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carl
08-09-2008, 11:11 PM
I think much depends upon the proficiency of the Russian armed forces as of this moment. If they are as inept as they were when they first went into Chechnya, things could get very complicated for Vlad.

Fuchs
08-10-2008, 10:43 AM
situation on friday (found in another forum)

http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/files/Jar/(080809143421)_karta_vojny.jpg

kaur
08-10-2008, 01:52 PM
I found following post from Russian military forum. One sentence is that Ossetians shot Gerogian prisoners.


На посту у этнических сёл наши солдаты собирают у бегущих грузин оружие и отправляют домой. Днём был мерзкий конфуз, осетины перестреляли 30 грузинских пленных, дезавуировав для мира зверства грузин против миротворцев. Грузины наглеют и ставят грады за административной границей рядом с обгоревшими остовами подбитых вчера. Танки и АА стреляют только через границу."
http://www.milkavkaz.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=28&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=1470

http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/co/1663697.htm

I have no clue how reliable this info is. Is this the beginning of blood feud? Geographically the ethnic villages are mixed.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f6/SouthOssetia_region_detailed_map.JPG

Fuchs
08-10-2008, 08:41 PM
The Georgian government, apparently.

The Georgians have displayed a good deal of operational incompetence as it seems. There's only one road (actually partially a tunnel!) between Russia and SO - they should have taken that in an air assault and blocked it (if not blown up altogether).
The mountain passes are impassable in winter - the Georgian attack in summer.

The initial attack doesn't seem to have won much terrain - apparently only a few kilometres at most before the Russian advance guard of few battalions arrived .

Well, #### happens if you begin a war with a 1:100 inferior army that's incompetent.

The Russians didn't produce flawless photos of their columns either. Poor camouflage, poor march organization, perfect targets for air/arty, irregular uniforms, riding on top of APCs...


I've observed discussions about this where people refrained about an oh-so-good U.S.-trained Georgian brigade.
Well, maybe we should create a thread to identify the armies that were trained by the U.S. military and didn't afterward suck asap?
I've got difficulties to remember any.

Ron Humphrey
08-10-2008, 08:50 PM
The Georgian government, apparently.

The Georgians have displayed a good deal of operational incompetence as it seems. There's only one road (actually partially a tunnel!) between Russia and SO - they should have taken that in an air assault and blocked it (if not blown up altogether).
The mountain passes are impassable in winter - the Georgian attack in summer.

The initial attack doesn't seem to have won much terrain - apparently only a few kilometres at most before the Russian advance guard of few battalions arrived .

Well, #### happens if you begin a war with a 1:100 inferior army that's incompetent.

The Russians didn't produce flawless photos of their columns either. Poor camouflage, poor march organization, perfect targets for air/arty, irregular uniforms, riding on top of APCs...


I've observed discussions about this where people refrained about an oh-so-good U.S.-trained Georgian brigade.
Well, maybe we should create a thread to identify the armies that were trained by the U.S. military and didn't afterward suck asap?
I've got difficulties to remember any.

For so eloquently pointing out the various reasons that this particular conflict and its origins seem only to fit the requirements of one of the participants.

To assume that the Georgians or their trainers;) didn't realize what you say is true might be asking a little much


It does however help to make it quite evident why now would have been a good time by Russian terms. And why preemption may have seemed acceptable.

Just another way of looking at it

Norfolk
08-10-2008, 09:21 PM
Well, with the Russians knocking at the door of Gori in the centre and Zhigdidi in the west (NYT (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/world/europe/11georgia.html?bl&ex=1218513600&en=21280383fa5b8c72&ei=5087)), things are not exactly going swimmingly for the Georgians, though they did manage to make a casualty of what appears to have been 58th Army's commander. But with perhaps three MRD, elements of three Airborne formations, plus other Russian formations and units moving into or already in the AO, good as Georgia's regular troops may be, they've definitely got their work cut out for them. The Russians do not appear to be willing to settle for anything less than precipitating the fall of the present Georgian government. Maybe they won't even settle for that now.

Some US advisers and contractors may really get to earn their pay soon (if not already); I'm sure they'll really looking foreward to that.:wry:

William F. Owen
08-11-2008, 06:21 AM
The Georgians have displayed a good deal of operational incompetence as it seems. There's only one road (actually partially a tunnel!) between Russia and SO - they should have taken that in an air assault and blocked it (if not blown up altogether).
The mountain passes are impassable in winter - the Georgian attack in summer.


I'm not sure that is an accurate judgement. The Georgians, like everyone else are hostages to the pre-conflict start positions, and political constraints. We won't know the truth for a couple of months.

... however, I bet all the "experts" will rush in with a whole series of "lessons from Georgia," which will mostly prove inaccurate, and be completely free from Georgian Staff and Command input.

Unlike Shimon Naveh, I don't and never have rated the Russian Army. Talk Jedi Knight, but act Cave man! - they can never do what they set themselves up for.

Ken White
08-11-2008, 02:45 PM
...When you're outnumbered, patiently waiting in an ambush is often the best tactical response.;) If you understand the situation, sometimes you don't need to wait very long, but since no one charged it, I have to assume that it wasn't a near ambush.was or is really that simple? :D

badtux
08-12-2008, 07:48 AM
I am however surprised at the speed of Russia's action, which suggest to me that it had to have been premeditated. Those troops must have been on twelve hours notice to move or less, and my recollection is that you don't keep people standing around like that for very long. I'm also not sure that the reactive armor is left in place during training, those tanks look "" dressed", to me, although I was Inf.

You may note that Georgia borders a Russian province called "Chechnya", and you may recall some unpleasantness there. Well, there is also a province immediately to the west of Chechnya between Chechnya and North Ossetia called Ingushetia which has also been restive due to Chechnyan fighters who fled to its mountains after the Russians defeated them in Chechnya. Because of all this, Russia had approximately 250,000 servicemen in the area six months ago as well as approximately 200 aircraft. There was/is a major Russian base in Vladikavkaz to deal with the Chechnyan situation to keep Chechnyan fighters from fleeing westward, indeed this is an ancient Russian fortress city built in 1784 to deal with the Chechnyans (who were rebelling then too, go figure). Which city, if you are looking at your maps, is 80km from the Roki tunnel, and then a further 40km to Tskinvali.

In short, it is not unusual for Russia to have forces in the area that are on alert, and furthermore, not unusual for Russia to have some of their best forces in the area -- as, undoubtedly, those T-90 tanks with reactive armor indicate. It is a two hour drive from Vladikavkaz to Tskinvali at 60km/h, so Russian troops arriving in Tskinvali twelve hours after fighting begins indicates that it took about ten hours for the Russians to get sorted out and underway -- not a great showing for a rapid reaction unit intended to respond rapidly to problems in Chechnya, but certainly not indicative of anything other than the fact that this region has been problematic for Russia for quite some time and South Ossetia happens to be close to Russia's main base in the region. In other words, the rapidity of Russian response does not indicate the Russians were necessarily expecting this particular trouble. They have plenty of other troubles to expect in the region too. Indeed, one wonders what the Chechnyans are thinking, now that the main force to their west keeping them suppressed has taken a detour into Georgia...

kaur
08-12-2008, 08:08 AM
Just today morning I found from Russian MoD site that they are denying involvement of Chechen "Vostok" and "Zapad" units. This info has vanished now. Reuters says that "Vostok" is in.

http://search.us.reuters.com/query/?q=%56%6f%73%74%6f%6b&s=USPHOTOS

Fuchs
08-12-2008, 01:57 PM
In short, it is not unusual for Russia to have forces in the area that are on alert, and furthermore, not unusual for Russia to have some of their best forces in the area -- as, undoubtedly, those T-90 tanks with reactive armor indicate.

I agree with your overall opinion, but I disagree about the description of the quality of the 19th MRD. It's one of the better units, but not equipped with significant quantities of 1990's or newer material.

The 19th MRD was equipped with equipment that was mostly 1970's/1980's equipment.
I am observing a board that focuses on hardware and they have running commentaries on the equipment on the published photos. They identified BTR-70 and T-62 (in a later wave), BMP-1 (probably part of the original peacekeeping force), mostly T-72 / BMP-2 / BTR-80.
They did also spot a Tunguska somewhere.

The general consensus was that the Georgian patchwork arsenal of 2nd hand equipment from Eastern Europe (and some American infantry equipment like BDUs) was in average more modern than the 19th MRD equipment.

The 19th MRD is a rapid-raction division with a lower than usual share of conscripts and higer than usual expenditures for training.
It still needed a rapid reaction force in itself (which formed the advance guard of few battalions) to have at least a part of it at a level of readiness approaching that of all Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's.

kaur
08-12-2008, 02:25 PM
"How well have Russian forces performed in Georgia?"

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/08/window-on-eurasia-how-well-have-russian.html

William F. Owen
08-12-2008, 02:40 PM
"How well have Russian forces performed in Georgia?"

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/08/window-on-eurasia-how-well-have-russian.html

Considering that military historians and operational analysts are still debating WW2 actions where we have a wealth of info, and there is still considerable debate over recent operations such as "Gothic Serpent" and "Anaconda", I can't see how anyone can yet produce a well informed opinion on the Russian Army, or the Georgians.

What all this tells me, is that there is now even less reason to suppose that the future wars will be small wars.

...and if you want to rapidly deploy a Brigade from Germany to Georgia, via Turkey, driving all the way, may be something to consider.

Jedburgh
08-12-2008, 02:46 PM
....I can't see how anyone can yet produce a well informed opinion on the Russian Army, or the Georgians.

What all this tells me, is that there is now even less reason to suppose that the future wars will be small wars....
A more entertaining look at the conflict, from The War Nerd (http://exiledonline.com/war-nerd-south-ossetia-the-war-of-my-dreams/):

.....What’s happening to Georgia here is like the teeny-tiny version of Germany in the twentieth century: overplay your hand and you lose everything. So if you’re a Georgian nationalist, this war is a tragedy; if you’re a Russian or Ossetian nationalist, it’s a triumph, a victory for justice, whatever. To the rest of us, it’s just kind of fun to watch. And damn, this one has been a LOT of fun! The videos that came out of it! You know, DVD is the best thing to happen to war in a long time. All the fun, none of the screaming agony—it’s war as Diet Coke.

See, this is the war that I used to see in the paintings commissioned by Defense contractors in Aviation Week and AFJ: a war between two conventional armies, both using air forces and armored columns, in pine-forested terrain. That was what those pictures showed every time, with a highlighted closeup of the weapon they were selling homing in on a Warsaw Pact convoy coming through a German pine forest. Of course, a real NATO/Warsaw Pact war would never, ever have happened that way. It would have gone nuclear in an hour or less, which both sides knew, which is why it never happened. So all that beautiful weaponry was kind of a farce, if it was only going to be used in the Fulda Gap. But damn, God is good, because here it all is, in the same kind of terrain, all your favorite old images: Russian-made tanks burning (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/afp/20080809/img/pwl-georgia-sossetia-russia-5-1271f9398e265.html), a Soviet-model fighter-bomber falling from the sky (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=b89_1218230892) in pieces, troops in Russian camo fighting other troops, also in Russian camo, in a skirmish by some dilapidated country shack. No racial overtones to get bummed out by—everybody on both sides is white! And white from places you don’t know or care about!......

Fuchs
08-12-2008, 03:18 PM
The initial combat did not seem to include much territorial gains.

The Georgian troops in the large Georgian valley enclave north of teh city were apparently overrun by the Russian advance guard.

I have heard (read) that there was little resistance after the first couple hours of combat between the Georgians and the Russian advance guard at the southern front line.

It sounded a lot as if the Georgians were withdrawing even without proper delaying actions - Russian recce units were able to "take & occupy" objectives.
Gori, for example, was apparently evacuated when the Russians arrived.
There was apparently no numerical or equipment superiority to speak of at the front lines.

Whatever success the Russians had was probably 95% psychological; the Georgian likely assumed their overall inferiority and didn't want to make last stands.

Neither Russians nor Georgians seemed to have been much interested in camouflage & concealment (judged by the published photos).

Caucasus people have a reputation of being more aggressive & physically robust than Russians, bullying superior numer sof Russian recruits in the army a conscripts. Maybe that description only fits the smaller nations north of the caucasus mountain tops.

The Georgian air defense fought apparently fairly well - the Russians did not seem to wage a SEAD campaign or use proper SEAD escorts.

The Russian Air Power (Su-25 and Mi-24 were mostly on video/photos) attacked operational (supply depots) and tactical targets (at least vehicles on road march) targets. I'm not sure how significant it was, but it seemed to have had an impact.
Russian air supremacy allowed their troops to drive along the single road without beign attacked.



That's the snippets that I heard/read about.
It'll be easier to learn about the Russian story than about the Georgian one because of the numerical superiority of exile Russians to exile Georgians.

Stan
08-12-2008, 03:31 PM
In short, it is not unusual for Russia to have forces in the area that are on alert, and furthermore, not unusual for Russia to have some of their best forces in the area -- as, undoubtedly, those T-90 tanks with reactive armor indicate. It is a two hour drive from Vladikavkaz to Tskinvali at 60km/h, so Russian troops arriving in Tskinvali twelve hours after fighting begins indicates that it took about ten hours for the Russians to get sorted out and underway -- not a great showing for a rapid reaction unit intended to respond rapidly to problems in Chechnya, but certainly not indicative of anything other than the fact that this region has been problematic for Russia for quite some time and South Ossetia happens to be close to Russia's main base in the region. In other words, the rapidity of Russian response does not indicate the Russians were necessarily expecting this particular trouble. They have plenty of other troubles to expect in the region too. Indeed, one wonders what the Chechnyans are thinking, now that the main force to their west keeping them suppressed has taken a detour into Georgia...

An excellent first post, Badtux !
As time permits you, please do introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=35).

