Infantry survivability - at the crossroads?

[Fuchs]

I have the impression that in modern combat infantry survivability is at a crossroads.
I admit that the difference is not fully perceptible in occupation duty and against poorly armed opponents (yet).

My thesis is this:

Heavy infantry (the one that moves to contact in AFVs or supports AFVs as primary mode)
- depends on suppressive fires for survivability
- depends on smoke (artificial concealment) for survivability
- depends on hard body armour (rifle bullet resistant) for protection (at least frontal)
My reasoning is that heavy infantry has its most critical moments in the offensive combined arms fight. It needs to accomplish its mission quickly to not waste too much momentum of the AFVs (protected mobility - that should be exploited).
That's why I assume that HI cannot emphasize covert (camouflaged/concealed/deception) approaches to tactical problems, but rather the brute and quick ones. HI can achieve surprise primarily through high tempo.

I assume a completely different profile for light infantry
(the infantry that fights only dismounted and usually without AFV support).
Light infantry is slow by design. Armour protection is only available as body armour, which is detrimental to mobility. It's therefore limited anyway.
The primary source for survivability should therefore be camouflage/concealment. The lethality of light infantry is in (besides the hopefully always available indirect fire support) its ability to ambush or at least to use surprise. The surprise would be generated not by tempo/speed, but by covert movement into position and a small dose of deception.


Well, comments on this would already be interesting.

I'm a notorious skeptic. I cannot limit myself to theory without fearing a failure of our forces (our=NATO) for this reason.
Shouldn't the personal body armour be very different for heavy and light missions?

We've seen lots of bullet-resistant hard/heavy body armour lately because our troops are almost permanently exposed to enemy observation.
Light infantry that relies on covert movement and ambushes should have very little use for such heavy body armour. It's too heavy (mobility and sustainability problem).
LI depends on its leg mobility and doesn't have much protection against indirect fires.
Shouldn't light infantry have full fragmentation protection?
At least when lying down on the belly (rear 180° of legs + butt protected)?

Frag wounds in the legs are often a "mobility kill", sometimes even deadly (blood loss). All immobilized soldiers need assistance of comrades and reduce the unit's capability and mobility. Frag wounds to arms can be a "mission kill".

There are a lot of minor issues about minor fragmentation wounds anyway. Every WIA in a hospital means that his unit is understrength. Teamwork and possibly even cohesion of the unit suffer with every even temporary casualty.
I haven't found any non-EOD anti-fragmentation trousers or jackets (not vests) yet - but I have pretty good sources. Abdomen and shoulder protection seem to be the maximum extras besides inflexible armour elements and pouch inserts.




P.S.: I'm sorry that I (re)defined light and heavy. I don't know official English terms that describe the difference perfectly and I know that some might object against my definition. Think: "Panzergrenadiere" and "Jäger".

[Ken White]

I have the impression that in modern combat infantry survivability is at a crossroads. I admit that the difference is not fully perceptible in occupation duty and against poorly armed opponents (yet).You may be correct but I'm skeptical. The demise of many things has long been predicted long before the actual departure from the scene.
...That's why I assume that HI cannot emphasize covert (camouflaged/concealed/deception) approaches to tactical problems, but rather the brute and quick ones. HI can achieve surprise primarily through high tempo.Too often true but quite often not necessarily so. What you posit is true in a movement to contact when opposed or when in the attack but those two evolutions are a small percentage of total time in war.
I assume a completely different profile for light infantry
...The lethality of light infantry is in (besides the hopefully always available indirect fire support) its ability to ambush or at least to use surprise. The surprise would be generated not by tempo/speed, but by covert movement into position and a small dose of deception.All true.
I'm a notorious skeptic. I cannot limit myself to theory without fearing a failure of our forces (our=NATO) for this reason.I'm unsure why your two assumptions which are reasonably valid lead to that conclusion. Particularly as the same parameters affect the opponent.
Shouldn't the personal body armour be very different for heavy and light missions?Yes -- IF armor is worn at all by light infantry. They are unlikely to wear it in the Jungle, for example -- not unless they want more heat casualties than combat casualties. My personal belief is that in mid to high intensity combat individual armor for LI should and will go by the wayside.
Shouldn't light infantry have full fragmentation protection?At least when lying down on the belly (rear 180° of legs + butt protected)?The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.
Frag wounds in the legs are often a "mobility kill", sometimes even deadly (blood loss). All immobilized soldiers need assistance of comrades and reduce the unit's capability and mobility. Frag wounds to arms can be a "mission kill".Not that big a problem. Do the math. Percentage of force that become casualties is not generally large enough for that to be mission impactor in most cases.
There are a lot of minor issues about minor fragmentation wounds anyway. Every WIA in a hospital means that his unit is understrength. Teamwork and possibly even cohesion of the unit suffer with every even temporary casualty.Again, do the math. There's a reason why the Marines have a 13 man squad and why the US Army will go from its current nine man peacetime squad to an eleven man squad in HIC. Teamwork and unit cohesion ALWAYS suffer in combat, peacetime 'ideas,' norms and habits will not work; they'll just get people killed unnecessarily.

