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SWJED
11-07-2005, 05:23 AM
Moderator's Note

This thread was closed October 2012 to May 2013, as there is a new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16303

After an appeal today it has been re-opened (ends).

7 Nov. Christian Science Monitor - A Junkyard Solution to IEDs (http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1107/p07s01-wosc.html). Excerpt follows:

"The latest thing to come out of the motor pool here at Qalat Forward Operating Base isn't pretty, and it isn't all that easy to steer. But it might just save some lives."

"It's a minesweeper that rides out front of a Humvee, designed to detect land mines or roadside bombs by setting them off..."

"The minesweeper, due to make its battlefield debut this month, has a distinctly Frankensteinish look to it - iron welded to iron, a steering column, and a Humvee-length space of nothingness, where an exploding roadside bomb will be unable to do harm. It's the type of battlefield ingenuity that the Pentagon could draw upon as it tasks a high-level general to develop countermeasures to roadside bombs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs)..."

aktarian
11-07-2005, 09:06 AM
Interesting idea but not a new one. Usually used on tanks though.

http://www.d-daytanks.org.uk/images/popups-images/matilda.jpg

In past this was countered by removing detonator from mine/bomb, place it ahead of mine and connect the two. So when tanks' rollers were above detonator the tank itself was above mine. So rollers triggered detonator underneath them and mine exploded under tank.

SWJED
12-29-2005, 08:14 AM
29 Dec. Washington Times - Deadly Attacks Prompt Safer Combat Vehicles (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20051229-122509-5557r.htm).


... The Department of Defense has not publicly called for replacing the Humvee, yet several companies are developing more advanced armored utility vehicles in response to the deadly roadside bombs being used by insurgents against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lt. Col. Keir-Kevin Curry, an Army public affairs spokesperson at the Pentagon, would not divulge whether officials desire an alternative to the Humvee, only saying, "soldier protection is our No. 1 priority. Everything we do is built around that priority."

"As new technologies emerge, the Army is aggressively working with industry to develop, test, produce, and rapidly field the best possible equipment, and get it into the hands of our soldiers in the field as soon as possible," Col. Curry said.

Although attacks by roadside bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive devices (IEDs), are decreasing in frequency since they became widespread in 2003 in Iraq, the sizes of the explosive charges are increasing....

...new 7.5 ton armored "Rock" -- in service with both private contractors and Department of Defense agencies -- has been struck by at least five IEDs, and all passengers have survived without injury. It's a different story for those soldiers and Marines who continue to travel Iraqi highways in up-armored Humvees...

SWJED
12-29-2005, 10:20 AM
29 Dec. USA Today - Corps Pays $100K for Retooled Jeep (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20051229/1a_bottomstrip29.art.htm).


The Marine Corps is paying $100,000 apiece for a revamped Vietnam-era jeep as part of its program to outfit the hybrid airplane-helicopter V-22 Osprey, Pentagon records show.

That's seven times what a deluxe commercial version of the vehicle costs. It's also three times what U.S. Export-Import Bank records show the Dominican Republic paid four years ago for a military version of the vehicle, called the Growler, a recycled version of the M151 jeep.

The Marines and the contractor, General Dynamics, say the vehicle has been thoroughly revised with modern automotive parts and adapted to fit on the V-22...

KenDawe
04-02-2006, 04:39 PM
This sounds like a good TTP:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060402/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_pope_glass_4

RAMADI, Iraq - The 21-year-old gunner was standing atop the turret of a Humvee called Frankenstein's Monster when the bomb exploded on the ground beside him, sending a wave of sizzling shrapnel and ball-bearings toward his head.
Knocked down inside his vehicle by the blast, Spc. Richard Sugai regained consciousness minutes later and realized he was lucky to be alive. His savior: a glass cocoon of 2-inch thick bulletproof windshields he had welded around the top of his turret three days earlier.
Troops mockingly call the modification "Pope Glass" because it brings to mind the ballistic-proof glass box the late Pope John Paul II traveled in after being wounded in a 1981 assassination attempt....
Not a truely innovative tactic, I suppose, but if it keeps troops alive, and uninjured, it's worthwhile. A buddy who is "over there" now tells me that a lot of troops are paying KellogBrownRoot guys to make these mods. Also that his Platoon Sergeant refuses to allow this on any of "his" M1114s because they are unofficial mods. :mad:

Nat Glozer
04-04-2006, 12:36 PM
But there is always a downside to every measure of force protection. On a convoy, gunners are the main eyes. They are the ones most likely to spot signs of an IED or possible ambush. That "pope glass" is going to get scratched up, reducing the gunners ability to see detail. Not saying I'd be against it, but you have to consider the downside as well.

CPT Holzbach
04-04-2006, 02:30 PM
They are the ones most likely to spot signs of an IED or possible ambush.

I'd have to disagree with this. Generally, the gunner should be down behind the turret armor to avoid being the victim of an IED. The driver and TC are responsible for spotting IEDs, the driver scanning the TC side, the TC scanning the driver side. The gunner only pops up as you go through major intersections to stop traffic. His primary duties are providing security while stationary, and engageing VBIEDs as necessary.


That "pope glass" is going to get scratched up, reducing the gunners ability to see detail.
We had some HMMWVs use that glass on their turrets, usually layered on top of the metal to provide double protection. It works well. I also had it around the BC's position on my two Bradleys. It does get a bit scratched and dusty, but the loss of visibility wasnt too bad. And it did allow you to expose yourself and see more without having to worry as much about having your head taken off by an IED, or sniper.

Nat Glozer
04-04-2006, 03:55 PM
Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. When we were rolling, my policy was that all eyes were responsible for scanning for IEDs. The best way to avoid being a victim of one was to was to spot them before they detonated. So, though every one was looking, as dusty as Iraq is, and as old as those HMMWVs were, if you were inside looking out, visibility was poor. Gunner's in a dangerous position, no doubt, but kept everybody safer overall.

Beowulf
04-10-2006, 05:16 AM
Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. When we were rolling, my policy was that all eyes were responsible for scanning for IEDs. The best way to avoid being a victim of one was to was to spot them before they detonated. So, though every one was looking, as dusty as Iraq is, and as old as those HMMWVs were, if you were inside looking out, visibility was poor. Gunner's in a dangerous position, no doubt, but kept everybody safer overall.


Common TTP now is "name tape defillade" for gunners. I don't necessarily agree with it but that is the guidance from higher. It is intended to minimize casualties from ied's and rollovers.

The Pope glass should enable a gunner to sit a little higher and be a bit safer, I supose scratching/visibility would be an issue, but not substantially more than the hmmwv windshield.

SWJED
10-31-2006, 01:28 PM
31 October USA Today - IED-resistant Vehicles Speeding to War Zones (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20061031/a_buffalo31art.htm) by Tom Vanden Brook.


The military is rushing armored vehicles with specially designed hulls to Iraq and Afghanistan to limit the damage from roadside bombs, the No. 1 killer of U.S. troops.

The bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, have killed or wounded thousands of troops and shredded conventional military vehicles. The new vehicles have a V-shaped hull, which disperses the force of an explosion and helps keep the vehicle from flipping over...

The Pentagon's Joint IED Defeat Organization is spending nearly $3.5 billion this year to combat IEDs. Pentagon records show that since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, 1,074 troops have been killed and 11,513 others wounded by insurgent bombs.

A major Pentagon supplier of V-shaped vehicles is 9-year-old Force Protection of Ladson, S.C. The Pentagon says the number of the company's Buffalo and Cougar V-shaped vehicles in Iraq is classified, but public records show the military has bought almost 300. That compares with more than 35,000 Humvees, the military's main multipurpose vehicle, in Iraq. The Buffalo vehicles cost $750,000 apiece, about five times the cost of an armored Humvee, which is smaller.

Force Protection says nobody inside a Buffalo has been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan despite encountering thousands of IED blasts...

Foreign companies, many of them in South Africa, have been the leaders in developing the vehicles. Some of the Pentagon's largest contractors are marketing V-shaped vehicles with foreign partners. They include:


AM General, the maker of the Humvee, is pitching to the Pentagon a V-shaped armored car called the Cobra. It is made by Otokar, a Turkish company, and uses a Humvee drivetrain.

Oshkosh Truck, which makes many of the military's trucks, has partnered with ADI of Australia to market the Bushmaster armored vehicle.

Blackwater, a private security firm that protects U.S. diplomats in Iraq, developed is own vehicle, the Grizzly, which it will send to Iraq soon...

Ray Levesque
10-31-2006, 06:34 PM
What amazes me is that it took so long. V-shaped armored vehciles, to deflect mines, were in use in the 80s in Africa. It's long been known that mines are the "tactic" of choice for insurgents -- whole studies were done in the Vietnam war.

It's sad that it's taken this long to implement this lesson.

Stu-6
10-31-2006, 11:18 PM
One of the major problems is we went in to Iraq with an army equipped to fight a war with front lines. Humvees which work so well for moving troops around outside of the line of fire are no match for modern weapons improvised or not. We armor them to increase survivability but by the time there is enough armor on them to make them internal security vehicles the suspension will break.

SWJED
03-24-2007, 07:38 AM
23 March The Australian - Military Claims Victory with V-shaped Truck (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21431127-31477,00.html) by Robert Lusetich.


A relatively minor redesign of military Humvees could save the lives of thousands of US soldiers in Iraq.

The Pentagon is spending $US210 million ($260 million) - and eventually probably billions - on almost 400 mine-resistant-ambush-protected (MRAP) combat trucks after the success of 200 prototypes in the Iraq war.

The MRAP has a V-shaped steel body to deflect blasts from improvised explosive devices, which have been responsible for 70 per cent of the almost 3200 US military deaths in Iraq.

No US soldier in Iraq has died while in an MRAP.

"The shape channels the full force of a blast up the sides of the vehicle rather than through the floor," said Joaquin Salas, a spokesman for Osh Trucks, one of the MRAP's makers...

Uboat509
03-24-2007, 09:01 AM
Claims Victory is a bit strong. These things certainly have a place but they are no where near the be-all and end-all. More on it here (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070323/a_mrap23.art.htm).


The Army may order more of the vehicles, but it doesn't intend for them to replace its 16,000 armored Humvees in Iraq, Brig. Gen. Charles Anderson said. The new vehicles are too heavy and hard to maneuver in urban areas such as Baghdad, said Anderson, the Army's director of force development.

"The Humvee is still a viable option in the theater," he said. The Army is committed to add-on armor kits for the Humvees, which cost almost $29,000 apiece. Each of the new vehicles costs at least $700,000, according to Army budget documents.


SFC W

davidbfpo
03-24-2007, 11:02 AM
The V-shpaed vehicle design has been around since the 1970's, first in Rhodesia and then developed in South Africa. The only open source book I know is Peter Stiff's 'Taming the landmine', which is now somewhat dated and is easy to find on Google.

Why the later South Africa versions have not been purchased or licensed by the coalition eludes me.

Yes, they were originally designed for 'bush warfare' where land lines were the main threat, not IEDs in urban areas. Are the principles of design and threat not the same?

davidbfpo

marct
03-24-2007, 11:48 AM
Hi David,


Why the later South Africa versions have not been purchased or licensed by the coalition eludes me.

Yes, they were originally designed for 'bush warfare' where land lines were the main threat, not IEDs in urban areas. Are the principles of design and threat not the same?

As far as the threat envelope is concerned, it appears to be quite similar: mines/IEDs, RPGs, occasional anti-armour, etc. The designs should work, as would some of the Israeli designs.

The only problem with the South African versions is that they suffer from a fatal flaw: "Not designed here in the good ol' USA" :wry:. Which means that some congressman doesn't get to claim they got their constituents a juicy contract to research something that has already been designed.

Marc

J Wolfsberger
03-24-2007, 12:58 PM
All,

The vehicles produced by Force Protection (www.forceprotection.net) are the South African designs, produced under license. They are selling to the U.S.

However, the deep vee design can't be applied retroactively. The writer who stated that "A relatively minor redesign of military Humvees could save the lives of thousands of US soldiers in Iraq" is completely wrong. Unless by minor redesign he means: raise radiator cap, insert new vehicle, replace radiator cap.

J Wolfsberger
03-24-2007, 01:03 PM
With regard to MRAP, there are a bunch of companies producing several different vehicle. Defense Daily is a good source for finding out who has received contracts so far. This program looks to become a large multi source procurement for interim vehicles until the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) develops a new one from scratch.

TROUFION
03-25-2007, 01:26 AM
Ok I think it is great to get these vehicles to the troops that need them but, claiming victory because you can break the red-tape barrier to procurment, 'eh not too impressive. The US built victory ships in one week, some of these remained in service around the globe more than 30 years later. Bombers, tanks, trucks flowed off assembly lines at the 'rapid rate'. No, while it is good to be able to buy what is needed it is 2007 the war started in 2003, the need for the vehicles was identified in late 2004. This is no victory, though it is a good thing.

tequila
04-19-2007, 11:14 AM
Seems like it's working thusfar (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-18-marines-new-vehicles_N.htm)- at least until the Iraqis develop something else. EFPs?


http://i.usatoday.net/news/_photos/2007/04/19/mrapx.jpg


In more than 300 attacks since last year, no Marines have died while riding in new fortified armored vehicles the Pentagon hopes to rush to Iraq in greater numbers this year, a top Marine commander in Anbar province said.
Brig. Gen. John Allen, deputy commander of coalition forces in Anbar province, said the Marines have tracked attacks on the vehicles since January 2006. The vehicles' raised, V-shaped hulls deflect the force of blasts from homemade bombs buried in roadways.

There's been an average of less than one injured Marine per attack on the vehicles, Allen said. There have been 1,100 attacks on coalition vehicles during the period in Anbar province, the heart of the Sunni Muslim insurgency.

Attacks on other vehicles caused more than two casualties per attack, including deaths, Allen said.

Culpeper
04-29-2007, 12:54 AM
Like most of the Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Anbar province, this one has been hit as many as three times by enemy fire and bomb blasts. Yet, to date, no American troops have died while riding in one. (http://apnews.myway.com//article/20070428/D8OPSTTO0.html)

SWJED
05-31-2007, 01:24 PM
31 May USA Today - MRAPs Can't Stop Newest Weapon (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070531/1a_lede31_dom.art.htm) by Tom Vanden Brook.


New military vehicles that are supposed to better protect troops from roadside explosions in Iraq aren't strong enough to withstand the latest type of bombs used by insurgents, according to Pentagon documents and military officials.

As a result, the vehicles need more armor added to them, according to a January Marine Corps document provided to USA TODAY. The Pentagon faced the same problem with its Humvees at the beginning of the war.

The military plans to spend as much as $25 billion for up to 22,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by 2009. Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that buying the new vehicles should be the Pentagon's top procurement priority.

But the armor on those vehicles cannot stop the newest bomb to emerge, known as an explosively formed penetrator (EFP)...

sullygoarmy
05-31-2007, 02:41 PM
Hey, if my M1A1 can't keep the EFP from punching through, there isn't alot of wheeled vehicles that are going to do it. Fortunately the amount EFP IEDs are only a small percentage what the troops find daily. Granted, they are much more lethal but I'd rather have my guys in an MRAP than an uparmored humvee. At least we're making improvements against the most common type of IED out there. IMHO, the way to defeat EFP IEDs is to continue to go after the builders, the suppliers and the cells planting these sophisticated devices.

120mm
05-31-2007, 04:08 PM
Perhaps this article should be cut and pasted in the "Why I hate journalists" topic. I read it earlier today, and I'm certain I've read more poorly written articles, but I cannot remember exactly where......

J Wolfsberger
05-31-2007, 08:24 PM
Perhaps this article should be cut and pasted in the "Why I hate journalists" topic. I read it earlier today, and I'm certain I've read more poorly written articles, but I cannot remember exactly where......

I'll bet it was some "why the US will lose" piece written by a lefty "military analyst."

120mm
06-01-2007, 05:35 AM
No, actually it is a "non-news" piece, written by a journalist who doesn't have the slightest idea what he/she is talking about. EFPs, by definition, can defeat ANY vehicle. You could construct an EFP that could defeat the Hoover Dam, if you chose to. And MRAP stands for "Mine-Resistent", not "Mine-Proof." The article is simply an attempt to spread hysteria and appear to be controversial by an ignorant "journalist" who lacks the talent and commitment to do their job, correctly. As a friend told me yesterday, "never assume ill-will, until you've ruled out sheer incompetence."

Very similar to the hatchet pieces being circulated about the M16/M4 by folks like Bryan Cox, to name names, who always seems to write about Heckler and Koch products in glowing terms, (omitting all sorts of inconvenient "facts" about weapons development and availability) and the current Army system as a dangerous failure. Irresponsible journalism like this doesn't help inspire confidence in soldiers' weapons.

zulucharlie
06-25-2007, 02:49 AM
Good evening all,
I agree with Ray Levesque #11
Not only did the Casspir save a lot of lives in the South African bush war the unique design enabled the vehicle to withstand serious damage and about 85% of the vehicles could be driven from the scene after some minor repairs, sometimes only the wheel needed changing, the most serious damage and injuries were caused from driving too fast enabling the mine to flip the vehicle onto its side. Speed and driving too close also caused the following vehicles to smash into the disabled vehicle; this fact should be the first thing drivers should be made aware of.

zc

Ken White
06-25-2007, 03:55 AM
designs are great for their intended missions. The Casspir and the Buffalo and todays RG 31 are big and very formidable mine protected vehicles that give effective protection against small arms. They were made with a high center of gravity and are great vehicles for their designed purpose -- to transport troops through scrub brush that was heavily mined so the troops could get to the area of a fight and dismount.

They were high both to allow enhanced mine protection and to allow visibility over the scrub. That height is a disadvantage in urban or flat desert areas. Their size means they are entirely too big to navigate in the narrow wadis and lanes in Afghanistan and much of Iraq. Further, there are mines in both theaters but the greater danger is from lateral IEDs. They are not lateral IED proof without getting as dangerously overweight as are the up armored HMMWVs, they are not good convoy escort vehicle. Great vehicles, better than nothing but still far from ideal.

The Australian Bushmaster is a good blend and has better capability for being up-armored and Oshkosh has a license agreement with BAE Australia; unfortunately, it too is a large and high vehicle designed to rapidly transport troops to a dismount point through scrub. Both the Dutch and the Strines are using it in the 'Stan (the latter also in Iraq) so it'll be interesting to see how it fares.

Otokar in Turkey makes an armored variant of the HMMWV (as does Mowag in Switzerland, now owned by GD) which would have worked well, but as Marc said, they weren't invented here. They would have been adequate provided some tactical sense was applied in their use and they'd have used standard in the inventory parts, (as opposed to the Cougar / RG 31 and such with MB and other non-standard parts), far cheaper and thus more could've been purchased. No matter, since International now has a big contract for yet a different vehicle, we'll see what happens.

We are reacting to a hysterical and ignorant media campaign that is at least partly political. That said, we're going to do it -- but the big Armored Busses are not the answer. The infantry -- I mean real infantry, the light guys over there -- who get around on foot don't have an IED problem.

Horses for courses and all that...

Jedburgh
07-20-2007, 12:50 PM
19 Jul 07 testimony before the HASC Joint Seapower and Expeditionary Forces and Air and Land Forces Subcommittees on The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program:

John Young, MRAP TF (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/JointALSPEF071907/Young_Testimony071907.pdf)


LTG John Castellaw, USMC,Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/JointALSPEF071907/Castellaw_Testimony071907.pdf)

Transcripts of statements by BG Michael Brogan, USMC, Cdr Marine Corps Systems Command and LTG Stephen Speakes, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-8, were not available.

Mark O'Neill
07-20-2007, 01:23 PM
The V-shpaed vehicle design has been around since the 1970's, first in Rhodesia and then developed in South Africa. The only open source book I know is Peter Stiff's 'Taming the landmine', which is now somewhat dated and is easy to find on Google.

Why the later South Africa versions have not been purchased or licensed by the coalition eludes me.

Yes, they were originally designed for 'bush warfare' where land lines were the main threat, not IEDs in urban areas. Are the principles of design and threat not the same?

davidbfpo

Australia has had the Bushmaster Infantry Mobility Vehicle (IMV) for a few years now. It is a locally made 'next generation' mine resistant vehicle for an Infantry Section. It is made by Thales, who bought ADI (Australian Defence Industries) a few years back. It is manufactured in Bendigo, Victoria. Here is the company's website:

http://www.adi-limited.com/site.asp?page=154

It is an Aussie design , inspired by the Buffel and Kaspir. It can withstand a pretty decent blast directly under the hull, I will not specify it here as I am not sure that the quantity of blast it can resist is unclassified.

We are using them in Iraq and Afghanistan to good effect, I understand that the U.S.A. is buying a largish - quantity for a trial.

FascistLibertarian
07-20-2007, 05:02 PM
I am pretty sure the Canadians put something on the front of their tanks similar to this in either operation tractable or totalize (i think it was the latter) in order to blow up mines.

V shaped makes so much more sense.
But then we didnt always put armour on an angle to make it thicker in early tanks, so common sense doesnt always work.....

Jedburgh
07-20-2007, 08:06 PM
...It is an Aussie design , inspired by the Buffel and Kaspir. It can withstand a pretty decent blast directly under the hull, I will not specify it here as I am not sure that the quantity of blast it can resist is unclassified...
It may have been classified in the past, but limited specifics are available on the open 'net (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-apv-bushmaster.htm). The ability of the hull to withstand blast is given as equivalent to two TM-57 AT mines, or 19kg (not quite 42lb) of TNT.

Mark O'Neill
07-21-2007, 03:20 AM
It may have been classified in the past, but limited specifics are available on the open 'net (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-apv-bushmaster.htm). The ability of the hull to withstand blast is given as equivalent to two TM-57 AT mines, or 19kg (not quite 42lb) of TNT.

That is a different figure to the one I am familiar with. Maybe some aspects regarding some tech specs are still withheld, for obvious reasons...

SWJED
02-16-2008, 08:04 PM
Vehicle Delay Blamed for Marines' Deaths (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080216/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/marines_mrap_deadly_delay) by Richard Lardner, Associated Press.


Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes.

The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of "gross mismanagement" that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years...

Among the findings in the Jan. 22 study:

• Budget and procurement managers failed to recognize the damage being done by IEDs in late 2004 and early 2005 and were convinced the best solution was adding more armor to the less-sturdy Humvees the Marines were using. Humvees, even those with extra layers of steel, proved incapable of blunting the increasingly powerful explosives planted by insurgents.

• An urgent February 2005 request for MRAPs got lost in bureaucracy. It was signed by then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, who asked for 1,169 of the vehicles. The Marines could not continue to take "serious and grave casualties" caused by IEDs when a solution was commercially available, wrote Hejlik, who was a commander in western Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005.

Gayl cites documents showing Hejlik's request was shuttled to a civilian logistics official at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in suburban Washington who had little experience with military vehicles. As a result, there was more concern over how the MRAP would upset the Marine Corps' supply and maintenance chains than there was in getting the troops a truck that would keep them alive, the study contends.

• The Marine Corps' acquisition staff didn't give top leaders correct information. Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, was not told of the gravity of Hejlik's MRAP request and the real reasons it was shelved, Gayl writes. That resulted in Conway giving "inaccurate and incomplete" information to Congress about why buying MRAPs was not hotly pursued.

