The Demise of Secretary Wynne

[SWJED]

The Demise of Secretary Wynne (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/the-demise-of-secretary-wynne/)

By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton, Small Wars Journal Blog


Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.

My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.

Something I’ve often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or “surge”) in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn’t one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it’s had. Prior to this discussion, I’d already been pondering the issue for some time...

[Tom Odom]

What had changed was clear. It wasn’t the extra boots on the ground that was turning the tide, it was the increase in HUMINT and the ability to hit a target with precision munitions from the air within a time frame of only 7 minutes. Gatherings as small as only 3 insurgents were being targeted for strikes, while predators and forces on the ground monitored the movements of any suspected insurgent. This aggressive doctrinal change was preventing insurgents from gathering, planning, and pulling off operations. It was classic COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, conducted almost entirely from the air. But if we accept the Army’s version of things, it never happened.

Its the same song revisited. with a disco beat. Classic COIN from the air? All kinetic--according to him--delivered from the air. Yeah right. The HUMINT he allows came from somewhere but all those boots on the ground were just to watch movements. No mention of the Anbar shift in the tribes. No mention of population control. Just air strikes.

Right.

Tom

[Ken White]

Couldn't get enough sense out of it to comment. Does the Army not understand the AF -- or does it downplay the AF due to political game required by our dysfunctional Congress? A 1,000% increase in munitions released???

Then all those things Tom correctly illustrates. Plus this comment:
"...Although I felt privileged to be present at the Pentagon as Secretary Wynne departed the building for the last time."Odd...

[Old Eagle]

Mike Wynne is an Army officer of the Rick Atkinson's storied West Point Class of '66

[Cavguy]

There was so much extrapolation to wild conclusions I couldn't follow the logic of the first half.

He makes the fundamental mistake that somehow we failed 2003-2006 to win Iraq because we weren't killing enough insurgents by dropping bombs? That bombs "forced" the awakening? The analysis fails on so many levels it saddens me. "Troops only increased by 20% and bombings by 400%, so the bombings MUST be behind it!" Why is the army covering this up?!? :rolleyes:

To say his friend Andres is an AF fan is like describing Ann Coulter as a mainline Republican. He's the Ann Coulter of the USAF. Andres truly frightened me with his pro-AF speech at a conference I attended last year "if we would only allow the Iraqis to drop more bombs we would win Iraq", and "our soldiers inflame popular resistance, as they stand on street corners and harass the local women." It was so bad the major media news network reporter I was sitting next to with lots of time in Iraq (3+ years as lead for her network in Baghdad) was calling "bull####". After the speech, I confronted Dr. Andres about several of his pejoritve quotes characterizing ground forces, and told him straight out "You're dangerous and you scare me". Too close to shades of Wolfowitz/Feith and their dreamy theories, and lack of anything but ivory tower experience on the ground for me. The fact that someone with such opinions willing to air them in such a forum was a special assistant to the SecAF disappointed me more.:mad: I guess it is a harbinger - if he was characteristic of the thoughts around the USAF leadership then it's no wonder Gates cleaned house.

Anyway, I thought the article's second half was an accurate diagnosis of the situation - the USAF's "organizational" attitude turns off the other services and doesn't help win its arguments - as evidenced by this article. The "The Army and Marines don't understand airpower" argument is lame. The conspiracy theory regarding a coverup of the "real" surge success data is even sillier. :rolleyes: Call the waaahbulance. I don't know what (if any) experience he has, but the Army and Marines are doing fairly well waging a joint fight with all of the tools in the kit. I just get the sense that the USAF sees itself as first among the services, and is throwing a tantrum because OEF/OIF have forced it into the back seat for awhile.

[Ken White]

..............

[Cavguy]

The author says:


What had changed was clear. It wasn’t the extra boots on the ground that was turning the tide, it was the increase in HUMINT and the ability to hit a target with precision munitions from the air within a time frame of only 7 minutes.

That wasn't a change. We did that from 2003-on. I don't know where he thinks that is a change. the 7 minutes is a best case scenario, the average time from request to drop is 2-5x longer. I know, I used to coordinate them.


Gatherings as small as only 3 insurgents were being targeted for strikes, while predators and forces on the ground monitored the movements of any suspected insurgent. This aggressive doctrinal change was preventing insurgents from gathering, planning, and pulling off operations. It was classic COIN (COunter INsurgency) operations, conducted almost entirely from the air. But if we accept the Army’s version of things, it never happened.

