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AmericanPride
09-01-2008, 12:37 AM
Just a few questions to perhaps get some discussion going:

I was reading through General van Riper's interview concerning Iraq (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html) where he stated that a contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was the absence of a former surrender. Then I considered why that occurred, whether it was an intentional decision or simply did not enter into the computation. Formal agreements of any kind grant rights to the opposing party and a recognition, at least in some part, to their legitimacy. Part of Israel's problem in making peace in the Palestinian territories, for example, has been the inability to find a counterpart it considers legitimate with which to make peace.

However, I think the difference with Iraq is its recognition as a formal state. Nevertheless, we failed in somehow producing an Iraqi leader from the previous regime with which to make peace. Did our criminalization of the Iraqi regime inhibit us from doing so? Did that failure, even in some small measure, contribute to the instability of Iraq? Are criminalized states less likely to make peace knowing the consequences for its leadership? Does the erosion of political sovereignty as a result of the pervasiveness Western norms (read: criminalization of non-Western regimes) contribute to the generation of small wars?

Ken White
09-01-2008, 01:26 AM
...Part of Israel's problem in making peace in the Palestinian territories, for example, has been the inability to find a counterpart it considers legitimate with which to make peace.One Israel considers legitimate or one that Israel is confident actually has effective control of the population and any agreement will thus be honored?
...Does the erosion of political sovereignty as a result of the pervasiveness Western norms (read: criminalization of non-Western regimes) contribute to the generation of small wars?I'm unsure why you say that political sovereignty erodes as a result of the pervasiveness of western norms? I'd also suggest that your "read: criminalization of non-Western regimes" linkage does not seem to apply universally.

As an aside, I disagree with Paul Van Riper and would suggest that in the case of Iraq, the contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was not the absence of a formal surrender but rather the fact that the Iraqis did not believe they had been defeated -- not the same thing at all.

Saddam told us up front what he was going to do; release all prisoners, arm the populace, set loose the Miliitias, the whole bit -- we totally ignored him and those problems. Iraq was a significant intel failure and a case of massive military overconfidence (and post operation / insurgency lack of training and preparedness) on our part. The insurgency was programmed, we blew it; the only effective preemption would have entailed a total, massive defeat of the Iraqis and much waste to the countryside -- not a good idea in this era.

As opposed to western norms, a formal document in the ME means little and I seriously doubt the existence of one would have changed anything.

AmericanPride
09-01-2008, 01:47 AM
One Israel considers legitimate or one that Israel is confident actually has effective control of the population and any agreement will thus be honored?

I think Israel faces both problems and the additional obstacle that a formal peace with Israel, depending on its terms, may even erode the credibility of a Palestinian faction among its population and therefore undermine any meaningful control it may have had over the population.


I'm unsure why you say that political sovereignty erodes as a result of the pervasiveness of western norms? I'd also suggest that your "read: criminalization of non-Western regimes" linkage does not seem to apply universally.

I should have spoken with more clarity and developed my line of thought more fully. Western norms are relatively more focused on human security, or at least, those kinds of norms have a higher profile and greater sensitivity in the West. The norms are specifically concerned with human rights, free market principles, and democratic governance. States which act in contradiction to those norms are not simply discredited, but criminalized to the extent that their political sovereignity is less measured by traditional means and increasingly more measured by those Western norms. Consequently, I think there's an "anything goes" attitude in regards to those states, akin to "Indian Country". This is not to say that states do not routinely undermine and challenge one other's sovereignity, but that the West is actively undermining the legitimacy of states in ways which I think prohibit effective diplomacy, and to a lesser extent, warfighting.


As an aside, I disagree with Paul Van Riper and would suggest that in the case of Iraq, the contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was not the absence of a formal surrender but rather the fact that the Iraqis did not believe they had been defeated -- not the same thing at all.