• The Combat Development Command, which decides what gear to buy, treated the MRAP as an expensive obstacle to long-range plans for equipment that was more mobile and fit into the Marines Corps' vision as a rapid reaction force. Those projects included a Humvee replacement called the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and a new vehicle for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

The MRAPs didn't meet this fast-moving standard and so the Combat Development Command didn't want to buy them, according to Gayl. The study calls this approach a "Cold War orientation" that suffocates the ability to react to emergency situations.

• The Combat Development Command has managers — some of whom are retired Marines — who lack adequate technical credentials. They have outdated views of what works on the battlefield and how the defense industry operates, Gayl says. Yet they are in position to ignore or overrule calls from deployed commanders.

More at the link above.

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 09:39 AM
A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,


They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).


YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

Fuchs
07-07-2008, 11:24 AM
A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

Generally,


They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).


YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

"better", "less" - in comparison to what?


The cross-country mobility of MRAPs has to be poor on all soft or hard but uneven terrains judged by the mean maximum ground pressure and the running gear.
Such vehicles only provide road mobility. They can negotiate difficult terrain sometimes, but not reliably enough to be used off-road regularly.

The protection is highly specialized against blast, crude EFP and obsolete RPGs. I bet that these vehicles don't have bomblet protection.

The costs are much higher than the costs of unprotected trucks and trucks with protected cabins.

MRAP is huge, even the "smaller" versions. These vehicles cannot easily be hidden against competent enemies with modern sensor technology.


But let's ignore the technical aspects for a while. The focus on armour to enhance survivability seems to me as an outgrowth of LI warfare. It worked because the opponents have only very limited lethality.
An opponent with modern lethality would easily destroy such vehicles despite their armour. There's a reason why so many people demand equal protection of IFVs and MBTs - even IFVs are not really survivable enough in a HIC.
Survivability in HIC requires to keep one's position unknown. Vehicles need to be easily concealable and if possible be silent and leave no traces offroad.
MRAP-sized vehicles cannot be easily hidden and their protection won't help much against battlefield weapons, so I'd say they're the wrong choice.

In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 11:41 AM
In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.

So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

VMI_Marine
07-07-2008, 11:55 AM
So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

Leather cadillacs and e-tools? :D

I had an MRAP for two months on my last tour. Fantastic vehicle for convoy ops - it's like having a Tactical Escalade compared to the Humvee. Useless offroad, though. We couldn't travel more than 10-15 kph offroad, and even then you had better be strapped in tight. I operated with an M113 briefly, until my CoC told me to cease and desist from operating Army vehicles, and in retrospect I loved the mobility it provided me over the MRAP. I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

Fuchs
07-07-2008, 12:18 PM
So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?

I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.
I'd integrate local militiamen into community-embedded platoons/companies anyway; the locals would create a safe environment and warn of dangers more thoroughly with some of them on every "foreign" vehicle anyway.
Soldiers could also use local transport vehicles on raids and intelligence missions.


For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)

- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts)

Such a truck would survive indirect HE fires less well, but it would be much less likely under such and other fires. The small signature to enemy reconnaissance would increase the uncertainty for the enemy.
Imagine an infantry company occupies a community close to a major city to block an important road nearby. It's no rural community, so there's no barn. MRAPs cold be parked under gas stations , but most of them only in the open.
An enemy 5 lbs drone makes a fly-over and the enemy knows almost all truck positions and the defender strength. 320mm MRL and 142mm SPH flatten the community with HE, a mech company approaches combat-like and clears the ruins.
Imagine a company occupying the community with my light truck design; you could send much better recon assets, even drive through with some recon AFVs and would still not become aware of the occupation.

In high intensity warfare you need to defeat their sensors, not their munitions for survivability.
Some people believe that "stealth" doesn't work on the ground. They think too much of Arab deserts imho.

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 01:28 PM
I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.

I think that long fast road moves are going to become increasingly important. That means putting tracked APCs on low-loaders and that takes a lot of time and then you are road bound anyway.

I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

It's worth just taking a look at this,
http://www.defense-update.com/products/w/wildcat.htm

It costs about 1/3rd of what Stryker does, and to my mind is more capable, in that given a choice, I would select this over Stryker.

Randy Brown
07-07-2008, 01:44 PM
I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.

...

YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.

I'm not sure whether I've unpacked your last paragraph correctly, but I am curious as to why your "MRAP and JLTV" query did not also mention the Stryker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker_(vehicle)) family of vehicles, as well as the Armored Security Vehicle (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/asv.htm). I recently attended a short briefing on the former, and was struck by some tactical and organizational advantages in its current use. For example:


Tactical: Moving quietly (http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/07/08/iraq_duty_sells_soldiers_on_quiet_stryker.html) on the battlefield.
Organizational: Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) are organized one battalion "heavier" (http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/10/02/stryker_brigade_101.html) than other BCT types.

Regarding the ASV, I note that some U.S. infantry with which I am affiliated deployed to OIF Security Force (SECFOR) missions were issued ASV, rather than armored Humvees. I don't know whether this was in order to make them provisional Military Police in all but name, but it did have implications for how they moved and fought.

I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 01:56 PM
I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.

(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)

I tried not to mention Stryker but the points raised sort of forced me into it for the sake of clarity - something i guess I should try harder for!! :D -

Both Stryker and ASV seems to have very poor levels of protection. I think technology, operational reality and threat have all left Stryker far behind, but it's here now so folks will have to deal with it.

Another interesting vehicle is the Australian Bushmaster (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushmaster_IMV)

Fuchs
07-07-2008, 02:01 PM
I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.

Mostly correct.
But consider this; how much would the infantry travel on roads? Let's assume a road speed of only 50 km/h. A five-hour move would certainly be an exception for infantry, happening only once in some weeks. The average truck might be moving less than one or two hours per day (logistics vehicles would move much more).
That's 22-23 hours per day without movement (albeit possibly waiting on or next to a road). Do you want a huge protected but difficult-to-conceal truck (an invitation to concentrate the squad in the vehicle especially in cold climate) or a smaller, easily concealed vehicle?

Concealed vehicles wouldn't need to be guarded as much and the lower weight and fuel consumption reduce maintenance and logistical requirements.
Some off-road capability is required for many tasks. Engineering vehicles for earthworks and lower echelon supply vehicles as well as vehicles for ATGM or mortar crews need to be off-road capable.

Furthermore; the armour employed in MRAPs is not quantity production material. Even if they used simple RHA we would still have a supply shortage in the event of a major war that requires ten thousands, not only about 2,000 vehicles per year. What's our equipment good for if you cannot produce it in wartime quantities, if you cannot equip your mobilized army?


Israel is a special case. It has rather high force densities in the event of a war, hard ground surfaces in many areas, many hilly terrains (Negev, Sinai, Lebanon, Golan) that don't permit much off-road activity anyway and its possible opponents cannot expect to achieve much with their reconnaissance or artillery.

Surferbeetle
07-07-2008, 02:29 PM
I enjoyed using the HMMWV before all the armor hit. The stryker looks interesting but I have never been in one during a combat tour so I can't say.

What have/do our allies use(d)?

From Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler_Dingo) the Dingo


The Daimler Scout Car, known in service as the "Dingo" (after the Australian wild dogs), was a British light fast 4WD reconnaissance vehicle also used in the liaison role during the Second World War.

From Defesanet (http://www.defesanet.com.br/afv/kmw_apc_e.htm) the Dingo 2


The DINGO 2 is a consistent upgrade of the DINGO 1 all-protected carrier vehicle transport vehicle introduced into service in the year 2000 and proven in many foreign missions. For as many as eight crew, it currently affords the highest level of protection against modern hand-held weapons, artillery fragments, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as well as against NBC combat agents. With its highly mobile off-road chassis, it reaches maximum speeds of more than 90 kph and a radius of action of approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the DINGO 2 is air-transportable on C160-Transall, C130 Hercules and the future A400M aircraft.

Fuchs
07-07-2008, 02:58 PM
Try this one for Dingo 1 / ATF:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ATF_Dingo
The protection levels are not fully known, of course. I remember that it's small arms and single or even double stacked blast AT mine resistant.

Dingos are armored Unimogs (light standard 4x4 truck).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unimog

This is another German 4x4 (partially) armoured vehicle, designed to fit into CH-53G, IIRC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mungo_ESK

The Bundeswehr also uses different armoured cabs for medium and heavy trucks and a 4x4 armoured observation vehicle (Fennek). Boxer/GTK, a huge wheeled APC, is another program.

A new program for a new vehicle generation is underway. This includes the Grizzly (and other vehicles)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KMW_Grizzly
http://193.158.125.14/images/91_KMW-GFF4.jpg

A design from a blank sheet on is the GeFaS. It's modular and again huge.
http://www.rheinmetall.de/index.php?lang=2&fid=1698

We have I think about six to eight different Mercedes G class jeep versions with armour protection. The protection escalated as the anticipated missions evolved from MP vehicle to Afghanistan road patrols.
I've recently heard that no lesser protected vehicles than Dingo 1 are used for Afghanistan patrols and convoys anymore our contingent had luck some months ago when mines did much less damage and caused less severe casualties than possible.
Sometime early in the ISAF mission we had lots of KIA when a bus (a bus!!!) got hit.
The first patrols in Kabul were done with sandbagged open Unimogs mostly (with the appropriate spin about barrett-wearing friendly soldiers and intentionally no intimidating armour...but in the background they were hastily buying more armoured Dingos ASAP).



I dislike the Bundeswehr's apparently uncoordinated procurement of many different wheeled armoured vehicles in the past ten years. I believe it exposes a poor planning capability and a lack of clear understanding of one's own requirements.
The end result is far away from the successful Family of vehicles" maintenance- and logistics-friendly approaches like our old 2nd medium/light truck generation and the French ACMAT VLRA had.

Surferbeetle
07-07-2008, 03:10 PM
Fuchs,

Thanks for the references. Here is one that might be of interest with regards to South African designs (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-blast-resistant-vehicles-2.htm).

Regards,

Steve

jcustis
07-07-2008, 03:47 PM
For the sake of our discussion here, let's not forget that "protection" is not simply a function of armor alone. Speed is security, thus all- round mobility, coupled with firepower slaved to good sensors, can work equally well at preventing that RPG from being lit off in the first place. If you treat the platform like nothing more than a taxi, you will always die easily.

Surferbeetle
07-07-2008, 04:04 PM
J,

Preach on. During OIF 1 no armor meant me and my team had the doors off, weapons outboard, good visibility, and good speed. One day, being a bit on the tired side I missed the initial signal, but rapidly got with the program when all of the Iraqi's bailed from both sides of the road around me & my team. Gotta love them HMMWV's, they are tough & maneuverable and we all cleared the zone.

The current war is a different one than OIF 1 however, and it would appear that armor has it's place.

Regards,

Steve

Fuchs
07-07-2008, 04:20 PM
Fuchs,

Thanks for the references. Here is one that might be of interest with regards to South African designs (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-blast-resistant-vehicles-2.htm).

Regards,

Steve

I've read a copy of "Taming the land mine", a book entirely about Rhodesian/South African anti-mine AFV designs of the 70's. I recommend it.

The V-shaped bottom was adopted by the modern designs, but the easily repairable wheel suspensions away from the hull ('monocoque design') was not. Some designs also have their cabin over the front axle or very close, also not very smart against pressure-fuzed AT mines.
I asked the Force Protection representative on Eurosatory 2008 about it and he evaded the hard questions. But he claimed that his company has "THE" experienced designer from South Africa with 30 years experience in mine-protected trucks.

Ken White
07-07-2008, 04:26 PM
... and it would appear that armor has it's place.It also has the significant and far too often overlooked disadvantage of lulling the unwary into a false sense of being protected. That's a pernicious and dangerous affliction.

No matter how good the armor -- or the active countermeasures in lieu of ever more of it -- it can and will be defeated. Tactical agility OTOH can easily compensate for a lack of 'protection.'

The old saw is wrong; speed does not kill, incompetence does. Speed is good...

patmc
07-07-2008, 05:20 PM
My unit received ASV's in late OIF IV to supplement our humvees and Mad Max trucks. It had better armor than our other vehicles, was faster, and had the turret with optics and protected crew-served weapon. It was hard to get in and out, and took more maintenance time when it did break.

I liked the ASV for Convoy Security, but for missions requiring constant dismounting, it would work for overwatch, but not troop transport.

The only people with MRAPs during my tour were EOD or "special," so we saw them out there, and thought, "be nice to have that." Speaking with a MSG currently on a MiTT that uses MRAPs, he is a big supporter. He just reiterated, make sure you buckle up.

Randy Brown
07-07-2008, 06:56 PM
The only people with MRAPs during my tour were EOD or "special," so we saw them out there, and thought, "be nice to have that." Speaking with a MSG currently on a MiTT that uses MRAPs, he is a big supporter. He just reiterated, make sure you buckle up.

Roger your earlier points on the ASV. I'd also be interested to find out if they were ever used in mixed tracked-and-wheeled formations, or used to overwatch dismounted troops in urban settings.

My only (indirect) experience with MRAP is with a couple of engineer units performing route-clearance missions. Given the intent of GEN Petraeus's Rule No. 4 "Get out and walk--move mounted, work dismounted" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3177)--I'm curious if you could shed any non-OPSEC skinny on how the MRAP worked in the MiTT mission.

(And, in a possible corollary to Petraeus, I swear I once heard SECSTATE Rice make an MRAP-related on-air comment to National Public Radio in late-2007. It was something about how "sometimes, you have to get out of the Buffalo." Haven't been able to find the cite since. It's part of an ongoing research project, if anyone else can point me to the original quote.)


I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.

...

For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)

- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts).

I liked how Fuchs started to break the intellectual problem down as a wish-list for equipment capabilities, as well as the rationale behind each of his criteria. Granted, he prefaces his comments in terms of High-Intensity Conflict (HIC), rather than Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), but I like the approach. In fact, I originally thought that's where this thread might be headed: Using a couple of existing platforms as conversation starters and examples, what would you want out of a future mobile infantry platform?

(Of course, remember the Alamo--and remember the painful developmental process of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (http://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Wars-Reformers-Challenge-Guard/dp/1557500819/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1215456700&sr=8-2).)

It's an interesting question, and one that forces a horse-and-armored-cart dilemma, the parallel being "how-do-you-want-to-fight" vs. "how-your-current-equipment-constrains/enables-you-to-fight."

Distiller
07-08-2008, 08:28 AM
MRAP - just another word for a heavy, truck-shaped APC? Or re-inventing motorized infantry with super-heavy trucks instead of ACMATs?

I still fail to understand the fascination with MRAPs, especially since most of them are a far cry from the original - and in their ops environ - valid idea. When they were invented by the Rhodesians (mines, embargo), they were infantry taxis with widely seperated wheels, mine bottom, protection against rifle bullets and provided an elevated shooter platform.

But the latest MRAPs try to become APCs plus IFVs plus a dash of CFV - all in one vehicle. And that is just wrong. MRAPs are funny shaped, fashionable APC, taxis for light infantry, pax hauler. To actually fight, the infantry gets out. They are not supposed to be in there when the shooting starts. In infested territory they should get out and clean, not ignore and safely drive by. And besides the fact, that MRAPs can't really go offroad, they also can't swim. And with the proliferation of EFP know-how the MRAP will face a threat it can't defuse.

Leaves the medium (4x4) MRAP the role as urban riot control vehicle (people with too much money can glue some reactive armor onto them). And for the heavy (6x6) MRAP the niche as engineering and mine clearing vehicles.
The propsed heavy German MRAPs (GFF4) are just nonsense. For transport duties something like a SISU or MAN SX with a protected cabin is more suited. Convoy protection by APCs or JLTVs.

Basically there is no reason why APCs shouldn't get more protection, learning from MRAPs, but keeping the good parts of the APC concept. The proposed Marine MPC already goes that way.


On the JLTV: Good as liaison and scout cars, esp when not heavier than e.g. the MOWAG Eagle IV. Here to stay, something I have a hard time seeing the MRAP.

patmc
07-08-2008, 10:17 AM
He did not give me any real specifics, other than that they replaced their humvees for force protection. They still did mix of mounted/dis-mounted, with face to face interaction and advising. We didn't get deep into the TTPs or SOPs.


My only (indirect) experience with MRAP is with a couple of engineer units performing route-clearance missions. Given the intent of GEN Petraeus's Rule No. 4 "Get out and walk--move mounted, work dismounted" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3177)--I'm curious if you could shed any non-OPSEC skinny on how the MRAP worked in the MiTT mission.

William F. Owen
07-08-2008, 11:25 AM
Basically there is no reason why APCs shouldn't get more protection, learning from MRAPs, but keeping the good parts of the APC concept. The proposed Marine MPC already goes that way.


...and how long and how much funding will that require? The USMC MPC may have some merit but it risks same technology dead end that came to light in the UK FRES trials with Boxer, VBCI and the mythical Piranha V - the vehicle that won the trial despite not being there to take part!

If the well understood APCs designs had such potential, how come commercially derived and configured vehicles are now offering lower acquisition cost, (even with reactive armour and APS) great protection, and lower cost of ownership? All this has been achieved in less than 5 years, in most cases, while the cold war APC designs seem to offer less and less, in terms of flexibility across the missions being encountered.

Yes, you do have to make physical compromises. Size is one, but for the more mature designs they are no bigger than an average commercial truck. Some are C-130 transportable and Wildcat is possibly Cargo 747/C-33 transportable. Yes they are not good at crossing north German ploughed fields on rainy winter nights and they could not follow same cross country routes taken by tracked armoured vehicles.

Food for thought, as the result of some discussion in France recently. A generic MRAP based battle group can theoretically move 1,000 dismountable infantrymen, 500 km in 12 hours, (assuming a convoy planning rate of 41-45kph) to a tactical dismounted task of 24 hours and recover them back 1,000km, in 12 hours, using <150 well protected vehicles, based all on the same chassis, with no external logistic support.

I am still crunching a few numbers to confirm this, but in basic form it is, in itself, is an intriguing capability.

jcustis
07-08-2008, 11:34 AM
The problem you have Wilf, is that you could do the same with MTVR trucks, and many Marines would prefer to do so.

I guess that's not really a problem though.

William F. Owen
07-08-2008, 12:15 PM
The problem you have Wilf, is that you could do the same with MTVR trucks, and many Marines would prefer to do so.

I guess that's not really a problem though.

Agreed. You could do the same thing in Bedford MK trucks and the UK used to move infantry companies from one side of the BAOR Corps Area in hours, but Bedford MKs had all the protection of a family car. MTVRs are much better, but MRAPs are even better protected, and can possibly deliver troops in better condition.

What I am trying to do with this thread (and I am extremely grateful for ALL the input) is error check a very simple concept that I can use to demonstrate a line of thinking to judge the usefulness of an idea. -

...and why would many Marines would prefer to do so? Comfort? Protection? Simplicity?

jcustis
07-08-2008, 12:52 PM
I think the answer lies in a mix of all three. I know several logistician types who would probably prefer to move such a force MTVR pure, as the vehicle (once uparmored) offers protection, good firepower(even if only using Mk 1eyeball sensors), while it has decent C2 ability with Blue Force Tracker for the convoy commander.

This is in use in Iraq today, and my current complaint with post-2003 Lieutenants is that some might think they can get away with this routine on all battlefields. Big vehs don't offer good "fighting" mobility, and I wouldn't want to be caught in a contact without HMMWVs for more nimble and lower profile support.

For daily support runs in W. Al Anbar, MTVR-pure has made in-roads.

J Wolfsberger
07-08-2008, 12:53 PM
They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).



Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

jcustis
07-08-2008, 01:31 PM
I must have missed those points previously, but JW is dead on methinks.

William F. Owen
07-08-2008, 01:37 PM
Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

Sure. The sources generally come from wide variety of documentation as well as talking directly with the manufacturers of both MRAPs and APCs. The reasoning is basically as follows.

a.) They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)

I can't find an data for an existing and in service APC/MICV meets STANAG 4569 level 3 and/or 4, for both direct fire, fragmentation and under wheel and chassis mine detonation. I can find APCs (M113 variants) that can meet STANAG 4569 level 4, for direct fire, but not under-wheel mine detonation. I think Boxer may, meet both (ARTEC won't say) but it's 32 tonnes compared with 18 tonnes for some MRAPs. - which is why I caveated the statement with "in general overall terms."

b.) They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs. This is from manufactures and pure extrapolation from those designs using COTS technologies and those requiring or that have already incurred extensive development costs. Compare the costs of developing Boxer to that of even the better MRAPs. Running costs is based on the same assumptions. Wildcat and costs the same to run as a commercial TATRA truck.

c.) They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
Four wheels produce less mechanical noise and surface disruption than eight or six.

...but I am not claiming these as absolute or categoric statements in support of some argument. Data indicates that MRAP examples show very good levels of ALL-ROUND protection versus a WEIGHT and COST argument that I do not see APCs readily matching right now.

I am not attempting an MRAP versus APC argument. Mobility alone assures APCs bright future

If you have open source data that shows any of these assumptions to be flawed, I'd be extremely and genuinely grateful. As a Clausewitzian, I am far more comfortable clinging to orthodoxy, than I am wrestling with innovation and all the attention it attracts!

jcustis
07-08-2008, 01:51 PM
The clarity makes sense.

VMI_Marine
07-08-2008, 01:59 PM
...and why would many Marines would prefer to do so? Comfort? Protection? Simplicity?

Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.

The only advantage MRAPs confer, by design, is protection. I liked my MRAP in Iraq solely because of the comm suite (ok, the TC seat was a lot more roomy and comfortable than an M1114 :D), which was superior to most Humvees. It had 3 multiband radios, which was vital since I had typically had to work LOS and SATCOM nets at the same time. This not specific to MRAPs, however, during the period that the Army loaned me that M113 I had the same capability. The MRAP just made it look sexier.

I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.

Ken White
07-08-2008, 02:12 PM
...I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.Add to that the cost difference (initial plus more parts and fuel due to excessive weight) and range limitations due to that extra weight; the MRAP advantages do not offset the disadvantages and the cost isn't justified.

A convoy of MRAPs under air attack -- or in a well planned ambush -- will fare little if any better than a convoy of MTVRs or FMTVs.

Sounds to me like a defense contractor is proposing this idea in order to replace his current swimming pool with an Olympic sized pool...

William F. Owen
07-08-2008, 02:16 PM
Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.


I think it is I who should apologise if I am not making myself clear! - but that said, I don't have really have a point. It's more a question, and I am getting some answered.

More over, if MRAPs are as limited as their detractors imply, then why have they evolved in the way they have, with the capabilities we see today. They are almost of the purest form of functional military equipment I have ever seen, so seeing that they fulfil a clear operational need, my basic suspicion is that the better designs may have utility beyond they theatres and conflicts we currently see them in.

...and I come from a tradition of going to war as 8-10 men inside an FV-432, or 8-6 men in a Saracen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvis_Saracen), and when push came to shove, 4 men in Land Rover or 16 men in a 4 tonne truck. Only the Saracen ever impressed me!

jcustis
07-08-2008, 02:42 PM
As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

Heck, from what I hear, some of the designs first fielded to Iraq didn't even tow points. Go figure.