Couple of questions from this paragraph:

1) Source for allegations (beside Andres)
2) Source that the all seeing predators were finding "insurgents"
3) Source that the Army doesn't acknowledge airpower's contribution?
4) What is "classic COIN from the air?" My bookshelf is light on any works or demonstrated successes of "COIN" from the air.

And it doesn't have anything to do with forcing the combat units into COPs 24/7 and into constant contact in the neighborhoods increased combat with the insurgents, which increased the need for airsrikes?

I'd like to see some source/authority/analysis rather than just expository statements based off a few conversations with USAF fanbois.

[Tom Odom]

This is from the Ebird of 14 July in advance of the 21 Jul edition of AF Times. It is an interview with the former Secretary of the AF. You cand read some of it now online at Wynne takes aim at Gates over firing, reasons I put it here because the former secretary's view of what has happened and is happening is interesting. Note the use of the term "police action" almost in the sense of 1950s Korea. Also his focus is on ability to use kinetic, lethal force. the proposition to "reachback" in a video screen COIN effort is somewhat understandable but also somewhat unreal. I am curious what he would see as administrative.

I do agree with the comment on 52 inch TVs:cool:


Q. What should be done about Iraq?

A. This is now a police action ... and the question is, when does this police action stop? ... I think the Army has done a marvelous job of corralling the insurgency, reducing the strife, creating auras of stability in many of the areas. And I think now is probably a good time to start taking advantage of that. ...

[My withdrawal plan] turns out to be the use of the reachback ... to begin to extract administrative personnel out of Iraq. Essentially if I take a battalion of administrative people out of Iraq, I now take the force protection requirements for that same battalion. And if I can run it all using the Internet in a distant place, why not?

In the same vein that the way the Air Force is currently running unmanned air vehicles from [the continental U.S.], why can’t I run some of the administrative attributes?

It does worry me that we’re beginning to sell 52-inch TVs in the Green Zone. How long are we going to be there? And where is it in our psyche that we must occupy the capital of a country? ... How do we begin to reshape ourselves so that we can maybe steer a course that allows us to reduce our forces but not reduce the firepower that is so necessary for stabilization and governance?

[Entropy]

Well as one of the few resident zoomies here let me say that Dr. Andres and Mr. Compton do not represent a lot of us in their views - they're more akin to that embarrassing uncle you wish was related to someone else.

This is just another example of the kind of counterproductive "criticism" some air power advocates will stoop to. There is plenty to justify the role of air power in all its forms without denigrating the other services while overemphasizing the role of your own. The irony is that is exactly what the author accuses the Army of doing.

I'm always wary of vague and sweeping generalizations and this essay is chock full of them. The "Army does not understand airpower" is the worst such generalization. Then there is the portrayal of Gen. Petraeus, the (former) JOINT force commander, as essentially a parochial stooge. How can the author here argue on one hand that airpower was the crucial element in the "surge" while arguing on the other that the Army doesn't understand airpower when it's primarily Army officers that are runnning the show in Iraq? Add cognitive dissonance to the many problems with this essay.

[Tom Odom]

Well as one of the few resident zoomies here let me say that Dr. Andres and Mr. Compton do not represent a lot of us in their views - they're more akin to that embarrassing uncle you wish was related to someone else.

This is just another example of the kind of counterproductive "criticism" some air power advocates will stoop to. There is plenty to justify the role of air power in all its forms without denigrating the other services while overemphasizing the role of your own. The irony is that is exactly what the author accuses the Army of doing.

I'm always wary of vague and sweeping generalizations and this essay is chock full of them. The "Army does not understand airpower" is the worst such generalization. Then there is the portrayal of Gen. Petraeus, the (former) JOINT force commander, as essentially a parochial stooge. How can the author here argue on one hand that airpower was the crucial element in the "surge" while arguing on the other that the Army doesn't understand airpower when it's primarily Army officers that are runnning the show in Iraq? Add cognitive dissonance to the many problems with this essay.


Thank you for that appraisal. I posted mine first last night and I asked myself whether I was being too harsh. My criticisms match yours exactly.

Tom

[Ken White]

This is from the Ebird of 14 July in advance of the 21 Jul edition of AF Times...Quite an interesting take on things -- in the Chinese sense. IMO, the 'thinking' (and I use the term rather loosely) reflected in your quote does not fill me with much confidence in our nominal civilian leaders in high places...

