PDA

View Full Version : The Modular Brigade Combat Team



Rifleman
07-08-2008, 01:12 AM
These questions are really targeted to current serving US Army soldiers, but anyone in the know feel free to jump in:

1) How do you feel about the "new" brigade combat team structure at this point; how's the organization working out?

2) Should a third (or fourth?) manuever battalion be added as standard?

3) Are any of the brigades (especially Light/Airborne/Air Assault) deploying with additional manuever battalions attached?

RTK
07-08-2008, 02:05 AM
These questions are really targeted to current serving US Army soldiers, but anyone in the know feel free to jump in:

1) How do you feel about the "new" brigade combat team structure at this point; how's the organization working out?

2) Should a third (or fourth?) manuever battalion be added as standard?

3) Are any of the brigades (especially Light/Airborne/Air Assault) deploying with additional manuever battalions attached?


This is a driveby to start since I'm tired and going to bed...

1. Reconnaissance task organization in all 3 BCT models sucks. Manning is horrible, as is the force platforms for these organizations. Resultantly, they're being used, improperly, as another maneuver BN (feeding into #2).

2. Yes, since that would follow doctrine. Task organization cutdown was based upon a premise (much like the FCS) that could prove to be fundamentally flawed, that our future conflicts are non-linear and can be fought with a premium on technology and sensors.

3. No first hand experience. I've heard rumors to the affirmative on this.

jkm_101_fso
07-08-2008, 03:53 AM
For the light Divisions, replacing an INF BN with a RSTA was a horrible idea. For many reasons; but most notably, because the MTOE now allows for far less Soldiers overall. Basically, the loss of an entire INF company. But also because CAV Troops are much smaller than INF co.

BCTs need more boots on the ground, not less. It seems that many of the 11B slots that are now either 19D or "went away"...may have migrated to HHC BDE, which are overstocked with bodies, of course.

Not to anger any of my CAV buddies out there, but I had the opportunity as a fire supporter to work with both 19Ds and 11Bs. I just observed an overall better performance by the Infantry, day in and out. Maybe it was just a phenomenon of the unit I was in, going through transformation, adding the 19 series Soldiers, NCOs and Officers into the mix, but it was very apparent that the CAV guys weren't in their element. Especially E-6 and above and many of the officers. The Soldiers adapted the "light infantry" mentality pretty quickly. I also think RSTA is a rediculous concept because we don't employ any of the elements of the R-S-T or A in combat. They are just another manuever element. Why didn't we just leave it as an infantry BN???

Steve Blair
07-08-2008, 01:20 PM
I'm interested in the recon/cav side of this based on an article I'm drafting. Looking forward to more discussion.

jkm_101_fso
07-08-2008, 02:00 PM
I don't want to insinuate that I am not a supporter of the Cav's mission, in regards to the light BDE, however, I think a recon troop attached at BDE or adding the RSTA to a BDE in addition to the 3 INF BNs would have been wiser. Another option would be to have a RSTA troop attached to each BN. Maybe we don't have the personnel to do that.
Just as RTK highlighted, the RSTA Sqn aren't exclusively conducting the "R" (recon), "S" (surveillance) or "TA" (target acquisition). They are just another maneuver unit...except with less Soldiers, thus handicapped in comparison to the INF units, who also own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, but have more capabilities because they have more companies, with more Soldiers.
Transformation also greatly affected the Field Artillery, as well. Now instead of 3 firing batteries of six guns, we have two firing batteries of eight. There are more platoons, but less commands. The Headquarters Battery was also greatly reduced in size, because the FIST moved to the INF or RSTA and all of the support is now in the Combat Support Companies. HHB now basically consists of the staff, survey, met, radar, medics and ammo. This has hindered the FA because many times, they will own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, in addition to their indirect fire/counter-fire mission, they have to conduct an INF mission as well. Now, we only have three batteries to own battlespace, as opposed to four and HHB is severely hampered by having so few Soldiers, they can basically only function as a platoon.

Cavguy
07-08-2008, 03:12 PM
I don't want to insinuate that I am not a supporter of the Cav's mission, in regards to the light BDE, however, I think a recon troop attached at BDE or adding the RSTA to a BDE in addition to the 3 INF BNs would have been wiser. Another option would be to have a RSTA troop attached to each BN. Maybe we don't have the personnel to do that.
Just as RTK highlighted, the RSTA Sqn aren't exclusively conducting the "R" (recon), "S" (surveillance) or "TA" (target acquisition). They are just another maneuver unit...except with less Soldiers, thus handicapped in comparison to the INF units, who also own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, but have more capabilities because they have more companies, with more Soldiers.
Transformation also greatly affected the Field Artillery, as well. Now instead of 3 firing batteries of six guns, we have two firing batteries of eight. There are more platoons, but less commands. The Headquarters Battery was also greatly reduced in size, because the FIST moved to the INF or RSTA and all of the support is now in the Combat Support Companies. HHB now basically consists of the staff, survey, met, radar, medics and ammo. This has hindered the FA because many times, they will own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, in addition to their indirect fire/counter-fire mission, they have to conduct an INF mission as well. Now, we only have three batteries to own battlespace, as opposed to four and HHB is severely hampered by having so few Soldiers, they can basically only function as a platoon.