I agree for the most part with your assessment. I certainly do not think a proclamation of surrender would have prevented an insurgency from forming, but I do think it would have inhibited it to some degree dependent on which Iraqi authority announced a formal surrender and which Iraqi factions were loyal to said authority. Then again, with Saddam elluding capture for some time, it may not have been possible to attain or create a "legitimate" Iraqi leader to announce a surrender.

jmm99
09-01-2008, 02:19 AM
I'd suggest that there is more agreement between Old Marine 1 and Old Marine 2 than Old Marine 2 seems to think:


from Van Riper
If you have a war that doesn't come to a very definitive conclusion, there are people who don't believe they've been defeated. One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces."
....
There were sufficient forces to capture Baghdad. But what we call follow-up forces—exploitation forces and reserves—were not available. Imagine on the day that we seized Baghdad, if we had follow-up armed forces, exploitation forces, continue up into what we now know as the Sunni Triangle, go into Tikrit, instead of having that long lag time. If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time.


from KW
As an aside, I disagree with Paul Van Riper and would suggest that in the case of Iraq, the contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was not the absence of a formal surrender but rather the fact that the Iraqis did not believe they had been defeated -- not the same thing at all

Grumpy Old Men without Ann-Margaret ?

The only reason I am getting into this is the I Law question of who gives a surrender when the recognized government has MIRVed in all directions, including spider holes. Have to look at Max Soreson's Manual and see if there is an answer.

The rest of this discussion (alternative military history) is outside my usual territory; except for the following learned maxim:

what coulda, shoulda happened = NOT necessarily = what woulda happened.

credit: White's Encyclopedia.

Ken White
09-01-2008, 02:26 AM
I'd agree that Israel faces all three of those problems plus the obvious geographic and demographic problems. Thus, seems to me that legitimacy of a Palestinian government is one of the more minor deterrents to the making of peace.
...The norms are specifically concerned with human rights, free market principles, and democratic governance. States which act in contradiction to those norms are not simply discredited, but criminalized to the extent that their political sovereignity is less measured by traditional means and increasingly more measured by those Western norms. Consequently, I think there's an "anything goes" attitude in regards to those states, akin to "Indian Country". This is not to say that states do not routinely undermine and challenge one other's sovereignity, but that the West is actively undermining the legitimacy of states in ways which I think prohibit effective diplomacy, and to a lesser extent, warfighting.I believe the problem is one of western arrogance, not so much "anything goes" as a 'they are not behaving properly and should be corrected.' Nanny stateism to the sixtieth power. It's not undermining legitimacy so much as it is a discounting or, more correctly lack of knowledge and ignoring of the differences.

The Formal Surrender Document is a good example; among western states such a document would have meaning -- in the ME, documents mean little -- unless the Middle Easterner knows you will adhere to the document, then he'll use it for all its worth against you while totally ignoring those aspects that pertain to him that he wishes to flaunt. Paper and treaties mean nothing, what occurs under the table and behind closed doors is what's important; surface pronouncements and agreements are mostly obfuscatory. Recall, this is an area where items in stores and markets do not have a price tag; haggling is a national sport and in such haggling hyperbole and even outright lies are encouraged and expected. Most in the west do not understand that and thus tend to think ME Folks are dishonest, etc. They aren't bad, just different -- and the lack of knowledge in the west fuels an apparent delegitimacizing (new word...).

The impact on warfighting is minimal to non-existent, it complicates diplomacy but does not prohibit it. The diplomatic problem is that ME specialists can try to tell their western political masters about the nuances but said masters have massive egos, power and obviously are omniscient -- so they ignore the knowledgeable people and make stupid decisions.
...but I do think it would have inhibited it to some degree dependent on which Iraqi authority announced a formal surrender and which Iraqi factions were loyal to said authority. Then again, with Saddam elluding capture for some time, it may not have been possible to attain or create a "legitimate" Iraqi leader to announce a surrender.Saddam was the government; there was no other authority. Such a surrender wouldn't have made any difference and in any event, there would not have been one because Saddam's two Russian Generals gave him some good advice -- "You cannot beat the Americans, so have your Army melt away before them, turn to guerrilla warfare and they will tire and leave soon so you can resume power." We missed it initially but on that last, 'leave soon' -- Fooled them... :D

Ron Humphrey
09-01-2008, 02:32 AM
that even had there been some sort of "formal" surrender the follow-on would have been exactly who had surrendered (Faction, Political Parties, Sunni, Shia) would it have mattered to what followed no matter had someone in particular said "we give up".

Disbanding the govt probably exacerbated it but theres a good chance would have been the same in the long run either way. The lack of bringing the larger populous into the process still would have followed.

