Social Media: the widest impact of (merged thread)

[zenpundit]

While the senior leadership of the military's ambivalent attitude to blogs and bandwidth-hogging sites is well known, most of the young rank and file tend to mirror the US population in their internet activity.

In Wikinomics (http://www.wikinomics.com/book/), the authors cite the example of FBI field agents using a first person shooter MMOG ( massive multiplayer online game) platform to "talk shop" as they game and get around cumbersome, dilatory, official, FBI channels to share information on cases that they are working. I'm curious as to the extent to which troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan have been availing themselves of social media apps for reasons other than personal amusement.

[SteveMetz]

The Army recently unblocked blogger and blogspot from its computers. Of course, the American Enterprise Institute and Stanley Foundation are still blocked (but not the official North Korean press agency or most jihadist sites).

[selil]

Along the same lines a recent CRS report on the Army and Avatars (virtual worlds) recently came out http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22857.pdf . There is some intersting discussion about Web2.0 (2.5?)....

[zenpundit]

Thanks selil - that was a lot of good data points for so short a paper.

Regarding the bit on HiPiHi, Robert Scoble indicated yesterday on Twitter that the Chinese have a social networking app that's hit 250 million users.

Steve,

Great avatar! Has the Army also become more encouraging of personnel blogging or just allowing greater access to the blogosphere?

[selil]

Zenpundit,

I saw the scoble twitter, send me or add me (selil) to your twitter feed if you get a chance. I'm wondering how many on the SWC are now googling twitter....?

[Jack]

I'd like feedback on a study we at OSD New Media had done through the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at NDU. Completed in May, the New Media and Strategic Communication (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/newmedia2008.pdf) study was to look at the issues in the news media industry and help us identify where we, as an organization, need to adapt to the transformation. Thoughts? Ideas? Comments?

[SWJED]

I'd like feedback on a study we at OSD New Media had done through the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at NDU. Completed in May, the New Media and Strategic Communication (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/newmedia2008.pdf) study was to look at the issues in the news media industry and help us identify where we, as an organization, need to adapt to the transformation. Thoughts? Ideas? Comments?

Jack,

Thanks much for posting this as the SWJ and Council are part of the 'new media' - even us old farts around here.

Council Members,

Please review and comment as part of the Small Wars Journal / Council community of interest. OSD had gone to great lengths to adapt - and Jack's office in particular had been very supportive of the efforts of mil bloggers and other members of the new media.

It's a new world out there...

Dave

[selil]

First, Page 3 chart on "strategic to tactical", JP 3-13 defines several of those elements within the Information Operations sphere (specifically, psyop, deception).

Second, Page 5, DIME venn made me laugh as I have that exact construct in a web posting I did and briefing on the topic. In the same colors. Why is it funny? I got hammered for not using MID-LIFE for the same discussion.

I really like the content, connectivity, cognition. Would be nice to see a venn of that linked to the physical, data, cognition constructs that exist. No I don't know how to do that.

Interesting support and counter point is Blog Wars by Perlmutter.

On first blush I like it. Now mulling.

[davidbfpo]

The paper is rather dense reading on a VDU and the layout needs to be improved.

I dislike the emphasis on the DoD being at the centre of strategic communications etc. Yes, relevant in combat zones like Afghanistan, not in Sub-Saharan Africa for example. What the USA has to communicate must come from clearly identifiable civilian sources, not the military.

The focus appears to be on the developed world, with it's electronic media access and variety of sources. In the less developed world internet access is the exception; radio plays a far more important role - cue the BBC World Service.

After 7/7 in London the Metropolitan Police (MPS) explained at a seminar that although they had excellent contacts with the mainstream media (of all types) they had next to no contact with two hundred plus non-English speaking radio outlets broadcasting in London. Reaching them would take time and a willingness to accept what MPS wanted to communicate. Curiously the multi-lingual press were not covered and in the UK their reporting / editorials appear rarely to reach outside their readership.

What media do non-American audiences use? I cannot recall seeing a mention of that, although it could have been in the footnotes.

IMHO designing a communication strategy without clearly stating that is doomed to fail.

Accepting a strategy is selected how will non-government US-based / US-owned media react? There will be no common "song sheet", rather I suspect the reverse - except in times of crisis.

What is the message the strategy seeks to deliver? That the USA is a good neighbour / friend and the worst enemy you can ever wish for once awakened?

In summary, I would not start this uphill fight based on this document.

[Ken White]

on my first reading; very bad format, over long, redundancy, developed world centric, inadequate attention to AM radio, etc. etc. DoD should only be involved at the operational and tactical level and then only lightly. It does not really address interface or dealing with a potentially hostile US media presence who will challenge anything done by the government just so they can say they did...

That said, however, like Sam, I'm still mulling.

[Ron Humphrey]

on my first reading; very bad format, over long, redundancy, developed world centric, inadequate attention to AM radio, etc. etc. DoD should only be involved at the operational and tactical level and then only lightly. It does not really address interface or dealing with a potentially hostile US media presence who will challenge anything done by the government just so they can say they did...

That said, however, like Sam, I'm still mulling.

Long enough that I decided to wait till next week to really dig into it.

That said I think this right towards the beginning is somewhat indicative of the problem your both pointing out.


DoD has the opportunity, if it so chooses, to strengthen its participation in national public diplomacy
and public affaires engagements. At the conclusion of the paper, we present recommendations in support of DoD public
diplomacy and public affairs transformation
DoD must not act alone: The interagency community and affected
stakeholders must craft a strategic path forward under the auspices of a common national communication strategy.

Not so sure that it sure ever be approached as DOD strengthening a position IN National public diplomacy. The two need to be definitively different in both their approaches and who's pushing them. Somewhat of a slippery slope there which pols might pull mil in whence they do not belong. That said the second part; NOT acting alone and making sure there is a common strategy and path forward is where DOD belongs as it is one of the largest stakeholders in that strategies success or failure; seems on the right track.

[Jack]

THanx Dave.

[Jack]

First, Page 3 chart on "strategic to tactical", JP 3-13 defines several of those elements within the Information Operations sphere (specifically, psyop, deception).

Second, Page 5, DIME venn made me laugh as I have that exact construct in a web posting I did and briefing on the topic. In the same colors. Why is it funny? I got hammered for not using MID-LIFE for the same discussion.

