Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead [Archive]

patmc

07-15-2008, 01:22 AM

NY Times just posted article on the battle:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/world/asia/15afghan.html?hp

Article provides details on the US/Afghan positions and militant tactics and plan. The US occupied the base only a few days ago, and were not finished with construction. They left their previous base because of repeated attacks. They also believe a airstrike that killed civilians may have turned many of the local populace against the US/ANA, though the area is easily infiltrated by fighters.

"The Taliban insurgents who attacked a remote American-run outpost near the Pakistan border on Sunday numbered nearly 200 fighters, almost three times the size of the allied force, and some breached the NATO compound in a coordinated assault that took the defenders by surprise, Western officials said Monday.
The attackers were driven back in a pitched four-hour battle, and appeared to suffer scores of dead and wounded of their own, but the toll they inflicted was sobering. The base and a nearby observation post were manned by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation is under way."

"American and Afghan forces started building the makeshift base just last week and its defenses were not fully in place, said one senior allied official. In some places, troops were using their vehicles as barriers against insurgents.
The militants apparently detected the vulnerability and moved quickly to exploit it in a pre-dawn assault in which they attacked from two directions, American officials said."

Uboat509

07-15-2008, 01:59 AM

While I would not characterize them as common, friends of mine who have served in Afghanistan have told me that their bases have been attacked in larger scale attacks similar to this one from time to time though perhaps not as large. The Fox News arcticle mentions that Chechens are known to operate in the area. That might explain the success of this attack. I am told that ordinary Afghans are not particularly spectacular fighters but the Chechans are brutal and very competant.

SFC W

Ken White

07-15-2008, 02:36 AM

CNN reported that an "observation platform" was overrun. The base itsself wasn't. Someone who knows what they're talking about can comment further, but it sounds to me like someone may have made a fatal mistake.People will do that. Poor planning kills more than poor execution. Shame we're not all infallible but we aren't; errors will be made -- and more numbers of troops just mean more errors....Sounds like the platform was set up so that the bad guys could generate an intense volume of fire on it from civilian buildings, but the good guys couldn't return fire en masse because of the civilians.Possibly true; some of the pictures I've seen of the siting and construction of OPs leave me furious that such tactical incompetence is allowed; that and the tendency to bunch up or herd. ALL the western Armies are bad on both those points. That's why I keep ranting about better training and concentrating on the basics, it's the little things that get you killed and it is criminal to have to learn how to do it right while under fire when that just is not necessary.Details are still sketchy, but if the deceased were more worried about being amongst the population than ensuring they always had a firepower advantage, then B is very relevant. (Assuming my assumptions are correct of course, which they may not be.)Not sure B is relevant even in that case. Gian wants High Intensity Conflict / warfare training and advocates greater application of force -- I presume the latter is that to which you refer while I was essentially referring to the former. I did that because the harsher application of force is not an option. Rightly or wrongly international consensus and current US Government guidance is to minimize civilian casualties even to the extent of increasing own casualties. This, if that is the case, will be just one more out of many in both theaters where our attempts to minimize civilian casualties has increased our own. Whether you, Gian or I -- or the Troops in contact -- agree or not is immaterial; that's the guidance and it is highly unlikely to change barring an existential war.

I suspect they were more worried about minimizing civilian casualties than they were about being among the population though the OP was established in that location in an effort to control the population. As I've said elsewhere, controlling the population isn't all that easy, may not be all that desirable and as I said above, it entails putting Platoons out where they become targets -- the option being to adopt a fortress mentality (which IMO is not at all a good idea). Counterinsurgency is not fun or nice, mostly due to that factor; if it's done correctly, the friendly casualty count is always going to go up (one reason why doing it right was deliberately avoided by many senior people in the early days in both Afghanistan and Iraq). The seven Ps? Piss Poor Prior Planning Promotes Poor Performance. They've been around even longer than I have... :D

bourbon

07-15-2008, 02:46 AM

The Fox News arcticle mentions that Chechens are known to operate in the area. That might explain the success of this attack. I am told that ordinary Afghans are not particularly spectacular fighters but the Chechans are brutal and very competant.

Possibly, but check out this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3754). Absent new movement, reports of Chechens in significant numbers in Afghanistan are questionable, if not myth. IIRC, the infamous 'Chechens' at Anaconda turned out to be Uzbek. The Afghans would call non-Arab foreign fighters 'Chechens', which led to the mix up.

Eden

07-15-2008, 01:11 PM

The bad guys have massed before in Afghanistan. When I served there in 2006-7, the US border outposts were from time to time subjected to attacks that required the employment of claymores and final protective fires - that pretty much defines for me high-intensity, if only on a localized scale. We thought these were typically used to mask the infiltration of larger/high-value groups across the border. And in and around Helmand province there were Canadian-led assaults against large numbers of bad guys. They used the ruined irrigation system as ready-made entrenchments, covered obstacles with fire, and held-back reserves capable of rudimentary fire and maneuver. Eavesdropping reminded me of the NTC at times, with engineers being used to breach obstacles, danger-close air support, and integration of artillery with maneuver.

It's one reason the Canadians shipped tanks to Afghanistan.

Cavguy

07-15-2008, 07:56 PM

Cavguy,

My wife went to high school and was good friends with one of the 9 Soldiers killed in action, apparently in this engagement. (I don't know for sure, but the info she got when talking to his mother sounded like it.) She is visiting her family outside Atlanta already while I have 4 classes of LTs in BOLC right now...anyway the funeral is supposed to be on Saturday. I am driving down from Knox to attend with her. Possibly one of the Soldiers from the unit will be there and I can get a first or second hand account of what happened. Will let you know.

Sorry to hear that. Would be interested in what the story is that can be told short of SIPR. (Or on SIPR, PM/email me).

Niel

Norfolk

07-15-2008, 10:50 PM

The Taleban operated in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and other parts of the South in groups of some 400, possibly even 500, on occasion. Practically as Light Infantry Battalions, and at times they would manoeuvre groups of around 100 to ambush Allied troops, using the high ground (go figure). That mostly ended after Operation MEDUSA in the summer of 2006, and with the exception of Musa Qala, the Taleban more or less cooled it after that, until recently of course. As Eden noted, the willingness of the Taleban to come out and go toe-to-toe in a pseudo-conventional slugfest was what compelled the Canadians to drop the light stuff and go back to MBTs and tracked APCs; it also caused them to evacuate their more exposed outposts, permanently.

It seems that Pak Army junior officers (presumably no longer on Active Service) are displacing Arab and Central Asian (especially Tajiks) types as the main instructional cadres for the Taleban. This is not a good development. And I am getting the feeling again that some of the seemingly exaggerated news reports that came out of the Korengal Valley a few months ago were perhaps not as inaccurate as subsequent official reports asserted.

davidbfpo

07-15-2008, 11:04 PM

It seems that Pak Army junior officers (presumably no longer on Active Service) are displacing Arab and Central Asian (especially Tajiks) types as the main instructional cadres for the Taleban. This is not a good development.

Norfolk,

Over a long period on SWC and elsewhere comment on the official and unofficial linkages between the Pakistani state and the Taliban have appeared. Invariably with ISI being the culprit, although large chunks of it's manpower are seconded from the Army.

Now this indication. The Pakistani Army allows for long periods of leave, for harvesting and the like - Stephen Cohen's book has several paragraphs on this, from memory for other ranks and not officers. It has been suggested by those who study the Pakistani Army that increasing numbers of officers have been radicalised, although the Army officially disowns this.

Or is this just a public airing of the suspicion that the long established ISI / Army support for the Taliban has taken a new form?

