"Pentagon Adviser: Dump Big War Training, Learn New Languages Instead"

[Fuchs]

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/07/army-generals-h.html

I have been a proponent of language skills like 2,000 words each in English + French + Russian + Arabic + Spanish.
I don't see a need to give up HIC training, though.
5x 2,000 words in like eight years (for some countries in the alliance it's only 4x 2,000 or even 3x 2,000 !) is not very much, but enough for basic communication and a good base for rapid improvement.

It's like five new words per day (assuming no learning on holidays and sick days).


I better don't start about the usefulness of assuming that past trends continue for long...

[Steve Blair]

Krepinevich's actual quote from the linked blog entry is:
Therefore, Krepinvech suggests, we should reduce "the military’s continuing relatively high emphasis on conventional operations... in order to support language and cultural training, as well as other 'soft' skills that are particularly useful in irregular warfare."

Anyone who's familiar with his commentary on Vietnam should expect this. I don't think he's calling for a total scrap of HIC training, but rather articulating (possibly badly) the need to keep other forms of training in place or expand them to deal with what we are most likely to face.

Again...too many (on both sides of the debate) seem to want to frame this as an "either/or" when it really has to be a "both."

[Cavguy]

Krepinevich's actual quote from the linked blog entry is:

Anyone who's familiar with his commentary on Vietnam should expect this. I don't think he's calling for a total scrap of HIC training, but rather articulating (possibly badly) the need to keep other forms of training in place or expand them to deal with what we are most likely to face.

Again...too many (on both sides of the debate) seem to want to frame this as an "either/or" when it really has to be a "both."

Agree strongly here. The thread title is very deceptive to what was actually said, and those familiar with his works know that as well.

[Ken White]

Balance. That's what Krepinevich said and the grabber headline misleads. He, is of course, correct in calling for balance and in chiding the Army for paying lip service to it thus far, or, certainly, for not adapting to the here and now as wholeheartedly as they should in all aspects.

Hmm. Did I say that? Wonder what it means? May need more commas... :D

I will now return to my siesta.

[Gian P Gentile]

Where does Dr K get this absurd notion?

He said:


...the military’s continuing relatively high emphasis on conventional operations...

He should go read the latest Dennis Steele article in Army Magazine that describes a common rotation for a combat brigade through NTC; nothing but and only Coin.

I got the fact that the insitutional army (great folks like RTK at Knox) are reasonably balancing coin, hic etc. But the operational army is not; a fact of life that I accept because we do have to do our utmost to win the wars we are in now with what we have. However comments from K like this do not help the cause.

It shows how detached from reality Krepinevich actually is. Clearly he has not gotten over his flawed interpretation of the American Army in Vietnam and that it could have won the war if we would have had more infantrymen and scouts trained to speak vietnamese and knowing of Vietnamese culture dispersed into thousands of cap-like outposts starting in 1965; you laugh, that is actually one of the bluf premises to his book. That and of course the usual suspect that the US Army until 68 and Abrams was trying to fight Normandy all over again in the central highlands.

I think this is exactly what he is getting at; he wants to turn the American army into a force purely suited for "irregular warfare." If anybody read the recent excellent article by General (ret) Wass de Czege posted on SWJ they should realize the bankruptcy of continuing to envision the future security environment as one defined by "irregular war."

Lets just say a couple of combat brigades got the call to launch east into Iran. One senior officer and advocate of the army's move to coin told me that he thought that the Iranian army would (and here is the power of the coin matrix in our thinking) realize our conventional prowess and instead of fighting us head-on would melt away and into the population, become insurgents like the Iraqis did, and then we would do Surge version 3 in Iran. Me, I dont see it that way. I would envision the Iranians doing actually the opposite and would fight us in a decentralized fashion but still with conventional capabilities organized along the lines that Hiz fought the IDF in summer 2006.

Plus how in the heck in practice for a combat battalion commander prepping for deployment in a year or so do we actually train or teach a foreign language? And really, what does the combat "strategic corporal" do on the ground in Iraq or Astan. He shoots, he stands a post, he secures, he moves, he does what his sergeant tells him to do. Does the stragegic corporal talk to the sheik or imam? I got the need to teach our soldiers about culture so that they can at least understand their surroundings and why they are there. But please, please this culture/language nonsense is going way too far.