William F. Owen
07-08-2008, 03:11 PM
As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

J Wolfsberger
07-08-2008, 03:46 PM
So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

I think so, for its purpose. And thanks for the clarification.

Uboat509
07-08-2008, 09:40 PM
I have not yet worked with the MRAP so I do not have first hand knowledge of them. What I do know is that the biggest killer among IEDs in Iraq is the underbody explosion. EFPs get a lot of attention because they are relatively sophisticated and are difficult to defend against because of their ability to penetrate a lot of armor. Underbody attacks, on the other hand, are very unsophisticated, basically a whole lot of boom buried under the road. The thing is an EFP is a linear weapon. The spall that it generates when it penetrates can seriously injure or kill but often it takes a direct hit to kill, meaning that it can kill one or more people in the vehicle depending on seating and the angle of the strike. Even a direct hit can be survivable depending on where it hits and who is seated nearby. Underbody attacks are not at all sophisticated, relying on pure brute force to pulverize the vehicle and its contents. Underbody attacks are often not survivable and will generally kill everyone on the vehicle rather than just the unlucky ones seated in the way. As far as I can see the MRAP was designed to answer that problem and mostly that problem alone. I am simply not sure that they were really considering all the other variables that have been discussed on this board so far. I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

Cavguy
07-08-2008, 09:47 PM
I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.

That was actually the delay in getting more fielded - the military procurement/force integration staffs didn't see it as having lots of general-purpose utility in the future. Gates shut that argument down hard, to his credit.

Fuchs
07-08-2008, 10:12 PM
Maybe it would be interesting to look for its limitations. The general purpose usefulness depends on how much it's specialized or not.

My list of possible shortcomings (in comparison to modern APC project wish lists) that don't hurt in Iraq:

- side slope capability / usefulness in mountaineous terrain
- usefulness in snowy terrain
- no heater (?), possibly not prepared for sub-zero temperatures
- very large/visible
- very limited off-road mobility
- no bomblet protection
- some MRAP have less seating capacity than necessary to fit in a full squad
- no standardization; spare part logistical nightmare

And the vehicles will of course be (almost) worn out after the war.

arty8
07-08-2008, 11:24 PM
I got back late last year and fought in Mosul, inside the city for the most part. My squad had uparmoured humvees and a single ASV. I liked having an ASV, it was great to haul broken humvee's and is fast and agile, although the crew was stuck inside for the durationof the patrol.

The humvee simply cannot haul enough troops around for any mout senario, 3 dismounts per truck isn't nearly enough to search multiple buildings. This is assuming a 4 truck patrol. I really envied the infantry with the stryker-fast, really quiet and it held enough troops to be useful and was resistant to most IED's despite having a flat hull. The humvee, on the other hand has close to zero armour on the bottom.

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

William F. Owen
07-09-2008, 05:40 AM
Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.


Concur. My take, is that it may well be useful to look at these vehicles as having wider utility, and especially for transporting infantry over operational distances. I am not suggesting they follow the tanks across the start line, when confronting a combined arms armour enemy.

Arty 8

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

Exactly. The MRAP designs that have appeared in the last 5 years have made me really question the design and requirements criteria behind things like Stryker and the UK FRES.

From what I saw in Paris last month, even the Russians are now selling/proposing MRAP/JLTV type designs.

jcustis
07-09-2008, 01:44 PM
Given the cost of their procurement, I'm not sure what MRAPs have to offer, outside of countering the IED and mine threats. Now, if the designs could be such that ground pressure per axle is reduced, profile/height is lowered, and there was a decent weight to power ratio, they may indeed have wider utility. I do not know what a troop's combat effectiveness would be after a 12 he ride in a current design, across moderately broken ground, because the ride can be very rough due to seat design.

As for not following tanks past the start line, where would they be? I don't have stats on how many troops were motorized vs. Mech'd up in March 2003, but I don't think we could have afforded single-role troop transport vehs. That is the beauty of things like the MTVR. Need to carry troops? Pop the seats up. Got a cargo mission? Drop them. Have you seen any current designs with that sort of modularity?

As for matters of Stryker design, 8-wheelers have been around for a ton of time. Is it something about the Army's use of Stryker that seems off, or simply the platform in general, as it relates to protection and lift?

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

Tom Odom
07-09-2008, 01:58 PM
Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

Add water tanks, pumps, and hose and they will make dandy mine protected fire trucks...:wry:

We could also use then as mobile PSYOPs Billboards, plastering billboard sized messages such as "Ignore me, I am not really a target" on them. :cool:

Sorry, I am guilty of sarcasm :o

Seriously, they are what they are: force protection centric counter-mine/IED vehicles. given their weight, size, and effective capacity, I am not sure they are even good cargo platforms (assuming they were modified to such a role).

Tom

jcustis
07-09-2008, 03:37 PM
If we expand this, do we want DO or ECO elements to have vehs with some MRAP capabilities, none, or full-up protection, assuming that they will spend time alone and unafraid?

Force recon units at one point had little Mercedes jeeps for a time, but they had nothing in the way of armor. Is that still the way DO mobility should go?

William F. Owen
07-09-2008, 03:41 PM
Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

I think it depends which MRAP? - just like which APC. Most of conclusions come from looking at ADI's Bushmaster as the first iteration and the IMI Wildcat as the next. Yes, some of the MRAPs currently deployed are not as capable as those I cite, so I guess I should have referred to specific vehicles, but I am very wary of seeming to advertise, so best not! :)

...but I became impressed with Wildcat when I compared it to Stryker.

Should they be baseline equipment for some Infantry units is the question I am trying to answer. I think the answer may lie on how you view the progression of future conflict. Personally I don't see clear blue water between what some call "Warfighting" and some call "COIN". This is why I think it's worth having the discussion.

As concerns patrolling on foot? This is what I spend the majority of my Infantry though, working on, so I concur 100%.

William F. Owen
07-09-2008, 04:34 PM
IMI Wildcat compared to M1126 Stryker

Sorry about the formatting. .pdf spread sheet was too large to upload.

Width 2.5m 2.7m with RPG armour 2.71m, without cage
Length 7.15m 6.98m
Height 2.69m 2.64m

Max Speed 104 kph 96 kph
Road Range 700km 530km

GVW 18,000 kg 17,236 kg
Curb Weight 12,600 kg U/K

Side Armour 14.5mm AP and/or RPG 14.5mm AP and RPG with cage
Under wheel IED STANAG 4569 Level 4 U/K

NBC System Full over-pressure and filtration U/K

Crew and passengers 3 crew 9 passengers 3 crew 9 passengers

Side slope 30% 30%
Gradient 60% 60%
Turning Circle 17.5m 17m
Step 40.6cm 58.4cm
Trench 0.9m 1.9m

Fuchs
07-09-2008, 04:48 PM
Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

Armor is really a last ditch protection, and it's one that can be overcome with technical means. That means better-equipped opponents will crack the shell often.

There are so many things that need to go wrong to be hit in the first place, a protection concept can intervene much earlier (armour is nice as last "oh ####" protection, but it comes at a great price).

To be killed by weapons in war while moving in a vehicle, you need
1. to have foes (or dangerous friends)
2. to not have shattered their resolve to fight you previously
3. to be spotted
4. to be identified as foe
5. to be decided upon/to be communicated as target in time
6. to be aimed at well (not applicable to many mines, of course)
7. to not have some form of effective active defense
8. to be hit
9. finally to lack sufficient passive protection

Well, I'd intervene at 3, 4 & 5.

(3)
Bounding, unpredictable off-road movements plus good camouflage and concealment can prevent this. Imagine log trucks moving as carefully as recce AFVs, using hand-held thermals to search for ambushers before moving through dangerous areas.
(4)
Look at Valkiri MRL; it's a MRL that can be disguised as a standard light truck with tarpaulin. SOF sometimes ride mules, have long beards and AK-lookalikes in AFG.
You don't need to drive in military-style vehicles on a recce or raid mission in Iraq/AFG everytime. There are plenty civilian trucks.
(5)
Limit the failure to prevent (3) to short intervals and (5) might be prevented.

(6) and (8) are mostly a function of distance, speed, size and changes of direction. MRAPs don't look so well in this because they drive predictably on (preferably paved) roads at most likely constant speed.

And most importantly, elect politicians that don't fail miserably at (1).

MRAPs represent a simplistic approach that focuses on (9) only. That works fine (for a while) if you want to wage war like the U.S. does in Iraq.

----

Wildcat/Stryker MMP and nominal ground pressure: factor two difference.
No problem on dry, hard ground or even paved roads.

Wildcat/Stryker behaviour after single AT mine hit:
Wildcat immobilized, Stryker moves on.

----

Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

William F. Owen
07-09-2008, 05:31 PM
@ Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

@ Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

I reject your assertion. My military thought is bounded by the core functions, so I adhere to,

a. Not being found
b. If found do not be fixed (loss of movement, comms, fires and observation)
c. If fixed do not be Struck (the action that creates harm)
d. If struck do not be exploited. Suffer catastrophic loss from the harm.

I am pretty familiar with this area. Transport by "disguised" civilian vehicles was commonly done in Northern Ireland. (I know at least one platoon was regularly carried in a grain lorry)

None of this helps me, if I need to move 650 men, 500km in one night, and sustain them once they are on task.

Actually the UK has looked at this before with AT-105 (http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0039.html) The problem with Saxon ( and I know it well) was it was a junk vehicle. - but I am now beginning to think elements of the concept were sound.

A concerns Sierra Leone, when I was there, if you wanted to travel the "upline" roads, you went in MAN 4x4 Commercial trucks. They go all over Sierra Leone. In fact most the world relies on pretty simple 4 x 4 commercial lorries. When I used to drive across the Sahara, I regularly encountered commercial lorries ripping along the "piste" with no problem

Fuchs
07-09-2008, 06:20 PM
I reject your assertion. My military thought is bounded by the core functions, so I adhere to,

a. Not being found
Large vehicles can be silent, but are difficult to hide.
b. If found do not be fixed (loss of movement, comms, fires and observation)
I admit I'd opt for 4x4 light truck, but 4x4 is not optimal as the loss of one wheel is a mobility kill. AT mines destroy a wheel easily, although they keep going on with some bullet holes.
c. If fixed do not be Struck (the action that creates harm)
Big size and probably poor agility (hp/ton and high center of gravity) aren't helpful.
d. If struck do not be exploited. Suffer catastrophic loss from the harm.

I am pretty familiar with this area. Transport by "disguised" civilian vehicles was commonly done in Northern Ireland. (I know at least one platoon was regularly carried in a grain lorry)

None of this helps me, if I need to move 650 men, 500km in one night, and sustain them once they are on task.

If you move that far you'll be out of reach of almost all opponents most of the time anyway. That might be different in COIN, but an unpredictable movement at night along secondary roads bypassing traffic nodes even offroad should provide a lot of security even in such an environment. 500km is hardly a routine infantry movement in COIN, after all.

Actually the UK has looked at this before with AT-105 (http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0039.html) The problem with Saxon ( and I know it well) was it was a junk vehicle. - but I am now beginning to think elements of the concept were sound.

A concerns Sierra Leone, when I was there, if you wanted to travel the "upline" roads, you went in MAN 4x4 Commercial trucks. They go all over Sierra Leone. In fact most the world relies on pretty simple 4 x 4 commercial lorries. When I used to drive across the Sahara, I regularly encountered commercial lorries ripping along the "piste" with no problem
[b]MAN 4x4 gl trucks hit about 14 tons if fully loaded, but five tons of this is payload. So most often such trucks will weigh rather 10-11 tons as most payload densities hit the volume limitation much earlier than the weight limitation.



Wilf; we agree that MRAP has a niche in a mission like Iraq. You thought about the other possible other missions.

I remember that the GTK/Boxer monster is in part such a monster because one of the requirements was a bomblet protection. The implied assertion is that APCs are under threat by artillery.

But there's likely no harassing fire on roads if the force densities would be like assumed in exercises and doctrine. Modern brigades shall cover frontages larger than the frontage of an overstretched WW2 division. The force density is necessarily low.
The result is that the artillery needs much better recce to hit.
The artillery would in fact need to find, identify, prioritize and fire at individual companies due to the dense road network that enables a brigade to disperse its marching columns on different roads.

Lots of artillery systems could still penetrate MRAPs or destroy less protected vehicles that march nearby.

jcustis
07-09-2008, 06:42 PM
Wilf, those rules are a good script for reconnaissance operations. I am stealing it for its simplicity and ease of retention.

Back to the subject though. Wildcat posts comparable numbers, but it cannot traverse the same terrain (berne ,gaps etc.) as a 6 or 8-wheeled vehicle. Having said that, Stryker is more complex from a maintenance perspective, but probably among only certain variants.

Wildcat will fit a role as a lightweight APC, but other variants will gain weight from the basic model. Looking at its arrangement, however, it doesn't seem to have fighting characteristics. It looks great for self defense, but Stryker compares differently because it has sensors to allow it to "fight for information", which is a big role within certain formations it finds itself in.

And Wildcat looks too damn high for chrissakes. I know it's a function of mine resistance, but what will have to be done to reduce that signature from a short halt?

The Marine Corps was looking at the LAV (logistics variant type-ish) as a MPC candidate, but that died for good reasons which would have otherwise negatively impacted the LAR community.

The balance to be struck is difficult to achieve, and no matter how fair the selection criteria are supposed to be, one "best value" consideration can leave us with a platform that does'nt fill the best niches. If we have to write new doctrine to account for MPC's the USMC is screwed.

William F. Owen
07-10-2008, 05:02 AM
Wilf, those rules are a good script for reconnaissance operations. I am stealing it for its simplicity and ease of retention.

You don't have to steal them. They are the core functions. They are how you defeat and avoid defeat in any environment against any enemy. First written down by Ferdinand Foch in 1903


Back to the subject though. Wildcat posts comparable numbers, but it cannot traverse the same terrain (berne ,gaps etc.) as a 6 or 8-wheeled vehicle. Having said that, Stryker is more complex from a maintenance perspective, but probably among only certain variants.
Agreed. Wildcat is a cheaper, simpler, 80% solution.

Wildcat will fit a role as a lightweight APC, but other variants will gain weight from the basic model. Looking at its arrangement, however, it doesn't seem to have fighting characteristics. It looks great for self defense, but Stryker compares differently because it has sensors to allow it to "fight for information", which is a big role within certain formations it finds itself in.
Agreed. It's just an APC/MRAP.

And Wildcat looks too damn high for chrissakes. I know it's a function of mine resistance, but what will have to be done to reduce that signature from a short halt?
Agreed. According to the figures it is two centimetres higher than the Stryker

The Marine Corps was looking at the LAV (logistics variant type-ish) as a MPC candidate, but that died for good reasons which would have otherwise negatively impacted the LAR community.

The balance to be struck is difficult to achieve, and no matter how fair the selection criteria are supposed to be, one "best value" consideration can leave us with a platform that does'nt fill the best niches. If we have to write new doctrine to account for MPC's the USMC is screwed.
More screwed than with CV-22 and AAAV?

Distiller
07-10-2008, 11:00 AM
Boxer is one crazy monster. With protection "ueber alles".

Your 1000 men force: If you can speed across country like that, you seem to be unopposed. Guess then you could as well hire a local bus company.
Coffee on Red Square in the morning anyone?

Another thought: How many bombs can the bad guys plant along a hard to predict route (different from the easy to predict patrol routines in Iraqi towns)? Seems like there'd be more danger from RPGs. And these neither the MRAP nor the APC can withstand without reactive armor.

The running costs: Guess if you use an APC like a road-bound MRAP, your running costs - which are dominantly automotive then - shouldn't be too different.

Of course, if you have a vehicle designed for a narrow usage profile (road-use only), then it will be overall cheaper and better suited for that single task than a vehicle with a wider usage profile. But ok, let's not turn this into MRAP vs APC.

As a vehicle to move troops from one square to another, I think trucks (with aramid mats) are equally suited; plus they provide more cargo space, and better rough-terrain capability.
You could put a mortar into an MRAP, and NETFIRES, and ATGM and MANPADS launcher, and cut down the rear cabin and put an autocannon instead. But you will still remain road/piste-bound, which limits your mobility.
And: All these above jobs a truck can also do. Which is basically what Caesar, Bereg, Pantsir, &c do.

I just don't see much space for the MRAP between trucks and APCs.

Btw, the Wildcat was designed for the MPC competition. One of the more interesting MRAPs is the Rafael Golan. But it's still a riot-control vehicle.


PS: NOTHING is more screwed than V-22 and EFV!

wm
07-10-2008, 11:53 AM
Just read a story on MSNBC.com about the IRAM 107mm rocket propelled bomb/flying explosive-packed propane tank. I wonder how well an MRAP, Stryker, or an M113 for that matter would survive getting hit by one of these overhead strike devices. Of course the probability of a direct hit is probably about the same as a direct hit from almost any projectile following a purely ballistic trajectory--maybe even less due to the no-doubt oddly shaped warhead. But if they are fired as an MRL spread (an apparent TTP) perhaps the odds go up.

Of course the bomblets from DPICM rounds could be pretty destructive to an MRAP convoy(do we still use them?). Alternatively, the US once was working on a funny submunition--the SADARM projectile--specifically designed to attack the thin-skinned top of engine compartments of armored fighting vehicles. That might be a pretty significant countermeasure for MRAPs too.

Fuchs
07-10-2008, 12:22 PM
I can think of dozens of improvised and quantity-produced weapons and munitions that could destroy/pierce MRAPs.
DPICM bomblets are still in use (and will remain so in many countries), sensor-fuzed submunitions like Sadarm are in many countries' inventories (USA, France, Germany, Russia have own designs).

MRAPs are really "blast-protected trucks with self-defence weapon".

I would agree that it's a good general APC, if

(for heavy brigades: ) it had an off-road capability closer to that of tanks

(for light brigades: ) I would trust the official assertion that troops need passive artillery protection even though they shall dismount out of sight of the enemy



The wheeled armoured vehicle design has really evolved in the past few years. Previously we saw very few armoured vehicles with large bulletproof windows (some wheeled APC like Fuchs and a Patria type had some windows).
I remember some Land Rover conversions, the Mamba and the South African designs.

Now we see large bulletproof windows as standard; the panoramic mirror was obviously not satisfactory for daily road movements in multiple multi-month deployments. Crash prevention was obviously not prioritized enough in Cold War APCs.

Another advance was the finally universal application of V-shaped hulls, resulting in the necessarily big height. Complicated suspensions and engines like in-wheel electric engines and hydro-pneumatic suspension don't fit well into an underbelly blast protection concept. These technologies lost momentum although they were high on wish lists ten years ago.

One lesson of MRAPs was the importance of size and turning radius in urban environments; maybe that the next designs will attempt to avoid very large designs in order to remain agile in urban environments. All axles steerable as in recce light AFV designs would help, of course.

The usage of MRAPs in other environments than Iraq/AFG would certainly lead to additional design changes and add-ons.

I' sure that the counter-blast armour developments of the past five years will enable much better APC designs in the future. I don't think that any real new APCs in the 12-18 ton range will have less than three axles, though. Almost everyone wants to be able to cross irrigation trenches and drainage channels without the time-consuming use of dedicated equipment.

William F. Owen
07-10-2008, 12:34 PM
One of the more interesting MRAPs is the Rafael Golan. But it's still a riot-control vehicle.

Cancelled six months ago, due to "commercial" problems, with the US partner company. Since riots do not include folks with RPGs, I can't quite see how an RPG protected vehicle counts as a riot-control vehicle. ...but AT-105 was directly descended from an "internal security vehicle" and Golan was, like all MRAPs was biased more to Security Operations than Combat Operations.

krsna
07-10-2008, 03:44 PM
Hi Guys,
Nice to be back. Best comments on the issue are of the guy who was in one such contraption. For others out of it and no hope or desire to get into one such machine there are some threads to hang on to:
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.
2. What is our role then? Hunters or Stabilizers? Each option has has its own dimensions.
3. If terrorist is to be beaten in Urban ops, it is the matter of locating him and pre-empting him first. Else he shall have the initiative always and every time. This is matter of intelligence. Stability ops in the city need more safety and some speed to maintain monopoly. This is where enemy can gain psychological advantage by IED attacks. Nothing is safe here. They blew a T- 72 of IPKF in SriLanka into pieces with just the right amount of RDX.
4. If we are looking at Complex or Off town ops we need to get there faster, quieter and safer. MRAP seems to foot the bill to some extent less the speed. Any armor and monocoque design with heavy suspension will cause that to happen. MPV of South Africa that we use is a monster but we swear by its reasonable invincibility despite its heavy and high frame and some what limited maneuvrability.
5. Strykers are good, but for another dimension of ops. MRAP seems to be filling the gap of light armored vehicle (hull protected) for on road tactical mobility and off road transportation to some extent. Similar protection on Stryker will make it slower too.
6. In conclusion, options must be weighed for the role than as a contest of inter-vehicle capabilities.
:)

Ken White
07-10-2008, 04:11 PM
...1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.For a while -- never say never... ;)

Agree with the rest but most particularly with this:
6. In conclusion, options must be weighed for the role than as a contest of inter-vehicle capabilities. :)Hmm -- that has to mean, as always in equipment selection, that the factors of METT-TC must apply. :D

I knew that! :cool:

Fuchs
07-10-2008, 06:31 PM
Hi Guys,
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.


Complete disagreement.
You sounds very much like a stock trader talking about ever-lasting hausse.

I recently read a 1988 magazine, one article was about the then-new Bundeswehr structure "2000". Think about that.

krsna
07-11-2008, 05:59 AM
Fuchs,
Send the link for my knowledge to comment any further . Stock traders and soldiers have one thing in common though - risk taking ability that leads to entrepreneurship. risk taking has a thin edge though between foolhardiness and courage. every single aspect of share market has unique parallel with battle space. profit goals and war goals are same sides of the coin. it is the coin that is different though. If the soldiers put in even a quarter of percentage of the amount of research that the stock analyst puts in the world shall be a safer place. It is all about fundamentals (or basics) if you take the Warren Buffet line and all about short term market opportunity if you take the average stock broker line. It is the role that you see for yourself in the end.;)

Sabre
07-14-2008, 08:43 PM
Hi Guys,
1. The future is counter terrorism. Call it LIC or HIC, terrorists care a damn. Organized wars are over.


Constancy-bias is big mistake.
How ironic, often those that are so quick to, for example, damn the military for the hide-bound thinking that low-intensity conflict in Vietnam was an aberration and that nation-state conventional warfare was the only possibile future, then proceed to make the exact same mistake, only in the opposite direction.

Let's not forget that the U.S. had to stage a good ole' fashioned conventional invasion to get into Iraq in 2003... and did the same thing back in 1991...

Saying "never" is a sure way to be wrong...

As long as there are consistuted nation-states in the world, and there still are a few, the possibility for conflict exists. Alliances can shift dramatically in only a mere decade.

Back to topic:
I really don't think that, starting from a blank (design) slate, a MRAP would have inherently better armor than a tracked-APC. Holding everything else constant, the only way to have better armor for the same mass is to have less surface area to armor - MRAP's tend to have greater surface area, and wheeled drivetrains require more volume (not much, but perhaps 10% more), and the V-shaped hull requires more still, driving up surface area to be armored (unless that is to be unprotected).