I am reliably informed from open sources and analyst(s) that nothing has changed - support for the Taliban remains a national policy decision? Policy in this area remains the perogative of the military (Army).

davidbfpo

Norfolk

07-16-2008, 12:30 AM

Yes, I was a tad sloppy in trying to express my thoughts. While ISI (along with trainers/operatives attached from the Army) have had their hands in this for decades, what worries me about it is the relative (and absolute) decline of the Arab/Caucasian/Central Asian cadres that used to predominate in the training camps, and their supplantment on a large scale by former Pakistani officers. The ties have been there for the better part of three decades, but Pakistani involvement has perhaps not been this high or this vital to the Taleban since the 90's. With the deaths of so many of the Arab, Chechen, and Central Asian cadres over the past several years, the war has become rather less a war against al-Qaeda and its Taleban supporters per se, and more and more a proxy war with powerful official elements within Pakistan itself. A war that is increasingly as much about internal dynamics within Pakistan as in Afghanistan.

Bill Moore

07-16-2008, 01:40 AM

Rebecca White

07-16-2008, 12:44 PM

By AMIR SHAH
Associated Press Writer

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) -- U.S. and Afghan troops have abandoned a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan where militants killed nine American soldiers this week, officials said Wednesday.

Compounding the military setback, insurgents quickly seized the village of Wanat in Nuristan province after driving out the handful of police left behind to defend government offices, Afghan officials said.

Some 50 officers were headed to the area to try to regain control, said Ghoolam Farouq, a senior provincial police official.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AFGHANISTAN?SITE=TXMCA&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

Sorry if this was posted elsewhere....is this true?

Norfolk

07-16-2008, 10:06 PM

In this case you're writing about current ongoing operations, so please consider operations security and respect for the families of the fallen, some who may not have been notified yet. This tragic incident is germane to small wars, but it is the wrong time to discuss it unless it is via secure means.

I apologize, I did not in any way intend to breach OPSEC. What I have been writing about comes from newspaper reports (and particularly Canadian ones - and also on my old Regiment's public site) over the past couple years. The specific events that I described occurred two years ago.

Edited to Add:

As to the alleged Pakistani ex-junior officers in the training camps, that was also reported in the papers, not taken from official sources. Once again, my apologies.

Cavguy

07-16-2008, 10:22 PM

I apologize, I did not in any way intend to breach OPSEC. What I have been writing about comes from newspaper reports (and particularly Canadian ones - and also on my old Regiment's public site) over the past couple years. The specific events that I described occurred two years ago.

Edited to Add:

As to the alleged Pakistani ex-junior officers in the training camps, that was also reported in the papers, not taken from official sources. Once again, my apologies.

I don't think he was specifically targeting you - he was also reminding me and RYNO to deal sensitively with operational details of casualties, and in the appropriate forums.

A good reminder from time to time.

Norfolk

07-16-2008, 10:24 PM

I don't think he was specifically targeting you - he was also reminding me and RYNO to deal sensitively with operational details of casualties, and in the appropriate forums.

A good reminder from time to time.

Thank-you. Just the same, as you said, a good reminder to watch what I say.

Darksaga

07-17-2008, 10:47 AM

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

No one else seems to have brought this up yet.

I have read a number of accounts of what happened. All open source and accounts vary wildly.

It seems the only thing they have in common was a temporary outpost was overun resulting in 9 US dead and 15 wounded. Some say 4 ANA were wounded as well. Reports of militant casualties are from 15 to 100+. They, for the most part, are also reporting that ISAF patrols will continue in the area. Some are reporting that the militants held the outpost. Some reports are stating that they have moved on.

The reported size of militant force has been placed at 200+ vs 45 US and 25 ANA. Even with those parameters the 101st did a good accounting for themselves and gave them hell.

Some reports says 'Taliban' some say insurgents some say enemy combatants. Truth is it was probably a breif joining of various groups (my theory). This outpost could very well have been seen as a threat to keeping the border open which is something the various criminal elements, smugglers (gems, wood, drugs, humans), Taliban and militants want in common.

Good old fog of water that is being stirred up by reporters who don't know jack from shinola.

To me it is looking more and more like a joint raid against an outpost that could have had a detrimental effect for various counter government groups.

My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

Final thought: One thing that is clear is that the perpetrators of the attack need to be tracked down swiflty and hit hard by boots on the ground and not by air power. Don't let this incident become a precident or rally cry.

Fuchs

07-17-2008, 10:59 AM

Afaik these forces use Wolfpack-like tactics. They move independently, converge on a target, exert their power of numbers (even if only as power projection to turn local militias) and then dissolve till the next target.

That's quite difficult to track. Movement of armed civilians in military age who speak pashtuhn is not something you could simply forbid and interdict there.

VMI_Marine

07-17-2008, 05:01 PM

My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

I was led to believe that most of the KIA came from the platoon's observation post, which I would bet was overrun pretty quickly. Air support would not have been able to respond in time to save the OP. The actual base itself wasn't taken, although they did breach the perimeter.

07-17-2008, 08:33 PM

The details of this attack will come out in due time and undoubtedly there will be tactical lessons learned. More important to our operational success in Afghanistan is our military and political response to the attack. According to a NY Times article today, the outpost was abandoned despite NATO spokesman assurances that “NATO and Afghan troops would continue to patrol the district and maintain ‘a strong presence in the area.’” The PAO further stated, “We are committed, now more than ever, to establishing a secure environment that will allow even greater opportunities for development and a stronger Afghan governmental influence.” (See Carlotta Gall, NYT, “U.S. Abandons Site of Afghan Attack,” July 17, pg. 10.)
Actions speak louder than words. By withdrawing (i.e. retreating) from the outpost we have taken a tactical win (the Taliban did not overrun the outpost despite their numbers) and granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers.
Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations. 10th Mountain and now the 173rd have done a fantastic job departing from the days of FOBs and brigade-sized cordon and search operations. They have established combined platoon and company outposts with Afghan forces in close proximity to rural villages and towns. Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT. More tragic than the loss of nine valiant soldiers, will be for this one attack to alter an otherwise sound strategy (barring discussions of overall troop numbers, Pakistan’s support, and cross-border operations). Hopefully, ADM Mullen’s comments about the outpost not having enough troops (Spiegel and Faiez, LA Times, “New U.S. Afghan Force Plan,” July 17, pg. 4) is not an indication of future policy requirements for larger, consolidated bases—a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!

Entropy

07-17-2008, 09:19 PM

KB,

Reading the media reports on the incident, the COP/OP or whatever it was was on low ground surrounded on three sides by the village of Wanat. Perhaps they "abandoned" the outpost because it was too vulnerable and perhaps another will be built in a more secure location.

Ken White

07-17-2008, 10:34 PM

...granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers. Been my experience that dancing does little; such an event if it were to occur will almost certainly ultimately change nothing of significance. Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations.Do you have the slightest backup for that statement?Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT.What you say is true and I totally agree that needs to be done, What you elide is that there is risk involved on several levels; one being that inexperienced leaders and commanders can select poor positions and not always organize them to best serve their purpose; another is that I don't care how good you are, odds of five to one are likely to get to you. Those are risks but they need to be taken -- the down side is that one will occasionally lose people. Goes with the territory.a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!I agree that knee jerk reactions are poor. I await your response on the decision to withdraw the OP being made in Washington rather than by the 173d. ;)

Rank amateur

07-18-2008, 12:59 AM

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

Ron Humphrey

07-18-2008, 01:05 AM

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

Ken White

07-18-2008, 01:17 AM

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?with no more information than we have?

There are so many factors that can influence that decision that to even try to second guess it from here is to go well beyond knee jerkery.

Local population, local government and Afghan government attitudes; as always, all the METT-TC factors. Add; was the withdrawal deliberate to suck in more Talibs or whoevers -- and that's just some of the open source stuff and conjecture.

Bad idea to try to second guess stuff that happens on the ground twelve hours ahead of you and 12,000 miles away based on what you glean from the news media. You're just about guaranteed a screwup...

Entropy

07-18-2008, 01:25 AM

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

...why it was abandoned and if the abandonment is temporary or permanent.

I'm getting the impression here that some are thinking that abandoning the position was somehow bad. Positions are abandoned all the time in war - what matters is why, imo.

Edit: What Ken said above :)

Rank amateur

07-18-2008, 02:31 AM

with no more information than we have?

It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?

If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."

Ron Humphrey

07-18-2008, 02:38 AM

I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."

But given what we know/ don't know about the specifics still doesn't seem like the worst thing to do.