I really like the content, connectivity, cognition. Would be nice to see a venn of that linked to the physical, data, cognition constructs that exist. No I don't know how to do that.

Interesting support and counter point is Blog Wars by Perlmutter.

On first blush I like it. Now mulling.

I'd really like to see that venn diagram in 3D rather than on a plane. We work in spheres of information, influence, action, etc. and on a plane the diagram can't get at the actual dynamics and connectivity of the cognitive factors sharing the content. I think I just gave myself a headache ...

Currently reading Perlmutter and 9th Edition of Effective Public Relations. Good stuff in both.

[BayonetBrant]

I've downloaded and hoping to read it at work today while all the suits are in their management meeting.

[selil]

I'd like feedback on a study we at OSD New Media had done through the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at NDU. Completed in May, the New Media and Strategic Communication (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/newmedia2008.pdf) study was to look at the issues in the news media industry and help us identify where we, as an organization, need to adapt to the transformation. Thoughts? Ideas? Comments?

Ok, I’ve read through extensively and would like to make a few more substantive comments. I am an academic, I do many reviews for journal articles, I am not intending to be harsh or hyper critical, If the authors (since this is an open review) feel slighted or angry my deep and sincere apologies.

Now for the long knives.

First opinion: The article is well constructed with an adequate if opinionated and biased review of the literature. Contrary examples and an obvious lack of understanding of the deeper technologies involved and societal adoption mechanisms for technology are woefully missing. The literature review appears to have a high selectivity bias and “cherry picking” of particular cases that underlie the primary themes.

The title new media refers extensively to concepts and ideas that are actually rather old. Though popular mythos suggests that the blogosphere and Web 2.0 technologies and user cases are relatively new they actually extend to the beginnings of the Internet and the original collaboration models that spawned the Internet.

The second paragraph (page 1) has a laundry list of basic assumptions, criticism, and detailed analysis of the problem space and not one citation to back the assertions up. If this were an academic paper that I was reviewing this abstract it would go back to be re-worked and supported by evidence rather than supposition even if that supposition is backed up by common understanding.

Once the authors on page 2 get into the problem statement citations begin to appear. Yet within the problem statement bias is heavily weighted. As a paper I can only assume advocacy is the primary mission of the article and put bias and selectivity up on the shelf again ignoring it other than to note it as I did as a pervasive theme.

Just say no to using “Furthermore, although....” the use of high intensity written gymnastics on web forums is fun, but should be slashed from serious writing.

Discussing the global information environment (page 3) in the first paragraph several opinions are detailed that may be erroneous. Content creation is mixed with tools and slowly baked over a set of communication strategies. Contrarian examples to the proposed issues are as simplistic as convergence. The global information environment is not growing it is shrinking to a singular set of devices and allowing for richer, faster content creation. The global information environment could be said to becoming more streamlined. Contrary assumptions to what appears to be an argument of megalithic growth. Perhaps a better term than growth or shrinkage would be resilient. Though a semantical deconstruction it shows a particular point of view that may be missing the changes that have happened to media. The media conglomerate with centralized management and practices is being pushed around by the decentralized highly resilient blogosphere. The blogosphere rather than being something new is a return to the decentralized localized news reporting that was dominate for the first two centuries of American politics.

Figure 1 may be from doctrinal documents but it should be replaced fast. It mixes a set of concepts and strategies that are recursively referential at different levels. See JP-3-13 for a detailed understanding of why I would disagree with it.

Quick note: Isn’t the 2006 National Security Strategy as cited a classified or FOUO document? Was the unclassified version used instead and if so wouldn’t the citation reflect that? I’m truly not sure about this.

Page 4, column two second paragraph. At this point convergence is finally discussed but it would appear that two different authors never coordinated between this section and earlier sections.

Page 5, is DIME still the primary model used by JFCOM?

Defining connectivity (page 6) using Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary? Missing context and so many opportunities to do it better.

Page 6 - 9 is a detailed discussion about the different media formats and it transitions all the way through Web 2.0. There is a bit of an issue with stopping there at Web 2.0 (a buzzword to be sure). What about the next step? Lots of people are trying to claim vision into the Web 3.0 world from semantic web to final convergence scions. The point that is missed is the social implications rather than the information implications take on a new meaning. Few forward thinkers are considering the social changes implicit in adoption of technologies. Here on SWJ/C there is an entire thread discussing various enthusiasms for the rejection of technology (military technocentricity) carried out through a variety of communication technologies. The irony still eludes the various posters.

Page 11 starting with recommendations. The first paragraph means what? A buzzword laden discussion is fun, but it links together various concepts and ideas but it is hardly a recommendation.

Page 12 Organization and structure from the second column. The DOD should create a news organization? Haven’t you argued fairly consistently that those agencies are failing and being replaced and you offer up this? The authors go on to suggest new media methods, but they should have either started with that, or been more consistent with their message.

Criticism is not meant to be accepted or rejected but considered as part of the process of communication and understanding. With all the above criticism and several pages of notes that aren’t included for brevity I can still say the document makes an interesting case. The actual purpose though discussed up front may not have been fully achieved by the time the conclusion occurs. However, it still shows maturity within the realm of new media (sic) on the parts of the authors. Which is refreshing.

[Ron Humphrey]

Sam,

Remind me to never take one of your courses. With my writing prowess or lack thereof it would take six tries for me to get me my rough draft right:wry:

Excellent breakdown BTW , I've been trying to read through it but for some reason I keep wondering off on mental tangets when I try:confused:

[davidbfpo]

A partial response to the article posted here; illustrates the difficulties posed to communication today: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/features/1867306/reading-on-the-web-is-not-really-reading.thtml

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

Insurgency Research Group, 24 Sep 08: How Insurgents Shape the Media Landscape (http://insurgencyresearchgroup.wordpress.com/2008/09/24/how-insurgents-shape-the-media-landscape/)

Last week the Insurgency Research Group at KCL held a workshop on How Insurgents Shape the Media Landscape. The theme of the workshop was as follows:

The so-called Age of Terror, often said to have begun in 1968, changed irrevocably with the end of the Cold War. Where formerly news access had been sought by insurgents eager to draw global attention to their cause and struggles, the choice of what to highlight and where to focus journalistic coverage remained with news organisations. When ‘hot’ stories were supplanted by breaking news in fresh locations, public interest would inevitably shift with the departing reporters. However by the turn of the 1990s free market expansion accompanied the demise of bipolar ideological politics. At the same time information and communications technologies proliferated, offering terrorists low-cost, efficient ways of recording and disseminating their own message. An explosion in global satellite television and the consumer internet expanded the reach and penetration of groups no longer solely interested in conventional state overthrow. Instead, these aspire to transnational ideological and religious transformation by appealing to diasporas scattered around the world. Today a new wave of jihadi insurgent increasingly controls its own publicity agenda through instant connectivity of ‘battlefield’ imagery via internet, mobile telephony, and television satellite uplinks. Has the balance finally shifted away from news editors in favour of the insurgent? As time-frames between event and broadcast/publication shrink, are news organisations now wrong-footed by insurgent commanders who create and seek to shape the story? Are we in fact witnessing a revolution in the media landscape?
Daniel Bennett (a PhD student in the department who blogs at From the Frontline) has posted a 2 part report: How Insurgents Shape the Media Landscape, Part 1 (http://www.fromthefrontline.co.uk:80/blogs/index.php?blog=18&title=how_insurgents_shape_the_media_landscape&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1) and Part 2 (http://www.fromthefrontline.co.uk/blogs/index.php?blog=18&title=how_insurgents_shape_the_media_landscape_1&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1).

[Jack]

Thanx all very much. I'll be watching if someone else has more to add. I'm now going to work this into questions for further research. I know what I think I know but I'm not sure I understand all I know about what I think I know. ya know?

[Jedburgh]

MR, Jan-Feb 09: The Truth is Out There: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and Deception Operations (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art005.pdf)

......Scholars, specialists, and the press5 have paid increased attention of late to the enormous effort Iislamist groups put into producing a range of media materials (particularly, although not exclusively, on the Iinternet) designed to recruit, mobilize, instruct, and persuade. This attention is clearly warranted Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild, a U.S. Army officer specializing in information operations, put it simply: “[The enemy’s] media infrastructure is quick, it’s collaborative, it’s virtual, it’s global, it’s technical, and it’s getting better all the time.” However, this work has consistently ignored a key element of much of this material. While it is certainly true these materials serve an important role for the movement’s internal purposes, they also represent a sophisticated story-telling ability, producing texts that can serve more than one rhetorical purpose at a time. For many of these groups (although certainly not all) their center of gravity is U.S. public opinion. Certainly this is true for many groups fighting coalition forces in Iiraq. Iin everything they do in terms of the creation of persuasive texts, they will have that audience at least partially in mind. Not every persuasive text is meant to influence audiences in the Iislamic world. The U.S. military should be aware of the ramifications enemy propaganda material has for U.S. domestic opinion when considering how to respond to it.....

[CWOT]

PAO’s, IO Dudes, and PSYOPer’s, I could use some help if anyone has some recommendations.
I have been writing on and off in Small Wars Journal for the past year about foreign fighters, how they are recruited, what can be done about it, etc. I have another installment coming out in the next couple weeks but am starting to research for the next extension of this path I am on which is how to break the local communication cycles where foreign fighters are recruited. The new administration has already talked about their shift to Smart Power (which includes Strategic Communication, PSYOP, IO, etc.) which will be critical in accomplishing this. I just got done reading the study “Social Software and Security: An Initial ‘Net Assessment’” by NDU professors Dr. Mark Drapeau and Dr. Linton Wells http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Defense_Tech_Papers.htm.
It’s really good and being not so savvy on new media, a good starting point for me.
Has anyone seen any research or case studies on how the US can use the new media to influence these hard to reach audiences where foreign fighters are being recruited? places the US doesn't have a persistent presence?
The above study gives some good case studies of how new media is being used. But, I am looking for some success stories from DOD and the West that are out there, where we have used new communications platforms (like this one) to engage vulnerable audiences. I have seen stories about CENTCOM using Youtube and an article about the British text messaging against the Taliban but I haven’t found much. Also, I want to look into the implications of using these new media platforms for SC, IO, PSYOP. Any thoughts you all have would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance for any recommendations.

[goesh]

The youtube angle sounds viable and probably could be the most fruitful. I can envision what I would put out on utube to target young men in 3rd world countries with visions of swag and glory wanting to take on the infidel invaders. Conventional thinkers with traditional backgrounds in such matters should probably be avoided. I would reach out to the sub cultures of the musicians and artists, graphics people and videophiles, the avante garde, underground type type folks. Their morals and political persusasions would run contrary to yours but said obstacles are easily overcome with crisp cash as such folk often tend to be borderline impoverished.

[MCalvin]

My immediate thought would be to focus on the mobile space first, rather than the workstation-based internet platforms, like laptop or desktop computers. The mobile space is growing faster and is much more pervasive in many of the at-risk areas where I would imagine you are focused. From a technical, implementation standpoint, companies like Clickatell (http://bit.ly/vVH2m) already provide the capability to reach mobile users across different carries in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan with a relatively simple, commercial platform and API. A strong presence in the mobile space will create room to then drive people towards more content-rich and flexible platforms, like youtube or facebook, which could carry an even stronger message. Some new media platforms, like twitter, coexist within both spaces as well. I apologize for not having any case studies or examples at hand, but I thought this bit of information might be useful from the tech/implementation side.

Another consideration when looking at social media in a counterinsurgency capacity is to anticipate and plan for the intimidation that will likely arise when insurgents begin to target members of the population who are identified as using these technologies, whether mobile phones or computers. Any new media strategy must be built upon the ability to protect the population (or potential terrorist/insurgent recruits that we wish to influence) while also providing the communications channels for effective IO. Just a thought.

Hopefully this will at least give you a few points to think about!

[Ron Humphrey]

My immediate thought would be to focus on the mobile space first, rather than the workstation-based internet platforms, like laptop or desktop computers. The mobile space is growing faster and is much more pervasive in many of the at-risk areas where I would imagine you are focused. From a technical, implementation standpoint, companies like Clickatell (http://bit.ly/vVH2m) already provide the capability to reach mobile users across different carries in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan with a relatively simple, commercial platform and API. A strong presence in the mobile space will create room to then drive people towards more content-rich and flexible platforms, like youtube or facebook, which could carry an even stronger message. Some new media platforms, like twitter, coexist within both spaces as well. I apologize for not having any case studies or examples at hand, but I thought this bit of information might be useful from the tech/implementation side.