Concur most with you and RTK, esp. regarding the RSTA limitations. It's a crippled div cav squadron without avn. Recent comment from JRTC was that only 1 of 10 RSTA units coming through did a recon mission, the rest were essentially used the same as infantry, with all the inherent limitations of a cav org doing that task.

Right now the FCS (FBCT) concept returns each BCT to 3 maneuver BN's (CAB's) plus a RSTA. The briefer I went to said the modular design was basically a way to create more BCT's quickly. However, the RSTA under the current design has NO ground cavalry, only UAV and AVN. Each BN gets a scout platoon, however, and the briefer suggested that if the BCT CDR wants ground recon he can pull his scout PLT's and form a BRT like organization. The groans from the assembeld audience at Knox were audible. However, the FBCT MTOE is in constant flux, so be prepared for a number of changes by 2017.

Eliminating a 3rd maneuver BN was a mistake, and violates a number of tactical principles. While the CAB task org was long overdue, most Modular BCT's are still doing cross-attachment of at least a mech company to the RSTA to give it enough boots on the ground capability, from my observations.

There was also no small motive in "adding" BCT's by creating smaller BCT's - a shell game from the 90's where we maintained the same number of BN's while cutting the D Company from each.

Eden
07-08-2008, 05:16 PM
...bollixed up by reality.

Current BCT organization is flawed for two primary reasons.

1. The RSTA squadron, as originally envisioned, was much more robust and high-tech than what ended up on the ground. It was not intended to be a maneuver element but to surveill and shape the 'whitespace' between the infantry battalions. In this way, you reduced the need for infantry because they could be employed with max efficiency. Unfortunately, the RSTA organization was reduced to save money/bodies (see #2 below) and some of the technological solutions have yet to show up (cf 'spiral development'). Yet this did not result in the addition of a third infantry battalion to compensate.

2. The driver for this product was we needed a certain number of brigades - the pie just had to be sliced thinner.

Good news is that all involved recognize what we have now is an interim solution - or compromise - that will have to be fixed in the future. Bad news is that interim solutions have a habit of hanging around long past their expiration date.

None of which is helped by the fact that, historically, cavalry has been habitually misused when placed in the hands of infantrymen or tankers.

Ken White
07-08-2008, 05:39 PM
...None of which is helped by the fact that, historically, cavalry has been habitually misused when placed in the hands of infantrymen or tankers.experience that the Cavalryman who tells said Infantryman or Tanker what he should be doing most always got to do that -- and do it his way... ;)

Tom Odom
07-08-2008, 06:12 PM
That the BCT commander has to wrassle is the monster BCT staff. I see many better uses for all the field grades in those staffs. Plus as we move along more and more of the divisional assets are being recreated.

the BCT staff is a massive talent sponge and it soaks up talent from the already undermanned battalions. given that we "transformed" into this beast in the current operational environment, I shudder to think what it would take to actually move such a BCT staff in a more conventional setting.

Tom

PS

Concur with all above

RYNO
07-08-2008, 06:13 PM
1. I don't think the structure is that bad, and it does have some high points. Infantry and Armor companies together in the CAB--about time. People will argue taking the support/maintenance/DFAC platoons away from BN HHCs and putting them in the FSC of the BSB stinks, but in the end they are going to be attached to the maneuver BNs anyway so it doesn't really matter. Having a Q36/Q37/ 4 LCMRs at the BCT Level in the Fires BN is money...especially in Iraq/Afghanistan. Also creating the BSTB to help handle all the "free agent" platoons and companies attached to the BCT (EOD/Psyop/MI/Signal/CA/NBC/MP) assists a BCT CDR greatly. The low point is that we created "Reconnaissance Squadrons," and that's exactly what we have--units that are equipped to conduct Recon Missions only, and can only do most Security missions or fight for information with augmentation. We can go on and on about that....If we are going to make them do those kinds of missions without aumentation, we either incur mucho risk or will lose alot of bubbas.

A big point to remember is that the BCT is Modular--the BNs aren't. When you Task Organize a maneuver BN away, which happens plenty in Iraq (at least it did 03-04 and 05-06 from what I saw) now you are in a situation where the BCT CDR has only 1 CAB left or one Rifle BN left in either HBCT/IBCT. Now he is almost forced to give an AO to the Recon Squadron or a small one to the Fires BN--which they are not equipped to do. So that's why it probably happens.

2. Yes, we could use a third--three is always better than 2--mainly it would preserve options for a BCT CDR when faced with a problem of having only 1 Maneuver BN if one was task organized away. The big issue to remember here though is that the Army's end strength is a zero-sum game. We aren't going to get more than 547,000 in the immediate future, and all the Manpower allocations are accounted for in 48 BCTs and the other types of brigades out there--so we can dream about it, but it probably won't happen. The Armor Branch is facing similar roblems right now with trying to fix the above-mentioned problems in the Recon Squadrons when trying to execute Full Spectrum Operations in COIN or fight for information. No other branch is volunteering to give up manpower allocations, and many of the proposed changes to the MTOE, including extra dismounted Cavalry Scouts in all 3 types of Recon Squadons, trade humvees in for Bradleys, add tanks and tank crews--well, the additional people have to come from somewhere. I dare not mention where with so many Brave Rifles around here....wouldn't do that to you, RTK.