Ken White

07-18-2008, 03:49 AM

It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?I'm dead serious, not trying to be obstructionist. I cannot answer your question and I submit that anyone who tries it based on the information available to most of us here in the States is being quite naive.

I don't know what that Battalion's mission is; don't know the enemy situation in any detail whatsoever; I don't even have a map of the area so I don't know the terrain; I don't know what US, ANA and ANP elements are available -- I don't even know what the rest of that Battalion is doing (perhaps something more important that precludes enough troops to stay or go back); don't know the logistic situation or what's available immediately; don't know what's scheduled to be done in that area or elsewhere that effect the timing of what could or should be done; Nor do I know the position of the local, Provincial and National governments -- which could be get out and stay (for domestic political reasons; they are the hosts; we do what they want); don't know the dynamics of the local population or their wishes. I could go on but you get the idea -- and I'll point out that if I were there, I'd know the answer to all those things, no great study would be required.

You have just asked me to prepare a marketing plan for a MacDonald's in Bangalore -- that's a case study, could you do that?

Having pointed out the absolute foolishness of even attempting to provide you with an answer for such a case study; I will now prove I'm a fool by providing an answer. Based only on what I know and assuming passivity or support from the Afghans, I'd pull out, try and lull the bad guys into returning and attempt to determine who's in charge of that sector for them and get him zapped then I'd go back in and reestablish in a nearby location (never the same location -- once it's been hit hard, never, ever use it again. Never do the same thing twice).

Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?

07-18-2008, 04:10 AM

Ken W,
Touche’ on the knee jerk quip…I’m guilty as charged. Assertion that abandoning outpost was due to D.C. pressure versus command decision on the ground was hasty. Nevertheless, the decision to depart Wanat (assuming media’s reports to be true) will have numerous results. It further emboldens Taliban/Al Qaeda supporters sending a message that one fierce firefight and the Americans will leave the area. It reinforces to the locals (particularly indigenous security volunteers and leaders who begin to cooperate with Afghan gov and U.S. initiatives) that they can’t count on U.S. support...if they want to save their skin that is! Lastly, the international community, American citizens, and our domestic political leaders get the impression that we’re on the run.
When tragedy does strike it affords us an opportunity to demonstrate our resolve.
It is highly possible that the unit involved doesn’t have the available resources to reinforce/reposition the outpost given their casualties and ongoing ops. If there is no operational reserve available that explains the action, it doesn’t change the significance of it. My main concern--and you’re right, it’s too early to tell--is that this action could be indicative of an aversion to risk that could alter our strategy. As a side note, I don’t advocate or excuse unnecessary risk. We still need leaders and soldiers making sound tactical decisions, but there is inherent risk to an aggressive strategy.
Lastly, there is a professional benefit in discussing ongoing operations, acknowledging there is a lot we don’t know from immediately available open source. Hence this discussion board, right? While I’ll espouse about operational strategy, you won't find me armchairing the outpost's location, defense plan, or actions of leaders and individuals given available info. Thanks for your earlier feedback. -KB

MikeF

07-18-2008, 04:43 AM

As I understand it, those boys were three days from going home.

I've watched a greater number of men die in similar situations in Iraq from the lack of the O's and senior E's preparations in the wake of the enemy's plans. This understanding will never temper the loss of the families, but it's the ground truth.

That's just the way it is. We are not always prepared nor do we always have the best and brightest in charge. In a COIN fight of living amongst and engaging the populace, we will suffer casualties. These loses must not necessarily distract us to proclaim strategic loss in the Long War.

If the enemy wants to videotape dancing along the OP or abadoned patrol base, so be it. It will be temporal. A thorough covert reconnaissance/surveillance will allow us to identify and positively react- thus executing KB's "opportunity to show our resolve."

As foolish as Ken was in applying an answer to the case study, I'm worse over for concurring...I'll simply tread once again amoungst the plane of the Sierra Nevada.

Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.

It is what it is.

Ken White

07-18-2008, 05:04 AM

...If the enemy wants to videotape dancing along the OP or abadoned patrol base, so be it. It will be temporal. A thorough covert reconnaissance/surveillance will allow us to identify and positively react- thus executing KB's "opportunity to show our resolve."True. Early days, no sense jumping to conclusions just yet, I think. I'm sure the guys there considered the IO costs. We aren't nearly as dumb as a lot of folks think we are.

That didn't make me shudder; this did:Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.At a Dining In once upon a time, the Guest, a Colonel kept referring to 'Sergeant Majors.' After going through the Vice, I asked said guest if he was aware that the proper plural was 'Sergeants Major.' Being a not too shabby Cav Dude; he quickly shot back that the "...Only similar term that comes to mind is Ladies in Waiting." Thus I still shudder when I see 'Sergeants Major.' Haven't corrected anyone else on that since... :D

Darksaga

07-18-2008, 10:31 AM

The story I've heard, this is completely unclass and is confirmed in a few open sources, was that a rifle platoon along with an ANA platoon were occupying (or scouting in some sources) a new COP location. As such, they had only initiated the priorities of work, and there were no fixed protective obstacles or defensive structures. The attack involved between 100 and 150 enemy, and they assaulted by using tactics very similar to ours for a company attack- echelonment of fires, breach, seized a foothold, and exploited it.

07-18-2008, 01:00 PM

When tragedy does strike it affords us an opportunity to demonstrate our resolve.

Please remember that stubbornness, which is often represented by a jackass, can be mistakenly identified as resolve.

Rank amateur

07-18-2008, 11:07 PM

While I’ll espouse about operational strategy, you won't find me armchairing the outpost's location, defense plan, or actions of leaders and individuals given available info. Thanks for your earlier feedback. -KB

That sounds right to me. I wouldn't write a marketing plan for McDonalds - opsec wouldn't let me put it on the net anyway- but I could comment intelligently on McDs India strategy.

If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:

A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?

Rex Brynen

07-19-2008, 12:56 AM

As Ken has argued, this is all situationally dependent. At times, it is important to show resolve, and not give ground for operational or political reasons. At other times.. well, Dien Bien Phu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dien_Bien_Phu)....

Ken White

07-19-2008, 02:31 AM

...I wouldn't write a marketing plan for McDonalds - opsec wouldn't let me put it on the net anyway- but I could comment intelligently on McDs India strategy.Yet, you wanted a marketing plan for Wanat? We can both comment intelligently on the US / NATO Afghanistan strategy but that wasn't what you asked; you asked about a low level tactical decision; putting one McDonald's in Bangalore...If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:

A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?Gotten away with what?

Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?

Have you considered the cost of extracting that price? You've apparently adopted the mantra of population control. Aside from the fact that absent draconian treatment with a whole lot of troops there is no way to obtain that, I'm unsure you realize that it is not an acceptable tactic in today's world and that the US is never going to do that. Nor should we.

Are you going to answer my question? :wry:

Rank amateur

07-19-2008, 02:34 AM

Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?

Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?

Ken White

07-19-2008, 02:46 AM

Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?No, there does not have to be nor should there be. The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave. We, NATO and the Afghans are powerless to prevent that on several levels. Try to make people 'pay a price for cooperating with the Taliban' under those circumstances and all you'll do is create a whole lot more Taliban from the population that you are coercing -- because that's what you're suggesting, coercion.

Not the American way nor the way of today's world.

The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...;)

Rank amateur

07-19-2008, 02:48 AM

Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?

Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)

But I think Wanat has now become strategic and you still need to be population centric. Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.

Rank amateur

07-19-2008, 02:51 AM

The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave.

My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)

You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...;)

Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you. ;)

The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.

Ken White

07-19-2008, 03:06 AM

Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)The significant problem with my solution is that it does not show any consideration what so ever for what other coalition elements may be doing -- it focuses only on one tiny village out of thousands in one Valley out of thousands. In short, you and I elevated a minor setback -- one of many over the last five years, with more to come -- into a strategic issue. It is not.But I think Wanat has now become strategicOnly in the sense it's in the intrnational news and that will fade within days. In a month, most of the world will not be able to tell you what or where Wanat is....and you still need to be population centric.True but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.Not necessarily a mistake, perhaps the best of several bad choices?