I would also add that Putin's 2004 Presidential order to create Mountain Troop brigades resulted initially in haphazard selections and often competing forces (glamor and better pay, if you will). Even as late as October 2007, weaponry and equipment for the new brigades were to come from defense arsenals, and more would need to be procured. That left one tiny little detail -- the construction of a base for the 33rd brigade in Botlikh (near the Chechen border) and the 34th brigade's base near Sochi and the Abkhaz border. Both brigades should have been formed and (ahem) "ready" by 01 December. Well, so much for that :D

As we are all well aware of, Russia has been fighting rebels in the North Caucasus since 94, and Russian peacekeepers are currently deployed in the mountainous South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia. The so-called mountain brigades "more or less" ended up being heavy armored motor-rifle groups.

I reckon that's why the peacekeepers ended up with artillery for the "rapid and initial" offensive :wry:

Welcome aboard and regards, Stan

William F. Owen
08-12-2008, 04:03 PM
Caucasus people have a reputation of being more aggressive & physically robust than Russians, bullying superior numer sof Russian recruits in the army a conscripts. Maybe that description only fits the smaller nations north of the caucasus mountain tops.


We have large amounts of Gruzynim living here in Israel. Popular culture puts them on the "don't F**K with" list, along with the Kurds.

Basically every Gruzinit has brothers intent on protecting their long lost virginity.

badtux
08-12-2008, 04:14 PM
The 19th MRD was equipped with equipment that was mostly 1970's/1980's equipment.
I am observing a board that focuses on hardware and they have running commentaries on the equipment on the published photos. They identified BTR-70 and T-62 (in a later wave), BMP-1 (probably part of the original peacekeeping force), mostly T-72 / BMP-2 / BTR-80.


Thank you, I did not take a look at the published photos but relied on someone who saw the reactive armor on a T-72 and thought it was a T-90. Of course the two have completely different turrets but the same hull so if you aren't looking closely it's a reasonable mistake to make. I probably should have checked more but it wasn't really the point of my piece so (shrug).



The 19th MRD is a rapid-raction division with a lower than usual share of conscripts and higer than usual expenditures for training.
It still needed a rapid reaction force in itself (which formed the advance guard of few battalions) to have at least a part of it at a level of readiness approaching that of all Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's.

I am not sure that the readiness of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's was all that high, other than their equipment being thirty years newer then. The Soviet infrastructure was crumbling, the Soviet economy was in the toilet, discontent and dissent were rife, they had the same problem of poorly-trained draftee soldiers as the heart of their army that afflicts the current Russian army. But that is a topic for another area.

Fuchs
08-12-2008, 04:28 PM
The Cold War readiness of WP forces in Central Europe was beyond belief.
Evacuation of bases in a matter of minutes upon alarm, for example.

They had two different sets of tanks; some for training, many always ready for immediate action (maintenance done, ammunition, fuel, oil, zeroed gun).


Exile Russians who were in the Soviet Army are VERY embittered about the post-Cold War developments in the Red/Russian army. The standards dropped to the bottom and 19th MRD was not much above that bottom apparently.

Ken White
08-12-2008, 04:30 PM
...I am not sure that the readiness of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's was all that high, other than their equipment being thirty years newer then. The Soviet infrastructure was crumbling, the Soviet economy was in the toilet, discontent and dissent were rife, they had the same problem of poorly-trained draftee soldiers as the heart of their army that afflicts the current Russian army. But that is a topic for another area.Significantly lower readiness than many wanted to presume for various reasons, I'd say...

Vastly over rated as a threat...

Fuchs
08-12-2008, 05:02 PM
Readiness and threat are two different kettle of fish.

Tom Odom
08-12-2008, 05:04 PM
For Entropy


Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/47618.html)

By Tom Lasseter | McClatchy Newspapers

TIRDZNISI, Georgia — The Russian fighter jet screamed low to the earth and peeled off so quickly that the bomb wasn't visible until it hit the ground. The explosion shook everything and sent a shower of debris flying over the head of a young Georgian soldier.

The soldier, lying against an embankment on the side of the road, shouted in a panicked voice for everyone to stay still. His palms were flat on the dirt in front of him. "It's Russian MiGs," the soldier said, his eyes wide.

For three days, Russian jets and bombers have unleashed a massive aerial campaign against Georgian forces that, more than anything, dramatically changed the war's direction.

Until Russian jets showed up, Georgian tanks and infantry looked to be on their way to defeating rebel forces in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway province of South Ossetia.

Van
08-12-2008, 06:00 PM
Tom,
Please redirect "Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card" responses to the Ever-ready Bunny of SWC - The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate (The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate)...

:)

Although, no one should be surprised if we see this cited in the future as an example of the "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power" (www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/10_propositions_regarding_air_power.pdf), especially "Whoever controls the air. generally controls the surface" and "Air power is primarily offiensive".

Tom Odom
08-12-2008, 06:26 PM
Tom,
Please redirect "Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card" responses to the Ever-ready Bunny of SWC - The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate (The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate)...

:)

Although, no one should be surprised if we see this cited in the future as an example of the "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power" (www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/10_propositions_regarding_air_power.pdf), especially "Whoever controls the air. generally controls the surface" and "Air power is primarily offiensive".

posted a copy and linked it

And a partial from Aerospace Daily (requires subscription) via ebird:


Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/channel_.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily#)

If the land war in Georgia so far seems to be going decidedly in favor of the Russian army and navy, the Georgians seem to be racking up a lopsided score with their air defenses....

...However, Georgian air defenses appear to be taking a steady toll on Russian aircraft. Russia has admitted to losing a total of four aircraft (the Georgians claim 10) in the conflict. So far they've admitted to the destruction of three Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft and a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber that was flying a reconnaissance mission.

Ratzel
08-13-2008, 04:50 AM
I can't understand why the Georgians would try to fight Russia using tanks? The Georgian Army should be a Army of 6 man cells, with the best shoulder fired weapons money can buy. I didn't hear about one Russian tank being hit by an anti-tank weapon? Why?

I assume that Georgia needs some armour protection to fight Chechen Guerrillas or other various "rebels" in their country? But so far, I can't say I'm too impressed with the Georgians.

If I was a Baltic State or Ukraine military planner, I would make note of this. It seems like these countries (and Georgia) have developed their militaries to take on NATO/American missions, while not thinking about their own territorial defense?

It seems necessary to have deployable units for peacekeeping or COIN, and then have units of small independent cells for the nation's defense against the bigger Russia. For a small country like Georgia, it shouldn't really be that expensive to equip and train some units to specialize in hit and run tactics, and supply line disruption?

William F. Owen
08-13-2008, 06:59 AM
I can't understand why the Georgians would try to fight Russia using tanks? The Georgian Army should be a Army of 6 man cells, with the best shoulder fired weapons money can buy. I didn't hear about one Russian tank being hit by an anti-tank weapon? Why?

I assume that Georgia needs some armour protection to fight Chechen Guerrillas or other various "rebels" in their country? But so far, I can't say I'm too impressed with the Georgians.

If I was a Baltic State or Ukraine military planner, I would make note of this. It seems like these countries (and Georgia) have developed their militaries to take on NATO/American missions, while not thinking about their own territorial defense?

It seems necessary to have deployable units for peacekeeping or COIN, and then have units of small independent cells for the nation's defense against the bigger Russia. For a small country like Georgia, it shouldn't really be that expensive to equip and train some units to specialize in hit and run tactics, and supply line disruption?

I not only concur but applaud your observation. It is exactly this point I tried to present to the Royal Thai Army. A couple of points are worth expanding.

a.) Tanks are fire support. They can achieve little in themselves, but you still need some. Tanks engender human emotion in a way I can never understand and I believe their generally unchanging form nearing the limit of its usefulness. No the tank is not obsolete. It merely needs to evolve.

b.) Beware the heroic little tank hunter teams. Context is everything, and the tide can very quickly turn against them. In order to be consistently successful they need large amounts of support and preparation. Even then they may suffer considerable attrition, unless they have the ability to very rapidly disengage.

Ratzel
08-13-2008, 08:44 AM
I not only concur but applaud your observation. It is exactly this point I tried to present to the Royal Thai Army. A couple of points are worth expanding.

a.) Tanks are fire support. They can achieve little in themselves, but you still need some. Tanks engender human emotion in a way I can never understand and I believe their generally unchanging form nearing the limit of its usefulness. No the tank is not obsolete. It merely needs to evolve.

b.) Beware the heroic little tank hunter teams. Context is everything, and the tide can very quickly turn against them. In order to be consistently successful they need large amounts of support and preparation. Even then they may suffer considerable attrition, unless they have the ability to very rapidly disengage.


a.) Countries like the Baltic States could probably use some armour if their Russian populations try to break away, but for actual war against Russia, they'd be useless.

b.) During OIF I my unit faced thousands of men acting in hunter killer teams, and it was very ugly for them (even in the cities). Terriean really makes a difference, as the desert is a bad place for the small AA team. However, a place like Georgia, or the Balkans is ideal for this. Another factor in OIF I was the Iraqi weapons. If the Iraqis had Javelins and Carl Gustavs instead of RPG 7's and 14's, we most likely would have had a lot of problems?

Stan
08-13-2008, 09:01 AM
Some interesting (self) observations at RIA Novosti (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080812/115990123.html) as reported in the Russian press.


The Georgian army has not yet tried many of its state-of-the-art weapons in the South Ossetian conflict, but is ready to do so at a decisive moment, Israeli media reported.

Even Georgia's Soviet-made T-72 tanks are better equipped than their Russian counterparts. Georgia has re-engineered its inventory of 165 T-72 tanks by fitting them out with the GPS navigation system, identification systems, thermal imagery systems for targeting fire, and up-to-date Falcon communication systems. The Georgian version of the tank, the T-72-SIM-1, is capable of night fighting and in adverse weather conditions, which is beyond the capability of Russian tanks.

The course of the war has shown that the Russian army needs overhauling. Meanwhile yesterday Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin refused to back a proposal by key security ministries to increase defense spending.

William F. Owen
08-13-2008, 09:41 AM
b.) During OIF I my unit faced thousands of men acting in hunter killer teams, and it was very ugly for them (even in the cities). Terriean really makes a difference, as the desert is a bad place for the small AA team. However, a place like Georgia, or the Balkans is ideal for this. Another factor in OIF I was the Iraqi weapons. If the Iraqis had Javelins and Carl Gustavs instead of RPG 7's and 14's, we most likely would have had a lot of problems?

The weapons are certainly an issue. Some UK MBTs took 12 + hits from RPGs when doing "raids" into Basra. The poor quality of both enemy troops and equipment was explicitly noted in the post operational report. EG- Don't try this again!

As I have said before, Javelin and Spike (MR/LR) change the world in ways we may not yet fully appreciate, but they are vastly expensive (especially Javelin). I see there as being a clear requirement for low cost, light weight wire guided ATGM, such as 9K115-2 or a much improved M47 Dragon.

...and yes, I know Dragon sucked more than a blind stripper with a club foot, which is why I said "much improved!" :wry:

kaur
08-13-2008, 09:53 AM
As Estonian I can say that due to our joining with NATO (now) 99 percent of effort is commited to joint operations with Allies. This means that platoon and company-sized units are trained to work as part of bigger Allied forces formation (company, batallion) against insurgents. This tactics changes 180 degrees from guerilla war. There was proposal that Ministry of defence chould produce side mines against armoured vechicles (that Finnish deep operations units use, kind of side mines used by Iraqi insurgents), latter was chocked. You can say that at least lessons are known, but you have to also drill this during conscription. This is not done. Picture of war in small country depens A LOT wether this is done with the help of allies or alone.

This case study is part of topic "how decisions are done."

If I remember correctly, US train and equip program was started to make Georgian army able to fight against Chechen isurgents that inflitreted Kodori gorge and established safe haven there. Russians were complaining this all the time and bombed Georgian territory.

Even US officer proposed deep operations concept.

http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bdreview/08bdr200.pdf

This paper is about territorial defence.

http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bdreview/07bdr200.pdf

Here you can find tons of papers.

http://www.bdcol.ee/?id=64

William F. Owen
08-13-2008, 10:58 AM
Even US officer proposed deep operations concept.

http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bdreview/08bdr200.pdf



Dear G*d! Not something I would ever want to try. A 10-man "deep operations squad." :eek:

Good romantic punchy stuff, but can't see how on earth you'd make it work in practice. If nothing else, the "2-man Carl Gustav" team is not going to work. You need about 4 men to make a Charlie G do its stuff

I'm all for "Stay behind ISTAR" with some sniper capability, and secure comms. That is proven to work.

VMI_Marine
08-13-2008, 11:38 AM
I can't understand why the Georgians would try to fight Russia using tanks? The Georgian Army should be a Army of 6 man cells, with the best shoulder fired weapons money can buy. I didn't hear about one Russian tank being hit by an anti-tank weapon? Why?

Indeed, it seems they missed some of the key lessons of Chechnya. Trying to take on the Russian Army in a conventional fight was an exceptionally bad idea. It looks to me like the Georgians wanted to use armored shock to quickly overpower the South Ossetians, but they appeared to have no contingency plan for the rapid response from the Russians. Light infantry could have hidden until the Russian main body had passed and then attacked the Russian LOC. This would have slowed the Russian advance and taken some of the Russian combat power away from the units facing the Georgians further south.

Wildcat
08-13-2008, 01:27 PM
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/13/georgia.russia.war/index.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7558399.stm

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/europe/14georgia.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin

Saakashvili is making accusations of violence by Russian tanks in Gori. The Russians are denying any presence in Gori and making counter-accusations of attacks by Georgian troops. Some journalists are saying they've seen no Russian tanks in Gori. Others (the BBC) are saying they have. Very murky details at the moment, but the cease-fire hasn't been formalized yet and it appears ready to break at any moment.

