What is the "Surge?"

[Entropy]

I've been reading some politics lately (yes, that's my first mistake!) and it seems apparent to me that there is a huge difference in what people of different political stripes think is the "surge." This definitional difference seems to be at the heart of disagreements over whether it has "worked" or not. Those disagreements go on to buttress basic policy differences.

So, to the professionals here, many of which I'm sure were either involved in planning and/or executing the "surge," what does it mean to you? Is there a commonly-accepted definition? I've always considered it much more than the simple addition of more forces but have never been completely sure myself what is "surge" and what is not. Is the surge something the military should provide a precise definition for (assuming there isn't one already that I've somehow missed)? Am I an idiot for asking these probably loaded questions in this forum? :D

[Cavguy]

Interestingly, the article COL MacFarland and I wrote (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/Smith_AnbarEngMarApr08.pdf) has become ground zero for the debate over recent comments by McCain/Obama campaigns.

Not where I like to be as a military officer - having our work being quoted in the middle of a political squabble over terms.

<sigh> :rolleyes:

My blog post in February (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/how-the-west-was-won/) (well before the current hubub) amplifying it included this:


Likewise, the major actions that enabled the “Awakening” pre-date the execution of the surge, publication of FM 3-24, and the arrival of General Petraeus to Iraq. Attributing the success in Ramadi to the “surge” would be erroneous. However, the change to population centric tactics, patrol bases, and local security alliances that the Ready First and some other units had used in 2006 were systemically spread and adapted to local conditions throughout Iraq under the leadership of General Petraeus and General Odierno. The additional forces in the surge coupled with new tactics and doctrine enabled the transformation of Baghdad and several other provinces. The actions of the Ready First in Ramadi and 3d Armored Cavalry in Tal Afar were validation and prototypes for the change in tactics that accompanied the surge, and validated the principles that now embody FM 3-24.


I would offer that perhaps people are talking past each other - two events are being discussed - the "surge" as defined as the addition of extra BCT's to Iraq (announced Jan 07, and used in the example above), and apparently a definition of the "surge" that was the shift to better COIN tactics (pop security, COPs, nested lines of operations) that can be reasonably described as beginning somewhere in 2005, and were standardized country-wide in 2007 with GEN P/GEN O. The above quote specifically refers to the first definition. I can handle the second, but it probably is confusing. I would describe it as "better operations and tactics through organizational learning."

As far as the Awakening, the article has the dates of when things happened - I'll let others hash on its relation to the "surge" depending on which version of the above you accept. SEN McCain (plus SENs Snowe, Liebermann, and Graham) visitied us in Dec 06 and got a full brief from COL MacFarland on the emerging turnaround. I can see how McCain might have included this in his definition of the "surge", because it directly played into the political debate over whether success was possible in Iraq - and the choice between the Baker/Hamilton plan and the Kaplan/Keane "surge" that was all the rage in the media.

As a personal opinion, I doubt that we would have had the flexibility to break Baghdad's "cycle of violence" without the addition of extra troops, combined with a coherent and synchronized operational plan based off of organizational learning. The Awakening probably would have occurred in Anbar regardless, but I doubt it could have spread into the "Sons of Iraq" movement without the addition of troops to mitigate the sectarian cycle of violence combined with evolved COIN practices (the above plus things like gated communities in B'Dad).

That's as far as I'm willing to wade into this one. All personal opinions above. I am endorsing neither side's account/interpretation, only responding to some commentator/blogger's use of our article for political hay that I have seen.

[PhilR]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

[Schmedlap]

This definitional difference seems to be at the heart of disagreements over whether it has "worked" or not. Those disagreements go on to buttress basic policy differences.

I think you got it backwards. Politicians start from a position and then seek ways justify the position.


Is the surge something the military should provide a precise definition for (assuming there isn't one already that I've somehow missed)?

No. The positions have been staked out. All candidates will shift this way and that, but none will shift too far from where their base of support wants them to go. If the military were to attempt to clarify the definition, it would immediately be spun by both sides to rationalize some way that it bolsters their positions, making the military the unwitting tool for political nonsense (or is that a redundant term?). When objective facts are irrelevant to the outcome of an argument, it is pointless to inject them into it.

[Rank amateur]

I think you got it backwards. Politicians start from a position and then seek ways justify the position.


