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Cavguy
07-14-2008, 09:27 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

No one else seems to have brought this up yet.

It appears that this remote unit (not sure if PLT or CO) had the perimeter breached by Taliban before being repulsed by the defenders and aircraft.

I am suprised that "several hundred" Taliban were able to mass and do this kind of assault. Will be interesting to find out if the perimeter was inflitrated first and then assaulted externally (infiltration), or if the perimeter was overrun by attacking militants.

Not a good sign when the enemy is massed and organized enough to do this.

Are we in/headed for Phase III insurgency in Afghanistan? I haven't read about such pitched battles of this scale before in OEF. From reading "Bear Went Over the Mountain" I know this was common for the Russians.

Thoughts?

marct
07-14-2008, 09:40 PM
I heard about this earlier (CBC I think). I doubt it's the beginning of a Phase III operation. Unfortunately, the report is very vague on who the "insurgents" were. Maybe the CJTF-82 newsfeed will have some more details.

Rank amateur
07-14-2008, 10:41 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

Not a good sign when the enemy is massed and organized enough to do this.



I think it's more a sign of how pathetically undermanned we are in Afghanistan. I'm confident the problem will be addressed though I fear we may get a band aid instead of all the troops we need.

B) Don't stop now Gian. Your message needs to be heard.

C) We need COIN in Pakistan. Even better if the Pakistanis do it, but until we get a "population centric approach" in Pakistan the bad guys will be able to run away every time we have a tactical advantage.

Ken White
07-14-2008, 10:56 PM
C. trumps A. (There is no 'A' but I'm guessing the first paragraph could be one) and B is of marginal, if any, relevance in this case. I doubt C. can or will be fixed in the near term therefor A will be of only limited utility.

I'd also suggest that A. is incorrect in that a Company or Platoon sized outpost will always be tempting to the bad guys. The option is to do a Sanchez and cluster in large, well defended bases -- that should be a non-starter. War is risky, you can obviate the risk by excessive concentration on force protection (or Mass...) but that will rarely be effective. You've got to put the troops out to get the job done and Platoons, even Companies, will be risked when one does that -- it goes with the territory.

Rank amateur
07-15-2008, 12:11 AM
CNN reported that an "observation platform" was overrun. The base itsself wasn't. Someone who knows what they're talking about can comment further, but it sounds to me like someone may have made a fatal mistake. Sounds like the platform was set up so that the bad guys could generate an intense volume of fire on it from civilian buildings, but the good guys couldn't return fire en masse because of the civilians.

Details are still sketchy, but if the deceased were more worried about being amongst the population than ensuring they always had a firepower advantage, then B is very relevant. (Assuming my assumptions are correct of course, which they may not be.)

patmc
07-15-2008, 12:22 AM
NY Times just posted article on the battle:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/world/asia/15afghan.html?hp

Article provides details on the US/Afghan positions and militant tactics and plan. The US occupied the base only a few days ago, and were not finished with construction. They left their previous base because of repeated attacks. They also believe a airstrike that killed civilians may have turned many of the local populace against the US/ANA, though the area is easily infiltrated by fighters.


"The Taliban insurgents who attacked a remote American-run outpost near the Pakistan border on Sunday numbered nearly 200 fighters, almost three times the size of the allied force, and some breached the NATO compound in a coordinated assault that took the defenders by surprise, Western officials said Monday.
The attackers were driven back in a pitched four-hour battle, and appeared to suffer scores of dead and wounded of their own, but the toll they inflicted was sobering. The base and a nearby observation post were manned by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation is under way."

"American and Afghan forces started building the makeshift base just last week and its defenses were not fully in place, said one senior allied official. In some places, troops were using their vehicles as barriers against insurgents.
The militants apparently detected the vulnerability and moved quickly to exploit it in a pre-dawn assault in which they attacked from two directions, American officials said."

Uboat509
07-15-2008, 12:59 AM
While I would not characterize them as common, friends of mine who have served in Afghanistan have told me that their bases have been attacked in larger scale attacks similar to this one from time to time though perhaps not as large. The Fox News arcticle mentions that Chechens are known to operate in the area. That might explain the success of this attack. I am told that ordinary Afghans are not particularly spectacular fighters but the Chechans are brutal and very competant.

SFC W

Ken White
07-15-2008, 01:36 AM
CNN reported that an "observation platform" was overrun. The base itsself wasn't. Someone who knows what they're talking about can comment further, but it sounds to me like someone may have made a fatal mistake.People will do that. Poor planning kills more than poor execution. Shame we're not all infallible but we aren't; errors will be made -- and more numbers of troops just mean more errors.
...Sounds like the platform was set up so that the bad guys could generate an intense volume of fire on it from civilian buildings, but the good guys couldn't return fire en masse because of the civilians.Possibly true; some of the pictures I've seen of the siting and construction of OPs leave me furious that such tactical incompetence is allowed; that and the tendency to bunch up or herd. ALL the western Armies are bad on both those points. That's why I keep ranting about better training and concentrating on the basics, it's the little things that get you killed and it is criminal to have to learn how to do it right while under fire when that just is not necessary.
Details are still sketchy, but if the deceased were more worried about being amongst the population than ensuring they always had a firepower advantage, then B is very relevant. (Assuming my assumptions are correct of course, which they may not be.)Not sure B is relevant even in that case. Gian wants High Intensity Conflict / warfare training and advocates greater application of force -- I presume the latter is that to which you refer while I was essentially referring to the former. I did that because the harsher application of force is not an option. Rightly or wrongly international consensus and current US Government guidance is to minimize civilian casualties even to the extent of increasing own casualties. This, if that is the case, will be just one more out of many in both theaters where our attempts to minimize civilian casualties has increased our own. Whether you, Gian or I -- or the Troops in contact -- agree or not is immaterial; that's the guidance and it is highly unlikely to change barring an existential war.

I suspect they were more worried about minimizing civilian casualties than they were about being among the population though the OP was established in that location in an effort to control the population. As I've said elsewhere, controlling the population isn't all that easy, may not be all that desirable and as I said above, it entails putting Platoons out where they become targets -- the option being to adopt a fortress mentality (which IMO is not at all a good idea). Counterinsurgency is not fun or nice, mostly due to that factor; if it's done correctly, the friendly casualty count is always going to go up (one reason why doing it right was deliberately avoided by many senior people in the early days in both Afghanistan and Iraq). The seven Ps? Piss Poor Prior Planning Promotes Poor Performance. They've been around even longer than I have... :D

bourbon
07-15-2008, 01:46 AM
The Fox News arcticle mentions that Chechens are known to operate in the area. That might explain the success of this attack. I am told that ordinary Afghans are not particularly spectacular fighters but the Chechans are brutal and very competant.

Possibly, but check out this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3754). Absent new movement, reports of Chechens in significant numbers in Afghanistan are questionable, if not myth. IIRC, the infamous 'Chechens' at Anaconda turned out to be Uzbek. The Afghans would call non-Arab foreign fighters 'Chechens', which led to the mix up.

Eden
07-15-2008, 12:11 PM
The bad guys have massed before in Afghanistan. When I served there in 2006-7, the US border outposts were from time to time subjected to attacks that required the employment of claymores and final protective fires - that pretty much defines for me high-intensity, if only on a localized scale. We thought these were typically used to mask the infiltration of larger/high-value groups across the border. And in and around Helmand province there were Canadian-led assaults against large numbers of bad guys. They used the ruined irrigation system as ready-made entrenchments, covered obstacles with fire, and held-back reserves capable of rudimentary fire and maneuver. Eavesdropping reminded me of the NTC at times, with engineers being used to breach obstacles, danger-close air support, and integration of artillery with maneuver.

It's one reason the Canadians shipped tanks to Afghanistan.

Cavguy
07-15-2008, 06:56 PM
Cavguy,

My wife went to high school and was good friends with one of the 9 Soldiers killed in action, apparently in this engagement. (I don't know for sure, but the info she got when talking to his mother sounded like it.) She is visiting her family outside Atlanta already while I have 4 classes of LTs in BOLC right now...anyway the funeral is supposed to be on Saturday. I am driving down from Knox to attend with her. Possibly one of the Soldiers from the unit will be there and I can get a first or second hand account of what happened. Will let you know.

Sorry to hear that. Would be interested in what the story is that can be told short of SIPR. (Or on SIPR, PM/email me).

Niel

Norfolk
07-15-2008, 09:50 PM
The Taleban operated in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and other parts of the South in groups of some 400, possibly even 500, on occasion. Practically as Light Infantry Battalions, and at times they would manoeuvre groups of around 100 to ambush Allied troops, using the high ground (go figure). That mostly ended after Operation MEDUSA in the summer of 2006, and with the exception of Musa Qala, the Taleban more or less cooled it after that, until recently of course. As Eden noted, the willingness of the Taleban to come out and go toe-to-toe in a pseudo-conventional slugfest was what compelled the Canadians to drop the light stuff and go back to MBTs and tracked APCs; it also caused them to evacuate their more exposed outposts, permanently.

It seems that Pak Army junior officers (presumably no longer on Active Service) are displacing Arab and Central Asian (especially Tajiks) types as the main instructional cadres for the Taleban. This is not a good development. And I am getting the feeling again that some of the seemingly exaggerated news reports that came out of the Korengal Valley a few months ago were perhaps not as inaccurate as subsequent official reports asserted.

davidbfpo
07-15-2008, 10:04 PM
It seems that Pak Army junior officers (presumably no longer on Active Service) are displacing Arab and Central Asian (especially Tajiks) types as the main instructional cadres for the Taleban. This is not a good development.

Norfolk,

Over a long period on SWC and elsewhere comment on the official and unofficial linkages between the Pakistani state and the Taliban have appeared. Invariably with ISI being the culprit, although large chunks of it's manpower are seconded from the Army.

Now this indication. The Pakistani Army allows for long periods of leave, for harvesting and the like - Stephen Cohen's book has several paragraphs on this, from memory for other ranks and not officers. It has been suggested by those who study the Pakistani Army that increasing numbers of officers have been radicalised, although the Army officially disowns this.

Or is this just a public airing of the suspicion that the long established ISI / Army support for the Taliban has taken a new form?

I am reliably informed from open sources and analyst(s) that nothing has changed - support for the Taliban remains a national policy decision? Policy in this area remains the perogative of the military (Army).

davidbfpo

Norfolk
07-15-2008, 11:30 PM
Yes, I was a tad sloppy in trying to express my thoughts. While ISI (along with trainers/operatives attached from the Army) have had their hands in this for decades, what worries me about it is the relative (and absolute) decline of the Arab/Caucasian/Central Asian cadres that used to predominate in the training camps, and their supplantment on a large scale by former Pakistani officers. The ties have been there for the better part of three decades, but Pakistani involvement has perhaps not been this high or this vital to the Taleban since the 90's. With the deaths of so many of the Arab, Chechen, and Central Asian cadres over the past several years, the war has become rather less a war against al-Qaeda and its Taleban supporters per se, and more and more a proxy war with powerful official elements within Pakistan itself. A war that is increasingly as much about internal dynamics within Pakistan as in Afghanistan.

Bill Moore
07-16-2008, 12:40 AM
In this case you're writing about current ongoing operations, so please consider operations security and respect for the families of the fallen, some who may not have been notified yet. This tragic incident is germane to small wars, but it is the wrong time to discuss it unless it is via secure means.

Rebecca White
07-16-2008, 11:44 AM
By AMIR SHAH
Associated Press Writer

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) -- U.S. and Afghan troops have abandoned a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan where militants killed nine American soldiers this week, officials said Wednesday.

Compounding the military setback, insurgents quickly seized the village of Wanat in Nuristan province after driving out the handful of police left behind to defend government offices, Afghan officials said.

Some 50 officers were headed to the area to try to regain control, said Ghoolam Farouq, a senior provincial police official.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AFGHANISTAN?SITE=TXMCA&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

Sorry if this was posted elsewhere....is this true?

Norfolk
07-16-2008, 09:06 PM
In this case you're writing about current ongoing operations, so please consider operations security and respect for the families of the fallen, some who may not have been notified yet. This tragic incident is germane to small wars, but it is the wrong time to discuss it unless it is via secure means.

I apologize, I did not in any way intend to breach OPSEC. What I have been writing about comes from newspaper reports (and particularly Canadian ones - and also on my old Regiment's public site) over the past couple years. The specific events that I described occurred two years ago.

Edited to Add:

As to the alleged Pakistani ex-junior officers in the training camps, that was also reported in the papers, not taken from official sources. Once again, my apologies.

Cavguy
07-16-2008, 09:22 PM
I apologize, I did not in any way intend to breach OPSEC. What I have been writing about comes from newspaper reports (and particularly Canadian ones - and also on my old Regiment's public site) over the past couple years. The specific events that I described occurred two years ago.

Edited to Add:

As to the alleged Pakistani ex-junior officers in the training camps, that was also reported in the papers, not taken from official sources. Once again, my apologies.

I don't think he was specifically targeting you - he was also reminding me and RYNO to deal sensitively with operational details of casualties, and in the appropriate forums.

A good reminder from time to time.

Norfolk
07-16-2008, 09:24 PM
I don't think he was specifically targeting you - he was also reminding me and RYNO to deal sensitively with operational details of casualties, and in the appropriate forums.

A good reminder from time to time.

Thank-you. Just the same, as you said, a good reminder to watch what I say.

Darksaga
07-17-2008, 09:47 AM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

No one else seems to have brought this up yet.


I have read a number of accounts of what happened. All open source and accounts vary wildly.

It seems the only thing they have in common was a temporary outpost was overun resulting in 9 US dead and 15 wounded. Some say 4 ANA were wounded as well. Reports of militant casualties are from 15 to 100+. They, for the most part, are also reporting that ISAF patrols will continue in the area. Some are reporting that the militants held the outpost. Some reports are stating that they have moved on.

The reported size of militant force has been placed at 200+ vs 45 US and 25 ANA. Even with those parameters the 101st did a good accounting for themselves and gave them hell.

Some reports says 'Taliban' some say insurgents some say enemy combatants. Truth is it was probably a breif joining of various groups (my theory). This outpost could very well have been seen as a threat to keeping the border open which is something the various criminal elements, smugglers (gems, wood, drugs, humans), Taliban and militants want in common.

Good old fog of water that is being stirred up by reporters who don't know jack from shinola.

To me it is looking more and more like a joint raid against an outpost that could have had a detrimental effect for various counter government groups.

My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

Final thought: One thing that is clear is that the perpetrators of the attack need to be tracked down swiflty and hit hard by boots on the ground and not by air power. Don't let this incident become a precident or rally cry.

Fuchs
07-17-2008, 09:59 AM
Afaik these forces use Wolfpack-like tactics. They move independently, converge on a target, exert their power of numbers (even if only as power projection to turn local militias) and then dissolve till the next target.

That's quite difficult to track. Movement of armed civilians in military age who speak pashtuhn is not something you could simply forbid and interdict there.

VMI_Marine
07-17-2008, 04:01 PM
My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

I was led to believe that most of the KIA came from the platoon's observation post, which I would bet was overrun pretty quickly. Air support would not have been able to respond in time to save the OP. The actual base itself wasn't taken, although they did breach the perimeter.

KB
07-17-2008, 07:33 PM
The details of this attack will come out in due time and undoubtedly there will be tactical lessons learned. More important to our operational success in Afghanistan is our military and political response to the attack. According to a NY Times article today, the outpost was abandoned despite NATO spokesman assurances that “NATO and Afghan troops would continue to patrol the district and maintain ‘a strong presence in the area.’” The PAO further stated, “We are committed, now more than ever, to establishing a secure environment that will allow even greater opportunities for development and a stronger Afghan governmental influence.” (See Carlotta Gall, NYT, “U.S. Abandons Site of Afghan Attack,” July 17, pg. 10.)
Actions speak louder than words. By withdrawing (i.e. retreating) from the outpost we have taken a tactical win (the Taliban did not overrun the outpost despite their numbers) and granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers.
Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations. 10th Mountain and now the 173rd have done a fantastic job departing from the days of FOBs and brigade-sized cordon and search operations. They have established combined platoon and company outposts with Afghan forces in close proximity to rural villages and towns. Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT. More tragic than the loss of nine valiant soldiers, will be for this one attack to alter an otherwise sound strategy (barring discussions of overall troop numbers, Pakistan’s support, and cross-border operations). Hopefully, ADM Mullen’s comments about the outpost not having enough troops (Spiegel and Faiez, LA Times, “New U.S. Afghan Force Plan,” July 17, pg. 4) is not an indication of future policy requirements for larger, consolidated bases—a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!