Serious defense analysts should stop trying to prove academic points and consider the effects of the recommendations that they are making.

gg
gg

[Ken White]

...He should go read the latest Dennis Steele article in Army Magazine that describes a common rotation for a combat brigade through NTC; nothing but and only Coin.Doesn't that make sense considering the fact that BCT will almost certainly deploy to one theater or another before their Captains make Major?
However comments from K like this do not help the cause.Actually, I thought it was fairly balanced with only a slight tilt to the COIN God.
...we would have had more infantrymen and scouts trained to speak vietnamese and knowing of Vietnamese culture dispersed into thousands of cap-like outposts starting in 1965That would've helped. Wouldn't have been a win, it was never going to be that. Could've been but we're not mean enough to do what would've been required. Nor should we be.
...That and of course the usual suspect that the US Army until 68 and Abrams was trying to fight Normandy all over again in the central highlands.Well, actually, it was Harkins and Westmoreland who tried to fight the run across Germany in 1945, not Normandy -- and Abrams is the guy who at the first briefing after he assumed command when
"...The briefer stated that the mission was to ‘seek out and destroy the enemy’, the mission of MACV [Military Assistance Command Viet Nam] under General Westmoreland forthe past four years. Abrams stopped the briefing and wrote out on an easel ‘The mission is not to seek out and destroy the enemy. The mission is to provide protection for the
people of Viet Nam’.

John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife, Chicago UP, 2002, p 175.However, that was then, this is now and Krepinevich's Viet Nam experience is about as relevant as mine -- means we can both get a cup of coffee at the Waffle House for a buck. Different time, different Army. we're better trained and have better people now so we can do more...
If anybody read the recent excellent article by General (ret) Wass de Czege posted on SWJ they should realize the bankruptcy of continuing to envision the future security environment as one defined by "irregular war."I read that. I thought he was pretty well balanced also, slight lean to HIC.

So we have one retired dude who says emphasize COIN a bit more, another who says emphasize HIC a bit more. Rank immaterial, it sounds like a wash to this retired Dude. What all us retired folks think is immaterial -- what you guys wearing funny suits do is what's important. I will, however, suggest that all three of us retired Dudes effectively suggest you not go off into the deep water at either end of the pool...
...the Iranian army would (and here is the power of the coin matrix in our thinking) realize our conventional prowess and instead of fighting us head-on would melt away and into the population, become insurgents like the Iraqis did, and then we would do Surge version 3 in Iran. Me, I dont see it that way. I would envision the Iranians doing actually the opposite and would fight us in a decentralized fashion but still with conventional capabilities organized along the lines that Hiz fought the IDF in summer 2006.Having served there as an Advisor to that Army for a couple of years a while ago, I think he's slightly more correct than are you. They would try to do what you say but only a few units will be able to pull it off then they'd go to the hills and cities -- they would not be a walkover.
...And really, what does the combat "strategic corporal" do on the ground in Iraq or Astan. He shoots, he stands a post, he secures, he moves, he does what his sergeant tells him to do. Does the stragegic corporal talk to the sheik or imam?All that depends on how much one trusts and uses to their capability ones troops. I'm sure that what you say is correct for many, perhaps even most units but I know it does not apply to all -- and I know that to use ones troops like that is to waste a lot of talent.
Serious defense analysts should stop trying to prove academic points and consider the effects of the recommendations that they are making.I can agree with that... ;)

[William F. Owen]

Me, I dont see it that way. I would envision the Iranians doing actually the opposite and would fight us in a decentralized fashion but still with conventional capabilities organized along the lines that Hiz fought the IDF in summer 2006.


...but this just shows the weak reasoning of assuming that there is something called COIN and then something call "Warfighting." I have said it before and I'll say it again. Though seemingly accurate, it is not a useful distinction.

In Iran, the guys wearing Civilian clothes and firing ATGMs would not be insurgents. They would be the Government. The same could be said to be true of Hezbollah, and is true of Hamas.

Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow the existing authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. FM 3 -24

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile
...He should go read the latest Dennis Steele article in Army Magazine that describes a common rotation for a combat brigade through NTC; nothing but and only Coin.

Ken White: Doesn't that make sense considering the fact that BCT will almost certainly deploy to one theater or another before their Captains make Major?

And perhaps that is why they are called Mission Rehearsal Exercises :wry:

[jkm_101_fso]

Plus how in the heck in practice for a combat battalion commander prepping for deployment in a year or so do we actually train or teach a foreign language? And really, what does the combat "strategic corporal" do on the ground in Iraq or Astan. He shoots, he stands a post, he secures, he moves, he does what his sergeant tells him to do. Does the stragegic corporal talk to the sheik or imam? I got the need to teach our soldiers about culture so that they can at least understand their surroundings and why they are there. But please, please this culture/language nonsense is going way too far.