So do "bases." Surge has become one of those words like guns, abortion, etc. upon which no intelligent conversation is possible, because contrasting emotions have been attached to the word, and now the bases would rather yell at each other. It's too bad because COIN is expensive and the only people who can pay for it are the voters. Nothing good can come out of taxpayers not understanding what they're paying for.

To one side "surge" means winning: which is simplistic at best. To the other it means, obsession with Iraq, but obviously Iraq can't be completely ignored.

Normally, "winning" and "we need to take care of ourselves first" are both pretty popular with voters. Probably why the politicians aren't budging.

If I were running the Obama campaign I'd be trying to shift the left's meaning of surge from "It's not worth the causalities" - which is losing relevance - to "why does McCain want to rebuild Iraq while bridges are falling in America, and people are losing their homes." Selfish pocketbook issues swing voters, and it ties in with the meme that "four more years" will mess up the economy and the whole Katrina thing. Then again, they may have thought of that and it tested poorly in focus groups. (This spin doctor thing is trickier than it looks.)

[Schmedlap]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?

[Wildcat]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?

Stop the presses! :eek:

I agree with Rank Amateur that the Surge has become a hot-button issue that provokes some pretty heated responses from both sides of the issue. Most voter polls I've seen have phrased the question very simplistically: "Do you think the Surge has been a success?" Well, by what metric do we gauge success? Overall success in Iraq would be a stable, self-sufficient state with no great need of Coalition forces for security. But the Surge's aims, to me, seem more restrained: establishing security, so that political reconciliation may follow. That would be the watered down version. You can't have the latter before the former, in my opinion. And that is what I consider the Surge to be: not just an escalation of troops, or better operations through organizational learning, but mainly the stated aim that security be established before any other strategic objectives can be accomplished. In other words, more troops and better tactics are just the nuts and bolts of the Surge.

Now, I'm not a professional and I don't have any time in country, so my opinion matters little, if at all. But from what I've been seeing and hearing, we are slowly achieving that goal of establishing security. It's too early to call the Surge a success. I think it is succeeding. While I mentioned that its goal (establishing security) is narrower than the overall goal of turning Iraq into a healthy state, the Surge is, by necessity, tied to that larger goal. So we won't really be able to call it a success until Iraq itself is a success.

[MikeF]

Enthropy-
Excellent timing. We just had a thorough discussion on this in class (All services and SF/Seals represented). Many of us served as ground commanders throughout Iraq from late 2006 to summer of 2007.

Situation: Years of frequent policy shifts(Saddam, Interim IZ Gov’t, Civil War, Islamic State of Iraq) and the introduction of partisan forces and the evolution of radical Islamist Jihad (suicide bomber) deteriorated the social fabric of the Iraqi (self, family, tribe, religion, and state) leaving an acephalous society- confusion, lack of self-identity, loss of hope. The insertion of additional combat troops and COIN strategy colliding with internal Iraqi actions led to the perfect storm of “The Surge.”

First, my personal, emotional, and categorical answer- Combined with other components listed below, the decisive point of “The Surge” was Airborne, Strykers, Cavalry, and Marine units moving deep into denied areas taking the fight to the enemy. This action took away the enemy’s information advantage (terrorize the terrorist/denying safehaven). The increase in kinetics (facilitated by the AF, but triggered by the grunt) allowed us to control these areas. The psychological impact on the Sunni populace was exponential. After years of instability, the populace believed that we could secure them. Finally, we broke the enemy’s will to fight, and they turned away from AQI and began providing actionable intelligence.

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Now, the challenge is how to put humpty dumpty back together again.

I probably missed a few components, but it’s a start. I look forward to hearing others views, feedback, and additions.

[jkm_101_fso]

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Now, the challenge is how to put humpty dumpty back together again.

I probably missed a few components, but it’s a start. I look forward to hearing others views, feedback, and additions.

Mike, great work. How critical (or not) are the Sons of Iraq, do you think? I'm assuming you'd place them under #1, although that has thankfully trickled beyond Anbar, to a pretty good degree of success, from what I've heard.

Without question, it is my observation one of the most critical elements was Petraeus coming in and cleaning out the FOBs and getting the line units on the streets and in the neighborhoods. He employed this wildly successful strategy in Mosul in '03 and it was an absolutely blessing when he applied it to the entire theater. It has been great tactically and for also for morale.