Entropy
07-17-2008, 08:19 PM
KB,

Reading the media reports on the incident, the COP/OP or whatever it was was on low ground surrounded on three sides by the village of Wanat. Perhaps they "abandoned" the outpost because it was too vulnerable and perhaps another will be built in a more secure location.

Ken White
07-17-2008, 09:34 PM
...granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers. Been my experience that dancing does little; such an event if it were to occur will almost certainly ultimately change nothing of significance.
Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations.Do you have the slightest backup for that statement?
Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT.What you say is true and I totally agree that needs to be done, What you elide is that there is risk involved on several levels; one being that inexperienced leaders and commanders can select poor positions and not always organize them to best serve their purpose; another is that I don't care how good you are, odds of five to one are likely to get to you. Those are risks but they need to be taken -- the down side is that one will occasionally lose people. Goes with the territory.
a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!I agree that knee jerk reactions are poor. I await your response on the decision to withdraw the OP being made in Washington rather than by the 173d. ;)

Rank amateur
07-17-2008, 11:59 PM
I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

Ron Humphrey
07-18-2008, 12:05 AM
I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

Ken White
07-18-2008, 12:17 AM
I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?with no more information than we have?

There are so many factors that can influence that decision that to even try to second guess it from here is to go well beyond knee jerkery.

Local population, local government and Afghan government attitudes; as always, all the METT-TC factors. Add; was the withdrawal deliberate to suck in more Talibs or whoevers -- and that's just some of the open source stuff and conjecture.

Bad idea to try to second guess stuff that happens on the ground twelve hours ahead of you and 12,000 miles away based on what you glean from the news media. You're just about guaranteed a screwup...

Entropy
07-18-2008, 12:25 AM
I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

...why it was abandoned and if the abandonment is temporary or permanent.

I'm getting the impression here that some are thinking that abandoning the position was somehow bad. Positions are abandoned all the time in war - what matters is why, imo.

Edit: What Ken said above :)

Rank amateur
07-18-2008, 01:31 AM
with no more information than we have?


It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?


If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."

Ron Humphrey
07-18-2008, 01:38 AM
I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."

But given what we know/ don't know about the specifics still doesn't seem like the worst thing to do.

Ken White
07-18-2008, 02:49 AM
It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?I'm dead serious, not trying to be obstructionist. I cannot answer your question and I submit that anyone who tries it based on the information available to most of us here in the States is being quite naive.

I don't know what that Battalion's mission is; don't know the enemy situation in any detail whatsoever; I don't even have a map of the area so I don't know the terrain; I don't know what US, ANA and ANP elements are available -- I don't even know what the rest of that Battalion is doing (perhaps something more important that precludes enough troops to stay or go back); don't know the logistic situation or what's available immediately; don't know what's scheduled to be done in that area or elsewhere that effect the timing of what could or should be done; Nor do I know the position of the local, Provincial and National governments -- which could be get out and stay (for domestic political reasons; they are the hosts; we do what they want); don't know the dynamics of the local population or their wishes. I could go on but you get the idea -- and I'll point out that if I were there, I'd know the answer to all those things, no great study would be required.

You have just asked me to prepare a marketing plan for a MacDonald's in Bangalore -- that's a case study, could you do that?

Having pointed out the absolute foolishness of even attempting to provide you with an answer for such a case study; I will now prove I'm a fool by providing an answer. Based only on what I know and assuming passivity or support from the Afghans, I'd pull out, try and lull the bad guys into returning and attempt to determine who's in charge of that sector for them and get him zapped then I'd go back in and reestablish in a nearby location (never the same location -- once it's been hit hard, never, ever use it again. Never do the same thing twice).

Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?

KB
07-18-2008, 03:10 AM
Ken W,
Touche’ on the knee jerk quip…I’m guilty as charged. Assertion that abandoning outpost was due to D.C. pressure versus command decision on the ground was hasty. Nevertheless, the decision to depart Wanat (assuming media’s reports to be true) will have numerous results. It further emboldens Taliban/Al Qaeda supporters sending a message that one fierce firefight and the Americans will leave the area. It reinforces to the locals (particularly indigenous security volunteers and leaders who begin to cooperate with Afghan gov and U.S. initiatives) that they can’t count on U.S. support...if they want to save their skin that is! Lastly, the international community, American citizens, and our domestic political leaders get the impression that we’re on the run.
When tragedy does strike it affords us an opportunity to demonstrate our resolve.
It is highly possible that the unit involved doesn’t have the available resources to reinforce/reposition the outpost given their casualties and ongoing ops. If there is no operational reserve available that explains the action, it doesn’t change the significance of it. My main concern--and you’re right, it’s too early to tell--is that this action could be indicative of an aversion to risk that could alter our strategy. As a side note, I don’t advocate or excuse unnecessary risk. We still need leaders and soldiers making sound tactical decisions, but there is inherent risk to an aggressive strategy.
Lastly, there is a professional benefit in discussing ongoing operations, acknowledging there is a lot we don’t know from immediately available open source. Hence this discussion board, right? While I’ll espouse about operational strategy, you won't find me armchairing the outpost's location, defense plan, or actions of leaders and individuals given available info. Thanks for your earlier feedback. -KB

MikeF
07-18-2008, 03:43 AM
As I understand it, those boys were three days from going home.

I've watched a greater number of men die in similar situations in Iraq from the lack of the O's and senior E's preparations in the wake of the enemy's plans. This understanding will never temper the loss of the families, but it's the ground truth.

That's just the way it is. We are not always prepared nor do we always have the best and brightest in charge. In a COIN fight of living amongst and engaging the populace, we will suffer casualties. These loses must not necessarily distract us to proclaim strategic loss in the Long War.

If the enemy wants to videotape dancing along the OP or abadoned patrol base, so be it. It will be temporal. A thorough covert reconnaissance/surveillance will allow us to identify and positively react- thus executing KB's "opportunity to show our resolve."

As foolish as Ken was in applying an answer to the case study, I'm worse over for concurring...I'll simply tread once again amoungst the plane of the Sierra Nevada.

Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.

It is what it is.

Ken White
07-18-2008, 04:04 AM
...If the enemy wants to videotape dancing along the OP or abadoned patrol base, so be it. It will be temporal. A thorough covert reconnaissance/surveillance will allow us to identify and positively react- thus executing KB's "opportunity to show our resolve."True. Early days, no sense jumping to conclusions just yet, I think. I'm sure the guys there considered the IO costs. We aren't nearly as dumb as a lot of folks think we are.

That didn't make me shudder; this did:
Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.At a Dining In once upon a time, the Guest, a Colonel kept referring to 'Sergeant Majors.' After going through the Vice, I asked said guest if he was aware that the proper plural was 'Sergeants Major.' Being a not too shabby Cav Dude; he quickly shot back that the "...Only similar term that comes to mind is Ladies in Waiting." Thus I still shudder when I see 'Sergeants Major.' Haven't corrected anyone else on that since... :D

Darksaga
07-18-2008, 09:31 AM
The story I've heard, this is completely unclass and is confirmed in a few open sources, was that a rifle platoon along with an ANA platoon were occupying (or scouting in some sources) a new COP location. As such, they had only initiated the priorities of work, and there were no fixed protective obstacles or defensive structures. The attack involved between 100 and 150 enemy, and they assaulted by using tactics very similar to ours for a company attack- echelonment of fires, breach, seized a foothold, and exploited it.

wm
07-18-2008, 12:00 PM
When tragedy does strike it affords us an opportunity to demonstrate our resolve.

Please remember that stubbornness, which is often represented by a jackass, can be mistakenly identified as resolve.

Rank amateur
07-18-2008, 10:07 PM
While I’ll espouse about operational strategy, you won't find me armchairing the outpost's location, defense plan, or actions of leaders and individuals given available info. Thanks for your earlier feedback. -KB

That sounds right to me. I wouldn't write a marketing plan for McDonalds - opsec wouldn't let me put it on the net anyway- but I could comment intelligently on McDs India strategy.

If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:


A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 11:56 PM
As Ken has argued, this is all situationally dependent. At times, it is important to show resolve, and not give ground for operational or political reasons. At other times.. well, Dien Bien Phu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dien_Bien_Phu)....

Ken White
07-19-2008, 01:31 AM
...I wouldn't write a marketing plan for McDonalds - opsec wouldn't let me put it on the net anyway- but I could comment intelligently on McDs India strategy.Yet, you wanted a marketing plan for Wanat? We can both comment intelligently on the US / NATO Afghanistan strategy but that wasn't what you asked; you asked about a low level tactical decision; putting one McDonald's in Bangalore...
If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:

A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?Gotten away with what?

Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?

Have you considered the cost of extracting that price? You've apparently adopted the mantra of population control. Aside from the fact that absent draconian treatment with a whole lot of troops there is no way to obtain that, I'm unsure you realize that it is not an acceptable tactic in today's world and that the US is never going to do that. Nor should we.

Are you going to answer my question? :wry:

Rank amateur
07-19-2008, 01:34 AM
Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?

Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?

Ken White
07-19-2008, 01:46 AM
Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?No, there does not have to be nor should there be. The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave. We, NATO and the Afghans are powerless to prevent that on several levels. Try to make people 'pay a price for cooperating with the Taliban' under those circumstances and all you'll do is create a whole lot more Taliban from the population that you are coercing -- because that's what you're suggesting, coercion.

Not the American way nor the way of today's world.

The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...;)

Rank amateur
07-19-2008, 01:48 AM
Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?

Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)

But I think Wanat has now become strategic and you still need to be population centric. Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.

Rank amateur
07-19-2008, 01:51 AM
The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave.

My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)


You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...;)

Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you. ;)


The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.

Ken White
07-19-2008, 02:06 AM
Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)The significant problem with my solution is that it does not show any consideration what so ever for what other coalition elements may be doing -- it focuses only on one tiny village out of thousands in one Valley out of thousands. In short, you and I elevated a minor setback -- one of many over the last five years, with more to come -- into a strategic issue. It is not.
But I think Wanat has now become strategicOnly in the sense it's in the intrnational news and that will fade within days. In a month, most of the world will not be able to tell you what or where Wanat is.
...and you still need to be population centric.True but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.
Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.Not necessarily a mistake, perhaps the best of several bad choices?

Ken White
07-19-2008, 02:23 AM
My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)There are many who agree with that. Unfortunately, most of them do not have the responsibility to actually do anything about the ability of insurgents worldwide to move among their own population pretty much at will, so yet again COIN 101 meets the reality of the world outside academe.
Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you. ;)Sorry, no intent to rush you; just to needle a teeny bit :o EVERYBODY can outthink and out type me, my two fingered approach inevitably mean fifty leven errors to correct...
Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.We agree more often that not. Generally, my apparent disagreement is designed to get you to think past the desirable (rarely obtained in any war) or the book solution (only a guide and subject to wide variations). Frequently I let things slide -- like we have no Tanks in Afghanistan from above and attempt to rain on only that part of your parade that needs, IMO, a nudge -- that's the arrogance of the aged (or curmudgeon like attitude thereof...).

Having said that, we do agree. We definitely need to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan; that's a key requirement. The question is how to get there without creating more problems than we solve -- and that is really one very knotty and difficult problem. Hopefully, Pakistan will get to work on it -- if they do not, we've been more than patient and we would be reluctant to take unilateral action but too many in the world fail to realize that the worst thing one can do is hack off the Americans; they tend to over react. My sensing is that we are starting to get annoyed... :D

Rank amateur
07-19-2008, 02:26 AM
but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.

Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.

Ken White
07-19-2008, 02:54 AM
Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.Regrettably, the one in which we live is far from ideal.

Controlling the population iis one way to do it -- it is also quite difficult. The world learned a lot of really bad lessons from Malaya. In that insurgency, the final and effective solution was population control. However, there are many differences between Malaya and almost every other one in which we've been involved. To the subject at hand, Afghanistan, those differences are:

The insurgents are not a distinct and minority ethnic group that the majority opposes; we cannot round up people an summarily move them into secure areas to preclude them having intercourse with the insurgents, the world won't stand for it (nor do we have the assets to do that; it would take a million troops to do it even part way); the US is not the government of the nation involved; the neighboring nations are not disposed to assist us and in fact one large neighboring nation is disposed to be decidedly unhelpful; there is no narrow, easily guarded peninsula border to secure, there are in fact 5,500 or so km of rugged, difficult to secure land border, 2,400+ with Pakistan. There's more, that's just a starter list -- but everyone of those factors makes this a whole lot different than Malaya or the 'British experience' (who I understand now privately admit they are learning from us and that they misapplied the Northern Ireland experience in Basra with poor results).

Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. You can force them to do things -- if you have adequate force -- but all you'll do is build up resentment. What you can do is control the environment to cut down on the visits of unfriendly types in the wee hours and we are doing that with some success, it just takes a while.

Bill Moore
07-19-2008, 03:55 AM
Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. posted by Ken

Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN. Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home. Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.

Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.

In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

Control measures range from the severe to the gentle persuaive arts of propaganda (talking points, films, fliers, engaging key local leaders) etc. However, regardless of the method used the most important supporting task is protecting the populace. Both sides will strive for legitimate control of the populace where the populace willingly supports them; however, the insurgent will use coercive measures to control the population as required as we are again seeing today. If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.

We controlled the American Indians by killing, displacing them and implementing a reservation system. The Soviets controlled their population with a secret police and fear. Mao used fear (mass murder) and brainwashing. However, they lacked legitimate control and they could only afford to swing the stick for so long, so it clear why these systems failed.

Realistically the host nation must establish control with our support. Occupiers cannot provide legitimate control. However, assuming the people don't want to be controlled by the insurgents and once they are convinced you're their to help them and that you will act on their intelligence tips they'll begin pointing out the insurgents to you, so you can start draining the swamp. It takes time and there will be set backs.

Now my politically incorrect thought, if the people honestly desire to be ruled by the insurgents and are supporting them because they believe in their cause, not because they are being coerced, we then have a much bigger problem. At this point we may have to use various degrees of coercive measures initially to control the populace until we can mobilize them to support the host nation government. If for some reason this can't be done, then the insurgency cannot be defeated. This is where we need to set aside our political correct assumptions and fight the populace as we did against the Indians and in the Philippines. How do you sustain national and international will to engage in this type of war? Perhaps another option is to allow the insurgents to win, then coerce the new State, which will be much more vulnerable to our military power.

Ken White
07-19-2008, 04:28 AM
Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN.Population control is one of several COIN theories; it can be a task if you want to make it one, or it cannot be if you use another approach.
Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home.Tell me about the populations we're 'controlling' in Afghanistan and Iraq...
Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.I forgot about Malaya (not Malysia) over forty years ago when I figured out it was so different that the lessons were generally not applicable. Much of which I picked from the two Troops (+) from 22 SAS who came to Bragg for fun and games in 19-ought-62 and most of whom had been in Malaya. Unfortunately, a lot of other people haven't forgotten it and learned some bad lessons. Like population control (not influence, I agree with that, physical control is not a viable option nowadays).

To put that in perspective, there are few similarities between Viet Nam and Afghanistan but look at the math; VN in the late 60s was a nation of about 18M people in an area of ~65K square miles; over a million South Viet Namese, US, South Korean, Australian/NZ, Thai and other troops not only could not control the population, they couldn't even control the ~1,200 miles of border to neighboring sanctuaries. In the 'Stan, we've got about 200K total Coalition troops in a nation of 32M people and an area of 250,000 square miles, just a tad smaller than Texas and a border of 2,400 clicks with Pakistan alone plus far more rugged terrain and a population that is significantly more violent and warlike. *

Point is even without that control, the insurgency in Viet Nam was effectively dismantled and Afghanistan is far harder thing in which to exercise control...*
Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.Thank you for that little tutorial. We can agree on your definition -- though I'll note you have now broadened control to exercise psychological as well as physical influence (which by definition may not include finite control; i.e. 'influence' does not equal 'control'). I know you know this but for others, here's the appropriate definition from the DoD Dictionary:

"3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed."