Another consideration when looking at social media in a counterinsurgency capacity is to anticipate and plan for the intimidation that will likely arise when insurgents begin to target members of the population who are identified as using these technologies, whether mobile phones or computers. Any new media strategy must be built upon the ability to protect the population (or potential terrorist/insurgent recruits that we wish to influence) while also providing the communications channels for effective IO. Just a thought.

Hopefully this will at least give you a few points to think about!

And welcome,

One thing to keep in mind is that any mass movements into the mobile realm which IMHO I agree will happen because (there's honestly little choice other than to cede that arena to one's opponents) is that it will also place the users (and their) information at a greater risk for compromise both in the information and physical domains.

So some major efforts to design and the define the how to's will probably be required in order to at least avoid the predictable issues.

[davidbfpo]

(Overlooked changing title, this is complete)

Not my area of interest, but in my reading the below book had references to how Singapore ensured Google searching for Jihad etc went to local, approved sites: 'Fighting Terrorism: Preventing the radicalisation of youth in a secular and globalised world', compiled by Abdul Halim Bin Kader; published in Singapore (free) and a very different explanation of the options.

The Kings College London (UK) Centre for has recently published a report on the web, maybe that will help: http://icsr.info/index.php (home page) and to report: http://icsr.info/news-item.php?id=21

Jihadica would be a good place to check: http://www.jihadica.com/

davidbfpo

[Hacksaw]

PJ,
Have you attempted to contact the Info Proponent Office at FT Leavenworth? Seems a logical place to discuss the topic and make inquiries... They are usually monitoring this site on and off... I will attempt to direct them toward you...

Live well and row

[MikeF]

Hi PJ.

I put together this thread to add to the work y'all are already doing. It seems that we struggle at times in the information war so maybe we could do better by leveraging those that do it well instead of reinventing the wheel. Here are several examples to consider.

v/r

Mike

Is Iraq Ready for Twitter? New Media in a War Zone (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893244,00.html)
Mark Kukis/ Time Magazine


Jack Dorsey, the founder and chairman of Twitter, sees no reason why Iraqis cannot join the growing chorus of global "tweets" appearing on computers and cell phones worldwide every day. "We've always been focused on making sure that the lowest common denominator, the weakest technology, still has a voice," said Dorsey, who was in Baghdad this week with a delegation of high-tech executives at the invitation of the State Department. Cellphone-carrying Iraqis, Dorsey said, could utilize Twitter applications on their current mobiles for a range of things, even without broadband Internet connections, which are still in short supply in Iraq. "In our case that's using Twitter through SMS [text-messaging]," Dorsey added. "What we've found in Iraq is that we have 85% penetration of the mobile market here." (Should the founders of Twitter be among the most influential people in the world? Vote for the TIME 100.)

What Dorsey means is that 85% of people in Iraq carry mobile phones, usually more than one. This is a new reality in a country where roughly six years ago cellphone were virtually nonexistent. For Dorsey and other tech executives visiting Baghdad, the merging of cell technology and the Internet looks like a potential leapfrog move in telecommunications for the country, much in the way cellphone networks lessen the need for traditional landline infrastructure. "We feel that there are some real opportunities here," said Jason Liebman, CEO and founder of Howcast, a website that offers how-to videos. (See the top 10 celebrity twitter feeds.)


Playing for Change (http://www.youtube.com/PlayingForChange)


Playing For Change is a movement to connect the world through music. Sign up for exclusive content, news and updates from hundreds of musicians and students around the globe at http://playingforchange.com

This movement is Bono (from U2) using Bob Marley's work and incorporating artist from around the world.

One more...This is Audioslave playing in Cuba- look at the reaction of the crowd. When I see what others doing, it reminds me of the creativity and ingenuity of the OSS and others during WWII.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaaHXn5qmEQ&feature=related

Just some indirect, non-military things to consider.

[CWOT]

Thanks to everyone for the great research leads. It’s amazing how behind I am on this stuff. I am just figured out how to use Microsoft Outlook. And then they spring all this new technology on me.

MCalvin, thanks for the note on Clickatell, it’s amazing I just start getting unsolicited advertising text messages on my phone last week and wondered how I ended up getting it. I guess that will be the new version of spam.

Ron Humphrey, you are exactly right. The planning and “how to” aspect will be a big one moving forward as I would imagine you can’t really train this very well right now. Another thing I am wondering about is how you stay ahead of the cycle in new media. The military fretted for years about how to get in front of the 24 hour news cycle, I can’t imagine the process for staying out in front of a 20 second information cycle.

David, thanks for those research links. I used to work with the founder of Jihadica and I am a big fan, I remember him telling me about his idea of creating it. He was the one that put me onto Small Wars Journal a couple years back and now these two locations are the only two things I read regularly. I think the days of academic journals with a 6-month turn around for publication are numbered.

Mike F, thanks for the Iraq article, Great stuff, it’s funny, it seems all media is moving to phones and laptops worldwide. And
Hacksaw, didn’t know they had an office but I’ll check it out.

I’m really interested in engaging small vulnerable audiences overseas. I brought this up a year ago in an article I wrote on Small Wars that breaking terrorist recruitment cycles requires local engagement inside of countries rather than nation wide engagement by State Department types meeting with official government folks at cocktail parties. Many thought this was impossible and told me this was a silly idea, but the more I learn about these new media platforms, the more I think local engagement could be possible. Still need to do some more research but the paper I’m publishing in the next two weeks ends my foreign fighter research for a while and I still think the number one issue is engaging audiences at the source of recruitment. Thanks for everyone’s help!

[MikeF]

PJ, something else to consider. The most notable is Greg Mortenson's work with building schools in Pakistan. I'd like to determine a way to incorporate them into our nation-building, reconstruction, and COIN operations. For example, if you want to do micro-grants, then hire the leading dude in micro-grants to do it right.