You are exactly right, sir. Folks get to wrapped up in "we stink at COIN" mantra, so we end up overdoing everything, in true Army fashion. Said CPL does exactly what you just explained...he just needs to know enough not to be dangerous; i.e., NOT putting his hands on an Arab female, NOT go into the mosque, how to use a 'terp, etc. That's what he has a squad and Platoon leader for. I was in a BN that was deploying that tried instituting a program w/ an arabic linguist to "teach" us arabic before deployment. Instead of putting the leaders in the class, we asked for volunteers in the ranks of E-5 and below, to include some mechanic and admin types that didn't go out of the wire that often. Wrong answer. The training should have been for leaders. The training was also conducted after duty hours, so the incentive was low to participate. If it truly was a priority, we would have done it during duty hours and made it mandatory for leaders...but how realistic is that when there are so many pre-deployment tasks? It was a half-ass attempt at "looking like" we cared about COIN, but not really.

[Steve Blair]

<sigh>

Aside from the standard "either/or" fixation that seems very popular in too many quarters, this stuff (and Linn's book) got me thinking about something. Random thought, and not run through the historical wringer, so I'm not putting it out as a major theory (yet....).

Why is it that each time we've won a major conventional conflict we've turned around and gotten our asses handed to us (at least at first) by either a conventional opponent or an unconventional opponent, while when we've done well against an unconventional opponent we've done reasonably well against either in the next conflict? This is a generalization, obviously, but it seems to stack up pretty well going back a ways.

Again, it's a generalization (almost thinking out loud, if you will). But it does point the way toward a tendency to "either/or" that really damages our overall quality (and ties in with Linn's theories about the three types of leaders within the American Army). At a certain point war is war. Of course. But there are shadings within that framework...techniques and levels of force that work in one situation but can be counterproductive in another. We tried jamming it all into a framework once....it was called massive retaliation. And it didn't work. In fact, I'd say it left us with problems that we have yet to solve or even reasonably address (recent AF issues, anyone?). It also (I think) caused some segments to loose focus on the fundamentals...a focus that we seem to lack in some areas to this day.

Ken makes a good point about units wasting the talents of troops, especially NCOs and younger leaders. Shocking though it may seem, there was a time in the Army when corporals and sergeants DID talk to sheiks (or their local equivalent), and they did pretty well with it. And if they aren't allowed to function, the chain of command has no right to expect them to suddenly morph into experienced and capable leaders once they pin on another stripe or an extra bar (or oak leaf). If you look back through the Marine experience in Latin America, the majority of the gendarme were led by Marine lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals (with local rank, of course). Such people can be the backbone of a unit...if they're allowed to be. If we don't, then shame on us.

"Either/or" is the only bankrupt policy I see here...and it's been a constant thread in too much of our military thought. Outside theorists don't always consider the effects of their recommendations, but I submit than many inside theorists are guilty of the same blindness.

[Maximus]

And really, what does the combat "strategic corporal" do on the ground in Iraq or Astan. He shoots, he stands a post, he secures, he moves, he does what his sergeant tells him to do. Does the stragegic corporal talk to the sheik or imam? I got the need to teach our soldiers about culture so that they can at least understand their surroundings and why they are there.

I don't know about the Army, but Marine infantry corporals and sergeants talk with sheiks, cops, village elders, etc. on almost every patrol they go on. The average corporal or sergeant is a 21-23 year old Warrior and Leader of Marines. They need this training. Our doctrine preaches--demands-- initiative at the small unit leader level. Our lance corporals and corporals--normally our fire team and squad leader ranks--are encouraged to make decisions without their sergeant telling them what to do. They are trained and expected to operate off of commander's intent.

Encourage all to check out the video of BLT 1/6 titled "Marines Shift Focus to Rebuilding" at this link: http://www.iimefpublic.usmc.mil/public/iimefpublic.nsf/UnitSites/24thmeu. Going back to past discussions on whether Iraq or Afghan have degraded our ability to fight high-intensity conflicts, I think the video demonstrates that our Marines today are ready for just about anything. I, for one, would be honored to serve with this sergeant on any battlefield.

[Bill Moore]

It shows how detached from reality Krepinevich actually is. Clearly he has not gotten over his flawed interpretation of the American Army in Vietnam and that it could have won the war if we would have had more infantrymen and scouts trained to speak vietnamese and knowing of Vietnamese culture dispersed into thousands of cap-like outposts starting in 1965; you laugh, that is actually one of the bluf premises to his book. That and of course the usual suspect that the US Army until 68 and Abrams was trying to fight Normandy all over again in the central highlands.

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.


Serious defense analysts should stop trying to prove academic points and consider the effects of the recommendations that they are making.

[Ken White]

...Instead of putting the leaders in the class, we asked for volunteers in the ranks of E-5 and below, to include some mechanic and admin types that didn't go out of the wire that often. Wrong answer. The training should have been for leaders. The training was also conducted after duty hours, so the incentive was low to participate. If it truly was a priority, we would have done it during duty hours and made it mandatory for leaders...but how realistic is that when there are so many pre-deployment tasks? It was a half-ass attempt at "looking like" we cared about COIN, but not really.You shot yourselves in the foot. Seems to me in the situation you describe the "we" stops at Battalion.