[Fuchs]

The math is not universal.

The USMC 13 squad is unique and even its leaders cannot insist that nothing changed after they took some casualties.

Squads of 7-10 are usual, 9-10 seems to be typical for LI.


Percentage of force that become casualties is not generally large enough for that to be mission impactor in most cases.
Sorry, but that's the unique experience of a country that never joined really big wars early on and that never fought against intact 1st rate armies.
And even under those conditions, U.S. forces were at times very much decimated, including complete destruction of battalions (1943-1950).

I don't bother to think much about future conflicts against 3rd rate opponents because those tend not to be real threats until we turn them into foes.
Competent enemy forces can inflict serious casualties, easily up to half the infantry of a brigade turning casualties in a matter of weeks.
The Western world just avoided to fight such opponents since two generations (there's no guarantee that our governments will be able to keep it like that).

[Ken White]

The math is not universal.There are obvious exceptions to every rule, even in math -- but the broad parameters are pretty constant. In most post WWI war, <25% Killed,wounded, captured or missing per major engagement; about 10% the rest of the time. COIN offers less but is not MIC or HIC.
The USMC 13 squad is unique and even its leaders cannot insist that nothing changed after they took some casualties.Yes, it is unique -- that's why I cited it, it's exemplary and it works. Didn't say that things didn't change, in fact what I did say was ""...Teamwork and unit cohesion ALWAYS suffer in combat, peacetime 'ideas,' norms and habits will not work; they'll just get people killed unnecessarily."" You must have missed that.
Squads of 7-10 are usual, 9-10 seems to be typical for LI.Usual does not equal right or even adequate. You must've also missed this; ""...why the US Army will go from its current nine man peacetime squad to an eleven man squad in HIC.""
Sorry, but that's the unique experience of a country that never joined really big wars early on and that never fought against intact 1st rate armies. And even under those conditions, U.S. forces were at times very much decimated, including complete destruction of battalions (1943-1950).Of course. You can look at it that way. You can also realize that EVERY Army has had Battalions get decimated -- that's why they call it war.

In any event, I'm unsure to what you refer with "...the experience of a country that never joined." don't think anything I said alluded to that -- what i did allude to was generic MIC - HIC casualty rates across many nations.

I'll also point out that the condescension in your unnecessary "...never fought..." comment has little or nothing to do with the discussion at hand and just invites counter comments like: As for joining big wars late, better late than never, I guess -- how'd that turn out for you? So we can both probably lay off them, they add nothing to any discussion.
I don't bother to think much about future conflicts against 3rd rate opponents because those tend not to be real threats until we turn them into foes.Or until they're ignored long enough to do so. You did note I stipulated HIC, not LIC or COIN in my original post?
Competent enemy forces can inflict serious casualties, easily up to half the infantry of a brigade turning casualties in a matter of weeks.You're kidding, right? During WW II, all the major combatants in all theaters had brigade sized units that had over 50% casualties in days, not weeks. During the maneuver war in Korea, both South and North Korea, the US and China had Brigade sized units rendered ineffective due to losses in a few days on several occasions. The US and North Viet Namese even hit that in Viet Nam on a couple of occasions.

However, as I said, that's the exception, not the rule -- the rule is about what you stated, 50% in weeks in reasonably intense combat (do 10% every two to five days for a couple of weeks and see what you get, math wise). That's what I based my statements upon.
The Western world just avoided to fight such opponents since two generations (there's no guarantee that our governments will be able to keep it like that).True -- which has little or no bearing on anything you or I said.

[VMI_Marine]

The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.

