. EFPs get a lot of attention because they are relatively sophisticated and are difficult to defend against because of their ability to penetrate a lot of armor. Underbody attacks, on the other hand, are very unsophisticated, basically a whole lot of boom buried under the road. The thing is an EFP is a linear weapon. The spall that it generates when it penetrates can seriously injure or kill but often it takes a direct hit to kill, meaning that it can kill one or more people in the vehicle depending on seating and the angle of the strike. Even a direct hit can be survivable depending on where it hits and who is seated nearby. Underbody attacks are not at all sophisticated, relying on pure brute force to pulverize the vehicle and its contents. Underbody attacks are often not survivable and will generally kill everyone on the vehicle rather than just the unlucky ones seated in the way. As far as I can see the MRAP was designed to answer that problem and mostly that problem alone. I am simply not sure that they were really considering all the other variables that have been discussed on this board so far. I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

[Cavguy]

I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.

That was actually the delay in getting more fielded - the military procurement/force integration staffs didn't see it as having lots of general-purpose utility in the future. Gates shut that argument down hard, to his credit.

[Fuchs]

Maybe it would be interesting to look for its limitations. The general purpose usefulness depends on how much it's specialized or not.

My list of possible shortcomings (in comparison to modern APC project wish lists) that don't hurt in Iraq:

- side slope capability / usefulness in mountaineous terrain
- usefulness in snowy terrain
- no heater (?), possibly not prepared for sub-zero temperatures
- very large/visible
- very limited off-road mobility
- no bomblet protection
- some MRAP have less seating capacity than necessary to fit in a full squad
- no standardization; spare part logistical nightmare

And the vehicles will of course be (almost) worn out after the war.

[arty8]

I got back late last year and fought in Mosul, inside the city for the most part. My squad had uparmoured humvees and a single ASV. I liked having an ASV, it was great to haul broken humvee's and is fast and agile, although the crew was stuck inside for the durationof the patrol.

The humvee simply cannot haul enough troops around for any mout senario, 3 dismounts per truck isn't nearly enough to search multiple buildings. This is assuming a 4 truck patrol. I really envied the infantry with the stryker-fast, really quiet and it held enough troops to be useful and was resistant to most IED's despite having a flat hull. The humvee, on the other hand has close to zero armour on the bottom.

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

[William F. Owen]

Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.


Concur. My take, is that it may well be useful to look at these vehicles as having wider utility, and especially for transporting infantry over operational distances. I am not suggesting they follow the tanks across the start line, when confronting a combined arms armour enemy.

Arty 8
Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

Exactly. The MRAP designs that have appeared in the last 5 years have made me really question the design and requirements criteria behind things like Stryker and the UK FRES.

From what I saw in Paris last month, even the Russians are now selling/proposing MRAP/JLTV type designs.

[jcustis]

Given the cost of their procurement, I'm not sure what MRAPs have to offer, outside of countering the IED and mine threats. Now, if the designs could be such that ground pressure per axle is reduced, profile/height is lowered, and there was a decent weight to power ratio, they may indeed have wider utility. I do not know what a troop's combat effectiveness would be after a 12 he ride in a current design, across moderately broken ground, because the ride can be very rough due to seat design.

As for not following tanks past the start line, where would they be? I don't have stats on how many troops were motorized vs. Mech'd up in March 2003, but I don't think we could have afforded single-role troop transport vehs. That is the beauty of things like the MTVR. Need to carry troops? Pop the seats up. Got a cargo mission? Drop them. Have you seen any current designs with that sort of modularity?

As for matters of Stryker design, 8-wheelers have been around for a ton of time. Is it something about the Army's use of Stryker that seems off, or simply the platform in general, as it relates to protection and lift?

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

[Tom Odom]

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

Add water tanks, pumps, and hose and they will make dandy mine protected fire trucks...:wry:

We could also use then as mobile PSYOPs Billboards, plastering billboard sized messages such as "Ignore me, I am not really a target" on them. :cool:

Sorry, I am guilty of sarcasm :o

Seriously, they are what they are: force protection centric counter-mine/IED vehicles. given their weight, size, and effective capacity, I am not sure they are even good cargo platforms (assuming they were modified to such a role).

Tom

[jcustis]

If we expand this, do we want DO or ECO elements to have vehs with some MRAP capabilities, none, or full-up protection, assuming that they will spend time alone and unafraid?

Force recon units at one point had little Mercedes jeeps for a time, but they had nothing in the way of armor. Is that still the way DO mobility should go?

[William F. Owen]

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

I think it depends which MRAP? - just like which APC. Most of conclusions come from looking at ADI's Bushmaster as the first iteration and the IMI Wildcat as the next. Yes, some of the MRAPs currently deployed are not as capable as those I cite, so I guess I should have referred to specific vehicles, but I am very wary of seeming to advertise, so best not! :)

...but I became impressed with Wildcat when I compared it to Stryker.

Should they be baseline equipment for some Infantry units is the question I am trying to answer. I think the answer may lie on how you view the progression of future conflict. Personally I don't see clear blue water between what some call "Warfighting" and some call "COIN". This is why I think it's worth having the discussion.

As concerns patrolling on foot? This is what I spend the majority of my Infantry though, working on, so I concur 100%.

[William F. Owen]

IMI Wildcat compared to M1126 Stryker

Sorry about the formatting. .pdf spread sheet was too large to upload.

Width 2.5m 2.7m with RPG armour 2.71m, without cage
Length 7.15m 6.98m
Height 2.69m 2.64m

Max Speed 104 kph 96 kph
Road Range 700km 530km

GVW 18,000 kg 17,236 kg
Curb Weight 12,600 kg U/K

Side Armour 14.5mm AP and/or RPG 14.5mm AP and RPG with cage
Under wheel IED STANAG 4569 Level 4 U/K

NBC System Full over-pressure and filtration U/K

Crew and passengers 3 crew 9 passengers 3 crew 9 passengers

Side slope 30% 30%
Gradient 60% 60%
Turning Circle 17.5m 17m
Step 40.6cm 58.4cm
Trench 0.9m 1.9m

[Fuchs]

Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

Armor is really a last ditch protection, and it's one that can be overcome with technical means. That means better-equipped opponents will crack the shell often.

There are so many things that need to go wrong to be hit in the first place, a protection concept can intervene much earlier (armour is nice as last "oh shit" protection, but it comes at a great price).

To be killed by weapons in war while moving in a vehicle, you need
1. to have foes (or dangerous friends)
2. to not have shattered their resolve to fight you previously
3. to be spotted
4. to be identified as foe
5. to be decided upon/to be communicated as target in time
6. to be aimed at well (not applicable to many mines, of course)
7. to not have some form of effective active defense
8. to be hit
9. finally to lack sufficient passive protection

Well, I'd intervene at 3, 4 & 5.

(3)
Bounding, unpredictable off-road movements plus good camouflage and concealment can prevent this. Imagine log trucks moving as carefully as recce AFVs, using hand-held thermals to search for ambushers before moving through dangerous areas.
(4)
Look at Valkiri MRL; it's a MRL that can be disguised as a standard light truck with tarpaulin. SOF sometimes ride mules, have long beards and AK-lookalikes in AFG.
You don't need to drive in military-style vehicles on a recce or raid mission in Iraq/AFG everytime. There are plenty civilian trucks.
(5)
Limit the failure to prevent (3) to short intervals and (5) might be prevented.

(6) and (8) are mostly a function of distance, speed, size and changes of direction. MRAPs don't look so well in this because they drive predictably on (preferably paved) roads at most likely constant speed.

And most importantly, elect politicians that don't fail miserably at (1).

MRAPs represent a simplistic approach that focuses on (9) only. That works fine (for a while) if you want to wage war like the U.S. does in Iraq.