I submit that for over 3,000 years a lot of folks have been trying to get to that point with the Afghans and none were successful; thus indications lead me to believe that we also will fail if try to get them to "respond as directed." We can and do influence them and we can parlay that into success -- so 'control' is not necessary, it just makes life easier. I BTW totally agree that under any theory of COIN one must be able to influence the population and that people are the center of mass.

I'll also note that in Viet Nam though the population was never controlled and there were never enough troops to sit in every village and hamlet, the population was effectively influenced and that influence was adequate to eliminate the insurgency as a threat. Later, conventional attacks may have done in SVN but the insurgency got whipped -- and that without controlling the population -- who never got to the point of reponding as directed.*
In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control. The first part is true, the second is possibly true -- as is this:
... If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.So what is your solution and recommendation for the situation in Afghanistan? :D

Darksaga
07-19-2008, 07:29 AM
Here is the account from Stars and Stripes.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=56237


Soldiers recount deadly attack on Afghanistan outpost

Everything was on fire. The trucks. The bazaar. The grass.

It looked surreal. It looked like a movie.

That was what Spc. Tyler Stafford remembered thinking as he stepped onto the medical evacuation helicopter. The 23-year-old soldier would have been loaded onto the bird, but the poncho that was hastily employed as his stretcher broke. His body speckled with grenade and RPG shrapnel, the Vicenza, Italy, infantryman walked the last few feet to the waiting Black Hawk.

That was Sunday morning in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. At a forward operating base — maybe as big as a football field — established just a few days prior.

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

That was July 13. That was when Stafford was blown out of a fighting position by an RPG, survived a grenade blast and had the tail of an RPG strike his helmet.

That was the day nine Chosen Company soldiers died.

It was just days before the unit was scheduled to leave the base.

Darksaga
07-19-2008, 07:33 AM
I think the reporting, in general, on this event shows how poorly the media can cover an incident due to a fundamnetal lack of knowledge on the subject they are reporting on accompanied by the fog of war and a sincere lack of journalistic integrity.

Bill Moore
07-19-2008, 02:58 PM
Ken,

I have very limited experience in Afghanistan, so I'm not prepared to offer any specific solutions, because specific solutions require local area expertise. About all I can offer is an appreciation for the terrain. However, I can rehash some basic principles such as controlling the populace, but the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).

Unfortunately you have the trump card on Vietnam since you were there, and I wasn’t (I think you can control the populace, but you can’t control when you’re born). However, based on my studies, GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.

If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008. While your definition of control may be one of many, the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it. How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace.

First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide such as recruits, intelligence, money, safe haven, etc. This must be assessed at the local level, as the motivation may vary neighborhood from neighborhood and village to village. If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection, which is what we have seen in Iraq with the clear, hold, build approach. If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures such as dominating the area with a big stick (establish numerous check points, conduct cordon and search operations, establish curfews etc.) initially, but simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

To address your math problem (I always hated math), you have to use to the oil spot strategy. You establish control over an area that you have the resources to control, and then gradually expand. In theory you could get to a tipping point where the people in the uncontrolled areas hear about the better quality of life in the government controlled areas and thus are eager to rapidly get rid of the insurgents in their area (an assumption of mine, I'm not aware of any historical examples). I think we may be spread to thin in Afghanistan and we’re responding to fires from what I read. I think we to start somewhere, then expand out. The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.

As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake, but I think in most cases we could convince most states to limit support to insurgents. I don’t recall in my studies where we made the same effort as the French did in controlling the border between Algeria and Tunisia. It would have been expensive and resource extensive, but over the long run I think it would have been more cost effective than dragging the conflict out for years because we couldn’t cut their international supply links.

We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.:)

Ken White
07-19-2008, 04:00 PM
Thanks for the reasoned response.
... the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).Totally agree.
...GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.Some village protection measures were undertaken from 1962 on, the problem was that there were never enough Troops to cover many. The Oil spot theory is not new -- it too was tried in VN. Problem with oil spots is that they work both ways. Phoenix was in operation over five years before Abrams got to VN, He and Colby just expanded it.
If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008.That is the way, in my perception, Rank Amateur was using the phrase and thus my response to him was couched as it was.
While your definition of control may be one of manyWords are important, we should not use words like 'victory' and 'defeat' in COIN because lacking killing a whole lot of people, there won't be either of those things, the best you can get is an acceptable outcome. Control as a word implies just this that you say:
the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it.Agreed.
How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace. ... The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.Again we've morphed from 'control' to influence -- with which I totally agree. This is more than a semantic argument of little import; as I said, words are important. Not only can the wrong words send messages to own or target population, they can also induce a mindset in own forces. Gearing up to achieve the unachievable is sort of a waste. We are emphatically not going to control the population of Afghanistan, we don't have the manpower. We can influence that population and we're doing that. Heres' a quote from the Andres piece at "The new role of air strike in small wars." (here at SWJ):

""Large occupation forces make good tactical sense, however, there are two serious problems with an outside power like the United States injecting tens of thousands of troops into a foreign country. First, foreign soldiers are often viewed with mistrust and their presence has a tendency to stir up nationalist hostility in the local population. The more visible the occupation forces, the easier it is for insurgents to use their presence to discredit the indigenous government. Thus, a large force can undermine the legitimacy of the government it is there to support. Second, large expeditionary armies are expensive and hard to maintain. As a rule, the larger the army, the shorter the period the United States can maintain it in the field. Thus, increasing the size of the force used in a counterinsurgency operation has a tendency to decrease the amount of time Congress will be willing to dedicate to the war.""

I don't agree with everything he says in that article but I do definitely agree with that quote -- and the Army had better absorb it.
To address your math problem (I always hated math)Me too but unfortunately, it rules...
... you have to use to the oil spot strategy. ... The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.Seems to me that's what we're doing; the issue is the degree of control that can be exercised.


As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake.True -- or how hacked off we get and -- this is important -- how the gut check factor is working in D.C.
We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.:)True dat... ;)

davidbfpo
07-19-2008, 08:24 PM
First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide...If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection...If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures .... simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

Bill and others,

From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.

Add in corruption, drugs and more local factors - a mess.

Reportedly the Taliban provide a level of governance in the areas they control and dominate - which can be a few hundred metres from Allied / ANP posts.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey
07-19-2008, 09:34 PM
I would just add and ask for thoughts about the following:

The Oil spot analogy always sounded pretty good to me because it also requires a second third and fourth look at the HT Bill refers to. Where to do it or whether to do it somewhere(relates to populace commited against you) is to learn how to differentiate between wet and dry land(terrain). Water and oil don't mix and so also do COIN efforts and those directly within or very close to the insurgents support network.

I do believe I mentioned before on a different thread that the good thing about this is as long as those areas which "can" are brought into the fold through a variety of means it will have a very much metrically unmeasurable, but physically palpable effect on the areas one cannot.

It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.

Bill Moore
07-20-2008, 03:09 AM
From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.

David, the objective for the government is to expand the government's reach over the ungoverned areas so they can control them. As I understand Columbia (I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong) is that the FARC controls a large area in the southern part of the country, but it is largely undeveloped jungle and drug production centers. The major cities are in government control and beginning to thrive economically. The FARC is still a threat, but it is a manageable one. As the government gets stronger it can gradually expand its control over the rest of the country. It will take time, so you work the most important areas first and consolidate power there, then eventually challenge the current status quo in the tribal/insurgent areas. There are certain areas that the government must control to be legitimate. In Iraq those are the major cities and the national money making resources, which in Iraq is the oil fields. In Afghanistan you have to secure the major the cities, major lines of communication, and develop a national money making resource other than opium. Does it really matter strategically if the tribes control the border area for another 5 years? Those are the types of questions we need to ask. I heard one NATO officer said that the insurgency starts where the road ends, which makes sense. It is hard for a government to control an area where it cannot readily project an overwhelming force or provide for the economic life of the locals. Maybe they don't need to control it.


It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.

Ron, I don't know if I concur entirely with this statement, but I have frequently viewed insurgency as a form of armed democracy. The side that can most effectively mobilize the populace to "actively" support them wins. Obviously not a civil method, but it is clearly political warfare. Tribal chiefs fight to maintain control of their tribe, insurgents fight to usurp government control of an area or country, and the government fights to maintain or regain control. The key is establishing control of the populace, thus insurgencies have accurately been called political warfare or psychological warfare (PSYWAR), as a matter of fact the first Special Forces Qualification Course was called the PSYWAR course. Funny how much we forgot over the years. The government usually has the advantage of resources and organization, thus most insurgencies have been defeated or marginalized to an acceptable level, but it requires the proper strategy, and I think your right only the locals can determine what that is.

Meinertzhagen
07-20-2008, 09:34 AM
In response to the posts on population control and given our limited current force structure, I would suggest that the Waygal Valley (where Wanat is located) is perhaps just a valley too far to effectively pacify. While Wanat is technically in Kunar Province, it is one of 9 major Waigali (Nuristani) villages located in the Waygal Valley or one of its capillary valleys. The valley itself has a population of perhaps 22,000, most residing in the major villages and speaking a unintelligible dialect of Nuristani and practicing a distinct culture forged in thousands of years of inter-tribal warfare.

The Waigalis, at their heart, are isolationists. There are probably no Al-Qaeda members among the local insurgents and the actual Taliban influence, outside of the deobandist meta-narrative is negligible. Each of the 9 villages are so remote and in such extreme terrain, that U.S. forces have never even visited most of them including the most important and largest village, Waygal. Simply to occupy a position in each of the villages would require much of the resources of an entire infantry battalion, not to mention an additional heavy-lift rotary-wing company for resupply. This begs the question of whether control of the valley is worth the resources that could likely be utilized to much greater effect elsewhere with more strategic or at least national influence or importance.

The Waygal vignette is an example of just how distant victory is in Afghanistan. One can find multiple other examples of similar valleys or regions with similar challenges; Kamdish, Korengal, Dawlat Shah are just some examples close to Wanat. This in no way minimizes the accomplishments of my fellow Sky Soldiers during the last 15 months in those most foreign of valleys, but extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal.

(View of Aranas Village, typical of others in the valley.)
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/10th_Mountain_Div._at_Afghanistan.jpg/700px-10th_Mountain_Div._at_Afghanistan.jpg

Tom Odom
07-20-2008, 12:16 PM
From the 173rd ABCT Commander:

Front page Mideast edition (http://epaper.stripes.com/)(in PDF)


Commander: Media Reports On Afghanistan Outpost Battle Were Exaggerated

173rd’s fight not symbol of more violent Afghanistan, says Preysler

By Mark St.Clair, Stars and Stripes

"The sky is not falling," Col. Charles "Chip" Preysler, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, said Saturday from Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

Preysler spoke via telephone less than a week after his paratroops and their Afghan allies were involved in a fierce attack at a small post near the village of Wanat. In the July 13 battle, nine of his men were killed and 15 others wounded.

But the attack is not a sign of conditions worsening in the country, he said.

The battle occurred just after dawn at a temporary vehicle patrol base called Bella. A platoon-sized element of Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) soldiers and a smaller Afghan National Army force were occupying a hastily built area as they had done many times over the 15 months they’d been in country, Preysler said. The soldiers were there on a reconnaissance mission to establish a presence and find a good location to connect with the local government, populace and Afghan National Police, he said.

Bill Moore
07-20-2008, 04:32 PM
Tom,

Thanks for posting that article, I know the Bde and Bn Cdr and there are no finer officers. Anyone familiar with the 173d know that they don't shy away from a hard fight. I just hope COL Preysler's interview gets disseminated beyond the Stars and Stripes so the record can be set straight on the home front.


extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal. posted by Meinertzhagen

Well said, and many thanks to the men in 173d ABN (The Herd) for their hard fighting over the past 15 months.

Rank amateur
07-20-2008, 08:27 PM
In response to the posts on population control and given our limited current force structure, I would suggest that the Waygal Valley (where Wanat is located) is perhaps just a valley too far to effectively pacify.

Excellent post, photo and analogy: "valley too far." I think that's a sound strategy. but looks it looks like we're going to stay population centric. From Tom's link, Page 3. (For some reason I can't copy the quote.)

Ken White
07-20-2008, 09:08 PM
Excellent post, photo and analogy: "valley too far." I think that's a sound strategy. but looks it looks like we're going to stay population centric. From Tom's link, Page 3. (For some reason I can't copy the quote.)copy it because I just read the whole page and can't determine from where you derived that conclusion (not that I disagree with the statement). Sorry, I'm old and slow...:(

Rank amateur
07-20-2008, 09:22 PM
copy it because I just read the whole page and can't determine from where you derived that conclusion (not that I disagree with the statement). Sorry, I'm old and slow...:(

It's "copy protected," - for me anyway - but here's it is retyped.


"...have separated the insurgents from the population in many areas," Pressler says. "This one area is still contested. We're going to have to go back in there, fight hard to separate the insurgents from the population and that is exactly what we're going to do."

Ken White
07-20-2008, 10:26 PM
Not that I question you or the statement, it's just weird. :confused:

The Mideast Edition I get at the link is the one for Monday, 21 Jul 08. Only thing I can figure is that maybe Tom posted the link early enough and you hit it and got the 20 Jul edition. Searched the whole PDF and Preysler's name doesn't appear -- nor does '173rd'...

Like I said, no disagreement or questions -- other than the vagaries of cyberspace. :confused:

Thanks for the response!

Rank amateur
07-20-2008, 11:50 PM
Only thing I can figure is that maybe Tom posted the link early enough and you hit it and got the 20 Jul edition.

That's it. Get July 20. Page 1 and 3. (http://epaper.stripes.com/index.php?archive=202703761764088209645088238789)

Ken White
07-21-2008, 12:49 AM
That's it. Get July 20. Page 1 and 3. (http://epaper.stripes.com/index.php?archive=202703761764088209645088238789)r eturned from dinner. Appreciate it -- any excuse for me to be lazy is good... ;)

I see what you meant...

Tom Odom
07-21-2008, 01:08 PM
returned from dinner. Appreciate it -- any excuse for me to be lazy is good... ;)

I see what you meant...

Ken if you can get to the Ebird, you can get the whole thing there

Tom

VMI_Marine
07-21-2008, 01:53 PM
This article (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) is a good account of what happened. As I suspected, most of the KIA occurred in the fight for the OP. The only problem I have with the article is that they continue calling it a FOB instead of a patrol base.


Cpl. Matthew Phillips was close by, so Stafford called to him for help. Phillips was preparing to throw a grenade and shot a look at Stafford that said, "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."

Ken White
07-21-2008, 04:33 PM
Ken if you can get to the Ebird, you can get the whole thing there

Tomall us pure retirees out; gotta have a .mil puter for the bird. I cannot now get to some pubs I could get to last year...

selil
07-21-2008, 06:03 PM
Dang Ken... I talked to somebody "attribution not allowed" who said that will be changing. I do not have any idea what they meant, but military ID cards becoming CAC cards and allowing retirees access to previously allowed now not allowed stuff? Something like that anyway. Sounds positive anyways.

Tom Odom
07-21-2008, 06:21 PM
all us pure retirees out; gotta have a .mil puter for the bird. I cannot now get to some pubs I could get to last year...

I get on from home with DEERS data but that is because I am still a DAC.

PM sent

120mm
07-21-2008, 08:14 PM
I'm completely heartsick about this. We trained these guys last year, and one of the tasks I wrote was "occupy a COP". And I made some friends in Chosen.

Ken White
07-21-2008, 09:48 PM
I'm completely heartsick about this. We trained these guys last year, and one of the tasks I wrote was "occupy a COP". And I made some friends in Chosen.an OP to watch the village. So, as usual, the media blew the reporting...