Ken White

07-19-2008, 03:23 AM

My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)There are many who agree with that. Unfortunately, most of them do not have the responsibility to actually do anything about the ability of insurgents worldwide to move among their own population pretty much at will, so yet again COIN 101 meets the reality of the world outside academe.Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you. ;)Sorry, no intent to rush you; just to needle a teeny bit :o EVERYBODY can outthink and out type me, my two fingered approach inevitably mean fifty leven errors to correct...Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.We agree more often that not. Generally, my apparent disagreement is designed to get you to think past the desirable (rarely obtained in any war) or the book solution (only a guide and subject to wide variations). Frequently I let things slide -- like we have no Tanks in Afghanistan from above and attempt to rain on only that part of your parade that needs, IMO, a nudge -- that's the arrogance of the aged (or curmudgeon like attitude thereof...).

Having said that, we do agree. We definitely need to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan; that's a key requirement. The question is how to get there without creating more problems than we solve -- and that is really one very knotty and difficult problem. Hopefully, Pakistan will get to work on it -- if they do not, we've been more than patient and we would be reluctant to take unilateral action but too many in the world fail to realize that the worst thing one can do is hack off the Americans; they tend to over react. My sensing is that we are starting to get annoyed... :D

Rank amateur

07-19-2008, 03:26 AM

but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.

Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.

Ken White

07-19-2008, 03:54 AM

Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.Regrettably, the one in which we live is far from ideal.

Controlling the population iis one way to do it -- it is also quite difficult. The world learned a lot of really bad lessons from Malaya. In that insurgency, the final and effective solution was population control. However, there are many differences between Malaya and almost every other one in which we've been involved. To the subject at hand, Afghanistan, those differences are:

The insurgents are not a distinct and minority ethnic group that the majority opposes; we cannot round up people an summarily move them into secure areas to preclude them having intercourse with the insurgents, the world won't stand for it (nor do we have the assets to do that; it would take a million troops to do it even part way); the US is not the government of the nation involved; the neighboring nations are not disposed to assist us and in fact one large neighboring nation is disposed to be decidedly unhelpful; there is no narrow, easily guarded peninsula border to secure, there are in fact 5,500 or so km of rugged, difficult to secure land border, 2,400+ with Pakistan. There's more, that's just a starter list -- but everyone of those factors makes this a whole lot different than Malaya or the 'British experience' (who I understand now privately admit they are learning from us and that they misapplied the Northern Ireland experience in Basra with poor results).

Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. You can force them to do things -- if you have adequate force -- but all you'll do is build up resentment. What you can do is control the environment to cut down on the visits of unfriendly types in the wee hours and we are doing that with some success, it just takes a while.

Bill Moore

07-19-2008, 04:55 AM

Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. posted by Ken

Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN. Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home. Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.

Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.

In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

Control measures range from the severe to the gentle persuaive arts of propaganda (talking points, films, fliers, engaging key local leaders) etc. However, regardless of the method used the most important supporting task is protecting the populace. Both sides will strive for legitimate control of the populace where the populace willingly supports them; however, the insurgent will use coercive measures to control the population as required as we are again seeing today. If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.

We controlled the American Indians by killing, displacing them and implementing a reservation system. The Soviets controlled their population with a secret police and fear. Mao used fear (mass murder) and brainwashing. However, they lacked legitimate control and they could only afford to swing the stick for so long, so it clear why these systems failed.

Realistically the host nation must establish control with our support. Occupiers cannot provide legitimate control. However, assuming the people don't want to be controlled by the insurgents and once they are convinced you're their to help them and that you will act on their intelligence tips they'll begin pointing out the insurgents to you, so you can start draining the swamp. It takes time and there will be set backs.

Now my politically incorrect thought, if the people honestly desire to be ruled by the insurgents and are supporting them because they believe in their cause, not because they are being coerced, we then have a much bigger problem. At this point we may have to use various degrees of coercive measures initially to control the populace until we can mobilize them to support the host nation government. If for some reason this can't be done, then the insurgency cannot be defeated. This is where we need to set aside our political correct assumptions and fight the populace as we did against the Indians and in the Philippines. How do you sustain national and international will to engage in this type of war? Perhaps another option is to allow the insurgents to win, then coerce the new State, which will be much more vulnerable to our military power.

Ken White

07-19-2008, 05:28 AM

Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN.Population control is one of several COIN theories; it can be a task if you want to make it one, or it cannot be if you use another approach.Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home.Tell me about the populations we're 'controlling' in Afghanistan and Iraq... Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.I forgot about Malaya (not Malysia) over forty years ago when I figured out it was so different that the lessons were generally not applicable. Much of which I picked from the two Troops (+) from 22 SAS who came to Bragg for fun and games in 19-ought-62 and most of whom had been in Malaya. Unfortunately, a lot of other people haven't forgotten it and learned some bad lessons. Like population control (not influence, I agree with that, physical control is not a viable option nowadays).

To put that in perspective, there are few similarities between Viet Nam and Afghanistan but look at the math; VN in the late 60s was a nation of about 18M people in an area of ~65K square miles; over a million South Viet Namese, US, South Korean, Australian/NZ, Thai and other troops not only could not control the population, they couldn't even control the ~1,200 miles of border to neighboring sanctuaries. In the 'Stan, we've got about 200K total Coalition troops in a nation of 32M people and an area of 250,000 square miles, just a tad smaller than Texas and a border of 2,400 clicks with Pakistan alone plus far more rugged terrain and a population that is significantly more violent and warlike. *

Point is even without that control, the insurgency in Viet Nam was effectively dismantled and Afghanistan is far harder thing in which to exercise control...*Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.Thank you for that little tutorial. We can agree on your definition -- though I'll note you have now broadened control to exercise psychological as well as physical influence (which by definition may not include finite control; i.e. 'influence' does not equal 'control'). I know you know this but for others, here's the appropriate definition from the DoD Dictionary:

"3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed."

I submit that for over 3,000 years a lot of folks have been trying to get to that point with the Afghans and none were successful; thus indications lead me to believe that we also will fail if try to get them to "respond as directed." We can and do influence them and we can parlay that into success -- so 'control' is not necessary, it just makes life easier. I BTW totally agree that under any theory of COIN one must be able to influence the population and that people are the center of mass.

I'll also note that in Viet Nam though the population was never controlled and there were never enough troops to sit in every village and hamlet, the population was effectively influenced and that influence was adequate to eliminate the insurgency as a threat. Later, conventional attacks may have done in SVN but the insurgency got whipped -- and that without controlling the population -- who never got to the point of reponding as directed.*In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control. The first part is true, the second is possibly true -- as is this:... If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.So what is your solution and recommendation for the situation in Afghanistan? :D

Darksaga

07-19-2008, 08:29 AM

Here is the account from Stars and Stripes.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=56237

Soldiers recount deadly attack on Afghanistan outpost

Everything was on fire. The trucks. The bazaar. The grass.

It looked surreal. It looked like a movie.

That was what Spc. Tyler Stafford remembered thinking as he stepped onto the medical evacuation helicopter. The 23-year-old soldier would have been loaded onto the bird, but the poncho that was hastily employed as his stretcher broke. His body speckled with grenade and RPG shrapnel, the Vicenza, Italy, infantryman walked the last few feet to the waiting Black Hawk.

That was Sunday morning in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. At a forward operating base — maybe as big as a football field — established just a few days prior.

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

That was July 13. That was when Stafford was blown out of a fighting position by an RPG, survived a grenade blast and had the tail of an RPG strike his helmet.

That was the day nine Chosen Company soldiers died.

It was just days before the unit was scheduled to leave the base.

Darksaga

07-19-2008, 08:33 AM

I think the reporting, in general, on this event shows how poorly the media can cover an incident due to a fundamnetal lack of knowledge on the subject they are reporting on accompanied by the fog of war and a sincere lack of journalistic integrity.

Bill Moore

07-19-2008, 03:58 PM

Ken,

I have very limited experience in Afghanistan, so I'm not prepared to offer any specific solutions, because specific solutions require local area expertise. About all I can offer is an appreciation for the terrain. However, I can rehash some basic principles such as controlling the populace, but the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).