Light infantry survivability (in the defense) stems from entrenching tools, not body armor IMO. The "rear 180° of legs + butt" are quite well protected when they are in the ground. On the offense, you have already mentioned that mobility + concealment = survivability for the light infantry.

Here was my thought process on body armor for the infantry, from another thread:


I participated in a MARCORSYSCOM survey about two weeks ago regarding the MTV. According to SYSCOM, BLT 1/6 and 2/7 have been fielded a plate carrier that is very similar in design to the MTV (I believe it is pretty much the same as PPI's Hornet). The plate pockets have soft armor backing for the plates (a requirement, for those who are not familiar with the difference between "in conjunction" and "stand alone" plates). The cummerbund design is identical to the MTV. Currently SYSCOM is considering issuing GCE units the MTV and the plate carrier.

A PPI rep brought along a vest they have designed that is a plate carrier with removable soft armor panels. With the soft armor panels, the coverage is equivalent to IBA; with them removed it is equivalent to the Hornet shown above. I like the concept, but am not crazy about the attachment system - it requires threading a wire through loops on the plate carrier and armor panels.

The reason I like the concept is because I picture using different levels of body armor for different phases of an operation. For instance, an infantry company doing a movement to contact would wear the plate carrier in order to have protection from small arms fire, but also the additional mobility and breathability for dismounted movement, and in case of chance contact or a meeting engagement where they need to maneuver aggressively. Once the unit reaches its assault position, the Marines (or Soldiers) don their soft armor in order to have the additional frag protection for the assault.

The survey group was interesting - I was the only infantryman in the room, the rest of the group were MPs, tankers, or amtrackers. I was the only voice in the room that wanted to reduce coverage in favor of mobility, and/or have a modular armor system that incorporated removable soft armor. Personally, I think we passed the good idea cutoff point when we added side SAPIs, but the casualty averse mentality has eliminated any chance of getting rid of those things.

[Fuchs]

I don't trust field fortifications anymore.
The accuracy improvement of 120mm mortars and 152-155mm guns and the capabilities of sensors (especially aerial ones) are scary. Some radars can produce accurate pictures of trenches (even between bushes) at a distance of more than 300 km. The technology was available to NATO nations 20 years ago - and initially (much less impressive performance) used in the Vietnam War. We might be on the reflecting end of this soon.

Entrenching doesn't work very well when you need to be mobile anyway.

It doesn't work well if you need to cover a large area / wide frontage with few troops as is usual requirement in staff exercises.
Our brigades need to cover frontages as did corps in earlier wars. That cannot be done by entrenched troops, not even on the static defense.

It's always good to dig for added protection when you've got time and strength to do so, but I believe that it's not remotely as important or effective against 1st rate opponents as it was a generation ago.


@Ken;
Collective experiences coin expectations and perceptions. That's why I mentioned the seemingly unrelated stuff.

I didn't take the most extreme losses of WW2/Korea as example to close in on the more modern low casualty perception. The plan was to reduce the dissent to keep the discussion easy. No kidding.


The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.

I don't get why.

[Ken White]

I don't trust field fortifications anymore.
The accuracy improvement of 120mm mortars and 152-155mm guns and the capabilities of sensors (especially aerial ones) are scary. Some radars can produce accurate pictures of trenches (even between bushes) at a distance of more than 300 km. The technology was available to NATO nations 20 years ago - and initially (much less impressive performance) used in the Vietnam War. We might be on the reflecting end of this soon.

Entrenching doesn't work very well when you need to be mobile anyway.Totally. Agree with the other comments on field fortifications as well.
I didn't take the most extreme losses of WW2/Korea as example to close in on the more modern low casualty perception. The plan was to reduce the dissent to keep the discussion easy. No kidding.No problem, however, I think those rates are very germane to and actually reinforce your positions.
I don't get why.If one is laying down, one is not moving, same thing applies to laying down as applies to armor (individual or vehicular) as applies to field entrenching which is never a good idea IF it can be avoided -- and it quite often can be if one is tactically agile.

Stasis is death; if it can seen and isn't moving, it can be killed. Movement is life; rapid and agile movement is a long life while rapid, agile and effective movement is death to the opposition while you live. Simple to say; harder -- but far from impossible -- to do. The key to units being able to do that consistently is simply good training and effective intuitive leaders (as opposed to he whose turn it happens to be...).

[Ken White]

Light infantry survivability (in the defense) stems from entrenching tools, not body armor IMO. The "rear 180° of legs + butt" are quite well protected when they are in the ground. On the offense, you have already mentioned that mobility + concealment = survivability for the light infantry.