Darksaga
07-23-2008, 09:47 AM
Tom,

While the commanders assessment is very important it is also important to keep in mind the political factors. This skirmish was all over the news. The politicians don't want to appear ineffective.

This incident is one that will change the face of operations in Afghanistan.

Tom Odom
07-23-2008, 12:13 PM
Tom,

While the commanders assessment is very important it is also important to keep in mind the political factors. This skirmish was all over the news. The politicians don't want to appear ineffective.

This incident is one that will change the face of operations in Afghanistan.

While I would not dispute the role of the political world, I would not rush to judgement concerning ops and this attack. Much is going to change in OEF in the coming months but I doubt those changes will be driven by this attack.
The politicians were already making noises about Afghanistan as were military leaders.

Tom

Entropy
07-23-2008, 01:47 PM
What it may ignite is more controversy on the M4. At least one news account (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) I read said that weapons froze up during the battle:


Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

Jedburgh
07-23-2008, 02:08 PM
What it may ignite is more controversy on the M4. At least one news account (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63479&archive=true) I read said that weapons froze up during the battle:
When you read the piece in full, there is only one instance where a weapon is specifically mentioned as seizing, and that was a M249 SAW. There is no mention of an M4 failure in that article.

Entropy
07-23-2008, 02:39 PM
When you read the piece in full, there is only one instance where a weapon is specifically mentioned as seizing, and that was a M249 SAW. There is no mention of an M4 failure in that article.

A bit later than that, the article says "several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire..." I'm assuming here (perhaps mistakenly) that probably actually refers to the soldiers' rifles.

Jedburgh
07-23-2008, 02:52 PM
A bit later than that, the article says "several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire..." I'm assuming here (perhaps mistakenly) that probably actually refers to the soldiers' rifles.
The rest of the sentence is ....several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire because of damage.

With the amount of shrapnel flying due to the high rate of RPG fire, plus grenades, that is not surprising - and it is very different from a statement of mechanical failure, as with the SAW.

Tom Odom
07-23-2008, 03:12 PM
This is another journalistic effort that comes close but does not quite get it right. First as Jed and Entropy are discussing is the issue of weapons failure versus weapons damage. The other is his use of FOB when it was patrol base. FOB implies a much more permanent structure. So far the coverage has been ok;I am reminded how off base reporting, press and military, was after the 5307th convoy incident. Compared to that, coverage of this one has greatly improved.

Tom

Hacksaw
07-23-2008, 03:25 PM
Dark Saga, as others have mentioned the scope of military activities in AFG will change in the coming months, but that was already well in the works.

As for the reporting on this incident, I'll take a mostly right account and consider the military ahead. Too often accounts are mostly wrong and require an inordinate amount of time to correct the record. Better things to do...

On a related note... Did anyone see ADM Mullen interview with Jim Lehrer last night? (link to interview: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec08/mullen_07-22.html ) Lehrertook an unusually agressive tone wrt AFG and Iran. Essentially saying... 1) We would like to do more in AFG but we are still mired in IZ 2) We can't possibly consider Iran 'doable' given we can't divert more assets to AFG 3) If you support the current Commander and Chief, how can you do the same if Obama happens to win...etc... In essence Lehrer took a page out of the Congressional Committee SOP and asked questions in the form of a statement. Mullen was cool and corrected the record where appropriate (e.g. where Lehrer read into a response made earlier in the interview). I've always thought of Lehrer as one of the more 'agnostic' members of the media, but the fangs were out last night.

Just food for thought

Tom Odom
11-04-2008, 03:49 PM
Latest on the investigation:


Afghan Officials Aided An Attack On U.S. Soldiers (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/world/asia/04military.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin)

By Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON — An internal review by the American military has found that a local Afghan police chief and another district leader helped Taliban militants carry out an attack on July 13 in which nine United States soldiers were killed and a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan was nearly overrun.

Afghan and American forces had started building the makeshift base just five days before the attack, and villagers repeatedly warned the American troops in that time that militants were plotting a strike, the report found. It said that the warnings did not include details, and that troops never anticipated such a large and well-coordinated attack.

The assault involved some 200 fighters, nearly three times the number of Americans and Afghans defending the site.

As evidence of collusion between the district police chief and the Taliban, the report cited large stocks of weapons and ammunition that were found in the police barracks in the adjacent village of Wanat after the attackers were repelled. The stocks were more than the local 20-officer force would be likely to need, and many of the weapons were dirty and appeared to have been used recently. The police officers were found dressed in “crisp, clean new uniforms,” the report said, and were acting “as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.”

The attackers were driven back after a pitched four-hour battle, in which American artillery, warplanes and attack helicopters were ultimately called in. Still, the militants fought in ways that showed imaginative military training, if not sophisticated weapons.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
11-04-2008, 08:37 PM
The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.

Actually, both probably should be done in parallel. :D

Ken White
11-04-2008, 11:20 PM
is convincing, not coercing, and assisting the local population to not be docile and do something to prevent the TB from committing random acts of terror against them. That was one of the main missions of the CAPs in I Corps: help the locals defend themselves against the local VC.And that was a spotty performance. It ranged from outstanding to poor. All CAPs and all villages were not created equal -- nor were the opponents of those two all equal throughout all of the I CTZ area. All those parameters were also in a constant state of flux for many reasons. There is no one best answer.
Actually, both probably should be done in parallel. :DAgreed to an extent, and, as with the CAPs in VN and as I've seen done elsewhere, I think we're doing that. I submit, however, that given the varying quality of advice and assistance from us, the availability and quantity as well as the willingness of village manpower and then considering the enemy plans, capability and effort locally that the convincing of the bad guys has to take first place to a significant degree; the village self defense can follow closely. :D:D

VMI_Marine
11-12-2008, 01:40 AM
Stars and Stripes has a redacted copy of the 15-6 on the battle. Part I (http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf) and Part II (http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat02.pdf).

Initial thoughts:

- The platoon chose to establish its patrol base near the village bazaar, and the OP was on slightly elevated terrain. It sounds to me like they chose not to occupy the dominant terrain features in the area. This was a significant tactical risk, and it is unclear how they tried to mitigate it.

- They assumed that risk in order to locate closer to the population, in order to better separate the insurgents from the population. This is in keeping with the mantra of the population as key terrain which I heard numerous times at JRTC last year. While I agree that in Iraq the population was vastly more important than existing natural terrain features, I don't believe this is the case in Afghanistan. The population is always important, but in AFG the natural key terrain must be taken into account.

- The Paratroopers showed great discipline in their individual actions in the Patrol Base, during stand to, etc. I'm surmising, from what little info I have, that it has a lot to do with why they were not overrun. Individual bravery accounts for a lot, but their disciplined approach to stand to ensured that they were awake, geared up, and ready for the attack.

FM 3-24 says that, "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." Certainly we saw that applied in Iraq, but I think Wanat is a counterpoint of sorts. We all know by know that to succeed in COIN you must secure the population, but I think the Battle of Wanat shows that a Counterinsurgent force cannot secure the population if it cannot secure itself. The Troopers of Chosen Co might have been more successful if they had established their VPB more along the lines of a "conventional" strongpoint defense and sacrificed some access to the population in favor of occupying key terrain. Otherwise, try to mitigate the risk by registering indirect fires on key terrain that you are not occupying.

If anyone has information that supports or refutes anything I said above, I'd love to hear it. I feel like this should be a case study in establishing a fixed position in a COIN environment. Unfortunately, the lessons drawn from Wanat are written in our Soldiers' blood, but to me that just makes it that much more important that we absorb those lessons.

Ken White
11-12-2008, 02:03 AM
I haven't read but have heard from good sources, I think your assessment is on the mark.

I also strongly agree with you on the facts that, in many cases (and Afghanistan is certainly one), the population has to take second or even third place in the METT-TC assessment; and that a COIN unit has to be able to survive and protect itself in order to protect anyone else. Never let the doctrine lead you into dumb...

Been my observation that most fighting forces will if possible avoid a pitched firefight with any unit that appears to be disciplined, competent and to know what it's doing. That belief matured over many years in strange places -- and even though I'm old and out of it, everything I've read or heard inclines me to believe that is still totally true and is particularly true in the current ME/SA theaters..

Yet, apparently the Taliban (or someone) attacked a fairly competent force that had it's act together. Does that negate my belief? Uh-uh. Bad guys can get bad intel, make stupid frontal assaults and screw up just like we do...

Fortunately, they even tend to foul up a bit more than we do... :cool:

VMI_Marine
11-12-2008, 02:23 AM
I think they believed that the terrain gave them enough of an advantage to negate the Soldiers' discipline and competence. Events seem to bear that out.

Another thought - the three attempts to reinforce the OP all ran directly to the OP itself. This appears to me to be the equivalent of rushing into the kill zone of a far ambush to reinforce the element in contact. From my couch in a well lit and air-conditioned room, with no one shooting at me, my first thought is to attack and seize key enemy positions, relieving pressure on the defenders at the OP, before seeking to move to the OP proper.

While talking with members of an ODA following an IED attack on my vehicle not far from Camp Blessing and the Waygal Valley, I mentioned that I immediately told the driver to keep going and get us out of the kill zone, even though I knew our gunner had been thrown from the turret. One of the team members thought it was screwed up that I was going to leave the gunner. I told him that it would have done the gunner no good to jump out of the vehicle and immediately get pinned down, if not get hit, in the kill zone. Far better to escape the kill zone and fight back to the casualty. As it was, the vehicle's engine was completely destroyed by the IED, and there was no accompanying ambush, so it was moot. :cool:

The gunner was fine, BTW. Just a few scalp lacerations.

Ken White
11-12-2008, 02:58 AM
instinctive or training implanted. We'd all like to do THE right thing but it's not always obvious just what that is...:eek: :confused: :o :cool:

Interesting anecdote. I'd have done the same thing. I left Boot Camp at P.I. over 50 years ago with many things drummed into my head. Two were "If the BAR man gets hit, take his weapon, his ammo and keep moving." and "Don't try to treat, that's the Corpsmans job." Both those things came out of harsh experience in a really big and very busy and brutal war. Both stood me in good stead and I saw their merit in Korea and later in Viet Nam and a couple of other places.

Taking the latter first, the combat Lifesaver Program negates what I was taught and practiced. It is a good thing and I know it's saved lives since it was introduced in the 90s but I do wonder if in major combat it will not be a detriment. Don't know the answer, we'll see -- but it worries me...

On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war. Again, we'll see...

You may be correct on the terrain aspect giving them enough advantage; though I'm not sure, all things considered and the relative numbers of KIA and probable wounded counted, that events bear them out. Bad guys can flub, too.

Bill Moore
11-12-2008, 03:48 AM
Ken and VMI_Marine, I agree that you have to get out of the kill zone first, then work your way back (if it doesn't result in mission failure) to any casualties. The leave no man behind mantra in some respects is a powerful tool for emboldening Soldiers to fight hard, but in many situations it violates our priorities and pre-empts the use of judgment.

I'm disappointed that an ODA member told VMI he messed up, but I'll assume it was a young ODA member. As VMI stated in his example, it is plain stuipd to jump out in the kill zone.

Every situation must be evaluated on numerous factors, and the leader must make that evaluation in seconds under the toughest conditions. Again I think the mantra makes the decision for the leader; therefore, judgment no longer applies. This may have terrible consequences if we get a tough war with numerous casulaties. The order of priority should remain the mission, your men, and then yourself. This is what we do, if we put ourselves or our men in front of the mission, then what have we become?

I recall getting taught that we were conducting an attack on an objective, you didn't stop and provide aid to the wounded enroute to the objective (you didn't divert combat power). You pressed with the attack, then took care of any casualties on the objective first to reinforce the combat power to resist a counter attack, then went back and collected/treated the remaining casualties. Obviously one needs to use to judgment, but this method seems to me to the most efficient militarily. Unfortunately the "leave no man behind mantra" precludes the use of judgment. On the other hand, it does seem to embolden our Soldiers, and they do (for the most part) live by it. I'm not 100% convinced I want to throw it out, but we need to address it more holistically in our leadership schools.

As for protecting the populace to separate them from the insurgents, if that was the mission, then in my opinion they set up appropriately to accomplish their mission. If they focused on the physical terrain and allowed the insurgents to access the populace, then they would have failed to complete their mission. You can argue the force was too small, but I don't want to get into the game of second guessing. Usually any fight for key terrain is a tough and bloody fight. I appreciate the respect that has been shown to these brave Soldiers throughout this discussion. I have a warm place in my heart for the Herd.

Schmedlap
11-12-2008, 03:57 AM
On the take the ammo and automatic weapon and move out bit, years later in the Army, after Viet Nam (and I think the 'after' is important) I sometimes was criticized for strongly and constantly pushing variants of that guidance until and even after I retired (some in uniform hate hearing 'guidance' and training stuff from old civilian employees) which I believed and still believe to be correct but it was in conflict particularly with the Ranger and SF communities and the 'never leave anyone behind' mantra. That's a post Viet Nam (Viet Nam induced???) idea and I often wonder about it given a real busy and big war.

I specifically recall this point being emphasized during our train up for OIF III. Whenever a SAW gunner went down, if you were a rifleman, then you swapped out your weapon for his. Months later, when we were deployed, I remember one of our SAW gunners getting shot in the leg and a 19-year-old rifleman in his team promptly swapped out weapons with him. They'll do it if you train them to. Those lessons from Nam weren't forgotten by all units.

Ken White
11-12-2008, 04:01 AM
are good because they do the basics well...

Cavguy
07-23-2009, 06:03 PM
Summary of the CSI report draft on the battle over at Tom Ricks' blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/23/wanat_viii_an_army_report_finds_a_major_coin_failu re


The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Charles Preysler. The core problem, Cubbison writes, is that the battle resulted from "a failure of COIN [counterinsurgency] manifested in a major combat action that although a marked tactical victory, became an operational and strategic defeat." Indeed, the report concludes that the unit's attempts at counterinsurgency were so badly implemented that they "were more likely to foster hostility than reciprocity from the local population."

Interesting ammo for both sides of the COIN debate - COL Gentile can argue that "dogmatic" COIN approach did play a role, and I can confidently state that it isn't the fault of the doctrine, but poor application and understanding.

Of note, is the report praises the combat performance of the troops while questioning the operational concept.

Ken White
07-23-2009, 06:59 PM
the Army's attempt to be honest about the action.

He provides one quote that many will be inclined to ignore. I think that would be a mistake:
The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.The basic problem with using the GPF in a FID/ SFA roles is not that the leaders cannot learn the TTP and apply them (though we obviously still need to work on that...) nor is is that decent leaders cannot control the actions if not the attitudes of young troops who feel as the quote suggests.

The basic problem is that some people are drawn to the application of force and many of these tend to get into the GPF. Others who see force as a tool to be applied sparingly and only when needed drift into SF or SF like organizations. Two different philosophies and approaches. The second can and will adapt to all cultures; the first is far less likely to adapt and very prone to insist or at some level believe that the other culture must adapt to them or, if it does nor, that said culture is not worth the effort involved.

Those are generalizations of course, with all the standard caveats but I've seen that effect too many places and too many times to discount its importance. To say that the GPF attitude is "look like me or die" is an oversimplification -- but not by much. :wry:

Once the training and education issue is fixed, the GPF problem in COIN will not be the troops who don't care for the culture, mission or location of the effort. The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

We need the GPF to be versed and trained in the TTP of FID /SFA, no question and we're working on that. More importantly, we also need to do our national best to avoid having to commit them to such efforts. Commitment of USAid, SF and other elements in an attempt to forestall future problems is vastly preferable. No matter how much avoidance costs, that effort will almost always be less costly to the US, the Host Nation and the local population than will GPF commitment.

IntelTrooper
07-23-2009, 07:36 PM
The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...
Absolutely. I expect young E-3s (and sadly, E-6's and E-7's) to make dumb comments like "F--- these goat f---ers." What is unacceptable was that I saw/heard these kind of statements made in the presence of lieutenants and captains who made no effort to correct that attitude. At that point it is a failure of the officers who should know better (and if they don't, they need to be riding a desk somewhere).