3. Don't know.

Ski
07-08-2008, 06:25 PM
The concept at the BCT level was good - the execution was terrible for a number of reasons.

The staffs are too large at the BCT and Division levels. 1000 people in the Division HQ now. Not a good idea.

The 3rd maneuver battalion was sacrificed for more BCT's. Even with the GTA initiative, you'll have more BCT's instead of maneuver battalions. Bad move.

Even worse move was making the RSTA's so light, even in the HBCT. I'm fairly certain there is a new design for RSTA's out there with some armor additions. The Army had to make cuts on certain equipment to make sure the RSTA concept could even get off the ground, and it the equipment in question was cut to the point of where they couldn't cut any more or the concept would be null and void.

patmc
07-08-2008, 08:27 PM
I am in a Fires BDE, and during the BDE validation exercise, I was amazed at the size of the BDE TOC, and the number of officers, warrants, and senior NCO's that I'd never seen before. There a ton of capabilities, but it seemed a little like information overload.

For the exercise, we simulated HIC in North Korea. Actually jumping a digital TOC is quite an event.


That the BCT commander has to wrassle is the monster BCT staff. I see many better uses for all the field grades in those staffs. Plus as we move along more and more of the divisional assets are being recreated.

the BCT staff is a massive talent sponge and it soaks up talent from the already undermanned battalions. given that we "transformed" into this beast in the current operational environment, I shudder to think what it would take to actually move such a BCT staff in a more conventional setting.

Randy Brown
07-08-2008, 08:56 PM
For the exercise, we simulated HIC in North Korea. Actually jumping a digital TOC is quite an event.

Jump a Digi-TOC? You mean you can't just click on "forward"?!

patmc
07-08-2008, 09:56 PM
Moving a graphic, closing your eyes, and "jumping" the TOC is a rough mental exercise. Unplugging and reconnecting a TOC of digital systems, is not as much fun.

RTK
07-08-2008, 10:11 PM
I also think RSTA is a rediculous concept because we don't employ any of the elements of the R-S-T or A in combat. They are just another manuever element. Why didn't we just leave it as an infantry BN???

I'd argue that we don't employ any of the elements because few and far between is the leader or staff who understand how to do so properly. Reconnaissance and security operations, for whatever reason, scare the hell out of a lot of people. Consequently, few in the force know how to plan, prepare for, and execute reconnaissance and security operations. As Ryno said, we haven't even equipped these organizations to properly conduct security operations.

So, as a default, since we don't know how to conduct reconnaissance and we aren't equipped to do security, we use the RSTA and reconnaissance squadrons as a maneuver battalion because we venture back to our comfort zones and base natures when we're uncomfortable.

That's not the RSTA's fault - that's an Army educational shortcoming that has to be addressed soon. We don't teach recon or security to the level of competency that we need to. Given 60% of the armor force are now reconnaissance organizations that can be commanded by either an infantryman or armor officer, we've already started to slide down the wrong side of the power curve in this arena.

If you can't tell, Tom Odom, Ryno, Cavguy, jcustis and a few others can tell you; this is my pet rock?:D

Ken White
07-08-2008, 10:42 PM
Pet Rock, that is...

Agree with all you said; this in particular:
...That's not the RSTA's fault - that's an Army educational shortcoming that has to be addressed soon. We don't teach recon or security to the level of competency that we need to. Given 60% of the armor force are now reconnaissance organizations that can be commanded by either an infantryman or armor officer, we've already started to slide down the wrong side of the power curve in this arena.Spent a few years in Cav and recon Platoons in Infantry units; only Cdr I had who had a clue what to do with the element in either recon or security modes was an old infantry COL who'd led an I&R Platoon during WW II.

Most of the others were fairly malleable and I could usually convince a series of S3s and an occasional S2 to let us do the right thing -- but there was the occasional hardhead who insisted on dumb missions or methods and, even lacking them, it should not be that way.

I recall being told at Knox back around 1980 that the biggest shortfall in NTC rotations was failure at R&S. Heard that again and again in the late 80s and in the 90s and heard the same of JRTC after it got rolling -- and I'll bet it's still true. I've seen entirely too much misuse and seen people get needlessly killed from that ineptitude.

I mentioned before that my son (A former RSTA C Troop 1SG) had commented at a war game that we did not do recon at all well and the new Troop TOE with Tanks was overkill. He then got told by a Cav COL that "...we (the US Army) don't have the patience to do Recon right so we just go out looking for trouble and to do that you have to have armor." I've given that a lot of thought. The patience aspect is a true statement in a sense -- but the issue is NOT with the Scouts, it's with the overlarge Staffs that don't have enough to keep them occupied and continually play the "Car 54 Where are you" routine on the net -- that's where the impatience is. It's not usually the Commanders, it's the staffs.