William F. Owen
08-13-2008, 01:38 PM
Saakashvili is making accusations of violence by Russian tanks in Gori. The Russians are denying any presence in Gori and making counter-accusations of attacks by Georgian troops. Some journalists are saying they've seen no Russian tanks in Gori. Others (the BBC) are saying they have. Very murky details at the moment, but the cease-fire hasn't been formalized yet and it appears ready to break at any moment.

About 3 hours ago, Sky News just had a phone interview with their man in Gori, standing next to a Russian Tank. Ain't the information age great!

Wildcat
08-13-2008, 01:52 PM
About 3 hours ago, Sky News just had a phone interview with their man in Gori, standing next to a Russian Tank. Ain't the information age great!

Yeah, I just checked Sky News and found this tidbit (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Russia---Georgia-War-Armed-Gang-Rob-Sky-Man-Outside-Gori/Article/200808215076752?lpos=World%2BNews_0&lid=ARTICLE_15076752_Russia%2B-%2BGeorgia%2BWar%253A%2BArmed%2BGang%2BRob%2BSky%2 BMan%2BOutside%2BGori).


Russia had denied its troops were making their way to Tbilisi.

But Anatoly Nagovitsyn, the Russian military's deputy chief of staff, had also categorically denied that there were any tanks on the streets of Gori....

Sky News correspondents Stuart Ramsay and Jason Farrell confirmed there were tanks on the streets in Gori, which has suffered extensively from Russian bombing raids....

"(The tanks) just rolled past us with their guns at the ready, definitely looking like they were ready to engage," he said.

Might they be Georgian tanks who moved in when the Russians supposedly vacated the premises? Or has all of Georgia's armor been destroyed by now?

Rank amateur
08-13-2008, 03:04 PM
I can't understand why the Georgians would try to fight Russia using tanks? The Georgian Army should be a Army of 6 man cells, with the best shoulder fired weapons money can buy.ain some units to specialize in hit and run tactics, and supply line disruption?

I'm glad that someone who knows what they're talking about raised this issue, because sometimes I look stupid when I ask obvious questions.
:D

I wondered if:

A) we didn't want to sell the Georgians sophisticated AT weapons or

B) we didn't want to teach these type of tactics because now that Hezbollah uses them that makes them "terrorist tactics."


After reading here though, the previously mentioned, we only trained the Georgians to get rid of terrorists because that's all we cared about, makes the most sense.

kaur
08-13-2008, 03:10 PM
The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was an American-sponsored 18-month, $64-million plan designed to increase the capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. On February 27, 2002 it began to be reported in the US media that the U.S. would send approximately two hundred United States Army Special Forces soldiers to Georgia to train Georgian troops.[citation needed] This program implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and addressed the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Train_and_Equip_Program

Mission completed. Georgians got rid of Chechens and US got allies in COIN operation in Iraq.

This is not only Hezbollah tactics. This is partly Chechen tactics, Iraqi insurgents tactics, Mujahideen tactics etc. ... but this is not politically correct tactics, because Goliath got hit to the groin. If I remember correctly van Creveld wrote in the beginning of nineties in "Transformation of war" that big states teach only their type of tactics. First, they can sale hardware and know-how. Second, this will not work against them.

Rank amateur
08-13-2008, 03:49 PM
but this is not politically correct tactics,

That's what I was getting at. Were we more worried about avoiding scandalous headlines back home - "US teaches Georgians terror tactics", than what the Georgians would need to do if they ever faced a Russian tank invasion?

Though, as others have mentioned, these teams have very high casualty rates. Maybe the Georgians weren't interested in being martyrs. A decision that I can't really disagree with.

As always, could be both, plus other factors too.

Uboat509
08-13-2008, 08:12 PM
Indeed, it seems they missed some of the key lessons of Chechnya.

I'm not so sure about that. I think that it depends on what your view of the lessons of Chechnya are. A good part of the reason for whatever success the insurgents have had against us in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we will always do our level best to avoid civilian casualties. The Russians seem to have no such compunctions. I suspect that if the Russians smell another Chechnya brewing, ie the trees start growing RPGs and ATGM things will get significantly more nasty, particularly if there are a lot of Chechnya vets in the Russian forces. I remember reading reports of how the tallest building in Grozny was no taller than two stories owing to the Russian air and artillery. The Chechan insurgents managed to do some damage to the Russians and the Russians, in turn, managed to do some significant damage to the insurgents, the civilian populace and the national infrastructure. The Georgians are probably still holding out hope for a solution that stops short of that kind of war.

SFC W

kaur
08-14-2008, 07:34 AM
Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.

http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-yuzhnoy-osetii-89-fotografiy-arkadiya-babchenko/

Stan
08-14-2008, 10:11 AM
Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.

http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-yuzhnoy-osetii-89-fotografiy-arkadiya-babchenko/

Great link and photos, Kaur !
Not to sound ungrateful, but it seems all those burning tank shots are the same 4 or 5 in all the Russian press. Begs the question: Just how many Georgian tanks were "actually" destroyed by Russian armor?

On another note, looks like we're cleared to go there and help out, as long as we dress like civilians :D

Ilusat Päeva Sulle, Stan

Jedburgh
08-14-2008, 02:26 PM
FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.chang.russiaresurgentgeorgia.html)

.....No doubt Russia’s military action in Georgia will prompt many countries to view Moscow in a sharper light, from the capitals of Europe to Beijing and Tokyo. However the world eventually interprets Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s civil conflict—whether as a “humanitarian effort” as Moscow portrays or as a “full scale invasion” as Tbilisi portrays—it does demonstrate the Russian military’s renewed ability to prosecute a relatively complex, high-intensity combined arms operation. Still, the evidently high state of readiness of such a broad array of Russian military units across all three services raises more questions about Moscow’s intentions and planning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

jmm99
08-14-2008, 04:28 PM
should end anyone's thoughts about how the Georgians should have defended their border (sealing the Roki Tunnel, etc.).

One wonders what old Uncle Joe (½ Geo., ½ Oss.) would think about all of this - as the Russians took his home town of Gori.


Joseph Stalin was born Ioseb Besarionis Dzhugashvili in Gori, Tiflis to Besarion Dzhugashvili, an Ossetian [8] cobbler who owned his own workshop, and Ketevan Geladze a Georgian who was born a serf.
[8] Simon Sebag Montefiore. Young Stalin. 2007. ISBN 978-0-297-85068-7 p19

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalin

Ken White
08-14-2008, 05:07 PM
FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.chang.russiaresurgentgeorgia.html)IIRC, the Russians had moved elements nearer to Georgia back in June-early July as a counter to the biennial Immediate Response Exercise (US, Georgia, Armenia and others) that began 15 Jul and ended 28 Jul. There's a lot more we don't know, open source, than we do but based on what I've seen since they had probably instituted provocations or very at least tacitly encouraged Georgia to attack, I suspect the fine hand of the FSB and a long time -- a year or more -- contingency plan. Time will tell.

Such a plan likely included all the things cited in the linked article and quite probably entailed prep, rehearsals and moves well prior to May or June predicated on Russian plan execution at Endex of the JEX and the beginning of the Olympics. Add to that some of the comments above in this thread and I don't see any significant improvement in Russian performance -- other than use of the media -- and, importantly, Vlad's shrewdness and will, which should not be underestimated. :eek:

Who, of course, was out of town and on international TV at the time, thus having a perfect alibi -- and allowing Dmitry to appear to be the BBMFIC. He loves it when a plan comes together... :cool:

kaur
08-14-2008, 06:01 PM
I agree more with this opinion.


Still, for serious military analysts, the remarkable thing has been how little Russian performance has changed over the years (and decades, and even centuries). Overwhelming force—the sledgehammer blow—remains the Russian approach to warfare. Nothing wrong with that in theory—it’s essentially the Powell Doctrine (which the Bush administration ignored in Iraq, leading to a near-disaster). The problem is that the Russian military remains indiscriminate in its targeting and horribly sloppy in its execution. Their sledgehammers tend to hit everything in the general area.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/assault-on-georgia-exclusive-military-analysis-on-south-ossetia-conflict.htm

OPFOR Battle Book ST-107 gives better overview.

Only outsider who who has entered Tshinvali.

http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=europe&c=georgi

Cavguy
08-15-2008, 07:31 AM
Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.

The answer I came up with would have been Javelin Missiles. Fire and forget, will take out a T-80 (or an M1). Could have made life nasty in the armored columns.

Just a late night musing.

kaur
08-15-2008, 09:00 AM
Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

Rank amateur
08-15-2008, 12:46 PM
Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

The terrain in Georgia offers more potential ambush locations.

http://lsd-25.ru/img/navoine-ru_IMG_9513.jpg

Also, Hezbollah countered the bombing of potential ambush locations by spending 5 or 6 years digging in. With only a handful of roads, deep buried IEDs and EFPs would've been effective. Of course, we didn't want the Georgians doing that. Plus, making the Russians angry probably would've convinced them to flatten Tbilisi. "Don't poke the bear" is probably Georgia's only option. To bad we forgot that. It's really too bad they forgot that.

kaur
08-15-2008, 01:47 PM
Just to add some backround info to my last post.

Terrain.


Mosaic of Forests, Meadows and Marshes

Almost half of Estonian territory (47.6 per cent) is under forest and woodlands; the area of forest stands has more than doubled during the last 50 years and is still growing.

Forests and woodlands are not evenly distributed in Estonia. The largest forests can be found in the northeast and in Mid-Estonia — a zone stretching from the Northern coast to the Latvian border.

Owing to abundant precipitation and slight run-off, Estonia is rich in wetlands. There are some 165 000 marshes greater than one hectare in area, of which 132 peatlands are larger than 1000 ha. The total area of marshes and swamp forests measures 1 009 101 ha which is over one fifth (22.3 per cent) of the country’s territory. Only Estonia’s northern neighbour, Finland, has a higher percentage (31) of peatland.

Approximately two thirds of the marshes in Estonia began as lakes which were gradually turned into quagmires by the spreading shoreline vegetation. The rest of Estonian swamps were formed by an opposite process, the paludification of mineral land.

http://www.einst.ee/publications/nature/

It's all about TTP, but during the exercise I described, opponent failed.

About foresest. Most of the collective farms are dead. Grandparents, who were mostly peasant are now in the end of their life cycle. Children are useing those farms mostly like summer houses. This all means that there is no need for fields for agricultural purpuse. What happens to the field, if you don't use it? During first ten years there are bushes. After that comes forest.

Cavguy
08-15-2008, 03:16 PM
Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

Thanks for the insight. As a tanker, I just know the fire and forget cpability of the Javelin scares me. Capable of top attack from 2.5k, with night sights, the "shoot and scoot" capability would seem ideal for a light unit seeking to harass armored formations. Get in range, pop a few off, and withdraw fast. Might work as the stinger did against the Russian helicopters in Afghanistan. It is also remarkably easy to use. Stories from SF employment with Pesh in northern Iraq (OIF 2003) is that Javelins decimated an Iraqi BN and forced a withdrawal.

Doesn't suprise me on the Russian counter-ambush tactics. Their COIN philosophy from Chechnya is brutal and effective.

Van
08-15-2008, 03:31 PM
Cavguy said:

Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.

EFPs?

Cavguy
08-15-2008, 03:52 PM
Cavguy said:


EFPs?

Requires knowing the standard Russian lines of advance, and a population willing to hide the emplacers. EFP's work best in the "urban jungle" where the insurgent can get close to the road and hide in the populace.

Javelin is much more flexible.

jmm99
08-15-2008, 04:54 PM
re: cavguy & kaur
....Finnish military school....

Curious if there was any discussion with Finnish officers (as opposed to the Finnish trained officers) about differences in Russ & Finn anti-ambush tactics - and the reasons for the Finnish tactics.

I suppose one reason might be that the Finns are such inherently sensitive people. :D

A better reason, I suspect, would be reflection back to the Winter-Continuation War and to avoid when advancing running into the defensive "motti" tactic (cutting up Russian armored columns into bite-sized pieces). Of course, Suomi has a lot more suomaat (swamplands) and erämaat (hunting wildernesses) to allow such tactics - and a hell of a lot of good ambush places to be "bombed"..

--------------------------
The Finns elected the Spike, rather than Javelin, for their own defensive purposes.


Finns buy Israeli missile tested on Lebanese civilians
Nicholas Blanford
Daily Star staff
Finland has agreed to purchase an Israeli anti-tank missile that members of UNIFIL’s Finnish battalion saw being test-fired against civilian targets in south Lebanon over a 16-month period. ....

http://www.generalaoun.org/july8-12.html
http://www.eurospike.com/downloads/EuroSpike-Profile-and-Products-02-Aug-07-f.pdf

Finn use of Spike & not Javelin; going to MBT LAW for this year & next.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipment_of_the_Finnish_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_(missile)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLAW


Puolustusvoimille uusia lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia
20.12.2007 09:25
Puolustusvoimat hankkii uusia, huippunykyaikaisia NLAW-lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia, jotka toimittaa ruotsalainen Saab Bofors Dynamics Ab. Hankinnan arvo on 38 miljoonaa euroa. ...

http://www.mil.fi/laitokset/tiedotteet/3635.dsp

reed11b
08-15-2008, 05:12 PM
How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's? Also any word on effectivness of the Russian "Active" defenses against the Javelin? I ask becouse good IR capability could be a strong counter to the Javelin.
Reed

Render
08-15-2008, 07:29 PM
Wouldn't Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?

All of which are issues not relevant to the average graduate of Frunze.

SISSI,
R

badtux
08-15-2008, 07:51 PM
How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's?