Danny
07-23-2009, 07:36 PM
I am currently reading this long report and will hold my thoughts for now. I will weigh in later on his analysis of Wanat, some I agree with thus far and some I do not. It is a well written and comprehensive analysis regardless of agreement or disagreement one might have with any particular bit of it.

As for the issue of massing of troops that Cavguy brougth up earlier, this doesn't surprise me as it has been a mainstay in their mode of operation. I hate to shill for a post I wrote, but this is important:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/05/19/taliban-tactics-massing-of-troops/

In my own analysis of Wanat:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/11/11/analysis-of-the-battle-of-wanat/

I was very critical of a number of things that he also criticizes (such as the delay in setting up VPB Wanat and the proximity of OP Topside which caused most of the deaths that awful night), but I didn't criticize the practice of COIN for reasons I will address later after I am finished with his report. I think that it's easy and necessary to provide open and honest critique of TTPs and other inanimate objects, but when it gets personal it's much harder and more subjective.

I wish all of these men well and my respect goes out to them all.

Cavguy
07-23-2009, 07:45 PM
Hersch,

A little off topic, but ...

As always, I enjoy your analysis, but find the Marine cheerleading a bit much throughout your blog. I love the marines, fought beside them, but there is a theme that constantly implies everything the Army does is bad and the Marines are always right. Also, the Marines didn't win Anbar, the US Military did. It's hard for me to stomach seeing that constantly in your blog when there were many services, and Army troops from 2004+ made up at least 40% of the troops in Anbar. A small point, but it does disservice to those soldiers from other services who also did quite well there.

Niel

Danny
07-23-2009, 07:52 PM
I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Cavguy
07-23-2009, 08:13 PM
I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Thanks. I know that is not what you mean, just how it reads. When you lose 80+ guys in Ramadi during 2006-2007, and transform the AO, it grates a little to hear "The Marines won Anbar". That's my raw nerve. After our article on Ramadi, I see it many places, but often on your blog. Then most of your Afghanistan posts tend to say (paraphrase) the Army should do what the Marines did in Anbar (or Hemland), when the Army has done those kinds of ops. You're not as bad as the guy over at Free Range International, who has some of the best commentary on AStan around but takes every opportunity to bash the Army, which isn't a monolith any more than the Marines are.

Don't get me wrong, I'm extremely hard on the Army for its failures. But the "Marines are always right" them just grates on me, because they're not. No more so than the Army is.

For example, you talk a lot about Marines transforming Fallujah/Haditha, but seldom mention a similar strategy executed successfully in Tal Afar by the Army in 2005 ... the Army knows this too - you would find a better commentary response from Army audiences if you used examples of where the Army did things well rather than chiding them for not being Marines ... different orgs, different culture, different purposes. For example, a look at 3/10 MTN's Afghan deployment of 2006 may be instructive, as it was related in Kilcullen's book.

Just an observation that may broaden your readership.

Also: Snippet from COL MacFarland on the joint effort (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_88/ai_n25432641/):


"You old guys need to get over that s--t."

- Young Marine to Marine sergeant major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

In the March-April 2008 issue of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.


Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

...

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force.

Danny
07-23-2009, 08:21 PM
Niel, there are two options for me. I might soon become very much a pro-Army blog if things work out. My son it appears isn't going to re-enlist in the Marines, but an Army recruiter is after him to take a big signing bonus to join up and go SF. If he decides not to do this, I'll shut my blog down.

Tim Lynch is a super nice and great guy and lot's of fun and informative to read. When I see his Oorah stuff I smile and continue reading. You're right. His is some of the best Afghanistan commentary on the web, and it is a must read as far as I am concerned. I don't miss his stuff.

AdamG
03-26-2011, 05:33 PM
Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.



A military investigation that followed, led by Marine Lt. General Richard Natonski, blamed the deaths in part on dereliction of duty by superior officers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and called for career-ending reprimands for company, battalion and brigade commanders up the chain.

Those recommendations were approved by Gen. David Petraeus, then chief of U.S. Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Army Secretary James McHugh then tasked Gen. Charles Campbell, the chief of the Army's Forces Command at the time, with reviewing Natonski’s investigation and taking appropriate action regarding the recommended letters of reprimand. After reviewing Natonski’s investigation and meeting with the chain of command, Gen. Campbell concluded that the officers were neither negligent nor derelict and rescinded the letters of reprimand.

Then the Army published their study of the battle – which, according to Dave Brostrom, put a large part of the blame on his son, who commanded the airborne infantry platoon at Wanat.

That report by the Army's Combat Studies Institute is now the official history of the battle, and Brostrom - a retired lieutenant colonel who is about to send his second son into the service – says the report needs to be re-written.

http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/25/army-accused-of-covering-up-mistakes-in-afghan-battle/?hpt=C1

Ken White
03-26-2011, 07:14 PM
Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.
http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/25/army-accused-of-covering-up-mistakes-in-afghan-battle/?hpt=C1I have no idea where you got the idea that Mogadishu was or was going to be 'buried' but that is simply not correct.

There was much discussion of the action within the Army, worldwide and most people understood both the political and the military problems -- and the political and the military screwups. I'm not going to waste time culling DoD press releases but there were many and most were pretty accurate other then not directly criticizing the President, the SecDef or senior FlagOs involved -- bad in a way but to be expected. IIRC, they made no bones about the flawed JSOC plan or 3d Ranger Bn screwups.

The Washington Post had fairly detailed coverage at the time LINK (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080700747_2.html).

Time magazine (LINK) (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979399-1,00.html) in Ocotober of 1993 -- four years before the Philadelphia Inquirer began publishing Bowden articles on the action and before Bowden's book. It was and is a good book and it added detail but it didn't break any news...

Rick Atkinson, BTW, had articles in the Washington Post in early 1994. PBS Frontline had extensive coverage in '95 (and even more in '98).

It wasn't buried, when 41 Silver Stars and a bunch of higher level decorations including two Medals of Honor are handed out and videos of downed US pilots being drug through the streets go viral worldwide, you can't bury much...

No, it wasn't buried -- that no one apparently learned much from the well publicized debacle is the crime...

Pete
03-26-2011, 07:30 PM
Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.

Cole
03-26-2011, 08:30 PM
Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.
Nah Pete, COL Johnson replaced COL Charles Preysler in October 2008. The battle of Wanat was July 13, 2008.

Nothing new here. I have personally employed the final (and earlier) CSI study for training, and feel it has extraordinary value in that context.

Believe it unfortunate that many terminated FCS items originally part of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team would have greatly assisted OP Topside and the main vehicle patrol base by providing better RSTA of deadspace, hotel and bazaar interiors, and exterior perimeters near OP Topside and COP Kahler. Same for COP Keating a year later in October 2009.

NLOS-LS and other planned UAS would have been highly effective, if perfected. The concepts were sound...the execution, IMHO sucked, probably primarily due to the network. Unfortunately the money is probably gone to AirSea battle concepts. The Army loses once again in efforts to provide the same asymmetric advantages already offered other services.

Fuchs
03-26-2011, 08:51 PM
Are you referring to the remote ground sensors?

Afaik the video version was a sad joke in comparison to cheap civilian gadgets and all versions had terrible battery endurance.


There's a huge difference between military equipment for a few weeks of action and military equipment for years of occupation. Those unmanned grounds sensors clearly belonged into the former category.

Cole
03-26-2011, 10:56 PM
Are you referring to the remote ground sensors?

Afaik the video version was a sad joke in comparison to cheap civilian gadgets and all versions had terrible battery endurance.


There's a huge difference between military equipment for a few weeks of action and military equipment for years of occupation. Those unmanned grounds sensors clearly belonged into the former category.
The real question is whether it conceptually made sense to have urban and tactical unattended ground sensors, plus UAS and ground combat vehicles at lower tactical echelons. The now terminated NLOS-Launch System would have had a smaller blast radius and greater precision than the 155mm at Camp Blessing 5 miles to the south.

Properly executed, WITHOUT the FCS-specific network problems associated with all FCS systems, the concept made sense for dismounted units. Perhaps it was less necessary for mounted units with good organic vehicle sensors and more frequent movement.

The small unmanned ground vehicle remains and can perform some functions the unattended sensors would have performed. Batteries are cheap and getting better and small fuel cells are coming. Believe aerostats also perform a similar function as small UAS and unattended sensors. But those are less realistic when longer term COPs/FOBs are not in play.

But then we Americans are stupid. I live in shame for the wanton destruction of the few Libyan air defense systems and their operators who threatened allied aviators. Because I have a half German wife, I concede your point about the direct and obvious parallel between the Holocaust and German aggression in Europe in WWII and NATO's recent "aggression" in Libya. :cool:

Bill Moore
03-27-2011, 03:14 AM
Posted by AdamG


Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.

Strictly opinion, but I'm not buying the "Marine" version, plus Webb was a former Marine, and GEN P has to bend to political winds to get support for other things, so in short this looks like a USMC revenge attack on the Army for their mishandling of the Marine SOF unit's mishap in Afghanistan a few years back where they overreacted to a contact and killed a few civilians, so were pulled out of country. Those trying to make the case that Marines shouldn't be in SOF were unprofessionally using this case as an example. Now they the USMC has a chance to strike back.

Unfortunately the truth is hard to come by in these situations, and judgments like these are not based solely on facts. How many years did it take to the CDR of the USS Indianapolis cleared after its sinking? Due to political pressure he had to be shamed, then years later they admit they were wrong? You go to war, you make contact with the enemy, bad things happen.

Looking at this over time, what lesson should we take from it? Is the Army supposed to become even more risk adverse than it is already? The 173d has a long history of being aggressive, and I think we want light infantry forces that are aggressive if we plan to win in combat, but if winning doesn't matter then O.K. let's have an investigation on every contact where a Soldier was killed. I'm sure that will help us attract and retain dynamic future leaders in our Armed Forces.

Fuchs
03-27-2011, 09:41 AM
But then we Americans are stupid. I live in shame for the wanton destruction of the few Libyan air defense systems and their operators who threatened allied aviators. Because I have a half German wife, I concede your point about the direct and obvious parallel between the Holocaust and German aggression in Europe in WWII and NATO's recent "aggression" in Libya. :cool:

Indeed, you didn't get anything.
Your primitive response shows how hopelessly far away you're from at least understanding the problem.

The very thought that you're too far away from atrocities is the problem. You're not. You're already one foot in.
The attitude is the problem. It can easily be exploited. It only takes some propaganda to push you over because your attitude is already ripe for it.
You'd be a willing tool if you were in a ethical challenge as others were in many, many conflicts before.


And don't use a false quote for a straw man. I call out attempts to use a straw man argument (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strawman) quite frequently.

Cole
03-27-2011, 03:25 PM
And don't use a false quote for a straw man.

Your attempt at making a mountain over the-attack-of-Libyan-air-defenses molehill, followed by the statement below, would lead most observers to infer your implication of some equivalence with your nation's WWII aggression:


Several generations ago, hundreds of thousands of mostly very competent - and in some cases highly experiences - officers were wrong. They fought for victory. They failed their men, they failed their profession, they failed their country and they failed humanity.

This is an experience that added to my country's and our armed services' collective wisdom. It's not about victory alone, not by a long call. Decades of sitting on a potential battlefield with our very own allies plotting my nation's annihilation with nuclear weapons helped us not to forget this.

Flawed correlation aside, your initial mea culpa could not resist a parting shot at allies protecting you during the Cold War. Your implication that the U.S. would devastate then East Germany with small tactical nukes (and Carter's less destructive Neutron bombs) ignores that just as in WWII, the USSR would have devasted Germany far more if they had stormed conventionally across all Germany and Europe with a subsequent occupation. If that had occurred, instead of being the 4th largest economy in the world, today your entire country would resemble East Germany of the 80s.

I have never understood how smart people could have been suckered by Hitler, or let him take power. The current aversion to any form of aggression is equally puzzling because Germans typically are anything but passive personalities. Then I read this and more became clear:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/25/stage_fright

AdamG
03-27-2011, 03:42 PM
Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.


Army officials have not named the three officers originally cited to be disciplined in the CENTCOM review, but news reports have identified them as the company, battalion and brigade commanders for C Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

Col. Charles Preysler, who is now assigned to the Pentagon, was the commander of the 173rd at the time of the battle. Col. William Ostlund, now deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, was the battalion commander at the time, and Capt. Matthew Myer was the company commander. Early last year Myer received a Silver Star, the third-highest award for valor, for his actions in the battle. He is now assigned to the 6th Ranger Training Battalion at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/06/army_wanat_report_062310w/

Fuchs
03-27-2011, 04:44 PM
Your attempt at making a mountain over the-attack-of-Libyan-air-defenses molehill, followed by the statement below, would lead most observers to infer your implication of some equivalence with your nation's WWII aggression:

"Several generations ago, hundreds of thousands of mostly very competent - and in some cases highly experiences - officers were wrong. They fought for victory. They failed their men, they failed their profession, they failed their country and they failed humanity."

"This is an experience that added to my country's and our armed services' collective wisdom. It's not about victory alone, not by a long call.
Decades of sitting on a potential battlefield with our very own allies plotting my nation's annihilation with nuclear weapons helped us not to forget this."

Flawed correlation aside, your initial mea culpa could not resist a parting shot at allies protecting you during the Cold War. Your implication that the U.S. would devastate then East Germany with small tactical nukes (and Carter's less destructive Neutron bombs) ignores that just as in WWII, the USSR would have devasted Germany far more if they had stormed conventionally across all Germany and Europe with a subsequent occupation. If that had occurred, instead of being the 4th largest economy in the world, today your entire country would resemble East Germany of the 80s.

I have never understood how smart people could have been suckered by Hitler, or let him take power. The current aversion to any form of aggression is equally puzzling because Germans typically are anything but passive personalities. Then I read this and more became clear:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/25/stage_fright

A did B, C did B. A still did B, no matter what C did. Period.

Besides - the planning wasn't only about "East German" cities. Like the French, the U.S. forces had no problem with using nukes on West German territory in war games.There was a major NATO war game at SHAPE in the eighties that was aborted when German representatives left it in protest over Americans simulating genocide against Germans.
It should also be noted that 4/5ths Germany protected the West more than the West protected it while 1/5th of Germany wasn't protected by the West at all. 12 of 26 divisions in Germany were German divisions. Add in the huge quantity of reservists of the territorial force and the result is that West Germany provided the majority of NATO land power in Central Europe during the Cold War.
Meanwhile, most of the U.S. contribution were forces beyond the Atlantic, which could impossibly have arrived in time to protect Germans.

And that ####ty article is relevant how? I've delivered the arguments, and I'm not exactly known as a fearful person. Nor does the article even mention the official reason for the non-vote, or is anyhow related to my opinion on the attitude of some other SWC members.

The so-called "correlation" only seems flawed to you because -again- you don't get it. You feel too far away, too secure from the risk of ever being challenged ethically. You're too unprepared.


Feel free to open another thread for the continuation of this topic so I can ignore that one, for I won't wage a pointless forum civil war here anyway.

Pete
03-27-2011, 06:35 PM
At a very low level I used to be involved in what Fuchs is alluding to regarding the defense of West Germany during the Cold War. I understand Fuch's point of view and had similar conversations about this very subject with German friends when I was stationed there. Hopefully this thread will not become too heated an exchange.

Ken White
03-27-2011, 06:51 PM
Hopefully this thread will not become too heated an exchange.That would be good...

Pete
03-27-2011, 07:09 PM
The defense of West Germany during the Cold War posed some dreadful moral dilemmas. It reminds me a bit of that town in Vietnam where the officer said, "We had to destroy it to save it." The area in which I live was much ravaged during the Civil War but it has been a long time since there was a land war on American soil.

Granite_State
03-27-2011, 10:33 PM
The defense of West Germany during the Cold War posed some dreadful moral dilemmas. It reminds me a bit of that town in Vietnam where the officer said, "We had to destroy it to save it." The area in which I live was much ravaged during the Civil War but it has been a long time since there was a land war on American soil.

Yes, we've been blessed by geography, and would do well to remember that more often.