[Rank amateur]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?


And people like me get paid big bucks to help them.

I've often wounded about the effect on the military and military culture. If Republicans were saying, "failed to plan for stability operations" would we have adopted better tactics and a population centric strategy sooner?

[Rank amateur]

I probably missed a few components,

I think building walls around the population always "works." It's also worth noting that the objective changed from the impossible - spreading democracy across the Middle East - to the very achievable "lowering violence."

Setting the objective is above everyone's pay grade, but if you set an impossible objective, failure is guaranteed.

I've also longed maintained that the single most important metric - to the schlep watching TV - was US casualties. As long as few of "our guys" are getting killed, we're not too worried about much else going on in Iraq because we figure most government projects are SNAFU and if the bureaucrats didn't waste money in Iraq they'd waste it here, so we can't get too worked up about reconciliation, rebuilding or the lack there of.

[Rex Brynen]

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)


Excellent list, although I would nuance #2 to underscore AQI's momentous mistake in finally pushing the Shiite militias and population into revenge mode with the February 2006 al-Askari (Samarra) mosque bombing.

Up to that point it was striking that the Shiite militias had typically NOT taken engaged in sectarian revenge attacks--a rarity for a civil conflict. With the upsurge of sectarian violence (and sectarian-"unmixing") in 2006, the Sunni population and non-AQI militias suddenly learned to count (as in "ummm.. so we're 20% of the population.. the Shiites and Kurds are 80%... maybe we better rethink our security interests...")

[jmm99]

from RankAmateur
I've also longed maintained that the - to the schlep watching TV - was US casualties.

I'd suggest that US casualties (as an abstract number) have been the single most important metric to some schleps (def. 2) producing, announcing and punditting TV (who've used them to support their own political positions - "right" and "left" - without much if any shame).

I'd suggest that the person watching TV becomes concerned about US casualties (1) when that involves a relative, friend or neighbor; and / or (2) when US casualties do not seem to be resulting in what that person considers progress; or are (in that person's opinion) the result of a bad governmental policy decision to continue the war.

Vietnam (if you are of that generation) was the same thing

Iraq has been very much of a schlep (def. 1) - long and arduous, indeed; as attested by better men than I. So was Vietnam. As such, both include(d) surges, back and forth, forth and back. So, we saw and see Operation This or That (I, II and III, etc.).

So, what is the "Surge" ? Dammed if I really know; but it probably will be expressed differently next month from this month.

End Rant.

--------------------------------
BTW: weren't sure whether you meant the older meaning of "schlep" (still used by paleo-anthropolgists re: technique of bringing back the produce of the hunt):


schlep : to drag or haul (an object); to make a tedious journey (from Yiddish shlepn; cf. German schleppen) (OED, MW)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_English_words_of_Yiddish_origin

or, the more current slang meaning (last below)


schlep or schlepp also shlep (shlp) Slang
v. schlepped also shlepped, schlep·ping or schlepp·ing also shlep·ping, schleps or schlepps also shleps
v.tr.
To carry clumsily or with difficulty; lug: schlepped a shopping bag around town.
v.intr.
To move slowly or laboriously: schlepped around with the twins in a stroller.
n.
1. An arduous journey.
2. A clumsy or stupid person.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/schlep

[Ken White]

Most Americans concern for casualties is that there be an exchange or payback of some sort -- they'll tolerate casualties as long as they think something is being accomplished. Only if they see no successes at all do they get unduly perturbed. there are a few that want to make casualties an issue but they're a minority -- and most of them have no relatives or even anyone one they know in the service.

The body bag myth is just that-- a myth. As is all the foolishness about showing the coffins arriving at Dover. Every military funeral gets plentiful local coverage, so there's no cover up. Parents with serving kids like me are mostly content with the process as it now works and see nothing to be gained other than dipwad political points from showing arrivals at Dover.

[Rank amateur]

or, the more current slang meaning

Definitely 2, but more affectionately.


Most Americans concern for casualties is that there be an exchange or payback of some sort

IMO, a perfectly reasonable cost benefit analysis.

[Ken White]

IMO, a perfectly reasonable cost benefit analysis.Though there are those who try to skew the process for political reasons, they are rarely successful.

[Ron Humphrey]

Though there are those who try to skew the process for political reasons, they are rarely successful.