The Russians claim that they're upgrading their T-72's with gear to deal with IR ATGM's, but like many Russian claims it is to be taken with a grain of salt. The T-90 is supposedly armed with the appropriate sensors and devices for dealing with IR and laser-guided missiles and the Russians claim it can deal with Javelin, but how well it works in actual combat... (shrug).

In any event, Javelin is good, but would not have been effective in this war because the rugged terrain was controlled by the Ossetian irregulars, who would have simply taken out any hunter-killer teams that tried to set up there. I am not sure how well you are familiar with the mountainous terrain of the region, but once you get away from the foothills that you saw near Tskhinvali, the terrain goes pretty much vertical and it's pretty much impossible to move through it without serious mountaineering gear or on the established roads -- which were under the control of the Ossetian irregulars. The terrain makes Afghanistan look like Florida ruggedness-wise. Once tanks reach the plains, then you have the problem of the sheer size and bulk of the Javelin system plus vulnerability to air strikes plus tanks and artillery using HE on you. It is not until you get to the cities that the hunter-killer teams would become effective, and Russia avoided sending tanks into the cities and towns until it was clear that the Georgian military had evacuated them.

In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.

Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response. Even under the more stringent standards of U.S. tort law, if you consider the NATO treaty as a contract, Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali would have been considered "bad faith" and thus rendered that self defense clause null and void (is it self defense if you yourself started the war?). Some folks here seem to have an overly ambitious notion of the power of paper. Sorry, folks. In international relations, it all boils down in the end to enlightened self interest and power. The paper is useful only insofar as it makes explicit such. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper. In the case of the current Georgian action, Georgia having that piece of paper in hand would have changed things not a lick -- it is not in the self-interest of Europe to start WWIII over Georgia, and thus it would not have happened.

Jedburgh
08-15-2008, 08:23 PM
Just today morning I found from Russian MoD site that they are denying involvement of Chechen "Vostok" and "Zapad" units. This info has vanished now. Reuters says that "Vostok" is in.
NCW, 15 Aug 08: Wanted Chechen Commander Leads his Battalion against Georgian Forces (http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?articleid=2374375)

Kavkazky Uzel reported on August 13 that members of the Chechen-manned Vostok battalion of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) were among the Russian forces that invaded Georgia. According to the website, the Vostok fighters were located in area of the Georgian town of Gori along with Sulim Yamadaev, the Vostok battalion commander. Yamadaev, who became a target of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s wrath following a confrontation and apparent shootout last April involving Vostok members and security forces loyal to Kadyrov, was put on Russia’s federal wanted list (http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?issue_id=4584) earlier this month.

Kavkazky Uzel quoted a correspondent for the Gazeta.ru website as saying that he had been told by several Russian servicemen that Yamadaev and the Vostok battalion were deployed in the “conflict zone” in South Ossetia. Meanwhile, the website (http://www.gzt.ru/) of the newspaper Gazeta, reported on August 12 that the Vostok battalion was located near Gori and that Yamadaev had led it in an assault on the Georgian village of Kvemo-Nikoz.....

Rex Brynen
08-15-2008, 10:47 PM
Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response.

That's not an entirely accurate reading of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which doesn't require any unanimity at all for individual member states to take action. However, the treaty doesn't require armed force in response to an armed attack, but rather "such action as [each state] deems necessary."

Treaty obligations, i would argue, have somewhat more weight than simply transitory self-interest, for a variety of reasons: the create incentives to demonstrate credibility, they modify public and international expectations, and they create webs of institutional interest and interaction that modify the ways situations are analyzed and interests are perceived within government. NATO membership, for example, has profoundly changed the way that the Canadian military, the Canadian government, and the Canadian public view the world.

Indeed, its precisely because most NATO members see the Treaty and alliance as something more than a fiction that most were opposed to Georgian membership.

jmm99
08-15-2008, 11:05 PM
from Render
....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?

Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.

Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).

All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).

The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.


The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.

http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61

But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?

Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces

Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia

---------------------------------------
What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.

Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:


Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."

The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".

Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.

Rank amateur
08-16-2008, 02:03 AM
Requires knowing the standard Russian lines of advance, and a population willing to hide the emplacers.

Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.

Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)

jcustis
08-16-2008, 02:33 AM
In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.

I'm not sure I follow. What does the size and bulk of the Javelin have to do with anything, especially bringing in many systems? You can move them in the back of a pickup truck if you have to.

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 02:45 AM
Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.

Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)

The bottlenecks were all north of T town. South of T town were almost Ukraine-like lowlands agricultural areas.
Seriosu mountaineering could have been avoided by helicopter insertion from the rear slope.

The firing position choice for ATGM teams would have been delicate, though.
Forward slope would have been suicidal.
The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.

I believe it comes down to quite the same success factors as in comparably slow lowlands warfare;
- keep enemy air power away and
- keep enemy artillery suppressed or at least seriously hindered by counterfire.
Some LRRPs could have guaranteed effective artillery fire without much high-tech for the Georgians, but I guess that's just like a raid on the tunnel something that the Georgians simply forgot to do.

Ken White
08-16-2008, 04:36 AM
...I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)'Some' being the operative word. 'Some' doesn't work, it has to be most...

Not that easy.

William F. Owen
08-16-2008, 06:49 AM
Javelin is much more flexible.

..and Spike (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OW3ka2TFjmQ&feature=related)more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.

I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.

Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.

...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.

Cavguy
08-16-2008, 07:17 AM
..and Spike (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OW3ka2TFjmQ&feature=related)more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.

I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.

Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.

...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.

As a tanker, long range, high powered, top attack, fire and forget ATGM's scare me. I'll admit it. And there's no good countermeasure, although the Russians claim some. Fortunately, the only armies that have them in bulk are friendly to us.

Agreed, with the right tactics and employment, it could do a lot of damage to a numerically superior mechanized force.

kaur
08-16-2008, 07:34 AM
Fuch said


The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.

Strix mortar round would be good alternative.

About military geography. Why Russians moved to town Gori? This is out ot LO borders, this is out of OSCE conflict zone borders? My humble opinion is that here starts the huge plain terrain until Tbilisi. It's easier to fight possible Georgian counter-attack. If this is the rationale, then tail wags dog or how the saying is.

About Finnish plans.

http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/sotilaallinen_maanpuolustus/sotmp_englanti_02.pdf

About T-90


Moreover, because of design differences between the domestic and export versions, the small batches of tanks ordered for the Russian army are expensive to produce. For example, the price of a T-90 rose from 42 million rubles in 2006 to 58 million in 2007 – an increase of 38%. This level of inflation can hardly be matched by similar increases in defense budget allocations, so a massive armored forces capability increase is highly unlikely.

http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2008/item2/article4/

Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.

http://vasi.net/2008/08/14/gruzinskaja_doblestnaja_armija_v_lesakh_juzhnojj_o setii.html

William F. Owen
08-16-2008, 12:11 PM
Infantry attempting tank killing is actually well covered in concept terms. The Soviets developed the Corps level Machine Gun Artillery Battalions, and you also have the all the English and Simpkin stuff written in the 1980s.

While I am a fan of guided weapons in terms of infantry fire support I don't think infantry companies should aim to fight units of armoured vehicles, while dismounted. I think it requires highly mobile, well trained Formation level Guided Weapons Companies.

You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.

- yes you can hope that they are ordered to do something stupid, as in the Lebanon, but once they understand what you are doing, you are dead in you bunkers.

Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.

Rank amateur
08-16-2008, 01:30 PM
'Some' being the operative word. 'Some' doesn't work, it has to be most...


Depends on your opponents aversion to causalities. By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense. But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.

Rank amateur
08-16-2008, 01:42 PM
You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on

Good point. If the Georgians could move in and out of ambush position - or whatever you want to call them - the Ruswsian "blast everything" tactic is less effective.



Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.

Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.

William F. Owen
08-16-2008, 02:45 PM
Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.

I concur. I was referring to decisive action at the tactical level, without which you tend to loose lots of folks, though you may win the war.

I do think that Georgia could exhaust Russia by attrition over time, to allow the diplomatic means to kick in. An all out 14-day effort is not beyond asking, in terms of an achievable capability.

jmm99
08-16-2008, 03:08 PM
from kaur
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.

Not nice stuff - should be required viewing for all politicians who would lightly send men off to war.


from kaur
About Finnish plans.

Booklet is a good summary of FDF overall; even though as 2002 document (so, based on 2001 White Paper), it is before 2004 White Paper.

Follow-up reading would be that 2004 paper and defense projection to 2025, at MoD:

http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_2160_English_White_paper_2004_1_.pdf
http://www.defmin.fi/files/674/Securely_into_the_future_-_strategy_2025.pdf

---------------------------
For those that don't know, Finland Proper (Turku region) owes its original settlement (a few 1000 years ago) to people from Estonia, who crossed the gulf by ship. Or, in the view of one a bit drunken Karelian, "Estonians are Finns who didn't learn to swim." Since I'm Ostrobothnian, I had to disagree, of course.

One ancestor, Pahwals Pass (and his two brothers) were from, or of ancestry from, the island of Runö. Family story from ca. 1500 - so, not easy to prove (although it is plausible).

Ken White
08-16-2008, 03:20 PM
Depends on your opponents aversion to causalities.Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability. With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one...
...By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense.Possibly true -- that it was successful obviously owed a very great deal to Israeli incompetence and miscalculation, so the 'credit' is not all due to Hezbollah. It is quite dangerous to assume that a tactic that works in a particular geographic, state of training and cultural setting (and all are very important) can be universally applied. Not to mention that whenever someone pulls off a successful offense or defense, every military guy in the world studies it in an effort to develop a counter -- usually successfully...
But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.Now that's true -- but I suspect there's a lot more to it than that. On both sides. Russia's op was a FSB op with the well prepped and rehearsed military as an instrument. What was Georgia's?

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 03:27 PM
@Kaur:
STRIX has a terribly small footprint. I don't remember the correct data, but it's so small that a single target should better not move.
To aim at a road when a coluimn is passing might be promising, but some self-guided munitions have a tendency to not lead enough on fast moving targets afaik.


You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.

Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.

The emphasis on mobility is a bit questionable imho. Getting away is important, but any emphasis on being faster is probably misleading.

The mobility-emphasizing tank destroyer concept of WW2 was not the expected success, whereas the StuG concept (always inferior in mobility to its major enemy T-34) that rested much of its AT tactics on old field artillery ambush tactics was a success (different environments and generally difficult to compare, but the opinions about the TD concept are afaik still rather negative).

The other reason is less military history than OR-like.
What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.
The speed aspect is the one that convinces me the least.
- not the tank's speed counts, but the tank unit speed
- 40-75 km/h depending on surface/type and depths of probably 5-15 km before the tanks do a lot of harm:
How much time does that give for leading an AT unit into a favourable position, probably more than once? Consider that the AT teams don't dictate the direction of the attack, they have time lags because they have to react.

A success in an AT mission requires imho either well-prepared ambushes, a lot of brute fireower or a combination of enemy mobility degradation and own mobility.
The MBT's speed is imho quite uninteresting. It's the unit's speed that counts, and that's under influence by some external factors (real and fake minefields, ECM against radio comm, intimidation by multi-spectral smoke walls - who wants to move into the unknown?).

Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?

William F. Owen
08-16-2008, 04:01 PM
@ Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.


@ What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.

@ Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?

@ I am not trying to suggest that anti-armour ambushes have not been historically successful, but that is not the point. As you say right time and place, so ensuring you have the freedom of action to exploit the opportunity is critical. Being on foot with 52kgs of equipment is not a way to lengthen the odds in your favour. If man power and resources are limited, you can't be ready on ever route, and if there are very few routes, the enemy is pretty much going to guess you may seek to deny them those routes and act accordingly.

@ More mobile means retaining the freedom of action, to move. Speed is only one parameter in that regard. If you can go places he can't, you have greater freedom, and speed may be totally irrelevant.

@ If he has greater mobility, he can simply bypass you or disengage. What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 04:35 PM
What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.

exploit=pursuit?

Pursuit is a risyky & difficult activity anyway.
To destroy a withdrawing opponent requires a lot of excess speed.

Pursuit was historically probably more about territory gains than destruction - but AT units rarely if ever have the mission to gain ground.

The whole speed issue loses relevance once one considers a battlefield with many units instead of a unit duel. A tank battalion that evades an AT company might run into another deadly threat.

William F. Owen
08-16-2008, 04:42 PM
exploit=pursuit?


Exploit in terms of core functions mean use the opportunity created. Realise the benefit of the strike. It may well mean withdraw.

Pursuit is risky at the tactical level, which is why the Russians have always taught/ tried to apply it at the operational level.

Ken White
08-16-2008, 04:43 PM
also...... :D

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 09:29 PM
some pictures

This is apparently a photo from northern SO (north of T town). It might be from Northern Ossetia as well (I cannot guarantee that it's from SO).
http://img91.imageshack.us/img91/8119/northernsoqy0.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
http://img91.imageshack.us/img91/8119/northernsoqy0.8b0c771d76.jpg (http://g.imageshack.us/g.php?h=91&i=northernsoqy0.jpg)
Have a look at the terrain.
No good opportunities for concealment- neither for those in the valley nor for ambushers on high ground. FO's on high ground and aerial recce would have had perfect conditions, though.

This is south of T town.
http://img399.imageshack.us/img399/8936/southofttownmn6.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
http://img399.imageshack.us/img399/8936/southofttownmn6.fc13887446.jpg (http://g.imageshack.us/g.php?h=399&i=southofttownmn6.jpg)
Excellent mechanized/armoured unit terrain. Terrible terrain for infantry. Terrible terrain for an army under air attack.