Unfortunately you have the trump card on Vietnam since you were there, and I wasn’t (I think you can control the populace, but you can’t control when you’re born). However, based on my studies, GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.

If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008. While your definition of control may be one of many, the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it. How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace.

First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide such as recruits, intelligence, money, safe haven, etc. This must be assessed at the local level, as the motivation may vary neighborhood from neighborhood and village to village. If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection, which is what we have seen in Iraq with the clear, hold, build approach. If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures such as dominating the area with a big stick (establish numerous check points, conduct cordon and search operations, establish curfews etc.) initially, but simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

To address your math problem (I always hated math), you have to use to the oil spot strategy. You establish control over an area that you have the resources to control, and then gradually expand. In theory you could get to a tipping point where the people in the uncontrolled areas hear about the better quality of life in the government controlled areas and thus are eager to rapidly get rid of the insurgents in their area (an assumption of mine, I'm not aware of any historical examples). I think we may be spread to thin in Afghanistan and we’re responding to fires from what I read. I think we to start somewhere, then expand out. The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.

As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake, but I think in most cases we could convince most states to limit support to insurgents. I don’t recall in my studies where we made the same effort as the French did in controlling the border between Algeria and Tunisia. It would have been expensive and resource extensive, but over the long run I think it would have been more cost effective than dragging the conflict out for years because we couldn’t cut their international supply links.

We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.:)

Ken White

07-19-2008, 05:00 PM

Thanks for the reasoned response.... the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).Totally agree....GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.Some village protection measures were undertaken from 1962 on, the problem was that there were never enough Troops to cover many. The Oil spot theory is not new -- it too was tried in VN. Problem with oil spots is that they work both ways. Phoenix was in operation over five years before Abrams got to VN, He and Colby just expanded it.If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008.That is the way, in my perception, Rank Amateur was using the phrase and thus my response to him was couched as it was.While your definition of control may be one of manyWords are important, we should not use words like 'victory' and 'defeat' in COIN because lacking killing a whole lot of people, there won't be either of those things, the best you can get is an acceptable outcome. Control as a word implies just this that you say:the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it.Agreed. How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace. ... The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.Again we've morphed from 'control' to influence -- with which I totally agree. This is more than a semantic argument of little import; as I said, words are important. Not only can the wrong words send messages to own or target population, they can also induce a mindset in own forces. Gearing up to achieve the unachievable is sort of a waste. We are emphatically not going to control the population of Afghanistan, we don't have the manpower. We can influence that population and we're doing that. Heres' a quote from the Andres piece at "The new role of air strike in small wars." (here at SWJ):

""Large occupation forces make good tactical sense, however, there are two serious problems with an outside power like the United States injecting tens of thousands of troops into a foreign country. First, foreign soldiers are often viewed with mistrust and their presence has a tendency to stir up nationalist hostility in the local population. The more visible the occupation forces, the easier it is for insurgents to use their presence to discredit the indigenous government. Thus, a large force can undermine the legitimacy of the government it is there to support. Second, large expeditionary armies are expensive and hard to maintain. As a rule, the larger the army, the shorter the period the United States can maintain it in the field. Thus, increasing the size of the force used in a counterinsurgency operation has a tendency to decrease the amount of time Congress will be willing to dedicate to the war.""

I don't agree with everything he says in that article but I do definitely agree with that quote -- and the Army had better absorb it.To address your math problem (I always hated math)Me too but unfortunately, it rules... ... you have to use to the oil spot strategy. ... The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.Seems to me that's what we're doing; the issue is the degree of control that can be exercised.

As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake.True -- or how hacked off we get and -- this is important -- how the gut check factor is working in D.C.We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.:)True dat... ;)

davidbfpo

07-19-2008, 09:24 PM

First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide...If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection...If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures .... simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

Bill and others,

From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.

Add in corruption, drugs and more local factors - a mess.

Reportedly the Taliban provide a level of governance in the areas they control and dominate - which can be a few hundred metres from Allied / ANP posts.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey

07-19-2008, 10:34 PM

I would just add and ask for thoughts about the following:

The Oil spot analogy always sounded pretty good to me because it also requires a second third and fourth look at the HT Bill refers to. Where to do it or whether to do it somewhere(relates to populace commited against you) is to learn how to differentiate between wet and dry land(terrain). Water and oil don't mix and so also do COIN efforts and those directly within or very close to the insurgents support network.

I do believe I mentioned before on a different thread that the good thing about this is as long as those areas which "can" are brought into the fold through a variety of means it will have a very much metrically unmeasurable, but physically palpable effect on the areas one cannot.

It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.

Bill Moore

07-20-2008, 04:09 AM

From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.

David, the objective for the government is to expand the government's reach over the ungoverned areas so they can control them. As I understand Columbia (I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong) is that the FARC controls a large area in the southern part of the country, but it is largely undeveloped jungle and drug production centers. The major cities are in government control and beginning to thrive economically. The FARC is still a threat, but it is a manageable one. As the government gets stronger it can gradually expand its control over the rest of the country. It will take time, so you work the most important areas first and consolidate power there, then eventually challenge the current status quo in the tribal/insurgent areas. There are certain areas that the government must control to be legitimate. In Iraq those are the major cities and the national money making resources, which in Iraq is the oil fields. In Afghanistan you have to secure the major the cities, major lines of communication, and develop a national money making resource other than opium. Does it really matter strategically if the tribes control the border area for another 5 years? Those are the types of questions we need to ask. I heard one NATO officer said that the insurgency starts where the road ends, which makes sense. It is hard for a government to control an area where it cannot readily project an overwhelming force or provide for the economic life of the locals. Maybe they don't need to control it.

It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.

Ron, I don't know if I concur entirely with this statement, but I have frequently viewed insurgency as a form of armed democracy. The side that can most effectively mobilize the populace to "actively" support them wins. Obviously not a civil method, but it is clearly political warfare. Tribal chiefs fight to maintain control of their tribe, insurgents fight to usurp government control of an area or country, and the government fights to maintain or regain control. The key is establishing control of the populace, thus insurgencies have accurately been called political warfare or psychological warfare (PSYWAR), as a matter of fact the first Special Forces Qualification Course was called the PSYWAR course. Funny how much we forgot over the years. The government usually has the advantage of resources and organization, thus most insurgencies have been defeated or marginalized to an acceptable level, but it requires the proper strategy, and I think your right only the locals can determine what that is.

Meinertzhagen

07-20-2008, 10:34 AM

In response to the posts on population control and given our limited current force structure, I would suggest that the Waygal Valley (where Wanat is located) is perhaps just a valley too far to effectively pacify. While Wanat is technically in Kunar Province, it is one of 9 major Waigali (Nuristani) villages located in the Waygal Valley or one of its capillary valleys. The valley itself has a population of perhaps 22,000, most residing in the major villages and speaking a unintelligible dialect of Nuristani and practicing a distinct culture forged in thousands of years of inter-tribal warfare.

The Waigalis, at their heart, are isolationists. There are probably no Al-Qaeda members among the local insurgents and the actual Taliban influence, outside of the deobandist meta-narrative is negligible. Each of the 9 villages are so remote and in such extreme terrain, that U.S. forces have never even visited most of them including the most important and largest village, Waygal. Simply to occupy a position in each of the villages would require much of the resources of an entire infantry battalion, not to mention an additional heavy-lift rotary-wing company for resupply. This begs the question of whether control of the valley is worth the resources that could likely be utilized to much greater effect elsewhere with more strategic or at least national influence or importance.

The Waygal vignette is an example of just how distant victory is in Afghanistan. One can find multiple other examples of similar valleys or regions with similar challenges; Kamdish, Korengal, Dawlat Shah are just some examples close to Wanat. This in no way minimizes the accomplishments of my fellow Sky Soldiers during the last 15 months in those most foreign of valleys, but extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal.