All throughout they usually think they are being successful, only to find that they were actually falling farther from their goal the whole time:eek:

[Ken White]

dat..........:cool:

[carl]

The insertion of additional combat troops and COIN strategy colliding with internal Iraqi actions led to the perfect storm of “The Surge.”


This seems a clear and concise definition of the "the Surge".

It is important to note that the elements coalesced into the perfect storm because we as a nation decided to keep on trying, and we were wise enough to do it a little harder and smarter.

[MikeF]

First Air Assualt,


"How critical (or not) are the Sons of Iraq, do you think? I'm assuming you'd place them under #1, although that has thankfully trickled beyond Anbar, to a pretty good degree of success, from what I've heard."

-jkm_101

The list was simply a timeline of my own brain. As to the weight of the Sons of Iraq, I simply don't know. I left at the end of July 2007 before they trickled into Diyala Province. Although, from NIPR, it appears that both Sons and Daughters of Iraq are succeeding there.

To rank amateur,



"I think building walls around the population always "works." It's also worth noting that the objective changed from the impossible - spreading democracy across the Middle East - to the very achievable "lowering violence.'"

Interesting tactic-I initially summarized it under secure Baghdad, but the decision to wall off Baghdad is significant.

To Rex,


"Excellent list, although I would nuance #2 to underscore AQI's momentous mistake in finally pushing the Shiite militias and population into revenge mode with the February 2006 al-Askari (Samarra) mosque bombing."

Yeah, I summarily categorized AQI's violence as one. In the macro sense, a decision to kill civilians and Shia outweights time- Samarra mosque bombing, Diyala attacks, and Sadr City attacks...

To Carl,

Quote:
Originally Posted by Carl

This seems a clear and concise definition of the "the Surge".


No issues there.

Looking foward to further submittals....Did we miss anything?

[MSG Proctor]

Without question, it is my observation one of the most critical elements was Petraeus coming in and cleaning out the FOBs and getting the line units on the streets and in the neighborhoods. He employed this wildly successful strategy in Mosul in '03 and it was an absolutely blessing when he applied it to the entire theater. It has been great tactically and for also for morale.

Bingo! After MCO, most (not all) of the armored/mechanized formations in the invasion force quite naturally holed up in large bases (usually a palace remodeled by the USAF). The airborne/air assault forces did what we do - disperse maneuver companies and platoons in order to hold key terrain on foot. When people talk about the "new strategy" of GEN Petraeus, I just shrug. Our BCT assumed this exact posture in southern Baghdad in 2003 with the same results as the 101 in Mosul. I recall thinking the war must be over if they're consolidating us ground pounders into FOBs.

"I attribute our company’s success to several things. First, our squad leaders and platoon sergeants led by example throughout the deployment. Secondly, we maintained a vigilance and steadfast belief that we were making a difference in people’s lives. Last, we submerged ourselves into the Iraqi communities rather than sitting behind the walls of one of the many huge base camps that you see in Iraq today. We were capable of knowing the fine details of every road and back ally in our area of responsibility because we lived among these people on a daily basis. Developing friendships while compiling knowledge from our local informants, we were able to maintain a stable environment and growing economy for the citizens of Mosul that became the model for other cities around Iraq."

-1SG J. Bradshaw, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st ABN DIV
From The Long Hard Road: NCO experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq published by USASMA

[Steve Blair]

As I seem to recall, the "Surge" was defined at the time (read - this is what the media tended to express it as) as the flow of more combat troops into Iraq. Cav Guy, MikeF, and others have pointed out the more nuanced aspects of it, but most of that didn't make it into mainstream (or more generalized) discussions of it. The "Surge" simply came down to more boots on the ground.

Granted that's a massive oversimplification, but I do tend to think that's how ma and pa back on the couch watching TV saw it (or had it explained to them).

[Ron Humphrey]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

It would seem that Phil has it right in that the greatest overall change took place in the perspectives of the people within Iraq, their leaders, and foreign interests; and what they were willing and ready to do about it.

The point at which the HN proactively begins to work towards change large scale will always be decisive. And General P with the surge forces and associated use of them was able to provide the conditions for that to happen.

Ultimately the locals have to win the local war and our soldiers helped and are helping to get them there.

Just my take ---

[Old Eagle]

The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.

