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OODA.LOOP
08-31-2008, 07:52 PM
I think Entropy is on target with respect to his comments (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=55502&postcount=4) concerning technology. I will only add a little to what he already expresses.

When I was still in the Marine Corps, my Marines and I suffered through this painful process of serving technology, vice technology serving us on numerous occassions.

This misfocus caused warfighting skills to atrophy. Misfocus kills. Misfocus kills because service members in harms way find they do not know how to quickly adapt to a combat environment because the baseline references to operate with an infantryman mindset are lost once people depart from basic training; sustainment training is set aside to follow gadgets and develop new systems when time should be focused on studying the nature of the fight, language training, anthropological and infrastructural studies of the threat environment via the use of sophisticated technologies.

Once service members deploy in theater, they lose access to bandwidth, technologies do not hold up well in indigenous weather/environmental conditions, and I spend more time maintaining the system than reading the enemy. This is ludicrous. Machines should serve me, not the other way around.

This frustration lead me to become an ardent follower of the late Colonel John Boyd when he stated the priority in preparing and execution of war lies in "people, ideas and hardware" in that order.

Warfare is about people. Warfare is about weaponizing time and space; the weaponization of time and space is best prosecuted by those who make the most effective timely decisions utilizing a tool/model known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA LOOP". We need people of all ranks to be able to make rapid/effective decisions in a time of crisis. This requires increased investment in the human mind in the form of language training, cultural training, free play exercises employing technologies and w/out technologies since our adversaries know the U.S. has the technological edge and evade/exploit their gaps. General Van Riper did this in Millenium Challenge 02 and this shut down the tech based exercise. One can read more about it here... http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020906-iraq1.htm . For those interested in learning how other countries see they can fight us best read "Unrestricted Warfare" via this link... http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf

Thank you for making a post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5936) regarding this subject and allowing people, like myself, to respond.

Cheers and Semper fi, Bob

William F. Owen
09-01-2008, 08:08 AM
Warfare is about people. Warfare is about weaponizing time and space; the weaponization of time and space is best prosecuted by those who make the most effective timely decisions utilizing a tool/model known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA LOOP".

I respectfully and absolutely disagree. Making effective decisions in a timely manner is nothing to do with the OODA loop. The OODA loop is a simplified model of one possible decision making process.

The idea of cycling the loop faster and faster means that bad decisions based on bad observations get acted on faster, and the same point of incomplete observation is revisited in a shorter time. The problem is further compounded when technology enables faster bad decisions, based on a pretence of understanding -EG: Robert's Ridge.

If the loop was merely to state the actions for which the enemy is unprepared both, temporal and spatial, are those most likely to succeed then it would be useful, and also the definition of surprise. However I have yet to see anywhere, where Boyd stated this.

Steve Blair
09-01-2008, 04:52 PM
As I've posted before, I still think OODA is perhaps most applicable in the realm it was first designed for: one on one air-to-air combat. As soon as you start adding people in, and bringing in new factors, it can easily degenerate into a series of poor decisions based on inadequate information and time pressure.

That said, I think the concept can be expanded to areas other than air-to-air combat, but the framework needs to change. OODA in the wrong hands can (and I'm sure has) lead to badly-informed decisions made solely on the pretext of being "fast" and thus "first." To tie back to the original thread, technology can make this worse by creating an illusion of complete information and complete communications.

Ken White
09-01-2008, 05:12 PM
...OODA in the wrong hands can (and I'm sure has) lead to badly-informed decisions made solely on the pretext of being "fast" and thus "first." To tie back to the original thread, technology can make this worse by creating an illusion of complete information and complete communications.can be quite simply illustrated by viewing or reading contemporary news media reports on virtually any topic and making a decision on the accuracy of the report or the potential effects based solely on their initial rapidity and frenzy to be first and thus providing inaccurate and most often down right misleading information.

To paraphrase an old gunfighter, "I don't need to be fastest, I need to be the best shot..."

William F. Owen
09-02-2008, 03:52 AM
As I've posted before, I still think OODA is perhaps most applicable in the realm it was first designed for: one on one air-to-air combat. As soon as you start adding people in, and bringing in new factors, it can easily degenerate into a series of poor decisions based on inadequate information and time pressure.

Well, as the chief Psychologist for the Swedish Armed Forces, famously asked, "How does explaining the OODA loop to a fighter pilot make him a better fighter pilot?" - and in Air to Air combat it is only applicable to one pilot looking at one other aircraft he is reacting to, or acting against.


That said, I think the concept can be expanded to areas other than air-to-air combat, but the framework needs to change. OODA in the wrong hands can (and I'm sure has) lead to badly-informed decisions made solely on the pretext of being "fast" and thus "first." To tie back to the original thread, technology can make this worse by creating an illusion of complete information and complete communications.

The problem is a nut shell, and one that would not exist if we didn't buy into OODA as accurately explaining the process in hand.
It does not accurately model how humans thing or make decisions (simple and idealised).
It's not a planning tool, and it's not even a good analysis tool.

Entropy
09-02-2008, 12:12 PM
I had not heard before that OODA was originally designed for air combat. That surprises me. Air combat is too fast-paced and fluid for pilots to be going through such mental checklists.