While the MRAP may have better protection from IED's, I don't see how an MRAP vehicle with the exact same mass as a tracked APC can have thicker armor to protect from other threats (i.e., direct-fire).

If I am sending an entire battalion on a road march for 1,000 km, why can't I just have a few MRAP's at the front of the column to hit any mines, and trucks for the rest of the column? (Yes, some particularly well-disciplined insurgent could wait to trigger a command-detonated mine, but those odds are much lower). Of course, this brings to mind the fate of Groupement Mobile 100, but then again, if you are facing a resistance organized into entire regiments... (You could also airlift that battalion, and worry about mines not at all.)

I would say that there is much more to be gained from incorporating MRAP features into the design of the next standard truck, since a supply truck that will not face a high threat of direct fire contact can afford to be fairly high, and not have wonderous off-road mobility.

Cavguy
07-14-2008, 09:21 PM
Back to topic:
I really don't think that, starting from a blank (design) slate, a MRAP would have inherently better armor than a tracked-APC. Holding everything else constant, the only way to have better armor for the same mass is to have less surface area to armor - MRAP's tend to have greater surface area, and wheeled drivetrains require more volume (not much, but perhaps 10% more), and the V-shaped hull requires more still, driving up surface area to be armored (unless that is to be unprotected).


Good post, only observation from my COIN expierences is that tracked vehicles are far more damaging to the urban environment than wheeled -the tracks shred curbs and water mains relatively easily. I know even my M113's had a negative effect on the infrastructure. As a result, I changed ops in "safe" areas where only wheeled vehicles were allowed to preserve infrastructure and not piss off the locals by tearing up the roads with tracks.

No debate on the necessity of tracked, armored combat vehicles for QRF/assault duty.

MattC86
07-15-2008, 03:32 PM
Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

Ron Humphrey
07-15-2008, 07:16 PM
Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

Then again five of those filled to the hilt with ammo could make a fairly hefty temp COP. ;)

jcustis
07-16-2008, 03:32 AM
Perhaps some of this will be put to the test? CNN and others have reported some 1,000 MRAPs are being audibled to Afghanistan. Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

It likely means that CNN is reporting a decision made by someone with absolutely no experience with MRAPs, or any exposure to feedback reports on just what they are capable of doing (performance-wise). Decisions like this are made all the time in the military, and we wonder why they happen, without ever being able to pinpoint who the Einstein was.

William F. Owen
07-16-2008, 07:10 AM
Unless they are going to use that many MRAPs for the few roads, I would suggest they're going to get a lot of off-road time. Most people here have said the MRAP has far less utility off-road. Thoughts?

Regards,

Matt

I have to admit, that according to folks I talk to, the UK MRAP, (Mastiff) seems to seek out soft ground and dive into it. It is apparently grossly overloaded with armour and other impedimenta.

krsna
07-16-2008, 03:37 PM
That's what matters! The view of the guy who has been in one such contarption!! The others are the Defence Contractors and Armchair procurement guys duly prodded on by some staffers of more Armchair Generals and the Voter savvy politicians as the ultimate arbiters of the things that will be. They would never get into one such machine ever. The only option for the boots on ground is-the proverbial 'MS Windows of opportunity'-get in and get out. Trust your feet for safer trip home. When the chips are down, no Infantarian ever felt safer in any tank. Cheers!;)

Fuchs
07-16-2008, 03:48 PM
It's really a function of (maximum) ground pressure, the number of axles and ground softness.

A good gearbox, electronics and CTIS can only help so far - at some point it's simply impossible to trick physics anymore.

A rule of thumb is that more than 8 tons on 4x4 becomes troublesome.
The choice of terrains that can be crossed without significant probability of troubles narrows down the higher the ground pressure becomes till drivers don't want to leave roads anymore.

6x6 is an indispensable minimum for crossing of serious obstacles (trenches mostly; irrigation channels for example).
6x6, normal military truck tires (pretty wide run-flat ones, connected with CTIS) = 11-13 tons acceptable weight as a rule of thumb.
And that's still not the x country capability that's needed to accompany MBTs.

The present 4-wheel MRAPs have no third axle to save weight and to better allow the overpressure of a buried mine explosion to escape sidewards. They were designed for roads (paved and unpaved ones), not as general armoured infantry trucks.

Btw, I was impressed by the small-size Force protection Cheetah
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheetah_MMPV
It looks like a good vehicle for many support units (engineers, MP, HQs, EW) and as security vehicle for air forces.

JHR
07-16-2008, 04:35 PM
A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".

Fuchs
07-16-2008, 05:36 PM
That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

Cavguy
07-16-2008, 05:39 PM
That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=4129901436807568337

Fuchs
07-16-2008, 06:03 PM
"...and now something completely different."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhUZPBiiunI



Damn, I love BBC's sense for humour.
I need to check with my friends how to get all seasons.

MattC86
07-16-2008, 07:18 PM
It likely means that CNN is reporting a decision made by someone with absolutely no experience with MRAPs, or any exposure to feedback reports on just what they are capable of doing (performance-wise). Decisions like this are made all the time in the military, and we wonder why they happen, without ever being able to pinpoint who the Einstein was.

I take it to be more the decision of somebody who said, "well, we need to appear to be doing something. . ."

Shifting how ever many MRAP or other vehicles to Afghanistan may not make an ounce of difference, but it plays well - all you need for proof is CNN's Pentagon correspondent glowing that the MRAPs have "played such an incredible role in drastically reducing US casualties," to know that from a political CYA perspective. . . mission accomplished! If a=b. . .

It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon:wry:) [/cynicism]

To try to get back ON the subject, the MRAP and vehicles like it also pose major issues that, particularly for the Marine Corps, cut to the very heart of the Corps' purpose. I recall GEN Conway lamenting last fall that the Corps was losing "its expeditionary flavor." If the Corps needs MRAPs, and MRAPs force the Corps to operate like a 2nd Army, why have the Corps? The MRAP doesn't fit well within the expeditionary concept, particularly maritime deployments; and it doesn't do much for a more deployable Army, either. Having them on hand for contingencies involving proper use - convoy, security, etc. is all well and good, but for the kind of action to be seen in Afghanistan, or in other, more expeditionary roles, forget it.

With my obvious disclaimer here being I've never been in one nor had my life saved by its armor. . .

Regards,

Matt

MattC86
07-16-2008, 07:20 PM
Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=4129901436807568337?

God, I had forgotten how great a bit that was. . .

Van
07-16-2008, 07:28 PM
A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".

I always heard this credited to Bill Mauldin's Willy and Joe. Upon reflection, Willy and Joe should be required reading for Army LTs.

Sabre
07-16-2008, 08:37 PM
I'm interested in seeing where the MRAP's end up, once the bulk of U.S. forces are "back home".

I do recall an interesting article by a U.S. Army officer in a Transportation battalion, which basically advocated permanently constituted security platoons for the logistics units (i.e., on the MTOE), manned by logistics soldiers that received the appropriate additional training. Basically his point was that convoy security wouldn't be such a drain on the available maneuver units, and this would ease some of the headaches...

So, a platoon of MRAPs for, say, every transportation (truck) company, for convoy security. Reminiscent of the ersatz "gun trucks" of Vietnam (I recall seeing a preserved example at the Transportation museum at Ft. Eustis).


Random thought:
I always wondered why, in the ROAD and Army of Excellence division designs, there was a mandate that combat arms MOS's make up no more than 50% of the design...

Fuchs
07-16-2008, 09:07 PM
Dedicated security elements are a typical type of unit for peace-time savings.
Peace-time structures almost never have proper security forces for logistics, medical camps, HQs, harbours or airfields.
The consequence is that the proper equipment for such roles does also not exist in peacetime.

Ken White
07-16-2008, 09:51 PM
...It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon:wry:) [/cynicism]Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified. :rolleyes:

MattC86
07-16-2008, 10:31 PM
Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified. :rolleyes:

Fair enough - I go no further. And you're correct - both candidates are playing, well, politics, which tends to be fast and loose with the truth.

Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. . .

Regards,

Matt

reed11b
07-24-2008, 07:18 PM
MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict. The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs. I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts. When I was in the 1/501st ABN in Alaska we had both hummers and SUSVs. This gives you a full spectrum force easy, and still cheaper then the complex stryker or specialized MRAP.
Reed

jkm_101_fso
07-24-2008, 07:51 PM
MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict.

Sorry, Reed, I'm not sure what you mean. Never had the chance to ride in or fight from one while in IZ; What's "specialized" (in, on or about it) that makes it not so useful for the tactical situation in IZ?

jkm

reed11b
07-24-2008, 08:41 PM
sorry, poor english on my part. I mean that they are specialized FOR the conflict in Iraq, not for over-all utility. They will likely lack the nessary mobility, utility, and/or firepower if the next conflict does not mirror Iraq. Of course when I was in Iraq we rode around in soft skins and I have never been in a MRAP so my opinion should be taken with a grain of salt.
Reed

William F. Owen
07-25-2008, 02:56 PM
The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs.

Golan does not exist any more (long story) Wildcat fits the bill of what you describe


I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts.

Well I'm not sure you can pick when you'll be urban and when you won't but BVS-10 is a hell of a track!

Fuchs
07-25-2008, 04:01 PM
BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

William F. Owen
07-25-2008, 04:05 PM
BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

BVS-10 does 2 week patrols in Afghanistan, where it is operating at 2,000kg over it's design weight. Rumour has it that some vehicles have already exceeded their supposed life time use. Maintenance does not appear to be a factor.

reed11b
07-25-2008, 04:20 PM
I used to have the old SUSV in my airborne unit along with Humvees. Humvees actually had a higher time needs for maintanance and we would drive the SUSV's on base roads and downtown and on 2-4 week fieldproblems and breakdowns were very very rare. Hummers on the other hand had at least one vehicle breakdown EVERY field problem. We actually used the SUSVs more often. Now SUSV's are not armored, but I feel that the Viking maintaince issue my be based on the maintance time required by other tracks. The suggestion was for both types of vehicle to be available btw.

WilF! Just looked up the IMI Wildcat, while maybe a touch larger then I like, it looks almost perfect in any other regard. I would like to see the drivers seat and see if it drives like a car (Then it could be operated by one of the squad) or if it is more complex and should be operated by a dedicated MOS.

For those of you that do n ot know me, I feel that bradleys and other IFV's should be manned by a dedicated IFV MOS and not by the infantry squad it carriers. I feel this is a source of major drain on the mechanized infantry manpower and training in there infantry role. The exception is commercial vehicle based systems that drive like a car.

Randy Brown
08-25-2008, 03:39 PM
Wired.com's Danger Room correspondent Noah Shactman reports today (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/mrap-lite.html) that the U.S. Army Materiel Command has issued a request for information (https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=1128c5f921058a2b08bffde5721cdc11&tab=core&_cview=0) for regarding industrial capabilities to produce a "lighter more agile, maneuverable, mobile vehicle with MRAP protection level capabilities." This effort is apparently unrelated to the current(?) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) (http://www.defense-update.com/products/j/jltv.htm) program, according to Shactman.

Thought this news might be of interest in this SWJ.com thread, at least for archival purposes.

Excerpt follows:


So the Army and Marines are looking for a next-gen MRAP, that combines the "agility, maneuverability and mobility" of a Humvee, with the protection of the brawny new vehicles.

Such a vehicle should not only be able to stop militants' most advanced bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, the services noted in a request for information, issued late last week. It should also to climb a "60% forward slope," beat a maximum speed of 65 miles per hour, and be able to "maneuver off-road and on narrow roads in rural mountainous terrain and desert sand."

The 10-ton vehicle must be transportable on a C-130 cargo plane. It should have a minimum range of 300 miles, and a turning diameter of 49 feet, And the crew has to be able to get out quickly, in case of a rollover.

sapperfitz82
09-30-2008, 01:11 AM
MRAPs in Afghanistan will add little to improve our situation. It’s been a couple years, but we did mostly air mobile and ground pounding for two weeks. Second time over was less air b/c Iraq sucked up some of the assets. Basically, to slow the flow at the border, a Hilux is a about the most one can rely on. Really need to be dismounted and have a couple choppers move you around. The problem all along has been that we carry too much weight and do not move fast enough. MRAPs don’t solve that when we are talking that type of terrain. The M1114’s couldn’t get in there in ‘06, and we broke the few M998’s we took out in ’02-’03.
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact. This is similar to getting so wrapped up in IED defeat that the best we can do is put a glow plug in front of our vehicle. We need to realign our thinking entirely here, not fashion new trinkets. The IEDs of today are simply a nuisance minefield. Our current M21 mine with a SFF device could, I am nearly sure, penetrate the MRAP, Stryker, M1, what have you. That mine has been around a while. A well built EFP goes through all the above as well.
Point is, did we totally redesign the M1 because shape charges evolved? Or did we adapt our tactics to defeat the minefield? Our vulnerability to IEDs is a sign that we are being out-maneuvered and a new vehicle is not the answer to that.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

William F. Owen
09-30-2008, 08:12 AM
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact.
I agree. Dismounted operations is the core of the infantry. However, you still require operational mobility.


I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.
OK, so around what parameters are you going to have that discussion. It may well be one worth having, but as Simpkin showed, there are conditions and circumstances were road moves are quicker and more effective than airmobile moves, so the context of the debate has to be very carefully framed.

jcustis
09-30-2008, 08:29 AM
Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

sapperfitz82
10-01-2008, 06:26 PM
I offer the CH-47 line more as a throw away than anything else.

I suppose that I am worried we are travelling down a dangerous garden path when we start making force protection the primary or even a qualifying characteristic of our vehicle selection.

I am aware of a movement in the doctrine writing community of a push to have force protection seen in a more holistic light which focuses much more the arrival of the force on the objective in such a manner that it is able to accomplish its mission and perhaps be readily prepared for a follow-on than as a litmus for vehicle protection against specific threats (blast/direct fire etc.).

When we start comparing center of gravity and hull angle, I wonder if we are missing the forest for the trees. The Stryker concept goes far beyond the vehicle itself, and would not be nearly as impressive or capable if the vehicle were simply offered as a replacement for the M113/Bradley.

With the MRAP/Cougar/M1151/what-have-you, we are readily accepting a substantially different platform that does in fact change how we execute our tactics without really giving much regard to that fact. Again, I was born and raised outside a vehicle so I may be super-sensitive to this, and probably the mech side of the house is adapting a great deal better.

Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

William F. Owen
10-02-2008, 05:47 AM
Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

I agree. There is a very valid argument to be had about vehicle design versus doctrine and training. IMO, the M2 is an example of failure. No one vehicle can address all needs, but we need a structure in which to discuss the compromises. Personally I would see that as a balance between security operations and combat operations.

ODB
10-03-2008, 01:58 AM
Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

Uboat509
10-03-2008, 02:24 AM
Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

I absolutely hated to see the trucks with the remote control turrets on them when I was in Iraq. Many times even on the trucks with manned turrets the gunners would be sitting so far down in the turret that all he could see would be through the the gap between the chicken plate and the sides of the turret. Great for force protection, not so great for situational awareness. One of our resident tankers correct me if I am wrong, but don't they teach that the TC should be heads up until they are actually in the fight? I know that that is how we operate. The gunner is never still. He is up and he is constantly moving, both the turret and his head. There's nothing wrong with force protection but at a certain point it becomes counter-productive.

SFC W

Ken White
10-03-2008, 02:39 AM
your head down and you'll get attacked. Bulldoze around like you know what you're doing and own the place and they'll leave you alone. That applies in all combat intensities. Excess caution kills...

Entropy
10-03-2008, 12:22 PM
I don't see the current crop of MRAP-type vehicles being all that useful in Afghanistan because of the lousy road network where a LOT of areas are like this (http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2007/a090407tj1.html). Hilux's are great there because they're are so light and nimble on those kinds of roads. They're also very dependable (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lrk6vsb77xk&) :) (part 2 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Uc4Ksz3nHM), part 3 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfZDtC9kjVk)). It seems like the Pentagon sees the disadvantages too and is looking (http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-09-11-MRAP_N.htm) for a new vehicle. See also this (http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/081002/marines_future_weapons.html?.v=2). The special ops folks already have some of these (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A423b8745-6eb8-409c-8e3b-1dfe9909ab0a), which look pretty cool.

So, if nothing else, this seems like a timely topic. I DO think we need more helo's in Afghanistan (especially 47's), but then again I have a bias since I supported helo ops when I was there.

Vojnik
10-06-2008, 05:32 AM
I'm a bit confused. I've read the entire thread, but I would ask someone to clarify for me.

I believe that we're debating whether the MRAP has a future beyond OEF/OIF? Or are we discussing whether the MRAP should not be fielded currently?

Thanks in advance.

Vojnik
10-06-2008, 05:40 AM
Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

I believe the MRAP was fielded to address the tactics used by units in OIF.
So the idea was to fit the gear to the tactics, not vice versa.

I have not used MRAPs, nor CROWS, nor am I privy to any sort of advanced testing and acquisition process. I am simplying stating that in this case it "looks" like the Pentagon was addressing a need stated by the in-country Commanders.

William F. Owen
10-06-2008, 08:38 AM
I'm a bit confused. I've read the entire thread, but I would ask someone to clarify for me.

I believe that we're debating whether the MRAP has a future beyond OEF/OIF? Or are we discussing whether the MRAP should not be fielded currently?

Thanks in advance.

As the thread starter, I will attempt to clarify. I believe that there is a good case for looking at "MRAPS" beyond the confines of what some call COIN.
Given ,

a.) good levels of protection
b.) Reasonably good mobility

then they would seem to have a role as basic infantry mobility systems. I do not consider them to be MICVs or MBTs.

A bad MRAP is a bad MRAP, so no argument there. The same basic set of argument that apply to all AFVs apply to MRAPs.

Vojnik
10-06-2008, 09:40 AM
As the thread starter, I will attempt to clarify. I believe that there is a good case for looking at "MRAPS" beyond the confines of what some call COIN.
Given ,

a.) good levels of protection
b.) Reasonably good mobility

then they would seem to have a role as basic infantry mobility systems. I do not consider them to be MICVs or MBTs.

A bad MRAP is a bad MRAP, so no argument there. The same basic set of argument that apply to all AFVs apply to MRAPs.

Thank you. That's what I thought the general debate was focused on.

ODB
10-08-2008, 12:07 AM
If the decision is made to use this for COIN only then the Army could always send them to DRMO to be bought by companies to use them as armored cars, just a thought.

Bullmoose Bailey
12-11-2008, 03:01 PM
Have already seen many of these vehicles sunk deep in the sands of Iraq.

Its a simple question of weight distribution. That's why I prefer the M113. Holds 10 men plus the crew & weighs only about 10 tons, with the weight caried on tracks with great earth coverage & very low ground pressure. I've commanded them on all types of terrain & they've never let me down. It also swims of course.

Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.

This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

William F. Owen
12-12-2008, 09:07 AM
Its a simple question of weight distribution. That's why I prefer the M113. Holds 10 men plus the crew & weighs only about 10 tons, with the weight caried on tracks with great earth coverage & very low ground pressure. I've commanded them on all types of terrain & they've never let me down. It also swims of course.

If it really is all about weight distribution (which IMO, is wrong) then surely you want a BVS-10 or STK Bronco. IRC the M113 is not amphibious once you load out beyond 11,700kg, and the IDF's up-armoured M-113s are currently tipping the scales at 18,000kg.

The new NIMDA and MTVL spec'd M113s are fine vehicles, but they also have significant limitations, in both protection and mobility.


Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.

Not sure what you mean. 30,000kg ISO containers, on three-four axles move around road systems world wide, with very little trouble. Unit level road moves conducted by units in wheeled APCs, are always conducted faster than those done by tracked units. The 2001 UK plan to move an infantry Battalion from Europe to Afghanistan, was possible with a wheeled platform and impossible using tracks.


This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

I spend a lot of time focussed on infantry mobility and W v T is simply not a debate that most of the serious minds in this area ever talk about. It's like debating fixed wing versus helicopters. You need both, and always have.

Cavguy
12-12-2008, 03:30 PM
This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.

Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

SethB
12-12-2008, 06:14 PM
Silence, please (http://www.economist.com/science/tm/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12286718).

The Economist.


Rattling along in the “washing-machine environment” of an armoured personnel-carrier (APC) on steel tracks can vibrate the soldiers inside to the point of exhaustion according to Dan Goure, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a think-tank in Arlington, Virginia. Meanwhile J.G. Brunbech, an APC expert at the Danish Army Material Command in Oksboel, observes that the crew’s limbs are prone to becoming prickly and numb, and their hands get tired because they must hold on tightly to the safety handles inside a vehicle’s cabin in order to try to avoid being jostled.

The vehicle itself suffers, too. The vibrations cause rapid wear and tear—not to mention outright damage, especially to its electronics. In the past, engineers have tried to reduce these vibrations by fixing rubber pads to the treads. The results, however, have not been satisfactory. The pads wear out quickly, and often rip apart or even melt. But now tough, new rubbers have come to the rescue. Moreover, these rubbers are not being used just as pads. Instead, they are crafted into enormous rubber bands that replace the steel tracks completely. As a result, the Danes are converting their entire APC fleet to rubber tracks. This means they have raised the amount of time a soldier can safely spend on board from one and a half hours to ten.

Also of note:


And although America has not sent APCs with rubber tracks into action, they form part of the Future Combat Systems, the Department of Defence’s principal modernisation programme.

Steve Blair
12-12-2008, 06:34 PM
Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

My MCS idea allows for either wheeled or tracked vehicles in the order of battle. For logistics purposes alone I'm not keen on a mix, but it wouldn't be difficult to do given the unit's framework.

Ken White
12-12-2008, 06:58 PM
It's an idea whose time has probably come. Both the Canadians and Danes are re-doing all their M113s and others are experimenting with Soucy tracks. Other companies are also playing with the idea. Technological and chemical advances have allowed this but Snowmobiles and ATVs like the Hagglunds BV 206 which the US Army adopted as the M973 Small Unit support Vehicle LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/susv.htm) also use a Soucy made rubber band track and have for years.

The Caterpillar DEUCE LINK (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/990400-klein.htm) also uses a rubber band track.

The DEUCE and BV 206 / M973 are fairly recent vehicles but the rubber band track is not that new as an idea; the US M114 Recon Vehicle from the late 50s used 'em:
"...The tracks, developed by the Caterpillar Corporation, were of the "rubber band" type, providing the supposed advantages of lower costs, reduced weight and ease of maintenance in comparison with a link track system. Manufactured as a single strip with bolted in track pads and grousers, this development never lived up to expectations. In an unsupported configuration on narrow road wheels, the "rubber band" allowed for the small GM engine, this in turn saved overall space and weight for the entire vehicle. In the event of light damage from mines or direct fire, there was no plan for a crew to repair broken track strips." (emphasis added / kw) LINK (http://www.eaglehorse.org/4_ftx_gunnery/equipment/m114/m114_pt1.htm).

They do need to work out a fix for the item I placed in bold...

SethB
12-12-2008, 07:21 PM
Could you just carry spare tracks to replace the broken ones with?

Cavguy
12-12-2008, 07:54 PM
Could you just carry spare tracks to replace the broken ones with?