[Hacksaw]

Clearly its easy to get several different events confused (vis'a'vis chicken or egg)... In defference to the context in which this thread grew (political volleyball) the "Surge" is commonly perceived as an increase in troops (BOG)

Was Petraeus part of the "Surge"... no but he helped develop the concept, and he sold it as a necessary capability to enable the "new" strategy - create security conditions that enable the space for Iraqi political progress.

Was the "Surge" the critical element that enabled MNC-I to string together a series of tactical successes that resulted in operational/strategic effects - near total collapse of AQI? Mostly no, some yes... Biggest factor was that MNC-I Staff evolved its thinking in terms of correctly defining the problem and developed a strategy to operate a tempo inside AQI's ability to adapt. That said, the inflow of increased combat capability was crucial to their ability to implement the strategy

"Surge" relationship to Petraeus strategy and Anbar Awakening? Anbar was first by all accounts, but then again Mosel in 2003 preceeded Anbar (tomatoo - tomatoe that's what its all about). Point is pockets and pools of smart people can arrive at similar conclusions - significance is that "Surge" strategy (secure population - JSPs - etc) became the norm rather than the exception.

These and several other related factors (see MikeF posting earlier) has led to a better situation in Iraq.

So what does it all mean? I don't know, but let me take a shot....

- III Corps (MNC-I), by virtue of others experiences and their own, got it right in terms of understanding the problem and developing an operational approach that made sense.

- GEN Petraeus and Ordierno were the right leaders at the right time

- The shift to offensive operations (really taking it to AQI, militias and other bad guys) had the same type of disorienting effect on our opponents as we tend to see in well executed conventional fights, hmmm.... might be a lesson there

- Can't do all this without adequate BOG so that oeprational commanders have the tools to implement.

I shall now return to the dark corner and shut my eyes :wry:

Live well and row

[selil]

The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.

I'd have to say that I agree. Further it short changes all the hard work everybody involved did. "The Surge" is a term that should be mocked.

[Alsultani]

I'm brand new to the board ( I posted in the introduction forum)

I look at the surge from the micro level. I was there, and extended for 4 months (16 total) due to the surge, as a team leader of a Tactical HUMINT Team. Serving in a Shia area owned by the Mahdi Army, the surge didn't mean much. I believe the surge is working militarily in the short term, but I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from. Last I knew, the Sadrist Current still has 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament. The Sadrist MP in our area has a PSD who were also members of JAM, involved in mafia activities. She provided political cover to an extent that the ISF in the province were paralyzed. Judges refused to issue warrants. JAM members could and did kill ISF and coalition forces with impunity, using Iranian trained and supplied action team members, who had official MOD identification cards, etc. JAM would murder a policeman in her city, and the next day the JAM commander would be publicly drinking Chai tea with the Chief of police at the station. I was in the room to hear a US state department rep say that this Sadrist MP had immunity because she's a politician. I observed the frustration of senior ISF at this statement; one of whom has since been assassinated by the very people he was prevented from going after. Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

[jmm99]

In early 2007, Fred Kagan published two reports setting out his "surge" vision.


Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
Phase I Report
By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Friday, January 5, 2007
PAPERS AND STUDIES
AEI Online
Publication Date: January 5, 2007
link to .pdf file in link below

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396,filter.all/pub_detail.asp


Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
Phase II Report
By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Wednesday, April 25, 2007
PAPERS AND STUDIES
AEI Online
Publication Date: April 25, 2007
link to .pdf file in link below

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26028,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

The first of them (dealing with things military) caught most comment.

I'm interested in your comments (who's been der, done dat) on the second report (dealing with things political); to set the palette:

1. Were any of Kagan's recommendations initiated in your jurisdiction ("microlevel") ?

2. If initiated, were they carried through ?

3. Were they successful ?

4. If not, your thoughts on why not ?

5. Any other thoughts re: Kagan's second report ?

Above subject to all security caveats which apply to you - so, only to the extent you can.

[MSG Proctor]

Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marja).

Your assessment that the governor is beholden to SICI (they have publicly removed the "R" for revolution but I know what you mean) indicates the religious chain of command is at work, regardless of the formal political network as recognized in the Parliament. Shia are obligated to obey the fatwas of their Marja until the Ayatollah/Hojat al Islam dies. This is 180 degrees the opposite of Sunnaism which recognizes no formal clergy heirarchy, is dependent on scholarship and consensus, and utilizes no religious chain of command. Moreover, it is religion that cements the ties between Iraq's Shia and the Iranian revolutionary council.