Here was my thought process on body armor for the infantry, from another thread:Read your earlier post. If one has to have Armor, then I agree with your approach. Since I'm not the Emperor, I guess we'll have Armor but I'm not a fan. I fully understand what it is and what it does and I do agree with it in an Iraq-like situation; I agree less with it for dismounted troops in Afghanistan. As I said above, if we end up in a jungle somewhere, there will be no armor worn (not after the first few weeks of heat casualties anyway). Individual armor impedes troop mobility, in some situations, the benefit is worth it, in others it will not be. METT-TC again...

I also agree with you on the entrenching tool but I submit two thoughts for consideration:

- The US does not defend well; we are very poor at it. We don't dig well, partly because we can't do it in training at home station due to environmental constraints (unlikely to change for the better) and partly because you have to almost beat Americans to get them to dig. Recall that every memorable British battle is a defensive one; virtually every one of ours is an attack. The upshot of all that is one thing and you can add that the days when the defense offered advantages are, I think going or gone. If you're static you can be made dead too easily. Sometimes a limited defense cannot be helped but it should be avoided by us if possible.

- Initiative and agility are tenets of our doctrine; yet we go out of our way to stifle the former and impede the latter with too much stuff and nonsense.

We really need to change that latter problem to preclude the former one.

[Fuchs]

Stasis is death; if it can seen and isn't moving, it can be killed. Movement is life; rapid and agile movement is a long life while rapid, agile and effective movement is death to the opposition while you live. Simple to say; harder -- but far from impossible -- to do. The key to units being able to do that consistently is simply good training and effective intuitive leaders (as opposed to he whose turn it happens to be...).

Yet it's possible to hide rather well as long as you don't move. In fact movement is still extremely helpful for detection, especially when camouflage or when radar is being used.
And you cannot move 24/7 anyway, especially not as infantry.

Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.

[VMI_Marine]

Read your earlier post. If one has to have Armor, then I agree with your approach. Since I'm not the Emperor, I guess we'll have Armor but I'm not a fan. I fully understand what it is and what it does and I do agree with it in an Iraq-like situation; I agree less with it for dismounted troops in Afghanistan. As I said above, if we end up in a jungle somewhere, there will be no armor worn (not after the first few weeks of heat casualties anyway). Individual armor impedes troop mobility, in some situations, the benefit is worth it, in others it will not be. METT-TC again...


Ken, I couldn't agree with you more. Even within Iraq, different situations require different levels of protection. In Ramadi, summer 2006 timeframe, wearing an MTV with ESAPIs and ESBIs makes a fair amount of sense. In rural Habbaniyah, trying to keep up with IA patrols in 120° heat, it made no sense at all. GOs have completely removed the ability of company grade officers to make those kinds of decisions, which goes with your second point below.


I also agree with you on the entrenching tool but I submit two thoughts for consideration:

- The US does not defend well; we are very poor at it. We don't dig well, partly because we can't do it in training at home station due to environmental constraints (unlikely to change for the better) and partly because you have to almost beat Americans to get them to dig. Recall that every memorable British battle is a defensive one; virtually every one of ours is an attack. The upshot of all that is one thing and you can add that the days when the defense offered advantages are, I think going or gone. If you're static you can be made dead too easily. Sometimes a limited defense cannot be helped but it should be avoided by us if possible.

- Initiative and agility are tenets of our doctrine; yet we go out of our way to stifle the former and impede the latter with too much stuff and nonsense.

We really need to change that latter problem to preclude the former one.

I agree that we don't do defensive ops well, but I don't know that the advantages of the defense are gone. Also, I'm not talking about long-term field fortifications for a static defense, I'm talking about digging in when forced to go static for short periods of time. My company commander had us dig everytime we stopped in OIF I. Even a shallow hole provides better frag protection than leg armor.


Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.

Agreed that leg mobility is very important - but providing infantrymen with leg protection will make them no longer "light" infantry, and will reduce their mobility to the point where you might as well treat them as heavy infantry. I don't believe the current state of body armor technology is capable of producing frag-resistant chaps that will not be a significant impediment to mobility.