Social entrepreneurship (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_entrepreneurship) is the work of a social entrepreneur. A social entrepreneur is someone who recognizes a social problem and uses entrepreneurial principles to organize, create, and manage a venture to make social change. Whereas a business entrepreneur typically measures performance in profit and return, a social entrepreneur assesses success in terms of the impact s/he has on society. While social entrepreneurs often work through nonprofits and citizen groups, many work in the private and governmental sectors.

The main aim of a social entrepreneurship as well as social enterprise is to further social and environmental goals. Although social entrepreneurs are often non-profits, this need not be incompatible with making a profit. Social enterprises are for ‘more-than-profit,’ using blended value business models that combine a revenue-generating business with a social-value-generating structure or component.



1. David Bornstein, How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas, Oxford University Press (and others) ISBN 0-19-513805-8

2. Ashoka: Innovators for the Public (www.ashoka.org)is a nonprofit organization supporting the field of social entrepreneurship. Ashoka was founded by Bill Drayton in 1981 to identify and support leading social entrepreneurs though a Social Venture Capital approach with the goal of elevating the citizen sector to a competitive level equal to the business sector. The organization currently operates in over 60 countries and supports the work of over 2,000 social entrepreneurs, elected as Ashoka Fellows. Ashoka also creates mosaics of best practices that map the commonalities and intersections of key principles that guide Fellows’ individual solutions. [1] Ashoka’s initiatives include Changemakers, Youth Venture, and Full Economic Citizenship.

v/r

Mike

[SWJED]

GEN Dempsey,

Both the subject of your post, and that you posted it here, demonstrate the Army's commitment to the importance of leveraging collaboration, social media and Web 2.0 technologies.

A quick scan of the linked discussion thread at the Small Wars Journal clearly indicated anticipation and appreciation for the ability to observe, and perhaps even participate indirectly through providing questions, the upcoming Senior Leader Conference (SLC).

The remainder of my comments are not directly related to the SLC, rather this venue itself and my own personal observations.

I first saw your post a few hours after it was made, commenting to my colleagues that the TRADOC Commander posting on the CAC blogs was yet another indication of the Army's support for and embracement of collaboration. Returning to your post this afternoon, I was slightly surprised that no one else had taken the opportunity to respond and engage you. After all, how often does one get such an opportunity?

Notice I did not say "completely" surprised, but only "slightly" surprised. I attribute that lack of surprise to my experience observing Army Majors over the last eight years at CGSC (1 year as a student, followed by 7 years as an instructor). During that time, I personally noted a prevailing culture of "keep your head down & don't make waves." This is not only an anecdotal observation, but was supported by a custom designed critical thinking exercise I presented on more than a dozen occasions.

My decision to respond to your blog today prompted me to write up and document that exercise and the observed results. By no means is this the first time I shared the exercise, I frequently sent it to faculty members within my own department for their use if they chose to execute it. (Below my remarks I've provided links to the referenced presentation.)

I'm reminded of GEN Casey's remarks in June, via a video message, at the CGSC graduation. He explained how one of his former mentors taught him to carry an index card with one question:

-- When was the last time you allowed a subordinate to change your mind?

Upon hearing him say that, my ears perked up and I wrote it down. For what he said supported my own beliefs and the exercise I've been conducting for years. However, with all due respect to the CSA, I'd postulate that card needs to have a second question on it. And, perhaps, that second question may even be more pertinent and significant than the one he mentioned:

-- When was the last time a subordinate TRIED to change your mind?

I pose that question not as an indictment of any person's leadership style - certainly not that of the person holding the card or answering the question. Rather, I suggest that if the answer to my question is "rarely, if ever", there may be a prevailing cultural barrier preventing them from doing so.

V/R
Bob King

An Exercise in Critical Thinking (http://thoughtspray.wordpress.com/2009/08/15/an-exercise-in-critical-thinking/) - Thought Spray

Critical Thinking Exercise (http://www.slideshare.net/subbob/critical-thinking-exercise) - Slideshare

Disclaimer: As I am no longer an Army CGSC instructor, I desire to make it clear that the above words are my own personal opinion, made on my own time and do not represent my current employer or sponsor.

[Starbuck]

Based on personal experience, I would say that many (though certainly not all) majors may not have grown up with the Internet and message board culture.

I'm currently a captain and have been involved in Internet message boards since I was in high school, and even among captains, this can definitely be a fringe activity, depending on your age and demographic. Certainly, the younger crowd is a lot more liberal with what they will say and post on the Internet.

It doesn't help that the Army has mandatory annual OPSEC classes, which often turn into a massive diatribe against Facebook and blogs (even though official military sites are far worse in terms of security violations). We are bombarded by over-the-top PSAs on AFN which tell us to watch what we put on our Facebooks, because thousands of pedophiles and terrorists are looking at us. We all had to watch a mandatory video in 2004 discussing the security risks from blogs, social networking sites and the like.

Yes, these threats are real, but why do we not discuss the positive aspects of social media at the unit level? Have we ever had a mandatory video from a senior leader discussing what sorts of things we should post on our Social networking sites? We have great senior leaders such as General Odierno and Admiral Stavridis posting great blog entries, but they don't get as much attention as they should.

[Jedburgh]

IACP Center for Social Media: Supporting the Needs of Law Enforcement Online (http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org)

In partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, the IACP (http://www.theiacp.org/) launched its Center for Social Media in October 2010. The goal of the initiative is to build the capacity of law enforcement to use social media to prevent and solve crimes, strengthen police-community relations, and enhance services. IACP’s Center for Social Media serves as a clearinghouse of information and no-cost resources to help law enforcement personnel develop or enhance their agency’s use of social media and integrate Web 2.0 tools into agency operations.

[Chowing]

Al-Shabaab has just begun to tweet heavily on its new twitter account. Details on my blog http://terrorisminafrica.com/2011/12/al-shabaab-opens-twitter-account/

[Fuchs]

Did anyone ever a published study on whether there's a growing divide between English and Arabic language jihadists?

I assume the language barrier would create such a divide over time - after all, not all wannabe jihadists can speak Arabic and thus the anglophone jihadism should be more than mere outward-oriented propaganda.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to London-based ICSR:
Yesterday, the Somali Islamist militia al-Shabaab announced that it was taking questions from jihadi forum users for an ‘open meeting’ with its official spokesman, Sheikh Ali Dhere. The group will take questions via email and private forum messages until Saturday, at which point they will be answered by its spokesman in a video.