I share your frustration with this thorny problem and agree that there is not much external military forces can bring to bear to untangle this corruption. However the government of Iraq will have to confront the issue (as they did in Bosra) of cleric-run militias under Iranian influence without creating 'martyrs' and inflaming fanatics. One must take into account that the majority of Shia believe that we are living in the End Times just before the appearing of Imam al Mahdi, the Shiite Savior. This apocalyptic furor is instrumentalized by many clerics as explicit justification for political and military action. Few CF INTEL/IO/PSYOP planners are fluent in these dynamics and may be operating in the dark in that regard.

[jkm_101_fso]

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

Alsultani--Welcome. Your experience and opinions will be much appreciated here. Your thoughts and insights into Iraqi politics are unique, but certainly not unfamiliar to many of us. The unfortunate reality of the Surge and our Operations in Iraq is that many unpleasant and unsavory characters will gain power and wealth. It irks me as much as you, trust me. Most people would like to focus on the tactical portion of the Surge, but the political aspect is actually what matters, in regards to many of the "benchmarks" our leaders set for the Iraqi leadership. The bottom line is that Iraqi leaders, starting with Maliki on down, will determine their own destiny. Who they choose to lead and grant power too is ultimately up to Iraqis, not us. Although, I've seen U.S. favored actors gain power and perform miserably (as far as acting in the interest of their represented population) I also believe that Shia factions tied to JAM and Iran are certainly the most dangerous and unpredictable. You highlight many good points, there. Your question is a hard one to answer, but is actually one of the most crucial, outside of security gains met because of the tactical part of the Surge.

[Ken White]

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.Are they? Or is the 'surge' (really silly term...) working to provide some stability to ALL Iraqis insofar as is possible? While those clowns try to game the process as is in their genes... :(

Being the ME, there will be no all encompassing stability; that area is going to change only slowly. My guess, having spent a couple of years there some time ago, is that lacking the invasion of Iraq (Afghanistan is not in the ME and occurrences there do not affect the ME...), it would have taken five generations for much change to be effected there. I believe the invasion and subsequent actions will speed that up to possibly as little as two generations. Will that be true and will the result have been worth it? I think so but only time will tell us for certain.
I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?I suggest they are two different things; the political reality is the ME, raw and as it has been for at least 800 years since Islam, once at the forefront of human knowledge, turned inward. The 'surge' -- it is really much more than that and encompasses a lot of things -- is opening a window for the ME to hop out and breathe some fresh air. We can't drag them outside, it's up to them; they can stay inside and stifle or come out that window. There will be internal and external pressures both ways. What will occur is in the hands of the fates.

The probability is that it will work but if it does not, at least we tried.

[Rank amateur]

I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from.


Thanks for the excellent comments and insight. I suggest that we have a great deal of influence over the definition of success. There's no reason we can't declare supporting an Iraqi government until it asks us to leave a roaring success. I realize Obama is just a senator, but if he and Maliki can work out a withdrawal timetable, there's no reason that Maliki and a president can't. (The British haven't spent a lot of time worrying about what's happened to Malaysia since they left.) The Middle East is obviously more strategical important than Malaysia but no one is even think about abandoning our military presence in the Middle East.

[Entropy]

Very interesting and informative responses all around. And to think I was a bit hesitant about broaching the topic because of the political implications!

I've done a bit of research and it looks like several terms in addition to "surge" were used in the early months. Maybe a lesson-learned in all of this is to pick a catch-phrase for a strategy at the beginning, define it clearly and use it consistently from there on out. Much less confusing for the unitiated not to mention it provides less room for those with political agendas to make their own definition.

[Rank amateur]

it provides less room for those with political agendas to make their own definition.

Unfortuntely - or fortunately depedning on your point of view - people with political agendas will always be able to change the meaning.

I've said it before, but spin is like a gun; it can be used for good or evil.

[Alsultani]

[QUOTE=MSG Proctor;53392]Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marja).

Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power, and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.

One on one, many Shia on the street wish for a strong man to come back because it's the only thing that will work in Iraq. Some of them wish Saddam was back. A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.