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 09:30 PM
A T-62 with partial slat armour, part of a late-coming unit (late-coming unit of 19th MRD or from another unit).
http://img81.imageshack.us/img81/2623/t62withslatsle0.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
http://img81.imageshack.us/img81/2623/t62withslatsle0.cc60f14d95.jpg (http://g.imageshack.us/g.php?h=81&i=t62withslatsle0.jpg)
In 2008 probably only useful as a good weather infantry fire support vehicle.
Nevertheless; it shows that the Russians used some very old equipment (also some BTR-70's).
I've already seen articles that claim a Russian technological superiority; T-80's and -90's, BMP-2 and -3, Tunguska, BTR-90 - of these were so far only Tunguska and BMP-2 confirmed afaik. Mediocre variants of T-72, BMP-1/2 and BTR-80's were afaik typical, especially for the five advance guard battalions and the peacekeepers (which had teh BMP-1's without ATGM).

Camouflaged (I think that this could be called "concealed" as well) Tunguska:
http://img504.imageshack.us/img504/9499/340xmn0ln9.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
http://img504.imageshack.us/img504/9499/340xmn0ln9.7a1c236fb3.jpg (http://g.imageshack.us/g.php?h=504&i=340xmn0ln9.jpg)
The first photos of the war showed no other camouflage than what the factory had applied. Later in the war appeared some photos of bushes with guns like this and photos of tanks wih marginal foliage for camouflage.
Maybe they only applied some camouflage materials once they had some longer breaks. They seemed to lack camouflage netting.


(I had to break this into two replies because the forum software counted 8 instead of 4 photos due to the integral links).

Rank amateur
08-16-2008, 10:12 PM
Nice pics. Thanks, I learned a lot.


Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability.

The Beirut barracks bombing destroyed very little military equipment, yet lead to a complete withdrawal: like you say, every case is different.

Back on topic: the fact that the Russians aren't averse to causalities left the Georgians with few realistic options.

Fuchs
08-16-2008, 11:36 PM
Google Earth already helps a lot to understand the terrain (as do good maps, of course).

I cannot post the snapshots from Google Earth due to copyright limitations, but everyone can use that free program and see quite acceptable quality imagery of South Ossetia.
There were four major different terrains;
- valley without much concealment (north of the combat zones only)
- mountains without much concealment (east/west, but not very close to the combat zones
- the city and several villages
- agricultural fields
The Russian march to the combat zone offered very different conditions for potential combat than the areas where the decisive combat took place at apparently rather short ranges - and then there's again a lot of long line-of-sight agricultural terrain south of the combat zone (and where the Georgian artillery and other support were apparently exposed to Rusian air attacks).

Ken White
08-16-2008, 11:51 PM
...The Beirut barracks bombing destroyed very little military equipment, yet lead to a complete withdrawal: like you say, every case is different.and you left this off your quote of me:

"With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one..."

Had you not forgotten that portion of my comment, it might have occurred to you that we and the Russians have quite different idea on casualties. That's a cultural thing. Loss of combat capability is a very practical thing that transcends culture.

The withdrawal from Beirut was an indicator of loss of will. It was one of several US failures that directly contributed to our being in Iraq today. Still, it was not a combat confrontation between opposing armed forces and is not really germane to your point -- or mine.

badtux
08-17-2008, 06:10 AM
Could hunter-killer teams at the bottlenecks north of T-town stopped the Russian advance? Answer: No. That territory was controlled by the Ossetian militia. Same deal with the mountain and valley terrain all the way to the military tunnel. You could not simply drive a pickup truck full of Javelins up the road and stash them all over the place as reloads for your Javelin teams. You could not blast out hidden bunkers into the slopes for your teams to use for concealment as the Russians approached. The most you could have done would have been to insert a few teams onto backslopes via helicopter and have them mountaineer to the foreslopes. That is where the size and weight of the Javelin system comes into play. Basically, you could not have sufficient reloads available to take out more than a couple of tanks with any given three-man team because you simply couldn't hump enough reloads to do more than that. The Russians would have simply shoved the burning tanks off the side of the road after taking out the hunter-killer team, and moved on.

South of Tskhinvali, the terrain gives over to agricultural fields. There, the open view lines make the tank the queen of the battlefield. Infantry are either bypassed or blown up with artillery or direct fire at long distance. The mobility to get your hunter-killer teams into place in front of whatever line of advance the tanks intend to use is impaired by artillery and air support, meaning that the majority of your hunter-killer teams are pinned down where their missiles will do no harm. Once again you will perhaps manage to take out a few tanks with the few hunter-killer teams who happen to be in place in whatever line of advance was chosen for the tanks, but once again you are not going to stop the Russian advance with hunter-killer teams in this scenario.

Immediately to the north of Tskhinvali was hilly wooded terrain. This is the ideal place for hunter-killer teams. If Georgia had possessed good ATGM's, this is where they would have done the most good. Georgia actually did control most of this terrain during the early parts of the fighting, and were using it to fire artillery down into Tskhinvali, resulting in most of the Ossetian militia evacuating the city other than a small rearguard that they left behind as a delaying action until Russian assistance came. A hundred or so Javelins here would have made life tough for the Russians, because they would have had to send in the infantry with artillery support to clear these woods after the first few tanks blew up. The eventual outcome would have been the same though because the Georgians simply did not have the manpower to mount a defense in depth here and had not had time to dig in deep enough to make it hard for infantry to root them out since this was terrain that had been controlled by the Ossetian militia prior to their offensive.

In short, this pretty much shows you why the Georgians want South Ossetia so bad. You basically cannot defend Georgia from attacks coming from Russia unless you have South Ossetia and do a Lebanon on it -- build bunkers and implacements all along the route from North Ossetia and fill them to the brim with ATGM's. Everything south of Tskhinvali to Gori is tank country and you aren't stopping the Russians there.

Compare/contrast to Lebanon. There, Hezbollah controlled the terrain prior to the war. Lebanon's border with Israel is very short, and the population of young military-age men is high because the Shia breed like rabbits. Hezbollah dug into the hills like gophers and overcame the mobility advantage of Israeli tanks via the simple expedient of sheer manpower -- wherever an Israeli tank went, there was a Hezbollah hunter-killer team with bunkers filled to the top with ATGM's behind them. Hezbollah could not actually stop the Israelis from going anywhere they wanted to go, but they could make it either very slow for the Israelis since the Israeli infantry would have to dismount and go de-mine the roads and fields and clean out the hunter-killer teams, or if the Israelis went fast Hezbollah could make it very costly for the Israelis. Israel was very casualty-aware and eventually, despite tactical victory in every encounter with Hezbollah, decided that their strategic objective (the elimination of Hezbollah) was not achievable within costs that Israel could afford, and left. In short, the constricted geographic area, the ability to prepare the terrain beforehand, and the high available manpower eliminating the mobility advantage of the tanks by simply assuring that wherever the tanks went, there Hezbollah would be. All these factors combined to make it too expensive both in casualties and money (because Israel had to call up her reserves, which shuts down the entire Israeli economy for the duration) for Israel to achieve their strategic goals.

However, it is much easier for Russia to achieve their strategic goals here. Possession of Tskhinvali was easily achievable within costs that were acceptable to Russia, thereby putting Georgia and the world on notice that at any time Russia could send their forces further into the country and destroy anything they wished to destroy -- such as, say, those pipelines. I think the Russians are quite satisfied right now, thank you very much. I think good ATGM's and MANPAD's in the hands of the Georgian military could have made the Russian victory more difficult, but given the limited Russian objectives in this offensive, and the fact that the defensible terrain was controlled by the Ossetian militia prior to the war, I seriously doubt they could have changed the outcome.

kaur
08-17-2008, 07:42 AM
1. Ratzel, you mean this strategy?

http://www.aeinstein.org/

This worked once :)

http://www.singingrevolution.com/

2. Fuchs, what can do German artillery EMP shells against this kind of columns? Are they already in depots or still on designers tables?

Strix has small foot print, but if you add to my description of Estonian terrain, which has nice narrow channels of movement "little" handwork with saws and demolition, then this should not matter.

3. About NATO/US military plans by RAND.


Chapter Five:
European Theater: A Russia-Baltics Game

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG112/

kaur
08-17-2008, 08:51 AM
[
B]The Russian-Georgian War: Implications for the Middle East [/B]

Ariel Cohen



Lessons from the War

Lessons for the Middle East and Israel from the Russian-Georgian War abound, and apply both to military operations, cyber-warfare, and strategic information operations. The most important of these are:

Watch Out for the Bear - and Other Beasts! Russian continental power is on the rise. Israel should understand it and not provoke Moscow unnecessarily, while defending its own national security interests staunchly. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary, such as Iran, is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter surprises. Just ask Saakashvili.
Strategic Self-Reliance. U.S. expressions of support of the kind provided to Georgia - short of an explicit mutual defense pact - may or may not result in military assistance if/when Israel is under attack, especially when the attacker has an effective deterrent, such as nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets. In the future, such an attacker could be Iran or an Arab country armed with atomic weapons. Israel can and should rely on its own deterrent - a massive survivable second-strike capability.
Intelligence Failure. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on the Russian threat to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is something to remember when looking at recent American intelligence assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training of Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas. Both are deeply flawed. There is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence.
Air Power Is Not Sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea Fleet, special forces, and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons still apply: the use of overwhelming force in the war's center of gravity by implementing a combined air-land-sea operation may be twentieth century, but it does work.6 Israel should have been taught this lesson after the last war with Hizbullah.
Surprise and Speed of Operations Still Matter - as they have for the four thousand years of the recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and parliaments were on vacation.
Do Not Cringe - within reason - from taking military casualties and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200 soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher enemy, like the Japanese or the Germans, or even Hizbullah, could well suffer a proportionally higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.
Information and Psychological Warfare Is Paramount. So is cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007 against Estonia), shutting down key websites. Russia was ready with accusations and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, shifting the information operation playing field from "aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore up support and boost morale at home.

http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=2402&TTL=The_Russian-Georgian_War:_Implications_for_the_Middle_East

kaur
08-18-2008, 05:12 AM
Here is one fresh table about military activites (in Russian).

http://www.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOTO/WEEKLY/2008/032/vlast_flag_1.gif

First symbol shows the area controlled by Russian forces.

http://www.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOTO/DAILY/2008/145M/_2008145m-05-01.jpg

kaur
08-18-2008, 08:03 AM
Gen. Vyacheslav Borisov eased up on security and allowed dozens of journalists to enter Gori. They were allowed no farther than the checkpoint before. The general himself rides around the city in a black Land Rover with Georgian license plates and gives orders. When asked when the army would leave the local area, he answered loudly, “We came here first and we will leave last. When we receive the order.”

http://www.kommersant.com/p1012852/Russia_Georgia_South_Ossetia_conflict/

kaur
08-18-2008, 08:24 AM
Ossetians provoked Georgians intentionally, and any response, tough or mild, would have been used anyway as a pretext for attack. Even if Georgians had taken it lying down, then Abkhazians would anyway have started their prepared operation of cleaning-up the upper Kodori. When the war is planned, there is always the pretext.


According to testimony by witnesses, the missile brigade of the 58th Army was put on the Georgian territory through Rokskiy Tunnel. This brigade is equipped with the MLRS “Uragan” and ballistic missiles “Tochka-U”. The “Grad” systems with caliber of 122 mm, unlike the more powerful “Uragan”, are little effective when striking cities or dug in troops. The “Tochka-U” (with the range of 110 km) is capable of reaching Tbilisi and vicinities from the district of Tskhinvali. Its high-explosive and fragmentation warhead covers 3 hectares, while the cassette one covers 7 hectares.

MLRS “Uragan” and “Tochka-U” were used in mass for shooting in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000, which caused mass death of innocent civilians and the destruction. Last week some targets in the Western Georgia were shot at from Abkhazia with the use of rockets “Tochka-U”. The launches were registered by the American global system of monitoring the missile launch. Abkhazian authorities stated it’s them to have done that shooting. Now Russia may allege it’s Ossetians shooting at Tbilisi as a revenge for Tskhinvali. Similar attacks, undoubtedly, would cause a terrible panic in Tbilisi, which might help overthrowing the Saakashvili’s regime.

http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/59/01.html


In the meanwhile, the Human Rights Watch working in the zone of conflict has made a statement about unreliability of information about the number of killed. “Judging from experience of other armed conflicts, the number of wounded is three times as big as that of killed” said the organization’s expert Tatiana Lokshina, who is in the South Ossetia now, to a Novaya Gazeta correspondent. “If the Russian media speak of 2 thousand killed, then there must be at least 6 thousand wounded people, and probably tens of thousands. However, when visiting the field hospitals in the Northern and South Ossetia, the doctors reported to us about tens – not even hundreds – of the wounded. In this conflict we are dealing with inhuman quantity of misinformation. No one can really understand what has actually happened here”.

http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/59/00.html

Ken White
08-18-2008, 03:25 PM
You do good work...;)

Jedburgh
08-20-2008, 01:15 PM
Asia Times, 20 Aug 08 (same piece published restricted-access in JDW two days ago):

Georgian Planning Flaws Led to Failure (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH20Ag01.html)

.....In light of the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious underestimation of the scale and scope of the Russian response.

The first of these factors, an over-estimation of Georgian capabilities, is rooted in the US-run $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP (http://georgian.georgia.usembassy.gov/gtep.html)) and the subsequent Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP (http://www.eucom.mil/english/GSSOP/index.asp)). Yet despite the seemingly impressive US effort, even after several years of training and equipping, the Georgian military essentially remains divided between four light infantry brigades, consisting of US-trained group of comparatively well-paid, professional servicemen, and a much larger, poorly-trained conscript force plagued by low morale and inadequate pay.