Perhaps it could be said the current SecDef does not suffer fools gladly. If so, good for him.

[Cavguy]

Well as one of the few resident zoomies here let me say that Dr. Andres and Mr. Compton do not represent a lot of us in their views - they're more akin to that embarrassing uncle you wish was related to someone else.

This is just another example of the kind of counterproductive "criticism" some air power advocates will stoop to. There is plenty to justify the role of air power in all its forms without denigrating the other services while overemphasizing the role of your own. The irony is that is exactly what the author accuses the Army of doing.


Entropy, good points. That's why I charaterized Dr. Andres as the "Ann Coulter" of the USAF - he is partisan beyond belief.

Hacksaw made a good point when discussing the speech I referenced above - why did the Air Force send him to make such a partisan speech at a high profile conference? That sent a message about the USAF leadership's view in and of itself. BTW, MG Dunlap was the other major USAF presenter, besides a COL from the CAOC in Qatar.

I just acquried a USAF Major as a neighbor, she confirmed what many have said to me from the USAF recently - there is a senior leader/airman disconnect right now. Your perspective?

[J Wolfsberger]

4) What is "classic COIN from the air?" My bookshelf is light on any works or demonstrated successes of "COIN" from the air.


He may be referring to the way the British Mandate of Mesopotamia chose to respond to unrest during the 1920s. The approach seems to have been pretty much what the AF advocates today: bomb them into submission. :(

There was a recent article on this campaign in one of the military history magazines. If I can find it, I'll post the reference.

[Cavguy]

He may be referring to the way the British Mandate of Mesopotamia chose to respond to unrest during the 1920s. The approach seems to have been pretty much what the AF advocates today: bomb them into submission. :(

There was a recent article on this campaign in one of the military history magazines. If I can find it, I'll post the reference.

I did a whole paper on it (well, the 1920 revolution). It wasn't counter-insurgency, unless you count randomly bombing troublesome villages COIN. It was intimidation of troublesome groups. It did little to foster the legitimacy of the Brits or Feisal's government, but did allow the Brits to fufill an economy of force between 1922-1933.

There's some bad juju headed down that road once you start peeling back the surface.

I guess I would be hesitant in calling that strategy "classic COIN". The goal wasn't to prevent insurgency, it was to protect the force until withdrawal.

[J Wolfsberger]

I did a whole paper on it (well, the 1920 revolution). It wasn't counter-insurgency, unless you count randomly bombing troublesome villages COIN. It was intimidation of troublesome groups. It did little to foster the legitimacy of the Brits or Feisal's government, but did allow the Brits to fufill an economy of force between 1922-1933.

There's some bad juju headed down that road once you start peeling back the surface.

I guess I would be hesitant in calling that strategy "classic COIN". The goal wasn't to prevent insurgency, it was to protect the force until withdrawal.

I'm in complete agreement with you.

But then again, I think that "COIN from the air" is like step 2, below:

512

:D

[Entropy]

I just acquried a USAF Major as a neighbor, she confirmed what many have said to me from the USAF recently - there is a senior leader/airman disconnect right now. Your perspective?

I would say there is definitely a disconnect. It runs from how the AF publicly portrays itself all the way down to uniforms.

[slapout9]

For all.
The Air Force calls it Air Control Theory, there version of COIN or Pennies From Heaven:) link to a good paper below. There are others out there but they all say about the same thing.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/corum.htm


What the Army is doing with ODIN might well end up being COIN from the Air invented by the Army and the Air Force is not to happy about it.

[LawVol]

I would say there is definitely a disconnect. It runs from how the AF publicly portrays itself all the way down to uniforms.

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).

The "police action" comment is to be expected. The AF sees lethal airpower as the answer to all war scenarios, whether they be conventional or unconventional. As I see it, the fact son the ground show that airpower, while agressively supporting the fight, has not been the deciding factor in our recent sucesses. This does not bode well for those that argue airpower's infallibility in war. Thus the change from war to "police action." If airpower had been the determitive factor, rest assured he'd have said war.

but what the heck do I know, I'm just a lawyer...:eek:

[MikeF]

I've been considering this post for some time IOT word it correctly.

I have no disagreements with any of the above dissent IRT the AF's future.