In a move which suggests a continuation of the burgeoning relationship between the Somali militia and al-Qaeda, the announcement by al-Shabaab’s al-Kataib Media Foundation was made through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), al-Qaeda’s main jihadi media centre.

Later comments:
Al-Shabaab’s intentions appear to be to fill the vacuum in the production of English-language jihadi propaganda left by the deaths of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, who were the chief producers of these types of materials. In recent months, the group has released a number of English-language materials formulated specifically to recruit and insight Muslims in the West.

Such a course of action or perceived action is likely to increase US concern with the group, although I remain unconvinced that Al-Shabaab has the capability to reach faraway targets unlike AQAP who had the "Underpants" bomber and the photocopier plot.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

I have amended the thread's title from 'Al-Shabaab Has a Twitter Account' to 'Al-Shabaab's use of modern media' to incorporate more than Twitter.

Plus the thread has been moved to the Media arena.

[SWJ Blog]

Social Media and Unconventional Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/social-media-and-unconventional-warfare)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/social-media-and-unconventional-warfare) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Social Media and the Arab Spring (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-and-the-arab-spring)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-and-the-arab-spring) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary by John McCubbin, with a profound opener:
the events of this past week have firmly pushed all military operations into a new era of information management and exploitation......This past week we have seen what I believe is a new chapter in how information is created, captured, analysed and used during high profile conflict situations.

Context gives way to timing:
At 1429 on 14th November a tweet appeared on the IDF’s Twittter account announcing that they were about to commence operations. Two minutes later they tweeted about the strike against Hamas leader Ahmed Al-Jabari. Within the hour, also on Twitter, the Palestinian Al Qassam Brigade had acknowledged his death and by 1905 that evening the IDF had posted video footage of the strike on their blog and YouTube.

Link:http://i-logue.com/how-social-media-is-changing-conflict-reporting/

Even with the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War as other examples, I do have doubts whether social media can have impact in remote areas, like Mali, or where one protagonist takes active measures to degrade the network that supports sending data.

There is a main thread 'Social Media and Unconventional Warfare' an dthis may one day be merged there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15367

[Bill Moore]

A good article, but I suspect Twitter and Facebook for the most part reinforce existing narratives. For example, IDF posts near real time they have become operations in Gaza against terrorist targets. Those who identify Hamas as terrorists will accept this because it reinforces their narrative, and they may appreciate the timely update. Those who support Hamas, or associate Hamas with the larger Palestinian issue, will interpret this as Israeli aggression regardless of Israel beating Hamas by a couple of minutes in getting their Twitter post out first.

Over time I think select u-tube videos that go viral showing civilian casualties on both sides can erode support for either side, and conversely increase support for the other, but there must be more to it than speed?

David, SM can have an impact in remote areas indirectly just as missionaries and others have an impact in remote areas. Those who travel to these remote areas carry the messages from SM with them, so while the connected world interacts real time exchanging information (or disinformation) via social media, those in remote areas that may not be connected will eventually hear it if they're a population that people desire to influence. If they're not then it is largely irrelevant.

[Bill Moore]

O.K, O.K., in some cases SM can create a narrative.....

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=142551#post142551


Questions are being raised surrounding the sudden and secret hanging of Kasab in India.


From International Business Times India:
Quote:
Ajmal Kasab a Victim of Dengue or Was He Hanged till Death? Soon after the news of Mohammed Ajmal Kasab's hanging was announced, several people started raising questions about the government's secrecy over his execution. While several people, including the victims' families supported the decision, many have raised doubts on the social networking sites asking whether the terrorist was actually hanged or he died of dengue.

The rumor of Kasab dying of dengue has become a hot topic of discussion on Twitter.

Excerpt From OneIndia News:
Quote:


Mumbai, Nov 21: The swiftness and secrecy in which the execution of Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab took place have come as a surprise to many. People are wondering why so much secrecy was maintained before hanging Kasab? Kasab was hanged till death at Yerwada jail in Pune around 7.30 am on Wednesday, Nov 21. Kasab, who was held in Mumbai's Arthur Road jail, was then moved to Pune's Yerwada prison."We kept secrecy. It was important to maintain secrecy in this matter," Shinde said, adding that Pakistan had been informed of the execution.

[davidbfpo]

John McCubbin has responded:
You raised a couple of interesting issues in your post.

I noted your comments on remote areas. The impact on remote areas is certainly an issue as today. However, I have just spent some time with the NGO sector and the rate of change in these regions is staggering. On Internet access the greatest growth regions between 2000-2012 were Africa (3,606%), the Middle East (2,639%) and Latin America (1,310%). Penetration rates are skill low but these are dramatic changes. It is a similar story on mobile phone access with Africa and the Middle East growing by 104% last year. By the end of this year 65% of the population in Africa will have a mobile phone account. The NGOs are only just waking up to the impact of this and the military should also be thinking hard about what it means for special or expeditionary force ops.

The more worrying aspect is your second point on state interference and manipulation. Certainly in Iraq and today in Syria there is clear evidence of state intercept and psyops. I also suspect the number of times I have seen the IDF and Al Qassam Bde blogs going off-line over the past couple of days has been due to individual or state sponsored cyber dabbling. Identifying reliable in-country sources and getting them an encrypted satphone should be a key consideration, although even that has its risks.

[SWJ Blog]

Social Media Intelligence (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-intelligence)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-intelligence) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Ann Marie Slaughter, of R2P fame, pops in different places and thanks to a "lurker" she has written 'The Media Cold War', which appears on a Swiss think tank's website:http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/the-media-cold-war-2

She opens with:
An information war has erupted around the world. The battle lines are drawn between those governments that regard the free flow of information, and the ability to access it, as a matter of fundamental human rights, and those that regard official control of information as a fundamental sovereign prerogative. The contest is being waged institutionally in organizations like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and daily in countries like Syria.

It ends with:
Americans say that sunlight is the best disinfectant. Citizens’ access to information is an essential tool to hold governments accountable. Government efforts to manipulate or block information should be presumed to be an abuse of power – one intended to mask many other abuses.

