Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[jkm_101_fso]

Can our AFG vets lend any credibility to this?


Deploying additional forces could backfire, however, if the United States and its allies don't devise a coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban insurgency, strengthen the Afghan government, bolster the country's economy and deprive Islamic militants of their safe haven in neighboring Pakistan.

The calls for reinforcing the U.S.-led military coalition come amid the worst violence since the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with the 7-year-old ''forgotten war'' in May and June claiming more U.S. dead than Iraq for the first time.

More foreign troops, however, would do little more than turn more war-weary Afghans against U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai if they are not part of a broader and more effective counterinsurgency strategy, some experts and U.S. officials warned.

"There is not one strategy with one person in charge,'' said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly. "If we had asked the Taliban to draw an organizational chart for allied forces in Afghanistan, they would have drawn this one."

As a result, U.S. and NATO troop have had to cede areas to the insurgents or turn over newly reclaimed territory to poorly trained, ill-equipped and illiterate police who often flee when attacked, are in cahoots with the militants or abuse the local population.

''You win every battle but lose the war because you can't hold any ground,'' said John McCreary, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The U.S.-led coalition is also desperately short of soldiers who can mentor Afghan National Police units. An estimated 3,500 more advisors are needed to live and work with newly trained police units.

Another looming requirement is for more experienced U.S. combat troops to deal with what U.S. commanders think may be an influx of foreign militants who might have otherwise gone to Iraq.


http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/619363.html

[Old Eagle]

From the article --
"Deploying additional forces could backfire, however, if the United States and its allies don't devise a coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban insurgency, strengthen the Afghan government, bolster the country's economy and deprive Islamic militants of their safe haven in neighboring Pakistan."

Spent a tour as an advisor at the ministerial level.

Deploying forces without a strategy "could" backfire -- how 'bout WILL backfire. Killing Taliban cannot solve the problems of Afghanistan. Think I ought to get paid for that deep insight.

Sorry for the rant. Yes, the solution has to be holistic. We need to do better. A better wrap up of the challenges is at CSIS by Tony Cordesman.

[DaveDoyle]

Clearly an increased international effort that uses all instruments of national power is in order for Afghanistan. And reading political tea leaves, I would suggest the increased effort is in the works. The effort cannot be divorced from increased resouces of all types. Thus, leaders working in Afghanistan need more capability which can be provided in part by more Soldiers, Airmen and Marines from our country and others. Speaking from experience, many operations (if not most) are being run on a shoestring. I too am wary of the idea that the "surge" that worked in Iraq should easily work in Afghanistan. However, a "surge" at this point would merely add forces that are sorely needed for a baseline effort.

[Tom Odom]

Think I ought to get paid for that deep insight.


Paid to think? You work at Leavenworth. Back on your head...:wry:

[Eden]

Clearly an increased international effort that uses all instruments of national power is in order for Afghanistan. And reading political tea leaves, I would suggest the increased effort is in the works. The effort cannot be divorced from increased resouces of all types. Thus, leaders working in Afghanistan need more capability which can be provided in part by more Soldiers, Airmen and Marines from our country and others. Speaking from experience, many operations (if not most) are being run on a shoestring. I too am wary of the idea that the "surge" that worked in Iraq should easily work in Afghanistan. However, a "surge" at this point would merely add forces that are sorely needed for a baseline effort.

Amen. Afghanistan has one-third the number of troops that are currently in Iraq - if you count all nations, some of which are doing very little to contribute to success. And they were short of everything from UAVs to artillery to helicopters. To give you some idea of the scale, when I was there in 06-07, there was the rough equivalent of an MP battalion, several infantry companies, and some SF trying to interdict the Afghan-Pakistani border. This incredibly rugged border, if placed in the United States, would stretch from Chicago to somewhere near Memphis.

So - absolutely right we are strategically bankrupt in Afghanistan; it certainly would make sense to have a plan for using any additional forces we send over there. But there is no conceivable plan that would work given the current troop levels. We need both a plan and the troops.

[Rank amateur]

We need both a plan and the troops.

Yes and the plan must eliminate - or at least severely curtail - sanctuary in Pakistan. One of the keys to defeating insurgencies is to remove their ability to control their loss rate and you can't do that if they can hide in Pakistan.

[Cougfootballfan]

perhaps with Gen Petraeus taking over as the head of CENTCOM there will start to be a broader plan for how to deal with the resurgent terrorists similar to his actions as head of the 101st and commander of Multi-National forces

[Norfolk]

No plan for Afghanistan will work without unity of command: so forget NATO, start pushing its command structure into the margins (preferably into Kabul and its environs, and tell the UN to move over and make room there); and give exclusive control of all US and willing non-US forces (there won't be many, so at least there might be a minimum of friction in that regard) to a single U.S. command with authority for all of Afghanistan. But stick with NATO and the present command structure, and everything that follows is throwing good after bad.

[Entropy]

The problem, IMO, is a lack of coherent and achievable strategic goals in Afghanistan borne of a fundamental misunderstanding of the region.

Let's assume for a minute the Afghan government becomes relatively enduring and stable and that a large, capable and mostly self-sufficient National Army is created. At that point, Afghanistan will be the rough equivalent of where Pakistan is today. And just like Pakistan, it will be incapable of controlling large swaths of its own territory. And getting to that point (stable government, national Army) is a long way off if it happens at all.

[Danny]

Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.

I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.

I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.

[MSG Proctor]

Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.

I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.

I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.

The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].

"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."

[Ron Humphrey]

The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].

"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."

Some of the things I've been reading from the regions history lately tells me that in this particular area that might not actually be the best way to go?