Moreover, neither US program was ever aimed at enhancing the combat readiness or offensive capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. Designed as a flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP was never aimed at providing the Georgian military with offensive capabilities, but merely provided training and equipment for 2,600 Georgian army and Interior Ministry forces using company infantry tactics with the intended goal of acquiring limited counter-terrorism capabilities. Similarly, the goal of the US-run Sustainment and Stability Operations Program was merely to prepare select Georgian units for deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While the limited value of the US military assistance did not seem to lower Georgian confidence, the second factor of under-estimating the Russian response was rooted in Georgia's mistaken threat perception. Specifically, Georgia's strategic assessment, reflected in its three guiding plans, the National Security Concept, National Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy, each disregarded any direct threat from Russia, stating that there was "little possibility of open military aggression against Georgia", and defining "the probability of direct aggression" against Georgia as "relatively low".

And perhaps most importantly, the actual state of readiness of the Georgian armed forces suggests that although the Georgian offensive may have been more than adequate against local forces in South Ossetia, they faced insurmountable challenges when confronted by a much more combat-capable and over-powering Russian force.

Thus, Georgian deficiencies from not being able to wage or defend against large-scale combat operations involving a major armed force, lacking any combined-arms experience or training, and from having insufficient logistical support and inadequate air defenses, combined to doom Georgia's operational goals in South Ossetia from the very start.

Ron Humphrey
08-20-2008, 01:22 PM
The Russians taking the US humvees that where at the port and reportedly Georgian security forces hostages.

You don't suppose those will end up being the

US backed Georgian and Chechnian Rebel fighters who were reportedly on their way to stir up things in Gori

Also in the roundup
Link (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/19/AR2008081900204.html)

Render
08-20-2008, 08:24 PM
AK-47's?

Not the AK-74's and AK-74u's seen in numerous photos of Georgian troops?

I've already seen one picture of a South Ossetian (Russian allied Cossack) militia member carrying an RPK with an M-4 carbine slung on his back.

I would imagine the Georgian in country stockpile of M-4 carbines and their 5.56mm ammo would have been limited to training material used by Georgian troops bound for Iraq and therefor in rather short supply.

===

I'm guessing the SAM defences around the Roki tunnel entrances must be pretty thick by now...

LOST
OPPORTUNITIES,
R

kaur
08-21-2008, 05:33 AM
Investigators Can't Count the Bodies


The Russian Prosecutor General’s investigative committee presented preliminary results in the criminal case connected with events in South Ossetia. The committee has been able to document the deaths of only 133 civilians, although the leadership of the unrecognized republic reported 1492 deaths. The number of peacekeepers killed remains unknown. However, genocide of the Ossetians carried out by Georgia has been established.

http://www.kommersant.com/p1013890/Russia_Georgia_South_Ossetia_conflict/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7572635.stm

Stan
08-21-2008, 05:46 AM
Got a kick out of this RIA Novosti O&A (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080820/116169189.html) regarding the Russian fleet vs the USN in the Black Sea. The last sentence strikes me funny however, with analysts concluding the very capable Georgia military, but with no spirit to fight. The reports we have from our teams abroad indicate otherwise.



"Our first encounter with far from the best foreign army has shown that the Georgians were equipped with better aircraft, tanks and communications. And what if they had fighter planes and state-of-the-art air defenses? It was our luck that Georgian soldiers proved to be so chicken-hearted."



U.S. could tie down Russia's Black Sea Fleet - analyst

The United States could send its warships to help Georgia. Yesterday the Russian General Staff confirmed this news: according to its sources, American naval forces will enter the Black Sea by the end of August. If this happens, Russia's Black Sea Fleet will be tied down, Georgia finds itself protected by U.S. ship air defenses, and all of the North Caucasus will come within the range of U.S. naval missiles.

... in the opinion of military expert Konstantin Makiyenko, even a modern cruiser and a few destroyers will be enough to neutralize Russia's Black Sea Fleet: "Today it is a museum-like collection of mismatched forces."
Theoretically, Moscow could send forces from other fleets to the Black Sea, but there is practically nothing to send. "The Northern Fleet acts as a nuclear deterrent," Makiyenko said. "The Pacific Fleet is too far away and has no forces suitable for the task."

The Baltic Fleet is compact-sized and well-balanced and has what is required, but its ships will be exposed to NATO's might while still en route to the Black Sea.

"If the Americans approach Poti and Batumi, we will have only one option left to save face: turn our ships back," said a Black Sea Fleet source.

The pro-nuclear bias should be corrected, and as soon as possible, say specialists.

Ron Humphrey
08-21-2008, 01:34 PM
Investigators Can't Count the Bodies



http://www.kommersant.com/p1013890/Russia_Georgia_South_Ossetia_conflict/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7572635.stm

I'm sure there will be more confirmed eventually regardless of what might have to be scewed or slightly redefined in order to do so.

In the meantime if I were someone in SO who managed to get big bro pulled into this whole mess on apparently such inaccurate and inflated information, I think I'd be sweating a lot right now, not to mention making sure I had my LWAT filled out:eek:


Another part to the whole thing is just like any crime scene, Since the Russians have been taking so long to "withdraw" their forces, by the time any internationally recognized investigators actually get to look into things it would be having a frat party at a crime scene then trying to come in and gather usable data.

Then again I'm sure that's not the intent??

kaur
08-26-2008, 06:23 PM
Is there anyone who can explain me the logic?

On the first photo, there are Georgian villages.

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/EEF4F1A349D9B4CB852574B0006D71D9/$File/unosat_DMG_geo080825.pdf?OpenElement

On the second photo, there is Tshinvali, which was under both side land and air forces attack during 2 days.

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/1269E9CB4650B9B3852574AD007513A6/$File/unosat_DMG_geo080822.pdf?OpenElement

Why are villages more destroyed than Tshinvali?

kaur
08-26-2008, 06:26 PM
Georgian MFA gives explanation.


Purpose of this document

In seeking to justify its invasion of Georgia, Russia has claimed that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported "surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however, Moscow continues to refuse to make public the time at which Russia launched its invasion into Georgia.

As the following timeline makes clear, Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control —and after confirmation that a massive Russian land force had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel.

This was the culmination of months of meticulous planning by Russia; 40,000 Russian troops were soon occupying Georgia, as part of a simultaneous land, air and sea assault, unfolding a premeditated strategy that had little to do with Russia’s stated claim of protecting its recently created "citizens” in the Tskhinvali region.

http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=461&info_id=7664

Stan
08-26-2008, 06:44 PM
the democratic countries are at a decision-making threshold.



“We are face-to-face (http://www.president.ee/en/duties/press_releases.php?gid=117704) with behavior on the part of Russia that the European Union and NATO must take into account when making future choices, because these are organizations with member states and partners that are united by common values and ideals of freedom that Russia has now called into question,” the Estonian Head of State said, which he feels necessitates the restoration of the NATO security planning process, among other things. “In a situation where there is wish to destroy the democratic order and European values, it is of primary importance that the European Union and NATO maintain their solidarity and support for other democratic countries.”

Both President Ilves and Chancellor Merkel assessed Russia’s actions against Georgia to be illegal aggression against a sovereign nation.

According to the Estonian Head of State and the German Chancellor, Russia’s decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are located on Georgian territory, as independent countries only increases tensions in such a complicated situation and violates the principle of the territorial integrity.

Jedburgh
08-29-2008, 03:19 PM
HRW, 29 Aug 08: Georgia: Satellite Images Show Destruction, Ethnic Attacks (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/28/georgi19712.htm)

Recent satellite images released by the UN program UNOSAT (http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/) confirm the widespread torching (http://www.hrw.org/features/georgia/satellite/UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_082408_Highres_v3.pdf) of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch said today. Detailed analysis of the damage depicted in five ethnic Georgian villages shows the destruction (http://www.hrw.org/features/georgia/satellite/UNOSAT_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_Highres.pdf) of these villages around the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was caused by intentional burning and not armed combat.

“Human Rights Watch researchers personally witnessed Ossetian militias looting and burning down ethnic Georgian villages during their research in the area,” said Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. “These satellite images indicate just how widespread the torching of these villages has been in the last two weeks.”

The new satellite images (http://www.hrw.org/features/georgia/satellite/Burning_Villages.zip), taken by a commercial satellite on August 19, were analyzed by experts of the Geneva-based UNOSAT program, which is part of the UN Institute for Training and Research and produces satellite-derived mapping in support of UN agencies and the international humanitarian community. UNOSAT experts identified visible structures on the images that were likely to have been either destroyed or severely damaged. The expert analysis indicates clear patterns (http://www.hrw.org/photos/2008/georgia0808/) of destruction that are consistent with the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch researchers working in the region.....

Render
09-05-2008, 09:18 PM
Not sure where else to put this yet...

===

Georgian Artillery Inventory prior to Russian Invasion:

The BBC is lying (again)...

Didn't anybody else notice that the bulk of the Georgian artillery inventory was left abandoned to the South and East of Gori?

Dana 152mm SP guns parked on the side of the road to Tblisi, a whole row of D-30 122mm guns left lined up on a Gori city side street. The photographic evidence of this is stark and irrefutable.

Globalsecurity/FAS reports that pre-war Georgia had just one (1) 203mm Pion 2S7 SP gun, just one (1) 2S19 SP 152mm gun, thirteen 2S5 SP 152mm guns, twenty-four 152mm Dana SP guns, fifteen (or sixteen) BM-21 MRLS, six (or eight) RM-70 MRLS, and other sources reveal less than a dozen of the Israeli made GRADLAR MRLS systems, only one of which has been confirmed as of the long range (45km) variety.

That single long range truck mounted GRADLAR system may have been the only Georgian heavy artillery to have actually responded to the Russian invasion when it was reported firing on the Russian tank column exiting the Roki Tunnel on the night of August 8-9. That firing may be indirectly confirmed by the finding of a single unexploded M85 DPICM munition, which could only have been fired by the Israeli made GRADLAR system – or placed in its found location by Russian disinformation.

The Georgian towed artillery included fourteen 152mm guns, and one hundred and eight 122mm guns.

No matter how one adds up the Georgian artillery park, it doesn’t come close to the BBC’s claims of over 300 guns. My own estimate is less then 200 total pieces in the entire inventory, the majority of which appear to have never fired at the Russians (who were outside of the normal range of those guns), but were lost in the rout south and east of Gori.

It should also be noted that for all of the visible damage sustained within the city of Tshkinvali, there were very few actual impact craters.


MY
NAME
IS,
R

Rex Brynen
09-05-2008, 09:35 PM
Georgian Artillery Inventory prior to Russian Invasion:

The BBC is lying (again)...


No matter how one adds up the Georgian artillery park, it doesn’t come close to the BBC’s claims of over 300 guns. My own estimate is less then 200 total pieces in the entire inventory, the majority of which appear to have never fired at the Russians (who were outside of the normal range of those guns), but were lost in the rout south and east of Gori.

I doubt the BBC would be "lying," which would presume deliberate falsehood. They could, of course, be misinformed, or lack the military expertise to understand certain data (rather common in the media).

The BBC report that I saw cited a total of 95 pieces of "heavy artillery" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7552012.stm) in the Georgian inventory (without defining what was "heavy," but including MRLs). Their source was Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments.

badtux
09-05-2008, 09:55 PM
An interesting source for information on recent Georgian imports (which may not be reflected in the FAS/GS totals) is the U.N. Arms Register's online database, http://disarmament.un.org . In 2007, for example, Georgia reported to the UN that it imported five 203mm PION artillery pieces from Ukraine and four 22/160mm reactive launchers from Israel. In 2006 they reported importing 57 assorted large-caliber pieces from various states, mostly 125mm DANA systems from the Czech Republic (which is retiring all their old Soviet gear) as well as a number of 122mm mortars.

In short, in this contest it appears that if Global Security / FAS said that Georgia had only a single PION artillery piece, they were operating on old information that does not include recent arms transfers to Georgia. Also note that we have no 2008 information for Georgia's arms imports, those will not be reported to the UN until the spring of next year. It would not surprise me if the BBC's total is understated also, since Jane's is typically also at least a year behind. As for what qualifies as a "large caliber artillery piece", I presume that pretty much everybody uses the U.N.'s definition, which appears to be any mortar or artillery piece over 75mm.

Render
09-06-2008, 12:24 AM
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/did-georgia-pre.html

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chechnya-sl/message/55785

Eh…

It would appear as though the BBC was repeating somebody else’s lies, this time.

=

For what must be the most obvious of reasons there are certain limitations that come with using free open source information for this kind of analysis. Not the least of which is, you get what you pay for.

Still…

No matter how one slices up the open source and very unofficial inventory of the Georgian artillery park, it just isn’t possible that they had 300 pieces of heavy artillery all firing at the Russian columns at the same time. If for no other reason then the Georgians, even by the highest of estimates, never had more than 200 pieces of heavy artillery in total. Even if one assumes a 100% reliability rate from elderly Cold War era guns and ammo…

Ok, now I’ve amused myself. I couldn’t keep a straight face while typing that last line.

GUFFAW,
R

badtux
09-06-2008, 01:42 AM
That was an interesting piece of agitprop that you linked to indeed. For example, the person who wrote it obviously has no clue as to the geography of Georgia. It is less than twenty miles from Gori to Tskhinvali and the terrain between the two is relatively flat. Gori is in the center of the country on the main highway and rail line connecting Tbilisi with the coast and Georgia itself is a relatively small country where artillery could be redeployed from one end of the country to Gori in less than a day. This can be verified via Google Earth or other such open source geomapping service. So much for that.

The question of whether Georgia had 300 tubes of heavy artillery, however, boils down to the definition of a "tube". Looking at the UN database (http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF), Georgia reported a fairly insignificant artillery section of 116 tubes in 2002, which appears to be the FAS/GlobalSecurity inventory that you reference since over half of it is D-30 towed howitzers. They made acquisitions in 2004(8 pieces), 2005(43 pieces), 2006(57 pieces), 2007(9 pieces), and presumably more in the first half of 2008. But that adds up to 233 pieces plus whatever they purchased in 2008. I seriously doubt they purchased 67 artillery pieces in the first half of 2008.