Not to mention that I expect the M1A2++ is going to run about $7M -- awfully expensive for a "recon" vehicle... :wry:

Whatever, we've been on the wrong side of that curve since WW II -- Northwest Europe has a lot to answer for... :mad:

It really, really needs to be fixed.

Oh, and I agree with everyone else; the BCT should have three maneuver Bns and the RSTA -- properly organized. Light Inf Bns should also have four rifle Cos. ;)

Fuchs
07-08-2008, 10:49 PM
1000 people in the Division HQ now. Not a good idea.

Is that a typo?

Norfolk
07-09-2008, 12:19 AM
Fuchs wrote:


Is that a typo?

Sadly, no. It could have been a reinforced Battalion though.



Pet Rock, that is...

Agree with all you said; this in particular:Spent a few years in Cav and recon Platoons in Infantry units; only Cdr I had who had a clue what to do with the element in either recon or security modes was an old infantry COL who'd led an I&R Platoon during WW II.

Most of the others were fairly malleable and I could usually convince a series of S3s and an occasional S2 to let us do the right thing -- but there was the occasional hardhead who insisted on dumb missions or methods and, even lacking them, it should not be that way.

I recall being told at Knox back around 1980 that the biggest shortfall in NTC rotations was failure at R&S. Heard that again and again in the late 80s and in the 90s and heard the same of JRTC after it got rolling -- and I'll bet it's still true. I've seen entirely too much misuse and seen people get needlessly killed from that ineptitude.

I mentioned before that my son (A former RSTA C Troop 1SG) had commented at a war game that we did not do recon at all well and the new Troop TOE with Tanks was overkill. He then got told by a Cav COL that "...we (the US Army) don't have the patience to do Recon right so we just go out looking for trouble and to do that you have to have armor." I've given that a lot of thought. The patience aspect is a true statement in a sense -- but the issue is NOT with the Scouts, it's with the overlarge Staffs that don't have enough to keep them occupied and continually play the "Car 54 Where are you" routine on the net -- that's where the impatience is. It's not usually the Commanders, it's the staffs.

Not to mention that I expect the M1A2++ is going to run about $7M -- awfully expensive for a "recon" vehicle... :wry:

Whatever, we've been on the wrong side of that curve since WW II -- Northwest Europe has a lot to answer for... :mad:

It really, really needs to be fixed.

Like several others here, RTK's observations about the BCT in general and the recce and surveillance side of things in particular are spot-on and rectification is required, urgently on the recce side. As an outsider on the matter of the BCT concept here, but not a disinterested observer (seeing as how the SBCT TO&E and especially the RSTA SQN TO&E in particular have been adapted and modified for Canadian purposes fo the sale of interoperability), I note that his and others' points match almost all those deficiencies that have been identified in Canadian service, particularly the consequences of the deemphasis upon ground reconnaissance in favour of "sensors", et al. There is no substitute or being able to sneek-and-peek and to be able to dominate the ground between yourself and the enemy. Sensors are useful, often very useful, but they do not dispense with the need for proper reconnaissance, in all its forms.

I am a little surprised though by the reaction against including MBTs in the 90's Div Cav Sqns. That said, in no way am I disagreeing with anyone that always defaulting to performing reconnaissance-by-fire mode is a bad thing; as has already been stated, it's fundamentally a leadership and training issue. But it needs to be affirmed at the same time that heavy armour has a role to play in ground reconnaissance at Formation-Level, and not just "light" recce elements. While sneek-and-peek really is necessary for proper (and most) ground reconnaissance, so is the ability to fight for information if and when you have to, or being able to perform in the covering force role and not just the screening role.

British and Canadian Armoured Recce units were good at most forms of ground reconnaissance until more recent years, but because they lacked any heavy armour, they were unable to fight to gain information if they needed to. All they could do was try to get out of Dodge if they ran into something that they couldn't hide from, or sit still and await the arrival of regular armour if they came upon a path or place they daren't go themselves. Recce have to be able to both fight and to watch and listen to do their job; each as tactically appropriate or necessary.


Oh, and I agree with everyone else; the BCT should have three maneuver Bns and the RSTA -- properly organized. Light Inf Bns should also have four rifle Cos.;)

I have been watching the whole BCT thing - IBCT, SBCT, HBCT - unfold for a while now and been slowly grinding my teeth. Besides the glaring lack of the third maneouvre battalion in the IBCT and the HBCT, the two CABs of the HBCT have also simultaneously both intrigued and dismayed me. Perhaps if the HBCTS were called RCTs instead I might buy the concept; that would also be conditional upon employing said RCTs as just that, and understanding that they are not Brigades, but rather Battle Groups.

And I would argue that all Inf Bns should have 4 Rifle Coys.;)

Ken White
07-09-2008, 01:59 AM
Co/Coy/Trp/Sqdrn per Bn/Regt (Commonwealth, not USMC). For the vehicular types, two Tank / SPG and two Inf per Bn. Yes, mixed vehicles. Not a problem; check an H series ACR. The nominal problem is pure branch parochialism...