Cole
03-28-2011, 12:58 AM
The reason I believe Wanat, and the Combat Studies Institute effort to document events is a valuable training scenario is that COP Kahler was a microcosm of the future Army concept of wide area security and combined arms warfare in irregular warfare. Likewise it exemplified war's inherent uncertainty. No plan survives enemy contact of this level.

To those who believe the C-o-C was deficient in planning/protecting/supplying COP Kahler, recognize that:

* The first of 50+ 155mm rounds began landing within 5 minutes of the first insurgent rounds. Two mortars were available to the platoon but were immediately destroyed.
* A B-1B arrived in about half an hour but the enemy was too close
* AH-64Ds and MEDEVAC arrived in about an hour from 50 miles away and provided decisive close combat attack and rapid evacuation
* Camp Blessing's ground QRF HMMWVs arrived within about an hour and a half from just 5 miles away, certainly a reasonable distance.
* The COP had over 70 troops guarding it, both US and ANA, This was more than typical for other similar COPs and the battalion was responsible for around 14 such COPs
* Waigal valley that Chosen Company was assigned had an average number of Troops in Contact far lower than other sister companies in the battalion, to include one in Korengal Valley
* The COP had a LRAS3 and Improved TOW sensor and initial UAS support
* It had 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons thus limiting locations for positioning the vehicles on adjacent terraced and steep slopes
* COP Kahler had been in place only since about midnight 8/9 July and the attack occurred at 0420 on 13 July
* The Chairman of the JCS was visiting the battalion in this timeframe, thus occupying the battalion commander's attention. No reasonable leader would ignore such a visit.
* The company commander was tasked to perform a AR 15-6 investigation over an Apache engagement of trucks with insurgent mortarmen and possible hijacked civilians and thus he arrived the afternoon before the attack after experiencing a one day air transportation delay. He brought supplies and planned to patrol and address OP Topside problems the next day...but time ran out
* Wanat was being built because it was seen as a safer site than COP Bella that was farther from Camp Blessing and only resupplied/reinforced by air. The unit had 14 months and two weeks in country and thus was better suited to moving from COP Bella than the inbound unit that was just arriving.
* It had rained hard, the road to Wanat was incomplete and in poor condition the final leg, and the route clearance package had lost assets just before the planned move to Wanat. The contractor would not move large truck assets without such protection but smaller trucks did bring supplies. Both iodine and hand pump filters were available and a SSG was quoted as believing he had adequate supplies in the five HMMWVs when they departed Camp Blessing.

Given these circumstances, reasonable efforts appeared to be in place by the C-o-C to include 1LT Brostrum.

My point is that other larger Army efforts are justified to help lessen the fog of war by providing dismounted troops better "foglights" to help detect the enemy and IEDs. The need for greater precision fires with a smaller blast radius near friendly troops is another lesson.

Ken White
03-28-2011, 01:14 AM
The reason I believe Wanat, and the Combat Studies Institute effort to document events is a valuable training scenario is that COP Kahler was a microcosm of the future Army concept of wide area security and combined arms warfare in irregular warfare...It's scary because it is an inefficient and generally ineffective method.

While it can work, marginally well, it should be avoided. If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels. In the heat. And the snow (as they did for a great many years... :rolleyes:).

And crew served weapons on vehicles must always be capable of being employed on ground mounts. We used to know that. Why did we forget it?

And... :wry:

Cole
03-28-2011, 02:02 AM
It's scary because it is an inefficient and generally ineffective method.

While it can work, marginally well, it should be avoided. If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels. In the heat. And the snow (as they did for a great many years... :rolleyes:).

And crew served weapons on vehicles must always be capable of being employed on ground mounts. We used to know that. Why did we forget it?

And... :wry: You are talking Infantry training issues. But not sure given the volume of RPG and machine gun fire that those weapons would have been any more effective dismounted. One mortar was surrounded by HESCO and still got taken out early as did the TOW vehicle that was poorly positioned on an open ramp.

Gunners may have had difficulty elevating over adjacent walls if they had been dismounted. One .50 cal gunner on the commander's vehicle was particularly effective because he had a wall behind him that protected the vehicle from RPG fire from the hotel and bazaar. All the HMMWVs were much too close to the village motel and mosque. The enemy fired from the mosque at both Wanat and COP Keating a year later.

You must admit (but probably won't ;) ) that combat outposts seems pretty ingrained now for irregular warfare. They likewise appear effective when placed near populations as opposed to indefensible and less essential terrain, and when patrolling is involved. Even Vietnam had firebases.

Now there is talk of turning over the entire Pech Valley to the ANA. Camp Blessing is at the mouth of Wanat's Waigal valley and near the Korengal valley. It was the site that took recent mortar fire, causing a helicopter QRF response that tragically engaged older kids instead of insurgents due to a mixed up target handover of unknown (by me) origin.

That was a negative for Army airpower but nearby a few weeks earlier, there were news reports of up to 65 killed insurgents that had the BDA video verifying it was a legitimate engagement.

Ken White
03-28-2011, 03:38 AM
Forget that and / or try to do it on the cheap and it'll cost you later...
You are talking Infantry training issues.No, I'm writing about land combat survival issues and our phenomenal ability to foolishly discard lessons and good practices learned the hard way. People who really know the basic principles of combat, land or air make fewer dumb mistakes that get people needlessly killed. Warfare means killing and dying, that's what it's about -- the object, per George C. Scott, is to make "the other dumb bastard give his life for his country."
But not sure given the volume of RPG and machine gun fire that those weapons would have been any more effective dismounted.One mortar was surrounded by HESCO and still got taken out early as did the TOW vehicle that was poorly positioned on an open ramp.Was not there so cannot comment on the specifics. What I can say is that HESCO Barriers lead to delusions of safety; that no one should EVER site any position, even a very temporary one, a halt on a march or patrol, on lower ground that allows opposing forces to move to extremely close range and overwhelm a portion of the position by massed fires. I can add that if mortars are taken out deliberately (accidents happen, bad guys can have good luck...) then the individuals responsible for those tubes' position were almost certainly wrong. Badly so.
You must admit (but probably won't) ) that combat outposts seems pretty ingrained now for irregular warfare.Why would I not admit it -- it's obvious and a fact of life. That does not make it sensible...:wry:
They likewise appear effective when placed near populations as opposed to indefensible and less essential terrain...By essential you mean near a population center, I presume. That's arguable but there is a time and place for it -- it should NEVER be viewed as a reflexive solution or an ideal way to do business. It is not. METT-TC in all things.
and when patrolling is involved. Even Vietnam had firebases.Bad example -- people in Viet Nam went out on three to five day patrols over tens of kilometers from those firebases. Some folks went out for longer period and for greater distances. I spent thirty plus days roaming around away from any base several times; so too did thousands of others. My sensing is that is not so in Afghanistan. Different wars...
... causing a helicopter QRF response that tragically engaged older kids instead of insurgents due to a mixed up target handover of unknown (by me) origin.That's a training issue -- a major one -- but it isn't solely an infantry issue...;)
That was a negative for Army airpower but nearby a few weeks earlier, there were news reports of up to 65 killed insurgents that had the BDA video verifying it was a legitimate engagement.That's warfare, ups and down. Who dares wins; Who is best trained wins...:cool:

He who violates common sense rules on position selection, weapon siting and availability, target identification or anything else will pay, one way or another...:(

Pete
03-28-2011, 03:43 AM
If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels.
Wait a minute here. Are you trying to tell us that basic combat skills are more important than intellectual concepts thought up by people with PhDs in think tanks?

Ken White
03-28-2011, 04:08 AM
who you are -- and what you do. And perhaps on whether you want to live or die. :D

METT-TC... ;)

Bill Moore
03-28-2011, 07:04 AM
Ken and Pete,

Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost. We are engraining a lot of bad habits in this war.

Cole
03-28-2011, 12:00 PM
In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

Bill mentioned the above earlier. Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.

But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP farther from buildings may have helped as would additional RSTA assets taken from the unit the final days...not by the C-o-C that was accused of negligence. And it was not higher headquarters' fault either. Sufficient assets did not exist in country. Secretary Gates has made rectifying that a major priority.

METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills. But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above. Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.

Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan. Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol. COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.

Bill Moore
03-28-2011, 03:41 PM
Cole,

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio). We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

Ken White
03-28-2011, 04:39 PM
Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.I think you just made our point...:wry:
But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP ...Is it just me or do "HESCO'd" and "COP" not constitute an oxymoron. An outpost is a tactical position temporarily occupied; HESCOs imply some permanance and require mechanical aids...
METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills.Way wrong -- they are essential cognitive tactical and operational skills, they require training for acquisition and practice for retention and improvement. To be of value they must be applied.
But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above.You get the morning's bureaucratic response prize!!! ;)

The key words there are "brigade level and above." I agree (that's where those acronyms have purchase, rightly or, IMO, wrongly...). However, the selection of the actual location of a COP is not the Bde (or above) call -- or absolutely should not be -- and that siting should be tactically determined. Sensibly tactically determined...
the Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.True -- and all that can be provided to mobile elements as well as to inefficient and mostly ineffective COPs.
Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan.True again and yet another reason that the use of these COPs is unwise.
Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol.Or you mount platoon and Company sized patrols of two to three weeks from larger, easier to sustain operational bases. You can affect a larger population over far more area that way than you can by sitting in a 'COP' and rusting. Combat entails risk, stasis in combat exacerbates risk. Infantry walks, it's part of what they do and they should be doing it vice sitting in bullet magnets that really have little effect on (or with) the population.

Fighting go-rillas means that one never stays anywhere outside a major well defended base more than 24 hours because your more flexible and knowledgeable of local terrain and conditions opponent will embarrass you. To succeed against guerrillas and insurgents, mobility is more important than presence. Here's an article I read last year (LINK) (http://afghanquest.com/?tag=ascopepmesii). I don't totally agree but it's pretty good. I do agree with the commenter he quotes...
COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.One could quibble on the secure bit but one should acknowledge that stasis is a combat negative and that stasis in a poorly selected and organized location is an invitation to trouble.

Pete
03-29-2011, 12:39 AM
Mobility trumps...
I read that Stonewall Jackson wasn't the best of tacticians but his ability to move around quickly and then hammer his foes hard was his particular genuis. Early on he had been a Light Artilleryman and as such he had to pay a lot of attention to the reconnaissance, selection and occupation of positions for his battery. As a Confederate general he had Jed Hotchkiss making him maps and he also had his staff make him tables of distances between different geographical locations. He moved quickly and struck hard, even though some other officers were better than he was at arranging the disposition of forces during engagements.

ganulv
03-29-2011, 01:19 AM
As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement (http://mapper.acme.com/?ll=35.05480,70.90756&z=15&t=S&marker0=35.05263%2C70.90758%2CWanat) on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/view_of_Wanat.jpg

Cole
03-29-2011, 01:48 AM
You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio). Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.


We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once. Sure, things like GPS make us lazy. But we tend to grossly exaggerate the number of nations truly capable of jamming GPS on a sustained basis. Those are the nations typically deterred by MAD. All the rest are the Irans, North Koreas, Libyas, etc.

While I disagreed with Fuchs implied comparison of actions in Libya to WWII Germany, I tended to agree that the Libyan aircraft and air defense threat was/is vastly overblown. I read an AviationWeek article that said the maximum altitude of the SA-6 is 7000 meters and the SA-8 was only 5,000 meters while a new SA-24 based on the SA-18 had a max altitude of only 3,500 meters...all unclassified figures they published. And as Fuchs pointed out, old MANPADS and radar-guided SA-6 don't work well and can be overflown at altitude. They also could have been jammed and taken out with HARMs from altitude. Only a handful of adversary nations have truly effective air defenses.

Meanwhile, ground forces continue to face far higher ground casualties from current adversaries and a host of potential ones. Yet the money and new developments keep feeding the already safer air and seapower. When was the last major ship-on-ship sea battle? Which potential threats have significant naval power. Only a few deterred by MAD and economics.


As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).If Nuristanis are xenophobes, their gem trade is threatened by the government, and Karzai likewise prevents Korengalis from selling lumber to Pakistan, how is there hope of winning those hearts and minds in areas adjacent to the Pech river? Why are they even relevant?

The rural areas are too large to cover. Do police set up precincts in the sticks? Even the AfPak border is too large and too hard to resupply. We can't even cover our border with Mexico and Canada. Only aerial technology can cover areas that broad and isolated...and not necessarily well.


However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.Agreed, particularly field commanders and Soldiers who have served honorably and effectively for 14 months and two weeks which no other service or SOF/SF element has been asked to endure.

However, in this instance from the safety of my couch it is easy to point out that perhaps 1LT Brostrum should have used his ANA to patrol since they were drinking local water and had effective ETT leadership. So in this instance, avoidance of patrol risk or lack of trust in the ANA, actually increased risk to the platoon as a whole.

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices, perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described. The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.

Ken White
03-29-2011, 01:50 AM
As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?In the minds of many of us it is indeed a misleading and inappropriate term. Here's one Thread: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=11579).

IMO its an attempt to put people in a rather immobile and little changing category as is the terrain. Won't work. People won't stand for it. Bad pun intended...:D

You can use the search function on the board and find half a dozen or more Threads and literally hundreds of posts dating back to the birth of the term about five years ago. All with some pros and some cons...

Cole
03-29-2011, 02:03 AM
As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement (http://mapper.acme.com/?ll=35.05480,70.90756&z=15&t=S&marker0=35.05263%2C70.90758%2CWanat) on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/view_of_Wanat.jpg
You are looking north up the Waygal river valley and can make out the road on the east valley ridgeline that the platoon and ground QRF and supply trucks employed.

If you zoom in using computer zoom to 400% and look just southwest of the blue creek line, you can make out the road that Vehicle Patrol Base (or COP) Kahler was sitting next to less than 50 meters from multiple buildings from which the enemy fired. OP Topside was next to Wayskawdi Creek and trees and deadspace just south of OP Topside allowed the enemy to sneak up within meters. So LRAS3 dismounted at OP Topside did little to safeguard the platoon from a close-in threat. Likewise, as the photo depicts, no amount of digging in without overhead cover would have safeguarded platoon fighting positions. A large overhead or small tactical UAS and unattended sensors or small unmanned ground vehicle quite possibly would have detected infiltration attempts.

It was a lousy position, but you could certainly argue that COP Bella further north was far worse and had even fewer members of the population to influence. If you look at it on 400% zoom and see other closer pictures you also see few places to park 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons. The ridge adjacent to the blue line was terraced with several foot high walls creating each steppe.

Ken White
03-29-2011, 03:04 AM
Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...I wasn't there and have no idea when the Platoon did what so I cannot comment on that. What I can say is that if you assume that Platoon sat from April to July, I suspect you're doing them a disservice. They most likely were running at least some patrols from the FOB. One would hope, at least.

Patrolling is never easy. In mountains, it is quite difficult -- but it goes with the job. You should not avoid it because it is dangerous, nor should you avoid it because it is really hard work. To do so is to invite trouble.

Also note that you're having them walk with all their supplies to set up a 'COP.' That's not a patrol, that's an approach march to establish a static position. That's a very different thing -- and not a good idea...
I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices...Flattering is in the eye of the peacetime soldier who can afford the time and effort to be pretty. Also note that though armor was available it was worn by virtually no one -- can't do it in jungle heat and if we do another jungle war, all those Armor lovers are going to have either cases of heat stroke or personal conniption fit when some sensible General says 'dump the armor' (which of course means we could drop it in Afghanistan -- but we won't...). ;)
perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described.and the short ones. Different Army. Quite different. Better in some ways, not as good in others but definitely different...
The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.That's emphatically mixing Breadfruits and Blueberries...:D

No patrol should ever be 'random.' Its route should be carefully selected to be purposeful but not predictable and it should appear random only to the untrained observer. Other units should pursue different routes and timings and no one should stay anywhere more than 12 hours. All should occasionally and seemingly carelessly double back to village and populated areas they just left. They should look like they know what they're doing -- the opposition will always head for the low hanging Breadfruits, the poorly trained and the sluffers, the lazy -- who are always with us... :wry:

Static outposts have a poor record in COIN efforts while well planned and conducted long patrols are proven very effective in counterguerrilla work. Overall casualty figures from the two approaches differ but little. Extensive patrols worked in WW II, in Korea and in Viet Nam. Elements of the 1/82 BCT employed them also successfully -- as 82 Redleg can attest -- in Afghanistan. They cannot be sent out just to say we did it, they have to have a purpose, a thoroughly planned route and resupply process and be willing to forego own DS Arty support. When the bureaucracy got going in Viet Nam in late 1967, one of their first foolish diktats was that no US unit could move out of US Artillery fans. That stopped the long patrols and the war went downhill from then on. Better safe than effective...