Have to dig some more but on the face of it, isn't the indigenous leadership there almost completely intertwined with the very groups we are seeking to overcome, (and in a much more established and well networked way.

Just pondering

Also: can anyone tell me when and who if ever an empire, state organized grouping under statelike pretenses, etc has actually come from within the area we call Afghanistan other than by being asbsored into a larger movement, being enabled(pressed) by an outside entity, or straight up conquered?

[MSG Proctor]

I understand the caution, but we have to ponder some givens...

1. Afghanistan is only about 25% literate. So, how does the National Identity message get conveyed? Answer: the Mosque.
2. Afghanistan's only unifying principle is Islam.
3. Mullahs, religious scholars and preachers have far more credibility than the government of Afghanistan (GoA). We spend most of our efforts seeking to legitimize the GoA in the eyes of the Afghans while marginalizing cleric influence.
4. The enemy knows bullets 1-3 and therefore pusues a vigorous policy of co-opting the Mullahs. D'ya think they know something?
5. Cleric engagement is not the same as supporting a Caliphate, a religious state or a theocracy; it merely acknowledges the most influential leaders among the population in a COIN fight and attempts to leverage their spheres-of-influence.
6. There is no long term solution in Afghanistan that does not include Islam. Most Muslims deplore the abberrant theology of AQ/Taliban; to offer secularism as a solution just strengthens the IO positions of the radicals. The worst nightmare of AQ/Taliban is a vibrant, orthodox Islam championed by the common people.
7. The war against Hirabists is global; support for Afghanistan's more orthodox Sunnis is a strategic blow to their movement.

[Fuchs]

I was never there and don't intend to change that - but wasn't there some kind of tribal thing and community leaders being relevant?
I remember stories about how Afghan warfare is basically about a show of force to enlist local forces into one's army. That explained pretty well the volatility there.

This "mullah" emphasis seems to overshoot the target a bit. I doubt that the mullahs lead troops.

[Rex Brynen]

2. Afghanistan's only unifying principle is Islam.

Given that 20% of the population is non-Sunni (largely Hazari Shi'ites), not entirely. Nor would I assume that Islam--as powerful as it is as a common narrative--is enough to overcome ethno-linguistic and even tribal cleavages. An Islamic identity wasn't sufficient to prevent civil war or sustain a shared sense of national interest and identity after the Soviet withdrawal--indeed, the fighting between self-proclaimed Islamic mujahiddin groups was as bloody as any in Afghanistan's history.

I also think there are some limits to the ability of coalition forces to play a leading role in effectively engaging local religious leaderships.

That being said, I don't doubt the wisdom of engaging local religious leaderships. I see it much more in terms of conflict management and stabilization, however, rather than "unifying" a fractious Afghanistan with a deep-rooted suspicion/aversion to both outsiders and central government control.

[MSG Proctor]

I was never there and don't intend to change that - but wasn't there some kind of tribal thing and community leaders being relevant?
I remember stories about how Afghan warfare is basically about a show of force to enlist local forces into one's army. That explained pretty well the volatility there.

This "mullah" emphasis seems to overshoot the target a bit. I doubt that the mullahs lead troops.

You have inadertantly identified our achilles heel. You doubt that Mullahs lead troops.

1. In COIN, tactical success means little without population buy-in. Kill all the insurgents you want - until you get the CoG and the IO pieces right, you'll be playing whack-a-mole and creating more insurgents.
2. Tribal sheikhs will not go against the Mullahs. Period.
3. Many Mullahs are in fact tribal leaders and wield significant power to marshall militia forces.
4. The enemy knows the religious leaders are the #1 sphere of influence and works hard to engage them with anti-CF IO themes.
5. Even Mullahs that do not possess direct militia authority influence everything that goes on in every tribe, neiborhood and village via the Friday afternoon sermon. Failure to grasp the legitimacy, significance and relevance of the Friday Mosque sermon is IO suicide.

@Rex: COIN is about legitimizing the GoA in THEIR eyes. Build all the roads, hospitals, wells, clinics, schools and military outposts that you want - but whoever defines Islam wins. Our work is not to intercede in the crossfire between Islamic theological poles - but to ascertain, understand and articulate what the religious leaders think is legitimate and support them in our IO. As long as the enemy engages the mosque and we don't, our 'secularizing' influence will be portrayed across Afghanistan (and the greater Islamic world) as a threat to Islam thereby serving as the optimal recruiting tool for more Hirabists and insurgents from Pakistan and other points of origin.

[Ken White]

1. In COIN, tactical success means little without population buy-in. Kill all the insurgents you want - until you get the CoG and the IO pieces right, you'll be playing whack-a-mole and creating more insurgents.
2. Tribal sheikhs will not go against the Mullahs. Period.
3. Many Mullahs are in fact tribal leaders and wield significant power to marshall militia forces.
4. The enemy knows the religious leaders are the #1 sphere of influence and works hard to engage them with anti-CF IO themes.
5. Even Mullahs that do not possess direct militia authority influence everything that goes on in every tribe, neiborhood and village via the Friday afternoon sermon. Failure to grasp the legitimacy, significance and relevance of the Friday Mosque sermon in IO suicide.All totally true not too many years ago. A large number of Mullahs and Imams led fighting bands and all those that did not influence and pushed those that did. I very strongly doubt that's changed other than for the worse.
... but whoever defines Islam wins... As long as the enemy engages the mosque and we don't, our 'secularizing' influence will be portrayed across Afghanistan (and the greater Islamic world) as a threat to Islam thereby serving as the optimal recruiting tool for more Hirabists and insurgents from Pakistan and other points of origin.Unfortunately true.

[Eden]

It is true that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the fabric of Afghan society, and it is true that mullahs exert great influence as religious leaders. However, keep the following in mind:

1. To speak of 'the mullahs' as if they were some homogenous group with membership cards and annual conventions is misleading. They are as heterogenous as the society they spring from. Some - the minority - are great scholars respected nationwide or within their provinces; most are dreadfully ignorant with horizons bounded by their valley walls. They do not share common goals and are as subject to ethnic, tribal, and local prejudices as anyone else.

2. Some are less motivated by Islam than they are by the prospect of personal or fiduciary gain. Like certain televangelists, they exploit religious feeling for their own ends.

3. They are less important than they used to be. Urban elites - a small but growing and influential group - disparage them as obstacles to development. More importantly, the current generation of fighters is different from the one that drove out the Soviets. Those guys are dead. This generation - and especially the leaders - were raised far from tribal influence in madrassi in Pakistan or recruited from foreign fields. They are far less likely to respect or heed some threadbare mullah in an isolated mud-brick compound and far more likely to derive their sense of self from more pan-Islamic sources.

None of this is to deny the importance or influence of 'the mullahs', but it is a reminder that all politics in Afghanistan is local, and that 'the mullahs' are a product of that society. Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[Tom Odom]

On Joe Galloway's commentary today:


Commentary: A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/galloway/story/46075.html)
By Joseph L. Galloway | McClatchy Newspapers
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair.

One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979.

Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant.

[Ken White]

With all but particularly this:


... Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[MSG Proctor]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...

GEN McCaffery's position that "we can shoot our way out of Afghanistan" is rather obvious in that we are dealing with a nasty religious-based insurgency there. It is a war of ideas. A war of cultures. And if as Eden states

"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy? Because that is suicide in a counterinsurgency. The more you marginalize religious leaders, the more you radicalize them. For God's sake, gentlemen, haven't we learned this already in OIF?

No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

[DaveDoyle]

Galloway had to have loosely paraphrased GEN McCaffery, a man I respect and admire.

Two combat brigades will make a huge difference in Afghanistan if skillfully employed. A combat brigade can do more than kill Taliban. And combat brigades bring with them leaders; creative, intelligent, and motivated leaders.

Our leaders can figure out how to solve problems that involve more than kinetic options.

[Ron Humphrey]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.


No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that said
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.

In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies

In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.

[MSG Proctor]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

But go ahead - continue to analyze Aghanistan like eastern Europe or Viet Nam. Islam recognizes no separation of religious and civil life, and every western attempt to impose it on the Afghans will be met with (a) gratutitous milking of CF bennies or (b) violent resistance.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it by the long term stake holders.

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Afghanistan will never be Turkey or even Iran but it needn't be the perpetual Gethsemane of western ideologies.

[Ken White]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...I think number 2 is correct and number 1 may be but submit that our ability to implement number 1 will be limited by the follow-on "...not homogeneous" and other factors; not least by this:
"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy?I'm unsure it is a stated goal but if it is, it's an exercise in futility if that goal is to be attained in less than a couple of generations. Even then it is at best dubious. While I'm unsure it is a stated goal, I have little doubt that it is the intent or at least the unstated desire of some in high places -- and that, unfortunately, desired sooner rather than later...

What I do know is that approaching Afghanistan with western thought processes, religious or irreligious, and anticipating a quasi-western society is likely to not succeed. Nor do I think it has to do so. Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...

[MSG Proctor]

Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...


Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

[Entropy]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

[MSG Proctor]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.

IMO the greatest obstacle to a stable Afghanistan is the poppy industry. Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce. Look at South Korea, a nation with virtually no natural resources - and is now a top 10 world economy since US intervention.

Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.

[Rex Brynen]

Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.

1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?

:D

[MSG Proctor]

1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?

:D

Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?

[Steve Blair]

Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?

No.

[slapout9]

Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).


MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there;)

[Fuchs]

So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?

A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share) would then only be possible if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).

What's the difference to just leave and let the civil war parties fight on, supporting the non-Taleban civil war parties along the late 2001/early 2002 invasion model?
It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.

[Ken White]

You have a bad tendency to try to apparently misquote or misunderstand others...

So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?No one said that; what was said was that it would not accord to the western 'democratic' vision.
A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share)I believe that...
...would then only be possible First place, there's no such thing as 'victory' in a COIN operation, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome, I see no difficulty in obtaining that in Afghanistan
...if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).Since our governments are adapting on a daily basis to realities on the ground, I think that's quite incorrect. Since Sharia is already in effect in Afghanistan, I'm curious as to on what you base that statement.
It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.Probably true; they have long memories over there. However, the answer to your question is generational change and hopefully improvement in attitude. We're there to antagonize and thus accelerate that change from five or more to about two generations-- your kids will see the result. Be patient.. :D.

[Ken White]

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.Actually, two whys:

What in that is inimical to our interest?

Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?

[Ken White]

No.Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not... :D

[Steve Blair]

Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not... :D

I don't tend to, frankly. I'm not a big revolutionary war type, but my experience with studying history in general (and my specialty areas in particular) leads me to be very suspicious of any *single* cause put forward for a major event. Religion played a role, but so did economics, ambitions (both of people and groups), and a certain amount of manipulating (conscious or otherwise) of outside parties. While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...:D

[Tom Odom]

I don't tend to, frankly. I'm not a big revolutionary war type, but my experience with studying history in general (and my specialty areas in particular) leads me to be very suspicious of any *single* cause put forward for a major event. Religion played a role, but so did economics, ambitions (both of people and groups), and a certain amount of manipulating (conscious or otherwise) of outside parties. While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...:D

The Canadians started it...:D

[Ski]

If you can edudate the people in Afghanistan - at least so they can read and write - everything else becomes completely irrelevant. The mullahs and imams preach the message, and without people being able to read and write and comprehend the Qu'ran in a different manner than these mullahs, it is a lost cause.

As Ken said, 20 years minimum. More like 40 IMO.

[Eden]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it...

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Interesting, though I would point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and any attempt to fit our OIF model to Afghanistan is as likely to fail as any proposed by us poor blinkered westernizers. Anyway, thanks for the corrective - I came away from Afghanistan thinking that the real power brokers were those who could bankroll the largest private armies, normally through criminal enterprises.

Also, while I agree that you can't marginalize Islam in Afghanistan, you can marginalize the local mullahs. One, they are neither as universally respected nor as influential as they would like us to believe; two, this is exactly what the bad guys are doing or attempting to do, through a combination of bribery, coercion, and invitations to the bandwagon.

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

[Ken White]

The Canadians started it...:DStill, while you're correct in all this:
...While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...:DThe religion referred to was not so much Presbyterianism resisting CofE / Anglican / Episcopalian domination as it was the real Scotch Irish religions; the dual track 'resist all attempts at good governance while making and drinking as much whiskey as possible -- preferable on a nontaxable basis.' :D

[Ken White]

...Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.This last item is possibly true however, I'll point out that NATO to an extent and us to a great degree have supported extended campaigns (Kosovo; NATO and us, for one example) or expensive long duration stays in unkind locations (from Korea to Kuwait for us). Not theocracies per se but unpleasant regimes and not terribly stable on occasion. In any event, what will transpire is IMO impossible to predict at this point. We'll see.

Hmm. Those start with a 'K' -- Afghanistan doesn't, maybe it'll be a change. Which way... :wry:

[Entropy]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.


I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

Ken,



What in that is inimical to our interest?

Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure. Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test? A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?


Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?

History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed. Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly. Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority. Given enough time - generations - it might be possible, but I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty. One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.

[Ken White]

...And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.I don't think similarity was the point; I think his aim was the benefit -- or not -- of US intervention and the resultant relative stability (important word, relative...). Stability in N.Asia and S. Asia are two very different things.
Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure.Our intervention and long stay in Korea was and is of little clear benefit to the US. Kosovo? Even Viet Nam. We do a lot of things that are of little clear benefit to us; have for years.
Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test?Good question does it? What are the benefit parameters and over what period of time will they be measured (note future tense)?
A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?Not having been a fly on the wall at Foggy Bottom or the Five Sided Funny Farm much less the WH or Camp David, I can't answer your question. I can say from my perspective that the strategy is far more encompassing than either Afghanistan or Iraq; that Iraq is mostly about attacks on US interests worldwide that originate in or from the ME and Afghanistan is mostly about attacks on US soil --plus we intend to repair our earlier failing of helping remove the Russian and then abandoning the area. In short, our presence may or may nor bring added stability -- we've already discovered our absence guarantees less stability...
History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed.History is a good thing, it teaches many lessons. One thing it teaches is that the Afghans like to fight each other but have achieved a balancing act of relative calm on occasion.
Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly.True, thus our ultra light hand in the area -- which IMO is good and I disagree that a large amount of troops infused will be a pure benefit.
Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority.True; onlly as they transition to post-tribal does that occur.
Given enough time - generations - it might be possibleOr even probable; the number of generations required then becomes the issue. I'd have put it at five or more five years ago; now it may be possible in a couple.
...I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty.If you noticed, I politley disagreed with that contention. I still do. The American people as a whole are far more tolerant of stuff like this than the media and the academics (and too many Generals...) think. NATO is another subject and will probably be less tolerant but I doubt that will have much effect on the US effort.
One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.I totally agree and as R.A. and I agreed some time ago, something needs to be done about that. My sensing is that we are starting to get slowly pissed. We'll see.
So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being. It is not our job to bring stability of any sort at any level to South Asia -- but someone has to try. We had the audacity to do that. Whether we will be successful or not is TBD. Either way, the long term prospects of an Afghan state are IMO a tertiary issue at most.

[jmm99]

open-source, online ? I'd like to read what he says - not what he is said to have said. So, if there is a url to the report, please. :)

Otherwise, I'm staying out of this one, where I've found out that:

1. My French-Canadian ancestors and relatives started the American Revolution. Not so; but they could have prevented it if Coulon had executed Washington at Fort Necessity.

2. The Revolution was started by the Scotch-Irish. That I can believe, since my wife is 1/8th Scotch-Irish (Blair).

Seriously, an interesting discussion, which is most timely in light of current, breaking events.

[MSG Proctor]

MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there;)

SlapOut9,
Thanks, I'm nobody and I know nothing, I am doing PSAs for CH(COL) Kenneth Sampson's brilliant strategy published in his War College monograph attached to reply #11 in this thread.

I am certainly not an expert on Afghanistan (although COL Sampson is) but have extensive experience in helping unravel the religious arteries and veins in Iraq. We have no hope of any kind of success at all with any anchor point that is antagonistic to [traditional, more orthodox expressions of] Islam. We have every reason to hope and expect progress and long term partnerships with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the greater Islamic world if we can adapt to conditions that allow Islam to inform democracy.

There are no panaceas, no silver bullets, no ready-made solutions in Afghanistan. The subject of this thread questions the wisdom or utility of a "Surge" of forces in OEF to stop the hemmorraging there similar to the way the Petraeus strategy did in OIF in 2007. My opinion is that the surge of forces informed by the right IO strategy can be highly successful. The ONLY truly transnational values in Afghanistan now are the common creed of Islam; the only transnational 'media' that exists is the Mosque sermon.

People much smarter than me can make the case that religion can be a potent force in fueling nationalism, and nationalism in this stage of the Afghan Republic's infancy would probably be a good thing.

I agree with Ken White's assessment that lasting, enduring change will take 20-40 years, but these concrete steps must surely be part of that strategy:

1. Co-opt the Islamic scholars, preachers and prayer leaders by forming councils and federations for mutual advantage;
2. Distribute mass media infrastructure to link Afghans together in purpose and identity;
3. Promote literacy;
4. Reward Afghan military leaders that lead well and demonstrate loyalty to the Afghan ideal;
5. Involve the UN/NATO in replacing the poppy trade with a legitimate commodity for international trade. This may involve outrageous sums of subsidies from donor nations (probably already underway, at least from our government's standpoint).

OK, I'm off my soapbox for a while. Kudos to all for a stimulating discussion....

[MSG Proctor]

I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.



Entropy:
Thanks for clarifying your positions. I would like to respectfully respond...

The information revolution overcomes the problem of linkage with outside forces. It may help the central gov't in Afghanistan promulgate its messages for national unity/identity in the long run. The erection of a serviceable and truly transnational information infrastructure is still a generation away.

The text I bolded above is the classical definition of a COIN problem statement. Winning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans (not a monolithic entity) requires vigorous cultural, religious and economic engagement. There is no strategy for achieving success in a COIN fight in Afghanistan that does not include Islam.

As for Korea, while I do not intend to conflate apples/oranges here, Korea had few connections with the outside world, a devastated infrastructure, had just emerged from a brutal Japanese occupation, had little natural resources and hostile powers on its border. There are some similarities between the two models IMO.

[MSG Proctor]

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

Gladly, Mr. Eden.

"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

The narrative will already include support for the Karzai government (and his legitimately elected successors). This will quickly present opportunities to build cross-tribal and trans-provincial coaltions through the erection of religious leader councils. The councils will require the support of the Islamic scholars who will have the ear of many of the Mullahs and mosque leaders.

Deliverables from these councils will include credible fatwas that endorse the GoA and the goals of the nascent republic. This religious network has 1000x more credibility than NATO PSYOPs messages or canned IO themes. It also has the potential to spread very rapidly and of course counter the enemy's IO. This is the model that turned the tide in Anbar Province in 2006 although the popular accepted narrative is that the tribal Sheikhs were the key spheres-of-influence. The Sheikhs however would not oppose the clerics when the clerics reached some semblance of consensus in favor of stability. The appetite for Islamic revolution has been greatly exaggerated by the enemy.

[For an example of the power and potential of religious councils in COIN, click here (http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0103/maki/maki_godpol.html#Anchor_top).]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Until NATO/CF aggressively counter the enemy's IO strategy of co-opting religious leaders, all gains in Afghanistan will be temporary and dependent upon foreign military assistance.

[wm]

Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce.

I guess that would explain why we still have a significant cigarette smuggling problem :rolleyes:, which, BTW, I suspect will get worse as the taxes on tobacco are boosted even more.

[wm]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

The goal in any nation building effort ought to be a stable state. All of the rest: source of stability, partnership in GWOT, source of economic power needs to be flushed with the list in the second sentence. Otherwise, the US effort (or any other "state stablizing/building" intervention by any country/coalition that is imbued with the latest instantiation of the huiman predilection for "missionary zeal") will be palliating short term suffering at the expense of introducing the seeds of long term instability.
Western states have been doing this kind of misguided crap for at least 4 centuries now; one would think they might have smartened up a little by now. :(

The most important thing, IMHO, about the aftermath of the American Revolution is that the 13 colonies figured out for themselves what kind of nation they wanted as/after they succesfully got the armies of George III to depart. While they had French help in ejecting Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, et. al., they had no such help in writing the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederacy or Constitution. Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

[Ken White]

Too logical, though, I suppose...:wry:

[marct]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.


Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

It would have been nice if that had happened at the 2003 Loya Jirga :cool:. Still and all, you are quite right that the ISAF/US coalition needs to agree to Afghan self-determination.

[jmm99]

from the aged.


from Proctor
"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."


from Proctor
The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak. See, for a perspective that is NOT mine:

http://www.cia-on-campus.org/

As a former NSA campus co-ordinator in the early 60s, I was on the other side; and still am - knuckle dragging Neanderthal that I am.

The point of digging up this ancient history is that what you are proposing, while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.

[MSG Proctor]

Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.



Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

[MSG Proctor]

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak.

...while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.


jmm99:
Thanks for the feedback. Co-opt is a military colloquialism and my usage (hopefully) explained the intent. Promulgate in the way I am using it just means to disseminate with a clear intent of obtaining compliance, ie, a high ranking cleric council issues a fatwa defining Muslim sacred obligation to support the government and defeat the taqfirists in armed jihad.

By covert I do not mean SECRET. In COIN, as Dr. Kilcullen and others point out, them (host nation) doing something tolerably is better than us doing it with excellence. Perhaps covert is the wrong term and I should have said something to the effect of CF staying in the background and out of the headlines as they support orthodox Muslim leaders and interreligious councils.

Thanks for the corrections...:D

[jmm99]

the thanx, Proctor.


By covert I do not mean SECRET

That's a relief - so, I guess we are talking about a low-keyed overt operation to promote the promulgation of that what emanates from the locals. How's that for casuistics - in the non-confessional sense.

I seem to recall an historical example of something like that, but will have to relook some Jesuit history to see what was done. Tricky stuff - trying to harmonize religions - as Jean-Louis Tauran could explain better than I.

[slapout9]

I just finished reading the report that MSG Proctor recommended by Col. Kenneth Sampson. I can be hard to impress sometimes but that paper is impressive. Closest thing to SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) I have ever seen:wry:It covers Motive,Method and Opportunity. It is one of the best examples of what COIN should be at a Strategic Level. Don't destroy the network that is in place but take it and flip it. All at once if possible. Achieve our policy objectives don't worry about changing them to a democracy or their religion...figure out how we can cooperate together. I was once told that Strategy is the path of most Assistance. Col. Sampson hit that one straight on the head.

[marct]

Hi MSG Proctor,


Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

The problem, as I see it, is that there is no "nationalism" per se in Afghanistan, at least in the sense that it exists in the US. What there was, centered on the monarchy and various tribal coalitions. I truly doubt that any real (as opposed to Potemkin Village) form of "virulent nationalism" will exist for at least another 20-30 years, regardless of support from Islamic scholars.


My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

I truly doubt that :wry:. By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

[MSG Proctor]

I truly doubt that :wry:. By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

Marc,
Most people were saying the same thing about Iraq in 2006, except they were using much stronger adjectives - hopeless, lost cause, civil war, etc... But the COIN strategy eventually (and long overdue) invited the powerful clerics into inter-religious dialogue councils and the results have been breathtaking (http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0103/maki/maki_godpol.html#Anchor_top).

The fact is, for good or for evil, nothing else even comes close to providing a vehicle for uniting the Afghans against a common foe and a bleak situation. At least faith in God offers hope and provides a common framework for defeating a religiously aberrant insurgency. My strong conviction is that any solution that does not posit Islam in the very core of its plan is doomed.

[Jonathan Mueller]

I read Chuck Spinney’s Counterpunch article, ‘Should Obama Escalate the War in Afghanistan?’ with concern. Chuck is a longtime friend and mentor, and a great public servant who is owed the gratitude of all Americans for his critiques of the corruption and inefficiency of the defense establishment. However, in this piece I fear he is going down the wrong road, arguing from some assumptions about the war in Afghanistan and about guerrilla warfare in general that are false. At the same time, I also see some dangerous elements in the potential Obama policies Chuck criticizes.



Both Chuck and Obama’s advisers I fear are being led astray by a very American misconception that the outcome of a guerrilla war is military victory. It is not, not usually. Insurgencies usually end in some sort of political settlement, although how and when military force is applied can have a big impact on who that settlement favors.



Clausewitz wrote that the most fundamental of all strategic decisions was the definition of what kind of war one is fighting, for all one’s actions flow from that definition.



In this regard, Spinney offers us a choice:

At the heart of this question is the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, specifically the question of whether or not it has mutated into something that is more akin to a classical guerrilla war as opposed to being part of a Fourth Generation War against al Quada.

This is a blinkered and narrow view of the war in Afghanistan which categorizes it by some of the tactics used to wage the war, not by its strategic nature. It was always much broader than our hunt for Al Quaeda, and the Taliban insurgency is just one aspect and the latest phase of a long-running conflict.

The war in Afghanistan is a civil war with a variety of Afghan factions resorting to force in their pursuit of power. As has become normal in failed states, it is an especially nasty and complicated war because of the great number of actors involved – state and non-state, domestic and foreign, regional and global. Not all the actors are party to the conflict – criminal gangs profit from the war and seek its continuation but are not actually combatants; NGOs and UN and other international organizations usually are not parties to the conflict but still have a role in resolving it.

The Afghan war to a certain extent pre-dated the Soviet occupation and provoked it, but today’s situation can best be seen as growing out of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when the United States, having armed and organized the Afghans, walked away and left them to sort out their own post-war (dis) order. The result was a turbulent situation which produced the Taliban and provided the environment for Al Quaeda to base itself in Afghanistan.

Spinney today is one of a group of critics of US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan who argue that an outside power cannot defeat a nationalist insurgency because its support discredits its local collaborators. That may sometimes happen, but it is as much the result of defects in the collaborators’ legitimacy as of their association with the outside power. In Malaya, while the British were fighting a communist insurgency (1948-58), they never broke stride in their march to independence for Malaya. Malaya’s democratic politicians who participated in this process never suffered any damage to their legitimacy because of their cooperation with the British.

Today, in Afghanistan it is a fair question: is Karzai discredited by his dependence on the West, or is the West discredited by its support for Karzai? Since Pashtun tribal leaders have told me that for all their anger at how the US has treated them they don’t want the US to leave because they trust Americans more than Karzai, what do you think the answer is?

Karzai has not lived up to the hopes reposed in him in 2002 and there may need to be replaced, but the problem with western support for him is not that it is damaging his legitimacy but that it may be propping him up when his lack of legitimacy might otherwise force change.

The US and its allies have now been present in Afghanistan for seven years. By the time the Soviets had been there for that long, they were in deep trouble, facing a broad-based war of national liberation involving multiple ethnic groups across most of Afghanistan. This is a great contrast to what we face in Afghanistan today – the Taliban are a minority of a minority (although the Pashtun are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, and they claim to be a majority, other groups question that – without a reliable census nobody really knows). While a third of Afghanistan’s provinces are affected by the insurgency, the majority are not. That is not to say there are no problems, security or otherwise, in the rest of Afghanistan, but that the Taliban are only part of the problem.

It is still troubling to hear the Obama camp talking about both increasing troop levels and using more precision firepower in a new offensive against the Taliban. This sounds like another Vietnam-style escalation, based on a continuing American belief in a chimerical military victory over insurgents.

Military power may be part of the solution to an insurgency, but it rarely the whole solution. If an insurgency appears to be defeated militarily, it is usually because other measures have pulled the rug out from under the insurgents.

Usually all the military can do in an insurgency is create conditions under which other measures (political, economic, etc., as appropriate) can resolve the conflict. The first requirement for this is for the military to secure the civilian population and isolate them from the insurgents. These security operations are exceedingly manpower-intensive, but firepower, even so-called precision firepower, is usually counterproductive.

British officers recently returned from Afghanistan have told me that there is a trade-off there between troops and firepower. Lack of troops leads to over-use of firepower, leads to civilian casualties and property damage, undermining the coalition’s moral superiority over the Taliban. Therefore, in their view, more troops are required, in order to carry out effective security operations, not to launch a new offensive against the Taliban.

Our war against violent Islamic extremists is our Great War, just as the Cold War was for our fathers, World War II for our grandfathers, and World War II for our great-grandfathers. It is the real war of today, and any other war we can speak of is hypothetical. Well-chosen or not, Iraq and Afghanistan are the battlegrounds. In Afghanistan we missed an opportunity in 2002 by declaring victory and moving on to Iraq, making possible the Taliban resurgence. Although our neglect has cost us, the situation is not irretrievable. Some of the steps which need to be taken sooner rather than later include:

The Pashtun may or may not be a majority of Afghans, but they are the largest ethnic group, so it is hard to imagine a lasting settlement to Afghanistan’s civil war that does not draw them in. Instead, Karzai and the US have treated them as the enemy. We have to reverse that. The tribal leaders are not the Taliban, and the Taliban do not have majority support among the Pashtun.

The coalition needs more troops, and some members need to step up to a more active combat role.

Civil and military efforts need to be coordinated, and civilian agencies need to move faster. Military entry into a district needs to be accompanied by rapid action to employ the locals in reconstruction programs that will make their lives better while priming the pump with cash in their pockets.

Since I am advocating more troops for Afghanistan, you might expect me to support Gates’s just-announced plan to double the size of the Afghan National Army. I do not. It is not an easy thing to build an army, still less a national army in as divided a society as Afghanistan. It does not take a very deep knowledge of our training efforts in Iraq to see how too-rapid a build-up compromised the quality, and effectiveness, of the output. The ANA can only grow as fast as we can produce quality.

An alternative to stand up Afghan forces rapidly is to draw on our experience with Popular Forces (militia) in Vietnam and with tribal forces in Iraq, and set up tribal militias in the hottest conflict zones in Afghanistan. This requires reposing some trust in the Pashtun tribes, but not a lot – we don’t have to give them heavy weapons, and they already have lots of small arms. At least try it and see what happens.

The corruption, inefficiency, and unprofessionalism of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is one of the major failures of Afghan reconstruction. This needs to be a litmus test for Karzai – if he is not willing to de-politicize and de-criminalize the ANP, then he has to go. The Germans, who took the NATO mandate for advising the ANP, have totally dropped the ball as well, and also need to either radically invigorate their program or be replaced by somebody who will.

This is not a complete program, but just these steps would materially improve the situation in Afghanistan and open the door to other measures o bring further progress.

The author is a management consultant based in London, England. He was formerly legislative assistant for defense to Hon. Dick Cheney, M.C. and program officer for Afghanistan in the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

[Ken White]

All relatively speaking of course -- and no intent to be derisory; merely to express some agreement and some disagreement. There have been messier wars, many -- and some we were involved in meet that standard. I doubt, by any measure it will ever be accorded 'greatness.'

I think any discussion of whether it's
"...classical guerrilla war as opposed to being part of a Fourth Generation War against al Quada." is an esoteric and academic debate of little value. I also shudder when anyone mentions Malaya in relation to Iraq or Afghanistan. No corollary at all, I think -- mostly because our US preferred option is to establish a host nation government of whatever sort we can (preferably with a 'friendly' leader) and act as invitees of that government * . In Malaya, the British were the government, that fact alone, much less the size and numbers argue against any use of Malaya for much.

I strongly agree with you that a military victory is not possible; only an acceptable outcome can be obtained in any COIN operation. With that fact -- and it is a fact in today's world -- in mind, I believe that Obama, McCain, Gates, Spinney et.al. are wrong. We do not have enough troops to do the standard COIN model in a nation the size of Afghanistan. I further believe that even if we had the numbers, it would make little difference. There are other military options that could achieve success but we cannot and will not pursue them.

Afghanistan -- or that region -- has been the way it is for several thousand years. We are not going to change it. Period. They will chew up what is sent, spit it out and go right back to their way of life. Can incremental changes to improve the lot of the ordinary Afghan be pursued? Certainly. However, we should recognize up front those changes will be incremental -- and even those slight modifications will come slowly. While I essentially agree with the solutions you propose, I suggest that the entrenched bureaucracies (all of them, including the Afghan government, the NGOs, the other Nations involved, NATO, the US Army and USSOCOM) will not support the program, at least not to the extent required. Given the number of players, the possibility of achieving a consensus on procedures is unlikely. I also think you omit mention of the Pakistan problem and solution of that is critical.

Afghanistan will go the way of those who have the most will to stick it out. My reluctant and regrettable suspicion is that will not be the western nations.

* A solution that has never worked for us and one would think we'd learn better. Apparently not. Seems illogical to me to take on a job and willingly give the folks you're trying to change a veto over what you can do...

[Render]

Much talk from politicians and press of a “surge” into Afghanistan…

Very little talk of the logistical surge that must accompany such a surge in combat units.

It is my (civilian) understanding that the bulk of OEF’s heavy logistical supply arrives via truck convoys through Pakistan. Truck convoys that pass right through Taliban held Pakistani territory.

Given that we’re already conducting air strikes against Taliban training camps and leadership within that same Taliban held Pakistani territory, doesn’t this put us in the unhealthy position of attacking our own supply lines? Certainly at least one of the Presidential candidates has suggested that we do exactly that. Much as I would like to disagree with his stated strategy, he may very well be correct, if only by accident.

We may very well have to invade and occupy Pakistan, if for no other reason then to secure our supply lines into Afghanistan.

I don’t think two or three brigades will be enough…

A
BIGGER
BOAT,
R

[jkm_101_fso]

It is my (civilian) understanding that the bulk of OEF’s heavy logistical supply arrives via truck convoys through Pakistan. Truck convoys that pass right through Taliban held Pakistani territory.

Are you talking about US/NATO supply lines?


Given that we’re already conducting air strikes against Taliban training camps and leadership within that same Taliban held Pakistani territory, doesn’t this put us in the unhealthy position of attacking our own supply lines?

No. Most strikes have eyes on prior to/during strike, whether it's BOG, UAV or SAT. Think about what you asked. Attack our own supply line? Who else's supply line would it be? The Taliban's? A pretty far-fetched insinuation.

[Render]

Yes, I'm talking about US/NATO supply lines. It's my understanding that the bulk of the US/NATO supplies are trucked into Afghanistan - through Pakistan. Is this an incorrect assumption on my part?

=

My mistake and fair enough, that was poorly worded on my part.

I didn't mean to imply that we were actually attacking our own convoys in transit.

I was trying to point out that it seems as though we are attacking back down our own logistical tail, against an enemy whose current "safe" (loosely used term) havens inside Pakistan surround and in some cases sit astride our convoy routes.

I'm somewhat surprised that the Taliban haven't made a stronger effort to attack those convoys, although they seem to be more interested in attempting to extort the trucking companies involved, so I suppose my surprise is due mostly to my attempting to put a Western slant on Taliban strategy and tactics.

MISSION
FROM
GOD,
R

[Ron Humphrey]

Yes, I'm talking about US/NATO supply lines. It's my understanding that the bulk of the US/NATO supplies are trucked into Afghanistan - through Pakistan. Is this an incorrect assumption on my part?

=

My mistake and fair enough, that was poorly worded on my part.

I didn't mean to imply that we were actually attacking our own convoys in transit.

I was trying to point out that it seems as though we are attacking back down our own logistical tail, against an enemy whose current "safe" (loosely used term) havens inside Pakistan surround and in some cases sit astride our convoy routes.

I'm somewhat surprised that the Taliban haven't made a stronger effort to attack those convoys, although they seem to be more interested in attempting to extort the trucking companies involved, so I suppose my surprise is due mostly to my attempting to put a Western slant on Taliban strategy and tactics.

MISSION
FROM
GOD,
R


One could hopefully assume we try our best not to shoot ourselves in the foot.

I have it on the greatest authority that all our supplies are aquired through a horn of plenty in kabul with its twin located in a warehouse in west dakota:D;)

[jkm_101_fso]

Yes, I'm talking about US/NATO supply lines. It's my understanding that the bulk of the US/NATO supplies are trucked into Afghanistan - through Pakistan. Is this an incorrect assumption on my part?

I am certainly not in a position to say where our supplies come from, however, I'd bet that some do come from Pakistan; that is possible. I'd imagine, at least from the US side, most of them are flown in to Kandahar, Kabul, etc. I don't know, good question.

However, if the Taliban have not attacked said supply convoys, I'd assume that it's not that significant. I'm pretty sure they would have thought of that already. Again, based on assumption...could be talking out of my A$$.

[Render]

http://oruzgan.web-log.nl/uruzgan_weblog/2008/08/taliban-attacks.html

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/23/asia/pakistan.php

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/08/14/degrading-security-in-afghanistan-causes-supply-and-contractor-problems/

http://www.newsweek.com/id/129529

===

They're attacking the convoys already. Just not as much as I would expect...yet.

ISSUES,
R

[davidbfpo]

This interesting article: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH12Df02.html refers to

KARACHI - The Taliban and al-Qaeda have with some success squeezed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's)supply lines that run through Pakistan into Afghanistan, especially goods in transit in Khyber Agency on the border. Now, according to Asia Times Online contacts, the target area is being shifted to the southern port city of Karachi, where almost 90% of NATO's shipments land, including vital oil. From this teeming financial center, 80% of the goods go to Torkham in Khyber Agency on their way to the Afghan capital of Kabul. About 10% go to Chaman, then on to the northern Afghan city of Kandahar. The remaining NATO supplies arrive in Afghanistan by air and other routes.

I recall sometime ago that some NATO allies rely on supplies via Iran and this was taken to explain their reluctance over the US policy on Iran.

davidbfpo

[Render]

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/pakistan_closes_tork.php

"Pakistan closed the Torkham border crossing in the Khyber tribal agency. The road through the Khyber Pass is NATO's primary supply line into Afghanistan."

===

As I said on Bill's blog...

Houston, we now have a problem.

NEED A
BIGGER
BOAT,
R

[reed11b]

What sort of tough line is available for the U.S. with Pakistan? They seem to be a major problem, rather than an asset in Afghanistan, as many predicted. Could require the loss of their nuclear capacity for any future funds? They wont go for it, but maybe they would back off from their tough guy stance on allowing U.S. troops to work in their border areas to gain some breathing room?
Reed