(View of Aranas Village, typical of others in the valley.)
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/10th_Mountain_Div._at_Afghanistan.jpg/700px-10th_Mountain_Div._at_Afghanistan.jpg

Tom Odom

07-20-2008, 01:16 PM

From the 173rd ABCT Commander:

Front page Mideast edition (http://epaper.stripes.com/)(in PDF)

Commander: Media Reports On Afghanistan Outpost Battle Were Exaggerated

173rd’s fight not symbol of more violent Afghanistan, says Preysler

By Mark St.Clair, Stars and Stripes

"The sky is not falling," Col. Charles "Chip" Preysler, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, said Saturday from Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

Preysler spoke via telephone less than a week after his paratroops and their Afghan allies were involved in a fierce attack at a small post near the village of Wanat. In the July 13 battle, nine of his men were killed and 15 others wounded.

But the attack is not a sign of conditions worsening in the country, he said.

The battle occurred just after dawn at a temporary vehicle patrol base called Bella. A platoon-sized element of Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) soldiers and a smaller Afghan National Army force were occupying a hastily built area as they had done many times over the 15 months they’d been in country, Preysler said. The soldiers were there on a reconnaissance mission to establish a presence and find a good location to connect with the local government, populace and Afghan National Police, he said.

Bill Moore

07-20-2008, 05:32 PM

Tom,

Thanks for posting that article, I know the Bde and Bn Cdr and there are no finer officers. Anyone familiar with the 173d know that they don't shy away from a hard fight. I just hope COL Preysler's interview gets disseminated beyond the Stars and Stripes so the record can be set straight on the home front.

extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal. posted by Meinertzhagen

Well said, and many thanks to the men in 173d ABN (The Herd) for their hard fighting over the past 15 months.

Rank amateur

07-20-2008, 09:27 PM

In response to the posts on population control and given our limited current force structure, I would suggest that the Waygal Valley (where Wanat is located) is perhaps just a valley too far to effectively pacify.

Excellent post, photo and analogy: "valley too far." I think that's a sound strategy. but looks it looks like we're going to stay population centric. From Tom's link, Page 3. (For some reason I can't copy the quote.)

Ken White

07-20-2008, 10:08 PM

Excellent post, photo and analogy: "valley too far." I think that's a sound strategy. but looks it looks like we're going to stay population centric. From Tom's link, Page 3. (For some reason I can't copy the quote.)copy it because I just read the whole page and can't determine from where you derived that conclusion (not that I disagree with the statement). Sorry, I'm old and slow...:(

Rank amateur

07-20-2008, 10:22 PM

copy it because I just read the whole page and can't determine from where you derived that conclusion (not that I disagree with the statement). Sorry, I'm old and slow...:(

It's "copy protected," - for me anyway - but here's it is retyped.

"...have separated the insurgents from the population in many areas," Pressler says. "This one area is still contested. We're going to have to go back in there, fight hard to separate the insurgents from the population and that is exactly what we're going to do."

Ken White

07-20-2008, 11:26 PM

Not that I question you or the statement, it's just weird. :confused:

The Mideast Edition I get at the link is the one for Monday, 21 Jul 08. Only thing I can figure is that maybe Tom posted the link early enough and you hit it and got the 20 Jul edition. Searched the whole PDF and Preysler's name doesn't appear -- nor does '173rd'...

Like I said, no disagreement or questions -- other than the vagaries of cyberspace. :confused:

Thanks for the response!

Rank amateur

07-21-2008, 12:50 AM

Only thing I can figure is that maybe Tom posted the link early enough and you hit it and got the 20 Jul edition.

That's it. Get July 20. Page 1 and 3. (http://epaper.stripes.com/index.php?archive=202703761764088209645088238789)

Ken White

07-21-2008, 01:49 AM

That's it. Get July 20. Page 1 and 3. (http://epaper.stripes.com/index.php?archive=202703761764088209645088238789)r eturned from dinner. Appreciate it -- any excuse for me to be lazy is good... ;)

I see what you meant...

Tom Odom

07-21-2008, 02:08 PM

returned from dinner. Appreciate it -- any excuse for me to be lazy is good... ;)

I see what you meant...

Ken if you can get to the Ebird, you can get the whole thing there

Tom

VMI_Marine

07-21-2008, 02:53 PM

This article (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) is a good account of what happened. As I suspected, most of the KIA occurred in the fight for the OP. The only problem I have with the article is that they continue calling it a FOB instead of a patrol base.

Cpl. Matthew Phillips was close by, so Stafford called to him for help. Phillips was preparing to throw a grenade and shot a look at Stafford that said, "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."

Ken White

07-21-2008, 05:33 PM

Ken if you can get to the Ebird, you can get the whole thing there

Tomall us pure retirees out; gotta have a .mil puter for the bird. I cannot now get to some pubs I could get to last year...

selil

07-21-2008, 07:03 PM

Dang Ken... I talked to somebody "attribution not allowed" who said that will be changing. I do not have any idea what they meant, but military ID cards becoming CAC cards and allowing retirees access to previously allowed now not allowed stuff? Something like that anyway. Sounds positive anyways.

Tom Odom

07-21-2008, 07:21 PM

all us pure retirees out; gotta have a .mil puter for the bird. I cannot now get to some pubs I could get to last year...

I get on from home with DEERS data but that is because I am still a DAC.

PM sent

120mm

07-21-2008, 09:14 PM

I'm completely heartsick about this. We trained these guys last year, and one of the tasks I wrote was "occupy a COP". And I made some friends in Chosen.

Ken White

07-21-2008, 10:48 PM

I'm completely heartsick about this. We trained these guys last year, and one of the tasks I wrote was "occupy a COP". And I made some friends in Chosen.an OP to watch the village. So, as usual, the media blew the reporting...

Darksaga

07-23-2008, 10:47 AM

Tom Odom

07-23-2008, 01:13 PM

Tom,

While the commanders assessment is very important it is also important to keep in mind the political factors. This skirmish was all over the news. The politicians don't want to appear ineffective.

This incident is one that will change the face of operations in Afghanistan.

While I would not dispute the role of the political world, I would not rush to judgement concerning ops and this attack. Much is going to change in OEF in the coming months but I doubt those changes will be driven by this attack.
The politicians were already making noises about Afghanistan as were military leaders.

Tom

Entropy

07-23-2008, 02:47 PM

What it may ignite is more controversy on the M4. At least one news account (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) I read said that weapons froze up during the battle:

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

Jedburgh

07-23-2008, 03:08 PM

What it may ignite is more controversy on the M4. At least one news account (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) I read said that weapons froze up during the battle:
When you read the piece in full, there is only one instance where a weapon is specifically mentioned as seizing, and that was a M249 SAW. There is no mention of an M4 failure in that article.

Entropy

07-23-2008, 03:39 PM

When you read the piece in full, there is only one instance where a weapon is specifically mentioned as seizing, and that was a M249 SAW. There is no mention of an M4 failure in that article.

A bit later than that, the article says "several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire..." I'm assuming here (perhaps mistakenly) that probably actually refers to the soldiers' rifles.

Jedburgh

07-23-2008, 03:52 PM

A bit later than that, the article says "several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire..." I'm assuming here (perhaps mistakenly) that probably actually refers to the soldiers' rifles.
The rest of the sentence is ....several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire because of damage.

With the amount of shrapnel flying due to the high rate of RPG fire, plus grenades, that is not surprising - and it is very different from a statement of mechanical failure, as with the SAW.

Tom Odom

07-23-2008, 04:12 PM

This is another journalistic effort that comes close but does not quite get it right. First as Jed and Entropy are discussing is the issue of weapons failure versus weapons damage. The other is his use of FOB when it was patrol base. FOB implies a much more permanent structure. So far the coverage has been ok;I am reminded how off base reporting, press and military, was after the 5307th convoy incident. Compared to that, coverage of this one has greatly improved.

Tom

Hacksaw

07-23-2008, 04:25 PM

Dark Saga, as others have mentioned the scope of military activities in AFG will change in the coming months, but that was already well in the works.