The way to shorten the OODA loop is not through study of OODA or any other artificial construct, but through training and practice - something I believe is true for any military enterprise.

Steve Blair
09-02-2008, 01:03 PM
I had not heard before that OODA was originally designed for air combat. That surprises me. Air combat is too fast-paced and fluid for pilots to be going through such mental checklists.

The way to shorten the OODA loop is not through study of OODA or any other artificial construct, but through training and practice - something I believe is true for any military enterprise.

The majority of Boyd's theories originated with his ideas regarding air-to-air combat. Where he (IMO) got into serious trouble is when he started expanding those ideas into a "one size fits all" theory for conflict in general. Boyd also wasn't much of a believer in missiles in air to air combat. He was a gun dogfighter pure and simple, and (again IMO) OODA reflects this.

Wilf, I think you might benefit from taking a step back and looking at OODA as more of an "after the fact" description of a thought process, which is where I feel it is most useful (that or breaking the AI of some computer games and possibly timed chess matches...anything where there is a finite time limit known to both participants). Note that I don't say it's perfect, or even much of a planning tool. To me it's more someone trying to explain something that can't necessarily be explained...but once the tools got their hands on it everything went south in a hurry. One could actually say the same thing about ol' Carl.

William F. Owen
09-02-2008, 02:03 PM
Wilf, I think you might benefit from taking a step back and looking at OODA as more of an "after the fact" description of a thought process, which is where I feel it is most useful (that or breaking the AI of some computer games and possibly timed chess matches...anything where there is a finite time limit known to both participants). Note that I don't say it's perfect, or even much of a planning tool. To me it's more someone trying to explain something that can't necessarily be explained...but once the tools got their hands on it everything went south in a hurry. One could actually say the same thing about ol' Carl.

Steve, you may be right. I have long been trying to work out why the OODA loop even exists, and why it is so loved.

I fully agree that the OODA explains how a Shepherd, using 2-3 dogs, herds a flock. This shows the OODA at work. It works because the Shepherd can see all his dogs and all the sheep.... totally unlike any form of warfare or conflict.

So, how does the OODA loop help us understand military activity against an enemy, or how does explaining the OODA loop to the Shepherd help him "flock" his sheep faster?

Here to learn! :)

Ron Humphrey
09-02-2008, 02:15 PM
You know what you know and as such you can choose to act on or not act on such things, but much the same as any interactions between humans you can and do only control you so of course you can only plan for your actions or inactions.

This is not necessarily the same as having no control over others. Anyone whos seen crowds together for one purpose or another can see that there are ways in which to produce almost certain reactions to stimuli. This is the only way I can see that one can honestly plan for enemy actions but it still comes down to a better more informed SWAG then one might generally make intuitively. The "hard" decisions still have to be made but the tools can at least help to make them slightly more informed than might otherwise happen.

Steve Blair
09-02-2008, 02:26 PM
So, how does the OODA loop help us understand military activity against an enemy, or how does explaining the OODA loop to the Shepherd help him "flock" his sheep faster?

Here to learn! :)

See...here's the rub. I'm not convinced that OODA necessarily helps the shepherd with his flock. Looking back, it might help him understand why something happened in the particular way that it did, and possibly plan for a similar circumstance in the future. But this also, to me, points out the finite nature of OODA. The shepherd has a limited window in which to act (direct his dogs), so understanding the sheep (and getting inside their OODA loop...not hard when one considers sheep) is important. Everything happens within his span of control, and his situational awareness is pretty good (he can see the flock and the dogs). It's when it gets out of that perfect awareness that things get flaky.

OODA might be useful for event triage (such as at what point did a unit's command and control break down and what factors contributed to that), but I'm not convinced that it can be predictive (not every unit will have the same strengths and weaknesses, and planning to exploit the wrong one can be a bad thing). In fact, I do think that the time-driven nature of OODA can lead to rash decisions, aggravated by the illusion of perfect intelligence and situational awareness.

I can understand why something like the OODA loop exists, and can see valid uses for it (mainly in post-hoc analysis). But I don't see it as useful as a predictive method or necessarily something one can master and practice consciously.

wm
09-02-2008, 03:24 PM
I refer readers to an earlier Boyd/OODA debate that sort of started with my post here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=27872&postcount=114)

reed11b
09-02-2008, 05:22 PM
In a number of currently active threads, there has been a lot of discusion about the failures and inadequacies of Boyd's OODA loop theory. I agree with most of them. However, I feel that it did bring one important fact to the table and this fact is often forgotten. OODA focuses on the "human" factor and that it is men that fight and determine the winner and loser in a conflict. For this reason alone, I feel OODA has some merit, though it is flawed as a complete model.
Reed

OODA.LOOP
09-03-2008, 12:03 AM
I unintentionally caused the discussion to digress from the subject.

W/ respect to the Boyd Cycle, all your points are duly noted. In fact, those that commented on the complexity of thinking and achieving a decision are absolutely correct and are not ignored, but few know this unless they are familiar with Boyd's work beyond the simple OODA Loop Description. The actual Boyd Cycle does not begin and end with the simple OODA Loop description due to the very reasons cited by some of you e.g. bad information in, bad out etc....all that is considered.