Div CavSqn (US) should have tanks and four ground troops, one per BCT, plus an air troop. Train the Cav Sqn, put the Troops OpCon or Atchd (METT-TC) to BCT and the relationship will insure, in most cases, the Cav gets to do Cav stuff...

Huh? Yeah, yeah. I know. However, much as I think it should disappear, I don't think the Division's going away anytime soon for several reasons, two big ones. Not those, well, them too -- but mostly log and comm... ;)

Fuchs
07-09-2008, 02:53 AM
I note that his and others' points match almost all those deficiencies that have been identified in Canadian service, particularly the consequences of the deemphasis upon ground reconnaissance in favour of "sensors", et al. There is no substitute or being able to sneek-and-peek and to be able to dominate the ground between yourself and the enemy. Sensors are useful, often very useful, but they do not dispense with the need for proper reconnaissance, in all its forms.

I'm very interested in reconnaissance issues and looked into the writings from several nations and periods into it.
One problem seems to be very common. Whenever the different types of ground reconnaissance are listed, nobody seems to integrate reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.*
The infiltration of the enemy force for reconnaissance will be and usually was the exception.
Most reconnaissance activities seem to happen in friendly-dominated or neutral terrain (I don't deny that the infiltrating recce delivers often especially interesting findings).

My (logical?) conclusion is that we shouldn't discuss and organize for reconnaissance, but for the domination of the neutral ground. We need to deny reconnaissance success to the enemy and at the same time keep an eye on him (& report findings).
That should be done by a stealth+sensors force that can evade superior opponents and overwhelm enemy reconnaissance elements if necessary in direct combat (preferably ambush).

(Norfolk; you know the details about it by my paper.)
This reconnaissance + counter-reconnaissance idea can at low cost be turned into a screen of skirmishers.
That's what I miss.

"Modern" reconnaissance assets seem to be observation forces most of the time (for example the German-Dutch recce car "Fennek; it would likely not survive contact with an opposing 1940's recce vehicle).


(Only problem; my skirmisher idea is about economy of force away from the operational center of gravity, not about spearhead ground recce for fast tactical movements.)


*:
There was a time in the 90's when the Armor Magazine had several articles about recce and counter-recce experiences from the NTC that emphasized the importance to win the recce fight before the major combat actions.

Rifleman
07-09-2008, 04:15 AM
Huh? Yeah, yeah. I know. However, much as I think it should disappear, I don't think the Division's going away anytime soon for several reasons, two big ones. Not those, well, them too -- but mostly log and comm... ;)

Uh.....two big stars? ;)

wm
07-09-2008, 12:30 PM
Uh.....two big stars? ;)
Actually, I think it's 4 stars--remember the two deputies in each vivision?

On American ineptitude at R&S, I think Norfolk hit the nail on the head when he noted our penchant for recon by fire. If one sends out troops to do a sneak and peek mission, the likelihood that some of those folks will come back hurt or not at all is a distinct possibility. Why would one want to risk that when one has the ability to let "your indirect fire do the walking" (to paraphrase an old Yellow Pages ad). During its more recent struggles (at least since WWI), the US has had the luxury of having plenty of ammo and large calibre, long range bullet launchers, which has allowed us to choose the materiel R&S solution of indirect fire over the personal touch of eyes on the target.

Ken,
Maybe if we couldn't/didn't build up such an iron mountain behind us, we might be able to dispense with that Division HQ, which we both acknowledge has to be around to enable our log and comms efforts. (BTW--IMHO, a large piece of the comms issue is related to IT infrastructure needed to support log function.) But, all those staff weenies would then just migrate down to the brigade TOCs, as they already apparently are doing. What's a force developer to do? :rolleyes:

Tom Odom
07-09-2008, 12:56 PM
What's a force developer to do?

1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up

3. Limit all "back ups" to the rule of 3. You can have 3 forms of comms. Period. You can have 3 ways to put direct fire on a target. You can have 3 ways to put indirect fire on a target. Manuever gets 3 subordinate manuever elements from team to division. Staffs have 3 main functions: intelligence, manuever, support. All staffs must fall under that functional organization with no more than --you guessed it--three subordinate functions. Etc etc. This may sound arbitrary; it is but with an intent to limit gilding the friggin lilly as we build capabilities. Commanders don't need 10 ways to communicate. You don't need 10 ways to kill a target with indirect or aerial fires. Dupilcating functions for functions sake is merely form.


That would be a true transformation but we won't do it. I asked a team leader looking at modular issues a couple of years ago, just how they were going to collect on secondary effects of transformation on the battalions and below.

Answer: We don't care. Nothing is changing below brigade.

Tom

wm
07-09-2008, 02:56 PM
1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up

3. Limit all "back ups" to the rule of 3. You can have 3 forms of comms. Period. You can have 3 ways to put direct fire on a target. You can have 3 ways to put indirect fire on a target. Manuever gets 3 subordinate manuever elements from team to division. Staffs have 3 main functions: intelligence, manuever, support. All staffs must fall under that functional organization with no more than --you guessed it--three subordinate functions. Etc etc. This may sound arbitrary; it is but with an intent to limit gilding the friggin lilly as we build capabilities. Commanders don't need 10 ways to communicate. You don't need 10 ways to kill a target with indirect or aerial fires. Dupilcating functions for functions sake is merely form.