Moqtada Sadr has his father's name. Outside of Sadr City, with which I am umfamiliar, Shia on the street do not respect him as a religious figure or intellectual. His reputation was that he was the Playstation champion of Najaf during his house arrest. Word on the street was that he was going to be fast tracked through the Hawza, the Shia theological education process, which is basically unheard of. As of when I left, we had not declared the Mahdi Army as a hostile force. The moniker of "special group" was created to distance Sadr from the activities of his worst and most effective insurgents. Believe me, he put minimal effort, if any at all, into reigning these guys in. What it did was give him deniability.

[Alsultani]

Thanks for the excellent comments and insight. I suggest that we have a great deal of influence over the definition of success. There's no reason we can't declare supporting an Iraqi government until it asks us to leave a roaring success. I realize Obama is just a senator, but if he and Maliki can work out a withdrawal timetable, there's no reason that Maliki and a president can't. (The British haven't spent a lot of time worrying about what's happened to Malaysia since they left.) The Middle East is obviously more strategical important than Malaysia but no one is even think about abandoning our military presence in the Middle East.

At one level I agree with you. (although the Brit veterans who were on the ground in Malaysia no doubt did spend a lot of time thinking about it) Will simply leaving and declaring the mission a success because there is "an" Iraqi government in place satisfy me? I would wonder if it was worth all the blood my unit and others have shed. I have a hard time looking at the current Iraqi government and thinking of the word "success." In my opinion they haven't deserved the blood and treasure we have spent.

However, I don't want to digress into all my personal issues. Perhaps if a thread is created called "Horror stories of the systemic complicity, corruption and incompetence of Iraq power holders," I will have more to say. I have to confess that my finding of this website was due to the recent coverage of Small Wars Journal's own David Kilcunnen and his comment on the Iraq war, as quoted by Spencer Ackerman in the Washington Independent. This led to my reading of his response on this site.

As I indicated, I'm new to the site, and just now embarking on formal study of strategic considerations in counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare, so please be patient with my micro perspective. I look forward to learning from you all.

[Rex Brynen]

Not much new in this, but a useful brief summary of the polling data:


Iraqi Public Opinion on the Presence of US Troops (http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/517.php?nid=&id=&pnt=517&lb=)

July 30, 2008
Testimony of Dr. Steven Kull
Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA),
University of Maryland
Director, WorldPublicOpinion.org

July 23, 2008 - 2:00 PM

Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight


In closing, it is clear that the Iraqi people are quite eager for the US to lighten its military footprint in Iraq. More importantly it appears that they are eager to regain their sense of sovereignty. As long as they do not have this sense, they are likely to continue to have a fundamentally hostile attitude toward all aspects of the US presence in Iraq. However, as Iraqis gradually regain this sense that their country belongs to them, they will likely move toward wanting some ongoing relationship with the US, both economic and military, to help them find their way out of this troubled period of their long history.

[MSG Proctor]

[QUOTE=MSG Proctor;53392]Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.



Alsultani, excellent insights and riveting to read. I am encouraged to hear you mention Shia eschatology, a concept I have rarely heard mentioned outside theological/chaplain circles. Until one grasps the role of the Mahdi in contemporary Shia thought and action, the Shia remain mysterious and incomprehensible. There is a good deal of religious conceptualizing required to appreciate what the Shia think of as relevant, and it comes rather slowly to those who have not comitted to unraveling the various layers of Shia tradition and history. Blessings upon you!

I am also heartened to hear Dr. Alawi's name is being bandied about on the Shia street. If anyone has the right values, character, experience and vision, its Iyad Alawi. And he is a Shia, but is not an Islamist. Would to God his influence would increase in Baghdad!

I understand that Moqtada al Sadr was on the 'fast track' to becoming an Ayatollah - something that in reality cannot be done. Titles may be conferred on him by some, but real gravitas as a Shiite holy man require decades of preparation and experience as a cleric. Sistani is still the primary Ayatollah in Iraq. He's 80. He's a traditional quietist and not at all in step with his neighbors to the east.

I appreciate your incredible insights and I am glad you posted here for the benfit of this community of interest.

[MSG Proctor]

53433Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power[/B], and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.



Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.

Very good discussions here friends. I see several new advantages to the escalation as I call it.

I find the term "surge" a bit inappropriate, I respectfully protest that a surge in western parlance applies more to electrical power than military power.