[Ken White]

Yet it's possible to hide rather well as long as you don't move. In fact movement is still extremely helpful for detection, especially when camouflage or when radar is being used.
And you cannot move 24/7 anyway, especially not as infantry.Got no problem with hiding, terrain and vegetation permitting and I've done a lot of that in a lot of places, it's not hard -- and light Infantry should not be employed where those factors do not exist -- and yes, people do need to eat and sleep but that does not require digging, which was my primary point. A secondary point is that going to ground under indirect fire is a no-no (or should be), one has to move out of it and rapidly.

Radar is vastly overrated as a surveillance device in most terrain aside from the desert, even foliage penetrating radar cannot see through slight folds in the ground. Tactical surprise is obtained by doing the smart thing, not by being caught out on a dumb route.
Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.Recoilless weapons? you're showing your age... :D

True but as VMI Marine says, the weight is a trade off. Plus it's really amazing how many people don't get wounded in firefights -- not to mention how many wounds are really superficial...

[Fuchs]

A secondary point is that going to ground under indirect fire is a no-no (or should be), one has to move out of it and rapidly.


That was probably mildly valid at earlier times, but I think it's plain wrong against a 1st rate opponent. The difference lies in how the indirect fire engagement looks like - we seem to assume completely different ones.



My assumption:
An observer calls for MRSI strike on time by multiple barrels (like 3 rds each from 4 mortars). No ranging shots - fire for effect right at the beginning.
The fire is accurate, dispersion is normal.
The observer will see a lot of smoke/dust after the strike and not call in another strike for a while unless he can observe worthy targets.
He might actually be deceived by "playing dead" as well.
The indirect fire assets he had called for relocate to avoid counterfire asap. A continuation of fire would require other assets to join and would not be justified if there's no positive target confirmation.

In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.

It's completely different if the observer needs to correct the first impacts and only then calls for fire for effect - then you could run.

[VMI_Marine]

In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.

Until they come up with a uniform that protects against frag without being any heavier or less breathable than current utility uniforms (MCCUU, ACU), anti-frag clothes are impractical - especially for light infantry. I've seen some pictures of kevlar "chaps" and such - no way in hell I would wear those on a dismounted movement.

[Ken White]

That was probably mildly valid at earlier times, but I think it's plain wrong against a 1st rate opponent. The difference lies in how the indirect fire engagement looks like - we seem to assume completely different ones.Still valid. The issue is being under indirect fire, who got it there or how they did it is irrelevant; you're under it. The quality of the opponent (your criteria) is immaterial -- indirect fire that goes 'boom' and is falling around you is totally independent of the quality of the cannoneer or mortarman who fired it or of the quality of the tube or launcher -- and the rounds themselves, as long as they explode, are not quality dependent. Having had a great deal of it poured my way over a fair number of years by 1st to 4th rate opponents and found it all to be equally hazardous regardless of the rating of the shooters, having lain under it and /or moved through it depending on the situation, I am not assuming anything.
My assumption: Your assumption is possible but to run will help. Try it instead of reading about it. I'd also submit your assumption calls for the receiving troops to have exposed themselves and while tactical idiots and bad luck exist, they can be negated. As I said; ""Tactical surprise is obtained by doing the smart thing, not by being caught out on a dumb route.""
In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.That's what we can disagree on... ;)

[Fuchs]

A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.

So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.
If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.

Movement makes sense when the indirect fires last longer and are not well-aimed at first - or if you get several seconds early warning based on radar data and radio alert.


Besides that; a combination of machine gun and mortar fire creates a dilemma that forbids running most of the time.

[Ken White]

A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.Can be true -- or not; CEP is still an issue as is the type of ground and how many people are in the open.
So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.If is a big word -- and even if one was so caught, fire does unpredictable things...
If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.Not a given; a probability, yes but there are no definitives.
Movement makes sense when the indirect fires last longer and are not well-aimed at first - or if you get several seconds early warning based on radar data and radio alert.Also true.

Again, the best solution is to avoid being caught in a fire trap in the first place.
Besides that; a combination of machine gun and mortar fire creates a dilemma that forbids running most of the time.Now that's correct -- but that's the addition to the problem under discussion... :D

[William F. Owen]

P.S.: I'm sorry that I (re)defined light and heavy. I don't know official English terms that describe the difference perfectly and I know that some might object against my definition. Think: "Panzergrenadiere" and "Jäger".

I just don't see a difference between Light and Heavy. Infantry is infantry. All the other stuff is cultural and organisational.