Ken White
09-01-2008, 02:44 AM
I'd suggest that there is more agreement between Old Marine 1 and Old Marine 2 than Old Marine 2 seems to think:

Grumpy Old Men without Ann-Margaret ?Don't know about Paul, who I knew in Viet Nam when he was a Captain advising the VNMC Battalion next door to the VN Abn Battalion I was an Advisor with but I have an Ann Margaret look alike... :D

I'll give it him on Rank but I was in the Corps before he was. :eek: and I respectfully agree with him on one point; as you say, we're in close to agreement on this: "If you have a war that doesn't come to a very definitive conclusion, there are people who don't believe they've been defeated." However, I still disagree with him on two points:

"One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces."

Since the only guvmint, Saddam, had decreed a fight after the fight, that was never going to happen. Further:

"If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time."

I strongly doubt greater numbers would have made much difference; more death and destruction might -- note the 'might,' even that would've been no guarantee -- have done so but no numbers we could have produced lacking a draft would have made much difference. LTG Van Riper has forgotten that over a million allied troops in Viet Nam couldn't control a nation a fourth the size and half population of Iraq... ;)
The rest of this discussion (alternative military history) is outside my usual territory; except for the following learned maxim:

what coulda, shoulda happened = NOT necessarily = what woulda happened.

credit: White's Encyclopedia.So let it be written, so let it be said... :wry:

(aka - reality bites)

reed11b
09-01-2008, 04:16 AM
Instead of greater death and destruction, what about less? If we had kept some part of the original Iraqi goverment working (mostly the IP and Army and service organizations) and had cracked down hard on the looting, perhaps the message would have been sent that the "rules" still apply and would have taken a lot of steam from the insurgency. Not a statment since I am the furthest thing from a SME, but it is my belief.
Reed

Ken White
09-01-2008, 03:22 PM
as a whole; I'm not advocating it; as I said, can't do that nowadays (I think there's a policy-maker message in that...). Lacking that in future operations, the potential for an insurgency is exacerbated. In the case of Iraq, had we been harder going in it might have deterred some but since that insurgency was the plan, don't think it would've changed that much.

That said, I agree with you that not using the Iraqi Army and Police was dumb -- though it could've been mildly problematic as well. I think it would've done more good than harm.

Either way, OUR not stopping the looting was a really poor move on our part. In fairness to the Troops (from Wallace down), Armies that have not trained for things shouldn't be expected to do them. That's why I fault the Army's senior leadership from 1975-2001 for allowing that omission in doctrine and training despite numerous protests from within and many signs that occupation, FID and COIN would be needed skills.

Render
09-02-2008, 08:03 PM
It's been my understanding that we didn't have much of a choice in keeping the Saddamite government or it's military operational, intact, or even visible.

It had all largely melted away before we got there.

As another commenter has already pointed out Saddam was The Government, and with Saddam and his sons hiding in a spiderholes, followed by having his neck stretched and his sons turned into ground hamburger, who else had the authority to surrender?

Keegan, Cordesman, et al...

OLD
NEWS,
R

120mm
09-02-2008, 09:40 PM
It's been my understanding that we didn't have much of a choice in keeping the Saddamite government or it's military operational, intact, or even visible.

It had all largely melted away before we got there.

As another commenter has already pointed out Saddam was The Government, and with Saddam and his sons hiding in a spiderholes, followed by having his neck stretched and his sons turned into ground hamburger, who else had the authority to surrender?

Keegan, Cordesman, et al...

OLD
NEWS,
R

A CA co-worker and I were having that same discussion, today. By the time we arrived at Balad, the Iraqi Army had completely melted away.

"The Plan", for what it was worth, was for the Iraqi Division Commanders to do certain things to signal that their divisions were not going to fight, and then once the big bullets quit flying about, for those Division Commanders to take over responsibility for their respective areas, I believe.

If memory serves, I believe those same Division Commanders bugged out first, once the shooting started.

reed11b
09-02-2008, 09:49 PM
120, true, but had they been offered amnesty, how many might have stepped up? Once the Baath party was "outlawed", there was no hope of getting either the IA or IP back into the game since the leadership of both was Baath in order to achieve there positions. Good point that it may not have been as timely as some people may assume.
Reed

Rank amateur
09-03-2008, 03:31 AM
Every third world dictator knows that the first thing you do when you take power is give the Army a raise. (Iraqi soldiers would've returned to base to get their pay checks.) After everything else failed, we ended up doing it anyway and calling them SOI.

And yes, backing people into a corner makes a fight inevitable. Assuming his story is true, letting Karadzic slip out the back door and worrying about him later worked out OK.