----

Wildcat/Stryker MMP and nominal ground pressure: factor two difference.
No problem on dry, hard ground or even paved roads.

Wildcat/Stryker behaviour after single AT mine hit:
Wildcat immobilized, Stryker moves on.

----

Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

[William F. Owen]

@ Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

@ Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

I reject your assertion. My military thought is bounded by the core functions, so I adhere to,

a. Not being found
b. If found do not be fixed (loss of movement, comms, fires and observation)
c. If fixed do not be Struck (the action that creates harm)
d. If struck do not be exploited. Suffer catastrophic loss from the harm.

I am pretty familiar with this area. Transport by "disguised" civilian vehicles was commonly done in Northern Ireland. (I know at least one platoon was regularly carried in a grain lorry)

None of this helps me, if I need to move 650 men, 500km in one night, and sustain them once they are on task.

Actually the UK has looked at this before with AT-105 (http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0039.html) The problem with Saxon ( and I know it well) was it was a junk vehicle. - but I am now beginning to think elements of the concept were sound.

A concerns Sierra Leone, when I was there, if you wanted to travel the "upline" roads, you went in MAN 4x4 Commercial trucks. They go all over Sierra Leone. In fact most the world relies on pretty simple 4 x 4 commercial lorries. When I used to drive across the Sahara, I regularly encountered commercial lorries ripping along the "piste" with no problem

[Fuchs]

I reject your assertion. My military thought is bounded by the core functions, so I adhere to,

a. Not being found
Large vehicles can be silent, but are difficult to hide.
b. If found do not be fixed (loss of movement, comms, fires and observation)
I admit I'd opt for 4x4 light truck, but 4x4 is not optimal as the loss of one wheel is a mobility kill. AT mines destroy a wheel easily, although they keep going on with some bullet holes.
c. If fixed do not be Struck (the action that creates harm)
Big size and probably poor agility (hp/ton and high center of gravity) aren't helpful.
d. If struck do not be exploited. Suffer catastrophic loss from the harm.

I am pretty familiar with this area. Transport by "disguised" civilian vehicles was commonly done in Northern Ireland. (I know at least one platoon was regularly carried in a grain lorry)

None of this helps me, if I need to move 650 men, 500km in one night, and sustain them once they are on task.

If you move that far you'll be out of reach of almost all opponents most of the time anyway. That might be different in COIN, but an unpredictable movement at night along secondary roads bypassing traffic nodes even offroad should provide a lot of security even in such an environment. 500km is hardly a routine infantry movement in COIN, after all.

Actually the UK has looked at this before with AT-105 (http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0039.html) The problem with Saxon ( and I know it well) was it was a junk vehicle. - but I am now beginning to think elements of the concept were sound.

A concerns Sierra Leone, when I was there, if you wanted to travel the "upline" roads, you went in MAN 4x4 Commercial trucks. They go all over Sierra Leone. In fact most the world relies on pretty simple 4 x 4 commercial lorries. When I used to drive across the Sahara, I regularly encountered commercial lorries ripping along the "piste" with no problem
[b]MAN 4x4 gl trucks hit about 14 tons if fully loaded, but five tons of this is payload. So most often such trucks will weigh rather 10-11 tons as most payload densities hit the volume limitation much earlier than the weight limitation.



Wilf; we agree that MRAP has a niche in a mission like Iraq. You thought about the other possible other missions.

I remember that the GTK/Boxer monster is in part such a monster because one of the requirements was a bomblet protection. The implied assertion is that APCs are under threat by artillery.

But there's likely no harassing fire on roads if the force densities would be like assumed in exercises and doctrine. Modern brigades shall cover frontages larger than the frontage of an overstretched WW2 division. The force density is necessarily low.
The result is that the artillery needs much better recce to hit.
The artillery would in fact need to find, identify, prioritize and fire at individual companies due to the dense road network that enables a brigade to disperse its marching columns on different roads.

Lots of artillery systems could still penetrate MRAPs or destroy less protected vehicles that march nearby.

[jcustis]

Wilf, those rules are a good script for reconnaissance operations. I am stealing it for its simplicity and ease of retention.

Back to the subject though. Wildcat posts comparable numbers, but it cannot traverse the same terrain (berne ,gaps etc.) as a 6 or 8-wheeled vehicle. Having said that, Stryker is more complex from a maintenance perspective, but probably among only certain variants.

Wildcat will fit a role as a lightweight APC, but other variants will gain weight from the basic model. Looking at its arrangement, however, it doesn't seem to have fighting characteristics. It looks great for self defense, but Stryker compares differently because it has sensors to allow it to "fight for information", which is a big role within certain formations it finds itself in.

And Wildcat looks too damn high for chrissakes. I know it's a function of mine resistance, but what will have to be done to reduce that signature from a short halt?

The Marine Corps was looking at the LAV (logistics variant type-ish) as a MPC candidate, but that died for good reasons which would have otherwise negatively impacted the LAR community.

The balance to be struck is difficult to achieve, and no matter how fair the selection criteria are supposed to be, one "best value" consideration can leave us with a platform that does'nt fill the best niches. If we have to write new doctrine to account for MPC's the USMC is screwed.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, those rules are a good script for reconnaissance operations. I am stealing it for its simplicity and ease of retention.

You don't have to steal them. They are the core functions. They are how you defeat and avoid defeat in any environment against any enemy. First written down by Ferdinand Foch in 1903

Back to the subject though. Wildcat posts comparable numbers, but it cannot traverse the same terrain (berne ,gaps etc.) as a 6 or 8-wheeled vehicle. Having said that, Stryker is more complex from a maintenance perspective, but probably among only certain variants.
Agreed. Wildcat is a cheaper, simpler, 80% solution.
Wildcat will fit a role as a lightweight APC, but other variants will gain weight from the basic model. Looking at its arrangement, however, it doesn't seem to have fighting characteristics. It looks great for self defense, but Stryker compares differently because it has sensors to allow it to "fight for information", which is a big role within certain formations it finds itself in.
Agreed. It's just an APC/MRAP.
And Wildcat looks too damn high for chrissakes. I know it's a function of mine resistance, but what will have to be done to reduce that signature from a short halt?
Agreed. According to the figures it is two centimetres higher than the Stryker
The Marine Corps was looking at the LAV (logistics variant type-ish) as a MPC candidate, but that died for good reasons which would have otherwise negatively impacted the LAR community.

The balance to be struck is difficult to achieve, and no matter how fair the selection criteria are supposed to be, one "best value" consideration can leave us with a platform that does'nt fill the best niches. If we have to write new doctrine to account for MPC's the USMC is screwed.
More screwed than with CV-22 and AAAV?

[Distiller]

Boxer is one crazy monster. With protection "ueber alles".

Your 1000 men force: If you can speed across country like that, you seem to be unopposed. Guess then you could as well hire a local bus company.
Coffee on Red Square in the morning anyone?

Another thought: How many bombs can the bad guys plant along a hard to predict route (different from the easy to predict patrol routines in Iraqi towns)? Seems like there'd be more danger from RPGs. And these neither the MRAP nor the APC can withstand without reactive armor.

The running costs: Guess if you use an APC like a road-bound MRAP, your running costs - which are dominantly automotive then - shouldn't be too different.

Of course, if you have a vehicle designed for a narrow usage profile (road-use only), then it will be overall cheaper and better suited for that single task than a vehicle with a wider usage profile. But ok, let's not turn this into MRAP vs APC.

As a vehicle to move troops from one square to another, I think trucks (with aramid mats) are equally suited; plus they provide more cargo space, and better rough-terrain capability.
You could put a mortar into an MRAP, and NETFIRES, and ATGM and MANPADS launcher, and cut down the rear cabin and put an autocannon instead. But you will still remain road/piste-bound, which limits your mobility.
And: All these above jobs a truck can also do. Which is basically what Caesar, Bereg, Pantsir, &c do.