[davidbfpo]

An ICSR report 'Who Matters Online: Measuring influence, evaluating content and countering violent extremism in online social networks' by J.M. Berger & Bill Strathearn. Fifty-three pages and in the summary ends with:
Finally, we believe that these metrics are only a starting point for the study of extremist use of social media. We believe the metrics and approaches here can be further refined, and we believe that additional research may yield substantial new
techniques for monitoring and countering the promotion of violent ideologies online.

Link:http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICSR_Berger-and-Strathearn.pdf

[davidbfpo]

In this short paper, we summarise the key opportunities and difficulties social media presents for engagement, intelligence and enforcement. It is far from comprehensive and offers only an overview of each. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the police will now certainly need to use social media to engage with the public, collect intelligence, and investigate crime, both on- and offline. This needs new settlements – in doctrine, resource allocation, operation, capability, regulation and strategy – that allow it to be done in accordance with the principles at the heart of the British model of policing: legitimacy, accountability, visibility, compliance with the rule of law, proportionality, the minimal use of force and engagement with the public.

Link:http://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOS_Policing_in_an_Information_Age_v1.pdf?136429 5365

Generally I like the work by Demos, but remain unconvinced that there is much intelligence gain in social media. How much sense can be made amidst so much?

[davidbfpo]

A summary of a recent Demos (UK think tank) report:
the Twitter conversations between the Metropolitan Police and the public following the vicious murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich.

Capacity is an issue when, astonishingly:
...45% of the 19,344 tweets they analysed were produced by a single bot network...

It concludes:
...this surge in social media interaction with police is obviously a mixed blessing; there is a small amount of potentially useful information included within a torrent of hearsay and rumour plus the inevitable general noise of people just participating in the #Twitcident without any particular motive.

It seems to me that there are two key social media challenges to police in the aftermath of major incidents:

To ensure that there is extra capacity to monitor social media accounts and ensure that accurate, timely and rumour busting information is sent out at regular intervals.

To have in place a sophisticated system to analyse tweets to provide intelligence and insight.

Link:http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=f3b97d02b5235c9e7c9b3a65b&id=b60a7d789b

To actual Demos report:http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/metpoliceuk

[JohnBertetto]

New Geographic Information System (GIS) technology can now map geo-located text, photos and videos that have been uploaded by disaster eyewitnesses to social-media platforms like Twitter and YouTube.

First responders need access to rapid information to react quickly and appropriately during emergencies and there is no way to get information faster than from eyewitness accounts.

Members of the community already use social media to upload and exchange enormous amounts of information during disasters – such as a photo of a bridge that is damaged, or video footage of flood waters rising.

This is vital, near real-time information that can be used to bolster in-house disaster intelligence such as rescue infrastructure maps, weather patterns or video feeds from traffic cameras.

GIS technology could help verify this crowd-sourced data by accessing the time and location of the post.

If a large amount of tweets are clustered within a narrow timeframe and in a certain area, we can be a lot more confident about their veracity...

Once verified, information becomes official intelligence and emergency managers can use it to conduct rescue operations, assess damage to critical infrastructure, and prioritise medical assistance.

Applicability far beyond disaster management.

http://www.gisuser.com/content/view/30032/2/#sthash.Jv7jkmAt.dpuf

[SWJ Blog]

What the Arab Spring Tells Us About the Future of Social Media in Revolutionary Movements (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-the-future-of-social-media-in-revolutionary-movements)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-the-future-of-social-media-in-revolutionary-movements) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating FP reflective article on the power of social media; sub-titled:
Social media may be protesters' favorite weapon, but new research on Syria's revolution shows it can do as much harm as good.

A taster:
So what is the role and power of digital media in movements for peace and democracy? In contrast to three years ago, we have a lot more data and evidence now that we can use in trying to answer this question. And according to our research, the importance and uniformity of social media in these uprisings has been both overstated and vastly oversimplified.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/17/media_moves_millions_social_ukraine_twitter

[Bill Moore]

A fascinating FP reflective article on the power of social media; sub-titled:

A taster:

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/17/media_moves_millions_social_ukraine_twitter

One expects any tool or weapon in war can be used and misused to advantage or disadvantage. I think it is too early to assess the full impact, but it is clear social media had some impact. What isn't clear is whether the revolt would have actually started in these recent cases without it, maybe and maybe not. Real time interactive communications to a mass media is powerful, but of course a number of factors will influence just how powerful and to whose side it will advantage. The reports it provided links to were interesting.

http://www.usip.org/publications/blogs-and-bullets-new-media-in-contentious-politics


Despite the prominence of “Twitter revolutions,” “color revolutions,” and the like in public debate, policymakers and scholars know very little about whether and how new media affect contentious politics. Journalistic accounts are inevitably based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research.


The impact of new media can be better understood through a framework that considers five levels of analysis: individual transformation, intergroup relations, collective action, regime policies, and external attention. New media have the potential to change how citizens think or act, mitigate or exacerbate group conflict, facilitate collective action, spur a backlash among regimes, and garner international attention toward a given country.

http://www.usip.org/publications/advancing-new-media-research

Lots more at the site, but the gist of this argument is that to actually study SM it would require the government to acquire intrusive technology and actually read the messages to understand its impact on any particular revolt, which of course is much more than metadata.


Studying new media raises a host of complex questions about privacy and accountability. Policy measures, such as encouraging actors to use new media in nondemocratic regimes, raise even more serious questions. Ethical guidelines for new media research and policy are badly needed.

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW91-Syrias%20Socially%20Mediated%20Civil%20War.pdf

No surprise, SM can be as bias as public media. The danger for those who don't realize that networks within networks shape the message could lead to outside actors getting played.


In particular, social media create a dangerous illusion of unmediated information
flows.

Key curation hubs within networks may now play a gatekeeping role as powerful as that of television producers and newspaper editors.

The pattern in social media toward clustering into insular likeminded
communities is unmistakable and has profound implications.

[Bill Moore]

Request members publish studies on the use of humor in social movements if any exist. Interesting article below.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/world/asia/taking-on-thailands-crisis-with-a-bit-of-western-bite.html?ref=world


Founded by two Thai-Americans, “Shallow News in Depth” is a low-budget weekly program posted to YouTube that employs a type of Western humor not common in Thailand — acid-laced sarcasm — and draws on the deep well of paradoxes, absurdities and mangled logic of Thailand’s otherwise deadly serious political crisis.