On the other hand, the hoary old 82mm SovBloc mortar is considered an artillery tube by the U.N. since it is larger than 75mm (though Georgia sensibly does not report it as such). By that standard pretty much everybody has 300 tubes of heavy artillery :D.

kaur
09-06-2008, 07:21 AM
Russian official list of South Ossetian and Russian casualties - civilians, paramilitaries and soldiers. In Russian.

http://www.regnum.ru/news/1050769.html

Here Russian side says that Russia lost 59 peacekeepers. In Russian.

http://newsru.com/arch/russia/05sep2008/victims.html

The data is really vague, because there is no precise data who were paramilitaries, South Ossetian army, armed volunteers from other parts of Russia etc.


Russian and South Ossetian officials say around 2,000 of the province's residents have been killed since Georgia began its ground and air offensive on South Ossetia on Friday.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who visited Russia's North Ossetia, where thousands of refugees from the Georgian province are being housed, called the killings an act of genocide.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080810/115933126.html

Culpeper
09-06-2008, 03:48 PM
Could someone please explain to me what happened? Didn't Georgia start an offensive that Russia was prepared for and and then Russia made sure Georgia couldn't wage war for some time?

kaur
09-06-2008, 05:53 PM
Culpepper,

This is the question of the year. EU foreign ministers decided to send their investigators (if this is the right word) to Georgia to find out how the war really started. At the moment there is Shaakashvili's word vs Russia's word. To be more precise the question is "Were Russian tanks in Roki tunnel 07.08?" I understand that Russian units were guarding the Roki tunnel entrance on the South Ossetian side with their air defence weapons and in North Ossetia's capital Vladikavkaz there were located many Russian units, that had their own rapid reaction units (due to the constant low intensity conflict in that region). They were located really close to tunnel. Russians say that these rapid reaction units enterd South Ossetia first and only after the Georgian attack. If in the end it comes out that Georgians saw ghost tanks, then I dare to compare this situation with the beginning of 2003 war, when Bush saw ghost bombs. .... AND then The Economist should apologise (again); like they did after the US failure to present the world with evidence. In the general picture this fact turns everything upside down and a lot of people have to eat their words.

badtux
09-06-2008, 07:57 PM
To be more precise the question is "Where Russian tanks in Roki tunnel 07.08?"

That actually is a detail that does not change the accuracy of the thumbnail description. Russian tanks in the Roki Tunnel would not change the fact that Georgia launched an offensive upon South Ossetia that Russia was apparently prepared for and responded to -- Georgian tanks crossed the South Ossetian border and entered Tskhinvali hours before the Russian response force arrived. The location of the response forces at the time of the Russian response to the Georgian offensive, whether in North Ossetia or South Ossetia, is a detail rather than a contradiction of any thumbnail description of the military action. It's an interesting detail, and one that would be nice to know the answer to, but still does not contradict the overall thumbnail description given above, that is:



Didn't Georgia start an offensive that Russia was prepared for and and then Russia made sure Georgia couldn't wage war for some time?


The political questions of whether Russia had a "right" to station response troops on the South Ossetian side of the Roki Tunnel, or whether Georgia had a "right" to launch an offensive if the Russians indeed did so, are left to the political thread since they are not military questions and do not affect the overall summary of the military situation.

Render
09-06-2008, 10:50 PM
It should be noted that Russian Cyberwar attacks on Georgia preceeded the Russian tanks in the Roki Tunnel by several weeks.

July 22nd, 2008

http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533

"Georgia President’s web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers"

THREATENED
WITNESS,
R

kaur
09-07-2008, 07:45 AM
badtux said:


The location of the response forces at the time of the Russian response to the Georgian offensive, whether in North Ossetia or South Ossetia, is a detail rather than a contradiction of any thumbnail description of the military action.

I think that that would be one huge scandal; as if Soviet troops entered just 1 m under the Brandenburg gates in a rush to come to help West German "peace organisations" in Berlin :)

I do understand that there was a regular traffic flow of military vehicles between South Ossetia and Russia during the last 17 years. SO troops were trained a lot by Russians in a former training base in SO and military exercises took place in the 58th Army training grounds in North Ossetia. Maybe just another such column was moving towards SO and the Georgians overreacted?

kaur
09-09-2008, 11:29 AM
Russian Air Force after Georgia, part 1


Flight's Moscow correspondent Vladimir Karnozov guest-blogs this week with a five-part after action report on the Georgia Air War, obviously from the Russian perspective. Karnozov is kindly filling in while this blogger is traveling all week on an assignment. Here's part 1.

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2008/09/russian-air-force-after-georgi.html

kaur
09-14-2008, 07:05 AM
CONTENTS




Editorial

Saakashvili: “War At Last!”



International Relations

Conflict in South Ossetia: Political Context

Implications of the Georgia-Russia War for Global Politics



War And People

The August War between Russia and Georgia

Force Development and the Armed Forces of Georgia under Saakashvili

Georgia's Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia

http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/

Stan
09-14-2008, 02:39 PM
Considering what I have available regarding aerial delivery ordnance data (or, the failure thereof), I wonder what the Russkies actual know about their overall (ahem) capabilities. Based on real data from 12 SEP 08, their "dud" rate is over 50% and climbing. That's not to say they even hit their targets... whatever those were.

However, that said perhaps it's Russian tactics to leave 250 to 500 kg bombs underground and unexploded to tie up logistics :rolleyes:

Kaur, anything in the Russian language press about delivered (dropped) Russian ordnance? Kind of hoping their egos will permit them to brag... They're real good about showing us what the Georgians abandoned in South Ossetia (albeit rounds without fuses and packed munitions), and the latest about their reactive armor sent in empty :D, but little more.

Regards, Stan

jmm99
09-15-2008, 12:26 AM
at Moscow Defense Brief.


Implications of the Georgia-Russia War for Global Politics
Fedor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief, Russia in Global Affairs
#3 (13), 2008
.......
Neighboring states now face the issue of how to guarantee their own security. Their dilemma is clear. One path is to seek the patronage of a strong state from outside of the region, finding support that goes beyond political one, to include real security guarantees. The other path is to conclude an agreement with Russia for the same type of guarantees against external threats, which also hedges against a possible worsening of relations with Russia itself.
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item2/article2/

Ah ..., back to the Treaties of Friendship.

If you remember Breakfast at Tiffany's: "Do they still put trinkets in Crackerjack boxes ?" "Yes" "Ah.. That is comforting."


same source
The reemergence of deterrence recalls not so much the Cold War (in the absence of real ideological conflict) but the type of competition typical of the 19th century. Ideological and political confusion only deepens the various imbalances that have accumulated in the world.

Perhaps, some evidence of the theory (which I think has some credence) that Vladimir Putin and Sergei Ivanov are very much influenced by the 19th century Russian nationalists. Small comfort for small countries in its path - that bear was very willing to devour.

It is interesting that to MDB, we have a "Stalinist North Korea" - so, Uncle Joe is not quite rehabilitated.

Anyway, a slick site (still under construction) - brings back memories.

kaur
09-16-2008, 08:07 AM
Georgia has released intercepted telephone calls purporting to show that part of a Russian armored regiment crossed into the separatist enclave of South Ossetia nearly a full day before Georgia’s attack on the capital, Tskhinvali, late on Aug. 7.


The intercepts circulated last week among intelligence agencies in the United States and Europe, part of a Georgian government effort to persuade the West and opposition voices at home that Georgia was under invasion and attacked defensively. Georgia argues that as a tiny and vulnerable nation allied with the West, it deserves extensive military and political support.

Georgia also provided audio files of the intercepts along with English translations to The New York Times, which made its own independent translation from the original Ossetian into Russian and then into English.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/world/europe/16georgia.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=europe

Stan
09-16-2008, 06:35 PM
Kaur, I understand there's now precise evidence that the Russians were already deep South as of 09 AUG PM and early morning 10 AUG.

I do however enjoy reading Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's recent rebuttals (http://www.rbth.rg.ru/lavrov.html)...


Our military acted in response to aggression efficiently and professionally. Maybe that is what our critics simply cannot forgive us?

It was an able ground operation. That was why we could reach our limited objectives so fast.

jmm99
09-16-2008, 08:30 PM
A while back, I asked (rhetorical question) where Sergei Ivanov was ca. 7 Aug. Now, I know, sorta ...


(from Times article, p.2)
Gen. Lt. Nikolai Uvarov of Russia ... said President Dmitri A. Medvedev had been on a cruise on the Volga River. Mr. Putin was at the Olympics in Beijing.
“The minister of defense, by the way, was on vacation in the Black Sea somewhere,” he said.

Not the worst place in the world to be for a Georgian operation - wonder where in the Black Sea. Maybe, the good general protested too loudly.

PS - Stan. I know three is a troika. If we add your buddy Lavrov, we get a fourka - is that the Russian version of a FORD.

kaur
09-17-2008, 09:59 AM
IISS Strategic Comment devoted to Georgia-RF war.

http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/latest-issue/

Russian SU-25 in Georgia. In the end of video you can see damage done by Georgian SAM's.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYRBSpi2u8U

kaur
10-02-2008, 06:04 AM
Very brave speculation by Felgenhauer.


The strategic exercise “Stability 2008” is no improvisation in response to the crisis of relations with the West after the conflict in Georgia. The defense minister Anatoly Serdiukov has noted it has been in preparation for more than one year. The intrusive troops had been mobilized and concentrated in the front lines by the beginning of August during the military exercise titled “Caucasus 2008”. Simultaneously, additional power forces were prepared for strategic support of Georgian operation, as it was not known till the end whether Americans would interfere or not. This time we landed on both feet, and now the mobilized forces and means are being trained for future, in this mega-exercise. It’s been for the first time after the Soviet Union collapse that our authority carries out military exercise intending direct preparation for the large-scale war with the West.

http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/72/03.html

jmm99
10-04-2008, 04:09 AM
Blast kills 7 Russian soldiers in South Ossetia
7 Russian soldiers killed when car explodes outside military headquarters in South Ossetia
MISHA DZHINDZHIKHASHVILI
AP News
Oct 03, 2008 15:57 EST

A car exploded Friday, killing seven soldiers outside Russia's military headquarters in South Ossetia, and Russian authorities charged it was a terrorist bombing meant to wreck the tense cease-fire that ended their war with Georgia.

Georgia's Interior Ministry blamed Russia, accusing it of arranging the blast to provide a pretext for delaying next week's scheduled withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory around South Ossetia and another Kremlin-backed separatist region, Abkhazia.....

http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=406557

Before you draw any conclusions from the headlines, read the whole article.

Competence of Russian EOD ?

Stan
10-04-2008, 05:08 PM
Competence of Russian EOD ?

Two quick comments regarding the situation and article:


There has been widespread looting and arson in ethnic Georgian villages in and around South Ossetia since the war. Residents and refugees from the area have reported the theft or confiscation of their cars by South Ossetian militias and marauders.

There's much more than mere anecdotal evidence of looting and this particular scenario affords an ideal opportunity to get into an otherwise "secure" area and cause mayhem. Based on our initial forensics, the Russians in occupied areas have far more to fear than simple VBIEDs.


Despite high tension since the war, Russian troops at checkpoints on roads leading into South Ossetia from Georgian-controlled territory often carry out only cursory searches of cars, glancing in trunks and waving drivers through.

They call themselves sappers with some actual demolitions background and even have Peace Keepers that, have and employ howitzers. :wry:

But, their Engineers and MPs are not qualified for the task at hand as noted here:


The explosion occurred Friday (http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081004/117435265.html) outside the headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the breakaway Georgian republic. A car bomb went off in a vehicle that had been moved to the capital, Tskhinvali, from a village in the buffer zone outside South Ossetia controlled by Russian forces.

As a returning volunteer opined: "This famous place now resembles the last bus stop before the end of the world!"

kaur
10-05-2008, 08:02 AM
So, is this insurgency, urban guerilla activity, terrorism etc?

It seems that North Caucasus daily routine has entered throurgh Roki tunnel.

jmm99
10-06-2008, 08:13 PM
and thought twice about posting it at all - which means I am probably screwing up.

Anyway, here is one way to cook up some very complicated theories - which seem subject to Crabtree's Bludgeon (IMO):


October 6, 2008
Justin Raimondo
Al-Qaeda in the Caucasus
A mysterious car bombing in Ossetia raises the specter of a sinister alliance ....

http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13555

Hard to separate some possible truths here from fantasies.

Stan
10-06-2008, 08:57 PM
... thought twice about posting it at all - which means I am probably screwing up.

Hard to separate some possible truths here from fantasies.

Not a bad find, but there's no evidence to back up this theory. The vehicle in question was stolen and later in front of the HQ when it went high order; and not at some patrol check point in the buffer zone. Nice touch though, adding a little Al-Qaeda to the equation.

No wonder why they won't allow EU and NATO observers into that area (just yet).

Sorry, but I'm having a hard time with this article :rolleyes:

jmm99
10-07-2008, 03:41 AM
from Stan
Sorry, but I'm having a hard time with this article

did I. Is anything in the article factually plausible ?

And, I also caught the factual error re: checkpoint.

kaur
10-07-2008, 06:14 AM
jmm99

About terrorists and insurgents in Southern Caucasus.


This program implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and addressed the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Train_and_Equip_Program


It had allegedly often been used as a base for transit, training and shipments of arms and financing by Chechen rebels and Islamic militants, many of whom followed Ruslan Gelayev.

Russia has attempted to attack the Chechen militants in the gorge. Georgia has also accused Russia of carrying out bombing raids in the gorge region in which at least one Georgian civilian was believed to have perished.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pankisi_Gorge

http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/P37

Why young people are going to mountains and resisting goverment in North Caucasus is so long story. Political stalemates (with violent solutions), bad governance, blood feud, tribalism, deprivation etc are the causes of mess. Just take a look at this site.

http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/

It just seems that free space for terrorists/insurgents has become bigger. In the North Caucasus there is same number of Russian troops but theatre has become 4000 sq km bigger.