[Fuchs]

I just don't see a difference between Light and Heavy. Infantry is infantry. All the other stuff is cultural and organisational.

I just don't see a difference between infantry and armor. Soldiers are soldiers. All other stuff is cultural and organisational.

Wait. Rewind. I do.

[wm]

A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.

So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.
If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.
I once was at Fort Sill attending a firepower demonstration. It was quite a while ago--we still had towed 8" in the inventory. The demo was an 8" battalion time on target on a tree line. After the firing finished, the announcer said, "No living thing could have survived that attack." And then, a family of 3 deer came walking out of the trees.

[William F. Owen]

I once was at Fort Sill attending a firepower demonstration. It was quite a while ago--we still had towed 8" in the inventory. The demo was an 8" battalion time on target on a tree line. After the firing finished, the announcer said, "No living thing could have survived that attack." And then, a family of 3 deer came walking out of the trees.

Very true. Human beings are surprisingly resilient. No army on earth can afford prophylactic fire missions to take out "possible" infantry positions. Even in a "big war" no one is going to un mask their guns just to stomp infantry.

The whole issue with infantry is that they are hard to find, and find it so easy to hide.

[Fuchs]

I once was at Fort Sill attending a firepower demonstration. It was quite a while ago--we still had towed 8" in the inventory. The demo was an 8" battalion time on target on a tree line. After the firing finished, the announcer said, "No living thing could have survived that attack." And then, a family of 3 deer came walking out of the trees.

Things changed a lot since fragmentation pattern design begun. Blast and non-prefragmented cases are surprisingly erratic in their lethality (especially if impacting at near-horizontal angles), a mortar bomb with a pre-defined fragmentation pattern, proximity fuze and near-vertical descent isn't.
That's one of those techological advances that de-value old experiences.

[Ken White]

is probably as old as you -- though admittedly far more common today than it was 40 years ago -- I have heard for over 60 years how "technology will change the rules."

As you have pointed out, an untrained tribesman with an old and rusty AK is still a threat. Technology still hasn't really managed to do more than slightly modify the rules...

[RTK]

I just don't see a difference between infantry and armor. Soldiers are soldiers. All other stuff is cultural and organisational.

Wait. Rewind. I do.


Then let's rephrase. In our Army, we did away with seperate MOSs for mechanized and light infantrymen a number of years ago. If you're an 11B, you'd better be able to competently lead in both. Either way, it's the size of the weapons and the travelling method; fundamentals remain the same regardless.

[Ken White]

11-Bush types who's done mechanized, walking heavy and airborne infantry, I don't see that there's a lot of difference; different techniques and equipement, sure -- but if you're Infantry, the bottom line is close with the enemy and kill people. It isn't that hard.

[Fuchs]

Then let's rephrase. In our Army, we did away with seperate MOSs for mechanized and light infantrymen a number of years ago. If you're an 11B, you'd better be able to competently lead in both. Either way, it's the size of the weapons and the travelling method; fundamentals remain the same regardless.

@RTK; the light infantry quality of the U.S. Army is widely not understood to have been 1st class during Operation Anaconda or in Afghan mountains in general.
The U.S.Army might have chosen not to differentiate anymore, but that doesn't tell us much about whether that was right or not.
"fundamentals" don't mean much either. Infantry "fundamentals" are soldier fundamentals, yet we specialize soldiers in different profiles.
The German FM on these fundamentals ZDv 3/11 is a central FM (ZDv) of Army, Navy, Air Force and Forces Base. It's not an army-specific FM (HDv) and never was, for good reason.


Heh. Aside from the fact that all you list
is probably as old as you -- though admittedly far more common today than it was 40 years ago -- I have heard for over 60 years how "technology will change the rules."

As you have pointed out, an untrained tribesman with an old and rusty AK is still a threat. Technology still hasn't really managed to do more than slightly modify the rules...

An angry wolf is still dangerous just like a 100,000 years ago. A WW2 AT mine design could still immobilize a modern MBT.
But that's irrelevant. I was writing about increased lethality, not diminishing other's lethality. There's no doubt about lethality increases.

-------------------

There are obvious differences and obvious similarities between different forms of infantry combat.

Mankind knows since millennia that specalization offers advantages at a price.

My take on this is that the best approach to tactical problems varies quite consistently in different scenarios between infantry that fights without and infantry that fights together with medium/heavy AFVs.