I just don't see much space for the MRAP between trucks and APCs.

Btw, the Wildcat was designed for the MPC competition. One of the more interesting MRAPs is the Rafael Golan. But it's still a riot-control vehicle.


PS: NOTHING is more screwed than V-22 and EFV!

[wm]

Just read a story on MSNBC.com about the IRAM 107mm rocket propelled bomb/flying explosive-packed propane tank. I wonder how well an MRAP, Stryker, or an M113 for that matter would survive getting hit by one of these overhead strike devices. Of course the probability of a direct hit is probably about the same as a direct hit from almost any projectile following a purely ballistic trajectory--maybe even less due to the no-doubt oddly shaped warhead. But if they are fired as an MRL spread (an apparent TTP) perhaps the odds go up.

Of course the bomblets from DPICM rounds could be pretty destructive to an MRAP convoy(do we still use them?). Alternatively, the US once was working on a funny submunition--the SADARM projectile--specifically designed to attack the thin-skinned top of engine compartments of armored fighting vehicles. That might be a pretty significant countermeasure for MRAPs too.

[Fuchs]

I can think of dozens of improvised and quantity-produced weapons and munitions that could destroy/pierce MRAPs.
DPICM bomblets are still in use (and will remain so in many countries), sensor-fuzed submunitions like Sadarm are in many countries' inventories (USA, France, Germany, Russia have own designs).

MRAPs are really "blast-protected trucks with self-defence weapon".

I would agree that it's a good general APC, if

(for heavy brigades: ) it had an off-road capability closer to that of tanks

(for light brigades: ) I would trust the official assertion that troops need passive artillery protection even though they shall dismount out of sight of the enemy



The wheeled armoured vehicle design has really evolved in the past few years. Previously we saw very few armoured vehicles with large bulletproof windows (some wheeled APC like Fuchs and a Patria type had some windows).
I remember some Land Rover conversions, the Mamba and the South African designs.

Now we see large bulletproof windows as standard; the panoramic mirror was obviously not satisfactory for daily road movements in multiple multi-month deployments. Crash prevention was obviously not prioritized enough in Cold War APCs.

Another advance was the finally universal application of V-shaped hulls, resulting in the necessarily big height. Complicated suspensions and engines like in-wheel electric engines and hydro-pneumatic suspension don't fit well into an underbelly blast protection concept. These technologies lost momentum although they were high on wish lists ten years ago.

One lesson of MRAPs was the importance of size and turning radius in urban environments; maybe that the next designs will attempt to avoid very large designs in order to remain agile in urban environments. All axles steerable as in recce light AFV designs would help, of course.

The usage of MRAPs in other environments than Iraq/AFG would certainly lead to additional design changes and add-ons.

I' sure that the counter-blast armour developments of the past five years will enable much better APC designs in the future. I don't think that any real new APCs in the 12-18 ton range will have less than three axles, though. Almost everyone wants to be able to cross irrigation trenches and drainage channels without the time-consuming use of dedicated equipment.

[William F. Owen]

One of the more interesting MRAPs is the Rafael Golan. But it's still a riot-control vehicle.

Cancelled six months ago, due to "commercial" problems, with the US partner company. Since riots do not include folks with RPGs, I can't quite see how an RPG protected vehicle counts as a riot-control vehicle. ...but AT-105 was directly descended from an "internal security vehicle" and Golan was, like all MRAPs was biased more to Security Operations than Combat Operations.

[krsna]

Hi Guys,
Nice to be back. Best comments on the issue are of the guy who was in one such contraption. For others out of it and no hope or desire to get into one such machine there are some threads to hang on to:
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.
2. What is our role then? Hunters or Stabilizers? Each option has has its own dimensions.
3. If terrorist is to be beaten in Urban ops, it is the matter of locating him and pre-empting him first. Else he shall have the initiative always and every time. This is matter of intelligence. Stability ops in the city need more safety and some speed to maintain monopoly. This is where enemy can gain psychological advantage by IED attacks. Nothing is safe here. They blew a T- 72 of IPKF in SriLanka into pieces with just the right amount of RDX.
4. If we are looking at Complex or Off town ops we need to get there faster, quieter and safer. MRAP seems to foot the bill to some extent less the speed. Any armor and monocoque design with heavy suspension will cause that to happen. MPV of South Africa that we use is a monster but we swear by its reasonable invincibility despite its heavy and high frame and some what limited maneuvrability.
5. Strykers are good, but for another dimension of ops. MRAP seems to be filling the gap of light armored vehicle (hull protected) for on road tactical mobility and off road transportation to some extent. Similar protection on Stryker will make it slower too.
6. In conclusion, options must be weighed for the role than as a contest of inter-vehicle capabilities.
:)

[Ken White]

...1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.For a while -- never say never... ;)

Agree with the rest but most particularly with this:6. In conclusion, options must be weighed for the role than as a contest of inter-vehicle capabilities. :)Hmm -- that has to mean, as always in equipment selection, that the factors of METT-TC must apply. :D

I knew that! :cool:

[Fuchs]

Hi Guys,
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.


Complete disagreement.
You sounds very much like a stock trader talking about ever-lasting hausse.

I recently read a 1988 magazine, one article was about the then-new Bundeswehr structure "2000". Think about that.

[krsna]

Fuchs,
Send the link for my knowledge to comment any further . Stock traders and soldiers have one thing in common though - risk taking ability that leads to entrepreneurship. risk taking has a thin edge though between foolhardiness and courage. every single aspect of share market has unique parallel with battle space. profit goals and war goals are same sides of the coin. it is the coin that is different though. If the soldiers put in even a quarter of percentage of the amount of research that the stock analyst puts in the world shall be a safer place. It is all about fundamentals (or basics) if you take the Warren Buffet line and all about short term market opportunity if you take the average stock broker line. It is the role that you see for yourself in the end.;)

[Sabre]

Hi Guys,
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.


Constancy-bias is big mistake.
How ironic, often those that are so quick to, for example, damn the military for the hide-bound thinking that low-intensity conflict in Vietnam was an aberration and that nation-state conventional warfare was the only possibile future, then proceed to make the exact same mistake, only in the opposite direction.

Let's not forget that the U.S. had to stage a good ole' fashioned conventional invasion to get into Iraq in 2003... and did the same thing back in 1991...

Saying "never" is a sure way to be wrong...

As long as there are consistuted nation-states in the world, and there still are a few, the possibility for conflict exists. Alliances can shift dramatically in only a mere decade.

Back to topic:
I really don't think that, starting from a blank (design) slate, a MRAP would have inherently better armor than a tracked-APC. Holding everything else constant, the only way to have better armor for the same mass is to have less surface area to armor - MRAP's tend to have greater surface area, and wheeled drivetrains require more volume (not much, but perhaps 10% more), and the V-shaped hull requires more still, driving up surface area to be armored (unless that is to be unprotected).

While the MRAP may have better protection from IED's, I don't see how an MRAP vehicle with the exact same mass as a tracked APC can have thicker armor to protect from other threats (i.e., direct-fire).

If I am sending an entire battalion on a road march for 1,000 km, why can't I just have a few MRAP's at the front of the column to hit any mines, and trucks for the rest of the column? (Yes, some particularly well-disciplined insurgent could wait to trigger a command-detonated mine, but those odds are much lower). Of course, this brings to mind the fate of Groupement Mobile 100, but then again, if you are facing a resistance organized into entire regiments... (You could also airlift that battalion, and worry about mines not at all.)

I would say that there is much more to be gained from incorporating MRAP features into the design of the next standard truck, since a supply truck that will not face a high threat of direct fire contact can afford to be fairly high, and not have wonderous off-road mobility.