Band track isn't separateable like normal track, as I understand. So if it is lost you have to get a whole new one on, not just replace a section like current track.

Ken White
12-12-2008, 08:14 PM
a repair / limp home kit. They'll figure it out sooner rather than later, I think.

Bullmoose Bailey
12-15-2008, 07:14 AM
a repair / limp home kit. They'll figure it out sooner rather than later, I think.

One of my Cavalry Values in Maneuver, so the reason I prefer mechanized over wheeled is for the ability to move effectively and with speed off road.

Bullmoose Bailey
12-15-2008, 07:57 AM
Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.

I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.

I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19).

Good point, friend, having it all in the kit bag would be great.

I recall when we had Tracks, PCs, 1/4 ton Trucks, 2 & 1/2 ton Trucks, 5 ton Trucks, & Heavy, Medium & Light Tanks, Half-tracks, motorcycles, horses & armored cars.

A Generation ago the Armor Officer's Basic Course taught about five weapons platforms; Stuart, Lee, Gavin, Patton, Sherman, Chafee, Walker & more inclusive. Today there's nothing between the Abrams & the HMMWV at the UMW's Basic Course & the HMMWV is only touched on. Strykers are POI'd directly to the units with great consternation, although they're slowly moving to the school house.

As a Cavalryman operating in OIF today I find myself drawing on experience with the older weapons platforms & in some instances missing them.

In the case of maneuver maybe there really is strength in diversity.

reed11b
12-15-2008, 08:24 AM
Gavin

Did you really just do that? We just call it a one one three or Track around these parts
Reed

Stan
12-15-2008, 02:50 PM
A short and insightful read. Survival Consultants Intl CEO David Woroner raises some food for thought at his website (http://www.survivalconsultants.com/news.aspx#n61), Defense Tech (http://www.defensetech.org/) and at Breach Bang Clear (http://breachbangclear.blogspot.com/2008/11/mrap-and-jltv-vs-reality-pt-ii.html)'s Blog.

There's even a para or two on Tires vs. Track at the blog link.


Tires vs. Tread, how will they move? This would seem to be a no-brainer, but I have to add it in. ... They’ll bog down far less frequently, and they can turn and maneuver far more effectively in urban terrain than anything with wheels.

Distiller
12-15-2008, 03:09 PM
CV90 ... about 8 psi ground pressure.
M1 Abrams ... about 15 psi.
Patria AMV (the best 8x8 in my eyes) ... about 35psi. More than a heavy truck.

8x8 should be outlawed for anything that comes in direct contact with the enemy (as long as this planet is not one huge parking lot). And for CS/CSS why not take a truck?
6x6 is something for a constabulary and para-mil units.

Bandwagon are not so good over boulders.
So far CV90 shows the way to go.
Will see what BAE/Hagglunds SEP will do. Is it still alive?

S-2
12-16-2008, 02:33 AM
Stupid idea from a guy not seriously following the discussion-

Design the vehicle roadwheels to displace adequate ground pressure and exert sufficient clearance to be towed or driven without tow on a hard-surface. Carry extra roadwheels as spaced armor ala' German tanks and Stugs in W.W.II. If the vehicle can reach a reasonable hard surface, off it goes to get the rubber band thingy replaced. Crew needs proficiency replacing a roadwheel (if lost)-not a rubberband track.

Fuchs
12-16-2008, 03:10 AM
Stupid idea from a guy not seriously following the discussion-

Design the vehicle roadwheels to displace adequate ground pressure and exert sufficient clearance to be towed or driven without tow on a hard-surface. Carry extra roadwheels as spaced armor ala' German tanks and Stugs in W.W.II. If the vehicle can reach a reasonable hard surface, off it goes to get the rubber band thingy replaced. Crew needs proficiency replacing a roadwheel (if lost)-not a rubberband track.

Tracked vehicles usually only need to power a single wheel per side to move forward - and that's usually not even one of those that carry the weight, but the first or last wheel - one that merely turns the track around (sorry, I don't know the English terms). That's a very simple mechanism and this simplicity is one of the tracked vehicles' advantages.
Your system would require the roadwheels to be powered (at least one per side) - that might happen with electric drive, but isn't common today (there were such convertible tire/track combos like yours in the late 1920's and 1930's, especially the Christie designs).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christie_suspension

Another feature of Christie's designs was the "convertible" drive: the ability to remove the tracks for road travel, allowing for higher speeds and better range, and saving wear and tear on the fragile caterpillar track systems of the 1930s. In order to allow this, Christie used very large rubber-rimmed road wheels, with no return rollers for the tracks. As with many track designs with center guide teeth, dual wheels were used, allowing the guide teeth to run between them. By 1939, the Soviets found that the BT tank's convertible drive was an unnecessary complication which also occupied valuable space in the tank, and the feature was dropped in the T-34.

Ken White
12-17-2008, 05:47 PM
...I recall when we had Tracks, PCs, 1/4 ton Trucks, 2 & 1/2 ton Trucks, 5 ton Trucks, & Heavy, Medium & Light Tanks, Half-tracks, motorcycles, horses & armored cars.

A Generation ago the Armor Officer's Basic Course taught about five weapons platforms; Stuart, Lee, Gavin, Patton, Sherman, Chafee, Walker & more inclusive. Today there's nothing between the Abrams & the HMMWV at the UMW's Basic Course & the HMMWV is only touched on. Strykers are POI'd directly to the units with great consternation, although they're slowly moving to the school house.

As a Cavalryman operating in OIF today I find myself drawing on experience with the older weapons platforms & in some instances missing them.

Your five weapons platforms are the M5 Light series (1941-46); the M3 Medium series (1940-1943); the M113 series -- which was NEVER named the Gavin other than by Mike Sparks and is a name not used by anyone in the Armed Forces that I've heard or read -- (1959-to date); the M26, M47, M48, M60 Medium series (1949-1991); the M4 Medium series (1942-52); the M24 Light series (1943-1953) and the M41 Light series (1951-1969). Surprising to think AOBC taught all those at the same time. That looks like three generations to me. The tracks of a generation ago would seem to be the M60 and the M113 series only. In fact, since I was an AOBC instructor a generation ago, I distinctly remember those were the vehicles used...

More notable is your comment that you recall Halftracks, Horses and Armored Cars. All those pre date me; I can recall them, of course, but am too young to have operated with them -- and I'm over 75. Yet, you're a Cavalryman operating in OIF today. Amazing.

I saw also your comment that:
"As long as I still get to wear my stetson I can abide the ASU." Good for you. Then this appeared:
"Worked closely in zone with an ESFS that was assigned to my Infantry Battalion in OIF. That ESFS conducted itself very well essentially carrying out a textbook COIN Operation in the area."Infantry and not Cavalry? That sort of confused me. So did the use of the word zone. :wry:

However, I'm old and do get confused often. For example, this statement boggled my little mind:
"Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op.Read it four times and still have no idea what it says...:confused:

Then I saw this from you:
"As a business leader myself I take the lesson that a corporation, like a man, can be good or evil." You are indeed a man of many parts...

Wildcat
12-18-2008, 02:15 AM
Oh crap, don't tell me Mike Sparks has recruited some disciples to espouse his "Gospel of Gavin"... :eek: I felt much safer when I thought that he was isolated and alone.

reed11b
12-18-2008, 03:36 AM
Oh crap, don't tell me Mike Sparks has recruited some disciples to espouse his "Gospel of Gavin"... :eek: I felt much safer when I thought that he was isolated and alone.

OK I won't tell you......but try to google military reform ,or heck, even military and see how many Sparky pages come up. My introduction to military forum communication was el' Sparky and still have some poor communication skills I learned there. Nearly as bad are the news groups. In fact there are alot of high noise to content "military" forums out there. Praise the moderators and your co-contributers for the sane wonderfulness that is SWJ.
Reed

Stevely
12-18-2008, 03:53 AM
The Internet is a good thing, but mostly it is a bad thing, as the Sparks thing demonstrates.

Steve Blair
12-19-2008, 05:29 PM
The internet is pretty much a neutral thing that can be used for either good or evil. We lean more toward the good here, and leave the other for the Sparkies of the world. But it does allow those sad and alone types to find other sads and alones and form bonds of a sort that we'd best not explore too deeply....:eek:

Sabre
01-07-2009, 03:12 PM
As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Heh, while we are off-topic, I have to thank you for that quote, Steve (and JKM_101_FSO).

I end up using it on at least a twice-weekly basis - it's just so... accurate...

Bullmoose Bailey
01-21-2009, 07:21 AM
I saw also your comment that: Good for you. Infantry and not Cavalry? That sort of confused me.

You are indeed a man of many parts...



Thanks for your commentary & insights from your personal experience.

The 5 weapons platforms are the ones that a former Squadron Commander of mine told me he trained on at AOB, c. mid sixties. I expect some variableness in models and individual experience. Do you agree with my point as to our loss of diversity in platform application ?

In reply to my present Infantry Affiliation, it sort of confuses us on a daily basis too so you're not alone in that. Our Troop presently works for an Infantry Batallion, apparently common in a Task Force scheme. So does a USAF ESFS in our case so we're quite diverse; AF Blue, INF Blue & CAV yellow......puke green ?:)

On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113, its an evolution of my desire and the great human instinct to name things that are dear to them instead of numbering them. That track is so dear to me that it would be like calling a child by their social security number. So you understand my desire to name it just like other vehicles are named. This is just my own preference my own style & I do not request anyone else conform. Isn't freedom of thought great.

In my experience Troopers name a great deal of things a great deal of names, weapons, vehicles, platforms...mostly after Indian tribes, battles, heroes & such things, although I agree that everyone's experience is different.

"Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op."

What I mean here is that I would be using the graphic for a brief, with proper citation & credit given of course...

For the sake of staying on topic I personally would appreciate it if you addressed "dead-agentism" or source impeachment questions that are off topic via messaging to my account. Then I could respond without opening myself up to "being off topic".

The thread topics here are areally good and deserved to be respected.

William F. Owen
01-21-2009, 07:49 AM
On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113,

Zelda is the official IDF name. Unlike Gavin. Zelda rolls off the tongue better than "Mem-Achad, Achad, Shalosh" in Hebrew. All IDF vehicles have names as opposed to numbers. ...some of them very odd names at that!

Ken White
01-21-2009, 05:20 PM
...Do you agree with my point as to our loss of diversity in platform application ?Not really, excess diversity creates massive logistic burdens.
In reply to my present Infantry Affiliation, it sort of confuses us on a daily basis too so you're not alone in that.I wasn't confused so much as I thought you were trying to 'embellish' your persona. Still do.
On my somewhat controversial usage of the name Gavin/Zelda & others for the M113...Isn't freedom of thought great.Yes to your question; foolishness with respect to calling the M113 a 'Gavin.' However, I suspect you and Mike would agree on other things as well.
For the sake of staying on topic I personally would appreciate it if you addressed "dead-agentism" or source impeachment questions that are off topic via messaging to my account. Then I could respond without opening myself up to "being off topic".I have absolutely no desire to have any personal contact with you. This is a public board and while I generally ignore most inane items, I may feel the urge to comment on occasion.
The thread topics here are areally good and deserved to be respected.We can agree on that. They are worthwhile and might I suggest that you can aid in keeping them that way by making an attempt to stay factual, avoid religious discussion and stop dredging up old and dead threads to make obscure points just so you can write something. All those transgressions are, of course, in my opinion...

Bullmoose Bailey
01-21-2009, 05:54 PM
Not really, excess diversity creates massive logistic burdens. I wasn't confused so much as I thought you were trying to 'embellish' your persona. Still do.Yes to your question; foolishness with respect to calling the M113 a 'Gavin.' However, I suspect you and Mike would agree on other things as well.I have absolutely no desire to have any personal contact with you. This is a public board and while I generally ignore most inane items, I may feel the urge to comment on occasion.We can agree on that. They are worthwhile and might I suggest that you can aid in keeping them that way by making an attempt to stay factual, avoid religious discussion and stop dredging up old and dead threads to make obscure points just so you can write something. All those transgressions are, of course, in my opinion...

Ken you are correct about the diversity of platforms. It does create certain logistical issues. We, my unit that is, presently have no less than four models of MRAPs each with their own planning considerations. I find the RG33 the best suited all around although I would like a rear gunner position.

Ken White
01-21-2009, 06:16 PM
Ken you are correct about the diversity of platforms. It does create certain logistical issues. We, my unit that is, presently have no less than four models of MRAPs each with their own planning considerations. I find the RG33 the best suited all around although I would like a rear gunner position.the RG33 has some minor maintenance problems but is otherwise great.

In any event, while I can from a distance appreciate the benefit of all MRAPs for the troops, I think we've got another case of rushing something into production in response to media pressure and thus not getting a good product much less the optimum solution due to the haste. One of our recurring national shortfalls... :wry:

It also annoys me that many other nations started working on MRAP-like solutions a number of years before we did. We did not do so due to the desire to avoid situations where such vehicles would be of use. Unfortunately, the Armed forces don't get to pick where or how to fight...

Bullmoose Bailey
01-21-2009, 07:01 PM
the RG33 has some minor maintenance problems but is otherwise great.

In any event, while I can from a distance appreciate the benefit of all MRAPs for the troops, I think we've got another case of rushing something into production in response to media pressure and thus not getting a good product much less the optimum solution due to the haste. One of our recurring national shortfalls... :wry:

It also annoys me that many other nations started working on MRAP-like solutions a number of years before we did. We did not do so due to the desire to avoid situations where such vehicles would be of use. Unfortunately, the Armed forces don't get to pick where or how to fight...
Very true...

These effects have placed us in the interesteing scenario of postulating as to whether we'll be concluding OIF with an outstanding fleet of excellent new vehicles or a fleet of niched overweight pillboxes on wheels which are sickeningly inbuilt with obsalescence since they by their very nature recommend new tactics to enemy actors.

I personally see many future applications for them as security, logistics, DV and diplomacy vehicles in theatres such as the Balkans and Africa.


Zelda is the official IDF name. Unlike Gavin. Zelda rolls off the tongue better than "Mem-Achad, Achad, Shalosh" in Hebrew. All IDF vehicles have names as opposed to numbers. ...some of them very odd names at that!
I like that about our Israeli friends.

Americans, I personally feel, also prefer names for everything over numbers which is why we have so many unofficial names; Hummer, Huey, Fat Albert, DRUT, Lead Sled, Zipper, Missile With A Man, Sled, Widowmaker & others. Some are almost universally misused; i.e. Huey, some less so i.e. Gavin, both equally incorrect technical names: UH-1"Iroquois" & M113.

Nicknames are a neat little part of our national propensity for endearment.

jcustis
02-26-2009, 08:45 AM
"There is no failsafe measure that can prevent all loss of life and limb on this or any other battlefield. That is the brutal reality of war. But vehicles like MRAP, combined with the right tactics, techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available against these attacks."'

Secretary Gates, Jan 18, 2008

Okay, I was prematurely vocal about my take on the MRAP, but I am wrapping up this current deployment, and have spent enough time in the back of both 4x4 and 6x6 models to make the following statement...they suck, and are a detriment to our combat capability. Sure, they can keep a guy ensconced in a blanket, but they are only effective as a mobility platform on hard-surfaced roads. Even then, the errant pothole could leave a axle in ruins if it is hit at the right speed and angle.

Cross-country mobility is so atrocious that just about every time I had to move cross-country, I've ended the movemnt fatigued and that is not the way to go into a fight (of which we have had none here thus far).

When our task force first arrived at its current operating location, we put these vehicles through paces that probably haven't been attempted before, and the maintenance status told the tale of a vehicle that simple could not withstand the slightest bit of rough terrain without crawling at 0-5 mph, and had to be gingerly maneuvered through chokepoint after chokepoint in order to get anywhere. We learned over time and stopped destroying them, but that time occured in a relatively benign environment. Secretary Gates is right on the notion of utilizing the appropriate TTPs, but the problem that we face, at least in the Corps, is that you don't get TTPs added in when drivers go to get their license and road time. We tried to employ them like other wheeled assets, and just simply failed. It's better now, but only because we have to baby the vehicles to excess.

I am hearing that the Corp's is looking for money to upgrade the suspension systems from a solid-axle so that these vehs can be made to operate in a wider range of environments. I hope that is possible, because the platform has a ton of potential, but until that suspension gets unscrewed, it won't be capable across the range that we need.

William F. Owen
02-26-2009, 12:05 PM
Cross-country mobility is so atrocious that just about every time I had to move cross-country, I've ended the movemtn fatigued and that is not the way to go into a fight (of which we have had none here thus far).


...but which MRAP and what level of protection? Some Armoured Vehicles have very high level of both mobility and protection.

jcustis
02-26-2009, 02:38 PM
Fair enough. It is our Cougar model.

William F. Owen
02-27-2009, 10:48 AM
Fair enough. It is our Cougar model.

Understood. Cougar seems to have less than stellar potential here in the UK as well. The operational people seem to have favoured RG-31/32, so it's by no means clear where the error crept in, even if indeed it did. You may want to look at the STK- ATTC Warthog as the UK's new APC for A'Stan.

This may also amuse.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_OwenAFV_Feb09.pdf

Additionally, it seems now useless to talk of "MRAPS" - we need to get back to talking about armoured vehicles.

VMI_Marine
02-28-2009, 01:40 PM
Sir,
Couldn't agree more. MRAPs are the exact opposite of where we need to be going with our mobility. I wrote a review on OPFOR after my last deployment, which pretty much echoes what you are saying.

MRAP Review (http://op-for.com/2008/04/mrap_review.html)

davidbfpo
06-29-2009, 08:05 AM
The discussion of the UK policy on patrol vehicles policy, in Afghanistan now, has re-appeared, albeit with little public or political resonance. The link refers to MRAP and other vehicles: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ and a former UK Army officer's view: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2009/06/26/when-is-the-wrong-vehicle-the-right-vehicle/comment-page-0/#comment-4731

This seemed the best place to add this!

davidbfpo

Kiwigrunt
08-04-2009, 11:19 AM
Here's (http://www.ivema.co.za/gila.htm) a newish MRAP from SA that looks kinda interesting. Appears to adhere to the KISS principle and looks like its been designed from the ground up to be exactly what it is, as opposed to some others that are based on existing civilian trucks. Armour protection looks a bit meagre though.

On a different note, the Dutch seem to be quite happy with the Bushmaster, orders now totalling 72. May have something to do with the fact that the Dutch and the Ozzies work and live together in A-stan?

davidbfpo
08-05-2009, 05:14 PM
Via a BSAP website this Russian website has a vast selection of photos and text in Russian of course: http://www.armourbook.com/forum/main_forum/first_aid/2008-12-11/kolesnye_bronemashiny/page/1.html

davidbfpo

kaur
08-22-2009, 10:41 AM
davidbfpo, thanks for good link. I add one more picture :)

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0019/VF_MRAP.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0019/VF_MRAP)

davidbfpo
08-22-2009, 12:38 PM
Testimony to the MRAP concept, a Pathfinder vehicle in Afghanistan after a 500 pound IED went off: http://cryptome.org/MRAPINCIDENT.pps

Appears to be a US Army Unclassified product. I note the engine has left the vehicle.

davidbfpo

wm
03-03-2010, 03:07 PM
This is extracted from a press release on the the DoD public web site (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13344).
The Army released last Thursday a request for proposal (RFP) for the technology development phase of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle being developed under the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) effort. The Army has worked extensively with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to develop this program. The GCV acquisition program will follow Department of Defense best acquisition practices and be a competitive program with up to three contract awards. The GCV development effort will consist of three phases: technology development, engineering and manufacturing design and low rate initial production. The Army anticipates awarding the first contracts for the technology development phase in the fourth-quarter of fiscal 2010.

The technology development phase involves risk reduction, identification of technology demonstrations, competitive prototyping activities, and planned technical reviews. Industry will have 60 days to submit proposals to the Army for this development effort.

The Ground Combat Vehicle effort is part of a holistic Army plan to modernize its combat vehicle fleet. This includes incorporating Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles into the fleet while modernizing current vehicle fleets including Stryker. The first Ground Combat Vehicle will be an Infantry Fighting Vehicle offering a highly-survivable platform for delivering a nine-man infantry squad to the battlefield. The GCV is the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an improvised explosive device (IED) environment. It is envisioned to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley, greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country mobility of an Abrams tank. The GCV will be highly survivable, mobile and versatile, but the Army has not set specific requirements such as weight, instead allowing industry to propose the best solution to meet the requirements.

Infanteer
03-03-2010, 03:18 PM
The GCV is the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an improvised explosive device (IED) environment.

A political statement if I've ever seen one. What kind of environment is that? Designed to withstand mines and booby-traps doesn't sound like anything new or groundbreaking. Also, what defines an "IED Environment"? An EFP is far different than 2 jugs of HME which are both different than a DFFC.

Red Leg
03-03-2010, 04:03 PM
Whole heartedly agree with Infanteer; IED's come in just as many varieties as any other munition type on the battle field. The MRAP was great at providing crew survivability (not vehicle survivability) against mine strikes, much better than Strykers or Bradleys, but it was just as vulnerable to EFPs and HEAT grenades. However, the government was so concerned with purchasing huge numbers, which plays well in the media, there was never an adequate number of spare parts or qualified mechanics to keep the fleet combat capable. My unit had 13 MRAPs assigned, of 5 different variants made by 5 different companies, and it was everything we could do to keep 9 combat capable. For the loggies out there, that is a 69% OR rate, which would get the SPO fired in most situations, and our OR rate was above the theater average.

Firn
03-29-2010, 07:47 PM
Whole heartedly agree with Infanteer; IED's come in just as many varieties as any other munition type on the battle field. The MRAP was great at providing crew survivability (not vehicle survivability) against mine strikes, much better than Strykers or Bradleys, but it was just as vulnerable to EFPs and HEAT grenades. However, the government was so concerned with purchasing huge numbers, which plays well in the media, there was never an adequate number of spare parts or qualified mechanics to keep the fleet combat capable. My unit had 13 MRAPs assigned, of 5 different variants made by 5 different companies, and it was everything we could do to keep 9 combat capable. For the loggies out there, that is a 69% OR rate, which would get the SPO fired in most situations, and our OR rate was above the theater average.

Doesn't sound so good. The performance of some of those vehicles in deep mud and snow must also be truly atrocious. Has there been any testing in this regard? I'm pretty sure that they were wise enough not to try.

Mud, mud, mud. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5d8XxtlpqQ)

In the end it is always about resources, local conditions and hard and wise choices.


Firn


P.S: BTW the BV 206S is truly a fantastic piece of machinery under said conditions, but certainly the vehicle of choice for braving IEDs.

TAH
06-30-2010, 06:57 PM
How about taking this discussion in a slightly different direction.

What is the potential use of all the "already bought and paid for MRAPs" for use in the Line-of-Communications/MSR security role?

Currently US Army Combat Support MP platoon are mounted in a combination of up-armored HMWWVS and ASVs (a 8x6 HMWWV to ASV mix). Could the MRAPs replace some/all of the HMWWVs?

What about as squad/team carriers for engineers in a Route Clearance Company? Same type of situation as above, combination of HMWWV and MRAPs now. Go all MRAP?