I feel the main stream media loved the term because it served to dehumanize the Troops. So extension or escalation is a superior term.

Yesterday & other days our C-in-c used the term so it does pass into history. I wonder who will be identified most with it in history; McCain, Petraeus, Bush, Pelosi ???

[Schmedlap]

Yesterday & other days our C-in-c used the term so it does pass into history. I wonder who will be identified most with it in history; McCain, Petraeus, Bush, Pelosi ???

Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but I think the fighting men and women will be most identified with it, as they should be.

[MikeF]

Kim Kagan just released this documentary titled Understanding the Surge (http://www.understandingthesurge.org/) (H/T Andrew Exum). COL Gentile describes it as COIN porn. I admit that I was a fan of her earlier Iraq Reports (http://www.understandingwar.org/), and I have not read her book. I thought she did a brilliant job of interpreting the available data at the time; however, this documentary seems very weak on analysis. I felt dirty after watching it.

Here's my reaction,


It took us four years to comprehend that the various insurgencies were conducting classic Mao protracted war- "clandestine organization, psychological preparation of the people, expansion of control, and consolidation of power." It's a failure of leadership on many levels that it took this long. Kim doesn't even acknowledge it in her documentary, and I would submit that many leaders still don't get it. She just shows the by-product of a Phase III civil war- lots of people were dying, and it was bad. Duh, but it didn't happen over night. During my one staff tour in 2005, it was increasingly apparent to many leaders on the ground that a civil war had sparked long before the mosque in Samarra was blown. Some acted- Remember McMasters and Tal Afar?

After we finally defined the situation for what it was NOT what we wished it to be, we employed a counter-strategy of population control measures, increased kinetics targeting leaders, facilitators, and bomb-makers, denial of safe-havens, destruction of training camps, and turning reconciliables. Additionally, GEN Patraeus and Ryan Crocker pressured the Iraqi Gov't to govern.

Am I off here? What are others' thoughts?

[davidbfpo]

MikeF asked:
Am I off here? What are others' thoughts?

I thought it was over-hyped although the incredibly short interview clips did have some interest.

davidbfpo

[jkm_101_fso]

It was kind of hokey and broad-brushed over many important details of the Surge beyond the tactical changes that were made.

I do like that history channel guy...maybe that's why it reminded me of a H.C. show, which I enjoy.

To a layman that knows nothing of what happened, it's probably appropriate.

[MikeF]

It was kind of hokey and broad-brushed over many important details of the Surge beyond the tactical changes that were made. I do like that history channel guy...maybe that's why it reminded me of a H.C. show, which I enjoy. To a layman that knows nothing of what happened, it's probably appropriate.

Y'all made some good points. David is right, the interviews are good. Guess I have to learn to step back and take a deep breathe on these type of things.

[Jedburgh]

SSQ, Summer 2010: Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge (http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/stancati.pdf)

....No one has argued that the influx of additional combat forces was the sole factor responsible for the reduction in violence in Iraq. The conventional wisdom is that the surge, working in combination with other causal factors, resulted in an improved situation. Some, however, question what the surge has actually accomplished, arguing that while it worked tactically from a military perspective, it failed strategically from a political perspective. The objective of this research is to gain an understanding of why that is the case by addressing three key questions. First, since scholars and subject matter experts have identified other causal factors besides the surge, could there be another? Second, is it possible that this “dynamic” factor, acting as a top-level governing element, directly affected the behavior of the others? Third, could this top-level “dynamic” factor be the primary reason the surge succeeded tactically but failed politically and strategically? Preliminary analysis suggests this could be the case. After a more in-depth evaluation, one factor did emerge that fit the category of a “top-level governing element,” that being the principle of Iraqi tribal dynamics......

[SteveMetz]

I take a shot at this question in my recent SSI study (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=985).

[MikeF]

I take a shot at this question in my recent SSI study (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=985).

A must/should read, but renamed by me as The Surge: All those unparked cars are parked along the sidewalk.

[SteveMetz]

A must/should read, but renamed by me as The Surge: All those unparked cars are parked along the sidewalk.


But, but, but.....

Actually, I had to fight this battle with my organization. I deliberately chose to NOT name it that to make the point that I believe that the "surge"--the troop increase--gets way more attention than it deserves.