[Cavguy]

Back to topic:
I really don't think that, starting from a blank (design) slate, a MRAP would have inherently better armor than a tracked-APC. Holding everything else constant, the only way to have better armor for the same mass is to have less surface area to armor - MRAP's tend to have greater surface area, and wheeled drivetrains require more volume (not much, but perhaps 10% more), and the V-shaped hull requires more still, driving up surface area to be armored (unless that is to be unprotected).


Good post, only observation from my COIN expierences is that tracked vehicles are far more damaging to the urban environment than wheeled -the tracks shred curbs and water mains relatively easily. I know even my M113's had a negative effect on the infrastructure. As a result, I changed ops in "safe" areas where only wheeled vehicles were allowed to preserve infrastructure and not piss off the locals by tearing up the roads with tracks.

No debate on the necessity of tracked, armored combat vehicles for QRF/assault duty.

[MattC86]

Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

[Ron Humphrey]

Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

Then again five of those filled to the hilt with ammo could make a fairly hefty temp COP. ;)

[jcustis]

Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

It likely means that CNN is reporting a decision made by someone with absolutely no experience with MRAPs, or any exposure to feedback reports on just what they are capable of doing (performance-wise). Decisions like this are made all the time in the military, and we wonder why they happen, without ever being able to pinpoint who the Einstein was.

[William F. Owen]

Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

I have to admit, that according to folks I talk to, the UK MRAP, (Mastiff) seems to seek out soft ground and dive into it. It is apparently grossly overloaded with armour and other impedimenta.

[krsna]

That's what matters! The view of the guy who has been in one such contarption!! The others are the Defence Contractors and Armchair procurement guys duly prodded on by some staffers of more Armchair Generals and the Voter savvy politicians as the ultimate arbiters of the things that will be. They would never get into one such machine ever. The only option for the boots on ground is-the proverbial 'MS Windows of opportunity'-get in and get out. Trust your feet for safer trip home. When the chips are down, no Infantarian ever felt safer in any tank. Cheers!;)

[Fuchs]

It's really a function of (maximum) ground pressure, the number of axles and ground softness.

A good gearbox, electronics and CTIS can only help so far - at some point it's simply impossible to trick physics anymore.

A rule of thumb is that more than 8 tons on 4x4 becomes troublesome.
The choice of terrains that can be crossed without significant probability of troubles narrows down the higher the ground pressure becomes till drivers don't want to leave roads anymore.

6x6 is an indispensable minimum for crossing of serious obstacles (trenches mostly; irrigation channels for example).
6x6, normal military truck tires (pretty wide run-flat ones, connected with CTIS) = 11-13 tons acceptable weight as a rule of thumb.
And that's still not the x country capability that's needed to accompany MBTs.

The present 4-wheel MRAPs have no third axle to save weight and to better allow the overpressure of a buried mine explosion to escape sidewards. They were designed for roads (paved and unpaved ones), not as general armoured infantry trucks.

Btw, I was impressed by the small-size Force protection Cheetah
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheetah_MMPV
It looks like a good vehicle for many support units (engineers, MP, HQs, EW) and as security vehicle for air forces.

[JHR]

A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".

[Fuchs]

That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

[Cavguy]

That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=4129901436807568337

[Fuchs]

"...and now something completely different."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhUZPBiiunI



Damn, I love BBC's sense for humour.
I need to check with my friends how to get all seasons.

[MattC86]

It likely means that CNN is reporting a decision made by someone with absolutely no experience with MRAPs, or any exposure to feedback reports on just what they are capable of doing (performance-wise). Decisions like this are made all the time in the military, and we wonder why they happen, without ever being able to pinpoint who the Einstein was.

I take it to be more the decision of somebody who said, "well, we need to appear to be doing something. . ."

Shifting how ever many MRAP or other vehicles to Afghanistan may not make an ounce of difference, but it plays well - all you need for proof is CNN's Pentagon correspondent glowing that the MRAPs have "played such an incredible role in drastically reducing US casualties," to know that from a political CYA perspective. . . mission accomplished! If a=b. . .

It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon:wry:) [/cynicism]

To try to get back ON the subject, the MRAP and vehicles like it also pose major issues that, particularly for the Marine Corps, cut to the very heart of the Corps' purpose. I recall GEN Conway lamenting last fall that the Corps was losing "its expeditionary flavor." If the Corps needs MRAPs, and MRAPs force the Corps to operate like a 2nd Army, why have the Corps? The MRAP doesn't fit well within the expeditionary concept, particularly maritime deployments; and it doesn't do much for a more deployable Army, either. Having them on hand for contingencies involving proper use - convoy, security, etc. is all well and good, but for the kind of action to be seen in Afghanistan, or in other, more expeditionary roles, forget it.

With my obvious disclaimer here being I've never been in one nor had my life saved by its armor. . .

Regards,

Matt

[MattC86]

Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=4129901436807568337?

God, I had forgotten how great a bit that was. . .

[Van]

A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".

I always heard this credited to Bill Mauldin's Willy and Joe. Upon reflection, Willy and Joe should be required reading for Army LTs.

[Sabre]

I'm interested in seeing where the MRAP's end up, once the bulk of U.S. forces are "back home".

I do recall an interesting article by a U.S. Army officer in a Transportation battalion, which basically advocated permanently constituted security platoons for the logistics units (i.e., on the MTOE), manned by logistics soldiers that received the appropriate additional training. Basically his point was that convoy security wouldn't be such a drain on the available maneuver units, and this would ease some of the headaches...

So, a platoon of MRAPs for, say, every transportation (truck) company, for convoy security. Reminiscent of the ersatz "gun trucks" of Vietnam (I recall seeing a preserved example at the Transportation museum at Ft. Eustis).


Random thought:
I always wondered why, in the ROAD and Army of Excellence division designs, there was a mandate that combat arms MOS's make up no more than 50% of the design...

[Fuchs]

Dedicated security elements are a typical type of unit for peace-time savings.
Peace-time structures almost never have proper security forces for logistics, medical camps, HQs, harbours or airfields.
The consequence is that the proper equipment for such roles does also not exist in peacetime.

[Ken White]

...It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon:wry:) [/cynicism]Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified. :rolleyes:

[MattC86]

Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified. :rolleyes:

Fair enough - I go no further. And you're correct - both candidates are playing, well, politics, which tends to be fast and loose with the truth.

Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. . .

Regards,

Matt

[reed11b]

MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict. The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs. I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts. When I was in the 1/501st ABN in Alaska we had both hummers and SUSVs. This gives you a full spectrum force easy, and still cheaper then the complex stryker or specialized MRAP.
Reed

[jkm_101_fso]

MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict.

Sorry, Reed, I'm not sure what you mean. Never had the chance to ride in or fight from one while in IZ; What's "specialized" (in, on or about it) that makes it not so useful for the tactical situation in IZ?

jkm

[reed11b]

sorry, poor english on my part. I mean that they are specialized FOR the conflict in Iraq, not for over-all utility. They will likely lack the nessary mobility, utility, and/or firepower if the next conflict does not mirror Iraq. Of course when I was in Iraq we rode around in soft skins and I have never been in a MRAP so my opinion should be taken with a grain of salt.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs.

Golan does not exist any more (long story) Wildcat fits the bill of what you describe

I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts.

Well I'm not sure you can pick when you'll be urban and when you won't but BVS-10 is a hell of a track!

[Fuchs]

BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

[William F. Owen]

BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

BVS-10 does 2 week patrols in Afghanistan, where it is operating at 2,000kg over it's design weight. Rumour has it that some vehicles have already exceeded their supposed life time use. Maintenance does not appear to be a factor.

[reed11b]

I used to have the old SUSV in my airborne unit along with Humvees. Humvees actually had a higher time needs for maintanance and we would drive the SUSV's on base roads and downtown and on 2-4 week fieldproblems and breakdowns were very very rare. Hummers on the other hand had at least one vehicle breakdown EVERY field problem. We actually used the SUSVs more often. Now SUSV's are not armored, but I feel that the Viking maintaince issue my be based on the maintance time required by other tracks. The suggestion was for both types of vehicle to be available btw.