That would be a true transformation but we won't do it. I asked a team leader looking at modular issues a couple of years ago, just how they were going to collect on secondary effects of transformation on the battalions and below.

Answer: We don't care. Nothing is changing below brigade.

Tom
Based on that guy's comment about nothing changing below brigade, it should be crystal clear why Effects are not part of Army doctrine. :(

I agree wholeheartedly with your proposed version of transformation, but when trying to get it implemented, my Latin tag line says it all, I think.

Ken White
07-09-2008, 03:00 PM
wm said:
(BTW--IMHO, a large piece of the comms issue is related to IT infrastructure needed to support log function.)Very true -- and the next biggest --and far less necessary -- slice is generally realtively useless Staff chatter aimed at eliminating potential knowledge gaps (too often predicated on not being embarrassed by a remotely possible question from the boss as opposed to a real need)... :wry:

As Tom said:
1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up.

To which I can only add one suggestion -- do away with the Force Structure bureaucracy and form ad-hoc task forces of people, LTC and below, actually serving in units to design structure. If that's in the too-hard box, then at least have a board of such people who are THE final approving authority for TOEs.

Eden
07-09-2008, 04:07 PM
Last few posts are right on, but nothing will change.

It would be an interesting dissertation for some struggling anthropologist grad student to report back from the jungle that is the DoD bureaucracy. How can so many smart, informed, dedicated people work so hard and so long to create such mediocre end-products?

Taking a flamethrower to the force structure bureaucracy makes for a satisfying daydream, but it would produce sheer chaos (as opposed to the manageable chaos we have today). The interconnectedness of all of our black boxes, systems, processes, and organizations means that sonething as simple as tinkering with, say, the number of companies in an infantry battalion, or the organization of the division staff, produces huge ripples in dozens of overlapping, intermeshed, and/or competing programs. Until you have lived it, it is difficult to communicate the complexity of the beast. All confirming the truism that the larger the organization, the more resistant it is to change.

Same thing with the 1000-soldier division staff. I will guarantee you that you need all of those people to keep the beast running, to do all the things you want to do. Crazy? Yes. But when we keep heaping missions and oddball little units onto division headquarters, you have to have people to keep the gears greased. I can also guarantee that all of the staff sections in that division will swear that they are overworked and undermanned - and they probably are.

All of this is a result of our communal military culture, where if something can be done, it must be done, and done well. Until you change the culture and suppress the appetite for excellence in all things, you will fail at trying to reorganize the supporting structure. If you were to arbitrarily axe the division staff by 50%, it would grow back on its own within three years.

jkm_101_fso
07-09-2008, 04:29 PM
I'd like to see the results of research conducted (maybe it was) on the effectiveness of the "pre-modular BCT" operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the old model, before units "transformed", pre-2005. Of the issues identified with MTOE, etc, did the Modular concept fix them or further complicate it?

At the highest echelons, I'm sure this concept got hairy, with each branch ensuring themselves "slots" in the new BCT. One example would be the Field Artillery, which managed to capture numerous NEW officer, warrant and NCO slots at the BCT/BN staff level in the new "FECC". I think the same could be said for Division FECC, also. This, of course is primarily attributed to the "non-lethal" arena becoming the new AO of Fire Supporters. The problem, especially at the MAJ and CPT level is that so many staff jobs exist now, getting FA CPTs into command (Modular Fires BN now has 3, instead of 4) and MAJ into ONE Fires BN S3 and XO slot is difficult; BDE FSO is not KD for MAJ, to my knowledge.
Other branches suffer from the same issue as FA...most notably EN, MI and MPs. Plenty of staff...no commands, XO or S3 jobs. I think when the personnel effects of Modularity come to fruition in 5 years, it maybe re-looked then. Until that point, some CPTs won't get commands and some MAJs won't get S3 and XO jobs. Not that every CPT or MAJ is entitled to these jobs, but some good people will get screwed because of Modularity and spend a whole lot of time in staff jobs that don't "count".

Cavguy
07-09-2008, 04:40 PM
I will say that as an AOE "legacy" BCT staff in Ramadi, we were awed by the size/scope of the 1/3 ID modular staff that replaced us. (about 50% bigger, and much heavier on rank) Lots more majors, a lot more rank and experience.

I'm not altogether convinced this was a bad thing. COL MacFarland replaced his largely pre-company command S3 shop over the tour with former commanders and even a prior BN S3 as the BCT S3 Plans, in addition to the former BN S3 who was the BCT 3. Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such.

We were severely strained as a "legacy" unit to fill the non-traditional manpower requirement not filled on MTOE - ISF cell, Engagements Officer, IO Officer, JVB, "Lioness" team to do female searches, BCT CDR's PSD (expanded from MTOE because of requirements in theater), out of hide MiTT teams, FOB Mayor cell, etc.