As for the reporting on this incident, I'll take a mostly right account and consider the military ahead. Too often accounts are mostly wrong and require an inordinate amount of time to correct the record. Better things to do...

On a related note... Did anyone see ADM Mullen interview with Jim Lehrer last night? (link to interview: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec08/mullen_07-22.html ) Lehrertook an unusually agressive tone wrt AFG and Iran. Essentially saying... 1) We would like to do more in AFG but we are still mired in IZ 2) We can't possibly consider Iran 'doable' given we can't divert more assets to AFG 3) If you support the current Commander and Chief, how can you do the same if Obama happens to win...etc... In essence Lehrer took a page out of the Congressional Committee SOP and asked questions in the form of a statement. Mullen was cool and corrected the record where appropriate (e.g. where Lehrer read into a response made earlier in the interview). I've always thought of Lehrer as one of the more 'agnostic' members of the media, but the fangs were out last night.

Just food for thought

Tom Odom

11-04-2008, 03:49 PM

Latest on the investigation:

Afghan Officials Aided An Attack On U.S. Soldiers (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/world/asia/04military.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin)

By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON — An internal review by the American military has found that a local Afghan police chief and another district leader helped Taliban militants carry out an attack on July 13 in which nine United States soldiers were killed and a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan was nearly overrun.

Afghan and American forces had started building the makeshift base just five days before the attack, and villagers repeatedly warned the American troops in that time that militants were plotting a strike, the report found. It said that the warnings did not include details, and that troops never anticipated such a large and well-coordinated attack.

The assault involved some 200 fighters, nearly three times the number of Americans and Afghans defending the site.

As evidence of collusion between the district police chief and the Taliban, the report cited large stocks of weapons and ammunition that were found in the police barracks in the adjacent village of Wanat after the attackers were repelled. The stocks were more than the local 20-officer force would be likely to need, and many of the weapons were dirty and appeared to have been used recently. The police officers were found dressed in “crisp, clean new uniforms,” the report said, and were acting “as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.”

The attackers were driven back after a pitched four-hour battle, in which American artillery, warplanes and attack helicopters were ultimately called in. Still, the militants fought in ways that showed imaginative military training, if not sophisticated weapons.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

11-04-2008, 08:37 PM

The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.

Actually, both probably should be done in parallel. :D

Ken White

11-04-2008, 11:20 PM

is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.And that was a spotty performance. It ranged from outstanding to poor. All CAPs and all villages were not created equal -- nor were the opponents of those two all equal throughout all of the I CTZ area. All those parameters were also in a constant state of flux for many reasons. There is no one best answer.Actually, both probably should be done in parallel. :DAgreed to an extent, and, as with the CAPs in VN and as I've seen done elsewhere, I think we're doing that. I submit, however, that given the varying quality of advice and assistance from us, the availability and quantity as well as the willingness of village manpower and then considering the enemy plans, capability and effort locally that the convincing of the bad guys has to take first place to a significant degree; the village self defense can follow closely. :D:D

VMI_Marine

11-12-2008, 01:40 AM

Stars and Stripes has a redacted copy of the 15-6 on the battle. Part I (http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf) and Part II (http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat02.pdf).

Initial thoughts:

- The platoon chose to establish its patrol base near the village bazaar, and the OP was on slightly elevated terrain. It sounds to me like they chose not to occupy the dominant terrain features in the area. This was a significant tactical risk, and it is unclear how they tried to mitigate it.

- They assumed that risk in order to locate closer to the population, in order to better separate the insurgents from the population. This is in keeping with the mantra of the population as key terrain which I heard numerous times at JRTC last year. While I agree that in Iraq the population was vastly more important than existing natural terrain features, I don't believe this is the case in Afghanistan. The population is always important, but in AFG the natural key terrain must be taken into account.

- The Paratroopers showed great discipline in their individual actions in the Patrol Base, during stand to, etc. I'm surmising, from what little info I have, that it has a lot to do with why they were not overrun. Individual bravery accounts for a lot, but their disciplined approach to stand to ensured that they were awake, geared up, and ready for the attack.

FM 3-24 says that, "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." Certainly we saw that applied in Iraq, but I think Wanat is a counterpoint of sorts. We all know by know that to succeed in COIN you must secure the population, but I think the Battle of Wanat shows that a Counterinsurgent force cannot secure the population if it cannot secure itself. The Troopers of Chosen Co might have been more successful if they had established their VPB more along the lines of a "conventional" strongpoint defense and sacrificed some access to the population in favor of occupying key terrain. Otherwise, try to mitigate the risk by registering indirect fires on key terrain that you are not occupying.

If anyone has information that supports or refutes anything I said above, I'd love to hear it. I feel like this should be a case study in establishing a fixed position in a COIN environment. Unfortunately, the lessons drawn from Wanat are written in our Soldiers' blood, but to me that just makes it that much more important that we absorb those lessons.

Ken White

11-12-2008, 02:03 AM

I haven't read but have heard from good sources, I think your assessment is on the mark.

I also strongly agree with you on the facts that, in many cases (and Afghanistan is certainly one), the population has to take second or even third place in the METT-TC assessment; and that a COIN unit has to be able to survive and protect itself in order to protect anyone else. Never let the doctrine lead you into dumb...

Been my observation that most fighting forces will if possible avoid a pitched firefight with any unit that appears to be disciplined, competent and to know what it's doing. That belief matured over many years in strange places -- and even though I'm old and out of it, everything I've read or heard inclines me to believe that is still totally true and is particularly true in the current ME/SA theaters..

Yet, apparently the Taliban (or someone) attacked a fairly competent force that had it's act together. Does that negate my belief? Uh-uh. Bad guys can get bad intel, make stupid frontal assaults and screw up just like we do...

Fortunately, they even tend to foul up a bit more than we do... :cool:

VMI_Marine

11-12-2008, 02:23 AM

I think they believed that the terrain gave them enough of an advantage to negate the Soldiers' discipline and competence. Events seem to bear that out.

Another thought - the three attempts to reinforce the OP all ran directly to the OP itself. This appears to me to be the equivalent of rushing into the kill zone of a far ambush to reinforce the element in contact. From my couch in a well lit and air-conditioned room, with no one shooting at me, my first thought is to attack and seize key enemy positions, relieving pressure on the defenders at the OP, before seeking to move to the OP proper.

While talking with members of an ODA following an IED attack on my vehicle not far from Camp Blessing and the Waygal Valley, I mentioned that I immediately told the driver to keep going and get us out of the kill zone, even though I knew our gunner had been thrown from the turret. One of the team members thought it was screwed up that I was going to leave the gunner. I told him that it would have done the gunner no good to jump out of the vehicle and immediately get pinned down, if not get hit, in the kill zone. Far better to escape the kill zone and fight back to the casualty. As it was, the vehicle's engine was completely destroyed by the IED, and there was no accompanying ambush, so it was moot. :cool:

The gunner was fine, BTW. Just a few scalp lacerations.

Ken White

11-12-2008, 02:58 AM

instinctive or training implanted. We'd all like to do THE right thing but it's not always obvious just what that is...:eek: :confused: :o :cool:

Interesting anecdote. I'd have done the same thing. I left Boot Camp at P.I. over 50 years ago with many things drummed into my head. Two were "If the BAR man gets hit, take his weapon, his ammo and keep moving." and "Don't try to treat, that's the Corpsmans job." Both those things came out of harsh experience in a really big and very busy and brutal war. Both stood me in good stead and I saw their merit in Korea and later in Viet Nam and a couple of other places.

Taking the latter first, the combat Lifesaver Program negates what I was taught and practiced. It is a good thing and I know it's saved lives since it was introduced in the 90s but I do wonder if in major combat it will not be a detriment. Don't know the answer, we'll see -- but it worries me...

On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war. Again, we'll see...

You may be correct on the terrain aspect giving them enough advantage; though I'm not sure, all things considered and the relative numbers of KIA and probable wounded counted, that events bear them out. Bad guys can flub, too.