WilF! Just looked up the IMI Wildcat, while maybe a touch larger then I like, it looks almost perfect in any other regard. I would like to see the drivers seat and see if it drives like a car (Then it could be operated by one of the squad) or if it is more complex and should be operated by a dedicated MOS.

For those of you that do n ot know me, I feel that bradleys and other IFV's should be manned by a dedicated IFV MOS and not by the infantry squad it carriers. I feel this is a source of major drain on the mechanized infantry manpower and training in there infantry role. The exception is commercial vehicle based systems that drive like a car.

[Randy Brown]

Wired.com's Danger Room correspondent Noah Shactman reports today (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/mrap-lite.html) that the U.S. Army Materiel Command has issued a request for information (https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=1128c5f921058a2b08bffde5721cdc11&tab=core&_cview=0) for regarding industrial capabilities to produce a "lighter more agile, maneuverable, mobile vehicle with MRAP protection level capabilities." This effort is apparently unrelated to the current(?) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) (http://www.defense-update.com/products/j/jltv.htm) program, according to Shactman.

Thought this news might be of interest in this SWJ.com thread, at least for archival purposes.

Excerpt follows:

So the Army and Marines are looking for a next-gen MRAP, that combines the "agility, maneuverability and mobility" of a Humvee, with the protection of the brawny new vehicles.

Such a vehicle should not only be able to stop militants' most advanced bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, the services noted in a request for information, issued late last week. It should also to climb a "60% forward slope," beat a maximum speed of 65 miles per hour, and be able to "maneuver off-road and on narrow roads in rural mountainous terrain and desert sand."

The 10-ton vehicle must be transportable on a C-130 cargo plane. It should have a minimum range of 300 miles, and a turning diameter of 49 feet, And the crew has to be able to get out quickly, in case of a rollover.

[sapperfitz82]

MRAPs in Afghanistan will add little to improve our situation. It’s been a couple years, but we did mostly air mobile and ground pounding for two weeks. Second time over was less air b/c Iraq sucked up some of the assets. Basically, to slow the flow at the border, a Hilux is a about the most one can rely on. Really need to be dismounted and have a couple choppers move you around. The problem all along has been that we carry too much weight and do not move fast enough. MRAPs don’t solve that when we are talking that type of terrain. The M1114’s couldn’t get in there in ‘06, and we broke the few M998’s we took out in ’02-’03.
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact. This is similar to getting so wrapped up in IED defeat that the best we can do is put a glow plug in front of our vehicle. We need to realign our thinking entirely here, not fashion new trinkets. The IEDs of today are simply a nuisance minefield. Our current M21 mine with a SFF device could, I am nearly sure, penetrate the MRAP, Stryker, M1, what have you. That mine has been around a while. A well built EFP goes through all the above as well.
Point is, did we totally redesign the M1 because shape charges evolved? Or did we adapt our tactics to defeat the minefield? Our vulnerability to IEDs is a sign that we are being out-maneuvered and a new vehicle is not the answer to that.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

[William F. Owen]

Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact.
I agree. Dismounted operations is the core of the infantry. However, you still require operational mobility.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.
OK, so around what parameters are you going to have that discussion. It may well be one worth having, but as Simpkin showed, there are conditions and circumstances were road moves are quicker and more effective than airmobile moves, so the context of the debate has to be very carefully framed.

[jcustis]

Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

[sapperfitz82]

I offer the CH-47 line more as a throw away than anything else.

I suppose that I am worried we are travelling down a dangerous garden path when we start making force protection the primary or even a qualifying characteristic of our vehicle selection.

I am aware of a movement in the doctrine writing community of a push to have force protection seen in a more holistic light which focuses much more the arrival of the force on the objective in such a manner that it is able to accomplish its mission and perhaps be readily prepared for a follow-on than as a litmus for vehicle protection against specific threats (blast/direct fire etc.).

When we start comparing center of gravity and hull angle, I wonder if we are missing the forest for the trees. The Stryker concept goes far beyond the vehicle itself, and would not be nearly as impressive or capable if the vehicle were simply offered as a replacement for the M113/Bradley.

With the MRAP/Cougar/M1151/what-have-you, we are readily accepting a substantially different platform that does in fact change how we execute our tactics without really giving much regard to that fact. Again, I was born and raised outside a vehicle so I may be super-sensitive to this, and probably the mech side of the house is adapting a great deal better.

Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

[William F. Owen]

Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

I agree. There is a very valid argument to be had about vehicle design versus doctrine and training. IMO, the M2 is an example of failure. No one vehicle can address all needs, but we need a structure in which to discuss the compromises. Personally I would see that as a balance between security operations and combat operations.

[ODB]

Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

[Uboat509]

Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

I absolutely hated to see the trucks with the remote control turrets on them when I was in Iraq. Many times even on the trucks with manned turrets the gunners would be sitting so far down in the turret that all he could see would be through the the gap between the chicken plate and the sides of the turret. Great for force protection, not so great for situational awareness. One of our resident tankers correct me if I am wrong, but don't they teach that the TC should be heads up until they are actually in the fight? I know that that is how we operate. The gunner is never still. He is up and he is constantly moving, both the turret and his head. There's nothing wrong with force protection but at a certain point it becomes counter-productive.

SFC W

[Ken White]

your head down and you'll get attacked. Bulldoze around like you know what you're doing and own the place and they'll leave you alone. That applies in all combat intensities. Excess caution kills...

[Entropy]

I don't see the current crop of MRAP-type vehicles being all that useful in Afghanistan because of the lousy road network where a LOT of areas are like this (http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2007/a090407tj1.html). Hilux's are great there because they're are so light and nimble on those kinds of roads. They're also very dependable (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lrk6vsb77xk&) :) (part 2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Uc4Ksz3nHM), part 3 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfZDtC9kjVk)). It seems like the Pentagon sees the disadvantages too and is looking (http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-09-11-MRAP_N.htm) for a new vehicle. See also this (http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/081002/marines_future_weapons.html?.v=2). The special ops folks already have some of these (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A423b8745-6eb8-409c-8e3b-1dfe9909ab0a), which look pretty cool.

So, if nothing else, this seems like a timely topic. I DO think we need more helo's in Afghanistan (especially 47's), but then again I have a bias since I supported helo ops when I was there.

[Vojnik]

I'm a bit confused. I've read the entire thread, but I would ask someone to clarify for me.

I believe that we're debating whether the MRAP has a future beyond OEF/OIF? Or are we discussing whether the MRAP should not be fielded currently?

Thanks in advance.

[Vojnik]

Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

I believe the MRAP was fielded to address the tactics used by units in OIF.
So the idea was to fit the gear to the tactics, not vice versa.

I have not used MRAPs, nor CROWS, nor am I privy to any sort of advanced testing and acquisition process. I am simplying stating that in this case it "looks" like the Pentagon was addressing a need stated by the in-country Commanders.

[William F. Owen]

I'm a bit confused. I've read the entire thread, but I would ask someone to clarify for me.

I believe that we're debating whether the MRAP has a future beyond OEF/OIF? Or are we discussing whether the MRAP should not be fielded currently?

Thanks in advance.

As the thread starter, I will attempt to clarify. I believe that there is a good case for looking at "MRAPS" beyond the confines of what some call COIN.
Given ,

a.) good levels of protection
b.) Reasonably good mobility

then they would seem to have a role as basic infantry mobility systems. I do not consider them to be MICVs or MBTs.

A bad MRAP is a bad MRAP, so no argument there. The same basic set of argument that apply to all AFVs apply to MRAPs.