The larger modular staffs arrived with manpower to execute these tasks, and also had trained for them in garrison, rather than pulling out of hide as we had done.

There is always the effect that when any org gets bigger it doesn't confine itself to what it was doing, it grows beyond its capacity, taking on new tasks. I'm not sure if it's perhaps not TOO big, but I know the larger staff is helping in an environment where BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions.

Ken White
07-09-2008, 05:13 PM
Eden, you make some very valid points, not least of which is that little is likely to change...

I agree with your comment on the 1,000 bod staff as things now stand while at the same time disagreeing that it must (or should...) grow back if it were cut. Having been on more staffs at higher levels than I care to recall, I know the truth in your "overworked and undermanned" comment -- yet I can also recall that on several occasions due to the vagaries of the world situation or the Army, heavy, even radical cuts were imposed to much wailing and gnashing of teeth. Know what -- it worked out okay. A lot of seemingly important stuff turned out to be not so important after all and it just got dropped with virtually no impact on things that really mattered...

Cuts to the bone sharpen the instincts; lacking those cuts, the instincts dull. Significantly. I think for soldiers and Marines, instincts are critically important so I say cut. It's amazing how many things are done to assure a comfort level. More about that in a few seconds

That said, I do strongly and quite seriously agree that anthropological study is called for. Both on the facet you cite, changing the zero-defects / can-do culture and on two other issues. You can take a perfectly good and competent SFC or CPT out of a line unit and place him on the Bn / Sqn staff and he'll walk in the door saying "we exist to support the line..." He believes that and he implements it. Yet, almost invariably, within 90 days, he become what I used to call 'Staff-eyes-d' and rails about the incompetence of even his own former Co /By/ Trp; he joins the us and them battle. Why is that?

Very much akin to that issue is the what I call the Action Officer Syndrome; I found long ago that if one was assigning Action Officers taskers and one or more of them vehemently objected to a program, give that program to the one who was the biggest pain about it -- within 90 days he'd marry that program and defend it to the death. Why is that?

I think a good Anthro guy could have field day (no pun intended) with those two very closely related manifestations of the human nature that does not exist

Yet another issue is the Colonel. I have worked for a lot of them. Colonel Commanders are with only rare exceptions aggressive, smart, tolerant of mistakes, innovative and great guys. Staff Colonels, OTOH (and again there are rare exceptions) seem to see themselves as the protectors of their Boss and the Institution (usually in that order) and are pretty intolerant of mistakes no matter how minor. They are highly change resistant, they will fight you for the status quo. That is a general observation and like all generalities is subject to caveats but it has certainly been my observation and experience; it applies broadly but in two specific cases I can recall individuals who I served under in both capacities (one commanded first, the other reversed that) who exhibited the traits I stated, job dependent.

No attack on anyone or anything, merely an observation and agreement that there is likely to be little change yet there could be -- and that there is evidence of a need for some real research

jkm_101_fso makes a very valid point:
I'd like to see the results of research conducted (maybe it was) on the effectiveness of the "pre-modular BCT" operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the old model, before units "transformed", pre-2005. Of the issues identified with MTOE, etc, did the Modular concept fix them or further complicate it?Good question and one which ties in with a comment from Cav Guy:
There is always the effect that when any org gets bigger it doesn't confine itself to what it was doing, it grows beyond its capacity, taking on new tasks. I'm not sure if it's perhaps not TOO big, but I know the larger staff is helping in an environment where BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions.(emphasis added / kw)Just so.

I'd also suggest that "BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions." is a residual of thirty years of peace and vastly underemployed (in peacetime) and oversized (at all times) Division staffs who got far further down in the weeds than they rightly should have. -- that deprived Battalion staffs of the ability or need to do their own jobs. Sad.

I'm aware of much but not all that goes on today and I certainly understand there are added communication and other assets but my suspicion based on anecdotal evidence from a few whov'e been both places is that Bn staffs in Afghanistan or Iraq are doing pretty much what their predecessors did in Viet Nam -- with more and better info and comm sources and twice as many people...

My question is how much of what's done by these large staffs relates to the bosses comfort level? Not to be a smart aleck but combat isn't conducive to comfort; not at anything above low intensity, at any rate.

I cite all that negativity because I'm afraid, at the risk of channeling Gian, you guys won't be able to do that in HIC...

Bad habits are hard to break. Definitely food for the Anthropologists...:wry:

Tom Odom
07-09-2008, 05:39 PM
To echo Ken and also related to CavGuy's comment "Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such", this becomes to talent vacuum I pointed to earlier.

It gets really noticeable when battalion staffs come through that do not have a single branch qualified captain. That is not uncommon.

Reason: they are all on the BCT staff.

As for comparisons, I have spoken with officers who served with a legacy BCT in theater then came home went back with the same unit after transformation. The reviews are decidedly mixed. A common thread regardless of point of view is confusion over functions.

Related to that is as Eden relates those 1,000 person division staffs. Modularitity was intended to push divisional functions down to the BCT; yet we see divisions never went away and they are again growing. If it is a company commander's war, continued additions to higher tactical commands and staffs is not helping. That gets to Ken's very valid point about "comfort".