We have/are resourcing the Comvoy Escort/MSR Security mission/role/task with National Guard BCT that get re-equipped and re-trained before they deploy. Maybe MRAPs sit in depots/storage to await the next need.

I have heard that some folks are in favor of either handing over all of MRAPs to the locals as we leave and/or creating more "artifical reefs" with them once we get rid of all the toxic stuff. Both options seem poor choices to me.

I feel there is a tactical niche for a vehicle like at MRAP in the convoy escort and route/MSR security role. We just need a proponent (branch) to step forward and say, I got this one.

Thoughts?

TAH

Ken White
06-30-2010, 08:26 PM
Maybe MRAPs sit in depots/storage to await the next need.Been my observation that machinery which sits tends to develop all sorts of expensive restorations to place back in service. Amazing how fast tubing, tires and track pads dry rot. Plus oxidation oxidizes...:wry:
I feel there is a tactical niche for a vehicle like at MRAP in the convoy escort and route/MSR security role. We just need a proponent (branch) to step forward and say, I got this one.Niche is correct. Won't work at all in MCO and there are better solutions in FID. The MRAP was a political answer to a political problem-- the American way, unfortunately -- and while they worked marginally well for the purpose, they are definitely one trick ponies. Overly complex, overly expensive, too many varieties cluttering up the supply system. poor x-country cape, poor mileage yet underpowered -- and a single piddly 85mm round, much less a Sagger, would ruin someone's day.

Armor is handy. It also can become a cocoon and folks can become reluctant to leave their cocoons. Armor stops hostile objects -- but you can only armor so much ; agility is better...

I'd note the last time the last time we had proponents step forward, Cavalry got the Bradley instead of the needed scout vehicle and the M8 got cancelled... :(

The Branch system and 'propency' needs to go. It's a relic of the 19th Century. We need to develop unit and service loyalty, branches interfere with that. I can recall one smart organizational move that was killed because implementing it would've meant the loss of an Armor Colonel space -- no matter it would have improved the Armor School's day to day ops and throughput. Wait and see what that branch proponency wrangle does to Information Ops... :rolleyes:

Sorry to dispense rain -- but you asked for thoughts...:wry:

TAH
07-01-2010, 12:30 PM
Ken:

The rain helps...

Really think someone/branch and/or "Center of Excellence" MCoE, MANCEN, CASCOM, needs to step forward and assume responsibility for this tar baby.

My thoughts are that it belongs over at MANCEN. They "own" MPs and the Maneuver Enhanved Brigades (MEBs). Don't know about the AC, but the RC MEBs are all including either an Infantry Bn, a Combined Arms Bn, or a Cav Sqdrn as their own organic Tatical Combat Force (TCF).

I think that TCF Bn is were MRAPs and their ilk belong. Lots of MSR patroling and convoy escorting. Some base/FOB defense tasks and only limited need to maneuver x-country extensively.

Talking to my son's Battle-buddy from BCT/AIT who deployed to Iraq last year as part of a "Theater Security Force BCT", he states that teh ASVs are sweet in this role.

At nearly a million buck a pop, seems like we should not let them just gather dust and rot.

TAH

B.Smitty
07-01-2010, 12:51 PM
Does anyone have experience with the various up-armor kits for MTVRs and FMTVs? How do they compare with dedicated MRAPs in terms of protection and mobility? The MTVR APK was supposed to handle detonations of 12lbs of Comp B (threshold), 16lbs (objective) and 7.62mm all around. I imagine this could be taken further with a custom cab and cargo bed designed to accept armor kits.

It seems like, if you have the option to up-armor your standard trucks to near MRAP protection, while retaining a significant degree of off-road performance, you can buy one vehicle and tailor your protection level to meet the METT-TC.

Ken White
07-01-2010, 02:38 PM
Really think someone/branch and/or "Center of Excellence" MCoE, MANCEN, CASCOM, needs to step forward and assume responsibility for this tar baby.However, I'll spare you my stock rant about the smarmy and dipwad "Centers of Excellence" BS terminology. That irritates me almost as much as this 'warrior' and 'hero' gar-bahge...:mad:

And Branches in general do. Moving right along:
I think that TCF Bn is were MRAPs and their ilk belong. Lots of MSR patroling and convoy escorting. Some base/FOB defense tasks and only limited need to maneuver x-country extensively.We can disagree on that. I think that would be preparing for this war and not the future. I really question the long term viability of road convoys and if we end up in a vaguely linear major war, the armor wouldn't be needed in the rear and in any event doesn't provide any real protection against likley weapons in such a conflict.

If we end up doing more FID:
Talking to my son's Battle-buddy from BCT/AIT who deployed to Iraq last year as part of a "Theater Security Force BCT", he states that teh ASVs are sweet in this role.I hear and read the same thing. Shows what can happen when you buy the right tool for the job...;)

The MRAP has a job (sort of...) today but it is / was really just a quick fix for a political problem that was necessitated by an Army and a series of Congresses that did not adapt to known and obvious equipment requirements due to ineptitude in high places in the Army and to political expediency in Congress during the 1990s. Militarily, tactically, it is a bullet magnet which can be defeated by the right weapon. It is large, slow, not agile, too heavy for the load it can carry (and for many roads and bridges...) and fills no real tactical need. It breeds tactical ineptitude and a vehicle bound mentality.

That's for MRAPs, the M-ATV and the JLTV are not MRAPs and are acceptable IMO. But only barely :D
At nearly a million buck a pop, seems like we should not let them just gather dust and rot.We waste a lot of money on more -- and less -- important stuff. Still, I agree, no sense in letting 'em sit somewhere. We can give them to the Iraqis and the Afghans (and other nations with similar problems). Let them deal with a solution bought for their conditions and that is not really tactically viable for most all US purposes.

I have visions of an MRAP trying to move down a jungle trail -- or in the mud at Ft. Campbell, Germany, Korea or some such place. Even better, in the snow of the high latitudes. Even worse, in a convoy somewhere, anywhere that is suddenly hit with dozens of ATGMs from an ambush two or three clicks off the road and that didn't get spotted by the patrolling Ravens...:(

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 03:01 PM
However, I'll spare you my stock rant about the smarmy and dipwad "Centers of Excellence" BS terminology. That irritates me almost as much as this 'warrior' and 'hero' gar-bahge...:mad:

Sometimes you are just too subtle for me, Ken. Are you hinting at something? :D

Ken White
07-01-2010, 03:15 PM
where I was an ROTC instructor (thankfully very briefly) and was charged with instructing gentlemen cadets inculcated the value of nuance -- and clean language... ;)

TAH
07-01-2010, 04:19 PM
ken:

Got your points about branches and centers and stuff Oh My!

Much if it I agree with.

However, our LOCs are now and will most likely remain in the future one of our Achilles Heels. Even after peeling out all the FOB/quality-of-stuff, units will still require daily to every-other-day re-supply.

If the routes are not patroled/secured and/or the convoys are not escorted, the supplies will not get thru. After 2-3 days without fuel re-supply an M1 becomes a really heavy-stationary Anti-tank gun/bunker.

JLTV is still a concept/in development, M-ATVs are smaller because of the terrain requirements in A-stan. As a result carry fews troops.

Pretty sure, if given the choice is MRAP or up-armored HMMWV or nothing, folks will opt for MRAP. May be a short-term solution. But think it gets us over the hump.

Agree in spades with your comment about ATGMs versus convoys.

A bettter solution maybe to get away from the idea of fixed MSRs and more MSR-on-fly. When your enemy does not know what road, trail, cart path ect your are going to take next/today, laying IEDs and setting up complex ambushes gets harder.

Even in Iraq (at least in 2004) there were/are plenty of farm-to-market type dirt roads that could handle convoys.

So, unless the future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) runs on sailboat fuel we are stuck with ground re-supply.

TAH

Ken White
07-01-2010, 10:20 PM
However, our LOCs are now and will most likely remain in the future one of our Achilles Heels. Even after peeling out all the FOB/quality-of-stuff, units will still require daily to every-other-day re-supply.True. That was the case 45 years ago. What's been done to fix it? The current convoy sims and other goodies as well as the MRAP attack the symptom, not the problem...
If the routes are not patroled/secured and/or the convoys are not escorted, the supplies will not get thru.Why? Because we've always done it that way? Because we're not smart enough to fix an obvious problem?.. Not picking on you, your statement is correct but the situation it refers to is inexcusable IMO.

I also intensely dislike the FOB concept. It is poor tactical employment that is almost -- almost but not quite -- necessitated by inadequate training and tactical competence. Units should be flexible enough to operate in the field. I fully realize that WW II was different but we didn't win it with a bunch of FOBs. Units went to the field and lived there day in and day out, moving constantly. The FOB is a stationary MRAP...
After 2-3 days without fuel re-supply an M1 becomes a really heavy-stationary Anti-tank gun/bunker.Yeah, stuff like that happens when you buy a known fuel guzzler not because it was better than the competitor but mostly to keep a failing auto maker afloat. :wry:
JLTV is still a concept/in development, M-ATVs are smaller because of the terrain requirements in A-stan. As a result carry fews troops.The JLTV is a bit more than a concept vehicle, it will appear. The M-ATV was purchased to address the shortfalls in MRAP. That it carries fewer people is of course true but immaterial, it is not an ideal vehicle on many counts but it will go places semi cross country that no MRAP will go. Most of our vehicles are too big, inadequately agile and are heavy (and have shorter range) due to added armor. Armor can lull you into a false sense of security, it cannot protect you from everything. Flexibility and agility do more to protect the force than does Armor.
Pretty sure, if given the choice is MRAP or up-armored HMMWV or nothing, folks will opt for MRAP.I'm sure you're correct. If you ask across the board, the whole Army. OTOH, if you ask Infantry units, I bet you'd get a different answer. :D
May be a short-term solution. But think it gets us over the hump.What hump? You seem to be trying to invent a need. I see no hump out there where those monsters provide a solution. Acknowledging the need for a few for Engineer route clearing ops -- and there are better solutions for that -- you might find sensible employment for a couple of hundred. We have thousands...

A bettter solution maybe to get away from the idea of fixed MSRs and more MSR-on-fly. When your enemy does not know what road, trail, cart path ect your are going to take next/today, laying IEDs and setting up complex ambushes gets harder.That option is not always available, sometimes terrain or politics forces a route or two. A better solution is to avoid them altogether. If we'd spent half the money we've spent on heavy armor on developing tactical agility, we'd have equipment that would negate a lot of the need for MSRs. Insisting on a 1,000 mile operating would lighten the load but MSRs would still be required. tjhe object should br to eliminate Ol' Ach's Heel. :D
So, unless the future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) runs on sailboat fuel we are stuck with ground re-supply.Perhaps. Or maybe we shouldn't pursue a future GCV...:cool:

Cole
07-02-2010, 02:04 AM
Excuse my attempt to roll TAH's comments about BCT reorganization into this thread because believe they are related.

Believe TAH has the right idea that going from two Armor companies per CAB to one larger one would save personnel in a zero sum gain force structure. But instead of diverting all the extra tanks to the Reconnaissance squadron, wonder if it would make more sense to use the personnel billpayer to add a stability ops, air-deployment, and counter-IED capability by including M-ATV in the CAB and Recon Squadron force structures. The result might look like this:

Combined Arms Battalion (CAB)
1 Armor Co: 4 platoons with 4 M1A2 tanks for 16 tanks + 2 in Co HQ (per TAH suggestion)
2 Infantry Co: 3 platoons with 3 GCVs (vs. 4 M2A3) AND 3 M-ATV each (leave 3 GCVs and 3 M-ATV in Co HQ for the Cdr, XO, and 1SG in case their GCV are required to back-up platoons with broke vehicles)

Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Recon Troops: Each with 1 M1A2, 3 M3A3, 4 M-ATV with LRAS3 on elevated masts

The M-ATV would add more organic equipment lift, fire team carry, and resupply capability to CABs in a more survivable vehicle than the LRAS3 HMMWVs. With one less GCV in the platoon and 3 extra M-ATVs, the platoon would be capable of splitting up fire teams between GCV amd M-ATV, or could carry additional light infantry. There would be additional maneuverable crew-served weapons in the M-ATVs with less fuel consumption than 4 GCVs despite 6 vehicles. For early air deployment, commanders/planners could always choose to deploy 5 M-ATV instead of 2 GCVs to increase vehicle coverage of an airfield perimeter overwatching light troops, either sea-deploying GCVs or sending them later in the TPFDL.

In noncontiguous distributed operations, it would help to use organic M-ATV to pick-up and deliver supplies to combat elements, or carry additional fuel and ammunition to extend time between resupply. M-ATV cargo beds also could carry small UAS and unmanned ground vehicles, unattended sensors, mast-mounted sensors, light mortars, and smoke generation/grenades, as well as IED jamming and detection gear to lead expensive GCVs and tanks.

Consider that the probability is far higher that our forces will encounter IEDs and normal RPGs that are more affordable to typical foes with lesser defense budgets. Heavily armored advance guards, while helpful on open terrain against Cold War era threats, are less likely to be as beneficial in future tight urban areas or on forested/mountainous trails limited to one (or none) lane traffic with little ability to traverse turrets or cross 3rd world bridges. Boulevards and 4-lane highways are the exception, not the rule in most urban areas.

Finally the resulting force structure would use less fuel than current CABs to enable support of longer lines of communication that Israelis don’t deal with and that expose logisticians to stay behind and guerilla elements. Believe there is insufficient armored threat (and many other assets can find/kill armor) justifying tank-like armor for GCVs and more tanks in recon squadrons. The fuel burden is too high. As "On Point" cited in Chapter 6 in its history of OIF 1:

"To understand the scale of this effort, CFLCC expected to consume 40 million gallons of fuel by D+20, or about 10 April. By comparison, the Allies in WW I consumed 40 million gallons of gasoline during the four years of the war, a war that Winston Churchill described as having been won "on a sea of oil." By contrast, during World War II, the Allied fuel reserves in Normandy reached 7.5 million gallons only on D+21."

So we want to go from a 2 mpg Bradley to a 2 gallon per mile Abrams fuel consumption for the entire HBCT maneuver fleet?:eek:

jcustis
07-02-2010, 07:42 AM
Does anyone have experience with the various up-armor kits for MTVRs and FMTVs? How do they compare with dedicated MRAPs in terms of protection and mobility? The MTVR APK was supposed to handle detonations of 12lbs of Comp B (threshold), 16lbs (objective) and 7.62mm all around. I imagine this could be taken further with a custom cab and cargo bed designed to accept armor kits.

It seems like, if you have the option to up-armor your standard trucks to near MRAP protection, while retaining a significant degree of off-road performance, you can buy one vehicle and tailor your protection level to meet the METT-TC.

The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

TAH
07-02-2010, 02:02 PM
Ken:

BLUF, keep the counter-points coming. Healthly debate is good for the soul.:D

I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability.... :(

I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy. If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security. The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this. Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers. Above the ones needed to transform the 3rd ACR and 1st BCT/1AD. A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

Agree about a fuel guzzling tank, but until/if we get a new engine its the one we have. I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)

I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.

Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdrn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

Is you intent to re-create combined arms/CAV platoons? Personaly like combined arms Co/Troops better. Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.

While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.

Cole
07-02-2010, 10:42 PM
I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability.... :(But in Vietnam, there weren't lots of M1A2s burning 500 gallons every 8+ hours whether moving or not.:(


We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy. Isn't IED route clearance at really slow speeds? If engineers do it multiple hours prior to the convoy, there is time to emplace new IEDs. If it is done immediately forward of the convoy, the entire convoy is reduced to a crawl and is vulnerable to ambush. Does that create a requirement for something to patrol the road behind the engineers and provide them security?

If a tank is involved in securing the convoy, it is generating a high logistical requirement for itself, is tearing up the road and tank without a HET, and may limit the convoy to roads with strong bridges. There are other manned and unmanned aircraft solutions that may be better than a tank escort.


If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security....Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers.Wonder if after early Stryker air deployment for deterrence, SBCTs will have less of a forward combat mission once sea-deployed HBCTs arrive. They can be task-organized with HBCTs to provide convoy escort, secure the engineer IED clearance teams and roads behind them, and can support AOs along convoy routes to provide full-time patrolling security and stationary surveillance.



A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?101st and 82nd already had a LOC security mission during OIF I and secured bypassed cities. So perhaps let the early deployed light guys do it again in their JLTV/M-ATVs and the Strykers/ASVs perform the mobile escort.


Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)
About 2,000 gallons per Abrams (roughly one HEMTT tanker per tank) every 1,000 miles. Probably 1,000 gallons per 130K lbs diesel GCV or 600 gallons per 80,000 lb GCV every 1,000 miles. (I'm not too bad in math :D)



Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

I realized that was messed up last night but waited for other input. Left out the word "platoon" with 1 tank, 3 M3A3, and 4 M-ATVs...basically substituting a tank and 4 M-ATV for the current 5 HMMWVs. So the net addition of 4 tanks to the Recon Squadron could occur as a separate platoon, as well, realizing they would probably be task-organized all the time with other troops.


While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.
Tractor trailers and commercial vehicles will bring many supplies most of the way. Forward Support Company HEMTT PLS trucks can cover the remaining distance but lack the off-road mobility of a M-ATV and are a bigger target close to dangerous AOs.

Guess you must push BSB HEMTT tankers all the way forward, but with fewer tanks you could get by with fewer HEMTT tankers. A more fuel-efficient infantry platoon with 3 GCVs/3 M-ATVs also reduces fuel requirements. You also could potentially carry 100 gallons (notional 750 lb of fuel + square rubber fuel drum) in the cargo bed of the M-ATV to resupply half of a 80K GCVs 200 gallon fuel tank. If it is a 140K pound GCV, you are probably only carrying 1/4th of a 400 gallon GCV tankful.

Let Strykers, Armored Security Vehicles, and M-ATV escort the HEMTT tankers and PLS racks forward and secure the dropped racks and fuel trucks until the CAB is ready to resupply.

Ken White
07-02-2010, 11:09 PM
not cater to the other guy's capability to do that so we can predictably respond...


Seems like we have lost that capability...True and it is a potentially costly mistake to have allowed that to happen. We had better get busy rebuilding the capability and the desire to stay away from FOB like locations.
I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.In reverse order; True -- that's why we should be trying to get a step or two ahead of them. Not to be too critical but it seems you're proposing we keep doing the same thing and hope it can be done better...:wry:

Yep, they're watching. If I were them and read on a web site the US was doing what you propose, I'd be wringing my hands in glee; 'No sweat, they're still going to do convoys...'

Uh, today's battlefield may be 'asymmetric' but only because we ALLOWED it to be. As for tomorrow's, I'm reminded of Omar Bradley's October 1949 comment, "We'll never have any more amphibious operations." Boy, did Inchon screw that up... :D

Or Niels Bohr's "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." Unfortunately, the US Army has to be prepared for everything from MCO to humanitarian intervention and all that worldwide. Thus maximum flexibility in unit organization and training is required, the number of one job specialty elements has to be kept low.
We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both.Or do without both...
What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security...The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this... So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?In order; Isn't LOC security an old MP function, augmented as required? The MEBs have been given the mission but other than in the ArNG, they theoretically do not have a "Combat Battalion." Rather they are assigned troop units as need for the task(s) assigned. Said Troops should be heavy on MPs with ASV or Strykers and should not include combined arms units unless they are REALLY needed (Really as in necessary, not desired by a vocal Commander). Your proposal of such a Battalion almost sounds like fishing for spaces and using MRAPS to ease the cost of standup... ;)

Create an 'Inf Bn (LOC)' and you will have created a major morale problem for all the 11Bs in the world who would do back flips to avoid such an assignment. Trust me on that one. To get assigned as an Inf Bn to such duty temporarily is one thing, for an individual to be assigned to such a unit is quite another. Plus, you are creating a purpose designed outfit, predicting that the next war will resemble this one. History says that's not a good bet. Harsh reality says that MRAP are best as history...
I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.Of course they aren't, that would be harmful to job security...
Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles.Not necessarily, one could have fewer, lighter vehicles with better mileage. Even better, one could launch the vehicles for a 1 or 200 mile trip out, a few hours of combat and a 1 or 200 mile return to their start point...
I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.They might be overkill, OTOH, in some scenarios, they might be inadequate. In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

So's the MRAP. ;)

And on this:
Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.I strongly agree that, almost criminally, we do not adequately train our Lieutenants and that we do not adequately trust our NCOs.

Rex Brynen
07-03-2010, 12:11 AM
Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

And on that issue:

Senior U.S. commander restricts Humvee use in Afghanistan (http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/01/afghanistan.humvees/?hpt=T2)
By Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
July 1, 2010 11:33 a.m. EDT


Washington (CNN) -- The once-ubiquitous Humvee may become a rare sight in some parts of Afghanistan following a decision by the senior U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan to restrict the use of the vehicles in the field.

Maj. Gen. John Campbell, commander of Joint Task Force-101, ordered this week that the use of Humvee vehicles outside a military base would have to specifically be approved by a colonel -- one of the most senior field grade positions in the military.

Prior to this, the use of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, or Humvee) had to be approved by a lower-ranking officer, according to Task Force spokesman Maj. Patrick Seiber.

...

William F. Owen
07-03-2010, 04:49 AM
In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

Infanteer
07-03-2010, 05:07 PM
I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

I'll second that! Defeat into Victory is probably 1 of 5 books that I would say all leaders should read. For a book about an Army on operations, there are useful lessons for leaders at all level.

Ken White
07-03-2010, 07:39 PM
(so far as I can recall) who never forgot the importance of the basics of the trade (Soldiering is a trade, not a profession...), his roots or what was really important -- as opposed to the many who spend much time on the seemingly important. Infanteer is right, IMO. Everyone who serves should at least read it. Owning a copy of "Defeat into Victory" is better, it merits re-reading from time to time...

Back to the thread. As he also wrote, you need specially trained folks for very long range strategic reconnaissance -- for everything else, a suitably trained and equipped Infantry Battalion can do the job. I would emphasize trained, equipage is important but good units can make do... :cool:

In more years than I care to recall, I've seen many varieties of infantry units from over a dozen nations in combat. Most of the 'specialized' units were not really successful. :eek: :o

Infanteer
07-05-2010, 01:16 PM
In more years than I care to recall, I've seen many varieties of infantry units from over a dozen nations in combat. Most of the 'specialized' units were not really successful. :eek: :o

But they tend to have real neat hats....

Tukhachevskii
07-17-2010, 03:44 PM
Apologies if already mentioned. New MRAP, Ranger (http://www.rangervehicle.co.uk/_downloads/ranger-brochure-web.pdf), with 30mm remote turret. Looks very Mad Max (esp. in 8x8 version)

jcustis
08-05-2010, 01:23 PM
The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

Here are some issues I have with the platform:

-Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

-There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

-There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.

Pete
08-05-2010, 10:25 PM
If I understand the situation correctly the MRAP procurement happened mainly because of the insistence of SecDef Gates as an emergency measure to help to prevent the casualties being caused by IEDs. The standard DoD R&D life cycle model was short-circuited at the highest level because of the perceived urgency of the need.