It's the American way. :rolleyes:

The far higher casualty figures from Viet Nam compared to Afghanistan are due to the very different type of war plus big differences in terrain and vegetation. It can also be attributed to a very different, more numerous, better trained, better armed and more competent enemy -- that last not my opinion but from an acquaintance who was SF for years to include Viet Nam and now works as a Contractor for somebody or other.

Cole
03-29-2011, 03:51 AM
Also note that you're having them walk with all their supplies to set up a 'COP.' That's not a patrol, that's an approach march to establish a static position.Was implying that for a long patrol, you would need to carry a lot of water, ammunition, and food regardless of whether setting up a COP.


Also note that though armor was available it was worn by virtually no one -- can't do it in jungle heat and if we do another jungle war, all those Armor lovers are going to have either cases of heat stroke or personal conniption fit when some sensible General says 'dump the armor' (which of course means we could drop it in Afghanistan -- but we won't...). ;)Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.


No patrol should ever be 'random.' Its route should be carefully selected to be purposeful but not predictable and it should appear random only to the untrained observer. Other units should pursue different routes and timings and no one should stay anywhere more than 12 hours. All should occasionally and seemingly carelessly double back to village and populated areas they just left. They should look like they know what they're doing -- the opposition will always head for the low hanging Breadfruits, the poorly trained and the sluffers, the lazy -- who are always with us... :wry:Good point, and perhaps it has been covered. But it just seems to me that if you are protecting the population, your patrols and resupply routes must either avoid the population (and risk becoming irrelevant) and use honesty traces to avoid the same routes/chokepoints so the enemy does not plant IEDs there, or concentrate patrols and surveillance nearly continuously on the same routes and streets used by the population so the enemy has no time to place IEDs without risking being observed. Is that even possible without a nearby COP from which to originate the patrols and use aerostats, sensor towers, and small UAS and unmanned ground sensors/vehicles?

IIRC, one LTC did it in one Iraq city sending patrols out continuously, but believe they originated from COPs. The Marines seemed to have figured something out in Sangin, but suffered a lot of IED casualties initially before patrolling flushed out the problem. They are also using COPs.


Static outposts have a poor record in COIN efforts while well planned and conducted long patrols are proven very effective in counterguerrilla work. Overall casualty figures from the two approaches differ but little. Extensive patrols worked in WW II, in Korea and in Viet Nam. Elements of the 1/82 BCT employed them also successfully -- as 82 Redleg can attest -- in Afghanistan. They cannot be sent out just to say we did it, they have to have a purpose, a thoroughly planned route and resupply process and be willing to forego own DS Arty support. When the bureaucracy got going in Viet Nam in late 1967, one of their first foolish diktats was that no US unit could move out of US Artillery fans. That stopped the long patrols and the war went downhill from then on. Better safe than effective...

It's the American way. :rolleyes:

The far higher casualty figures from Viet Nam compared to Afghanistan are due to the very different type of war plus big differences in terrain and vegetation. It can also be attributed to a very different, more numerous, better trained, better armed and more competent enemy -- that last not my opinion but from an acquaintance who was SF for years to include Viet Nam and now works as a Contractor for somebody or other.Good comment and realize that the North Vietnamese were a tougher foe. But the shorter distance from sea to land bases had to be easier than resupply of Texas-sized land-locked terrain. Most resupply would need to be by air if forces never settled on key terrain protecting key populations. Doesn't that risk revealing friendly positions by either helicopter or airdrop resupply? Guess if done at night with multiple false insertions...
and GPS airdrops...that pesky tech thing again.

BTW, in my earlier text referring to the photo of Wanat's terrain, I should have said the deadspace was north of OP Topside, not south.

Pete
03-29-2011, 04:36 AM
Stonewall Jackson's strongest skill was in the area of route reconnaissance, both by map and as well as by aides or cavalry detachments. Like Forrest he got there ''The fastest with the mostest," even though at times his tactics could have been better. He was a cannon-cocker, not a trained Infantryman.

Ken White
03-29-2011, 05:23 AM
Was implying that for a long patrol, you would need to carry a lot of water, ammunition, and food regardless of whether setting up a COP.Not necessarily. Two to three days worth of necessary stuff will run about 40-50 lbs -- including the ubiquitous batteries. The key is resupply and there are several ways to do that. Going out with 60 pounds for a week long patrol isn't unheard of...

I have to caveat that by noting that I believe the water guidelines are for people in reasonable shape, vastly overstated.:wry:
Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.Tech solutions are great and I'm all for them but the jungle armor problem is less pure weight than the enclosure of the trunk and the stifling effect. A cooling tube arrangement would assist but that may entail even ore constraint on the torso...

Does Armor help keep people alive? Yes. Is it necessary that it be worn at all times in all situations? No. METT-TC...

Also note that the fact the technology can be pursued to make a lighter cooler vest, perhaps we should determine, tactically and politically just how important that is. Just because we can do it doesn't mean we should. We really need to prioritize development and procurement a little better; the current process tries to give everyone something and the result is fragments and crumbs...
Good point, and perhaps it has been covered. But it just seems to me that if you are protecting the population, your patrols and resupply routes must either avoid the population (and risk becoming irrelevant) and use honesty traces to avoid the same routes/chokepoints so the enemy does not plant IEDs there, or concentrate patrols and surveillance nearly continuously on the same routes and streets used by the population so the enemy has no time to place IEDs without risking being observed. Is that even possible without a nearby COP from which to originate the patrols and use aerostats, sensor towers, and small UAS and unmanned ground sensors/vehicles?That's the current view of things. The real issue is what you want the force to do. If you want it to engage in population security and attempt to protect the people from predators and civic action efforts with persistent presence, then you're on the right track. You will also need a large force and to establish a number of company sized COPs. Platoon sized invite defeat in detail -- or at least raise the risk thereof. You will also have difficulties in your assistance as the opponent will impede you pretty much in any way he can thus causing a two steps forward and one back process which will be quite expensive.

OTOH if you want to provide increased security for the populace so that someone else can do that civic action stuff in relative safety and without much of it being undone, then you find the troublemakers and kill them. You can do that with a far smaller (but better trained) force and COPs are the antithesis of what you should be doing.

What we currently appear to be doing in Afghanistan is an amalgamation of those two techniques with too small a force that is not adequately trained to do much else and the resultant compromise will work but it is terribly inefficient and it is un-American in that it's slow. ;)

The terrain and the settlement patterns in Afghanistan are not conducive to a heavy patrolling approach unless there is adequate air support for lift and resupply. We have the capability to provide that but have elected to not do so for primarily personnel policy reasons. We have elected not to seek and destroy (mostly) -- with the GPF to not 'waste' casualties on a war we cannot win. I do not blame the Army or the Commanders for that. We should've gone in trashed the Talibs and left but Bush was too nice a guy to do that. We're there and the guys are doing their best with the hand dealt.

Howsomeever, ideally, heavy patrols looping through populated zones on varied routes generally under surveillance by technical means or LRS troops (that are now mostly not being used to do what they're nominally trained to do because of the risk factor)...
IIRC, one LTC did it in one Iraq city sending patrols out continuously, but believe they originated from COPs.Several have, good units will always patrol heavily and frequently.
The Marines seemed to have figured something out in Sangin, but suffered a lot of IED casualties initially before patrolling flushed out the problem. They are also using COPs.Again, not there so cannot really comment but my perception and information is that the IED problem is mostly a training problem and that as units gain experience in theater, the numbers and effects go down considerably -- personnel policy again...

As an aside I've had several folks recently there tell me they're convinced the MRAP is an invention of the Devil -- good units use them sensibly, poor ones do not and tend to get Cocoonitis...
Most resupply would need to be by air if forces never settled on key terrain protecting key populations. Doesn't that risk revealing friendly positions by either helicopter or airdrop resupply?Mission dependent, that's not a problem. If it's a combat patrol, seeking to kill bad guys, you don't care if they know where you are once in a while. Plus the resupply strikes great envy in the hearts and mindsof the Evil Ones. If it's a recon patrol then this works:
Guess if done at night with multiple false insertions...and GPS airdrops...We used to be pretty good at that; even without GPS... :D
that pesky tech thing again.I'm not anti tech, not at all -- I just hope the limitations are realized and stay upset because we waste money on dumb things at the behest of Congress and the various communities in the services. That and the fact that we after April 1980 should have worked at developing stealthy insertion and extraction aircraft, tactical and strategic -- but did not because the Big War mafia was in charge. There was also a risk aversion factor in that omission...

We also are belatedly trying out unpiloted K-Maxs and Hummingbirds for resupply. At least the Marines are as the SOF folks have. Where's the Army and Army Aviation in that? :confused:

No easy answers to any of it...

AdamG
03-29-2011, 03:34 PM
To those who believe the C-o-C was deficient in planning/protecting/supplying COP Kahler, recognize that:
many details.

Good post, thanks for those observations.

Bill Moore
03-29-2011, 05:57 PM
Cole,

Your arguments seem to be all over the map and that is fine in a forum like this where we simply exchange ideas, many not fully explored and thought out. I'm no fan of our former SECDEF, but he did get some things right, and while politically unpopular the "fact" of the matter is you go to war with the kit you have (then it approves over time based on requirements from the field).

Regardless of our high tech kit, you still have to employ your forces using sound tactics. High tech doesn't replace what should be common sense. It is important to note that the U.S. military has only been defeated by technically unsophisticated foes. That may imply that our technology edge forces them to be more tactically compentent and encourages us to become less compentent over time?

I don't agree with Ken's comments on COPs. I think they can be effective (they were effective in Iraq), and don't recall our find, fix and finish operations having a major impact UNTIL they were augmented with sound COIN doctrinal tactics of controlling the populace, and part of that was employing COPs. In remote Afghanistan that is more challenging, and in my "opinion" shouldn't be done country wide to start with, but start at secure areas and gradually push out (leaving secure LOCs/MSRs behind you). More of the classic oil spot approach. Of course we're in a hurry now, so we're taking dangerous shortcuts.

Tactics are like you know what, so we can agree to disagree on those, but principles are principles and should only be violated after careful consideration.

Ken White
03-29-2011, 07:01 PM
They were in Iraq due to the compact nature of the operational area (mostly Baghdad and environs) and flooding the zone with a bunch of troops. The COP idea has worked elsewhere to include some -- but not all -- places in Viet Nam.

My point is that METT-TC considerations have to guide what you do and that second 'T' determines whether or not you should opt for persistent presence (lotsa troops...) or for aggressiveness and mobility (fewer but better trained troops). The other two 'Ts' also impact (along with distances, a subset of the first 't' and political issues, a sometimes -- this time -- subset of the third 'T' as well as always of the 'C') and, in Afghanistan, they IMO do not lend themselves to the COP approach. YMMV. ;)

Whatever works... :D

ganulv
03-29-2011, 08:26 PM
The terrain and the settlement patterns in Afghanistan are not conducive to a heavy patrolling approach unless there is adequate air support for lift and resupply.
Many archaeologists take an extensive line of sight (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/4746250454/) (which they tend refer to as viewshed) from a settlement as an indication of concern for defense. The photos (http://www.panoramio.com/photo/6971756) and video I have seen taken in Kunar lead me to believe that there is excellent line of sight not only from individual settlements but also on the roads and paths between them. Obviously a recon patrol is going to go off the transportation network and I know that the region is forested, but even so, am I correct in assuming that this is a serious constraint for recon patrolling?

I have to caveat that by noting that I believe the water guidelines are for people in reasonable shape, vastly overstated.
I don’t know, anyone traveling by foot in the Hindu Kush while wearing full body armor and carrying fifteen gallons of water is going to be sweating like nobody’s business. :wry: But in all seriousness, I was surprised upon reading the Wanat report to find how much the tempo of getting fortifications up was slowed by limitations in POU water treatment (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Point_of_use_water_treatment). Does anyone have a sense if this was simply a case of the equipment not being there in a timely manner for this particular unit or if it is generally representative? No POU system is ideal but relying on bottled water so extensively doesn’t seem necessary to me in any area that is not completely arid.

Pete
03-29-2011, 08:44 PM
Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost.
If the Small Wars Journal and Council had medals for leadership, judgement, the passing on of military knowledge, and the counseling and nurturing of younger people, be they current or former officers or enlisted, Ken White's chest would be covered with glory. Attention to Orders!

Ken White
03-29-2011, 09:39 PM
...lead me to believe that there is excellent line of sight not only from individual settlements but also on the roads and paths between them. Obviously a recon patrol is going to go off the transportation network and I know that the region is forested, but even so, am I correct in assuming that this is a serious constraint for recon patrolling?That's true anywhere there was brigandage and among warlike peoples (that includes much of the colonial and post colonial US...). It has an impact but is ordinarily not too significant although exceedingly heavily forested, swampy or mountainous terrain can make it a severe problem on occasion. Key is that the patrolling force recognize and account for it, a training and experience factor...
I don’t know, anyone traveling by foot in the Hindu Kush while wearing full body armor and carrying fifteen gallons of water is going to be sweating like nobody’s business. :wry: ... No POU system is ideal but relying on bottled water so extensively doesn’t seem necessary to me in any area that is not completely arid.Several factors, most notably an overconcern with sanitation to preclude waterborne illnesses, force protection take many guises...

When I was a young Marine, the old guys told us to always eat the local food and drink the water everywhere we went, said it would drive the Corpsmen and Docs nuts (a plus... ;)) and would probably make us mildly sick for a day or two then our system would adapt and if we later had to live off the land, we could do so with little problem. I was young and foolish, listened to them and did it everywhere. Still do. Worked for me, never had a problem... :cool:

Though the tiny Crayfish in rice paddies didn't taste too good. At least, I think they were crayfish...

My basic comment was aimed at the amount; we tend to significantly over hydrate IMO. Your fifteen gallons may be a bit much -- but not by much...:wry:

carl
04-02-2011, 10:57 PM
Here is an item from the Ares Blog I thought might be of interest.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a38b67c45-5a60-4bae-b8da-1a7560d52ef4&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

It is about success the French are having going out on up to 10 day long patrols with Afghan forces.

jcustis
04-03-2011, 05:16 AM
Here is an item from the Ares Blog I thought might be of interest.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a38b67c45-5a60-4bae-b8da-1a7560d52ef4&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

It is about success the French are having going out on up to 10 day long patrols with Afghan forces.

I'm unpleasantly surprised that this is a big revelation for the command element mentioned in the article.

I am pleasantly surprised that they have found a way to get the Afghan security forces working with them to stay out that long (perhaps they are rotated halfway through the ten days :wry:), because at about the 72-96 hour mark, I've observed effectiveness to plummet.

120mm
04-03-2011, 11:03 AM
Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.


Really? Rumsfeld telling the truth is dangerous?

Personally, I hate to actually experience a political and military leadership too cowardly to allow soldiers to dump their "modern body armor" and force them to stay in their MRAPs/M-ATVs. I'd prefer winning, which you cannot do if you are married to Michelin man suits and your vehicle the size of a three story building.


Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.

I'm assuming you have no idea what you are talking about, here. The armor weighs the same, though it's more effective. And every time something gets made lighter, military morons in the leadership use that occasion to find something worthless to add to the soldiers' load.

Cowardice on the part of leaders and risk aversion is not how you win a war, COIN or not.