[Vojnik]

As the thread starter, I will attempt to clarify. I believe that there is a good case for looking at "MRAPS" beyond the confines of what some call COIN.
Given ,

a.) good levels of protection
b.) Reasonably good mobility

then they would seem to have a role as basic infantry mobility systems. I do not consider them to be MICVs or MBTs.

A bad MRAP is a bad MRAP, so no argument there. The same basic set of argument that apply to all AFVs apply to MRAPs.

Thank you. That's what I thought the general debate was focused on.

[ODB]

If the decision is made to use this for COIN only then the Army could always send them to DRMO to be bought by companies to use them as armored cars, just a thought.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Have already seen many of these vehicles sunk deep in the sands of Iraq.

Its a simple question of weight distribution. That's why I prefer the M113. Holds 10 men plus the crew & weighs only about 10 tons, with the weight caried on tracks with great earth coverage & very low ground pressure. I've commanded them on all types of terrain & they've never let me down. It also swims of course.

Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.

This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

[William F. Owen]

Its a simple question of weight distribution. That's why I prefer the M113. Holds 10 men plus the crew & weighs only about 10 tons, with the weight caried on tracks with great earth coverage & very low ground pressure. I've commanded them on all types of terrain & they've never let me down. It also swims of course.

If it really is all about weight distribution (which IMO, is wrong) then surely you want a BVS-10 or STK Bronco. IRC the M113 is not amphibious once you load out beyond 11,700kg, and the IDF's up-armoured M-113s are currently tipping the scales at 18,000kg.

The new NIMDA and MTVL spec'd M113s are fine vehicles, but they also have significant limitations, in both protection and mobility.

Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.

Not sure what you mean. 30,000kg ISO containers, on three-four axles move around road systems world wide, with very little trouble. Unit level road moves conducted by units in wheeled APCs, are always conducted faster than those done by tracked units. The 2001 UK plan to move an infantry Battalion from Europe to Afghanistan, was possible with a wheeled platform and impossible using tracks.

This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

I spend a lot of time focussed on infantry mobility and W v T is simply not a debate that most of the serious minds in this area ever talk about. It's like debating fixed wing versus helicopters. You need both, and always have.

[Cavguy]

This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

[SethB]

Silence, please (http://www.economist.com/science/tm/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12286718).

The Economist.

Rattling along in the “washing-machine environment” of an armoured personnel-carrier (APC) on steel tracks can vibrate the soldiers inside to the point of exhaustion according to Dan Goure, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a think-tank in Arlington, Virginia. Meanwhile J.G. Brunbech, an APC expert at the Danish Army Material Command in Oksboel, observes that the crew’s limbs are prone to becoming prickly and numb, and their hands get tired because they must hold on tightly to the safety handles inside a vehicle’s cabin in order to try to avoid being jostled.

The vehicle itself suffers, too. The vibrations cause rapid wear and tear—not to mention outright damage, especially to its electronics. In the past, engineers have tried to reduce these vibrations by fixing rubber pads to the treads. The results, however, have not been satisfactory. The pads wear out quickly, and often rip apart or even melt. But now tough, new rubbers have come to the rescue. Moreover, these rubbers are not being used just as pads. Instead, they are crafted into enormous rubber bands that replace the steel tracks completely. As a result, the Danes are converting their entire APC fleet to rubber tracks. This means they have raised the amount of time a soldier can safely spend on board from one and a half hours to ten.

Also of note:

And although America has not sent APCs with rubber tracks into action, they form part of the Future Combat Systems, the Department of Defence’s principal modernisation programme.

[Steve Blair]

Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

My MCS idea allows for either wheeled or tracked vehicles in the order of battle. For logistics purposes alone I'm not keen on a mix, but it wouldn't be difficult to do given the unit's framework.

[Ken White]

It's an idea whose time has probably come. Both the Canadians and Danes are re-doing all their M113s and others are experimenting with Soucy tracks. Other companies are also playing with the idea. Technological and chemical advances have allowed this but Snowmobiles and ATVs like the Hagglunds BV 206 which the US Army adopted as the M973 Small Unit support Vehicle LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/susv.htm) also use a Soucy made rubber band track and have for years.

The Caterpillar DEUCE LINK (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/990400-klein.htm) also uses a rubber band track.

The DEUCE and BV 206 / M973 are fairly recent vehicles but the rubber band track is not that new as an idea; the US M114 Recon Vehicle from the late 50s used 'em:"...The tracks, developed by the Caterpillar Corporation, were of the "rubber band" type, providing the supposed advantages of lower costs, reduced weight and ease of maintenance in comparison with a link track system. Manufactured as a single strip with bolted in track pads and grousers, this development never lived up to expectations. In an unsupported configuration on narrow road wheels, the "rubber band" allowed for the small GM engine, this in turn saved overall space and weight for the entire vehicle. In the event of light damage from mines or direct fire, there was no plan for a crew to repair broken track strips." (emphasis added / kw) LINK (http://www.eaglehorse.org/4_ftx_gunnery/equipment/m114/m114_pt1.htm).

They do need to work out a fix for the item I placed in bold...

[SethB]

Could you just carry spare tracks to replace the broken ones with?

[Cavguy]

Could you just carry spare tracks to replace the broken ones with?

Band track isn't separateable like normal track, as I understand. So if it is lost you have to get a whole new one on, not just replace a section like current track.

[Ken White]

a repair / limp home kit. They'll figure it out sooner rather than later, I think.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

a repair / limp home kit. They'll figure it out sooner rather than later, I think.

One of my Cavalry Values in Maneuver, so the reason I prefer mechanized over wheeled is for the ability to move effectively and with speed off road.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

Good point, friend, having it all in the kit bag would be great.

I recall when we had Tracks, PCs, 1/4 ton Trucks, 2 & 1/2 ton Trucks, 5 ton Trucks, & Heavy, Medium & Light Tanks, Half-tracks, motorcycles, horses & armored cars.

A Generation ago the Armor Officer's Basic Course taught about five weapons platforms; Stuart, Lee, Gavin, Patton, Sherman, Chafee, Walker & more inclusive. Today there's nothing between the Abrams & the HMMWV at the UMW's Basic Course & the HMMWV is only touched on. Strykers are POI'd directly to the units with great consternation, although they're slowly moving to the school house.

As a Cavalryman operating in OIF today I find myself drawing on experience with the older weapons platforms & in some instances missing them.

In the case of maneuver maybe there really is strength in diversity.

[reed11b]

Gavin

Did you really just do that? We just call it a one one three or Track around these parts
Reed

[Stan]

A short and insightful read. Survival Consultants Intl CEO David Woroner raises some food for thought at his website (http://www.survivalconsultants.com/news.aspx#n61), Defense Tech (http://www.defensetech.org/) and at Breach Bang Clear (http://breachbangclear.blogspot.com/2008/11/mrap-and-jltv-vs-reality-pt-ii.html)'s Blog.

There's even a para or two on Tires vs. Track at the blog link.

Tires vs. Tread, how will they move? This would seem to be a no-brainer, but I have to add it in. ... They’ll bog down far less frequently, and they can turn and maneuver far more effectively in urban terrain than anything with wheels.

[Distiller]

CV90 ... about 8 psi ground pressure.
M1 Abrams ... about 15 psi.
Patria AMV (the best 8x8 in my eyes) ... about 35psi. More than a heavy truck.

8x8 should be outlawed for anything that comes in direct contact with the enemy (as long as this planet is not one huge parking lot). And for CS/CSS why not take a truck?
6x6 is something for a constabulary and para-mil units.

Bandwagon are not so good over boulders.
So far CV90 shows the way to go.
Will see what BAE/Hagglunds SEP will do. Is it still alive?

[S-2]

Stupid idea from a guy not seriously following the discussion-

Design the vehicle roadwheels to displace adequate ground pressure and exert sufficient clearance to be towed or driven without tow on a hard-surface. Carry extra roadwheels as spaced armor ala' German tanks and Stugs in W.W.II. If the vehicle can reach a reasonable hard surface, off it goes to get the rubber band thingy replaced. Crew needs proficiency replacing a roadwheel (if lost)-not a rubberband track.

[Fuchs]

Stupid idea from a guy not seriously following the discussion-

Design the vehicle roadwheels to displace adequate ground pressure and exert sufficient clearance to be towed or driven without tow on a hard-surface. Carry extra roadwheels as spaced armor ala' German tanks and Stugs in W.W.II. If the vehicle can reach a reasonable hard surface, off it goes to get the rubber band thingy replaced. Crew needs proficiency replacing a roadwheel (if lost)-not a rubberband track.

Tracked vehicles usually only need to power a single wheel per side to move forward - and that's usually not even one of those that carry the weight, but the first or last wheel - one that merely turns the track around (sorry, I don't know the English terms). That's a very simple mechanism and this simplicity is one of the tracked vehicles' advantages.
Your system would require the roadwheels to be powered (at least one per side) - that might happen with electric drive, but isn't common today (there were such convertible tire/track combos like yours in the late 1920's and 1930's, especially the Christie designs).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christie_suspension
Another feature of Christie's designs was the "convertible" drive: the ability to remove the tracks for road travel, allowing for higher speeds and better range, and saving wear and tear on the fragile caterpillar track systems of the 1930s. In order to allow this, Christie used very large rubber-rimmed road wheels, with no return rollers for the tracks. As with many track designs with center guide teeth, dual wheels were used, allowing the guide teeth to run between them. By 1939, the Soviets found that the BT tank's convertible drive was an unnecessary complication which also occupied valuable space in the tank, and the feature was dropped in the T-34.

[Ken White]

...I recall when we had Tracks, PCs, 1/4 ton Trucks, 2 & 1/2 ton Trucks, 5 ton Trucks, & Heavy, Medium & Light Tanks, Half-tracks, motorcycles, horses & armored cars.

A Generation ago the Armor Officer's Basic Course taught about five weapons platforms; Stuart, Lee, Gavin, Patton, Sherman, Chafee, Walker & more inclusive. Today there's nothing between the Abrams & the HMMWV at the UMW's Basic Course & the HMMWV is only touched on. Strykers are POI'd directly to the units with great consternation, although they're slowly moving to the school house.

As a Cavalryman operating in OIF today I find myself drawing on experience with the older weapons platforms & in some instances missing them.

Your five weapons platforms are the M5 Light series (1941-46); the M3 Medium series (1940-1943); the M113 series -- which was NEVER named the Gavin other than by Mike Sparks and is a name not used by anyone in the Armed Forces that I've heard or read -- (1959-to date); the M26, M47, M48, M60 Medium series (1949-1991); the M4 Medium series (1942-52); the M24 Light series (1943-1953) and the M41 Light series (1951-1969). Surprising to think AOBC taught all those at the same time. That looks like three generations to me. The tracks of a generation ago would seem to be the M60 and the M113 series only. In fact, since I was an AOBC instructor a generation ago, I distinctly remember those were the vehicles used...

More notable is your comment that you recall Halftracks, Horses and Armored Cars. All those pre date me; I can recall them, of course, but am too young to have operated with them -- and I'm over 75. Yet, you're a Cavalryman operating in OIF today. Amazing.

I saw also your comment that: "As long as I still get to wear my stetson I can abide the ASU." Good for you. Then this appeared:"Worked closely in zone with an ESFS that was assigned to my Infantry Battalion in OIF. That ESFS conducted itself very well essentially carrying out a textbook COIN Operation in the area."Infantry and not Cavalry? That sort of confused me. So did the use of the word zone. :wry:

However, I'm old and do get confused often. For example, this statement boggled my little mind:"Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op.Read it four times and still have no idea what it says...:confused:

Then I saw this from you:"As a business leader myself I take the lesson that a corporation, like a man, can be good or evil." You are indeed a man of many parts...

[Wildcat]

Oh crap, don't tell me Mike Sparks has recruited some disciples to espouse his "Gospel of Gavin"... :eek: I felt much safer when I thought that he was isolated and alone.

[reed11b]

Oh crap, don't tell me Mike Sparks has recruited some disciples to espouse his "Gospel of Gavin"... :eek: I felt much safer when I thought that he was isolated and alone.

OK I won't tell you......but try to google military reform ,or heck, even military and see how many Sparky pages come up. My introduction to military forum communication was el' Sparky and still have some poor communication skills I learned there. Nearly as bad are the news groups. In fact there are alot of high noise to content "military" forums out there. Praise the moderators and your co-contributers for the sane wonderfulness that is SWJ.
Reed

[Stevely]

The Internet is a good thing, but mostly it is a bad thing, as the Sparks thing demonstrates.

[Steve Blair]

The internet is pretty much a neutral thing that can be used for either good or evil. We lean more toward the good here, and leave the other for the Sparkies of the world. But it does allow those sad and alone types to find other sads and alones and form bonds of a sort that we'd best not explore too deeply....:eek:

[Sabre]

As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Heh, while we are off-topic, I have to thank you for that quote, Steve (and JKM_101_FSO).

I end up using it on at least a twice-weekly basis - it's just so... accurate...

[Bullmoose Bailey]

I saw also your comment that: Good for you. Infantry and not Cavalry? That sort of confused me.

You are indeed a man of many parts...



Thanks for your commentary & insights from your personal experience.

The 5 weapons platforms are the ones that a former Squadron Commander of mine told me he trained on at AOB, c. mid sixties. I expect some variableness in models and individual experience. Do you agree with my point as to our loss of diversity in platform application ?

In reply to my present Infantry Affiliation, it sort of confuses us on a daily basis too so you're not alone in that. Our Troop presently works for an Infantry Batallion, apparently common in a Task Force scheme. So does a USAF ESFS in our case so we're quite diverse; AF Blue, INF Blue & CAV yellow......puke green ?:)

On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113, its an evolution of my desire and the great human instinct to name things that are dear to them instead of numbering them. That track is so dear to me that it would be like calling a child by their social security number. So you understand my desire to name it just like other vehicles are named. This is just my own preference my own style & I do not request anyone else conform. Isn't freedom of thought great.

In my experience Troopers name a great deal of things a great deal of names, weapons, vehicles, platforms...mostly after Indian tribes, battles, heroes & such things, although I agree that everyone's experience is different.

"Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op."

What I mean here is that I would be using the graphic for a brief, with proper citation & credit given of course...

For the sake of staying on topic I personally would appreciate it if you addressed "dead-agentism" or source impeachment questions that are off topic via messaging to my account. Then I could respond without opening myself up to "being off topic".

The thread topics here are areally good and deserved to be respected.

[William F. Owen]

On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113,

Zelda is the official IDF name. Unlike Gavin. Zelda rolls off the tongue better than "Mem-Achad, Achad, Shalosh" in Hebrew. All IDF vehicles have names as opposed to numbers. ...some of them very odd names at that!

[Ken White]

...Do you agree with my point as to our loss of diversity in platform application ?Not really, excess diversity creates massive logistic burdens. In reply to my present Infantry Affiliation, it sort of confuses us on a daily basis too so you're not alone in that.I wasn't confused so much as I thought you were trying to 'embellish' your persona. Still do.On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113...Isn't freedom of thought great.Yes to your question; foolishness with respect to calling the M113 a 'Gavin.' However, I suspect you and Mike would agree on other things as well.For the sake of staying on topic I personally would appreciate it if you addressed "dead-agentism" or source impeachment questions that are off topic via messaging to my account. Then I could respond without opening myself up to "being off topic".I have absolutely no desire to have any personal contact with you. This is a public board and while I generally ignore most inane items, I may feel the urge to comment on occasion.The thread topics here are areally good and deserved to be respected.We can agree on that. They are worthwhile and might I suggest that you can aid in keeping them that way by making an attempt to stay factual, avoid religious discussion and stop dredging up old and dead threads to make obscure points just so you can write something. All those transgressions are, of course, in my opinion...