During peacetime one of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schools, probably Infantry or Armor, would have served as the "combat developer," performing studies and analyses to define system "requirements." Once those desired characteristics had been defined in a "requirements document" approved by the proper level within DoD or the service, the program would have been turned over to a "materiel developer" (such as whatever the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command is called these days). They in turn would release an RFP, conduct source selection, and then develop a prototype. Then testing of the product takes place. The problem with this system is it usually takes 12 to 20 years to put a new item of equipment in the hands of troops.

How Army Ordnance ever developed the M1 Carbine so quickly in 1940-42 doesn't happen very often these days, mainly because our own DoD and service regulations for the development of new systems don't allow us to go from Point A to Point B without performing 35 steps in between. Often many of the documents produced during a developmet program have to be distributed to numerous DoD or service offices, any of which can non-concur and prevent forward movement in the program.

Pete
08-06-2010, 01:42 AM
They say a picture is worth a thousand words (https://ilc.dau.mil/default_nf.aspx), which is about how many there are on this diagram of the DoD acquisition life cycle model, courtesy of Defense Acquisition University. :eek:

Regarding the site certificate warning, DAU is a DoD organization and as such not likely to have dangerous stuff online.

Geronimo53
11-16-2010, 04:08 AM
Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

How they should be incorporated into the operational Army structure is the question. Should every unit be issued MRAPs to replace 5-Ton trucks and Humvees - resulting in scores of them cruising around Ft Bragg and Ft Drum? Should they all be mothballed until we need them again? Maybe we should donate them to "friendly countries"? Obviously if I am taking the time to write this I must be advocating a different COA. In fact, I have done the COA analysis (not included in this entry!) and determined a balanced way that ensures proper training, availability, and utilization, while also reducing logistical costs. Surprisingly, as you’ll see, that means not integrating them directly into Army tactical units.

I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers


There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs. The MRAP after all is only a troop carrier - a very well armored truck. Yes, it sometimes used for route clearance missions but its main utility is transporting combat troops safely around the area of operations. Tactically speaking, riding in the back of a MRAP is not much different than riding in an old army Deuce and Half, unless of course that ride takes you over an IED. But it doesn’t require extensive day to day training for the passengers, just driver licensing/familiarization training.

That said, the Army must complete a performance review of the six existing MRAP variants in an effort to reduce the number of variants in the force to two, or at the most three. This will reduce both the overall logistical costs and field maintenance nightmares, and increase vehicle uniformity within the force. Criteria that should be considered are durability, soldier survivability, adaptability to different environments/terrain, and the costs of contractor supported logistical support.

CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
Given our current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the distinct possibility that this will not be our last visit to the Middle East/SouthWest Asia, the Army should maintain eight BCT-sized allocations of MRAPs for combat and stability operations in the CENTCOM Theater to rotate among deployed BCTs. As US operations wind down and the MRAPs are no longer required on the ground they can be transitioned to CENTCOM APS locations.

Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
At the Army installation level, a battalion-sized allocation of MRAPs should be contractor maintained for use by divisional units in specific training areas on the base. This would allow for the development of specialized home station lane training (ex. MOUT, route clearance, etc) utilizing these troop transport vehicles, prior to deployment to a CTC or to combat/contingency operations. In this way they are a shared division level training asset that is used by BCTs when needed, not sitting unused in BCT motorpools for extended periods of time. Due to contractor maintenance costs, having the MRAPs available for units to train with as needed is preferable to completely incorporating them into the division force structure.

National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
As the current wars have shown, the National Guard and Reserves makes up a large part of this nation’s contingency force. Therefore they must not be left out of the MRAP training cycle. Prepositioned stocks of MRAPs, with all required logistical support included, should be available at National Guard Mobilization Training sites and Annual Training locations. Depending on location, this will coincide with the existing stocks used by the active duty units as stated above. This will provide the National Guard the same advantages that it provides the active duty forces – equipment that is there when they need it, without the persistent logistical maintenance costs.

Combat Training Centers
The MRAPs should be part of the prepositioned stock that rotational units draw for their training at the Combat Training Centers. NTC, JRTC, and JMRC are the primary pre-deployment training locations for deploying units. Deploying units could train on MRAPs, similar to the ones they’d soon be issued in theater, in realistic and immersive training environments. These training centers already issue rotational vehicles out of their preposition yards, so adding MRAPs and the contractor supported maintenance would not be something unmanageable.

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

jcustis
11-16-2010, 04:42 AM
The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

I have to play devil's advocate before this discussion gets too deep, when in fact a specific layer needs to be addressed.

MRAPs have become an integral part of operations, but can we truly say they have proven their worth?

MAJ Chris Isgrig
11-16-2010, 05:15 AM
We will need something like the MRAP again, in fact we will need a better MRAP in the future. Giving the MRAP to "friendly nations" will only ensure that our future adversaries have a training set. The point is however moot since we will continue to need the MRAP and we will soon need a better MRAP.

There is an assumption that the MRAP is a COIN only vehicle. I believe that assumption is not true. The MRAP is a servicable vehicle for anywhere the opposition does not have tanks or APCs. It is a good vehicle for where ever the main threat are mines and artillery. As such its a pretty good vehicle for route control and so would be a good asset for MP units and some engineer units, the people who are tasked with mobility tasks and who would not be in direct contact with the forward edge of the battle area.

As for the Strykers and the other vehicles in the forward areas where they might engage enemy armor or mechanized units those too need to evolve into something more MRAP like.

The trend in Soviet armored vehicle design toward the end of the cold war was for low silhouette vehicles, but those vehicle have not faired well against our taller vehicles. So there is room to imagine that some future replacement for the Bradley or the Stryker might be taller and have a "V" shapped hull.

One think can be assumed to be a sure bet, the opposition TTPs in the COIN fight will evolve their own TTPs to counter the MRAP and so there will have to be an MRAP evolution. As such the current set of vehicles may not be as valuble in 10 years as we might wish.

SJPONeill
11-16-2010, 08:02 AM
It's interesting how similar problems have similar solutions in the resemblance between MRAP and some of the vehicles developed by South Africa and Rhodesia in their counter-insurgencies in the 70s and 80s...

If current predictions run true and this form of warfare is going to be the new 'regular' warfare for the next 2-3 decades, then I think you are correct. The risk may lie in going too far down the COIN vehicle path at the expense of the those optimised for traditional force-on-force conflict - much we we did in the 80s and 90s across NATO and ABCA...

The other risk with vehicles such as MRAP is that they will continue to be perceived in some quarters and 'anti-IED' vehicles which they are not...any vehicle designed to be anti-IED is only a reaction and not the response that CIED really needs...

TAH
11-16-2010, 02:06 PM
Future of the Army MRAP Force

I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers [/B]


There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs.

I would suggest expanding your unit profile beyond just BCTs. Route Clearance Engineer Companies and Combat Support MP Companies who patrol MSRs are two obvious canidates for MRAPs as organic systems as opposed to for deployment only.

Each of the National Guard Maneuver Enhancement Brigades will inlcude a combat arms bn (Infantry, CAB or Cav/Recon) as a rear area combat force. I think that should be another canidate.

There is also a need/requirement to train the system mantainers/mechanics.

Ken White
11-16-2010, 03:16 PM
An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable. :rolleyes:

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

Tom Odom
11-16-2010, 03:57 PM
An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable. :rolleyes:

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

Agreed

MRAPS were made to make me appreciate Blackhawks.

Tom

IntelTrooper
11-16-2010, 03:59 PM
100% agree with Ken and his friend.

William F. Owen
11-16-2010, 04:30 PM
100% agree with Ken and his friend.
Me to, and I think Tom Odom nailed it pretty well when he said,

MRAPS were made to make me appreciate Blackhawks.

Eden
11-16-2010, 05:31 PM
Let me add my voice to the chorus.

MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.

Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.

Fuchs
11-16-2010, 05:39 PM
The MRAP story sounds a lot like the hard body armour plate story on steroids, doesn't it?

Geronimo53
11-16-2010, 06:23 PM
Let me add my voice to the chorus.

MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.

Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.

So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.


I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground. How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

Obviously MRAPs aren't indestructible. They are being destroyed by IEDs with more ferequency in Afghanistan now. But what's the alternative?

Geronimo53
11-16-2010, 06:32 PM
An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable. :rolleyes:

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

You left out "killing the enemy."

Eden
11-16-2010, 09:09 PM
How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.

I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.

Ken White
11-16-2010, 09:53 PM
You left out "killing the enemy."One might just capture them or wound them -- or deny them an objective or goal they aimed toward. In any event tactical dominance implies whatever it takes, kill, maim, pillage, block, divert, whatever... ;)

Eden can answer this...

ADDENDUM: He did and his answer is far better than mine; shorter, too...END

...Until he does, you might consider a point or two:
So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.If one tries to fight in short increments measured in hours or days, that will be a problem -- if one fights as one should, often off base and in the field for weeks at a time, it is far less a problem...
I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground.Not totally on small unit leaders and TTP -- those things are expensive, are provided and the system expects them to be used so they will be. Whether they're used inappropriately or by people that shouldn't have them at all will not be a major issue -- it should be but it will not be. :mad:
How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology... Soldiers are dying from small arms fires, grenades and IEDs because they're in combat. That's a fact of life. In this combat, they are fighting an enemy that does not have Artillery and uses the IEDs as a substitute; if he had Arty, almost certainly a far greater number would be dying from that.

There are ways to negate enemy artillery, there are ways to negate enemy use of IEDs but both require extra effort, some privations, tactical finesse and an appetite for taking risk. Not ever strong points of the US Army in my observation. Do some units do the right things some of the time? Absolutely. Do most units fail to do that most of the time? Regrettably, yes.

They should not use MRAP 'technology' because its a fallacious techno-fix for a training and employment shortfall. It feeds the "I'm safe in here" syndrome and a reluctance to dismount (or to order dismounting, a different but allied problem). It becomes a crutch -- and a reason no risks are taken...

Most units are only marginally trained and they use their MRAPs to achieve a measure of protection while doing dumb things like 'presence patrolling' in a large, unwieldy vehicle with no tactical saving grace aside from its protective ability. That and commuting to work are not beneficial. Combat is not a commuting sort of job, it's an outdoor sport.

The fascinating thing is that MRAPS are a symptom of the risk avoiding culture that has overtaken the Army and that many people who decry that effect support the MRAP, the epitome of risk avoidance.

I can't speak for Eden but IMO the senior leaders were not so much spineless as they were intent on protecting the institution that is the Army. We had not purchased armor protection for GP and utility vehicles because its expensive and because it has limited utility in mid to high intensity combat. As US policy was, before 2001, to avoid nation building, FID and COIN -- with good cause and good sense -- that procurement decision was quite sensible. Still is, IMO.

However, upon entering Iraq, political opponents of the war and the ignorant media -- but I repeat myself -- hopped on the so-called vulnerability of unarmored vehicles and the rest is history, The senior leaders resisted the idea of such vehicles on a number of sensible grounds but the political and media pressure grew so they finally acceded to the purchase as the lesser of two evils. Either purchase an unneeded and poor vehicle or face a lengthened trainup time and concomitant increase in casualties. Given the Congressional pressure to spend money on equipment instead of on training, they had little choice and thus bought vehicles of marginal utility that breed bad habits...

Spineless or pragmatic? Dunno. That's life in a democracy... :D
...and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?The bulk of the American public understand the why. The fact that other parts of the public did not or chose not to understand as fanned by the ignorance of the news media is sad but a factor of life today. Why anyone would expect no casualties in a war is mind boggling but some said they did expect just that or close to it... :rolleyes:

Senior leaders failure to level with the public -- indeed, with the Army -- on that score is spineless or remaining above the fray, not sure which. Either way it was and is dumb and merely leads to future acquiescence to later ignorant or ill informed demands.

M.L.
11-16-2010, 11:01 PM
I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.

I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.

There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive. While TTPs are important, why can't they be married with force protection for a greater effect?

The second assumption is that MRAP isolates Soldiers from the environment. MRAP is an inanimate object. MRAPs don't formulate missions, orders, TTPs, or SOPs. That would be the responsibility of commanders and leaders. While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue.

Another issue I have with this comment is the comparison to 100 lbs worth of body armor. Certainly, there is a tipping point where too much force protection inhibits mission accomplishment. Excessive equipment weight would seem to be one of them. On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong.

Lastly, I'd be careful about that last argument. While casualties are a part of war, the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense. Soldiers are combat power. If you lose combat power, you lose your ability to accomplish the mission. Therefore, you must preserve your combat power.

This isn't an emotional appeal for the lives of young men. It is a time-tested tenet of tactics and strategy.

davidbfpo
11-16-2010, 11:25 PM
The article's full title is: Room to Live: Why Aren't Armoured Vehicles Surviving the Explosive Threat in Afghanistan?

Link:http://www.defenceiq.com/article.cfm?externalID=3500

On a quick read from my "armchair" it may supplement this thread.

Johannes U
11-17-2010, 02:58 PM
Since I am a participant in a NATO C-IED Train-the-trainer course in Croatia, some of the points made are of immediate interest to me.
The principles and techniques we are taught here all stress on the importance of literally having "boots on the ground" when patrolling in an AOO with IEDs as a main threat.
I have no problem with that - even more - I fully concur with that.
The best "weapon" against an IED-network in my view is infantry doing foot patrols, showing presence, not only observing but controlling an AOO ...
But I still have the following question: what is from your point of view the ideal vehicle for supporting those infantry guys doing foot patrols?
x Is it the MRAP? - from what I've read so far, the majority disaggrees
x Is it an uparmored HUMMWV? (i hope i spelled that right) - from what I've heard from our instructors (all retired US Army with multiple tours as adivsors/trainers in Afghanistan and Iraq), because of its small size etc it is not.
Addendum: if the best weapon against IEDs is "boots on the ground", you need more than 2-3 dismounts per vehicle.
x Is it some kind of wheeled APC? Stryker, Fuchs, Pandur to name a few.
x Or is it just some kind of armored truck, like a MAN or UNIMOG with additional armor

I would be interested in your comments and maybe further information, especially since it is my job at home to train soldiers to be squad or platoon leaders at the Austrian Infantry School.

Johannes

William F. Owen
11-17-2010, 04:24 PM
But I still have the following question: what is from your point of view the ideal vehicle for supporting those infantry guys doing foot patrols?

"It depends," and what you need the "support" to do.

What's the threat? What's the terrain? How good is your training? Do you have helicopters - which was what defeated the IRA's IED threat. A well trained foot patrol can stay out for days, being re-supplied either by caches or helicopter drops. Re-supply can even be "dropped" from "civilian vehicles."

Training, risk and competence solves 95% of the problem. It's not a "vehicle" issue. It's a competence issue.

Ken White
11-17-2010, 05:20 PM
In order of your list, I'd vote for:

No -- MRAPs are the worst choice. Logistically, tactically and mobility-wise unsound in all aspects
No -- Poor vehicle; tries to be all things to all people and fails. Number of troops issue is secondary but does have the benefit of fewer casualties in event of a catastrophic hit.
Yes -- best choice, multi-task capable and designed as a combat vehicle for ANYTHING less than high intensity armored combat. Pandur or the Patria AMV would be my current choices as both offer many advantages over the Stryker.
No -- MRAP by another name; only saving grace is logistic commonality which the MRAP doesn't have.

And Wilf is right, the old METT-TC factors rule. Ignoring those factors is always perilous and the MRAP problems are that Troops Available will misuse them and the Enemy will find way to negate their already limited value.

As long as I'm here...

M.L.

I don't think that's what he wrote...


There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive...While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue...On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong...While casualties are a part of war,

the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense...I think his point was that balance should be sought between the competing demands of mission and protection and the MRAP stacks the deck toward the latter at possibly excessive cost to the former. He also addressed the fact that we consistently and IMO wrongly downplay the harsh and unforgiving aspects of the job that is soldiering for some unfathomable reason. Among other flaws, that leads (or allows...) politicians to think wars can be successfully waged and concluded on the cheap. They cannot. Such an approach also deludes prospective entrants to the Armed Forces. A better approach is that old Marine recruiting poster below.

Poor leaders will not do what you correctly say is required and the presence of the MRAP provides not only an excuse but an incentive to do wrong. Good leaders won't have the problem but not all leaders are good -- some are atrocious -- and the poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin. No one has a problem with force protection, the question is how to best balance that with mission parameters. The MRAP was a poor solution, politically forced and does not merit defense -- or retention in the inventory.

M.L.
11-17-2010, 10:22 PM
Ken:

My reading of his post does not support your contention. His exact words are

"I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting."

This suggests to me that MRAP is "wrong" and TTPs are "right." There is nothing in these words that would lead me to your conclusion that he is advocating a balanced approach.

As to the point of leadership. Indeed, leaders often have incentives to do the wrong thing. As to the point that, "poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin."

I'd simply say that if your subordinate leaders are not getting out of their MRAPs, you have a leadership, not a material issue. You can band aid the symptom by removing MRAPs, but the leadership issue will remain. Or, you can solve the root problem, and have MRAPs too.

This is all too common; remove the ability to make a bad decision rather than teaching Soldiers to make a right decision. Good leaders do the latter.

This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this. After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?

IntelTrooper
11-18-2010, 02:08 AM
This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this. After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?

I don't think anyone is saying that the MRAP has no place in our formations. It certainly has limited utility. And if an entire BCT is having to commute great distances to work... I would say that they are not properly employing our pop-COIN principles. It's hard to "Clear" or "Hold" anything, let alone "Build" when you're having to reclaim the same road every morning.

M.L.
11-18-2010, 02:16 AM
IntelTrooper,

I understand what you are saying, however, if you look at Afghanistan, a piece of real estate the size of the southeast US, then look at how many BCTs we have there, it seems reasonable that we can't clear, hold, and build everywhere. Therefore, we need to accept risk in some places, and have a force projection capability to rapidly react to enemy activity in those places.

I agree with you to a point - in an ideal world, we aren't commuting.

In the real world, with a 10 DIV Army, you must have force projection capabilities.

IntelTrooper
11-18-2010, 02:25 AM
Therefore, we need to accept risk in some places, and have a force projection capability to rapidly react to enemy activity in those places.


To my knowledge, no helicopter has yet been hit by an IED. ;) That's a start.

Ken White
11-18-2010, 03:24 AM
My reading of his post does not support your contention. His exact words are

"I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles ... The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting.

This suggests to me that MRAP is "wrong" and TTPs are "right." There is nothing in these words that would lead me to your conclusion that he is advocating a balanced approach.Balance was my word and perhaps a bad one. What I meant was that he seemed to want to do it right but did not totally reject the force protection aspect -- merely stating that the MRAP was and is a poor force protection equipage and there were better ways to do it...
I'd simply say that if your subordinate leaders are not getting out of their MRAPs, you have a leadership, not a material issue. You can band aid the symptom by removing MRAPs, but the leadership issue will remain. Or, you can solve the root problem, and have MRAPs too.Again I was perhaps unclear -- subordinate leaders are not my concern; as you say they'll do pretty much what they're told. The senior people are the concern; they have been issued expensive pieces of equipment that provide some protective features and are handy for moving people about. Thus they will use them and direct their use by subordinates. The problem is at the field grade and higher level, not with junior leaders.

If the units did not have the MRAPs, they'd have to work a bit harder and smarter. Easier to use the MRAPs...
This is all too common; remove the ability to make a bad decision rather than teaching Soldiers to make a right decision. Good leaders do the latter.No question. However, by definition half the leaders in the Army are good and the other half less so. Percentiles rule this Army. The current personnel system says that all LTCs are equal -- they are not. Not by a long shot.

Having said that, philosophically, I agree with you but I'm not really advocating removing the ability to make a bad decision, I'm advocating removing a piece of equipment that encourages bad decisions. In doing so I pointed out that the MRAP was a politically derived solution to a perceived problem; that the Army sensibly resisted buying the monsters until media and political pressure became too great to resist and that now we're stuck with them -- I understand that but believe any suggestion about keeping them is an invitation to future problems.

You are correct that we often use equipment selection to compensate for training shortfalls. We are only marginally trained due to a number of factors, not least that the Congress pushes a lot of ill conceived ideas on all the services and the budget process is so flawed that training is denigrated in order to fund equipment purchase because training dollars benefit only a few Congroid districts; equipment procurements invariably flow funds to numerous districts.

However, in the case of the well intentioned but flawed MRAP we do not have a case where anyone tried to substitute equipment for a training shortfall, we have a situation where a set of equipment was provided by ill informed people with good intentions at huge cost and with much publicity to enhance force protection. No training issue involved. They were provided, they do provide some protection ergo they will be used -- by direction (real or implied) and that's the problem -- the 'employ' outweighs the reasons to use or not use...
This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this.I doubt anyone's overlooked that, most of the commenters have been there and have seen a fight or two somewhere. Aside from the fact that huge AOs in geographic terms are not at all new. Bns in Viet Nam often had of 1K Km² or more and Bdes often had entire Provinces. That the "modern BCT" is ill designed for its job is a factor (though my spies tell me the mounted Cav Trps are little used. Odd, that...) but you seem to be advocating commuting to work. Why not lift out to an AO, spend a few days or two or three weeks foot mobile and then lift to another after a short break?

I know why but we have deliberately chosen not to do that even though it would be far more effective. The MRAP is part of the reason we have made that choice; a a capability exists and it will be -- must be -- used even though it's one that the Army, left alone would likely not have chosen.

You're of course correct that we need to improve training but we also need to be careful what equipment we provide because if a a capability exists, it is going to be used -- even if it should not be. Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains are NOT the problem with that syndrome...
After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?Good idea and I totally agree. The Stryker is a marginal vehicle, the Pandur is better but any good wheeled APC is great and we could use more -- we should not use more MRAPs because MRAPs are not combat vehicles, their x-country cape is pathetic and their height makes them iconic targets on any halfway modern battlefield. Heh, they're iconic targets on the far from modern Afghan battlefield...

Still, even with wheeled combat vehicles as Tom Odom noted above, for this kind of war, Blackhawks are better. I'd add that combining the birds with lengthy patrolling (as opposed to a day or two) on foot is also better. Way better...

M.L.
11-18-2010, 01:12 PM
To my knowledge, no helicopter has yet been hit by an IED. ;) That's a start.

Intel Trooper:

You are correct. The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.

Ken:

I'll grant you we have leadership issues at every level, including the shadowy "they" people at the field grade level (e.g. "boy, they really screwed this up...). I still don't think that warrants not putting a tool in the proverbial rucksack. I say give the CDR MRAPs, and if he is good, he'll figure out when to use them and when not to, how to use them etc....

I'll admit I've been playing something of a devil's advocate on this issue. So, I should lay my opinion out there.

While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.

What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...). That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

William F. Owen
11-18-2010, 01:54 PM
The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.
You could if you wanted to. You just choose not to.

That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...
.....or get more helicopters

Entropy
11-18-2010, 02:59 PM
Road travel in Afghanistan is generally not a good idea for any number of reasons. The problem with MRAPs is that they confine you to the roads which causes practical as well as tactical problems.

Practically, my old CSAR unit on its last tour recovered several soldiers who were trapped and drowned inside MRAP's or armored Humvees when the sh&tty Afghan road gave way under the vehicle's weight. Also, MRAPs are slow on these crappy roads.