However, it must be addressed that they are a combat multiplier. I would submit that we should credit them with their role as a supporting component in the surge.

I can comment on four of the more kinetic operations of the surge(specifically November2006-June2007): Turki Village/Diyala River Valley (my unit, 5-73 Recon) and Najaf/Baqubah (Strykers out of Fort Lewis).

Furthermore, it must be understood that these situations were esentially counter-state denied areas (i.e. areas that the enemy controlled and CF/GOI did not regularly patrol). These situations were unique to the time period.

The AF brought to bear the combined weight of the American military power in certain almost linear conflicts (e.g. in Turki Village (JAN 2007), 38 x 2000 lbs JDAMs in under two hours on an entrechment of Wahabi fortiments. In a prior conflict, we were throwing hand grenades back and forth. This time, the AF reigned supreme.)

However (again), it must be addressed that these were supportive roles. Enemy fortifications were not identified solely by Predator drones; in 90% of the PID, enemy activity was identified by covert reconnaissance, movement to contact, OR specific intelligence gathered from the populace.

Regardless, I love the AF as long as they don't make any assumptions on their superiority over the boys on the ground.

[selil]

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).



As of today I really really really realize that. In the morning I'll tell you about my meeting after the panel session.

[slapout9]

Here is a more complete study of "Air Policing" based upon the British experience. This is very interesting because that used Air officers in a ground/cultural intelligence collection process to control tribes, also developed the the Inverted Blockade Technique (they kept people away from their homes and farms) most common weapon was a 5 pound bomblet.

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_Theses/SAASS_Out/Longoria/longoria.pdf

[Cliff]

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).


While the focus of the Air Force is more on high-intensity conflict, I don't think everything is focused on blowing things up.

There is a definite understanding that right now ISR, Non Traditional ISR, mobility, force support, and in-lieu of taskings are how we support the joint force in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Armed overwatch of the folks on the ground is the main kinetic operation, but even in that we've developed some great TTPs to reduce the force used to the neccessary levels.

See this article for examples:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/sum08/haendschke.html


The main way the AF is directly involved in counterinsurgency (IE as a supported force if you will) is in training the HN AF. Our Coalition Air Forces Training Team (CAFTT) in Iraq is being hugely plussed up, and is supported not just by AFSOF but also by AETC and a host of other folks.

Finally, there's a lot the AF can do on the support side to help with counterinsurgency. A good example is this article:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/sum08/brown.html


I want to make it clear I am not advocating air policing in Iraq or Afghanistan, nor am I saying it would be effective or could replace the Army.

At the same time, you have to understand that some of these articles (MGen Dunlap is one example) have problems with the doctrine as written. Just because air policing wouldn't work in Iraq or Afghanistan doesn't mean it won't ever work... it is simply another tool or capability. At some point it may be the right tool. That decision will be based on both the situation/country in question but may also be based on the US population/leaderships will to commit money/people/resources... IE, there could be a situation (just like in Iraq for 12 yrs following Desert Storm!) where the will of the nation will support air policing, but not boots on the ground. Attacking debates on doctrine just because they wouldn't work in the current fight leads to dogmatism.

Again, I am not agreeing with all of the arguements made by some of the airpower enthusiasts, I am simply arguing that a healthy debate on doctrine isn't bad.

V/R,

Cliff

[SWJED]

The New Role of Air Strike in Small Wars (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/the-new-role-of-air-strike-in/)
A response to Jon Compton

By Richard Andres, Small Wars Journal


In a recent Small Wars Journal article entitled “The Demise of Secretary Wynne,” Jon Compton offered some observations about the role of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. The article has received a good deal of attention and spurred some debate. Like most other readers, I agree with some parts of the article and disagree with others. However, since Jon cited me and my name has been linked to his in what has become a contentious discussion, I would like to offer some thoughts of my own.

I should begin by saying that I have no intention of laying out a complete summary of counterinsurgency theory here. I will talk mainly about the role of airpower, and particularly airpower in an ISR and strike role. Except where these subjects are concerned, I am generally in agreement with John Nagl on transforming the Army for the COIN mission and with James Corum on the role of airpower. I will leave it to the reader to determine the delta...

[Norfolk]

Perhaps I have misunderstood Professor Andres, but if he is proposing the use of airpower in an economy-of-force role, isn't this much the same sort of error the British made in Iraq during the 1920's?