As for your Corporals and what they know, one way to look at it. I'll simply suggest that like the Generals, they'll do what they're trained to do. Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

[RTK]

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

We are nothing as a fighting force if we cannot conduct reconnaissance to allow our commanders timely and accurate reports to allow them the reaction time and maneuver space to make an informed decision. Further, we aren't conducting our duties as warfighters if we can't react to contact. This baseline core competency is constant and, above all, essential no matter what the operating environment is. Thus, it should always be of paramount importance. As the old adage says, it's easier to throttle back than throttle forward....sometimes.

[jkm_101_fso]

You shot yourselves in the foot. Seems to me in the situation you describe the "we" stops at Battalion.

As for your Corporals and what they know, one way to look at it. I'll simply suggest that like the Generals, they'll do what they're trained to do. Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

Yes, I refer to "we" as the battalion collectively, primarily the leadership. I was a lowly 1LT at the time and was opposed to the way the class was established, but had little influence. I was one of the few officers in the class, but I was going on a MTT assignment, so it was appropriate for me to be there. Unfortunately, in many cases, the language class was the last priority, trumped by FRG meetings, ranges and the like. I heard the BN instituted the same language class before their next tour (I had PCS'd) and made several appropriate changes, to include: making leaders attend, holding class during duty hours and making it priority over other training. That is good and I hope it was more successful for them.
I will concur with the majority of your second point; however, I don't think COIN is really that difficult, from a common sense perspective. I'd argue the INF BN I was a part of in Mosul/2003 got it right. Of course, our CG was Petraeus, we executed his tactics; he had COIN right from the get-go.

[Rex Brynen]

Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

I had always heard the Iraq war justified in terms of WMDs, or maybe transforming the Middle East. Now I find out it was all about those evil enemas... :eek:

[Ken White]

is a constant process and all of us make errors, particularly when confronted with something we haven't done before -- the key is to not make the same mistake twice

My broader points were that, as we all know, people will do what they're trained to do; that the leaders have to be trained in order to train their people correctly -- and thus, that an oversight in what is is to be trained and how it is to be trained can have really significant effects downstream. Training too often gets lip service and falls in priority to other 'important' but really slightly less so programs.

What the troops do and how well they're employed is one of my pet rocks. The US Army does, IMO, a very poor job of learning from the mistakes of others (a separate thread...) and in productively and sensibly employing its largest batch of human capital. Joe is generally capable of doing a whole lot more than the Army will allow him to do. There are exceptions, of course but most troops try to do the right thing most of the time and most are capable of doing a whole lot more than the zero defects, fear of failure, fear of having the troops show up their nominal betters (that last being far more significant than many realize) average chain of command will let them do. It is, again IMO, a borderline disgrace and a sad commentary on many leaders that this syndrome is not only allowed but tacitly encouraged.

Yet another residual of WW II and a draftee Army. Sad.

These kids are sharp; the current high reenlistment rate indicates what every leader in the Armed forces should know -- let people do their jobs, encourage and challenge them to do more and avoid mind numbing make-work and dumbing things down and people will stay in. The kind of guy or gal we want will respond to challenges; treat 'em like cannon fodder and not terribly bright pawns and they'll leave -- as they should.

I mention the troops but that applies to all ranks and I'd suggest that overlarge and thus underemployed (or make work comfort level reinforcing overemployed...) Staffs have a deleterious effect on Officer retention (also another thread... :D).

[Ken White]

I had always heard the Iraq war justified in terms of WMDs, or maybe transforming the Middle East. Now I find out it was all about those evil enemas... :eek:You're supposed to know better than to listen to what Politicians say... :cool:

It was indeed really about them, the evil ones. One could even say the issue was the product and not the tools employed... ;)

[Rank amateur]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

[RTK]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

I'm using that in my next brief...

[Maximus]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

[Steve Blair]

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

Quite so. The trick is knowing when to flow from one to the other, or how to synchronize them so that both activities take place at the same time, although in different locations. And if you don't train properly, and in both areas, you'll only learn this (if it's learned at all) through very expensive trial and error. Since setting up constabularies or gendarmes doesn't seem to be an option these days, regular troops need to be prepared for those roles...at least until the host nation can take over. Otherwise you end up training a force for another Korea when that might not be the proper response at all...:wry:

Breaking out of "either/or" is essential.

[RTK]

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

I concur, which is what I should have started my post with. My tangental thinking during the training exercise I run without the benefits of sleep caused me to neglect that point.

[Rank amateur]

I'm using that in my next brief...

I'm honored and glad that I could make a small contribution.