There's one thing that's probably being more emphasized (and actually; revived during the 90's) in Germany: The operational speed of armoured units (which of course include infantry).
Light infantry has its capabilities, but its approach to, for example, capturing a bridge in a village would rather look like a slow-moving careful attack along lines of natural cover and if possible waiting for advantageous environmental conditions (night or unpleasant weather).
Mech/heavy infantry would arrive on the scene and be tasked to immediately clear the village in much less than an hour, so the armoured unit would not lose much of its momentum. The action would need to include more material and shock.

Infantry could be trained to be proficient in both styles, of course - but at a price. Besides the problem that it's difficult to have a perfect mindset for both light and heavy styles, you would need much more time (training time & cost) to train them for both.
Just think about the training necessary to cooperate well with tanks, to keep out of danger zones, to learn the timing and sharing of tasks.

Infantry is historically a quickly burnt-out (psychically) and even quicker decimated (physically) part of the ground forces. Few armies in history were able to keep up high training levels in wartime.
Look at the U.S. infantry. The last I heard is that although it's in principle suitable for both HIC and LIC, the HIC training suffers a lot. NTC tours and such are all about LIC now? That clearly shows the limitations that prevent all-round infantry training in wartime.

Well, light & heavy infantry have their roles next to each other in the same conflict and still happen to have very different profiles in many forms of conflict. My reasoning is that it's better to specialize a bit to leverage the advantages of specialization than to attempt to train can-all infantry.

This is not a proposal for a
100%/0% capability, but rather like
80%/20% instead of
50%/50% for all-round infantry or
70%/70% for all-round infantry with lots of training time.

80 beats 50 to 70. And few if any infantry will get enough training in wartime for 80/80.

[Ken White]

Everyplace in the world is not central Europe...
...the light infantry quality of the U.S. Army is widely not understood to have been 1st class during Operation Anaconda or in Afghan mountains in general.Not necessarily so; the command errors during Anaconda impacted the Infantry unfavorably; the units did okay. Since then, they're doing all right at both command levels and in unit performance.
But that's irrelevant. I was writing about increased lethality, not diminishing other's lethality. There's no doubt about lethality increases.No but lethality increases do not equate directly to better performance in war, major or minor.
There are obvious differences and obvious similarities between different forms of infantry combat.

Mankind knows since millennia that specalization offers advantages at a price.Of course there differences and specialization does offer benefits -- no one is disputing that. The issue is how much specialization is required and how quickly one with specialty X can be retrained to specialty Y. The answer is not much and not long.
My take on this is that the best approach to tactical problems varies quite consistently in different scenarios between infantry that fights without and infantry that fights together with medium/heavy AFVs.I agree -- IF the terrain will support it...
Infantry is historically a quickly burnt-out (psychically) and even quicker decimated (physically) part of the ground forces.Only if poor commanders allowed that to happen.
Few armies in history were able to keep up high training levels in wartime.The Wehrmacht did amazingly well at that in WW II with many disadvantages...
Look at the U.S. infantry. The last I heard is that although it's in principle suitable for both HIC and LIC, the HIC training suffers a lot. NTC tours and such are all about LIC now? That clearly shows the limitations that prevent all-round infantry training in wartime.Again, you miss the point. The issue is not that one man can do everything; the issue is that infantry tasks are similar across types of operations and that the retraining required to switch from mounted to dismounted or vice versa is not that significant. Neither is the switch from HIC to LIC though the reverse is more difficult; thus initial training should be for HIC, after that hopefully good grounding, switching is not problematic.
80 beats 50 to 70. And few if any infantry will get enough training in wartime for 80/80.Possibly -- but they'll learn quick when they get committed... :D

[William F. Owen]

Well, light & heavy infantry have their roles next to each other in the same conflict and still happen to have very different profiles in many forms of conflict. My reasoning is that it's better to specialize a bit to leverage the advantages of specialization than to attempt to train can-all infantry.


...but you're buying into the current accepted norms. This is not the way ahead, IMO.

If a "light" infantryman and an "armoured" infantry man have the same fitness and training standards and the same equipment, what is the difference? The MICV is protected mobility and stand-off fire support, plus some good sensors. Very nice to have. If you don't have it, then plan B.

Stryker Battalions are Light Infantry in armoured vehicles. How would then be any different if they were in well modified M-113s?

[VMI_Marine]

...but you're buying into the current accepted norms. This is not the way ahead, IMO.