I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.

ganulv
04-03-2011, 12:19 PM
I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.
And time scale is worth considering. If body armor (or anything else) contributes to fewer casualties on a day-to-day basis but also contributes to prolonging an operation then it might not actually contribute to fewer casualties, after all. By way of comparison, while a lot of contemporary views of Grant paint him as recklessly sending those under his command to their deaths in a series of frontal assaults it seems pretty clear that they themselves were willing to accept the risks if it lessened the chance they would end up dying of cholera on the march or in a Confederate POW camp.

Cole
04-03-2011, 01:36 PM
Really? Rumsfeld telling the truth is dangerous?

Personally, I hate to actually experience a political and military leadership too cowardly to allow soldiers to dump their "modern body armor" and force them to stay in their MRAPs/M-ATVs. I'd prefer winning, which you cannot do if you are married to Michelin man suits and your vehicle the size of a three story building.So you would prefer not to improve HMMWVs with additional armor and future chimneys? There's no value in getting farther from the COP in a M-ATV or JLTV that is survivable? Getting out of the vehicle is another matter entirely unrelated to the need for survivable vehicles against major current (and future) battlefield killers. If you get to the patrolling area before exerting yourself excessively walking there, seems to me you have more energy to go farther and stay more alert during the patrol. You also cover a larger patrolling area and have a vehicle to carry your supplies.

At 6 gallons of water per Soldier per day, how much weight would Soldiers at Wanat have carried if they had "patrolled" to COP Kahler instead of driving there? They also would have been carrying two .50 cal machine guns and tripods, two 40mm grenade launchers, and two mortar systems, plus an LRAS3.



I'm assuming you have no idea what you are talking about, here. The armor weighs the same, though it's more effective. And every time something gets made lighter, military morons in the leadership use that occasion to find something worthless to add to the soldiers' load.

Cowardice on the part of leaders and risk aversion is not how you win a war, COIN or not.

I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.Military cooling vests already are available to include for Soldiers, dogs, and military pilots. Nobody used body armor in Vietnam because it was heavier back then or unavailable and they did not have cooling vest technology. If a vest can be made around 2 pounds and the Army spends more for body armor 2 pound lighter, my peabrain head calculator indicates no increase in Soldier load.

Casualties not experienced are casualties that don't take several to all troop's attention away from the patrol, yes?

Have less than fond memories of an incident where I was training Soldiers in MOPP IV conducting a road march and a Soldier experienced a heat injury...in springtime Germany. Of course I was the bad guy.

Bottom line. Just because guys like you and me are in reasonable shape does not mean today's 18-30 year old is. Get them in shape, sure. But physiology and body heat remain a concern in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere no matter your condition.

Some day I'll tell you all about the study I volunteered for where they sent us out flying after being injected with atropine in varying quantities...and what that does to your body temperature and how they measure it.:eek:

Fuchs
04-03-2011, 03:14 PM
There was a time when weight-inefficient steel was used for helmets (M1 'steel pot'). A helmet weighed about 2.85 lbs then.

Other (more weight-efficient) materials appeared, a kevlar helmet (PASGT-helmet) was adopted. Significant weight saving was possible. It weighed 3.1 to 4.2 lbs.

Then came MICH, with reduced coverage. It weighed a bit less than 3 lbs.

Then came ACH. It weighed 3 - 3.6 lbs.

The Marines introduced the LWH, at a medium version weight of 3.05 lbs.

More weight-efficient materials, roughly the same coverage - no loss of gear weight. In fact, now you can add a NVS' weight to a helmet.

------------

Rifle bullet-proofed body armour had its revival in the 90's; Dyneema used pressed PE, the Russians like titanium and steel plates, but most inserts used ceramic plates since.

Improvements in ceramics lead to better weight effectiveness, better multi-hit properties, higher rating (protection against SVD with AP, not just against AK with ball). Weight didn't drop, though.
Whenever there was some 'room for improvement' generated by 'weight savings', something was added. NIJ Level II basic vests instead of simple flak vests have been introduced. The front plate of the Ranger assault armour became the example for the ISAPO vest with back coverage as well. Interceptor improved protection again. Upper body side plates were invented & added, even some shoulder plates.

Again, vests have not significantly shedded their weight since 1995. The materials advanced and became more weight-efficient, but vests did not become lighter.

- - - - -

There's a lot of buzz about "weight savings" for the "warfighter" blah blah, but all weight savings merely free up some weight for some other tool or toy.
Maybe it's human nature, maybe it's bureaucratic nature - or maybe political nature? In the end, there are no weight savings. There are additional tools ("capabilities") enabled by cutting weight off old tools.


Occasionally, some people fantasize about "light infantry" as "lighter individual load" infantry, even if only as a sidekick to heavy infantry of the conventional pattern. I did it several times as well.
It's hopeless. Auxiliaries may patrol & fight "light", but not our troops. They're Marius' mules and will stay so as long as we can afford their gear.

Ken White
04-03-2011, 03:25 PM
So you would prefer not to improve HMMWVs with additional armor and future chimneys?A poor truck can only take so much unplanned weight...:(
There's no value in getting farther from the COP in a M-ATV or JLTV that is survivable? Getting out of the vehicle is another matter entirely unrelated to the need for survivable vehicles against major current (and future) battlefield killers.That's not entirely correct. A capability provided will be used; if it increases 'safety' its use will be demanded. That leads to a self defeating spiral.
If you get to the patrolling area before exerting yourself excessively walking there, seems to me you have more energy to go farther and stay more alert during the patrol.Yes and no -- but it's obvious you haven't been on many real patrols. That's not a slam, it's something one has done or has not and one who has done it knows that the movement is a big part of the object of the patrol in a great many cases. It depends on what the purpose of the patrol happens to be.

Not to mention that Infantry, by definition, walks...:wry:
You also cover a larger patrolling area and have a vehicle to carry your supplies.Again yes and no, many variables in that statement, too many to address here but I will note that the ability to carry your supplies is a mixed blessing. Room for more junk and nice to have stuff that can often detract from mission success.
At 6 gallons of water per Soldier per day, how much weight would Soldiers at Wanat have carried if they had "patrolled" to COP Kahler instead of driving there?Nobody needs that much water. Nobody.
They also would have been carrying two .50 cal machine guns and tripods, two 40mm grenade launchers, and two mortar systems, plus an LRAS3.Nor would anybody with any sense contemplate taking a .50 or a 40mm AGL on a foot patrol or in a foot borne approach march -- if it's an approach march to establish a COP (dumb idea...) you'd fly the stuff in later.
Nobody used body armor in Vietnam because it was heavier back then or unavailableSome -- few -- did use it, most did not. It was available, it was lighter than current Vest / plate carriers but it was too constricting and it encased the torso (as does any current model...) and that induced heat casualties. It also too severely impeded mobility and most Commanders at the time knew that and they wanted -- and needed -- that mobility. It was a different Army, different mores...

ADDED: Just for info; USMC M1951 vest weighed ~8 lbs, USA M1952 about 10 lbs. and today's Interceptor about 16 to 25 lbs depending on plates and add-ons.
and they did not have cooling vest technology. If a vest can be made around 2 pounds and the Army spends more for body armor 2 pound lighter, my peabrain head calculator indicates no increase in Soldier load.Your calculator works, the rest of the brain isn't considering Drew's statement -- the 'leaders' will compensate for that weight reduction by adding something else -- that is, regrettably, pretty much proven by history. :rolleyes:
Casualties not experienced are casualties that don't take several to all troop's attention away from the patrol, yes?No. False choice. Casualties in combat are a fact of life. Having the technical ability to avoid some only lessens or weakens the skills needed to avoid others and thus increases those others -- sooner or later, in most (not all) circumstances, one has to leave one's vehicles. One should know how to do that. Increased reliance on vehicles lessens the skill in dismounted efforts.

It's a trade off. The real issue is not casualties and where and how caused but tactical and operational success, stasis or failure. That's the choice.

Cole
04-03-2011, 06:58 PM
A poor truck can only take so much unplanned weight...:
Which is why you buy newer M-ATV and JLTV with V-Hulls and figure new ways to make old HMMWVs more survivable such as "chimneys" that vent the blast and keep the vehicle from getting airborne.

The Army is often guilty of looking backwards instead of forward, and being hesitant to try something new. I'm sure the horse cavalry thought being on a small, agile horse provided more advantages than a mechanically complex and heavy behemoth that uses lots of fuel. Or maybe they were partially correct! What would happen if the mech guys created a 15,000 pound JLTV-variant that was CH-47 or airdrop transportable, carried just three troops, and had glass-armor chimneys running through the middle between tandem-seated troops. At 3 foot wide like an attack helicopter, it would optimize V-Hull angle that doubled as side armor. The resulting armored scout and OP would further disperse Bradley dismounts in a teamed vehicle relationship.

You could spend $10 million buying each new GCV to carry 9 troops. Or for $2 million dollars each, you could upgrade Bradley and Stryker armor, and spend a million $ buying each JLTV-variant as just described. That vehicle would replace LRAS3 HMMWVs and M3 Bradleys, not to mention creating a common vehicle for airborne and air assault divisions. Such a vehicle would be truly full spectrum capable safeguarding isolated OPs and checkpoints, and enhancing cordon and search, not to mention pursuit of insurgents firing from distant locations. Of course you could always run after the insurgents across 500-700 meters of open ground with numerous bounds, while the insurgents disappear and blend in....


A capability provided will be used; if it increases 'safety' its use will be demanded. That leads to a self defeating spiral.That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.

I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat. Airborne infantry often won't consider inherent threats to C-130s in a forcible entry. Airlanding 50 miles away across an international border and driving to the objective will be seen as the wimpy way. Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.

On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types, keeps the enemy guessing and allows optimized employment for the situation. I read that Wanat was taken by the Taliban in the past week. Wonder what the enemy response would be attempting to land in the same location where COP Kahler had been occupied? Yet if the Infantry simultaneously infiltrated on foot, drove in vehicles, and air assaulted to the site, the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.


Yes and no -- but it's obvious you haven't been on many real patrols. That's not a slam, it's something one has done or has not and one who has done it knows that the movement is a big part of the object of the patrol in a great many cases. It depends on what the purpose of the patrol happens to be.So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard? How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise. You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.


Not to mention that Infantry, by definition, walks...:wry:Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.


Nobody needs that much water. Nobody.Nor would anybody with any sense contemplate taking a .50 or a 40mm AGL on a foot patrol or in a foot borne approach march -- if it's an approach march to establish a COP (dumb idea...) you'd fly the stuff in later.Yet 5.9 gals of water per Soldier was a primary issue in the Wanat blame game. It was a cited rationale justifying not patrolling or digging more during the day. Iodine and hand pumps were available if less water was an option. The Marines used iodine and the ANA drank local water. Yet those became issues for which the C-o-C was going to receive reprimands. There was a helicopter/UAS shortage not under the C-o-C perview. At the time just prior to the Wanat attack, there were ongoing attacks in other valleys the battalion controlled that required attention/resources...yet inability to protect/supply/visit/supervise EVERYWHERE became issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.


Some -- few -- did use it (Vietnam body armor), most did not. It was available, it was lighter than current Vest / plate carriers but it was too constricting and it encased the torso (as does any current model...) and that induced heat casualties. It also too severely impeded mobility and most Commanders at the time knew that and they wanted -- and needed -- that mobility. It was a different Army, different mores...

ADDED: Just for info; USMC M1951 vest weighed ~8 lbs, USA M1952 about 10 lbs. and today's Interceptor about 16 to 25 lbs depending on plates and add-ons.Your calculator works, the rest of the brain isn't considering Drew's statement -- the 'leaders' will compensate for that weight reduction by adding something else -- that is, regrettably, pretty much proven by history. :rolleyes:




http://defensetech.org/2006/01/12/vietnam-flak-vests-soooo-light/

I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.


No. False choice. Casualties in combat are a fact of life. Having the technical ability to avoid some only lessens or weakens the skills needed to avoid others and thus increases those others -- sooner or later, in most (not all) circumstances, one has to leave one's vehicles. One should know how to do that. Increased reliance on vehicles lessens the skill in dismounted efforts.

It's a trade off. The real issue is not casualties and where and how caused but tactical and operational success, stasis or failure. That's the choice.Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.

If a Soldier can survive 7.62mm and shrapnel because he is wearing effective body armor and helmets, he has NODs that give him night vision advantages, and effective fire support and attack helicopter/fixed wing CAS/lethal UAS support is nearby, he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.

If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do, he has little control if the enemy places effective fires while he is in the open. Dismounted infantry are extremely vulnerable to artillery as you know...particularly without body armor and good helmets. A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.

Ken White
04-03-2011, 08:09 PM
That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.No, it is a procurement issue. It is one because it is at the whim (yes, whim...) of people whose leadership is not focused on mission accomplishment other than minimally but on institutional survival, they are a product of that branch perception problem -- in short, it is a techno fix that is only peripherally aimed at the mission and it is a human foible issue that will induce more human foibles and arguably could lead to as many or more casualties.

Short sharp actions always have many casualties -- long drawn out actions invariably produce more casualties and more damage. Similarly, excessive efforts at self protection are generally counter productive and also lend to the stretching out, in time. of combat, thus arguably and possibly (but often...) entailing more casualties over time.
I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat...Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.That's called stating the obvious and it contributes little to this sub thread. Having been Mech, a Tanker, Cav and Airborne over the years, I certainly know it's true but suffice to say, METT-TC should be involved in all those issues.
On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types...the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.Again, the action and effort should be tailored to the situation; there is no one size fits all.
So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard?Maybe, maybe not. Most likely the local warning net or the kids messed up any potential "shock value" -- plus, having done that few times, with and without vehicles, my assessment is that the "shock value" if it existed at all wore off very quickly. :rolleyes:

All in all, that's again METT-TC -- there is NO single answer...
How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise.Depends on what you're trying to do, doesn't it? Perhaps the object is not to surprise but to loudly announce ones presence and to seek contact. :D
You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.Don't believe everything you read. Talk to folks who are there or have been recently and you'll find that some units have problems like that while others do not -- and most will have such problems in the first few weeks after arrival until the experience factor builds up to compensate for our mediocre training. There's also the issue of not knowing the terrain because of tour lengths, stationing, etc. -- the opponent has a significant advantage there and that doesn't go away no matter how you move.
Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.In reverse order: Yes, that's why all that support structure and those aircraft AND vehicles (including Tanks) exist to let the three guys that survive in that rifle squad own that terrain or remove that opposition; It should do more than walk and dig, what is its purpose? If its limited weapons are as equal or surpass as the opponents, why have a lot of excess? What area do you want it to "cover" -- again the issue is what one is trying to do. Well, we aren't going to carry either vehicle in their current form on a 130, that means C5s or C17s and that means you aren't going to use an assault strip...

And if you need an airstrip where you don't have one, somebody has to get it or build it.
Yet 5.9 gals of water...Can't -- or won't -- argue that. IMO, the Army wants a very excessive amount of water.
There was a helicopter/UAS shortage... supply transport and other issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.I cannot discuss Wanat sensibly because I wasn't there. As for resource allotments, that's a METT-TC issue which neither of us can address knowledgeably.
I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.Um, yeah. What's the point? As a minor point, the old vests weren't designed to stop SA fire, they were to stop shell fragments as Artillery in WW II (and Korea) was theoretically the biggest killer on the battlefield. Viet Nam changed the rules because
Clyde didn't have much Arty, was not good with Mortars (in contrast to the Chinese in Korea) but was a good shot. Prep for last was and all that...
Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.Come on, Ken? I'm here. Yes, I know that -- again, what's your point?

I also know that in good and /or experienced units the adverse psychological impact dissipates rapidly, in a matter of days of exposure and then increasingly becomes a negative for the planters and quite unfortunately, for the local populace. Did you know that?
If a Soldier can survive...he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.We can disagree on that. I think, again, that if you talk to some folks, you'll find that as units gain theater experience, they do better at spotting, evading or destroying IEDS. Which lead me to wonder if your gripes are with the personnel system and policies or patrol methodologies. ;)
If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do... A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.No question about that. I totally agree.

Uh -- doesn't that take us back to METT-TC? :wry: