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SWJED
08-14-2008, 10:11 PM
Assessment of Effects Based Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/assessment-of-effects-based-op/)

14 August 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations

1. Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

2. Therefore, we must return to time honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear Commander’s Intent, unambiguous tasks and purpose, and most importantly, links ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today’s more complex operating environments.

3. My assessment is shaped by my own personal experiences and the experience of others in a variety of operational situations. I’m convinced we must keep the following in mind: First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart, and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote Sherman, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.” History is replete with such examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO’s long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.

4. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. JFCOM’s purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smoothes and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.

5. While NATO and many Partner Nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO’s policy focuses on the whole of government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO’s Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror U.S. EBO. NATO’s use of EBAO is left unaddressed in this USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance.

6. A pre-decisional working draft of this document was prematurely circulated and should be discarded. I regret any confusion resulting from the unintended early release of this draft document.

J. N. MATTIS
General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander’s Guidance Regarding Effects Based Operations (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usjfcomebomemo.pdf) - US Joint Forces Command (PDF)

Steve Blair
08-15-2008, 01:06 PM
Very nice! Good to see someone actually thinking about these things and then writing coherently about them.

William F. Owen
08-15-2008, 05:28 PM
Baruch Ha Shem! I can die happy. Common sense at last, and not before time. It's only taken 5 years to reach this point!

Ski
08-16-2008, 11:29 AM
Good news! One less thing I have to learn about at CGSC!

davidbfpo
08-16-2008, 07:33 PM
Excellent letter and I'm dazed by the "punches". Will this led to a debate here, let alone within the US military? Can we (UK police) borrow him to administer some sense here!

davidbfpo

Cavguy
08-16-2008, 07:50 PM
EBO is dead. Long Live EBO!!!

Be assured, the systems guys will be pushing EBO under another name shortly. The original (leaked) draft was also interesting, because it dismissed several other terms such as "net-centric warfare", "attack the network", "system of systems", and a few others as being jargon that confuses rather than enlightens the picture.

However, it was obviously spiked in the final, probably so as not to shut down research along those lines, perhaps to not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

selil
08-16-2008, 07:56 PM
I totally agree with getting rid of network centric, and system of systems, and "attack the network" when we are talking about social, cultural, human, clusters and not technology. I am of the lonely opinion that human traits should drive technology language rather than technology jargon subsuming human activities. I'm stretching here, but technology is a metaphor for the human activity, and humans are NOT metaphors for technology. Jargon, ontological semantics, and techno-speak should reflect the reality not some tarted up euphemistic jargon speak. It is lonely being me.

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 08:17 PM
EBO is dead. Long Live EBO!!!

Be assured, the systems guys will be pushing EBO under another name shortly.

Wasn't it called "Theory of five circles" or something like that around '90?

TT
08-17-2008, 04:59 AM
davidfpo,

The Effects Based Approach reportedly appears to have disappeared in in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine (3rd Edition), dated Aug 2008. EBA used to be found in Chapter Five and in this edition there is now no mention of the term in that chapter. Don’t have a copy I can post, but if you are interested, check The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD (hmm, I just checked and cannot see the new edition :confused:). So not sure whether the change is in a 'draft' or in an official version (DCDC does publish drafts).

Not sure yet what this absence means, beyond an apparent excising of the EBO/EBA terminology, for the British are (have been?) committed, last I heard to the Comprehensive Approach (another term for EBA) - as is NATO. EBA always made more sense to me, but as Cavguy says, and unfortunately I believe rightly so, the 'systems approach' types have not gone away.

Cheers

TT

William F. Owen
08-17-2008, 06:12 AM
Not sure yet what this absence means, beyond an apparent excising of the EBO/EBA terminology, for the British are (have been?) committed, last I heard to the Comprehensive Approach (another term for EBA) - as is NATO. EBA always made more sense to me, but as Cavguy says, and unfortunately I believe rightly so, the 'systems approach' types have not gone away.


Yes the CA is still here and is EBA. It is also substantially faulty and a mis-reading of the military instrument. EBA is also in the last copy ADP Land Ops that I have. It's about to have another "whizz bang" concept bolted on to it, which I am currently researching.

I have it on very good authority, that the current FM-3, though "rejecting" EBO has a lot of Systemic Operational Design, which based on what I have read recently is about as useful as a chocolate tea pot, and a rehash of the old estimate process. To quote from Fig 6, in the work I have been looking at -
"Learning porblemization" - if it's not correct English then best not to use it. :confused:

Bill Moore
08-17-2008, 07:08 AM
When I first heard of EBO, I admit I had high hopes for it, that was until I was actually trained in it, and saw the seriously flawed concepts of SoSA, ONA, and worse, much worse, MOE and MOP. Then I noted every one assumed their actions (unilaterally) we're creating these magical effects. At first I thought it was intended to flatten the organization and harmonize the interagency actors by arming everyone with the objectives and the associated effects, thus if you didn't have guidance from higher, you knew what needed to be done on the ground. However, after studying it and watching it in practice in the real world and during exercises it is clear that GEN Mattis's memo is spot on in most aspects.

I was a small bit player in one of the most successful interagency and multinational operations in recent history and that was JTF Liberia in 2003. Fortunately, it didn't receive much press outside of Africa, so we had considerable freedom of movement. During this operation the multinational forces and interagency were successfully harmonized with clear objectives that resulted in orders with clear cut task(s)/purpose(s). In this case leadership was decisive (both State Department and Military). I think we would have failed miserbly if we used EBO doctrine.

Unfortunately, this EBO like process has manifested itself in other ways, where U.S. forces inappropriately apply a CARVER matrix to terrorist and insurgent organizations, which resulted in the failed network approach where one attempts to destroy an insurgency by killing or capturing its so called key nodes (important individuals). In limited cases this method will work, and most cases it is a key supporting role, but not at the expense of failing to protect the population. What worked in Iraq was large scale population control measures that the surge enabled, where the focus was protecting the populace. I'm confident history will show that the much bragged about approach "it's the network stupid" was actually a failure or at most a minor enabler. Like EBO this was based on faulty assumptions that an insurgency is a simple system or simple system of systems like an electric power grid. It isn't, and surgical actions won't when the fight anymore than surgical bombings. That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both, and if we focused on the objective of defeating the insurgency, vice all the sub effects, we would have realized from day one we needed more forces (Iraqi or otherwise) to get control initially.

Prior to EBO, I think the most damaging concept to our military was the force protection bureaucracy which was an off shoot of GEN Downey's investigation of the Khobar Towers incident. Force protection was always an inherit responsibility, and there were several anti-terrorism courses long before force protection level I thru IV training. This resulted in an another cottage industry of contractors, wasted military manpower and in too many cases operational paralysis. Force protection is important, it has always been our second priority, which in order are the mission, the men, then yourself. Prior to 9/11 we let force protection (the men) trump accomplishing the mission as a priority. I would like to see GEN Mattis tackle this one, and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.

William F. Owen
08-17-2008, 09:35 AM
That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both,

I am convinced EBO gained as much ground as it did, because officers saw huge personal gain in it's advocacy, rather than in it's understanding. EBO is flawed. It assumes you have knowledge and insights, that rarely and mostly never exist. It also assumes you can predict a second or even third order effect and that the effect you create is observable. I rarely if ever encountered an EBO advocate who did not admit this - but was usually just prepared to ignore this fundamental.

I am convinced that at the root of all this stuff is some bizarre belief that there must be "a better way," and that this "better way" should involve less killing and destruction. The problem is that this idea (and it's been around a while) is never argued in a way that considers how difficult complex ideas (SOD?) are made to work when action is opposed.


and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

I am an IO-sceptic purely because there is little if any clarity that I can see. The only valid explanation I have ever seen came from Tom Odom, when he told me it was matching the message with the action.

Spud
08-17-2008, 11:20 AM
Like all of these things I think a simple concept got overly ‘technologified’ by people with far too much time on their hands ... IO in many regards is exactly the same.

To me EBO started simple for simple audiences … a process/terminology used at whole-of-Government level to let the military be the military and the politicians be the politicians and the other departments do what they needed to do in support of national needs. We (the military) could simply ask Government what end state they wanted and what effects they wanted to achieve and then we could go off and plan the military things to achieve it. We could also clearly identify those non-military things/elements that we needed for success. Really it was about letting the military plan to achieve the job with their complete arsenal of options rather than plan to meet the COA outlined by Government ... "We want to you to win (without defining it) without causing undue political pressure for us (without defining what that was) and you need to do it all within this arbitrary budget and with exactly 727 personnel.... oh by the way we want all of the services included and please make sure no one gets killed" I can really see the frustration that led us down this path ... "just tell us what you want done and let us go and do it" ... that's all EBO was really about.

It got caught up when a simple process for getting clear and coherent intent statement out of our political masters suddenly became something that influenced the operational art and played in tactics.

If we had left it up at the strategic (vice the military strategic) I think it would fly ... we'd end up with nice language that worked across Government and let everyone feel happy about things. Importantly the military then could do its normal planning (JOPES, JMAP whatever) and carry on. When you try to bring the language and theory down into the operational and tactical level it suddenly plays havoc with concepts of mission command and everything else.

Theorists, boffins and academics (ducking into my Stage 3 Fighting Pit here) have to accept a lot of responsibility for this ...:D

William F. Owen
08-17-2008, 01:14 PM
I can really see the frustration that led us down this path ... "just tell us what you want done and let us go and do it" ... that's all EBO was really about.

I beg to differ. EBO is "just tell us what you want the enemy to think and what you want the end state to look like as result, plus we want to risk very little, and use very little."


Theorists, boffins and academics (ducking into my Stage 3 Fighting Pit here) have to accept a lot of responsibility for this ...:D

Agreed, but the real problem was/is the soldiers who accepted the words and teachings of the theorists, boffins and academics, without holding them to rigour. Radical military thought is the slimming pill, hair restorative viagra, that few Officers can resist.

I submit, (from the same Stage 3 Fighting pit and digging to Stage 4) that the adherence to, and acceptance of certain modern schools of military thought is almost entirely emotional.

Would we even have heard of John Boyd if he had been a 35-year-old kaftan-wearing civilian woman academic called Joanna Boyd presenting the same ideas to the same audiences?

Ken White
08-17-2008, 05:03 PM
...
EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.Master of understatement...:D

Steve Blair
08-18-2008, 12:41 PM
I totally agree with getting rid of network centric, and system of systems, and "attack the network" when we are talking about social, cultural, human, clusters and not technology. I am of the lonely opinion that human traits should drive technology language rather than technology jargon subsuming human activities. I'm stretching here, but technology is a metaphor for the human activity, and humans are NOT metaphors for technology. Jargon, ontological semantics, and techno-speak should reflect the reality not some tarted up euphemistic jargon speak. It is lonely being me.

Agree 100%, so you're not as alone as you might have thought...;)

Ron Humphrey
08-18-2008, 01:45 PM
I totally agree with getting rid of network centric, and system of systems, and "attack the network" when we are talking about social, cultural, human, clusters and not technology. I am of the lonely opinion that human traits should drive technology language rather than technology jargon subsuming human activities. I'm stretching here, but technology is a metaphor for the human activity, and humans are NOT metaphors for technology. Jargon, ontological semantics, and techno-speak should reflect the reality not some tarted up euphemistic jargon speak. It is lonely being me.

Keeping in mind that if more had been able to remember this and the technology focus had been kept accordingly this particular memo might not have been necessary.

Technology should be meant to help man do what man does only better. Not to do what man can't even do with help.

Rifleman
08-19-2008, 02:25 AM
The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information.

I don't know about the joint force and EBO, but that certainly describes police operations.

I'm still digesting the article, but a few other things about it seem to have police application as well.

Hajduk
08-20-2008, 03:46 AM
Here's a stab at it:

I always felt that EBO, EBAO, CA whatever you want to call it was the institutionalization of conducting warfare where every military or political leader can read and rehash a concept to look and sound like he has the answer to the future conduct of war.

Other than confusing the heck out of everybody in the room & battlefield, as seen during the Isreali-Hez war, the whole EB(A)O / CA debate was always sterile and somewhat to good to be true.

To me it seems that CA-EB(A)O was intended to codify what yesterday's military greats and statesmen (Alex the Great, Ceaser, Nap, Claus, Patton, Churchill) possessed either by shear luck of talent or what I always thought was the key CHARACTER.

Its not hard to agree with Gen. Mattis that such concepts might work within a closed system but the 'total' complexity of war demands for a specific type (or specific group) of people to conduct war.

Some people are born to be warriors some are not. I think EB(A)O was thought to be the holy grail, or at least the road to it, of conducting war where anyone could just open the book and follow it full circle to ultimate success on the battlefield.

Ken White
08-20-2008, 04:18 AM
Some people are born to be warriors some are not. I think EB(A)O was thought to be the holy grail, or at least the road to it, of conducting war where anyone could just open the book and follow it full circle to ultimate success on the battlefield.The former is absolutely correct and the EBO thing is simply the latest in a long line of attempts to allow anyone to successfully fight a battle or a war.

That's deemed necessary due to DOPMA and the US insistence that all _______(Insert rank and specialty of choice) are absolutely equal in skills and attributes. That's patently nonsensical. Better training would help but even that will not make a cautious metric lover into an intuitive commander. :rolleyes:

Cav Guy was right in his comment above; the systems guys will be back. I've seen about four or five iterations along the same line in an attempt to force decision codification over the past 60 years. None of 'em worked, the next one won't either. :mad:

It's an art, not a science...

Hajduk
08-20-2008, 04:37 AM
Cav Guy was right in his comment above; the systems guys will be back. .

I agree that the 'system guys' will always look for a reason (justification) to unleash the wrath of their calculators and powerpoint presentations. I would only allow them to exist within the experimentation departments (where failure is acceptable).

The dying breaths of the systems nerd were heard a while back with the changed order of affairs in today's hotspots reached unacceptable proportions. Now, its about time that leaders (that don't get hard ons when they see a "super-cool" ppt slide from a vitamin-d deficient concept developer) are at the strategic level making decisions that will change the way future concepts and doctrine (and their developers) are influenced and written.

Gen Mattis is in no way new to the game ;)

William F. Owen
08-20-2008, 03:32 PM
I suggest that good doctrine and concepts should use no words that do not appear in the UKs 1924 field regulations! Plain simple, and all about killing His Majesties enemies! :wry:

slapout9
08-24-2008, 11:17 PM
I have been very busy the last 2 weeks at my day job and have not had a chance to post much. After reading the full document Mattis may produce some very good things without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. On page 6 of the memo just under the comments by General Kelly and Dave Killcullen are four ideas that will be retained by current Joint Doctrine. What is unusual is these are all very important "Systems Thinking Concepts." Real systems thinking concepts are not fuzzy or complicated and should be kept as apparently Mattis intends to. The rest of the stuff should go as Mattis is apparently going to do. Time for a return to the "Enemy As A System."

jcustis
08-25-2008, 05:47 AM
The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information.

And right here I see something that typifies this great general. If he said the enemy was at the bottom of that cliff, I need you to jump off it to kill them...I'd peek first, but would figure out how to make that poncho into a parachute real quick.:D

William F. Owen
08-25-2008, 05:49 AM
Time for a return to the "Enemy As A System."

This force me to ask why? Does it help? Is it useful?

OK, having read up on systems theory to help me understand Shimon Naveh's work, I can see very little merit in it's application to military thought. - I also think Naveh is mostly wrong.

The problem is ambiguity. If the enemy is a system, then he is usually self healing, adapting and evolving, and all the other bumper stickers that add complexity.
Why do I want to get into a competition tracking and understanding this?
Why don't I just kill and destroy any part of him I come across?

Systems Theory seem to be a starting point that wants to advocate clever and complex solutions.

Yes, everything may be a "system", but like the OODA loop, why does thinking that way help?

Ron Humphrey
08-25-2008, 02:06 PM
This force me to ask why? Does it help? Is it useful?

OK, having read up on systems theory to help me understand Shimon Naveh's work, I can see very little merit in it's application to military thought. - I also think Naveh is mostly wrong.

The problem is ambiguity. If the enemy is a system, then he is usually self healing, adapting and evolving, and all the other bumper stickers that add complexity.
Why do I want to get into a competition tracking and understanding this?
Why don't I just kill and destroy any part of him I come across?

Systems Theory seem to be a starting point that wants to advocate clever and complex solutions.

Yes, everything may be a "system", but like the OODA loop, why does thinking that way help?

The most notable concern that I hear over and over is exactly as you say,
ambiguity.

The real effect in using any type of systems approach should be IMHO simply being able to more quickly identify, or recognize opportunities, changes taking place, weaknesses, strengths, etc. KISS principle works in life because most of us would rather be able to just pick a direction and go with it at least knowing that everyone is on the same page(even if it turns out to be the wrong page:wry:).

The problem with refusing to not only accept that some systems approach may be necessary if one is to truly be able to address the larger environment, is that it may be in the end, the only way to actually define what will be the most effective KISS principle with which to approach the particular situation.

Think formulas in math, they are useful because they allow us to figure out answers to given problems sets without actually having to go through all of the extra steps. Thus problem solving is simplified and thus hopefully more within the comfort zone of most those who have to use them.

For every part of the enemy you decimate there exists another portion yet unidentified which will most likely fill the vacuum. Now in a normal war or LE circumstance it is probably doable to say that you'll just keep eliminating until their all gone.

In the current world climate exactly how long do you think it would take to actually do that, or is it even more likely that at some point you will have eliminated so many that a new stock of problems develops from the results of those which is even more menacing and perhaps less defined by cause and more defined by revenge/personal loss. This is what they mean by the statement you can't kill your way out of an insurgency. I submit thats probably true to some extent in ANY battle.

William F. Owen
08-25-2008, 02:26 PM
This is what they mean by the statement you can't kill your way out of an insurgency. I submit thats probably true to some extent in ANY battle.

I will ponder the rest of your post at length, but I just wanted to pick up this.

You are exactly right. Insurgents are defeated just like everyone else.

Insurgencies fail, or are defeated because the insurgents gives up. He is militarily defeated. He may not have been defeated solely by military means but, as an armed opponent, he suffered defeat.

All the so called non-military aspects of COIN are aimed at detracting from the effectiveness of someone using force. If an insurgency did not use armed force, it would not be a military or police problem.

Understanding an Insurgency as "a system" merely allows you to kill and arrest the right people. The defeat of the Shining Path, in Peru being one of the best examples I know. The bigger the system, the larger the amount of people have to be taken out circulation.

slapout9
08-26-2008, 02:12 AM
Hi Wilf, the answer to your question on the benefit is...well I would be hard pressed to come up with a better answer than Ron Humphrey gave.
EBO is complex and not worth it. Systems thinking is simple and will bring clarity to the situation when done properly.




The real effect in using any type of systems approach should be IMHO simply being able to more quickly identify, or recognize opportunities, changes taking place, weaknesses, strengths, etc. KISS principle works in life because most of us would rather be able to just pick a direction and go with it at least knowing that everyone is on the same page(even if it turns out to be the wrong page:wry:).

The problem with refusing to not only accept that some systems approach may be necessary if one is to truly be able to address the larger environment, is that it may be in the end, the only way to actually define what will be the most effective KISS principle with which to approach the particular situation.



Ron that is quote of the week type stuff....very well said.

Ron Humphrey
08-26-2008, 01:56 PM
Hi Wilf, the answer to your question on the benefit is...well I would be hard pressed to come up with a better answer than Ron Humphrey gave.
EBO is complex and not worth it. Systems thinking is simple and will bring clarity to the situation when done properly.




Ron that is quote of the week type stuff....very well said.

by your praise:o

One thing I learned fairly quickly in corrections was that although things are never simple, their not always as difficult as they seem either. :wry:

William F. Owen
08-26-2008, 02:12 PM
Systems thinking is simple and will bring clarity to the situation when done properly.

Slap mate. I want to believe! - the religious side of me! ;)

..but can you give me an example? How does thinking of the IRA or a Soviet Style Motor Rifle Regiment, as "a system" help me defeat him?

I totally get that deep understanding of how something mechanical, cybernetic or even chemical allows me to use the minimum force to sabotage it, but how do I apply that to real world enemies and threats? - which are endlessly "open" systems, are they not?

Ron Humphrey
08-26-2008, 04:25 PM
Slap mate. I want to believe! - the religious side of me! ;)

..but can you give me an example? How does thinking of the IRA or a Soviet Style Motor Rifle Regiment, as "a system" help me defeat him?

I totally get that deep understanding of how something mechanical, cybernetic or even chemical allows me to use the minimum force to sabotage it, but how do I apply that to real world enemies and threats? - which are endlessly "open" systems, are they not?

They must eat, sleep, work, watch their back, find support, find the good guys, create alliances, establish boundaries, conquer ground, address the populous, etc.

If that ain't a system of some sort not sure what is. :D

That doesn't mean there's not some difference in how one is to approach said systems. It is simply to identify that their still the same just trying to use a little tech to help think about them.

Whats the difference between a tape or CD, how about VHS or DVD,
Standard res / HD Its about clarity of perception and understanding not different answers. Hopefully better answers to the same questions.

I'm sure that didn't help:wry: but Oh well I tried

wm
08-26-2008, 05:25 PM
Systems thinking usually seems to arise when one is feeling resource constrained. In other words, if you can't rain down tons of steel on your opponent in a rather indiscriminate fashion, you have to be selective about what you target. Since you have to be selective, you want to make every shot count. Rome'e enemies tried to capture the legions' eagles as a way of breaking the legionnaires' will to fight. Modern systems thinking looks at what might achieve the equivalent "biggest" bang for the buck. That, at least, is the theory. But I am not sure that the theory has ever been mapped successfully to practice (in modern warfare at least). From what I've read, "surgical" strikes against Iraqi C2 facilities, e.g., didn't really break the will of the Iraqi Army in OIF I.

Of course some smart guy will tell me that this is not a failure of the systems approach. Rather, we failed to correctly identify the right or critical node in the system which was the Iraqi Armed Forces, Al-Qaeda in Iraq or whomever. I hope this reminds you of the kinds of responses you hear from conspiracy theorists when they are presented with evidence that is meant to disprove their hypotheses about the world takeover conspiracies of the Illuminati, the KGB, the Knights Templar, etc. ;)

Ron Humphrey
08-26-2008, 06:43 PM
;)
Systems thinking usually seems to arise when one is feeling resource constrained. In other words, if you can't rain down tons of steel on your opponent in a rather indiscriminate fashion, you have to be selective about what you target. Since you have to be selective, you want to make every shot count. Rome'e enemies tried to capture the legions' eagles as a way of breaking the legionnaires' will to fight. Modern systems thinking looks at what might achieve the equivalent "biggest" bang for the buck. That, at least, is the theory. But I am not sure that the theory has ever been mapped successfully to practice (in modern warfare at least). From what I've read, "surgical" strikes against Iraqi C2 facilities, e.g., didn't really break the will of the Iraqi Army in OIF I.

Of course some smart guy will tell me that this is not a failure of the systems approach. Rather, we failed to correctly identify the right or critical node in the system which was the Iraqi Armed Forces, Al-Qaeda in Iraq or whomever. I hope this reminds you of the kinds of responses you hear from conspiracy theorists when they are presented with evidence that is meant to disprove their hypotheses about the world takeover conspiracies of the Illuminati, the KGB, the Knights Templar, etc. ;)

I don't think it takes all that smart a guy to figure out that if your right hand doesn't know what your left hands doing and your feet have decided to sit it out things might not go very well. CO-CO-COmmunication

slapout9
08-27-2008, 03:35 AM
Slap mate. I want to believe! - the religious side of me! ;)

..but can you give me an example? How does thinking of the IRA or a Soviet Style Motor Rifle Regiment, as "a system" help me defeat him?

I totally get that deep understanding of how something mechanical, cybernetic or even chemical allows me to use the minimum force to sabotage it, but how do I apply that to real world enemies and threats? - which are endlessly "open" systems, are they not?


Wilf, if I can still find it I actually have a 5 rings analysis of a Soviet Style Motor Regiment. Actually I think it is a whole Soviet Army arrayed against NATO. It shows how the system was taken apart to show what to attack in order for NATO to win. If I can not find it ask Warden..he studied this intently and produced a real plan for it. The Soviets were none to happy about it either...they new they would have lost. Again this is open source material so don't be concerned about the material. I also have one of a basic Terrorist organization...I will find and post. Also Major Adam Strickland wrote a paper for one of the Marine War schools he went to and does a brilliant job of applying the 5 rings and systems thinking. It should be in the SWC library somewhere.
Again Ron Humphrey makes very good points in his recent posts...what he describes would be ring#2 systems processes or systems essentials depending on which version you use.
Our own SWC Dr. Jack Kem wrote a campaign Planning handbook which shows how to use the rings as part of the Campaign Design process. Later Slap...keep believing!

Cavguy
08-27-2008, 04:13 AM
Slap,

Here is a very astute critique (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/win95_files/ware.htm) of the 5 rings from Airpower Journal - agrees with Wiif and my viewpoint to some extent. What do you think?


As an Operational framework for the employment of strategic airpower, the air campaign has sought and attracted much attention in recent years. Its champions have been tireless in promoting a commanding position for it among the US Air Force's many roles and missions. Such zeal gives the impression that winning acceptance for this particular form of using the air weapon may be the real campaign in question.

In establishing the value of the air campaign, its advocates assert that the enemy is a system on which they base the claim to have constructed a model of the conflictual environment. This essay scrutinizes the logic of that assumption. It examines its analytical and conceptual content so as better to assess how well this assumption explains the environment of future conflicts in which the armed forces will be expected to operate.

My purpose is not to challenge the need for the kind of airpower that the air campaign represents. Clearly, we need a rational template for the application of airpower against enemies organized as states. Nor is it my purpose to question the ways the air campaign employs airpower operationally to its best advantage against such enemies. A rational template helps identify critical targets, and it is far better to engage critical targets than those that have less significance for the course and outcome of fighting. My purpose is simply to underscore the problem that occurs when enthusiasm for an idea outstrips the logic marshaled in its support.

and


Advocates assert that the enemy is organized in five concentric rings and that inasmuch as the five rings represent the enemy's basic architecture, they therefore constitute a system. The rings descend in order of importance from the innermost to the outermost—namely, from leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, and population to fielded forces. Imbedded within these rings, we find centers of gravity (COG), viewed as the points of maximum utility to attack. The destruction of these COGs is most likely to hurt the enemy the worst and produce decisive results. Furthermore, these COGs may be divided into sub COGs and nodes of pressure.5 By virtue of the airplane's ability to transcend the limitations of natural topography, it remains the weapon of choice to render the enemy strategically powerless under the conditions of the five ring analysis.

Nevertheless, the five ring analysis begs the question of who and what the enemy is, what circumstances he operates under, and what qualifies him as a “system.” War is not an act of individuals but a social activity. This statement is not social science double talk; it is an issue critical to our understanding of warfare. Hence, we are obliged to ask in what way this view of the enemy resembles a social construct. However we may choose to define the component elements of a social construct called “the enemy,” there can be little argument that, through the interaction of its individual parts, a social construct represents people organized according to patterns which provide for enduring cooperation and collective expression. One important manifestation of such collective expression is in the manner and means by which people conceive and make concrete the idea of violent conflict. To grasp such manifestations in their most unambiguous form requires more than superficial analysis.

and


It is worth repeating that the model which advocates propose for the air campaign can operate successfully only in an international environment where the enemy's form of sociopolitical and economic organization is the “state” and where he has the industrial capacity to produce and field the conventional forces amenable to the dissection of the five ring analysis. Unfortunately, the present day international environment has been changing in ways that no longer make the state the sole focus and arbiter of violent conflict. To this end, RAND analyst Carl Builder has argued in his book The Icarus Syndrome that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Air Force has, indeed, lost all sense of its mission.20 The formulations that have resulted in the flawed concepts of the air campaign, with its seductive appeal to simplistic reasoning, speak emotionally to a military culture in mourning for the loss of its historical roots and in search of a new purpose. Be that as it may, we must also say that the five ring analysis of the enemy as a system is the newest contribution to thought regarding the employment of airpower—however flawed the concepts of the air campaign may prove to be. What we should always strive for in the end is a better understanding of the contribution that airpower makes to war fighting and the means by which that contribution adds value to the military endeavor. The five ring analysis of the enemy as a system is a start in that direction, but it is not the end.

slapout9
08-27-2008, 04:27 AM
Cavguy, I am familiar with the article from some years ago. I just printed it out and want to read it again. I dig your new uniform in your avatar.:wry:

William F. Owen
08-27-2008, 04:44 AM
Wilf, if I can still find it I actually have a 5 rings analysis of a Soviet Style Motor Regiment. Actually I think it is a whole Soviet Army arrayed against NATO.

Very interested. I await it most earnestly! - and that is the 5 Rings stuff.

But what about Naveh's "Systemic Operational Design". All his assumptions are based on the "Fact" the enemy is a system!!

selil
08-27-2008, 04:45 AM
One of the Airpower Journals Seasonal issues in 2006 if I remember was all about EBO. A theme issue. If I'm remembering correctly anyhow.

Bill Moore
08-27-2008, 08:22 AM
Looking at an insurgency as a system, or a system of systems, is dangerously misleading. William Owen is correct about his comments regarding mechanical systems (closed systems or simple systems) verus open (or complex systems). You can predict the results of a nodal attack on a closed system, but you can only guess what the result will be when you target a node in an open system, because that system will adapt (perhaps in your favor, perhaps not). While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy). They don't focus on so called HVI's, but rather all the bad guys to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, thus the goal is to purge an area and put our "systems" in place to prevent their resurgence (functioning gov, security, intelligence, public diplomacy, etc.). We attempted systems targeting initially during OIF and it largely failed to achieve the desired results, but when we surged and changed the environment to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, that combined with the targeting methodology had a positive impact. Only history will tell how long it will last.

I still support using a systems model on occassion when looking at the insurgency to identify potential vulnerabilities, but the focus must be on the basics, which is changing the environment (it is tough, dangerous, and requires patience). If I can shut down a weapons smuggling ring (system), or a financial support arm (system), that is a bonus, but only a temporary one until they adapt to the disruption. If I can deny the populace to them by setting conditions to get them to actively support the government I can overwhelm the insurgents, vice constantly hitting them with pin pricks. They won't be able to recover from staggering blows.

Slapout if you can find a magic silver bullet for defeating an insurgency please let me know. I have a case of beer saying you can't. :)

Cavguy
08-27-2008, 01:36 PM
If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy).

Absolute gold, and dead on.

Ron Humphrey
08-27-2008, 02:09 PM
Looking at an insurgency as a system, or a system of systems, is dangerously misleading.

Most definately misleading, but not necessarily wrong. Is it the fact that its not a system thats the problem or more that we average folk tend to look at it as more prescriptive rather than enlightening?



William Owen is correct about his comments regarding mechanical systems (closed systems or simple systems) verus open (or complex systems). You can predict the results of a nodal attack on a closed system, but you can only guess what the result will be when you target a node in an open system, because that system will adapt (perhaps in your favor, perhaps not).

Once again that is correct in that if the expectation is to find the silver bullet then yes almost guaranteed failure do to unforseen reactions. However if one uses the systems approach in an attempt to better understand the enemy rather than to define what to do to them is that still a problem? If one thing is certain it should be that critical thinking is required if we are to approach operational environments without being constantly drawn into natural/biased assumptions vs more informed and well thought out approaches.



While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy). They don't focus on so called HVI's, but rather all the bad guys to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, thus the goal is to purge an area and put our "systems" in place to prevent their resurgence (functioning gov, security, intelligence, public diplomacy, etc.).

Could not be more in agreement here and I ask you this. Many of us have tried to explain a complex situation to those around us and very often there is confusion of what we say by misperception of those on the recieving end of the discussion(or insufficient ability on our end to adequately explain it:wry:).

How often have you found that a commanders intent is one thing to the the commander and by the time it gets two levels down it apparently became something completely different. The thing I guess I'm trying to get at here is that a systems approach can be extremely helpful in the explanation and planning process for ensuring that at least most of the individuals are on the same page as to the overall environmental characteristics. Anything beyond that along the prescriptive lines would seem to be problematic.

As to systems in general perhaps a change in how one looks at that system might represent more of what you mention, Good ol COIN. Although in mapping a system one tends to focus on the nodes much as we usually connect the dots to draw a picture, are the nodes really the important part or rather is it the (what,how,why,where, and whos of what connects them. Those lines represent the true focus of the operation. How do they get around (the people), how do they fund,(the people), what makes them have to move(the people), what is their achilles heel, ETC.





We attempted systems targeting initially during OIF and it largely failed to achieve the desired results, but when we surged and changed the environment to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, that combined with the targeting methodology had a positive impact. Only history will tell how long it will last.

I still support using a systems model on occassion when looking at the insurgency to identify potential vulnerabilities, but the focus must be on the basics, which is changing the environment (it is tough, dangerous, and requires patience). If I can shut down a weapons smuggling ring (system), or a financial support arm (system), that is a bonus, but only a temporary one until they adapt to the disruption. If I can deny the populace to them by setting conditions to get them to actively support the government I can overwhelm the insurgents, vice constantly hitting them with pin pricks. They won't be able to recover from staggering blows.

Slapout if you can find a magic silver bullet for defeating an insurgency please let me know. I have a case of beer saying you can't. :)

In identifying how difficult it is to take the right approach and how much it requires from those who are leading it haven't you just made the point that more often than not many may not be quite patient enough, or persistent enough, or informed enough to continue the right process without some sort of more basic(said silver bullet) type approaches. Is it not therein that the greatest difficulties are to be found?

Eden
08-27-2008, 02:10 PM
Eisenhower once said "In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensible." It is a shame that effects-based thinking - originally formulated as an aid to planners in thinking about what they wanted to accomplish before they decided how they wanted to accomplish it - evolved into effects-based operations. Now we will throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Effects-based thinking became EBO due to that peculiarly American proclivity for intellectual hubris (we can know everything) and reductive thinking (we can eliminate the friction and fog of war through information gathering and analysis). We love tables, graphs, and data. We regard reliance on instinct and professional judgment as evidence of sloppy thinking. When is the last time you saw a briefing end with a slide saying "Trust me"?

Effects-based thinking is an effective tool for thoughtful planners. EBO is a crutch for drones seeking false precision to prop up mediocre plans. Moreover, it became an exercise in onanism as the ends began to overshadow the means. Producing snazzy charts consumed more time and staff energy than any actual thinking about operations.

I saw this in action at my last headquarters, where the long-range planners became more and more separated from reality. They carefully crafted their desired ends, made sure they were nested properly and gauged by Measures of Effectiveness. They thought long and hard about second- and third-order effects. What they didn't do was spend much time on how they were going to bring about their desired effects. The 'action' part was considered secondary, an incidental problem for the current ops guys (like me) to figure out. As a result - and this is the real killer in EBO - ends became increasingly de-linked from ways and means.

Anyway, kudos to General Mattis. As Orwell warned many years ago, "We've reached the point where the first duty of intelligent men is to restate the obvious."

Steve Blair
08-27-2008, 02:27 PM
I tend to take a more holistic approach to 'systems' (one that wouldn't pass muster with the more technologically-focused systems analysis). To me, the population support for an insurgency is in its own way a system, but one that you have to pressure and adjust in multiple ways. Much of what I've seen in the EBO/systems stuff is more (to me) grasping for a justification to build more fancy stuff and/or use that fancy stuff in a way that might appear to offer a silver bullet solution.

I do agree with Eden that there is some good nestled in the EBO stuff, but it tends to get lost in the technological shuffle (I tend to pin many of our problems not so much on intellectual hubris as I do an over-reliance on technology...and I do think that 'total knowledge' of any battlefield is a myth).

Cavguy
08-27-2008, 02:40 PM
I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.

Steve Blair
08-27-2008, 02:44 PM
I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.

I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.

Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.

Ron Humphrey
08-27-2008, 02:48 PM
I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.

Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.

Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them:confused:

Steve Blair
08-27-2008, 02:55 PM
Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them:confused:

Because the AF is not especially "into" either close air support or interdiction, at least at the higher policy level. Also, the promise of hitting a node and knocking an opponent out of the conflict is far more attractive from a political standpoint than a prolonged interdiction campaign. One of the odd takeaways that some higher command types got from Vietnam was that interdiction (i.e. Rolling Thunder) failed whereas node strikes (Linebacker II) succeeded. Both these simplistic "conclusions" are flawed, but they did survive for some time and became enshrined in the "lessons learned" from that conflict.

The promise of war on the cheap is based on being able to hit a small number of targets with precision weapons and take out an opponent without ever having to commit ground forces (or at least a very small number of forces).

William F. Owen
08-27-2008, 03:04 PM
As a result - and this is the real killer in EBO - ends became increasingly de-linked from ways and means.


That is the central weakness of EBO and thus I have never understood how it got as far as it did. Unless you can issue orders using simple language, that allows folks to draw up simple and achievable plans, then I don't see how anyone is in business.

The number of verbs a mission statement should be allowed to contain are actually pretty limited. I might even have a bash and writing them down sometime! :)

slapout9
08-27-2008, 03:14 PM
Wilf, I stayed up late last night and I found it:) I also reread the article that Cavguy posted, by then it was bed time. I will try and post the 5 rings later but I had problems doing this last time. Either way I will email it to you if all else fails. But first I will have to respond to all this in sections and some separate posts.

Cavguy, I need to set some background on the article that has a few facts the author either left out or was unaware of. You will read him refer to the Air Campaign Planning process. There was an actual handbook published to do this which was on the INTERNET for a long time but for some reason it was removed, I have a hard copy and so does the Air War College in their library.

First there are 5 steps in the process!!! You don't get to the rings until number 3.
Here are the 5 steps :
1-Operational Environment Research
2-Objective(s) determination
3-COG(s) determination (the rings )
4-COA/Campaign development (parallel attack)
5-Operational plan/order issued

Much of what the author criticize as a lack of understanding of the social processes of war would take place in step one!!! If you can get the handbook the list of experts recommended is comprehensive.

His second argument that it only applies to interstate warfare is again incorrect. Warden showed how to apply his theory to an international drug organization in several of the articles the author sites as references. For some reason the author failed to point this out:confused: You must understand the the time frame 1995, this was a radical concept then and it was pre 911 so terrorist groups did not have the spotlight they do today.

Three, the parallel attack or what came to be known as TVA, the time value of action or really recently here at SWC Strategic Compression. Warden has consistently said and written the most important thing to do is to attack in parallel across the rings, not just leadership(again Warden points this out in his articles but this author fails to point them out). The attack may be lethal or non-lethal, it could be a bomb or dropping medical supples, or a combination of both. It depends on the mission.


Bill Moore haven't forgot you but need more coffe:wry:

Steve Blair
08-27-2008, 03:32 PM
Slap,

If you're talking about the Rand report on air campaign planning, it's still available.

selil
08-27-2008, 04:52 PM
I tend to take a more holistic approach to 'systems' (one that wouldn't pass muster with the more technologically-focused systems analysis). To me, the population support for an insurgency is in its own way a system, but one that you have to pressure and adjust in multiple ways. Much of what I've seen in the EBO/systems stuff is more (to me) grasping for a justification to build more fancy stuff and/or use that fancy stuff in a way that might appear to offer a silver bullet solution.

I do agree with Eden that there is some good nestled in the EBO stuff, but it tends to get lost in the technological shuffle (I tend to pin many of our problems not so much on intellectual hubris as I do an over-reliance on technology...and I do think that 'total knowledge' of any battlefield is a myth).

Your point is well taken. Much like Wilf grasping at the closed versus open mechanical system the reality is much broader. Capitalism is an economic system. An HMO is an entity in the health care system. A village will have a social system. Like I said earlier we (collective with mouse in pocket) have a tendency to utilize technological constructs and metaphors and rationalize them regardless of fit or usefulness. Systems theory (even the hyper-technical) is useful for understanding differing entities and relative behavior patterns in the aggregate. Specificity falls off as the relationships devolve towards the individual.

It also seems that EBO was misused as a method to apply scientific method or metric based analysis to a woefully inappropriate task. Much like the meandering discussion on the platoon and fire team the mission changes, the scope is slippery (pun intended), the constitution begs for flexibility, the reality is counter to the evidence. EBO fails in providing leaders ease of understanding in a cognitive effort that is not easy to address. To have the answer to the EBO effort is to in many ways not need the EBO tools.

Awaiting flung stones.

slapout9
08-27-2008, 06:13 PM
While I am busy organizing some stuff, I thought what does this thread need? Some Systems Music (Jams) and who better than The Bob Seger System. You young guys will learn that Bob's first band was organized and called a system. If you can find the old LP album he even has a defintion of a system on the back of it:) The little round thing the guy is holding in his hand at the clip below is called a 45 RPM record...part of a music playing system we used to have. Anyway for your listening pleasure and systems education may I present Lucifer-by The Bob Seger System:wry:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHP_ba8aaiw

I will be gone a little while but I'll be back. Bill Moore get that beer ready:eek:

slapout9
08-27-2008, 11:06 PM
Slap,

If you're talking about the Rand report on air campaign planning, it's still available.


Steve, I don't think that is the one. This one was produced at the Air War college by some instructors.

Wilf, check your email for a 5 rings analysis of a Soviet Fuel Depot:wry:

Bill Moore wrote:
While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy).

Bill,that is systems thinking at it's best. Almost a perfect 5 rings analysis to.

Ring5 is the insurgency and you go Kill or capture or convert them. Ring 4 are the various population groups you want to protect. Ring 3 is the physical infrastructure you want to protect and/or build. Ring 2 is the counter process you use to undermine the insurgency. Ring 1 is the leaders and leadership systems you want in place when you leave. Killcullen has written various papers about using the systems thinking approach to COIN. Some are in the SWC library if I am not mistaken.

Now for my case of beer. I don't drink that much but I do like Corona's very,very cold with a small piece of lime pushed into the bottle. My association with SF when I was in the service allowed me to find out many of you guys cook a mean steak and or hamburger. So a Corona and a steak will work or should we ever meet you get the beer and I will get the steak:eek:

Now for the answer..... Che Guevara-Bolivia-1966. The closest thing to a silver bullet theory I have seen. Combination of CIA-SF-Local forces to get him. And there is an important lesson there...the sooner you act against an insurgency the easier they are to deal with. If UBL had been killed when he first started his crap we wouldn't be doing what we are doing now. But as COIN theory points out many Insurgencies are not recognized and or dealt with by Governments until they are well developed. It which case you will have to deal with a whole and much larger system then just a single individual or small group.

Later Slap

SWJED
08-28-2008, 01:55 PM
More on EBO (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/more-on-ebo/) - SWJ Blog

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis’ Effects Based Operations memo and the “vigorous debate” that followed. Excerpts from the article:


Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis' decision to exorcise the term "effects-based operations" from US Joint Forces Command's vocabulary is sparking passionate debate as the military mulls potentially sweeping implications for doctrine, training and operations.

Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. It is supposed to be backed by a framework called operational net assessment (ONA) enabling commanders to capitalize on unprecedented high-tech information about the battlespace as well as an analytical process called system of systems analysis (SoSA) focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.

But somewhere along the way it all stopped making sense, according to Mattis, who writes in an Aug. 14 memo that EBO, ONA and SoSA are "fundamentally flawed" and must be removed from the military's lexicon, training and operations…

There has been a spirited debate about EBO in recent years. Critics such as retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper and Naval War College professor Milan Vego have vivisected the concept, while Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, one of EBO's main proponents, and other advocates like Naval War College professor James Ellsworth have repeatedly argued its merits.

Mattis' memo is not the end of the debate, but the start of a new chapter. Deptula is defending EBO while welcoming further discussions that will follow from JFCOM's guidance.

"I stand by the efficacy of EBO as a proven joint planning construct and welcome internal discussions on the topic as different viewpoints in joint doctrine are important in raising dialogues that ultimately result in enhancing joint force operations," Deptula tells Inside the Pentagon…

Not surprisingly, the memo is ruffling feathers in Air Force circles.

Before Deptula provided comments on the missive to ITP, Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney (retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney) , who unloaded heaps of criticism.

"Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document," McInerney says. "I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much."

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

Much, much more at ITP – praise, criticism and “between the lines” - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription.

William F. Owen
08-28-2008, 05:57 PM
In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

Is there actually any evidence to support the assertion that EBO is proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years

Regardless of the actual lack of military logic, EBO lacks evidence and always has.

Cavguy
08-28-2008, 06:01 PM
Is there actually any evidence to support the assertion that EBO is proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years

Regardless of the actual lack of military logic, EBO lacks evidence and always has.

I told you the EBO crew would strike back .... :D

This is more to do about the USAF continuing to justify that it can "win wars" by itself than a honest appraisal of doctrine. EBO justifies a lot of USAF doctrine and programs. Without it, rice bowls are threatened. Therefore, a pushback was expected.

I'm with you, show me where EBO had measurable, verifiable success and I'm ready to be persuaded.

Ken White
08-28-2008, 06:42 PM
Plus, this:
"McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo."is living proof of the wisdom of C. Abrams -- "Generals should be noted for their silences."

The shocking thing is that a retired anything would have the gall to presume to encourage those serving to ignore something one of their also serving brethren put out -- disagree, yes. Ignore is way wrong and bad advice.

"They-y-y'r-re ba-a-ack," indeed...

Cavguy
08-28-2008, 07:17 PM
Plus, this:is living proof of the wisdom of C. Abrams -- "Generals should be noted for their silences."

The shocking thing is that a retired anything would have the gall to presume to encourage those serving to ignore something one of their also serving brethren put out -- disagree, yes. Ignore is way wrong and bad advice.

"They-y-y'r-re ba-a-ack," indeed...

I can imagine that this isn't going to do much for the USAF's objective of rehabilitiating its image within DoD as a team player who gets the current environment, especially since USAF PAO referred questions to McInerny.

Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.

Tom Odom
08-28-2008, 07:20 PM
I can imagine that this isn't going to do much for the USAF's objective of rehabilitiating its image within DoD as a team player who gets the current environment, especially since USAF PAO referred questions to McInerny.

Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.


Billy Mitchell lives....

Retired 3 stars can be recalled...

slapout9
08-28-2008, 07:24 PM
Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.


Cavguy, that is putting it mildly. He is promoting the disobedience to a direct order:eek: That used to be a crime.

slapout9
08-28-2008, 07:28 PM
Is there actually any evidence to support the assertion that EBO is proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years

Regardless of the actual lack of military logic, EBO lacks evidence and always has.


Wilf, it is not just that but at the time of the 2 sources sited EBO hadn't even been developed as a concept as far as I know. :confused:

slapout9
08-28-2008, 07:40 PM
This is more to do about the USAF continuing to justify that it can "win wars" by itself than a honest appraisal of doctrine. EBO justifies a lot of USAF doctrine and programs. Without it, rice bowls are threatened. Therefore, a pushback was expected.


Cavguy, should have put this with my other post but you hit the nail on the head,triple time. This is more about rice bowls than anything else and it is going to block real progress or try to at least. Their are important parts in EBO that should stay but there is a lot that should go.....mainly the term itself!!! I talked to Colonel Warden about this a couple of months ago and I was thinking of doing an interview with him about this subject. It would have been a very short interview because he said the problem is....nobody knows what anybody means by that term! Plus you have the added confusion of the word affect and effect sound just alike, but have different meanings and often would need to go together to truly explain yourself. (cause/affect and effect/result)
But if you speak southern English like me and ya was tawkin to me you woodint know if I aid affects or effects:D It is an English language WMD waiting to go off.

Cavguy
08-28-2008, 10:10 PM
But if you speak southern English like me and ya was tawkin to me you woodint know if I aid affects or effects:D It is an English language WMD waiting to go off.

Slap,

Thanks. My plain speak must be because I was born in Opelika, AL! :D

selil
08-29-2008, 04:04 AM
It is an interesting consideration that the USAF feels threatened. I had actually looked at using some of the EBO strategies to explain primary, secondary, and tertiary effects of cyber warfare. When you think about computer network attack and proportionality the idea of applying metrics to results is an inherent part of the planning process. And fairly ludicrous due to the self propagating nature of some attack vectors in cyber space. That led to a realization that cyber warfare has elements that are more like disease than bombs. Unfortunately that is not generalizable across the spectrum much like EBO can not be used by itself to meet the stated goals. That has me mentally swapping back and forth returning to the taxonomical models of Gagne and Bloom and rolling them into an OODA, SARA, IPDE decision process and analysis methodology. I think though EBO will return.

Bill Moore
08-29-2008, 09:12 AM
Slap, Che's little movement in Boliva was pretty lame, and let's face it so was Che, but he had cool hair and a nice profile, so the t-shirt is really super cool. I think I have one in my closet somewhere, or maybe it is a Bob Marley t-shirt. Back on target (pun intended), in my opinion that wasn't network targeting, because there was no network, just some guy with cool hair and few followers. A latter day Jesus of sorts. Anyway I guess I set myself up for that one, so you get a warm case of black label and a burnt hot dog.


In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

In fairness McInerney may have a point, it just didn't come out in this article (I can only see what is posted, I don't have a subscribtion). If he is referring to an effects based approach to harmonize the interagency and coalition (politically) to pressure the national leadership of Serbia and Iraq, then maybe there is some merit, but that isn't EBO, that is simply using effects based thinking to frame a problem. As for putting steel on targets causing the Serb or Iraqi Army to collapse I think EBO proved to be a failure. Iraqi's didn't pull out of Kuwait because we shut down the electric power in Baghdad, and our whimpy bombing campaing in Kosovo wasn't the lever that pried the Serbs out. So I'm left guessing at what his point was.

SWJED if you could get permission to post the entire article to this site it may be helpful.

SWJED
08-29-2008, 10:17 AM
Bill,

I can't post in full due to copyright but will see if ITP will move it to an area with full access to non-subscribers. They made an offer to SWJ concerning this once - will follow-up on that - no promises.

Dave

On edit - request to Inside Defense sent - if they respond favorably I will post a link here to the full article.

slapout9
08-29-2008, 01:31 PM
Dave, I do have a copy of what was called "Country X as a Candidate for an Air Attack" published by the AWC that goes through the entire Air Campaign planning process (later EBO). It is about 15 pages long it is very revealing. It shows how systems thinking is used for the whole process not just the rings. I guarantee most folks have not seen this:wry: If I scan it and email to you (Dave aka SWC editor) can you put it up here? Or if anybody here can help with this? As they say a picture is woth a thousand words. I have to go get some stuff for the Hurricane that is coming right now but should be back after lunch. Slap

SWJED
08-29-2008, 02:42 PM
Inside Defense was kind enough to agree to our request - Mattis Sparks Vigorous Debate On Future Of Effects-Based Ops (http://defensenewsstand.com/insider.asp?issue=08282008sp) - full article.

SWJED
08-29-2008, 02:43 PM
Dave, I do have a copy of what was called "Country X as a Candidate for an Air Attack" published by the AWC that goes through the entire Air Campaign planning process (later EBO). It is about 15 pages long it is very revealing. It shows how systems thinking is used for the whole process not just the rings. I guarantee most folks have not seen this:wry: If I scan it and email to you (Dave aka SWC editor) can you put it up here? Or if anybody here can help with this? As they say a picture is woth a thousand words. I have to go get some stuff for the Hurricane that is coming right now but should be back after lunch. Slap

Thanks. Will upload to our server after you send it to me and I'll post a link here.

Cavguy
08-29-2008, 03:26 PM
Tell us what you really think ...



Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney, who unloaded heaps of criticism.

“Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document,” McInerney says. “I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much.”

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to “ignore” what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM’s missive the “most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force).”

He belittles the two-page memo as a “tantrum” and the accompanying five-page guidance as “puerile” and “totally unbecoming” of a JFCOM commander.

Mattis should be “encouraging multiple perspectives for the enhancement of joint operations -- not trashing them,” McInerney asserts. The JFCOM memo is “intellectually bankrupt” and the policy’s conclusions are “profoundly out of touch with reality,” he adds.



Emphasis mine.

Wow. From a retired 3-star referred by USAF PAO. There are ways to disagree without this kind of insubordinate/vindictive rhetoric.

Anyone see another USAF relief/resignation for cause in the works? More evidence the USAF leadership just doesn't get the ramifications of its attitudes on the other services.

Ron Humphrey
08-29-2008, 03:28 PM
Inside Defense was kind enough to agree to our request - Mattis Sparks Vigorous Debate On Future Of Effects-Based Ops (http://defensenewsstand.com/insider.asp?issue=08282008sp) - full article.

I agree with Ellsworth's take on the memo and it is pretty much what I got from it too. I would however agree that there is a very strong chance that the memo in and of itself would be used as ammo to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

The important thing here is that there be the recognition that ideas are reflected into reality in such context as those hearing them percieve the need. What this means is that in a great many circumstances too many solutions and not enough questions equates to systems or programs which address the symptoms without really acknowledging what the problems really are.

The capabilities offered by the such systems can be ten fold force multipliers if and only if used correctly. If anyone finds themselves avoiding the "hard" decisions" which have to be made because of a tool then I suggest the problem is readily apparent to any who would truly see it.

Despite all of the rice bowls involved I still believe that the majority of those who work for DOD in any capacity still have first and foremost at their minds the mission, the soldier, and how to accomplish the former with the least detriment to the latter, as fast, effectively, and safely as possible.

All in all I think what Gen Mattis has done is brought forth the fact that it is time to start reviewing where things have gone too far and instead get the main focus back on the missions and soldiers and their leaders and get everyone on the same page rather than all over the map due to Symantics overload.

Steve Blair
08-29-2008, 03:29 PM
Since the guy's already retired, I'd say this is just the standard AF line. They always like to find some retired general to scream about things. The next step is an article in Air Force Magazine. They seem to think this gives them some sort of deniability, but never grasp that people understand what they're doing.

TheLapsedPacifist
08-29-2008, 04:01 PM
Okay, can you guys help me out on this?

(Places tin-hat on head)

Gen Mattis has made a decision that EBO in its current format is not fit for purpose. It is academic whether I agree with this, since it's his decision to make. Good luck to him. But, we should reject the flawed staff work that went into the paper – neither the assertion that warfare is impenetrable to scientific-thinking nor the tenuous association of previous operations to EBO stands up to any significant scrutiny. Discounting these, what remains is not sufficient for us to form a robust conclusion by ourselves, so for me the jury is still out. Finally, the thinly veiled attack on the USAF detracts from what should be an object statement of a Commander’s intent.

===========

Long version!

I feel that one could summarise the paper into three points:

1. Mattis's personal preferences and experience: empowering junior commanders, having a clear commander's intent, less process more art, etc. No bones with this.

2. The paper asserts that the nature of warfare is unknowable...that war is a chaotic and complex system, you can’t predict second or third order effects. Therefore war is impenetrable to scrutiny via scientific approach ergo EBO is fundamentally flawed. Now I can disagree with this, it’s a fallacy.

Chaotic and complex systems can be analysed, their behaviour can be predicted. This is a fact – the weather is a chaotic system, and we can predict the weather out to a certain timeframe. Okay it’s probably not an “organised” complex system, so it isn’t directly analogous the EBO situation, but what it means is that just because someone identifies a system as chaotic, doesn’t mean that one cannot (and shouldn’t attempt to) predict its behaviour to some degree.

The point here is that we can predict the behaviour of some complex systems, but the problem is that we may only be able to do for a very short period of time or that the cost of deriving the prediction may be very expensive (in resources).

As for second or third order effects, "predict" is a strong word, it would have been preferable for EBO to be less gung-ho about this and look to "identify" and "anticipate" second or third order effects and develop branches and serial to deal with them.

3. The paper identifies a number of operations that are examples of EBO in action and that these were failures. I find the association of these operations to EBO to be really tenuous. I don’t think that Gulf War 1 was EBO, nor Kosovo, nor Gulf War 2 “Shock and Awe” – but if they were, didn’t we win?

Of greatest concern is that within the paper references are made to a report on Israel vs Hezbollah ’06, where EBO is identified as one of the primary factors contributing to Israel’s defeat. Hogwash! The “We Were Caught Unprepared” report is researched excellently but you could derive a completely different conclusion from the facts.

Selected facts from the report

1. By 90s Hezbollah was “transformed into a highly competent resistance organisation.”

2. ‘93, Op Accountability, Hezbollah prepares for an Israeli ground offensive but was “taken aback by the massive Israeli air and artillery campaign...[this] proved a valuable lesson...that would better prepare Hezbollah for the next war.”

3. ’96 Op Grapes of Wrath, “IDF generally resorted to stand-off precision firepower...[it] failed miserably...at no time during Op Grapes of Wrath was the IDF’s standoff precision weaponry able to silence Hezbollah’s rockets.”

4. 2000, as IDF and SLA withdraw from the security zone “Israeli troops staggered back across the border, telling reporters that their equipment and training had proven useless against Hezbollah...”

5. 2000, post-retreat, Hezbollah’s Sec-Gen Nasrallah states that “Israeli Achilles’ heel [was] Israeli society”. Hezbollah “was convinced that, in any future war, Israel would rely heavily on air and artillery precision weapons and limit its use of ground forces...it was confident that Israel would have no stomach for casualties...”

6. 2000, Hezbollah’s strategy becomes “...confront [Israeli] ground forces to a limited extent, to stall ground incursions, and inflict as many casualties as possible, which would wear out IDF, slow down their progress, and allow continued [Hezbollah] rocket fire.”

7. 2000, “Hezbollah’s robust and hardened defences [against both land and air attack] were the result of six years of diligent work...”

8. 2000, “As a result of the second Intifada, fewer [Israeli] recruits received suitable training...[Israeli] officers [have] little experience with military operations other than counterinsurgency warfare.”

9. 2006, “IDF stretched to the limit by budgetary cuts to the ground forces and the continuing demands placed on them by the Palestinian uprising.” “[S]oldiers with perishable combat skills, such as tank crewmen, going years without training on their armoured vehicles.”

10. 2006, Hezbollah “had prepared for an effects-based campaign...”

11. 2006, “Anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armoured brigade commander but a cook.” “Every single tank crew in the Wadi failed to use the smoke screen system on their tanks...”

To conclude that Israel’s EBO approach to the operation was one of the primarily reasons for their defeat is a fig-leaf to hid the fact that their land component had morphed into a counterinsurgency force, no longer capable of all-arms action. Hezbollah judged correctly that IDF would be forced to employ tactics that limited casualties, ie air-centric, and they develop a response to this. To make matters worse, the Israeli’s are guilty of repeatedly ignoring the writing on the wall. It would have been interesting to see how Hezbollah's strategy would have fared against a well-equipped, well trained, and well-organised armed-force - take your pick, US, UK, French, Russian, etc.

Cavguy
08-29-2008, 04:21 PM
Extensive post, and well argued. Since it is your first, we appreciate an introduction here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?goto=newpost&t=1441). Comment below.



3. The paper identifies a number of operations that are examples of EBO in action and that these were failures. I find the association of these operations to EBO to be really tenuous. I don’t think that Gulf War 1 was EBO, nor Kosovo, nor Gulf War 2 “Shock and Awe” – but if they were, didn’t we win?

Vaunted claims by some in GW 1 was that airpower through an EBO model would collapse the Iraqi Army alone - it still took a ground attack to do it. That ground attack was successful due in large part to the damage done to Iraqi C2 and morale by the air campaign. But whether it constituted an EBO success is something on which reasonable people can disagree. The Iraqis still fought hard (but unsuccessfully) with their Repulblican Guard divisions, but were outclassed by our Army.

Kosovo - probably "the" model where Airpower can be argued to have forced resolution to a conflict alone.

GW2 "Shock and Awe" - did little for decaptitating Iraqi C2 or forcing collapse. The simutaneous strikes did not strike fear into the Iraqi leadership. It wasn't until the statues toppled and Thunder Runs occured that the regime collapsed.


Of greatest concern is that within the paper references are made to a report on Israel vs Hezbollah ’06, where EBO is identified as one of the primary factors contributing to Israel’s defeat. Hogwash! The “We Were Caught Unprepared” report is researched excellently but you could derive a completely different conclusion from the facts.

To conclude that Israel’s EBO approach to the operation was one of the primarily reasons for their defeat is a fig-leaf to hid the fact that their land component had morphed into a counterinsurgency force, no longer capable of all-arms action.

Agreed on the atrophy of the IDF ground forces, but there was never a plan to use them - IIRC the original intent of the campaign was an EBO model being conducted by the IAF. When that failed to achieve its objectives, a hasty decision was made to employ ground forces which had neither prepared or trained for the operation it was asked to conduct. Difficulty and failure ensued. Wilf can probably add some here, as he discussed some of the mythology in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1034&page=2).

Tom Odom
08-29-2008, 04:21 PM
To conclude that Israel’s EBO approach to the operation was one of the primarily reasons for their defeat is a fig-leaf to hid the fact that their land component had morphed into a counterinsurgency force, no longer capable of all-arms action. Hezbollah judged correctly that IDF would be forced to employ tactics that limited casualties, ie air-centric, and they develop a response to this. To make matters worse, the Israeli’s are guilty of repeatedly ignoring the writing on the wall. It would have been interesting to see how Hezbollah's strategy would have fared against a well-equipped, well trained, and well-organised armed-force - take your pick, US, UK, French, Russian, etc.

I would agree with the first half of the sentence but the second half is another fig leaf. I have seen the briefs on this and listened to the same leap--that emphasis on COIN is somehow the root of the problem. I have no doubt that it accentuated tendencies long standing in the IDF.

Those same tendencies existed in the 56, 67, and 73 war including preference and over reliance on air versus artillery, use of armor in a pure role, and a spotty approach to integrating infantry in a combined arms attack. I watched the IDF do the same things as a UN observer in southern Lebanon in 1987. As the IDF applied EBO in the operation, EBO furthered accentuated those tendencies.

And this is not to single out the IDF for its mistakes or its tactics. Unless a force has actually exercised combined arms warfare, it will face issues, regardless of nationality.

Tom

selil
08-29-2008, 04:50 PM
Okay, can you guys help me out on this?

(Places tin-hat on head)


So how long have you been an Air Force Officer? :p

I'm going to think about your points even if you did use "it is academic" as a pejorative phrase and I feel really sad and lonely now.

Points we agree on: I do think that the commanders intent document used cherry picked examples to make a point rather than frame the discussion. Good politics, and bad science/research. I do think that EBO has a place but I am unsure of that place and as I have dug in to the literature it becomes fuzzier. I do agree and support that saying the fog of war can not be pierced is woefully ignorant. The fog of war is a sliding window of commanders intentions and understanding that moves with technologies and techniques, always getting better at seeing further and understanding more, and always revealing that much more that needs to be included (think long tail, skewed curve).

Points you would have to express to convince me: This is commanders intent and direction of action. It does make a case that the terms and techniques are implicitly not meeting the needs perceived. That is a non-negotiable statement. Either the tools intended for a commander work or they do not. There is an entire thread next door talking about technology not meeting the users needs and how difficult it is to get people to pay attention to that issue. Here a commander is talking about a perceptual and cognitive tool that does not in his opinion meet the needs of the "SERVICES" and apparently one service disagrees. There is a user assessment mistake made in technology called "silos of decision" where only one stake holder is involved in a community used product design. The technology be it software or hardware fails miserably when extended to the larger population. A cognitive and planning tool for joint operations (and from what I can tell all military operations are joint) needs to be useable by all.

I like the idea of knowing the primary through tertiary effects of munitions. The various laws of war would seem to dictate considerations of proportionality and casualties be part of the planning and operational strategies. What I see looking through the dozen papers (and likely maybe not the right papers) is a buzz word laden, tumultuous process, filled with gross expectations, and wildly absurd claims.

Though I likely have no credibility to you or many, after having read the dozen or so AF Journal papers, I don't believe I could adequately explain the process. If a person of moderate to minimal intelligence with a sincere desire to understand something can not become conversant in that topic then the topic is horribly flawed or the community understanding of the topic is horribly misunderstood. This is especially true of something that must be used in an environment of limited intellectual real estate, faced with mortal events, and compressed by time and the efforts of various forms of combat and conflict.

One of my favorite authors Thomas Kuhn tells us that for ideas and concepts to have relevancy in explaining "things" they must be easily generalized and useable across the broadest spectrum. I am not sure that EBO has been rendered and explained into that state.

Bill Moore
08-29-2008, 05:51 PM
All quotes are from the InsideDefense article, and much thanks to InsideDefense for allowing SWJ to post the entire article. There is no doubt that this article will serve as a catalyst to drive a serious debate over EBO's future, assuming it has one.


Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets.

Yes and no, it probably was a revolution for the Air Force based on their their technology evolving to the point to enable precision targeting. For example, in previous wars the Army Air Corp and Air Force would bomb miles of rail to interdict rail traffic, but now with more accurate weapon systems they can put steel on point X and achieve the same objective. Our technology and knowledge of closed systems like an electric power system allow to turn the lights off in any city with a few well placed strikes, and we can shut it down for hours or months. However, the following addresses this isn't EBO, as a matter of fact we always did this when we had the capability. For example, the French underground during WWII used the CARVER method of analysis to determine which pinpoint targets to hit to achieve their objectives.


But Ellsworth also says the memo’s references to EBO’s utility for targeting against well-defined, “closed systems” like power grids, roads and railways should spark concern because this is not what the effects-based vision was about. Mattis himself concedes this in the memo when describing the many elements of the concept he deems worth salvaging, Ellsworth asserts.
“At its core, the promise of effects-based thinking is precisely the ‘hard stuff’ of complex adaptive systems against which it has not performed well,” the professor says.

I think we can agree that precision targeting closed systems is not EBO, it is not new, and in some cases it has value. If not, then please post a counter argument.

Mattis' primary point was that EBO was a,
wasted intellectual effort and the expenditure of literally tens of millions of tax dollars to develop and promulgate a ‘non-idea,’”. It diverted attention away from real operational problems that the U.S. military needed to resolve, insurgency being at the forefront.”

while I agree it was a non-idea, I was hopeful it was a method to implement an interagency process, but to date that doesn't seem to be the case, the follow argument supports GEN Mattis,


Army Maj. Gen. David Fastabend wrote that he went to Iraq in 2006 believing “EBO was merely useless, an attempt to build a doctrinal theology around the notion that actions have consequences.”

“But in its more radical interpretation,” Fastabend wrote, “EBO advocates a strict planning focus on outcomes isolated from actor or method, and this in turn leads to operational planning that rapidly devolves into a ridiculous essay, a listing of aspirations: ‘let us eliminate corruption, isolate the border, prevent sectarian tension.’ Such aspirations, with no consideration of who must do what by when are worse than useless; they are damaging because they conceal the need to make hard choices. Therefore, I now believe the EBO concept is not merely useless but actually damaging to our ability to plan realistically and conduct operations.”

Here is my take, I have not yet seen EBO applied effectively yet at the strategic, operational or tactical level. It leads to some pretty slides, but it doesn't lead to clear task/purpose type orders required to achieve desired effects. Is there merit at analyzing systems? Of course there is, but we have always done that during the targeting process. What I have seen is the attempt to describe everything as a system or network, then conduct nodal analysis and attempt to solve the problem with a nodal attack. This has failed miserbly in our recent COIN adventures, we only turned it around when we got away from the so called HVI hunt and focused on controlling terrain (the population in COIN).

Special Operations Forces also attempts to apply this approach to conventional warfighting to the point that general harassment operations in enemy territory are considered a waste of time by several leaders, because the only way to achieve an effect according to them is to hit a critical node that will have repurcussions throughout the system (the silver bullet approach). This completely disregards the years of experience that proves harassment operations may have a larger impact (effect) than pin point strikes on nodes. For example, we only need to look at the numerous harassment type operations conducted against us in Iraq and Afghanistan to see what a significant impact these types of attacks can have. If I can divert divisions and erode national will with a few hit and run attacks on low value targets I would call that an effect based operational strategy without nodes. The current EBO construct prevents that type of thinking.

The surge operations had a huge effect, but it wasn't based on attacking nodes. How do you actually fit "effective" strategy into the EBO process?

It is hard to make an counter argument without sounding like you are completely against the subject you are criticizing. I'm not completely anti-EBO, I think there are some parts of it that have merit, but GEN Mattis in my opinion is correct on his main points that EBO has evolved into a non-functional distraction.

The challenge for any of us at any level from strategic to tactical is to correctly identify and then frame the problem in a useful way that allows us to develop a "feasible" solution. Using numerous models and problem solving methodologies (not only MDMP) will only expand our capabilities to do so when time permits, but in the end that problem solving process for the military must result (I think) in clear task/purpose type orders. The current EBO process does not.

Ken White
08-29-2008, 07:46 PM
Okay, can you guys help me out on this?

(Places tin-hat on head)Sorry, all hat placement is an individual responsibility... ;)
...
2. The paper asserts that the nature of warfare is unknowable...that war is a chaotic and complex system, you can’t predict second or third order effects. Therefore war is impenetrable to scrutiny via scientific approach ergo EBO is fundamentally flawed. Now I can disagree with this, it’s a fallacy.Change it to the more correct "you can’t predict second or third order effects with any degree of certainty." While your rebuttal is superficially correct, it forgets two things; (1) the enemy is not as predictable as the weather, he's vastly more flexible; and (2) nothing we do as actors on the ground will have significant impact on the weather, yet if we err in war we can exacerbate the second and third order effects (see the Israeli - Hezbollah stupidity; Israeli tactical errors, not anything to do with EBO), change the enemy's actions and reactions, even change our own future actions -- or negate a past action. The same thing applies, in reverse to the enemy. Wx forecasting doesn't have to deal with that...

The only weather related thing in war, the fog of war, is not the problem -- OTOH, the friction inherent in war is a big problem.

Still:
...but what it means is that just because someone identifies a system as chaotic, doesn’t mean that one cannot (and shouldn’t attempt to) predict its behaviour to some degree.Agreed -- but one should be very aware of the limitations and tenuous results likely from that predictive effort. EBO, like other theories, has uses -- it is not the holy grail.
3. The paper identifies a number of operations that are examples of EBO in action and that these were failures. I find the association of these operations to EBO to be really tenuous. I don’t think that Gulf War 1 was EBO, nor Kosovo, nor Gulf War 2 “Shock and Awe” – but if they were, didn’t we win?Yes, we -- emphasize that, WE -- did and the real wins were by people on the ground not using EBO (and perhaps accruing more or less benefit from others use of EBO...).

CavGuy addressed the first and last but don't forget on Kosovo, the Serbs didn't start to back off until the KLA (the guys that sucked us into that stupidity with a con job in the first place) went in on the ground.

We won. Yep, we is a good word.
It would have been interesting to see how Hezbollah's strategy would have fared against a well-equipped, well trained, and well-organised armed-force - take your pick, US, UK, French, Russian, etc.The last isn't what you say, but it is big and does have a lot of stuff. I think they'd have been terribly embarrassed and only their disregard for own or civilian casualties would have saved them from a debacle. The first three probably just would have been embarrassed.

EBO can lead one to believe they've achieved something that they have not. Like any planning aid, the correct alternatives have to be selected. That's subject to human error. Anything that purports to be the answer to most problems is subject to misuse; the more such processes are depended upon, the more likely they are to fail.

slapout9
08-30-2008, 02:42 PM
Found this article that I have had for awhile and was going to post to my Targeting thread, but I will post it here. This comes from the Air Campaign Planning Process. step 1 Operational Environment Research.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/wolusky.html

Update I have emailed Dave the Country X study and Dave will put it up here as promised. But I would like everyone to pay attention to Ring 4 Population and double especially Ring 5 Leadership analysis it was far more extensive and detailed when it was just systems analysis as part of campaign planning as opposed to EBO which is why it should be changed back wards. RMA Reversal of Military Affairs as Bill Moore would say. Also Wilf used to say anything he read about EBO he used to scratch out EBO and see if it made any sense. Do the same thing for the country X study scratch out Air Force and just judge it as a systems analysis of a general Campaign plan.

davidbfpo
08-30-2008, 05:04 PM
Slap,

The Wolusky paper is a good read, on a quick first read, although it is focuses on the American experience and the use of air power.

My only quibble is with the description of 'Op Deliberate Force', the coercion of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzcogovina, after the Sarejovo market place attack. Yes, air power played an important part, but I recall that several writers, yes including General Richard Rose, have commented that the local military balance in Sarejevo was affected by the Anglo-Dutch-French artillery on Mount Igman (name of mtn not 100% sure of).

I lke the story of Mullah Omar escaping death, as a AGM was aimed at the front of the building he was in and he exited the rear door after impact.

davidbfpo

Ken White
08-30-2008, 05:29 PM
...I lke the story of Mullah Omar escaping death, as a AGM was aimed at the front of the building he was in and he exited the rear door after impact.

davidbfpomany times. IIRC, took too long to go all the way to CentCom to get a decision the guys on the ground should have made so he arrived at the house and entered before the Navy JAG Captain and Franks announced their flawed (IMO) decision. :(

That's one of the major EBO problems; it doesn't consider the second and third order effects of gross stupidity on our part...:rolleyes:

pvebber
08-31-2008, 03:52 AM
The debate over how effects should influence our thinking about warfare is fundamentally a philosophical (epistemology) one. Unfortunately some seeming semantic arguments over "effects-based thinking" vs "effects-based operations" belie a much more fundamental debate in philosophical world view. This is the same argument that is currently being debated in scientific circles. One characterization is the "physics-based" worldview vs the "biology-based" worldview.

What this boils down to is a disagreement over what is "knowable" and how we go about "knowing". Can we break everything into components (analyze) to understand how the world works, or must we also understand how some "wholes are greater than the sum of their parts" and conceptualize how things work together (synthesize).

This may seem a long way from warfighting effects - but TheLapsedPacifist dives in head first on the "physics-based" logical positivist side with the statement:

Chaotic and complex systems can be analyzed, their behavior can be predicted. This is a fact –...

Only if you are a logical positivist and its underlying assumptions of "knowability" are true. That indeed you can understand all you need to about how things work by breaking it apart to see how the pieces operate (analyze) and them just aggregate them back together.

Prediction requires an understanding of causes and effects. So this statement "is a fact" if and only if, one has the required understanding of the relationship between cause and effect. Logical positivism (and related empiricism) are based on a "glass is half full" assumption that we can only say what we know, and can't say what we can't know, (because we may discover new knowledge that allows to understand what we previously thought was unknowable).

The use of weather used as an example of predictability is also an example of what many who question the optimism of logical positivism point to as a counter-example. Yes we can predict the weather a few hours ahead for a given location well, and we can 'forecast' (ie set probabilities on a range of possible outcomes - different from prediction) a few days out. But what hope is there for predicting the weather in your backyard 1 million years from now? Those working on complex system theory and philosophy would say that predictability has a horizon and that there is a "predictability horizon" beyond which we can't know.


So how do we know where the "predictability horizon" is for say, a military campaign? We know we don't know, but don't know if it is even knowable - because to know it is to be able to predict up to it - and know somehow your prediction just past it is false.

If we believe that we can predict the "predictability horizon" for a complex system - or we don't believe that such a thing exists, then indeed, it would logically follow that Chaotic and complex systems can be analyzed and predicted. Theoretically it would be possible to predict the weather in my back yard 1 million years from now, you just lack data of sufficient granularity. Just like the EBO, ONA and SOSA advocates say about adversaries "as systems" - the only thing preventing accurate prediction is data.

What we are learning about complex systems appears to be challenging that worldview. The physics-based worldview says if you understand the fundamental building blocks of nature that you can aggregate them together, establish all the causal chains that define the effects they produce, you can understand nature. Deus ex machina. Even Einstein didn't think "god played dice with the universe" - yet the implications of quantum mechanics put a chink in the notion of a possibly unimaginably complicated, not by provably unknowable universe. But increasingly physicists are learning that there seem to be an infinite regression of "fundamental particles" - that exist in an infinitely regression of dimensions. The universe increasing appears "fractal" - some even say "holographic" in its construction. If there is no fundamental building block" how do you win the knowlede game by breaking it down (analyzing it) ad infinitum?

Like relativity came in to address where Newtonian, mechanistic physics failed, biology inspired conceptualizations of how the universe work are increasingly coalescing. Truly complex systems are indeed more than the sum of their parts, and the implication of that is that in truly complex systems may not be analyzable and may not be predictable.

TheLapsedPacifist writes:

2. The paper asserts that the nature of warfare is unknowable...that war is a chaotic and complex system, you can’t predict second or third order effects. Therefore war is impenetrable to scrutiny via scientific approach ergo EBO is fundamentally flawed. Now I can disagree with this, it’s a fallacy.

Not if the what we think we are learning about complex systems stands up to be true. There are deterministic complex systems that one can create that are unpredictable and unanalyzable (Cellular automata like Conway's Game of Life are a good simple example - there is no way to predict the future state of a system of Cellular automata except by "executing the ruleset" ie the rules constitute the simplest algorithm to find a future state - there is no simpler "model" that allows a short cut - the essence of a "predictive model". In other words "the earth itself is the only absolutely accurate map of our planet".

If we believe Godel's incompleteness theorem, the implications for more complex rulesets with indeterminism is more bleak. We can't say impossible, because we 'don't know what we don't know' so the debate moves out of the theoretical into the useful. As my sig line says "All models are wrong" - meaning no predictions are perfect - but some models - hence their predictions - are useful. SO how do we determine the usefulness of prediction?

Understanding they are all to some extent wrong is the first step. That means that we can never have accurate initial conditions, and ultimately will have "a predictability horizon" - which we will only have an educated guess at. Enter the pragmatists into the philosophy of science - that science is not about "truth" - which appears if not unachieavable - at best a long, long, long way off. In the mean time (or as a basic epistemological concept) lets not worry about truth in science, but usefullness.

As for second or third order effects, "predict" is a strong word, it would have been preferable for EBO to be less gung-ho about this and look to "identify" and "anticipate" second or third order effects and develop branches and serial to deal with them.

This gets to where proponents of EBO have been their own worst enemy. The notion that we can "know what the enemy is going to do before he does" and other claims of ONA in particular that are tantamount to precognition are such an intellectual reach that one wonders how they ever got into our concept documents. "Usefulness" would have been good enough, but in their zeal to carry the "Physics-based" worldview to its logical conclusion they seem to take the deus ex machina to extremes not seen since the days of "epicycles of celestial spheres". The problem is that in order to "deal with something" you have to know it is a possible outcome - a form at least forecasting, but one that requires identification of specific chains of events, and an implies reducibility of the causal network. More on that...

Wrap all this mumbo jumbo up and you have the school that The LapsedPacifist and many others ascribe to that the ideas of EBO, ONA and SOSA may be "data-challenged" but represent a goal to strive for that may have limited 'usefulness' today, but will become increasingly 'useful' as we understand it more completely and foomd ways to acquire the required data.

In the other corer you have Gen Mattis and the EBO critics who have an intuition that, at best, the day when we will have the required data (assuming the above school is correct in its assumptions) is so far off and the relative 'usefulness' so marginal that its a waste of time to pursue; at worst the degree of indeterminancy in the basic data, together with an indecipherable nexus of causes and effects in all but the most academic SOSA problems (like power grids and logistics chains) means that the promises of EBO, ONA, and SOSA are in the realm of "not knowable".

The "trajectory of knowledge" to my analysis is in favor of Gen Mattis and the skeptics. In the systems we are interested in, the complex causal networks are irreducible by analysis and thus the are not usefully predictable. TRADOCs recent booklet "Commander's appreciation and Campaign Design",

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf

mentioned in Gen Mattis memo, takes the term "wicked problems" from Barry Watts

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20080821.US_Combat_Training/R.20080821.US_Combat_Training.pdf

and discusses the implications of this on military planning. It discusses some of the fundamental distinction between cases where the engineering oriented notions of EBO, ONA, and SOSA work (simple but extremely complicated to those of limited - 'reducible' complexity) and cases where there are no "scientific solutions" (irreducible complexity) where operational art and it takes a design (some might argue a biologically inspired) plan of attack.

THe bottom line is - "effects-based thinking" from the design-based or biological worldview is likely "useful". Effects-based Operations, ONA and SOSA - derived from a physics-based engineering inspired wordview is at best far in our future, and at worst, not possible to make 'useful'.

William F. Owen
08-31-2008, 05:27 AM
To conclude that Israel’s EBO approach to the operation was one of the primarily reasons for their defeat is a fig-leaf to hid the fact that their land component had morphed into a counterinsurgency force, no longer capable of all-arms action. Hezbollah judged correctly that IDF would be forced to employ tactics that limited casualties, ie air-centric, and they develop a response to this.

Yes, the IDF had a multitude of problems, most associated with launching a war at less notice than the US Army had for Hurricane Katrina, but that does not let EBO off the hook.
The IDF brigade staffs certainly feel that EBO was responsible. Almost all unit commanders complained of not being given clear precise orders, and a ground manoeuvre operational concept was also lacking. This was caused by the General Staff buying into EBO.


It would have been interesting to see how Hezbollah's strategy would have fared against a well-equipped, well trained, and well-organised armed-force - take your pick, US, UK, French, Russian, etc.

I'd be interested to hear your thinking on this. How for example is a French all Arms Formation better organised than an IDF?
How are Russians better trained or equipped?
What UAV coverage can a UK Formation commander rely on, compared to an Israeli, and how many helicopters does he have available?

This may be of interest http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=55186&postcount=30

Bill Moore
08-31-2008, 09:13 AM
Slapout that was a good article, and for the most part good examples of effective uses of air power. However, I didn't see any reference directly or indirectly to EBO, which is probably why it was good. :) The entire article was well worth the read, but I want to focus on objectives and endstates to further my argument against EBO (as practiced today).

LTC Wolusky, USAF writes:


Objective determination involves deciding what to accomplish in a campaign, thereby allowing one to focus on the desired end state. A good air campaign objective is clear, concise, attainable, measurable, and directly supportive of the JFC’s and president’s national security goals.

later in the article he uses our Operation in Somalia as an example,


The UN’s desired end state called for creating “an environment in which the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations can assume full responsibility for the security and operation of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts.” Under this vague guidance for the political objectives, Maj Gen Steven L. Arnold, military commander of Army forces in Somalia, could neither develop discrete military objectives nor a clear exit strategy other than “to be able to eventually leave.”

Shifting directions from policy makers and a fatal deficiency of tenable objectives forced the military to improvise from day to day and just “muddle through.

In a different article, MG Fastabend made a similiar argument when he wrote,


EBO advocates a strict planning focus on outcomes isolated from actor or method, and this in turn leads to operational planning that rapidly devolves into a ridiculous essay, a listing of aspirations: ‘let us eliminate corruption, isolate the border, prevent sectarian tension.’ Such aspirations, with no consideration of who must do what by when are worse than useless; they are damaging because they conceal the need to make hard choices.

My stance is that effects based thinking has some utility, but the effects based operations process is critically flawed exactly because it does lead to these vague ideas. Do we really have to eliminate corruption and isolate borders to achieve our military objective? If that is the case our country would have fallen years ago. Those are nice long term goals, but not for our military. What is our task and purpose? What does winning look like? What do we need to do to get there? The EBO process doesn't get us there at the operational and tactical level. I'm not yet convinced it gets us there at the strategic level.

LTC Wolusky, USAF adds, the
Chechnya occupation, and Vietnam War are all examples of military operations without workable end states. Every party to a conflict has its own desired end state, but unless it is achievable, protracted and interminable warfare results.

GEN Mattis's memo may have been harsh, and may result in temporarily throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but at the same time we urgently need clear and useful guidance today if we're going to make progress in Afghanistan. The academics can resurface the son of EBO later, right now we need a functional warfighting doctrine.

reed11b
08-31-2008, 09:30 AM
I am always dubious of using Somalia as an example. Somalia was the first and AFAIK the only time that a president has pulled troops from a mission while there was still signifigant public support for the operation. I feel that failure of Somalia falls directly into the lap of Mr. Clinton and nowhere else. I do not feel the "mission" was impossible, or counter to our security needs (today Somalia is a hotbed for Islamic radicalism). IMNSHO We should have stayed on mission.
Reed

slapout9
08-31-2008, 04:11 PM
[QUOTE]=Bill Moore;55689]Slapout that was a good article, and for the most part good examples of effective uses of air power. However, I didn't see any reference directly or indirectly to EBO, which is probably why it was good. :) The entire article was well worth the read, but I want to focus on objectives and endstates to further my argument against EBO (as practiced today). [QUOTE]

Hi Bill, that is a big reason why I posted it, also because it ties in with an earlier criticism on this thread of 5 rings analysis where I pointed out in campaign design the 5 rings analysis would take place in step 3 of the air campaign planning process behind Operational Environmental Research and Objective determination. It was pre EBO but still Systems Analysis based.

Solving a crime is recreating the past. To do that you must find and understand the history that led up to the crime or predicament.

EBO has become a mental crime:eek: it claims to have a process of knowing something that can not be known. pvebber's post explains this in a most eloquent fashion. EBO has become a WMD attack (Words of Mass Disruption) and to fix it as Mattis is trying to do he wants to conduct an RMA (Bill I think you invented this) Regression in Military Affairs or a Forensic Analysis to find out what went wrong and fix it.

Analyzing and understanding situations as systems is sound....predicting the future is not. What you can do is project forward in time an estimate of the situation and plan for various contingencies. Systems thinking and analysis will certainly help you do it because it is fractal, a pattern the repeats itself at all levels and situations, thus giving you a common or joint planning template for both miliary/govenment and non-government agencies, in both conflict and non-conflict environments.

Ken White
08-31-2008, 04:43 PM
It can fall off the steps unless pointed precisely... :wry:
Solving a crime is recreating the past. To do that you must find and understand the history that led up to the crime or predicament.I'd say that was arguable, partly in view of the many crimes that are solved by confessions, tips and being caught in the act or with the goods... ;)

Regardless and accepting your statement as correct, that gets us only to the present. As you further say, it doesn't predict the future. The problem is that some adherents will attempt to use EBO to do just that as you sort of point out here:
Analyzing and understanding situations as systems is sound....predicting the future is not. What you can do is project forward in time an estimate of the situation and plan for various contingencies. Systems thinking and analysis will certainly help you do it because it is fractal, a pattern the repeats itself at all levels and situations, thus giving you a common or joint planning template for both miliary/govenment and non-government agencies, in both conflict and non-conflict environments. (emphasis added / kw)I can agree with that last sentence -- however, only with respect to a non-conflict environment (if I correctly understand how you're using that phrase). Given conflict; i.e. an armed confrontation, you're faced with multiple variables dependent upon the terrain (human and otherwise) -- all the METT-TC factors -- and your and the opponents moves which can both range from stupid to brilliant and thus favorably or unfavorably affect each other and thus modify outcomes in unpredictable ways.

Systems thinking has a place, even in combat -- but its use must be very carefully watched lest the systems lovers get carried away and foresee things that won't occur or fail to react to those that do due to linear thinking and target fixation. On balance, EBO offers more potential for harm in ground combat than it offers benefits. Painstaking police work has solved a lot of crimes, it's also failed to solve many. Conversely, intuitive cops have some successes -- experienced and intuitive combat commanders have even more...

Bill Moore
08-31-2008, 05:01 PM
posted by Reed11B,
Somalia was the first and AFAIK the only time that a president has pulled troops from a mission while there was still signifigant public support for the operation. I feel that failure of Somalia falls directly into the lap of Mr. Clinton and nowhere else. I do not feel the "mission" was impossible, or counter to our security needs (today Somalia is a hotbed for Islamic radicalism).

Reed, we agree wholeheartedly on this one, but I believe you took the example out of context. Somalia indicated the need for a clear objective and end state, which was notably absent. If the military had a clear obtainable objective they could have achieved it. One can make argument that Clinton's weak kneed withdrawal from Somalia shaped OBL's perception of America being weak, which was further reinforced by a lame response to the Kenya and Tansania Embassy bombings, which led to 9/11, etc. No need to respond, I don't want to derail this thread, but I didn't want to leave that out there hanging.

Entropy
09-02-2008, 02:29 PM
This discussion finally prompted me to read a bit more on EBO. Even though I'm in the AF, I had ignored EBO for the most part. So here's my take:

First, EBO sounds very familiar to me. In my early career in the Navy, I used to do a lot of analysis and support to targeting against integrated air defense systems (IADS). The analytical techniques and targetting decisions against an IADS look remarkably similar to EBO as a general concept. I'm speculating here because the research I've done is limited, but it appears to me EBO is based, at least in part, on the same sorts of analytical and targeting techniques we use(d) against IADS and other systems.

There are many things the Air Force and Navy are good at, but one in particular is taking down an enemy's air defense system. So, ISTM that some in the AF who are EBO proponents have taken a methodology that's been very successful in one area and attempted to apply it as a "Grand Unified Theory" (GUT) for targeting and operations in general. I think it's only natural for people who've used a successful tool to advocate its use in other areas. Some have suggested that EBO is simply an attempt by the AF to dominate the other services or to justify itself or its programs. While there may be a small bit of truth to that in some specific cases with some specific individuals, I think for the most part EBO advocates honestly believe in it as an effective approach. Regardless, I think there is quite enough material to make a case against EBO without resorting to speculation about a proponent's motivations.

That said, I don't have any issues with taking a successful model and attempting to apply it elsewhere, but in this case I think EBO proponents have gone a bit overboard and have failed to consider the very important differences across the spectrum of military operations - differences that make it unlikely any analytical/planning tool can or will be a GUT, including EBO.

I see two principle problems with EBO as a GUT for analysis/planning. To begin with, the factors that make EBO-like planning a great success for things like IADS are not simply present in other areas. IMO EBO will work well in technical areas - by technical, I mean those areas of warfare where technical limitations are a primary factor constraining an opponent's options. Using an IADS as an example again, the capability of any IADS is limited by technical factors that are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to overcome no matter how skilled its operators are. (For instance, Iraq in the 1990's poured billions into special projects, many of which were designed to modify Iraq's existing air defense equipment to make it more effective against coalition aircraft. Of course none of those efforts even marginally improved Iraqi capabilities - you simply can't take an SA-2 and give it the capabilities of an SA-10. It was lucky for us Iraq wasted so much money on those efforts instead of improving other capabilities.) The US intelligence community is very very good at discovering those technical limitations. So in the case of an IADS, a planner will have a pretty good understanding of the upper limit of an adversary's capability even if we know nothing about their training, doctrine or even the number of systems an opponent may posses, which is never the case. This factor lends itself to EBO planning for reasons others have already discussed.

By contrast there are many areas of conflict where technology is not a significant limiting factor. A group of motivated individuals with ubiquitous technology (guns, explosives, cell-phones, etc.) simply have a lot more options available and are limited more by the operating environment and human factors than technology. And I think that the human factors are really the Achilles heel of EBO as a universal planning tool for a number of reasons, many of which others have already discussed.

The second problem I see with EBO stems from my experience with analytical methodologies in intelligence. There are literally dozens and dozens of different methodologies, several of which are purported to be universally applicable to any intelligence problem. The reality, however, is that while analytical techniques are helpful, they cannot substitute for a lack of information or data, nor the most powerful analytical tool there is - the human mind. Analytical techniques are useful for exposing bias, they can reveal roadsigns that point toward unconsidered possibilities and they can serve to check assumptions. IMO that is pretty much the limit of what any analysis technique can do and in my mind that applies to EBO or any other "universal" planning tool. So when some "new" technique comes along that promises to be the GUT for intelligence, then I am there raising the BS flag because I don't believe that at GUT is possible in the first place.

With EBO, or really any analysis/planning methodology, I believe the same is true. EBO certainly has utility in certain instances and it may be useful in others if applied and tested and validated, but for the reasons stated above, it is not a GUT and should not be treated as such.

wm
09-02-2008, 03:46 PM
[S]ome in the AF who are EBO proponents have taken a methodology that's been very successful in one area and attempted to apply it as a "Grand Unified Theory" (GUT) for targeting and operations in general. I think it's only natural for people who've used a successful tool to advocate its use in other areas.
The above is an extremely astute observation, IMO. OODA is another example of trying to find a "one-size fits all" silver bullet. And, in order not to be accused of AF-bashing, I think that MDMP and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IBP) also have fallen into that category. None of them need to have become such, except for the human tendency to over-generalize and -simplify, which leads to falsification and misapplication.

My personal take, as I have suggested in many other posts, is that developing solutions requires that one first assess things in terms of METT-TC and then plot a course of action based on that assessment. Since some (or all) of the components of METT-TC are likely to be different in every new operation, some intuitiveness needs to be applied. I think USMA had it right when they named their 2 semester survey course "History of the Military ART" (caps intentional) . By seeing how others have practiced the Art in various situations, we may be able to hone our intuitions about what might be the best way to proceed when thrust into a new situation. If nothing else, this study may refine our sense of the kinds of things that need to be considered before acting. I suspect that, with practice, this "sorting and evaluating" process may happen so fast that it appears to be an unthinking/intuitive response to a situation.

Bill Moore
09-03-2008, 05:29 AM
Posted by wm,

I think that MDMP and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IBP) also have fallen into that category. None of them need to have become such, except for the human tendency to over-generalize and -simplify, which leads to falsification and misapplication.

Agreed, but failure to simplify very complex situations into a comprehenable modelor models may result in operational paralysis due to the complexity of the problem. The goal of MDMP, OODA, EBO, etc. is to make a complex problem understandable (hopefully a correct understanding), enabling a commander to act. Unfortunately, these models frequently provide the wrong answer, so you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. Is the model broke or is the information fed into it wrong? We may never know, but I think we should use multiple models when time permits to provide a broader context to inform our intuition.

wm
09-03-2008, 12:38 PM
Agreed, but failure to simplify very complex situations into a comprehenable modelor models may result in operational paralysis due to the complexity of the problem. The goal of MDMP, OODA, EBO, etc. is to make a complex problem understandable (hopefully a correct understanding), enabling a commander to act. Unfortunately, these models frequently provide the wrong answer, so you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. Is the model broke or is the information fed into it wrong? We may never know, but I think we should use multiple models when time permits to provide a broader context to inform our intuition.

I suspect that many attempts to simplify will result in distortion. And distortion is a form of falsification. Being able to distill a complex problem into a series of sound bites may be great for after action reporting to the media, but I'm not sure that it helps in planning to execute a mission. I'm reminded of the final rehearsal scene around the model of the chateau in "The Dirty Dozen." Each step has a catch phrase--"8-Jimenez has a date"--that summarizes and sequences an extensive set of steps to complete a mission that has been rehearsed many times. This process is the capstone not the beginning of the activity to plan the mission. The 12 can execute from these catchphrases because, having learned the complete set of steps to take as part of their mission training effort, they "know" the whole story behind each of the short-hand phrases.

Having and employing more than one model for investigating options is ideal. I also seem to remember that part of at least the Army's planning process is to have 2 sets of planning going on simultaneously--1 by the CDR, 1 by the staff--which can serve as checks/devil's advocates for each other. The final plan, one would hope, represents a fusion of the best parts of these two efforts.

pvebber
09-03-2008, 03:41 PM
Agreed, but failure to simplify very complex situations into a comprehenable modelor models may result in operational paralysis due to the complexity of the problem.

The book "Simplexity" by Jeffery Kluger makes a valiant effort to frame the problem of getting to Einstein's "Everything should be amde as simple as possible, but no simpler". Whenever we model something we introduce abstractions that simplify, but must be careful that such do not produce a representation that diverges too much from the reality we are trying to understand.

Too often I've seen senior decision makers demand over-simplification, with the full knowledge that the answer they get will be wrong (to the point of not being useful) and have actually said essentially "It is better to have a wrong answer I can defend with some sort of analysis, than say I don't know, or waste time I don't have polishing a turd."

"Operational paralysis do to the complexity of a problem" is generally more about not wanting to accept a limit on what is "knowable" in the time available. When faced with a situation where complexity overwhlems us, we have two choices - "paralysis by analysis" or accepting we don't know something and planning to minimize the impact of that unknow on our plan.




The goal of MDMP, OODA, EBO, etc. is to make a complex problem understandable (hopefully a correct understanding), enabling a commander to act.

And this is where it has oversold itself. One of the significant "unintended consequences" of EBO-ism is to give commanders a false sense of the knowable, and a planning construct that assumes "Assuming an answer (that oh by the way is known to wrong) and forging ahead" is better than admitting an unknown. These assumptions by higher headquarters become "facts" down stream and before you know it, the "planning world" is in a major disconnect fromo reality.

Better in my opinion to plan to take maximum advantage of what you know, and try to minimize the impact of what you know you don't know. The unknown unknowns will be bad enough without adding assumptions that are taken as facts by lower echelons who will then be blindsided by their turning out to be untrue...


Unfortunately, these models frequently provide the wrong answer, so you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. Is the model broke or is the information fed into it wrong? We may never know, but I think we should use multiple models when time permits to provide a broader context to inform our intuition.

The goal of planning - whether 'effects-based' or not is NOT to "make a complex problem understandable", but to "understand what you know and don't know about a complex problem". You will never be able to "make complex problems understandable" by their very nature - the causal network in such cases is "irreducible" past a certain point. You have to judge how far you can use abstraction to reduce it, accept that you will not be able to accurately predict that point, and take steps to be prepared for the impact of bothe "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns".

Models always give "wrong answers" - the issue is when they give (or do not give) USEFUL answers. "Beleiving the pretty computer display" is one of the worst pathologies we have in our thinking. "Multiple models" may indeed help shed different lights on what we think we know, and what we are unsure of, but "adding more models" just "touches the elephant" some extra times, it will never "gives us the answer", or give us "the ironclad assurnace many decision-makers want, that they have made the correct decision.

This is where the framework in "Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design":

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf

really gets to the meat of what efects-based thinking can provide us, without the "reading our FITREPS and believing it" that occurs too often now...

Ski
09-04-2008, 11:27 AM
I agree with Bill Moore 100%.

As much I hate to admit it, the US Army works off simple processes and models. It has to for a number of reasons that can be expounded on later. The complexity of the MDMP, OODA, etc...makes them unwieldy to use in any situation outside of deliberative planning. Ask anyone who was a company commander in OIF or OEF if they used MDMP....almost all will say the same thing "We never had time, and were lucky to use TLP's."

The pace of modern operations, combined with the immense cloud of information that has resulted in the information revoulation and the natural micromanagement of commanders, has led to the destruction of most planning models from what I have seen. Perhaps they exist at higher levels, but I worked in the CJ3 at a 3 Star Command in Afghanistan, and we never used any sort of MDMP or deliberative planning process. Not enough time, not enough qualified people, too much desire for information "right now" or even "yesterday."

TheLapsedPacifist
09-11-2008, 01:12 AM
Pvebber,

I appreciate that your response (3rd Sept) is well researched, but I should like (if I may) to take issue with a few points.

I am not a positivist and I do not as a general rule subscribe to or spout forth "mumbo-jumbo". I do believe in using the broadest range of tools to crack a problem - which to me includes looking at the strengths and weakness of philosophical approaches be that positivist, post-positivist, or whatever and evaluating how they all might help. I am a scientist by trade, but mostly I find myself surrounded by colleagues who are only too aware of the limits of reductionist scientific thinking, but rather than choosing to abandon a problem because it is too difficult they seek to incorporate a broad range of thinking into their problem solving.

I am pointing out that the paper informs us that because war is chaotic complex it is unknowable. As I said this statement is wrong...some chaotic and complex systems can be predicted. You can argue the toss if you like, but it doesn't change the fact that the original paper does nothing to identify (or reference to some work that does) war as a class of chaotic and complex systems that are ultimately unpredictable. War MAY be unknowable, but it isn't being pedantic to argue that no one has even come close to proving this.

I think that if you believe that "The earth itself is the only absolutely accurate map of our planet" then you are obviously finding it difficult to rationalise what an atlas is: a simplified version of earth, lacking in all sorts of important details, which may allow us to get from A to B. We should not reduce arguments for or against "modeling" ad absurdum - this is not helpful. As you say, some models are useful, and so I say that the jury is still out on EBO and that the prosecution have made a poor case against the defendant (or perhaps Judge Mattis has decided on trial without jury?!)

EBO thinking, its fundaments, are to think before you act. EBO has been poorly represented in its US-implemented form and (typically in the USA inter-service melee) been over-sold in order to win funding. So my real fear here - and the inspiration for my original response - is that EBO-thinking will become an anathema in the US - any bright, forward-thinking soldier that has career aspirations will want nothing to do with it. I don't think that this what Mattis wants, but it might be what he gets.

Please, a point of clarification on wicked problems Rittel and Webber 1973 - not Watts 2008!
[http://www.uctc.net/mwebber/Rittel+Webber+Dilemmas+General_Theory_of_Planning. pdf]

Eden
09-11-2008, 01:07 PM
I am also a believer that effects-based thinking can be a valuable tool for planners. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense is not a community of thinkers/scientists, it is a bureaucracy. To implement change in a buraucracy, one must wield blunt instruments freely. This is why - I assume - GEN Mattis has used his sledgehammer to crack walnuts. Anything less simply wouldn't get the message across.

Those who are smart enough to use effects-based thinking without allowing it to undermine their analysis with false precision - a minority, unfortunately - are free to do so.

Ken White
09-11-2008, 07:59 PM
Mattis, as you said, is simply trying to prevent misapplication by those not in that minority you cite...

William F. Owen
09-12-2008, 04:29 AM
EBO may or may not be a good tool for planing. The problem is that EBO has not been advocated in a useful and responsible way. What is EBO anyway?

EBO constantly morphs in the shape criticism. It's a wooly imprecise thing, which is why it has persisted for far longer than it should. It's like fighting a cloud. It's "effect" has been confusion. No one seems prepared to defend one constant definition, as they were with Manoeuvre Warfare for example - of which it is a direct descendant.

Many of us were EBO sceptics long before Mattis, and don't need senior officers to share our opinions for validation, but he makes all good points. My guess is that he wants a return to a re-set point where there can be greater scrutiny of the ideas, before people who are not Marines, impose ideas upon them.

In the IDF EBO is dead and buried. As I have been told, missions statements will now use a very limited number of words, with precise and unambiguous meanings.(hold/block/search, etc.) Terrain objectives and timings will be given. It's a re-set to 1967.

Bill Moore
09-12-2008, 08:55 AM
am also a believer that effects-based thinking can be a valuable tool for planners. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense is not a community of thinkers/scientists, it is a bureaucracy. To implement change in a buraucracy, one must wield blunt instruments freely. This is why - I assume - GEN Mattis has used his sledgehammer to crack walnuts. Anything less simply wouldn't get the message across.

Those who are smart enough to use effects-based thinking without allowing it to undermine their analysis with false precision - a minority, unfortunately - are free to do so.

Eden, simply because some folks disagree with you doesn't make them stupid. I don't know what your level of military experience is, if any, but I have found the military to have numerous intelligent problem solvers, and many of them, if not most, tend to reject EBO for the reasons Mattis stated and others. The concept is painfully simple, unfortunately it is too simple to mesh with the reality of life.


EBO thinking, its fundaments, are to think before you act.

If this statement is true, and it isn't, what exactly is new? Military planners have always had to think before they act. All you need to do is review some historical case studies on WWI and WWII strategy, where what we now call PMESII systems of systems (political, military, economic, etc.) were considered in detail before acting.

Does EBO provide a helpful framework? The jury is still out, but I'm glad it is being pulled from doctrine until we determine how to best apply it (if there is a way). Does that mean folks won't experiment with it? Absolutely not, the Jennie is out of the bottle for better or worse.

As for your comment about the military being too bureaucratic to use EBO, I would counter that arugment with the "fact" that EBO has made us more bureaucratic with the constant demand for measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, we further strengthened upper level management to the point that EBO has become sufficating. I was a former EBO advocate, and I'm still in the 12 step rehab program. EBO is like beer, you can drink one or two and still function (you think you're functioning better and looking better), but once you drink three or more, you start getting a little stupid, and unfortunately we created staffs of EBO'holics.

wm
09-12-2008, 11:25 AM
I submit that EBO is what a junior accountant would come up with if asked to develop a system/methodology for planning high level strategic operations. The bad news is that the system does not seem to have any Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to back it up. If it does, then either the average practitioner has no clue what the GAAP is or the body of "rules" that make up the GAAP is so dynamic as to be nearly useless as foundational operating principles. (Calvin ball again rears its head.)

WARNING: Metaphor shift ahead

Based on the accounting/GAAP analogy, I agree with Bill Moore that General Mattis has taken action to switch a runaway train on to a siding before it causes a lot of damage to the rest of the line. If/when someone is able to figure out how to keep the locomotive's governor/speed regulator/brake system from malfunctioning (create/stabilize the GAAP of EBO), maybe the EBO train will be allowed back on the main line.
(Sorry for mixing metaphors :wry:)

Eden
09-12-2008, 12:39 PM
I don't know what your level of military experience is, if any, but I have found the military to have numerous intelligent problem solvers, and many of them, if not most, tend to reject EBO for the reasons Mattis stated and others.
As for your comment about the military being too bureaucratic to use EBO, I would counter that arugment with the "fact" that EBO has made us more bureaucratic with the constant demand for measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, we further strengthened upper level management to the point that EBO has become sufficating. I was a former EBO advocate, and I'm still in the 12 step rehab program. EBO is like beer, you can drink one or two and still function (you think you're functioning better and looking better), but once you drink three or more, you start getting a little stupid, and unfortunately we created staffs of EBO'holics.

Effects based planning or operations requires an encyclopedic grasp of the operating environment, the systems extant within that environment, and of human psychology as expressed individually and in crowds. It also requires a pretty sensitive BS detector. This is why, despite being a 'simple' concept, it doesn't work.

I spent two years as Chief, Current Plans at a NATO Corps HQ which then went for a year in Afghanistan. EBO (or in Eurospeak, EBAO) was the mechanism by which that headquarters tried to make its plans. I struggled to work with it and through it, and to explain the concept to furrow-browed senior leaders.

I stand by my statement that only a minority of military planners and staff are capable of using effects-based thinking effectively - that is, in a way that can actually produce relevent, practical, well-crafted plans. I base that on three years experience at the corps/theater planning level. It's not that we were stupid - we were all, as you say, intelligent problem solvers. We simply didn't have the background, time, or opportunity to do the deep research needed. And, yes, some of us didn't have the philosophical bent required to avoid EBO's pitfalls.

By the way, I completely agree that EBO made the headquarters more bureaucratic. It's another reason to abandon it as an organizing theme: it feeds our predilection for chartology and brute-force analysis. MOE, MOP, second-and-third order effect matrices, sub-effects, sub-sub-effects, action/effect links, undesired effects charts, etc. Worse than IPB.

slapout9
09-13-2008, 12:03 PM
Found this article on EBO and EBS (Effectsbased Strategy) written by an Australian. It includes a definition of EBO, one of the most complete I have seen.....but the same definition shows how incredibly complex any type of EBO would become.:eek:

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/lazarus.html

pvebber
09-15-2008, 04:09 AM
I am not a positivist and I do not as a general rule subscribe to or spout forth "mumbo-jumbo". (snip valuable amplifying discussion)

My apologies for being unclear as to who I was directing the "mumbo-jumbo" at - it was intended at the writers of the more forward leaning EBO writers - I was not characterizing your post in that manner.

In general, as I understand it, the philosophical bent that it must be proven that something is opaque to science is a positivist one. Your criticism that "...the fact that the original paper does nothing to identify (or reference to some work that does) war as a class of chaotic and complex systems that are ultimately unpredictable. War MAY be unknowable, but it isn't being pedantic to argue that no one has even come close to proving this." appears an example. The statement "war is unpredictable" can only be falsified by demonstrating that is predicable. This leads to a number of logical problems. Working from the statement "war is predictable" is logically preferable from the standpoint of falsification. The point is not to establish a connection to positivism or not, but to promote an appeal to demonstrate what CAN be done, not what can't - which leads to the fallacy of negative proof.



I am pointing out that the paper informs us that because war is chaotic complex it is unknowable. As I said this statement is wrong...some chaotic and complex systems can be predicted.

To argue that the statement "because war is chaotic and complex it is unknowable is wrong" because there are examples of other chaotic and complex systems that have useful predictability horizons is to ascribe characteristics of a subset of "chaotic and complex systems" to ALL of them. Yes there are examples of chaotic and complex systems that are to some extent predictable, but there are also examples that are not (a Conway's game of life matrix, or a Lorentz waterwheel, or the outcome of a sporting game for that manner) using the same logic I can declare that war is unpredictable.

I prefer to err on the side of assuming that war is unpredictable until it is demonstrated otherwise. Which EBO as yet to come anywhere near doing.

That is not to say that "effects-based thinking" (of the sort espoused in "Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design") can't be useful. I just believe that a technique needs to PROVE ITS USEFULNESS not be accepted until proven false.



I think that if you believe that "The earth itself is the only absolutely accurate map of our planet" then you are obviously finding it difficult to rationalise what an atlas is: a simplified version of earth, lacking in all sorts of important details, which may allow us to get from A to B.

That an atlas can get us from A to B lacking all sorts of important details obviously means it is not "an absolutely accurate map of our planet". Getting from A to B is not an example of a complex problem. To the extent that solving a problem requires an arbitrarily accurate representation of the earth's surface, an atlas is not useful. If these characteristics are initial conditions to a typical complex problem, then the "predictability horizon" will be dependent on how accurate they are. The example was not to suggest an "absolutely accurate map" is required for all problems, but that those that are complex require arbitrarily accurate initial conditions (and relational functions) to achieve an arbitrary predictability horizon. And we don't know the relationship between the two...

That does not bode well for useful predictability from an Atlas.


As you say, some models are useful, and so I say that the jury is still out on EBO and that the prosecution have made a poor case against the defendant

This is where we fundamentally disagree - experimentation must be performed that attempts to falsify the statement "EBO is useful" not "prove it" or falsify the statement "EBO is NOT useful. Unlike a trial where a defendant is assumed innocent until proven guilty, science assumes skepticism and looks to falsify positive statements (assuming you accept Popper's criticism of positivism's demand of verificationism). Having been involved in a lot of the experimentation surrounding EBO, I have to say that Gen Mattis is looking at the results of SEVERAL "trials" and the defendant has yet to definitively prove its usefulness, and the biggest problems have revolved around the notions of "predictability" that it has increasingly espoused.


EBO thinking, its fundaments, are to think before you act. EBO has been poorly represented in its US-implemented form and (typically in the USA inter-service melee) been over-sold in order to win funding. So my real fear here - and the inspiration for my original response - is that EBO-thinking will become an anathema in the US - any bright, forward-thinking soldier that has career aspirations will want nothing to do with it.

"EBO thinking" confuses the things I had tried to seperate in my initial discussion - the framework of "Effects-based thinking" - which I would characterize not as simply "think before you act" - but "consider carefully the results of your actions - in as complete a context as you can - before acting." And that is something that successful commanders have always done - just to a lesser or greater extent intuitively, rather than by design and education.

EBO has collected a cart-load of baggage that has reduced its usefulness. This baggage needs to be stripped away and the concept "returned to its roots" in order for it to become the useful tool I believe it can ultimately become. Part of that baggage in my mind has to do with the manner in which it was connected with "chaotic and complex systems" that were bad science, bad logic, and misunderstood much of what complexity science teaches us. Mostly that we have become expert at reductionist analysis taking things apart to understand them - but that is only half the toolset - we need to get as expert as holistic synthesis - understanding why things become "more than the sum of their parts".

We are in violent agreement that throwing the baby out with the bathwater would be a tragic mistake.

SWJED
11-22-2008, 01:23 AM
Colonel David Gurney (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/bio/gurney_biov5.pdf) (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_JFQ_List.htm) and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/assessment-of-effects-based-op/) by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.


Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqvanriper.pdf).


We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis’ actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general’s action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military’s decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.

U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqcarpenterandrews.pdf)


The USJFCOM directive to “turn off” EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that “the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war.”

We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

The current issue of the U.S. Army War College’s Parameters (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/) also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08autumn/mattis.htm) with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08autumn/ruby.htm).


Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis’s memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command’s vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis’s decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

William F. Owen
11-22-2008, 08:52 AM
As Van Riper says, there was no baby!

EBO is shape shifter concept that always stays just out of reach, and alters in the face of criticism. Success are, in hindsight, chalked up to EBO, and failures were "poorly done" EBO.

EBO endures because it's many and varying definitions are so general and so non-specific, that anything good can be attributed to it, and anything bad can be denied as being part of it. It abuses history in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare, and 4GW do.

That to me, indicates that it's real utility is to promote agendas, secure budgets and make reputations. It's no good for the practitioner.

Ken White
11-22-2008, 02:08 PM
as the kid...

Sayeth Defenders:
We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force.Neither of which accomplished much until folks went in on the ground thus 'success' is a highly relative term...
The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.Heh. Good luck with that search.
Practically made for mission-type orders, EBO is not locked to any specific level of conflict and may be used by commanders at any level . . . Mission-type orders are essentially an application of EBO at the tactical level.This from the service that demands control off all air assets in theater and issues Air Tasking Orders. Sorry, their statements are beyond counter intuitive.
... the revisionist “slap” at the value of precision aerial attack is oddly out of place . . . If “precision fires alone” are judged by USJFCOM to have been “ineffective” in 1991, 1999, and 2003, we must wonder what standard is used to make this provocative judgment.Nothing revisionist about it; even the USAF has acknowledged many times that air effort alone is not enough and USAF bombing campaign assessments have found shortfalls.

I suspect the standard for the judgments revolves around the fact that troops moving into Kuwait in 1991 found most of Saddam's men and equipment demoralized but still largely intact and functional; Post war assessments in Kosovo showed the USAF and its coalition partners had bombed a large number of decoys and missed a large number of real vehicles plus little changed until the KLA went in on the ground...

The effort in 2003 combined the flaws of both earlier wars -- and compounded the failure to deliver by being called "Shock and Awe." Embarrassing.

I'll also echo what Wilf said...

reed11b
11-22-2008, 09:58 PM
As Van Riper says, there was no baby!

EBO is shape shifter concept that always stays just out of reach, and alters in the face of criticism. Success are, in hindsight, chalked up to EBO, and failures were "poorly done" EBO.

EBO endures because it's many and varying definitions are so general and so non-specific, that anything good can be attributed to it, and anything bad can be denied as being part of it. It abuses history in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare, and 4GW do.

That to me, indicates that it's real utility is to promote agendas, secure budgets and make reputations. It's no good for the practitioner.
Amen to that. I'll further that by saying that nearly all strategic planning outside the tactical realm equals philosophy and is every bit as improvable and untestable as philosophy in any other realm is. If it had merit, it could be tested and it can not. It can't even use the standby of previous "strategic" constructs like maneuver warfare and use historic patterns.
Reed

Bill Moore
11-23-2008, 02:04 AM
The key is to not abandon the EBO concept. The key is to ensure that effects-based operations are properly planned and executed and that the effects are measured within the decision cycle of current operations.

What the heck does this mean? Comments like this support GEN Mattis's claim that EBO is too vague and complex to be of value, or as Owen wrote above, EBO tends to alter in concept everytime it is challenged in order to remain unassailable, so its supporters can contiinue to operate under the pretense of scientific method.


When Generals Casey, Abizaid, and Pace were asked by the White House in 2006 about the prospects for a “surge,” none believed it would work. Their core belief was that there were already too many soldiers on the ground in Baghdad and that to add more would only add to the number of deaths.12 The commander’s intuition that General Mattis says we need to rely on resulted in a strategy based on killing as many insurgents as possible rather than providing security for the Iraqi people. If not for America’s civilian leadership pushing the military, then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) would either still be playing “whack-a-mole” or possibly even failing by now. All because there was no understanding of what the desired strategic effects in Iraq were or how to design a campaign that would permit the parties to plan backward in an effort to achieve them.

Here I can agree with the author about the failure of intuition, but I suspect strongly he is wrong in his attempt to associate the surge with EBO. Securing the populace has been a principle of counterinsurgency for several decades, so how can he claim it was the result of an insight derived from using the EBO conceptual approach? All he demonstrated was that a Commander's intuition can be incorrect. That isn't exactly a novel idea.

His argument also collapses when it is examined closer, because the failed "whack-a-mole" approach he is talking about, was a result of the EBO process. EBO advocates attempted to frame the enemy problem as a system with key nodes (HVIs) that should be targeted, which in turn will supposedly collapse the system . This proved to be a bunch of rubish..


The elimination of EBO, SoSA, etc., would be a definitive step backward for America’s military and its move away from mass to technological and qualitative superiority.

Why is it a move away? The services were doing effective targeting prior to Desert Storm. The OSS taught the French Underground how to target using the acronym CARVER (english, CRAVER in French), which was nodal analysis of rail systems, electric power, and other simple systems that were easily analyzed using a scientific method. It isn't new, the only thing new is the failed attempt to attempt to transfer this method to complex adaptive systems that are unpredictable. When we can accomplish the mission with a surgical strike we will, when we can't we will use a more holistic approach.

Additionally, the author's statement the paragraph prior to this one where he claims EBO supported the surge. Which one is it? The reality is it was EBO and SoSA like thinking that led to the failed strategy during the initial phases of the OIF COIN fight (the whack-a-mole phase). It just so happens that sometimes more boots on the ground is the most efficient method, because it may smoother the fire before it explodes. I took EBO classes and the process did not facilitate that type of thinking and complexity, instead it guides you down the path of system and nodal analysis (if you tickle node Y you get result X), and any attempt to claim otherwise is an attempt to twist EBO into something it is not. If there was a baby in the bathwater, then the baby was this works for simple systems (railroads, electric power, factories, etc.), but again not for more complex problems.


The EBO concept was developed to prevent misanalyzing and attacking centers of gravity that do not lead to the attainment of objectives. The US military cannot continue to analyze the enemy with the same shortsighted and unimaginative results when “popular support for the insurgency” or “the enemy population” are his centers of gravity.

Sticking with the author's example, I don't see how he can defend it using EBO. If I'm not mistaken, most of the civilian casualties (due to coalition forces) in Afghanistan are due to NATO air strikes. I'm not blaming air power for this, because most bombs are not dropped without permission of the ground commander, but my point is qualitative technological superority isn't always the best answer. War is nasty, tough, hard and unpredictable, so mistakes will always be made by all participants. If the author's argument is we should do a better job of planning, he is right. If his argument is that EBO is the key to doing so, then I remain skeptical.

There are no easy answers, and the continued search for nodes that we can surgically target with our advanced technology to disrupt enemy so-called systems will simply continue to provide the illusion of progress. We have been doing this in Afghanistan and situation continues to deteriorate. This isn't because we're not using EBO, rather it is because we are using some EBO like methods. The reality is that to actually defeat the enemy you still have to wage a war of attrition to push the enemy and populace to the tipping point. This involves taking and holding terrain (human terrain is part of that equation), and it involves killing/capturing or turning the combatants (not just the leadership). EBO does not facilitate the development of campaign plans and holistic objectives, it is a simple targeting tool that has been taken way out of context. EBO, whether by design or default, attempts to frame complex problems into systems, subsystems, and nodes that can be effectively targeted and predictably influenced, which has proven to be false time and time again.


The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.

As Ken stated, "good luck with this one". Please tell me where we had long term success usng the military to change a foreign culture's behavior? If this is what EBO advocates are defining as mission success (a military objective), then we should pack our bags and go home now. How can be so blind as not to see this as an offensive operation that will offend those we are allegedly attempting to help? Are we now Conquestor missionaries?

EBO thinking has been used for years on the war on drugs with less than desirable "effects". We can't even change the behavior of criminals and the market for illegal drugs, yet we're (the military) going to change cultures that have been in existance for hundreds of years?

The Operational Design Doctrine (draft) that the author attacks as simple minded thinking, is actually a much better attempt to provide a framework to address complex problems.

Surferbeetle
11-27-2008, 07:59 AM
Judgment, experience, and capability allow operators to effectively use tools. An Artisan and an Amateur who use the same tool set will nonetheless most certainly produce different outcomes.

Commanders must understand the Principles of War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principles_of_War) and have appropriate judgment, experience, and capability in order to successfully apply management tools. Effects Based Operations Methods are sets of management tools, which enable a Commander bring to bear the predictive power of systems analysis and applied mathematics to the chaos of warfare.

Since EBO Methods are no longer approved, one could search for case studies which demonstrate the cost/benefits of using non-EBO systems analysis and applied mathematics techniques to analyze chaotic situations which are similar to our situation.

Operations Research Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_research) is a field, which affords many of its practioner’s a wage (http://stats.bls.gov/oco/ocos044.htm) above that of the US median wage.


Median annual earnings of operations research analysts were $64,650 in May 2006. The middle 50 percent earned between $48,820 and $85,760. The lowest 10 percent had earnings of less than $38,760, while the highest 10 percent earned more than $108,290. Median annual earnings of operations research analysts working in management, scientific, and technical consulting services were $69,870.


“Operations research” and “management science” are terms that are used interchangeably to describe the discipline of using advanced analytical techniques to make better decisions and to solve problems. The procedures of operations research were first formalized by the military. They have been used in wartime to effectively deploy radar, search for enemy submarines, and get supplies to where they are most needed. In peacetime and in private enterprises, operations research is used in planning business ventures and analyzing options by using statistical analysis, data and computer modeling, linear programming, and other mathematical techniques.

OR case study which includes small firms. (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0612308)

How Operations Research Drives Success at P&G (http://www.bnet.com/2403-13241_23-188137.html) (Large firm case study)

Can we or should we train our staffs on the use of new (to many of us anyway) management tools in order to support our Commanders? Let us consider (http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228) what the deep thinkers are saying.


"As Schlesinger said, we must again embrace eggheads and ideas – and the Minerva Consortia can move us in that direction."

Bill Moore
11-27-2008, 08:48 AM
Surferbettle I applaude your continuing attempts to integrate science and its ever emerging theories into our planning and operational processes, but I still argue we already used the scientific approach prior to EBO when and where it was applicable. Obviously some were better than others, and I suspect there was a lot of unnecessary wasted effort in previous conflicts, but I don't think EBO is the silver bullet that will address those shortfalls. Of course many shortfalls were only visible in hindsight, and we should keep that in mind. The EBO approach works (as did previous targeting methodologies) when it is applied to relatively simple systems that are predictable, but it is an educated guess at best when it is applied to complex adaptive systems; therefore, it is not a scientific method. I support continued research in this area. We have no idea what will be possible in the future, but EBO theory is not ready "today" for prime time and should not be part of our doctrine.

A couple of interesting articles/studies that support many of the naysayer arguments:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n1/feature6.html


As noted above, the goal of EBO is to force the opponent to make choices that are consciously limited by the structure of a campaign. While this is true of all operations, the distinction between the assumptions of EBO and classic military campaigns is the degree of certainty associated with the limitations of those choices. A brilliant campaigner like Napoleon or Lee might be able, through his own intuition or genius, have the insight to lead his opponent about by the nose; EBO claims a scientific-like process for generating similar outcomes, reliably and in a replicable fashion.

Choice, however, is a matter of human judgement and interpretation. The complexity of any human society stems from the fact that even in the most repressive systems, there is a level of freedom in every human choice. Even the most totalitarian system has never been able to completely reduce human choice to a short list of politically acceptable options. Despite draconian punishments, all political systems have dissidents and criminals. Illiteracy, ignorance, and madness itself also impacts on the choices individuals make and further complicates any model attempting to predict human behaviour. Indeed, the very distinctions between any of these categories are themselves suffused with uncertain political and moral judgements and individualistic interpretations of right and wrong.

Mechanical causality makes three assumptions:
- same causes have the same effects;
- there is an equivalence between the force of the cause and that of its effect; and
- the cause must precede the effect.20

http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCVol2No1/vol2no1KellyandKilcullen.pdf


On present trends, it seems probable that EBO will remain at best a worthy
aspiration. The pluralistic nature of Western democracies, including that of
Australia, limits the coherence and unity of an effects-based approach to
strategy. Moreover, Clausewitz’s trinity of chance, uncertainty and friction
continues to characterise war and will make anticipation of even the firstorder
consequences of military action highly conjectural. Interaction between
personalities and events means that any given military action may have
totally unpredictable effects on different actors. In addition, a systems
approach to warfare does not guarantee that second- and third-order
consequences of actions can be predicted, let alone managed. Clausewitz
was right when he argued that the best outcome that a military force could
achieve was to disarm an enemy. The use of force will continue to be an
imperfect instrument of persuasion, while coercion is likely to be unpredictable in its moral impact on an enemy. Uniformed professionals
should strive for the achievement of positive effects from their military
actions while working hard to minimise negative outcomes. Developing a
capacity to be more discriminating in the use of armed force is perhaps the
closest that Australian military practitioners can hope to come to the ideal of
executing effects-based operations.

On occassion I use an EBO like model to help define problems and solutions, but I still agree with GEN Mattis' assertion that EBO has done more harm than good for the reasons previously posted.

William F. Owen
11-27-2008, 11:20 AM
Judgment, experience, and capability allow operators to effectively use tools. An Artisan and an Amateur who use the same tool set will nonetheless most certainly produce different outcomes.
Concur, but the tools and taxonomies have existed for about 100 years. EBO is not a tool. It is a series of assumptions about the nature of conflict. How would a Brigade Commander in WW1, have used EBO?

Commanders must understand the Principles of War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principles_of_War) and have appropriate judgment, experience, and capability in order to successfully apply management tools. Effects Based Operations Methods are sets of management tools, which enable a Commander bring to bear the predictive power of systems analysis and applied mathematics to the chaos of warfare.
I can't see how the so called "Principles of War" bear on this argument. They are sets of arbitrary and generally definition free opinions
EBO is not a management tool. If it was, it would be called EBMT. It's proposed as methodology for the conduct of operations, thus it's name.

Since EBO Methods are no longer approved, one could search for case studies which demonstrate the cost/benefits of using non-EBO systems analysis and applied mathematics techniques to analyze chaotic situations which are similar to our situation.
We don't have to search. We were pretty good at operations in WW1 and 2. I would submit that for pure effectiveness, the British Army of late 1918, has never been matched in scale or complexity. My main question is why do we want to tinker and fiddle with this stuff when were are:
a.) No good at it.
b.) We have done it successfully before.

Can we or should we train our staffs on the use of new (to many of us anyway) management tools in order to support our Commanders
IIRC a US Division could conduct an attack in less than 24 hours of receipt from orders from Corps with the majority of Div planning staffs, that usually had less than 2 years training. We don't need new management tools. We need to study history, and make use of what we learn. - not pander to technology and concepts.

Surferbeetle
11-27-2008, 03:23 PM
A successful fighter is mentally agile. Coalition Forces are currently engaged in a complex fight, which requires mental agility. A Mixed Martial Arts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixed_martial_arts) match is an adequate analogy. The standing and ground phases of a match require different techniques, and most importantly, the judgment, experience, and capability to appropriately apply them in order to win. There is no fixed recipe for success and it is very much a stochastic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic) process.

Quote from Bill:

On occassion I use an EBO like model to help define problems and solutions, but I still agree with GEN Mattis' assertion that EBO has done more harm than good for the reasons previously posted.

A good Commander, and perhaps a lucky one as well, has a multidisciplinary staff beyond that of the traditional 1, 2, 3, and 4 functions. By welcoming to his staff the historians, the scientists, and the mathematicians he avails himself to a variety of techniques, which can be applied at appropriate times in the fight. A good Commander learns from success and failure.

The World War I battles in and around Asiago Italy were notable for innovative techniques. As the winter snows closed in upon our brother soldiers fighting well above the treeline an innovator decided to dig tunnels in the mountains in order to garrison his men and prevent losses associated with avalanches. Another innovator decided to dig tunnels under the garrisoned men, pack them with explosives, and detonate them. Today’s ridgelines along the battlefield of Asiago (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Asiago) still bear witness to what occurred there. If you get the opportunity to walk the battlefield you still have to watch for live ordnance…

Quote from William:

We don't have to search. We were pretty good at operations in WW1 and 2. I would submit that for pure effectiveness, the British Army of late 1918, has never been matched in scale or complexity. My main question is why do we want to tinker and fiddle with this stuff when were are:
a.) No good at it.
b.) We have done it successfully before.

Warfare techniques, tactics, and procedures continually evolve out of necessity. Those who do not adapt to this evolutionary process, or are unlucky, die.

Deliberately and decisively massing ones appropriate forces (men, UAV’s, botnets, etc.) at decisive times and places upon the battlefield usually requires a deep understanding of how to achieve and apply unity of command (aka the successful application of appropriate management techniques) . Pre or Post computer world the Principles of War will never lose their functionality or relevance.

Ken White
11-27-2008, 05:05 PM
A successful fighter is mentally agile. Coalition Forces are currently engaged in a complex fight, which requires mental agility... The standing and ground phases of a match require different techniques, and most importantly, the judgment, experience, and capability to appropriately apply them in order to win. There is no fixed recipe for success and it is very much a stochastic process.That is totally true -- and the successful fighter must apply HIS mental agility and knowledge to be successful. Some people are mathematically inclined. Some are not...

Proponents of EBO are mathematically inclined and seem determined to place that straitjacket around some intuitive tacticians. While they mean well, all they manage to do is constrain the sharp intuitive leader and blunt his abilities.

Many think war is a science -- it is not; it has great human variability thus the practice is an art, not a science.
A good Commander, and perhaps a lucky one as well, has a multidisciplinary staff beyond that of the traditional 1, 2, 3, and 4 functions. By welcoming to his staff the historians, the scientists, and the mathematicians he avails himself to a variety of techniques, which can be applied at appropriate times in the fight. A good Commander learns from success and failure.True -- but not proof of the net desirability of EBO as a concept.
The World War I battles in and around Asiago... Another innovator decided to dig tunnels under the garrisoned men, pack them with explosives, and detonate them.True again. Did the second innovator use a mathematical model to determine such a scheme would work or was, as is far more likely, it merely an intuitive process on his part?
Deliberately and decisively massing ones appropriate forces (men, UAV’s, botnets, etc.) at decisive times and places upon the battlefield usually requires a deep understanding of how to achieve and apply unity of command (aka the successful application of appropriate management techniques)...Did Hannibal know this? Nathan Bedford Forrest? Bill Slim?

On the other hand, William C. Westmoreland was a Harvard MBA.

Point of all that is that there is no one size fits all; people differ and will use what works for them -- and that ought to be okay. I have watched several iterations of mathematically driven 'solutions' to military planning and operations foisted off on the system; all have failed. No reason to quit experimenting -- it IS a reason to not attempt to impose the latest fad as THE solution.

sdspieg
12-12-2008, 11:10 AM
Fascinating discussion - also because it nicely illustrates a) the faddish and formulaic thinking that has become so dominant in our defense organizations AND b) its continued theoretical isolation from the other 'scientific' disciplines. I wish I could say this is a predominantly US pathology, but alas it is not. Many NATO-countries (and even non-NATO ones), with much broader and better access to US doctrinal thinking than ever before (courtesy of NATO, JFCOM liaisons, MPAT, the Internet in general), routinely pick up various new buzz-words and then frantically try to work some version (imitation?) of it into their doctrines. ("damn, we had just written our EBO-doctrine, and now it's apparently 'out' and SOD is 'in' ")

A number of us at TNO (the main Dutch research and technology organization - www.tno.nl - with about 1200 defense scientists) have been struggling with some issues surrounding Complex Adaptive Systems in a number of different projects. These range from more 'theoretical' ones (work on new more adaptive C2 concepts; planning under deep uncertainty, a benchmark study on EB(A)O, some CAS modeling efforts, a little piece now on SOD) to more practical ones (we have rotating in-theater operational analysts supporting the Commander of Dutch Task Force Uruzgan in the South of Afghanistan with, among other things, effects measurement).

For what it's worth - here are some of my personal idiosyncratic take-aways from this work:
the most useful literature on this for ME personally has been non-military. Chief among those were the following two - essentially sweeping, erudite AND accessible literature reviews of recent thinking in a number of disciplines, which can be used as a stepping stone to the voluminous underlying - and referenced! - material:
Eric Beinhocker's The Origin of Wealth. Evolution Complexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics (I'd make the chapter on Strategy required reading at our military academies)
Philip Ball's Critical Mass. How One Thing Leads to Another (Being an Inquiry into the interplay of chance and necessity in the way that human culture, customs, institutions, cooperation and conflict arise)
The few useful references (again IMHO) to this in the defence realm include first and foremost Anne-Marie Grisogono and her team at DSTO in Australia, but also a select few others at various defense research organizations doing serious work on complexity and its implications on operational planning

The implications of our better understanding of complexity (and the analytical AND practical humility it imposes) are still underestimated in the defense world. This is especially the case for operational planning, which is currently based on heroically simplistic, linear assumptions (i.e. concepts such as course of center of gravity, action, objectives, end-state, etc.) that will have to be rethought. Parts of the EBO-debate have proven useful from this point of view (and the postings of pvebber have been spot-on here from my point of view); others have not (indeed the unjustifiable urge to put the cart in front of the horse by starting to 'model' everything

The USEFUL bits of the EBO-debate have been hijacked (and now even - temporarily probably - eclipsed) by some fairly mundane stovepipe-games within the US military. While Gen Mattis (for whom I have a LOT of respect, also having supported his Multiple Futures Effort at ACT in NATO) had some excellent points in his Aug 08 memo, stifling the debate was the last thing he should have done. In the REAL spirit of CD&E (another term that has been bastardized almost beyond recognition by (part of) the M&S mafia), or if you prefer 'probing actions' (Grisogono) or a 'bushy' (too bad that word sounds so much like a famous contemporary politician :) strategic tree (Beinhocker) - he should have made his point but stimulated further initiatives on this. To give another example - SOD's post-modernist roots are a bit to sophist for my taste, but the way Naveh and his disciples apply it _I_ certainly find worth exploring further (as part of a bushy doctrinal tree).

It will take a while before the radical implications of these new insights will take root in our defense organizations. Officers who 'understand' wicked problems because of their real-life operational experiences do GET this. They KNOW, for instance, the the OPP is broken and has to get fixed. Give them another 5-10 years and they'll be calling the shots. I fear that in our defense research establishments it will take longer to break the hegemony of the OR/engineering crowd (as a point of disclosure - I myself come from the TRULY most dismal clan of all scientists - I'm a political scientist, who - to add insult to injury - is even a recovering Sovietologist who spent 10 years at RAND:eek:). I observe an interesting emerging clash between that OR/engineering crowd and the sprinklings of say evolutionary biologists who DO get complexity who are being hired now. But the incentive structure of our research institutions is too much geared towards the 'tame', merely complicated problems; and until we get some reallocation of resources and serious retooling and widening of skill-sets, change is unlikely to come from there.

Did I mention these are PERSONAL views? :) To me the ESSENCE (the 'baby' if you wish) of EBA is to be more humble, more 'emergent' (in Mintzberg's wording) in our planning in face of the complex, adaptive systems we find ourselves in. I actually think (and it's ironic because, as Gen van Ripper reminds us in the past issue of JFQ, the ORIGINS of THIS use of 'effects based' lie with good old-fashioned targeting) the word 'EFFECTS' is EXTREMELY useful from this point of view, because it is NOT (only) purposeful! You do not only GENERATE effects, but they also just EMERGE (sometimes perversely, sometimes despite your actions). This also reminds me of a point that many people miss in Nassim Taleb's Black Swan - that the MAIN usefulness of the concept 'black swan' lies in the ABSTRACT concept itself. Once you 'find', 'name' black swans, they're no longer black swans. So the main idea is to constantly remain vigilant for the high-consequence unexpected outlier. That doesn't mean one shouldn't TRY to pick up weak signals, or - in our case - that one shouldn't TRY to think through all sorts of effects of planned actions, but it DOES mean that you CONSTANTLY have to be aware that you will not capture all of them. And that forces you to think about operational (and strategic!) planning in very different ways.

There's an ocean of deep uncertainty out there (out there in our current and future operations, out there in our future strategic environment) AND some islands of relative certainty (some in our territorial waters, as pvebber pointed out - within the 'predictable' horizon; but ALSO in the deep ocean itself - e.g. much of what pertains to the many remnants of industrial-age armed forces that will stay with us for some time to come). So we have to find ways to merge the still useful parts of what I like to call 'plan and pray' with new, more adaptive, emergent, 'sense and respond' planning schemes.

Would love to hear comments on this - as I will be finishing the paper I'm doing on it before the end of the year!

Cheers!

-Stephan

William F. Owen
12-12-2008, 12:57 PM
To give another example - SOD's post-modernist roots are a bit to sophist for my taste, but the way Naveh and his disciples apply it _I_ certainly find worth exploring further (as part of a bushy doctrinal tree).

Why anyone has taken SOD seriously is a mystery to me. In fact I have yet to find anyone who can explain the ideas to me, without descending into semantic waffle and mostly poor English. Naveh's book is hugely confusing and contains substantial inaccuracies and un-supported opinions. The SOD work books that I have, are also either dressed up statements of the obvious or old wine in new bottles.

If you have some other insight, please share.

Cavguy
12-12-2008, 03:17 PM
Why anyone has taken SOD seriously is a mystery to me. In fact I have yet to find anyone who can explain the ideas to me, without descending into semantic waffle and mostly poor English. Naveh's book is hugely confusing and contains substantial inaccuracies and un-supported opinions. The SOD work books that I have, are also either dressed up statements of the obvious or old wine in new bottles.

If you have some other insight, please share.

I'll tell you SOD is gaining traction here @ SAMS - The Booz Allen Hamilton crowd has retained Naveh and are promoting his ideas to the Army - translating them from Hebrew.

The one brief on SOD I have seen was incomprehensible to me. Something to do with focusing on understanding the environment before understanding the enemy.

I still think it's flavor of the week, but it seems to have "buzz" in the SAMS/Plans crowd.

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 03:37 PM
Agree completely that SOD documentation is probably more understandable if on LSD. I took a week of training stone cold sober, and walked away scratching my head. Naveh thought I was untrainable, and Huba Wass De Czega, understood my frustration, and had plenty of his own. He took my frustration personal as his inability to educate me. As I assured him, my confusion was not his fault.

That said, there is goodness within this, you just have to dig too hard to find it as it is currently written.