If a "light" infantryman and an "armoured" infantry man have the same fitness and training standards and the same equipment, what is the difference? The MICV is protected mobility and stand-off fire support, plus some good sensors. Very nice to have. If you don't have it, then plan B.

Stryker Battalions are Light Infantry in armoured vehicles. How would then be any different if they were in well modified M-113s?

Exactly, Wilf. USMC infantry units are light formations; our armored vehicles are kept in an entirely separate battalion and attached to infantry units as needed. There are advantages and disadvantages to this, but it apparently didn't hinder 1st Marine Division during the march up to Baghdad. They were able to operate at a "mechanized" tempo, but the infantry units retained their light infantry flavor for when it was needed (i.e. Phase IV). Not to say it's a perfect system, but it's worked well for us so far.

[Rifleman]

Exactly, Wilf. USMC infantry units are light formations; our armored vehicles are kept in an entirely separate battalion and attached to infantry units as needed. There are advantages and disadvantages to this, but it apparently didn't hinder 1st Marine Division during the march up to Baghdad. They were able to operate at a "mechanized" tempo, but the infantry units retained their light infantry flavor for when it was needed (i.e. Phase IV). Not to say it's a perfect system, but it's worked well for us so far.

I've often wondered if something similar might be appropriate for Army light infantry units. Perhaps A, B, and C Companies foot mobile and D Company with vehicles, mounted weapons, and crews but no dismounts.

As you said, there would be advantages and disadvantages.

[Steve Blair]

I've often wondered if something similar might be appropriate for Army light infantry units. Perhaps A, B, and C Companies foot mobile and D Company with vehicles, mounted weapons, and crews but no dismounts.

As you said, there would be advantages and disadvantages.

This is something similar to what was done with air cavalry squadrons in Vietnam. A,B,and C Troops were air, while D Troop was ground. Obviously, divisional cavalry squadrons used a similar organization, with D Troop being air and the rest ground.

[VMI_Marine]

I've often wondered if something similar might be appropriate for Army light infantry units. Perhaps A, B, and C Companies foot mobile and D Company with vehicles, mounted weapons, and crews but no dismounts.

As you said, there would be advantages and disadvantages.

What I was really getting at was the separate Assault Amphibian Battalions. We typically "mech up" one rifle company for a MEU deployment. That company gets a platoon of AAVs and a platoon of tanks from the division's AA and Tank battalions, respectively. The AAVs and infantry train as completely separate entities before the MEU "locks on" and begins its workups. After the MEU, the AAVs and Tanks return to their parent battalion, and the rifle company trains as light infantry again. This was done on a divisional scale for OIF 1 - the AA Bn's were used to mech up all of the infantry battalions in 1st MarDiv. While there are advantages to dedicated mech infantry formations, this arrangement works pretty well for the USMC's missions.

[Rifleman]

Yes, I understood what you were getting at, I was just wondering if Army light infantry units would benefit from following the same general principal - having a unit with vehicles (Strykers, M113s, something else?) and crews but having the dismounts come from another unit.

I just suggested a company (of some suitable vehicle) per battalion for Army light infantry for the sake of discussion, but I understood that the USMC has a battalion of amphibious tractors per division.

[Distiller]

@ Heavy vs Light Inf:

Major difference I see between heavy (mechanized) and light (foot) infantry is, that heavies are in a supportive role for the armor, whereas the lights do everything themselves. This might actually lead the heavies to be light (as their stuff, like mortars and guns are on the vehicles), and the lights be heavy (since they carry their stuff themselves). So it seems more a job discription than anything else.
Also, what about losses? You might run out of heavies (in case their AFVs are not kaputt) and need to use lights then anyway.

Or: In 15 years robot crawlers, walkers and exo-skeleton troopers will be heavy and pure humans light. Beware of Skynet!


@ Dropping vs Running:

Mostly a question of instinctive assessment of potential cover within a few meters in your forward field of view the moment you hear it coming, I think. When it goes boom it's too late to decide.

Digging makes really nice radar returns. But: Do the other chaps have it?
Basically I think the age of digging in is over, as the age of mass infantry assaults is also over (at least as long as we don't go back to WW1 style). For bivouacing shrapnell-protection you might use one of these really sturdy kevlar raincoats overhead. Might also help against IR. Entrenching doesn't work too well on rocky soil either. Saw a MG gunner on a picture from Afghanistan sitting behind a piled up wall of stones. Crazy!