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Not really, excess diversity creates massive logistic burdens. I wasn't confused so much as I thought you were trying to 'embellish' your persona. Still do.Yes to your question; foolishness with respect to calling the M113 a 'Gavin.' However, I suspect you and Mike would agree on other things as well.I have absolutely no desire to have any personal contact with you. This is a public board and while I generally ignore most inane items, I may feel the urge to comment on occasion.We can agree on that. They are worthwhile and might I suggest that you can aid in keeping them that way by making an attempt to stay factual, avoid religious discussion and stop dredging up old and dead threads to make obscure points just so you can write something. All those transgressions are, of course, in my opinion...

Ken you are correct about the diversity of platforms. It does create certain logistical issues. We, my unit that is, presently have no less than four models of MRAPs each with their own planning considerations. I find the RG33 the best suited all around although I would like a rear gunner position.

[Ken White]

Ken you are correct about the diversity of platforms. It does create certain logistical issues. We, my unit that is, presently have no less than four models of MRAPs each with their own planning considerations. I find the RG33 the best suited all around although I would like a rear gunner position.the RG33 has some minor maintenance problems but is otherwise great.

In any event, while I can from a distance appreciate the benefit of all MRAPs for the troops, I think we've got another case of rushing something into production in response to media pressure and thus not getting a good product much less the optimum solution due to the haste. One of our recurring national shortfalls... :wry:

It also annoys me that many other nations started working on MRAP-like solutions a number of years before we did. We did not do so due to the desire to avoid situations where such vehicles would be of use. Unfortunately, the Armed forces don't get to pick where or how to fight...

[Bullmoose Bailey]

the RG33 has some minor maintenance problems but is otherwise great.

In any event, while I can from a distance appreciate the benefit of all MRAPs for the troops, I think we've got another case of rushing something into production in response to media pressure and thus not getting a good product much less the optimum solution due to the haste. One of our recurring national shortfalls... :wry:

It also annoys me that many other nations started working on MRAP-like solutions a number of years before we did. We did not do so due to the desire to avoid situations where such vehicles would be of use. Unfortunately, the Armed forces don't get to pick where or how to fight...
Very true...

These effects have placed us in the interesteing scenario of postulating as to whether we'll be concluding OIF with an outstanding fleet of excellent new vehicles or a fleet of niched overweight pillboxes on wheels which are sickeningly inbuilt with obsalescence since they by their very nature recommend new tactics to enemy actors.

I personally see many future applications for them as security, logistics, DV and diplomacy vehicles in theatres such as the Balkans and Africa.

Zelda is the official IDF name. Unlike Gavin. Zelda rolls off the tongue better than "Mem-Achad, Achad, Shalosh" in Hebrew. All IDF vehicles have names as opposed to numbers. ...some of them very odd names at that!
I like that about our Israeli friends.

Americans, I personally feel, also prefer names for everything over numbers which is why we have so many unofficial names; Hummer, Huey, Fat Albert, DRUT, Lead Sled, Zipper, Missile With A Man, Sled, Widowmaker & others. Some are almost universally misused; i.e. Huey, some less so i.e. Gavin, both equally incorrect technical names: UH-1"Iroquois" & M113.

Nicknames are a neat little part of our national propensity for endearment.

[jcustis]

"There is no failsafe measure that can prevent all loss of life and limb on this or any other battlefield. That is the brutal reality of war. But vehicles like MRAP, combined with the right tactics, techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available against these attacks."'

Secretary Gates, Jan 18, 2008

Okay, I was prematurely vocal about my take on the MRAP, but I am wrapping up this current deployment, and have spent enough time in the back of both 4x4 and 6x6 models to make the following statement...they suck, and are a detriment to our combat capability. Sure, they can keep a guy ensconced in a blanket, but they are only effective as a mobility platform on hard-surfaced roads. Even then, the errant pothole could leave a axle in ruins if it is hit at the right speed and angle.

Cross-country mobility is so atrocious that just about every time I had to move cross-country, I've ended the movemnt fatigued and that is not the way to go into a fight (of which we have had none here thus far).

When our task force first arrived at its current operating location, we put these vehicles through paces that probably haven't been attempted before, and the maintenance status told the tale of a vehicle that simple could not withstand the slightest bit of rough terrain without crawling at 0-5 mph, and had to be gingerly maneuvered through chokepoint after chokepoint in order to get anywhere. We learned over time and stopped destroying them, but that time occured in a relatively benign environment. Secretary Gates is right on the notion of utilizing the appropriate TTPs, but the problem that we face, at least in the Corps, is that you don't get TTPs added in when drivers go to get their license and road time. We tried to employ them like other wheeled assets, and just simply failed. It's better now, but only because we have to baby the vehicles to excess.

I am hearing that the Corp's is looking for money to upgrade the suspension systems from a solid-axle so that these vehs can be made to operate in a wider range of environments. I hope that is possible, because the platform has a ton of potential, but until that suspension gets unscrewed, it won't be capable across the range that we need.

[William F. Owen]

Cross-country mobility is so atrocious that just about every time I had to move cross-country, I've ended the movemtn fatigued and that is not the way to go into a fight (of which we have had none here thus far).


...but which MRAP and what level of protection? Some Armoured Vehicles have very high level of both mobility and protection.

[jcustis]

Fair enough. It is our Cougar model.

[William F. Owen]

Fair enough. It is our Cougar model.

Understood. Cougar seems to have less than stellar potential here in the UK as well. The operational people seem to have favoured RG-31/32, so it's by no means clear where the error crept in, even if indeed it did. You may want to look at the STK- ATTC Warthog as the UK's new APC for A'Stan.

This may also amuse.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_OwenAFV_Feb09.pdf

Additionally, it seems now useless to talk of "MRAPS" - we need to get back to talking about armoured vehicles.

[VMI_Marine]

Sir,
Couldn't agree more. MRAPs are the exact opposite of where we need to be going with our mobility. I wrote a review on OPFOR after my last deployment, which pretty much echoes what you are saying.

MRAP Review (http://op-for.com/2008/04/mrap_review.html)

[davidbfpo]

The discussion of the UK policy on patrol vehicles policy, in Afghanistan now, has re-appeared, albeit with little public or political resonance. The link refers to MRAP and other vehicles: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ and a former UK Army officer's view: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2009/06/26/when-is-the-wrong-vehicle-the-right-vehicle/comment-page-0/#comment-4731

This seemed the best place to add this!

davidbfpo

[Kiwigrunt]

Here's (http://www.ivema.co.za/gila.htm) a newish MRAP from SA that looks kinda interesting. Appears to adhere to the KISS principle and looks like its been designed from the ground up to be exactly what it is, as opposed to some others that are based on existing civilian trucks. Armour protection looks a bit meagre though.

On a different note, the Dutch seem to be quite happy with the Bushmaster, orders now totalling 72. May have something to do with the fact that the Dutch and the Ozzies work and live together in A-stan?

[davidbfpo]

Via a BSAP website this Russian website has a vast selection of photos and text in Russian of course: http://www.armourbook.com/forum/main_forum/first_aid/2008-12-11/kolesnye_bronemashiny/page/1.html

davidbfpo

[kaur]

davidbfpo, thanks for good link. I add one more picture :)

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0019/VF_MRAP.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0019/VF_MRAP)

[davidbfpo]

Testimony to the MRAP concept, a Pathfinder vehicle in Afghanistan after a 500 pound IED went off: http://cryptome.org/MRAPINCIDENT.pps

Appears to be a US Army Unclassified product. I note the engine has left the vehicle.

davidbfpo