This car bombing reminded me this Chechen act from 2002 in Grozny.

http://video.kavkazcenter.com/clips/grozny_buil.wmv

... and Znamenskoye.

http://video.kavkazcenter.com/battlefield_chechnya/znamenskoye.wmv

Goble writes about this boming here

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/10/window-on-eurasia-will-explosions-in.html

jmm99
10-07-2008, 04:27 PM
and Chechens in the news today.

Hey K, your references to Pankisi Gorge were timely.


from CSM
Georgia's Chechens relive own Russian war
Russia's military presence in Georgia has unnerved refugees who fled here from Chechnya in the 1990s.
By Paul Rimple | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the October 7, 2008 edition
.....
Pankisi Gorge, Georgia - When Russian tanks rolled toward Tbilisi, Georgia, in August, shops closed and streets emptied as residents stayed indoors, glued to their televisions and radios. A hundred miles northeast, in the mountainous enclave of Pankisi Gorge, Chechen refugees also watched Russian troops advancing on TV, but with less stupefaction and more cynicism.
.....
Four to five thousand refugees spilled over the mountain border into Pankisi Gorge and found sanctuary with fellow Muslim Kisti, ethnic Chechens who had arrived in the Georgian region some 150 years earlier.

Most refugees were women and children, though many guerrillas also used the area as a haven from which to launch operations into Russia. By 2003, however, with the help of US military training, Georgia cleared the area of these paramilitary fighters. ....

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1007/p04s01-woeu.html

So, from the viewpoint of this report, the Pankisi Gorge problem was solved in 2003.

Goble's concluding comment (in the last url cited by you) is insightful (IMO):


Areshev’s words clearly reflect the view of many in the Russian security agencies who oppose a pullback. And their beliefs, especially if carefully and cleverly articulated by Russian officials, almost certainly would find understanding among many in the West who are increasingly willing to accept Moscow’s version of the Russian-Georgian war in which Tbilisi is to blame even though it did not invade another country and Moscow is innocent even though it did.

In short, there is a lot of political spin going on - and not that much factual analysis - nothing new about that.

Stan
10-09-2008, 05:14 PM
did I. Is anything in the article factually plausible ?

And, I also caught the factual error re: checkpoint.

I'm not going to take the whole article apart, but will comment on a few paras that based on anecdotal evidence are, pathetically off, way off base.


they stopped a car with Georgian license plates in which the occupants were armed. The car was taken to a Russian checkpoint, where it promptly exploded. Nine Russian soldiers, including a Russian general in the nearby headquarters, were killed, and seven others were wounded.

The HQ was in the capital, not anywhere remotely near the buffer zone, or any check point. My previous point about Engineers performing EOD - Two very different skill fields (other than perhaps the ability to use explosives, which is also in question).


A car bomb in the Caucasus?

This is a weapon, and a method of terrorism, with a very familiar signature. It points to the introduction of a rather sinister aspect to the Russia-Georgia conflict – the entrance of radical Islamic elements on the field of battle, and clearly on the side of the Georgians.

Not sure I follow the author here. We have better criminals that barely use 250 grams of HE and do far more damage. The sad fact herein is: Russian soldiers had been stealing vehicles and property, taking said directly to the General for (ahem) inspection (and redistribution of possessed assets), and they established a pattern that even a 1st grader could follow.


Yet, far from being all-controlling, the Russkies are hardly in the drivers' seat on the far fringes of their supposedly resurgent empire...

This part I agree with. They got caught with their pants down thinking the Georgians gave up. Maybe they should consider the fact that nearly 30 percent of their targets were not hit, and, less than half of what was dropped failed to go high order. WWII munitions on a modern battlefield - maybe they were getting rid of their stockpiles :D


How many millions are we sending to Tbilisi? We're training their coast guard on American ships anchored in the Black Sea. Are we also training their intelligence service in the fine art of car bombing – or do they farm that out to the real experts?

I think the total is now collectively 25 billion ;)

Pure conjecture or, Bravo Sierra.

Sorry, can't do much more with the Obama and McCain syndromes (don't even want to).

Regards, Stan

jmm99
10-10-2008, 02:53 AM
It was interesting reading the article just discussed, and others in the popular press and spin sites, after reading through (and being a bit involved in) the threads here on Georgia.

Let us say that I was able to be much more fact-critical than I would have been without the knowledge gained from SWC. That applies to many other areas as well.

and, as to this:


Sorry, can't do much more with the Obama and McCain syndromes (don't even want to).

agreed, agreed & agreed - oh well, less than a month left. Deo Gratias.

Stan
10-13-2008, 04:44 PM
A quick email sitrep from an (ahem) observer in the buffer zone:


Overall, life in Georgia is slowly returning to normalcy with locals going about their daily routines. Interesting to note are those locals that typically cross the buffer zones and Russian checkpoints without giving it another thought. It appears that it will only be a matter of time before everything is back to normal. There are even signs of the previous infrastructure returning to normal at schools, stores and government institutions.

NGO HALO Trust is spooling up for their first month working on the UXO problems. Their initial task will be to control areas and declare those either free of UXO, or in need of additional clearance operations. HALO thinks 6 to 9 months.

Departing Russians

05 OCT planned departures actually began on the morning of the 8th !
The initial plan called for Russian units to depart in unison beginning at 0800. However, some fruity MG Kulakhmetovi ordered that each checkpoint would depart only when at least 3 EUMM members were present. If that wasn’t already confusing for the Russian troops, the good general decided that each checkpoint could depart as individuals. This only led to a further delay with some of the checkpoints deserted and “Engineering” equipment left behind. (Trust me when I say their equipment is stone age Bravo Sierra).

The Georgian locals are convinced this was intentional with Russians returning throughout the night to recover their equipment. On a side note, don’t the Russians give their peacekeepers port-a-poties when deployed? I mean seriously, they like took dumps everywhere. The Russian troops are still hanging around Akhalgori as if it was strategic (it is after all real friggin close to Tbilisi).

Say, does that Colonel you worked with in Africa still do Ace hardware? Holy Moses, he could make a killing here.

kaur
11-27-2008, 11:28 AM
Finland Sees a Familiar Pattern in Photos From the Georgia Conflict


MOSCOW — One of the stranger questions to emerge after the August conflict between Russia and Georgia: Did Russians go to war in camouflage filched from Finland?


Today, the two countries share a quiet 800-mile border. Asked whether Finnish authorities were concerned about distinguishing their troops from Russians on the battlefield, Captain Karhuvaara noted that the uniforms under scrutiny belong to troops in the Russian Ministry of the Interior, which oversees police forces inside Russia. “If Russian Ministry of the Interior troops would invade Finland,” he said, “we would have big trouble.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/europe/21finland.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=finland%20m/05&st=cse&oref=slogin

kaur
03-05-2009, 11:17 AM
The Georgia conflict of August 2008: Exponent of Russia's assertive security policy,

Marcel de Haas

Carré Januari 2009


However, if the Kremlin maintains its military
ambitions and is capable of realizing them, then the West,
confronted with a resurgent Russia, might have to change
its defence plans into those in which collective defence has
once again a central focus.

http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090101_cscp_dehaas_carre_georgia%20conflict.pdf

Jedburgh
03-06-2009, 03:46 PM
ARAG, 6 Mar 09: Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War (http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/09%2802%29CWB.pdf)

Key Points

• Russian annexation of Abakhazia and South Ossetia has increased instability throughout the region.

• Georgians will not accept annexation of their territory

• Within weeks snow will melt increasing the danger of war

• Tbilisi must be made aware of the need for restraint

• Cross-border ethnic groups possessing dual nationality are vulnerable to manipulation
Complete 21-page paper at the link.

kaur
03-13-2009, 11:54 AM
Wartime Approaching in the Caucasus

March 12, 2009


The period when war was physically impossible in the Caucasus is now almost over, but the halfhearted attempts by European Union mediators to strengthen the ceasefire have accomplished virtually nothing.


There are still several weeks left for the West to recognize the imminent threat and begin a high-level round of shuttle diplomacy to compel or coerce all sides to genuinely strengthen the ceasefire and disengage forces. Moscow must understand all the disadvantages of a new crisis and agree to strengthen the observer mission's mandate. The Georgians must find a way to contain internal political strife. The Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders must stop mindlessly provoking a new war. In short, a miracle is needed.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34690&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=aef92993f9

I just wonder why Flegenhauer left out variable "Russian internal clan fight". This has been getting sharper and sharper due to the economic crisis.

kaur
05-21-2009, 07:03 AM
The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia
Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia

TIMOTHY L. THOMAS
US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/thru-the-mountain.pdf

kaur
06-03-2009, 10:24 AM
Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War

ROGER N. McDERMOTT

Spring, 2009

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/09spring/mcdermott.pdf

kaur
12-03-2009, 01:45 PM
Fresh Russian report in Russian.

http://www.cast.ru/comments/?id=351

Fuchs
10-10-2010, 10:54 AM
I'm looking for the Russian lessons learned and for details about why a Russian general was wounded when he was with his advance guard during an ambush (I am not used to reports about modern generals - especially not Russian ones - leading from the front).

So far I found this

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/thru-the-mountain.pdf

The bad news is that Russia’s military performance was marred by inadequate equipment and organization. This point was underscored many times in the press to include by some prominent military figures. Electronic warfare systems did not work well, command and control was hampered by radios that performed poorly, and operations were disjointed due to an
inadequate Global Satellite Navigation System (GLONASS). Night operations remained weak. In short, many of the same problems affecting the Russian armed forces in Chechnya were once again evident.


... that there were operational and combat support issues that left room for improvement. First, a lack of satellite support left the troops in an information deficit. The main problem was noted as “the lack of the requisite space grouping and GLONASS receivers.”26
Electronic warfare systems were not used to suppress Georgia’s air defense systems and there was an absence of aircraft controllers. This caused armored columns to advance without the proper cover. Second, traditionally weak areas for the Russian army, such as nighttime actions, reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support, remain weaknesses. Night sighting devices are blinded by gunfire flashes and old tanks did not have global navigation systems or friend or foe systems. Third, it was rare to see vehicles
fitted with shields or additional armor and, as a result, soldiers still prefer to ride on the outside of these vehicles where, if thrown off, they have a chance of surviving. There was poor interaction between tanks and motorized infantry units and, on occasion, units sometimes fired on one another. Fourth, there was a shortage of modern precision weapons in the Russian air
force and virtually a total lack of drones. Pchela drones used in Chechnya are
practically worn out. Finally, a 1998 decision to remove helicopters from the ground force has turned out to be a problem. There are no experts in army air aviation in the air force that know how to support ground troops.

Recommendations by Tsyganok included creating information troops that take into account state and military media, modernizing forces by the end of 2015, reconstituting army aviation in the combined-arms armies and corps, and equipping aircraft and helicopter gunships with modern systems.

It is also necessary to put more satellites in orbit (24 are needed but only 13 are in orbit) and procure more GLONASS receivers, to develop friend or foe systems, and to develop new radar stations. Journalist Mikhail Lukanin wrote that insufficient use was made of ground attack and tactical aviation. Other errors on the part of Russia’s armed forces were a lack of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, inadequate organization of communications, inadequate personal gear and equipment, and the absence of precision weapons.

On 19 August the Presidium of the Globalization Problems Institute talked about South Ossetia and the question of information. They concluded that the Russian political and military leadership experienced indescribable panic and confusion when they realized Georgia was actually
invading South Ossetia. They also wrote that the Russian military command acted with incompetence. Soldiers in many cases had no knowledge of how to counter Georgian guidance systems which were searching for Russian signals from radios and mobile telephones. They concluded that the main goal of the war was to draw the Russian army into military operations.
...
Deputies wanted to know why all types of reconnaissance had failed, why there were serious organizational shortcomings, why there were such tangible losses in heavy equipment (helicopters, jet aircraft, etc.) against such a haphazard army, and why so much equipment
broke down while the world was watching.

Overall nothing unusual, such problems happen in most wars after long periods without involvement in a similar war - and the Russian forces were obviously impaired in their abilities by more than a decade of very tight budgets.

I found no explanation for the WIA of a formation leader in an advance party, though.

kaur
10-20-2010, 07:52 PM
I'm looking for the Russian lessons learned and for details about why a Russian general was wounded when he was with his advance guard during an ambush (I am not used to reports about modern generals - especially not Russian ones - leading from the front).

Take a look at page 61.

http://www.cast.ru/files/The_Tanks_of_August_sm_eng.pdf

From Wikipedia in Russian you can find also some details :)

Хрулёв, Анатолий Николаевич

kaur
11-08-2010, 07:36 AM
Sustainable Armor Capability for Small Powers: The Case of Georgia in the August War - Frederic Labarre

http://www.bdcol.ee/files/files/documents/Research/BSDR2009%282%29/6_%20Labarre%20-%20Sustainable%20Armor%20Capability%20for%20Small% 20Powers.pdf

kaur
04-06-2011, 07:39 PM
Many pic sets by Russian soldiers.

Captured US Hummers http://twower.livejournal.com/518110.html#cutid1

Russian airborne unit in Poti harbour http://twower.livejournal.com/518883.html#cutid1

Georgian Senaki base http://twower.livejournal.com/519639.html#cutid1

Airborne unit arrives by train http://twower.livejournal.com/520917.html#cutid1

kaur
08-30-2012, 09:23 AM
Pic series by Russian war correspondent. A lot of old pics, but some are new.

http://starshinazapasa.livejournal.com/438748.html

http://starshinazapasa.livejournal.com/445358.html

http://starshinazapasa.livejournal.com/440020.html