Tactically, the road network only reaches a small part of Afghanistan which makes the enemy's intelligence and targeting much, much easier. The enemy will know generally where you're going and how long it will take you to get there.

We reportedly spend around $10 billion dollars on MRAPs of various kinds. $10 billion could have bought us 1,600 Blackhawks. Sure, it would have taken longer to get them built, crews trained, and into the field, but had we done that, we'd be in a much better tactical position than we currently are. How much are we spending on JIEDDO? Billions more.

The enemy's anti-air capabilities are marginal compared to what they can do to our soldiers traveling on roads. So I don't understand why we would want to try to brute-force our way through the enemy's advantage instead of fully exploiting their obvious weakness.

Finally, I'm now in the UAV ISR business. We, as a community, spend a lot of time looking for IED's or providing overwatch for convoys traveling on IED-ridden roads. This is a task we can do, but it's not something we're really optimized for. Furthermore, it's fundamentally reactive. With helicopters, we could spend our efforts in much more productive and less reactive areas instead of endless hours looking at spots in roads or trying to determine what some guy digging near a road is really doing.

Ken White
11-18-2010, 03:17 PM
..The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.Don't have enough -- or overdo the flying hour / flight safety and force protection aspects of aerial support to the detriment of that support? All excessive caution is not restricted to ground combat operations...{Note 1}
I'll grant you we have leadership issues at every level..and if he is good, he'll figure out when to use them and when not to, how to use them etc....True that. My problem is that there was and still is literally national pressure on senior commanders to use the things regardless of mission or merit; they were bought at great expense and they do save lives. However, we are where we are, that's for sure. I'd just hate to see us repeat this massive expenditure for equipment of limited use.{Note 2}
While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.Iraq was a very different and unusual war so I certainlyagree with that -- to an extent. I do think we bought far more than was desirable in an effort to quell a ground swell of media induced angst. Unfortunately, the normal US reaction is over reaction... :wry:

I also think we inadvisably moved or sent many of them to Afghanistan, a still different war. All wars differ and buying specific equipment for specific wars should be an effort in minimalism. Forcing the use of inappropriate equipment simply because it's available is all too common.
What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...).Totally agree.
That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...Yes. Sadly. One that hopefully will take place in the corridors of power before arriving at the conclusion that they're not wise, prone to manipulation in process, excessively costly in a great many aspects and rarely deliver desirable result. A simple cost-benefit study... :cool:

{All Notes} Just as an aside, the cost of MRAPs was said to be about $17.6B in 2008, (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MRAP_%28armored_vehicle%29). I suspect we're now looking at about a gross total of over $25B including replacements and the added purchases and the 8K plus M-ATVs at ~$500K each, a 12+ ton vehicle carrying five people albeit with slightly better cross country ability, but still...:rolleyes:

That money spent more wisely would have purchased over 500 various helicopters at an average cost of $35M (plus ancillaries). The training requirement and O&M are considerations but all in all, Wilf is correct; we simply made -- were forced into -- a bad choice. More birds would have been a better investment. That was pushed by some at the time but the Army caved (I think that might have been part of Eden's "spineless" issue).

In any event, it seems you and I do agree that there are better approaches, that our training and personnel policies could be improved and that the consideration of METT-TC rather than political expediency should drive TTP.

ADDENDUM: Entropy's correct on the tactical aspects, Toyotas will go where no MRAP will go and do it a whole lot faster Those guys are more agile than we and instead of opting to 'out-agile' them, we bought into an even greater lack of mobility and agility than that with which we were already saddled.

Entropy bought all Blackhawks, I bought a mix of Blackhawks, Apaches and Hooks, thus the difference in numbers...

Bob's World
11-18-2010, 03:23 PM
The SWAT teams that inherit the MRAPs will have a nice law enforcement capability.

While these vehicles are saving lives every day, they do indeed drive "means-based" operations and have limited application on a battlefield. Based on how we are approaching this problem we need them, or is it because we have them that we are approaching the problem in this manner... at some point the nuance becomes sadly moot.

MRAPs are not the problem, they are definitely one more objective indicator of the flaws in our strategic/operational understanding of the problem, and certainly our approaches to the same. Snake oil salesmen don't just pimp out multi-million dollar vehicles, they pimp out strategy, policy, operational design and tactics as well.

Fuchs
11-18-2010, 03:24 PM
Don't forget the logistical side of helicopter operations. You could easily end up replacing half the infantry in-theatre with army aviation people if helicopters would replace MRAPs unless the overall strength is being raised, which creates again logistical overhead....


An alternative would be to accept that wars kill your citizens, and pro/contra war reasoning should take this into consideration - and thus end up saying no to wars of choice. You won't be able to opt out of the KIA/WIA mess simply by throwing several billions at the bureaucracy and more billions at the contractors whose PAC has supported you or your representative.

William F. Owen
11-18-2010, 03:56 PM
Don't forget the logistical side of helicopter operations. You could easily end up replacing half the infantry in-theatre with army aviation people if helicopters would replace MRAPs unless the overall strength is being raised, which creates again logistical overhead....
Huh?? I don't see that. Where do you get that data from?

Very, very rough figures. - anyone with good technical numbers please chip in.

Say I have a Brigade of 3 INF BNs of 4 COYs = 12 Companies, or 36 Platoons. None of the INF has any vehicles and all are FOB based.

20-24 Platoons will be at Rest, Prep, or guard. Actual tasking will be for about 12 Platoons, so you'd be fine 8 CH-47 and 8 UH-60. You'd probably have 5-6 of each type available in any 24 hours, for about 200 men, including aircrew.

Fuchs
11-18-2010, 04:56 PM
Huh?? I don't see that. Where do you get that data from?

Very, very rough figures. - anyone with good technical numbers please chip in.

Say I have a Brigade of 3 INF BNs of 4 COYs = 12 Companies, or 36 Platoons. None of the INF has any vehicles and all are FOB based.

20-24 Platoons will be at Rest, Prep, or guard. Actual tasking will be for about 12 Platoons, so you'd be fine 8 CH-47 and 8 UH-60. You'd probably have 5-6 of each type available in any 24 hours, for about 200 men, including aircrew.

Really? So no reserves?

You should better put an infantry Coy's worth of helicopters on QRF as well.

You need another two as MedEvac reserve, preferably with proper equipment for the role.

The helicopters would run the resupply of all outposts and patrols.

The fuel consumption of rotorcraft is horrible. A normal UH-60 flying hour costs about 1,700 - 2,700 $/hr (= four indigenous mercenary-months), but fuel is many times as expensive as normal, thus it's probably more than 4k in AFG.
All that fuel needs to be transported into the country on roads full of corrupt officials, locals and Taliban checkpoints. The additional Taliban income generates additional Taliban mercenaries.

The environmental conditions (hot, high, dirt) require a robust mechanics crew for all helicopters. A CH-47 needs about 45 maintenance man-hours per flying hour under normal conditions.

Since I'm already discussing environmental conditions; your brigade will likely not be able to fully exploit their rotorcraft's nominal performance in hot&high conditions, for the payload is reduced under such conditions.

Now add in additional overhead for the aviation component above brigade level. The additional aviation personnel also requires additional overhead at at least one base.

Finally there's the issue of flight safety. Many birds fall down over there. The additional accident KIA need to be subtracted from the saved IED KIAs.

M.L.
11-19-2010, 12:15 AM
Gents-

What we are really talking about with helicopters here is making enough to get an huge force air mobile.

As a UH-60 pilot, I have a good deal of experience with air mobility, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. More than anyone, I'll tell you about the goodness of air assault.

Sadly, my perspective also compels me to say this: There are simply not enough helicopters in the Army inventory to make air our primary intra-theater force projection platform. Furthermore, the training and maintenance required for a huge fleet would simply be unsustainable.

Ken:
We pilots are a cautious bunch. When things go wrong in a helicopter, the flight generally ends immediately and fatally. If you are ever in one of my helicopters, you can be sure it will be in top shape, and the crew well-trained and rested. You may call this over cautious, but I'll wager 99% of the grunts that ride on my ships are with me on this one.

jcustis
11-19-2010, 01:45 AM
Good idea and I totally agree. The Stryker is a marginal vehicle, the Pandur is better but any good wheeled APC is great and we could use more -- we should not use more MRAPs because MRAPs are not combat vehicles, their x-country cape is pathetic and their height makes them iconic targets on any halfway modern battlefield. Heh, they're iconic targets on the far from modern Afghan battlefield...

Although it is still not the LAV I would prefer to fight from, by a long shot, and it is not a fighting vehicle, the M-ATV is not your Daddy's MRAP, and I will admit that that vehicle, albeit tall, bodes far better in cross-country capability that any other MRAP I have been in, and in certain respects, it has better mobility than an LAV, but across certain conditions. The M-ATV is a brute!

Ken White
11-19-2010, 02:26 AM
We pilots are a cautious bunch.and I remember many a ride and CA where this was not so, that done with pilots and crews running over 100+ hours a month, no seats in the a/c and other things that today would cause many to have the vapors. Not saying that caution is all bad, however, folks there today tell me it very much varies from Avn unit to Avn unit though the overall philosophy seems to trend toward ever greater caution; sort of Airframe protection instead of pure force protection. :wry:

The informants are airborne and SF types and they may have a slightly different perspective than others that ride with you but I suspect the difference is slight. Not there, don't know -- I merely pass all that along for what it might be worth and as a thought provoker for your consideration.
What we are really talking about with helicopters here is making enough to get an huge force air mobile.Huh? Take my 500 plus birds, a relatively realistic number given the funds stated, you'd be looking at 20-30% or so deployed, worldwide, at any one time; say 75 UH60s, 20 AH64s and a like number of CH47s. Take the Afghan slice, add an OR of ~70% -- that's a max of about 80 op birds or less spread over a nation about the size of Texas -- hardly Airmobile Division fill even at the KAF International Airport level of concentration. ;)

Those 500 birds equate to about 3K air crew (O, WO and E) and a like number of maintainers. That's doable, sustainable and IMO, desirable -- but we have elected to not go that route, so it's all academic in any event.
Sadly, my perspective also compels me to say this: There are simply not enough helicopters in the Army inventory to make air our primary intra-theater force projection platform.I agree at this time; the question was whether that would have been a better approach than the massive purchase of MRAPs. The allied (and perhaps far more important) question is whether commuting to war is a good approach. Those questions are just that; questions. The answer to both is that we may have elected to buy fewer aircraft due to, I believe, OMA costs more than any other one reason plus the forced MRAP buy but the reasons are immaterial, you are correct we don't have enough to do air movement with the current fleet and TTP. We have rightly or wrongly elected to commute to war and to do that in MRAPs simply because they are there. Interestingly, No one I've talked to with much recent combat experience has much use for them...

Take away the MRAP, use existing air wisely, extend patrol times significantly and decrease the number of FOBs and you'd have a different war. Not going to happen due to risk avoidance. I'm opposed to risk avoidance as a philosophy but do understand its presence in Afghanistan to compensate for a total lack of strategy in why we're still there and what we're now doing. C'est la guerre -- or perhaps as my son who's there for his third trip says of today, "I don't know what this is but it isn't war." C'est Le temps frappé then, I guess. :D

Fuchs
11-19-2010, 02:38 AM
Take away the MRAP, use existing air wisely, extend patrol times significantly (...)

The summer heat puts serious restrictions on this unless you hug from one settlement into another.

Ken White
11-19-2010, 04:47 AM
However, Soldiering is an outdoor sport so that's okay.

Plus villages are where the people live. The key is to travel light and never stay in the same place more than 12 hours. Not as much fun as working out in an ad hoc gym on a FOB that takes an occasional mortar round but eases resupply in many senses and is considerably more effective.

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 07:06 AM
Really? So no reserves?

You should better put an infantry Coy's worth of helicopters on QRF as well.
Agreed, so that's 2-3 x Chinook, but you don't just sit the reserve on the ground doing nothing. You use it

You need another two as MedEvac reserve, preferably with proper equipment for the role. = 2 x UH-60, with cross-deck-able MED Fit.

The helicopters would run the resupply of all outposts and patrols. Leaving you with 3-4 of each type, so 6 to 8, for maybe 8 re-supplies to Coy locations (re-supply every three days) and 6-8 patrol tasks.

Now in reality you'd probably have to have X-number of aircraft dedicated to just to Base re-supply and troop rotations, and maybe a dedicated Case-evac flight as well, but it's all far from impossible. Maybe 10 CH-47, and 10 UH-60.

It's not just money, its time and manpower needed to do things like re-supply. How many trucks, men and hours does it take to move 10,000kg of stores (1 x CH-47 Payload) 50km down the road to a base?

M.L.
11-19-2010, 01:06 PM
And what happens when the weather goes down to no ceiling/visibility for three weeks?

(Hate the throw the weather monkey into this wrench, but we need at least some minimal visibility to fly...)

Entropy
11-19-2010, 02:50 PM
And what happens when the weather goes down to no ceiling/visibility for three weeks?

(Hate the throw the weather monkey into this wrench, but we need at least some minimal visibility to fly...)

Weather affects MRAPs too - roads get washed out or become a mucky mess.

I don't think anyone here is saying that we give up land transport completely in favor of rotary wing. The main point, for me at least, is, given limited resources, how should troops be moved around in Afghanistan? Given the choice between MRAPs and rotary wing, my personal opinion is that rotary wing is clearly superior. It's faster, it doesn't project to the enemy what you're doing, it exploits a weakness in enemy capabilities, it doesn't suck up a ton of ISR assets for force protection, helos can put troops where MRAPs can't, etc. Again, why is it better to brute-force the IED threat through increased armor protection rather than avoid the threat entirely?

Not to say that focusing on rotary-wing support doesn't have downsides - certainly it does - but overall, in most situations, I think helo's are better. If you disagree and think MRAPs are the way to go, then I'd definitely be interesting in hearing why.

Finally, I've been hearing and reading since 2005 that Afghanistan is perennially short of helicopters to support our operations. It's not like the need for more rotary wing support in Afghanistan is anything new. The geography and infrastructure of the country are biased toward air and foot transport. Maybe MRAPs made sense in Iraq (I honestly don't know), but for Afghanistan they cause more problems than they solve, especially since, as Ken noted above, there are alternatives in terms of tactics and equipment.

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 03:01 PM
And what happens when the weather goes down to no ceiling/visibility for three weeks?
3 weeks? Show a time and place where this has happened? OK, Arctic circle and Northern Norway. Possible.

...but between the Tropics...SOG operations ran throughout the monsoon. I know of one patrol in Ulster that was "weathered in" for 4 days. Weather got very bad in the Falklands, but it never stopped helicopter operations completely.
None of the Lima Sites in Laos was ever socked in for 3 weeks, - that I am aware of- and numerous locations where Helo-supply only. I'm far more worried about MANPADs than weather.

Fuchs
11-19-2010, 03:28 PM
It's not just money, its time and manpower needed to do things like re-supply. How many trucks, men and hours does it take to move 10,000kg of stores (1 x CH-47 Payload) 50km down the road to a base?


You do realize that the Taliban could simply cut your base off the supply by blocking/ambushing the road and thus force you to fight along roads, even move on roads with vehicles again?

You cannot effectively supply a helicopter base with helicopters. The overhead would explode.

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 04:33 PM
You do realize that the Taliban could simply cut your base off the supply by blocking/ambushing the road and thus force you to fight along roads, even move on roads with vehicles again?
Sigh.... That's not the point is it.
a.) Can you substantially reduce and in some cases eliminate road movement by using helicopters? Yes or no?
b.) Can you bias your helicopter support on a selective basis, weather, operations, and enemy action dependant? Yes or no?

Fuchs
11-19-2010, 07:56 PM
I don't get "bias as a verb, but I'll use another approach anyway.

Wilf, I respect you in tactical matters, but you need to think farther.

Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry?


I pointed at the truck convoy dependency as an indicator for the inability to dodge the road ambush problem entirely. Targets are available for the Taliban in abundance, and they can simply focus on the supply convoys and less on the patrols at will.


Remember the IED effect on patrols, especially in cases where no MRAPs/helicopters are available (or practical): The mere threat suffices at times to restrict the troops actions. It may be a subconscious influence, but it's there. Especially the less zealous contingents and troops might even consider to minimize patrol activity.

Such a restriction success could also be attempted in regard to fuel supplies. The less fuel transports reach the base, the less helicopter sorties.
The counter-counter-measure? Convoy escorts. There we are again, vehicles running the gauntlet. Except that this time there hasn't been much effort directed at road control and sweeps as would have been if road movement was still standard.


Meanwhile, the civilian populace knows the foreign troops only from helicopters and foot patrols while the Taliban move at will in Toyota Land Cruisers.
Who looks like a winner and in power? Those who venture out of their fortresses only through the air or those who dare to go everywhere?

Ken White
11-19-2010, 10:53 PM
Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry? ... and less on the patrols at will ... Meanwhile, the civilian populace knows the foreign troops only from helicopters and foot patrols while the Taliban move at will in Toyota Land Cruisers ...Who looks like a winner and in power? Those who venture out of their fortresses only through the air or those who dare to go everywhere?the object is to use the helicopter for only initial entry into the area and for resupply -- the troops would move about on foot -- aggressively and frequently -- and we have light vehicles that will provide superior mobility and tactical agility when compared to Toyota pickups. They would be out of the air -- and large vehicles -- for a couple of weeks or more at a time. For various reasons, we have elected to not operate in that manner -- the capability to do it absolutely exists and can be expanded, the will to do that obviously does not. :mad:
Remember the IED effect on patrols, especially in cases where no MRAPs/helicopters are available (or practical): The mere threat suffices at times to restrict the troops actions. It may be a subconscious influence, but it's there. Especially the less zealous contingents and troops might even consider to minimize patrol activity.That over caution is an acknowledged problem. It is a significant training and a tactical employment defect. Many Commanders and leaders know better but are not permitted to do better...

Can't make your neighbors look bad, not egalitarian enough. Uniformity is more important than competence and success. Can't expect much more from an Army that worries about what color reflective belts the Troops wear when moving about on Bases that have 'Mayors'. In a combat zone... :rolleyes: :mad:

All a result of flawed policy decisions over many years and the Armed Forces just get to pick up the tab at delivery time... :(

Pete
11-19-2010, 11:24 PM
My knowledge of how the MRAP came to be procured may be faulty, but I recall reading that SecDef Gates forced the issue on their procurement after the U.S. Army tank-automotive guys wanted to follow established DoD R&D procedure and spend years conducting studies and analyses to define requirements for a new IED-resistant vehicle.

Gates was in a hurry because it was a problem on his watch and as he saw it the best solution 12 years from now was the enemy of the good next year, hence the MRAP. I don't believe the circumstances that led to the buying of this vehicle will have a pronounced effect on tactics or doctrine in the future, it's just that future designs will have more armor protection than in the past.

What amazes me about this situation is that from 1914 to 2003 thin-skinned tactical vehicles were accepted as the norm by most militaries in the world, and suddenly in 2003-04 they became anachronisms that reflected poorly on the judgement of the leaders of the armed forces that used them..

Fuchs
11-20-2010, 12:01 AM
@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.

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@Pete:
All vehicle armour is a compromise, same as with even the biggest and baddest battleships of history.

Being bulletproof was considered good enough for a tank until 1938 and good enough for support vehicles until very recently. Bullets, fragments and AP mines represent the largest share of troubles and to mostly neutralize them is relatively simple.

The real weight problems come when you want to protect against bomblets, autocannon APFSDS, stacked pressure AT mines or underbelly AT mines.


We'll likely go back to low protection ratings after the wars.
I expect that new programs will incorporate huge mine resistance ratings as "equipped for, but not with" capability of AFVs.
Similar to amhibiousness (for up to 20t AFVs), deep fording (above 20t), 125mm APFSDS-proofed glacis and ADS.

Ken White
11-20-2010, 02:03 AM
@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.Given that I and millions of others some years ago were doing weeks and rarely even months long stints on foot in all kinds of weather in places like Korea with >38°C summer and <35° C winter and the lovely SE Asia vacation spot known as Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam where it was always summer, always hot, I'm unsure why many changes would need to be undertaken. A few, mostly to offset the current excessive reliance on transport of some sort -- but not many. It's been done before; successfully. Done against an enemy at least as competent, generally better armed and certainly more numerous and in equally forbidding terrain.

The most significant change would be to the mindset that it is too difficult...

Pete:

As western society has grown far more risk averse over the past three generations, so too have the Armies of those societies. The fact that those societies are also richer allows them to spend money on things that are nice to have but not truly necessary. Thus money gets spent on ultra heavy, poorly mobile vehicles of limited utility but with significant protective capability. Unfortunately, that protection -- cocooning to my mind -- coupled with the lack of combat mobility and function promote mindsets and training approaches that do not bode well for the future.

Instead of lighter, more mobile and agile vehicles that encourage rapid and aggressive tactical action and innovation, vehicles which do not delude the occupants into the belief they are bullet proof, we're creating a generation that will want to go to wars in air conditioned comfort and have no casualties.

That, as they say, ain't gonna happen... :(

Dayuhan
11-20-2010, 04:45 AM
@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.

One change might be to reassess the loads that individuals carry: 40 kilos at 40 degrees is going to impose some limits. Granted, a very fit person can carry 40 kilos in 40 degree temperatures, but that same person will move a lot farther and be a lot more agile with 20 kilos than with 40. Of course everything these guys carry has an important purpose, but if they carry everything that might possibly be important they won't even be able to stand up. At some point marginal returns diminish and something has to be sacrificed.

William F. Owen
11-20-2010, 07:10 AM
Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry?
Hopefully it will scare the Cr*p out of them.
The point I intended to demonstrate was was that 16 Helicopters, with 200 crew and support staff can provide a very real edge to a 3 Battalion Infantry Brigade. Basically, sound employment of support helicopters is always going to be beneficial.

Done sensibly there are no down sides. We have to wary of pumping out arguments used to justify not having enough helicopters because commanders and politicians make stupid decisions.

M.L.
11-20-2010, 05:08 PM
3 weeks? Show a time and place where this has happened?

Khandahar, Afghanistan, winter/spring of 2005. We couldn't get past the clouds that settled in the mountains north of the airfield. Tarin Kowt was cut off for weeks, and we only had a few days we could get to Shindand.

I've had weather keep me down for longer than 3 weeks (40 days once in Hawai'i), though 3 weeks was longest in a combat theater.

I doubt there is anyone contributing to this forum that has more experience with air mobility than I do.

I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.

It is a tool in the tool bag, but large armies have always and will always move along the ground.

William F. Owen
11-20-2010, 05:25 PM
I've had weather keep me down for longer than 3 weeks (40 days once in Hawai'i), though 3 weeks was longest in a combat theater.
Well I 'll defer to your experience of that, but I'd also suggest that this is a pretty rare situation. I guess mandated operating minima is somewhat responsible, when the Royal Navy is operating in blizzards on the Fortuna glacier - and loosing 2-out of 3 Helicopters but with no deaths.


I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.
I agree when qualified with those criteria. I am very sceptical of "Air mobility" for major combat operations, for example. The Air-Mech-Strike stuff for example.

... but I do think we have been remiss in not making more use of Air Re-supply when faced with irregular enemy with very little capability... because why else then do we have helicopters? They exist to be used, and its always better to have more than less.