Finally Eden is correct that a ground up revision would shatter the extant force development nightmare. That it is so confusing and intertwined documents the need swing the wrecking ball.

Tom

Rank amateur
07-09-2008, 05:56 PM
How much of the large staff is due to technology? (Somebodies got to watch the sensors, UAV feeds etc.) Plus you need geeks to keep everything running. That's a lot different from one guy listening to a radio and another plotting the info on a map.

jkm_101_fso
07-09-2008, 06:38 PM
To echo Ken and also related to CavGuy's comment "Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such", this becomes to talent vacuum I pointed to earlier.

It gets really noticeable when battalion staffs come through that do not have a single branch qualified captain. That is not uncommon.

Reason: they are all on the BCT staff.

I've watched a few BNs manage post-command CPTs and post-PL NBQ CPTs in combat twice, now. For some reason, Commanders are reluctant to "hold on" to post command guys and put them on their BN staff. Not sure why. I've also watched as 1LTs make CPT, they are moved from their platoons to staff (sometimes in a created job) because their time was up and/or they had a replacement, not necessarily because they made CPT.

At one point, my BN had 5 NBQ CPTs in the S-3 shop. A few asked to leave Iraq to attend the Captain's Career Course. There was absolutely no excuse not to send them. Of course, they weren't gainfully employed (or were with BS) and not happy about it and wanted to get on with their careers. But because of the Division's archaic and ridiculous "no one goes home early from deployment" policy (another discussion about ridding the Army of the zero-defect culture), these 5 CPTs festered in the OPS shop for six months and they all, to the man, got out of the Army. They were all good performers that the Army needed. What a tragedy.

Staff requirements are understandable, but shouldn't be the main effort. Quality over Quantity should always be considered. I know what the MTOE says, but if Commanders are smart enough to put capable dudes in critical jobs, they can mitigate the numbers requirements. But that wasn't even the case with my BN! We were over 100% strength on CPTs!

Which leads me to another point...Battalion Commanders should be able to decide what is good for their organization. My commander knew those CPTs should have left Iraq for the career course, but he was trumped by a stupid division policy! He's a LTC! Not wise enough to manage his own personnel?

As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Sorry for the rant…had to throw it out there.

Tom Odom
07-09-2008, 06:44 PM
As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

And he is right! When I knew him he was a MSG (1977); he must have gotten busted before he met you. :D

Tom

Steve Blair
07-09-2008, 06:48 PM
As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Major sig material! Sorry for the minor derailing of the thread, but that's a great quote.

jkm_101_fso
07-09-2008, 08:36 PM
And he is right! When I knew him he was a MSG (1977); he must have gotten busted before he met you. :D

Tom

You knew him before I was born!

wm
07-09-2008, 09:38 PM
You knew him before I was born!
The guys Tom and I knew were your guy's father and uncle. Ken may have been their grandfather :D

Ken White
07-09-2008, 10:00 PM
And I have a lot of that... :D

I do note that one of my sage sayings has through the generations morphed from 'kicking' to "punching." No matter, it's the thought that counts. ;)

patmc
07-09-2008, 11:11 PM
We would kill for some post-command CPTs, or any CPTs. I am the senior CPT on staff right now, and I've been a CPT for one year. I moved to staff as soon as I hit 1LT(P). I was not given a command because I was detailed to MI. Our CPTs that just came out of command went to HRC or BDE for second commands. We'll wait and see what deployment brings, but I expect that the post-command CPTs will have to go to staff, if they're switched at all. My buddy at CCC wants to come back and take a command, but he leaves for an Afghanistan MiTT in a few weeks. There's just not enough bodies to fill these slots (BTRY/COMP, BN, BDE, DIV, CORPS, etc...), and it will only get worse as the Army grows its units.

I would add "then laughs about it" to the hitting oneself in the balls.



I've watched a few BNs manage post-command CPTs and post-PL NBQ CPTs in combat twice, now. For some reason, Commanders are reluctant to "hold on" to post command guys and put them on their BN staff. Not sure why. I've also watched as 1LTs make CPT, they are moved from their platoons to staff (sometimes in a created job) because their time was up and/or they had a replacement, not necessarily because they made CPT.

Tom Odom
07-10-2008, 12:54 PM
You knew him before I was born!

He is the eternal grizzled senior NCO whose sage advice is always valuable to those wise enough to listen to it.

I worked with one in Zaire. He often tolld me to quit punching myself in the balls.

RTK
07-10-2008, 02:37 PM
He is the eternal grizzled senior NCO whose sage advice is always valuable to those wise enough to listen to it.

I worked with one in Zaire. He often tolld me to quit punching myself in the balls.

God bestowed on every officer an NCO to guide him right and keep him from punching himself.

Ken White
07-10-2008, 05:00 PM
The good ones do that. Regrettably, some will say "Yes, Sir" entirely too readily and thus let, even encourage, their Bosses do dumb things...

Those folks give the rest of us a bad name. Show me a mediocre or bad officer and I'll show you a guy or gal that had a bad Platoon Sergeant early on.