Bill Moore

11-12-2008, 03:48 AM

Ken and VMI_Marine, I agree that you have to get out of the kill zone first, then work your way back (if it doesn't result in mission failure) to any casualties. The leave no man behind mantra in some respects is a powerful tool for emboldening Soldiers to fight hard, but in many situations it violates our priorities and pre-empts the use of judgment.

I'm disappointed that an ODA member told VMI he messed up, but I'll assume it was a young ODA member. As VMI stated in his example, it is plain stuipd to jump out in the kill zone.

Every situation must be evaluated on numerous factors, and the leader must make that evaluation in seconds under the toughest conditions. Again I think the mantra makes the decision for the leader; therefore, judgment no longer applies. This may have terrible consequences if we get a tough war with numerous casulaties. The order of priority should remain the mission, your men, and then yourself. This is what we do, if we put ourselves or our men in front of the mission, then what have we become?

I recall getting taught that we were conducting an attack on an objective, you didn't stop and provide aid to the wounded enroute to the objective (you didn't divert combat power). You pressed with the attack, then took care of any casualties on the objective first to reinforce the combat power to resist a counter attack, then went back and collected/treated the remaining casualties. Obviously one needs to use to judgment, but this method seems to me to the most efficient militarily. Unfortunately the "leave no man behind mantra" precludes the use of judgment. On the other hand, it does seem to embolden our Soldiers, and they do (for the most part) live by it. I'm not 100% convinced I want to throw it out, but we need to address it more holistically in our leadership schools.

As for protecting the populace to separate them from the insurgents, if that was the mission, then in my opinion they set up appropriately to accomplish their mission. If they focused on the physical terrain and allowed the insurgents to access the populace, then they would have failed to complete their mission. You can argue the force was too small, but I don't want to get into the game of second guessing. Usually any fight for key terrain is a tough and bloody fight. I appreciate the respect that has been shown to these brave Soldiers throughout this discussion. I have a warm place in my heart for the Herd.

Schmedlap

11-12-2008, 03:57 AM

On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war.

I specifically recall this point being emphasized during our train up for OIF III. Whenever a SAW gunner went down, if you were a rifleman, then you swapped out your weapon for his. Months later, when we were deployed, I remember one of our SAW gunners getting shot in the leg and a 19-year-old rifleman in his team promptly swapped out weapons with him. They'll do it if you train them to. Those lessons from Nam weren't forgotten by all units.

Ken White

11-12-2008, 04:01 AM

are good because they do the basics well...

Cavguy

07-23-2009, 07:03 PM

Summary of the CSI report draft on the battle over at Tom Ricks' blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/23/wanat_viii_an_army_report_finds_a_major_coin_failu re

The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Charles Preysler. The core problem, Cubbison writes, is that the battle resulted from "a failure of COIN [counterinsurgency] manifested in a major combat action that although a marked tactical victory, became an operational and strategic defeat." Indeed, the report concludes that the unit's attempts at counterinsurgency were so badly implemented that they "were more likely to foster hostility than reciprocity from the local population."

Interesting ammo for both sides of the COIN debate - COL Gentile can argue that "dogmatic" COIN approach did play a role, and I can confidently state that it isn't the fault of the doctrine, but poor application and understanding.

Of note, is the report praises the combat performance of the troops while questioning the operational concept.

Ken White

07-23-2009, 07:59 PM

the Army's attempt to be honest about the action.

He provides one quote that many will be inclined to ignore. I think that would be a mistake:The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.The basic problem with using the GPF in a FID/ SFA roles is not that the leaders cannot learn the TTP and apply them (though we obviously still need to work on that...) nor is is that decent leaders cannot control the actions if not the attitudes of young troops who feel as the quote suggests.

The basic problem is that some people are drawn to the application of force and many of these tend to get into the GPF. Others who see force as a tool to be applied sparingly and only when needed drift into SF or SF like organizations. Two different philosophies and approaches. The second can and will adapt to all cultures; the first is far less likely to adapt and very prone to insist or at some level believe that the other culture must adapt to them or, if it does nor, that said culture is not worth the effort involved.

Those are generalizations of course, with all the standard caveats but I've seen that effect too many places and too many times to discount its importance. To say that the GPF attitude is "look like me or die" is an oversimplification -- but not by much. :wry:

Once the training and education issue is fixed, the GPF problem in COIN will not be the troops who don't care for the culture, mission or location of the effort. The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

We need the GPF to be versed and trained in the TTP of FID /SFA, no question and we're working on that. More importantly, we also need to do our national best to avoid having to commit them to such efforts. Commitment of USAid, SF and other elements in an attempt to forestall future problems is vastly preferable. No matter how much avoidance costs, that effort will almost always be less costly to the US, the Host Nation and the local population than will GPF commitment.

IntelTrooper

07-23-2009, 08:36 PM

The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...
Absolutely. I expect young E-3s (and sadly, E-6's and E-7's) to make dumb comments like "F--- these goat f---ers." What is unacceptable was that I saw/heard these kind of statements made in the presence of lieutenants and captains who made no effort to correct that attitude. At that point it is a failure of the officers who should know better (and if they don't, they need to be riding a desk somewhere).

Danny

07-23-2009, 08:36 PM

I am currently reading this long report and will hold my thoughts for now. I will weigh in later on his analysis of Wanat, some I agree with thus far and some I do not. It is a well written and comprehensive analysis regardless of agreement or disagreement one might have with any particular bit of it.

As for the issue of massing of troops that Cavguy brougth up earlier, this doesn't surprise me as it has been a mainstay in their mode of operation. I hate to shill for a post I wrote, but this is important:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/05/19/taliban-tactics-massing-of-troops/

In my own analysis of Wanat:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/11/11/analysis-of-the-battle-of-wanat/

I was very critical of a number of things that he also criticizes (such as the delay in setting up VPB Wanat and the proximity of OP Topside which caused most of the deaths that awful night), but I didn't criticize the practice of COIN for reasons I will address later after I am finished with his report. I think that it's easy and necessary to provide open and honest critique of TTPs and other inanimate objects, but when it gets personal it's much harder and more subjective.

I wish all of these men well and my respect goes out to them all.

Cavguy

07-23-2009, 08:45 PM

Hersch,

A little off topic, but ...

As always, I enjoy your analysis, but find the Marine cheerleading a bit much throughout your blog. I love the marines, fought beside them, but there is a theme that constantly implies everything the Army does is bad and the Marines are always right. Also, the Marines didn't win Anbar, the US Military did. It's hard for me to stomach seeing that constantly in your blog when there were many services, and Army troops from 2004+ made up at least 40% of the troops in Anbar. A small point, but it does disservice to those soldiers from other services who also did quite well there.

Niel

Danny

07-23-2009, 08:52 PM

Cavguy

07-23-2009, 09:13 PM

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Thanks. I know that is not what you mean, just how it reads. When you lose 80+ guys in Ramadi during 2006-2007, and transform the AO, it grates a little to hear "The Marines won Anbar". That's my raw nerve. After our article on Ramadi, I see it many places, but often on your blog. Then most of your Afghanistan posts tend to say (paraphrase) the Army should do what the Marines did in Anbar (or Hemland), when the Army has done those kinds of ops. You're not as bad as the guy over at Free Range International, who has some of the best commentary on AStan around but takes every opportunity to bash the Army, which isn't a monolith any more than the Marines are.

Don't get me wrong, I'm extremely hard on the Army for its failures. But the "Marines are always right" them just grates on me, because they're not. No more so than the Army is.

For example, you talk a lot about Marines transforming Fallujah/Haditha, but seldom mention a similar strategy executed successfully in Tal Afar by the Army in 2005 ... the Army knows this too - you would find a better commentary response from Army audiences if you used examples of where the Army did things well rather than chiding them for not being Marines ... different orgs, different culture, different purposes. For example, a look at 3/10 MTN's Afghan deployment of 2006 may be instructive, as it was related in Kilcullen's book.

Just an observation that may broaden your readership.

Also: Snippet from COL MacFarland on the joint effort (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_88/ai_n25432641/):

"You old guys need to get over that s--t."

- Young Marine to Marine sergeant major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

In the March-April 2008 issue of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.

Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

...

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force.