In Naveh's defense, this guy is a genius, who is thinking in one language, about concepts that he studied in another language, that he is now trying to communicate to us in a third language. Add to that the fact that he has been thinking about this stuff for years, things that are intuitive to him at this point are completely new concepts to the students.

I really put the onus on the Booz team to be the ones who must translate these concepts into terms that everyone can understand. Naveh resists this, but the managers really need to control the "talent," and take charge of packaging this, or they risk becoming irrelevant as the doctrine writers grow frustrated and shift their focus to what is captured in Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design instead. Best world is to glean from both.

Another factor that makes SOD difficult is that Naveh is adamant that it not be constrained by, or condensed to a process. But the fact is, that as a planner, if this does not in someway inform the process it is of no practical value.

That said, two major commands have managed to employ this to good effect. ARCENT and USSOCOM. These products have freed planners from a total threat-centric intel analysis and given them a fresh, holistic view of the environment that identifies connections that are otherwise missed, and with a new set of priorities on what is truly important to achieving the desired ends (vs what is considered the most dangerous or most likely "threat" that must be defeated or defended against). The intel guys still get their say, it just now has some perspective to weigh it against.

Cavguy
12-12-2008, 03:48 PM
That said, there is goodness within this, you just have to dig too hard to find it as it is currently written.

In Naveh's defense, this guy is a genius, who is thinking in one language, about concepts that he studied in another language, that he is now trying to communicate to us in a third language. Add to that the fact that he has been thinking about this stuff for years, things that are intuitive to him at this point are completely new concepts to the students.

I really put the onus on the Booz team to be the ones who must translate these concepts into terms that everyone can understand.

Bob,

Good summary. I am prepared to be convinced by it, heck, would love to be convinced by it.

But if it's that hard to understand and that non-intuitive, how valuable will it ever be? It's the same problem I have wth my colleague's center-of gravity analysis methodlogy - if it's so hard to "get" then how useful is it? I'm not saying every process has to be simple if the results are worth it, but I wonder how much value there is in complexity.

Reminds me of some of the "Boydism" from a previous thread here where the Boydites say you had to have attended one of Boyd's week-long indoctrinations to become a disciple.

The idea that we must understand the environment and how the environment shapes our operations is a good one - moving from being completely enemy centric in our analysis also has beneifts. We at the COIN center have been advocating holistic appreciation of the environment for a few years now.

SOD still confounds me. I suspect those things which I don't understand and yet 'smart' people say is great - EBO was the last one of these.

William F. Owen
12-12-2008, 03:51 PM
In Naveh's defense, this guy is a genius, who is thinking in one language, about concepts that he studied in another language, that he is now trying to communicate to us in a third language. Add to that the fact that he has been thinking about this stuff for years, things that are intuitive to him at this point are completely new concepts to the students.


I don't know if Naveh is a genius. His book is extremely difficult to read and understand. Significant parts of what I understand I disagree with. Also, Hebrew is not that hard to translate to English. Hebrew is a very simple and clear language. BS in Hebrew comes out as BS in English. There are nuances, but no more than Russian and German.

If SOD can't be simply explained and articulated and then turned into effective action, with simple training, then it's purpose is to make money and reputation, and not to help the majority of practitioners.

Having seen the intellectual flaws and fraud behind EBO and Manoeuvre Warfare, and having read what I have of SOD, I do not assume SOD to be any different. I may be wrong, but as I see no need for SOD, I am not really inclined to revisit it.

Ken White
12-12-2008, 04:07 PM
SOD EBO. Is that a fair assessment? :D

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 04:21 PM
I will concur fully that if the doctrine writers do to SOD what they did to COG theory, then burn it now and save us all. How one line of theory in "On War" turned into 8 pages of rigid process in the Joint Pub I'll never understand. Particularly, when for all of the rigidity of process, it is still so convaluted that if 20 staffs were asked to conduct COG analysis on the same problem they would come back with 20 different answers, with no way to validate any one of them.

I came up with my own model that is simple, validatable, and more importantly, produces product that is as useful for the squad leader as it is for the Corps Commander. Of course I was intelectually executed for failing to follow the doctrinal steps laid out in the Joint Pub... Can send the process and my GWOT product if anyone is intrested. Three simple slides. One for process, one for COIN, and one for CT. (or more accurately, one for FID to help the HN with COIN; and one to counter the external organizations that are conducting networked UW operations to influence the insurgency).

Ken White
12-12-2008, 04:26 PM
...Three simple slides. One for process, one for COIN, and one for CT. (or more accurately, one for FID to help the HN with COIN; and one to counter the external organizations that are conducting networked UW operations to influence the insurgency).I think most of us would be interested...

Hacksaw
12-12-2008, 05:00 PM
Unless there is something proprietary... lets take a look

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 05:16 PM
Not a problem. Due to the "thumb drive ban" this isn't something I can do over lunch. Will track down the trons and see about getting it up this weekend.

It really is a bit "CARVER" like in that it boils it down to "what projects should I do at the squad level to achieve my strategic COIN effects; and which Nodes should I target (or as important, not target) and which HVIs make those nodes function for the CT side, again to achieve the strategic effect. Whole idea is to achieve a focus and efficiency of effort. I don't have to worry so much about a elaborate EBO assessment on the back end if I did focused COG based planning on the front end.

I will say this though, this is theory. When I had an opportunity to operationalize at theater level, the intel community could not make the transition from "bad guy focus" to "environment focus." Since then the intel community has come to recognize that it needs to evolve, but they have a long ways to go.

Tom Odom
12-12-2008, 05:39 PM
I will say this though, this is theory. When I had an opportunity to operationalize at theater level, the intel community could not make the transition from "bad guy focus" to "environment focus." Since then the intel community has come to recognize that it needs to evolve, but they have a long ways to go.


They are making progress. Look here if you have not seen it before:



Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/11/isr-collection-management-in-t.php)
Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness
by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren

And also send me the electrons as I can find use for them with CALL and JRTC.

Best

Tom

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 09:39 PM
Ok, hopefully this uploaded properly...

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 10:01 PM
Ok, I guess that posted ok.

This is just a wave tops presentation I threw together, so it may make more sense to me than to those seeing for the first time. Happy to elaborate.

I like the whole COG-CC-CR-CV construct, but the way everything derives from the CCs in the joint pub never made much sense to me. Also the lack of nesting and refining that comes from Drilling down within the same target set from CR down to CV down to HVT down to HVI that I use.

Key to this for use on the ground is interaction with the populace and solid assessment. What exactly is the failure of governance that is making this particular popualce support the insurgency? Using PMESII as your start point for CRs you may determine that in this region it is the lack of political voice and poor infrastructure. Breaking that down, you then determine CVs of corrupt elections and an exclusion of members of the religious group that dominates that region for "Politics"; and for "Infrastructure you determine that it is a lack of bridges and sewage systems that are the primary concern. Breaking this down further you identify several key positions that need to be put to a vote as soon as possible as HVTs, and facilitate an election that ensures candidates from the entire populace have a chance to run and that everyone has a chance to vote. Your HVTs for bridges may be 3 key bridges that connect the community to larger commerce and allow the children to get to a school that is not corrupt with insurgent ideology. You also secure funding, bring in a contractor and hire local help to tackle the sewage problem.

You get the idea. Focus. This type of engagement is not charity, nor is it bribery. It must be executed through and with the HN government. By understanding what is the most important to the populace you are trying to gain the support of, your efforts are likely to be more effective. Other projects are fine, but prioritize them accordingly. This tool also provides a means to sit down with State, NGOs, etc that are also there to help and allow you to influence their efforts to the same end.

Similar for CT. Instead of chasining faces on a deck of cards, you task your intel to determine what network functions are taking place in your AOR, and sorting out which ones are really critical to the insurgency, and of those which ones you can take down without negative side effects. Then figure out who the HVIs are that really make those nodes click, and remove them first. By being more surgical in your approach you are less likely to alienate the populace, and more likely to disrupt the network.

Bob's World
12-12-2008, 10:06 PM
Oh, "CTAF" stand for "Counterterrorism Analytical Framework." I'm not sure if that is generally available. If not, I will post once I find the file. Nice tool for thinking about terrorist networks.

Ken White
12-12-2008, 10:19 PM
Thanks, Bob

Cavguy
12-13-2008, 04:49 AM
How would you differentiate from this (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/COIN_CoG_Analysis_Mil_Review-Ulrich(Sep-Oct07).pdf)?

The co-author works with me and this is taught in his sessions. I am not fully sold on the process (I think it is too cumbersome in the macro, but okay in the micro), but yours seems similar.


COIN COG analysis translates theory into practice from the bottom up, exposing insurgent lines
of operation (LOOs) and suggesting possible counters to them. rather than thrusting objectives from the top down that may or may not apply to a given situation, it balances counterinsurgent efforts and provides metrics. Links between COIN IPB and the root causes of a confict, and between COIN COG analysis and tactical actions, are analyzed to fgure out how to preempt
insurgent activity instead of merely reacting to it. the process approaches COiN from the dual perspective of the nature of the population and the nature of the insurgent, not from the perspective of the counterinsurgent.

PPT is here (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/LW6-IPB_Part_IV_3NOV08.ppt)

William F. Owen
12-13-2008, 10:34 AM
I will concur fully that if the doctrine writers do to SOD what they did to COG theory, then burn it now and save us all. How one line of theory in "On War" turned into 8 pages of rigid process in the Joint Pub I'll never understand. Particularly, when for all of the rigidity of process, it is still so convaluted that if 20 staffs were asked to conduct COG analysis on the same problem they would come back with 20 different answers, with no way to validate any one of them.


Concur 100%. By far the most sensible thing is to be sure of your own "Critical vulnerability" rather than looking for the enemies.

It does seem to me that US JP writing confuses "objectives" with "planning" when it comes the practical application of the process.

Bob's World
12-13-2008, 11:48 AM
Ok, you tricked me into reading 79 slides of PowerPoint on a Saturday morning, so you got me there. In general, this is one of the better products I’ve seen. I’ll discuss some fine points that I think are important, but this guy is pretty close. The entire community was mentally hamstrung by national level COG analysis that insisted that “Ideology is the strategic COG,” and also by a rigid doctrinal approach to COG analysis. He has escaped both of those constraints, so kudos for that. Some points to consider:

Slide 15: Would enjoy discussing these three root causes. Completely agree that you must have a vulnerable population (dissatisfied might be more accurate). Can’t get on board with the rest though. “Lack of government control” really sticks in my craw. Sometimes too much governance can cause insurgency, and sometimes governance comes from informal tribal mechanisms that are not recognizable as “government” by our western eyes. I like to use “lack of good governance,” distinguishing that “good” is not the same as “effective.” Good is one the populace is satisfied with, regardless of form, effectiveness or degree of control.

Slide 34: “COI is to deny insurgents access to the population.” This is a common position. I prefer to take the position that “Government must regain support of the population.” Fact is that the insurgent IS part of the population and will be when the insurgency is over, possibly as part of the government as well. Goal is to address the failures of governance that sparked the insurgency, and bring the insurgent either to justice or back into the fold. This why it is key to distinguish groups and treat each based on their purpose. Do attempt to separate AQ waging UW from the populace, but this is addressed with the CT LOO.

Slide 37: His analysis is from the perspective of the insurgent. Why? The insurgent is just a symptom of the larger problem, and the COG is the populace. I say you must do your analysis from the perspective of the populace. Once you have earned the support of the populace no insurgency capable of seriously threatening the government can exist. But if you defeat the insurgent without doing this, a new one will replace the old. I believe this to be the crux of why most COIN operations are long affairs, and also the number one reason why civil leadership must remain in overall C2, to avoid the natural tendency to shift to defeating the insurgent.

Slide 48+: I really don’t think you need to do this detailed “friendly vs. Enemy” COG analysis, because at the end of the day you are out to render the insurgent irrelevant and must remain focused on assisting the HN to regain the support of their populace. I can see where an enemy perspective analysis could help a commander to be more predictive of what the insurgent might be focused on though. In general, these are good “paint by number” charts to help a staff gain a better sense of what is going on to get to a focused scheme of engagement that has not lost sight of the overall COG, and that is good.

Slide 68: OK, I am a traditionalist. All of this is FID if done in a foreign country to assist a HN with a COIN operation. It is COIN when done in one’s own nation. (SFA is a subset of FID as well).

Slide 72: I’d want this taped out on a big white board, and then update w/dry erase constantly. Don’t let the permanence of ink lock you in as the situation continues to flux.

Ken White
12-13-2008, 04:33 PM
Bob's World's slides: Good, usable but not, as advertised, by Squad Leaders; :wry: I'd add not even by most Company Commanders most of the time or by few Battalions. Though I'll caveat that and give Bob a prop by noting that people differ; the analytical type will appreciate his idea, the intuitive folks will note it and say "Well, yeah, isn't that what everyone does?" (Acknowledging that everyone is not an intuitive commander or leader).

The Leavenworth PPT show: Generally agree with Bob's critique with particular, strong, effusive and total agreement with his comments on Slides 15, 34 and 37. I think his comments are VERY important for the process and for the thinking of he who would be a COIN / FID fighter. I'd also add that for Slide 37 it can be extremely difficult to insure that you have accurately determined the Insurgent's desired end state while determination of the goals of the bulk of the populace are far simpler and more sure. They are, after all, what it's really all about.

Also agree that Slide 48 + series is probably overkill for most other than the really analytically inclined. On Slide 68, don't think it makes much difference what you call it, people will juggle and jiggle terminology in any event and DoD / DA / TRADOC will change the vernacular in any event. On Slide 72, Bob's comment is valid but it leads to a far larger point in my mind:

That process is all very well. I'm surprised that CGSC needs presentations with that much elementary detail (acknowledging that the course has foreign and civilian students and I haven't attended) but the Slides do lay out an effective presentation and a functional methodology. My concern is that the process gets so far down in the weeds that it will take an inordinate amount of time for the initial assessment (time that may not always be available), will require constant updating (previous remark applies plus manpower requirement) and will become an end to itself to some (a cynic might say "too many..."). I think that means that it's overdone and therefor needs significant paring and simplification in order to be usable by the Bn or Bde Staff which is operating at 50% strength due to casualties and personnel shortfalls...

Bob's World
12-14-2008, 11:51 AM
Ken, good comments. To clarify, concur that i don't see a squad sitting down to a cup of coffee and some COG analysis, but what I meant is that a BCT commander can do this for his AO, refining to one level; his BN CDRs taking that and further refining and tailoring for their AOs as well, with Company CDRs taking it even lower. Ultimately it is that Sqaud that goes out into the populace, gathering the knowledge and executing the engagement that makes this work.

I spoke to my Son's BN and BDE CDRs when he came back from his first tour to Iraq, and am convinced that they were executing a very savvy and sound mix of COIN and CT; but at the PFC level the soldiers didn't understand or appreciate what they were doing and more importantly why. A simple model that says, "look, treat the people like this, and here is why, and for the next few months these are going to be our priority efforts, and here is why, here is how it supports the big picture." You know the deal, the American soldier accomplishes remarkable things when he understands the purpose and desired endstate. It is the greatest strength of the American military, and we need to maximize it.

Cavguy
12-14-2008, 03:18 PM
Ken, good comments. To clarify, concur that i don't see a squad sitting down to a cup of coffee and some COG analysis, but what I meant is that a BCT commander can do this for his AO, refining to one level; his BN CDRs taking that and further refining and tailoring for their AOs as well, with Company CDRs taking it even lower. Ultimately it is that Sqaud that goes out into the populace, gathering the knowledge and executing the engagement that makes this work.

I spoke to my Son's BN and BDE CDRs when he came back from his first tour to Iraq, and am convinced that they were executing a very savvy and sound mix of COIN and CT; but at the PFC level the soldiers didn't understand or appreciate what they were doing and more importantly why. A simple model that says, "look, treat the people like this, and here is why, and for the next few months these are going to be our priority efforts, and here is why, here is how it supports the big picture." You know the deal, the American soldier accomplishes remarkable things when he understands the purpose and desired endstate. It is the greatest strength of the American military, and we need to maximize it.

Bob,

FYSA the COG method on the PPT was taught at the COIN academy @ Taji from mid 2005- early 2006 and then removed. It is also covered in a few of our Leader Workshops @ the COIN center.

The presentation you viewed is probably V11 of the slides, it took that long to make it comprehensible! It also benefits from actually being instructed - it doesn't lend itself to PPT education alone unless (like you) you get the whole COG methodology.

My problem is that when I tried to apply LTC Ulrich's method to my old company sector as a test, it was far too large and required an immense amount of attention to update. It does focus RFI's and PIR's well, and aligns end-ways-means. I guess I advocate just doing the process on defined targets and not the entire environment. It also forces the commander to consider ECOA and second/third order effects.

BTW, it is called "Center of Influence" analysis because CoG irritated too many doctrine purists.

If you haven't seen it, check out LTC Ulrich's entire workshop @ COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil) in the knowledge center. It covers the IPB I-III and some other subjects as well.

Bullmoose Bailey
12-15-2008, 08:30 AM
Oh, "CTAF" stand for "Counterterrorism Analytical Framework." I'm not sure if that is generally available. If not, I will post once I find the file. Nice tool for thinking about terrorist networks.

Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op.

Glad for the simplistic presentation you've exploited so that we may easily distinuish the levels at which your analysis applies.

Bob's World
12-15-2008, 02:18 PM
I make house calls...

slapout9
12-17-2008, 03:18 AM
Bob's W, neat paper but I offer of couple of comments based upon Colonel Warden's original concept on Systems Warfare.

1-You originally posted that you had to understand the systems purpose, that is absolutely critical before any COG analysis can take place at all.

2-You may not like this one. Whether or not a COG has a critical vulnerability has nothing to do with the strategic question of is it or isn't it a COG. Whether or not it is vulnerable is more a function of your organizations tactical capability, not the Strategic level analysis.

3-What Colonel Warden means when he says COG in Army terms is High Payoff Target Targets are chosen based upon their ability to accomplish your objective and the highest payoff from your expendature of energy.

EBO should have been changed to CBO (Change Based Operations), becuase that is what you are trying to do. You want to change a system from how it is now to what you want to be. And kinetic attacks may not be the best way to do that at all.

Here is a link form Colonel Warden's Blog to how the 5 rings were adapted to be used on understanding people in an organization. It is a civilian business application but it has good points for COIN I think. Also has a link to a paper AU on COG. They are better expressed as focus or focal points.

http://customerinnovations.wordpress.com/2008/01/05/centers-of-gravity-levers-for-shifting-the-customer-experience/

BobKing
02-20-2009, 03:46 AM
Last week a note about this subject in the Air Force Magazine's Daily Report eNewsletter started a lively email discussion within our teaching department at the Army Command and General Staff College.

We had just stood up our new blog, Joint Chatter (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/djimo/default.aspx), the day before. So the discussion was moved there under the post Effects-Based Operations: Bastardization of Airpower? (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/djimo/archive/2009/02/13/effects-based-operations-bastardization-of-airpower.aspx)

Ron Humphrey
02-20-2009, 04:06 AM
Last week a note about this subject in the Air Force Magazine's Daily Report eNewsletter started a lively email discussion within our teaching department at the Army Command and General Staff College.

We had just stood up our new blog, Joint Chatter (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/djimo/default.aspx), the day before. So the discussion was moved there under the post Effects-Based Operations: Bastardization of Airpower? (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/djimo/archive/2009/02/13/effects-based-operations-bastardization-of-airpower.aspx)

Pretty much seem to track with the discussions we had here a while back

William F. Owen
05-03-2009, 06:00 AM
Systems thinking is simple and will bring clarity to the situation when done properly.


This is now get. I am now interested in "Systems Thinking" IF it makes things simpler. Only took six months but I got there....

I am still implacably against the SOD, chin rubbing, "oooh... very complicated," "not for mortals" variety that SAMs and CAC seem so fond of. That stuff is just a recipe for disaster.