[Bill Moore]

This isn't about revolution and information war, simply how Facebook can assist friends and family notify their families on their status after a natural or manmade disaster.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/15/post-paris-facebook-activates-safety-check/75826294/

Post-Paris, Facebook activates Safety Check


Here's how it works: Those Facebook members in the vicinity of a disaster get a notification that asks whether they are OK. Users can tap an "I'm OK" button. Those wondering about friends can call up the Safety Check tool and see friends' statuses.

[OUTLAW 09]

Social media has reached a new realm in the last 18 months and has become the leader in pushing back 24 X 7 against Russian, Iranian and IS info warfare--support to the effort comes from a vast range of groups and or individuals --not being paid by anyone.

In the identification of IS social media accounts---this group has come to the forefront----

Anonymous vows to "hunt down ISIS" following Paris attacks
http://bit.ly/1RYJGZU
pic.twitter.com/bS0Uon6L5i

[Bill Moore]

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/altman/battleground-now-includes-social-media-20160228/

Battleground now includes social media


The system, he said, is what’s broken.

“In the face of a nimble, adaptive opponent, unconstrained by truth, or ethics, our people are left swimming in bureaucracy, using outdated technology,” Lumpkin said, “The bottom line is that we are not putting the required resources against the problem set. As a result, the U.S. and our are allies are conceding the information battle space to a far less capable enemy.” Blunt in his assessment of the challenges, Lumpkin is also confident in the State Department’s new approach, creating a Global Engagement Center, which is “taking a fundamentally different approach.” We will see, at least Lumpkin has a vision and energy, but will it be enough to overcome a stubborn bureaucracy?

[OUTLAW 09]

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/altman/battleground-now-includes-social-media-20160228/

Battleground now includes social media

We will see, at least Lumpkin has a vision and energy, but will it be enough to overcome a stubborn bureaucracy?

In my 50 or so odd years of working with and for various governmental agencies I have never seen and or heard of the simple concept...speed.

in the info war that I am sorry to say is the first true "grey war" of the 21st century it is fully aimed at the US and for two long long years this Obama WH and especially DoS Kerry has simply ignored the info war challenge...recently even DoD and DoS stated and yes even Obama stated we cannot respond to every rumor, fake, disinformation or lies put out in this info war.

BUT here is the problem.....Russian uses the "narrative" concept....meaning the "narrative" is set in motion from Moscow an then their info warriors carry it out......meaning social media picks it up and drum beats the heck out of it..mostly lies and pushbacks, then specific writers pick it up in articles which in turn get picked up by MSM in order to hit the 24 hour news cycles. the Russians have a social media trolling system in place that cannot be matched right now by even tons of money and a new DoS department...

Info warfare is a battle of the "perception" and the US has never been good at understanding the concept of "perception"...hate to say it Russia does understand that game well.

The SWJ carried banner quote of Eisenhower actually goes to the heart of "perception".

NO DoS department with even 5K employees will ever match the Russian concept with what is needed.....a constant speedy counter narrative and a social media component to carry the fight all built around the concept of finally saying the truth nothing more nothing less even if it hurts us at first.

Example of just how poorly DoS can function is their release yesterday of the Syrian Coordination Center.....explain to me an thousands of Syrians caught in the true middle of a war zone call drop everything in the middle of a Russian cluster munitions air strike and call DoS via 1-800 or email them from a war zone that has virtually limited anything?

That alone sets a "perception" in motion that at least in Syria is viewed as proving the US has done a "secret handshake" with the Russians and are simply just going through the motions of showing they did something.

Here is the kicker...the Russians know that ME "perception" of the US right now and play their info war to exactly that "perception" to reinforce their narrative that what they are doing is totally correct and even supported by the US.

And the US info warfare response.....ZERO.

A famous US writer that knows the power of words said the following:

Thunder is good, thunder is impressive, but it is lightening that does the work.

-- Mark Twain

The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightning and the lightning bug.

-- Mark Twain

Then there is this comment:

I'd rather be approximately right than exactly wrong.

-- John Maynard Keynes

And another comment:

The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right.

-- Thomas Jefferson, 1787


That is info warfare in a nut shell and no DoS department is ever going to come close to even meeting Twains words.

Social media is the battlefield and a hearty band of warriors across the internet do it daily and massively pushback on the Russian narratives...with an amazing success rate..meaning when you can take Russia off their narrative and force them into a response mode they utterly swim and that is then a declared victory and then you move on to the next word battle.

Problem is that here in SWJ there have been a number of US articles written by US professional types that smack closely to the Russian narrative...so is in effect Russian money flowing and paying for these types of articles that are then carried by reputable US MSM then picked up by SWJ....totally unchallenged....

That is the front line DoS should be pushing back against. But the core problem is money...the Russian info warfare budget is estimated in the 600-800M USDs a year..and DoS is never going to match that dollar for dollar

WHY...the Russian info war is inherently designed to change the attitudes of a specific targeted civil society to conform to the Russian narrative...IE see the campaign now against refugees in Europe and Europe is having an extremely hard time in pushing back against it..just look at Germany who just woke up about their being targeted by Russian info warfare.

BUT it was European social media that saw it coming and pushed back hard, but not a single European MSM outside of BILD picked up on it....until social media/BILD finally caught the attention of the German security services.

Why did BILD pick it up...they have hired over the last two years several social media savvy reported types who had a long track record covering Syria and Ukraine and know the info war game from their blogger days and coupled with the power of a major MSM in fact checking and a larger info pull have done some remarkable articles against Russian actions in both Ukraine an Syria...earning them the total dislike of the Russian FM that has accused them recently of being anti Russian......

So again back to Twain if the DoS thinks they can hold their own...after their dismal failure of the 1-800 call the US DoS in DC disaster...I simply believe it is wasting US taxpayer dollars.

BTW...for two years I have been saying here at SWJ social media is where you even win or lose against IS...or against any form of non linear warfare.

Non linear warfare has two key cornerstones;
1. "weaponization of information
2. cyber warfare

And we are not doing so well against both right now.