Here is a link for those interested in finding out more. http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/john-r-boyd

Appreciate the counter points...We'll talk more later.

Cheers Gents, Bob

OODA.LOOP
09-03-2008, 12:14 AM
"If the loop was merely to state the actions for which the enemy is unprepared both, temporal and spatial, are those most likely to succeed then it would be useful, and also the definition of surprise. However I have yet to see anywhere, where Boyd stated this."

William, your comment is exactly what the Boyd Cycle is meant to capture. Boyd's works were put into writing by Dr Chet Richards.

Cheers, Bob:D

William F. Owen
09-03-2008, 06:17 AM
"If the loop was merely to state the actions for which the enemy is unprepared both, temporal and spatial, are those most likely to succeed then it would be useful, and also the definition of surprise. However I have yet to see anywhere, where Boyd stated this."

William, your comment is exactly what the Boyd Cycle is meant to capture. Boyd's works were put into writing by Dr Chet Richards.

Cheers, Bob:D

Thank you Bob. My observations were in no way personal to your chosen title. I just have Manoeuvre Warfare, Lind, Boyd, and OODA issues that I need to work out... as anyone here will tell you!! :D

I'll seek out the Chet Richards stuff. I have the Franz Osinga book, so I'll give it another look.

Hacksaw
09-03-2008, 04:24 PM
This whole discussion always reminds me of one of the most intellectually scarry moments as a young maj...

There I was, a new member of the Screamin' Eagles, sitting in a Div rehersal for Ulchi Focus Lens. My previous assignment -- planner for 2ID. At the end of the rehersal, the CG struts front and center to address the small herd of MAJs clustered at the end room...

His words (close paraphrase)... Welcome to 101st!!! Where we make decisions at 200 km/h (homage to Apache Helicopters)...

My immediate thought... Yeah and we will get our a$$ in a crack at the same speed...

Skip forward one week... BCT AASLT wiped out due to insufficient condition setting - mission launched on orders of Corps commander against best advise of Div Commander...

Skip forward two days... BCT AASLT wiped out (previously destroyed BCT is Div Res - its magic) while conducting AASLT to secure near and far objectives of deliberate river crossing -- 'Div is T+ at river crossing - we can fly'

I reiterate all this only to illustrate this one point...

Speed does NOT equal Tempo...

For an entire week this one point was continually (negatively) reinforced to any who wished to recognize...

Next year... Same Corps Commander... Same results...:mad:

In my mind this is OODA at its worst... Fortunately only digits were harmed

You can't make this stuff up:o

wm
09-03-2008, 05:00 PM
I reiterate all this only to illustrate this one point...

Speed does NOT equal Tempo...
(The following is not a sports metaphor.)
Your point is made rather poignantly on the field of friendly strife known as soccer in the US and Football everywhere else. US teams trend to have no concept of tempo in that 90 minute struggle, which may explain why the US national team got bounced early in the Olympics and doesn not advance to far in World Cup.

Sometimes the right answer is observe, orient, decide, wait a while, act. I think that was how, among many others, Hannibal won at Cannae, Epaminondas at Leuctra, Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld, and Napoleon at Marengo,.

Ski
09-04-2008, 11:20 AM
Anyone who thinks OODA = speed

is simply wrong.

Like any theory or framework, it needs to be simple and understood by most. That's where Boyd failed - OODA is complex and difficult to understand and therefore misinterpreted by many.

Hacksaw
09-04-2008, 02:28 PM
Hopefully my little vignette didn't imply that I was under the impression that speed = anything other than speed.

However, I would argue there is a whole group of senior leaders who tend to get speed mixed up with tempo and getting inside an opponent's decision cycle.

The little story provided earlier involves two gentlemen who subsequently went on to earn a fourth star (no commentary offered - just a fact). An anecdotal sample size of two

I would offer the opinion that they are not unique and in fact this tendency influenced US/Coalition operations for the first five years in IZ/AFG.

As for a cultural bias - I offer how many times in training junior leaders have we heard the expression - make a decision lieutenant/corporal/cadet etc

I acknowledge that none of this earth shattering, but the profound lack of tactical much less operational/strategic patience is our greatest weakness.

Cavguy
09-04-2008, 02:43 PM
I would offer the opinion that they are not unique and in fact this tendency influenced US/Coalition operations for the first five years in IZ/AFG.

As for a cultural bias - I offer how many times in training junior leaders have we heard the expression - make a decision lieutenant/corporal/cadet etc

I acknowledge that none of this earth shattering, but the profound lack of tactical much less operational/strategic patience is our greatest weakness.

On interesting quote from a British Brigadier I saw speak in Canada seems relevant. He stated that General Sir Rupert Smith once told him that in counterinsurgency you should delay making a decision to the last possible moment and allow the conditions to develop. Reflecting on it, it's more of a "military art" than a "science" thing, as there are many examples where delayed decisions caused catastrophe as well as rapid ones.

William F. Owen
09-04-2008, 03:14 PM
On interesting quote from a British Brigadier I saw speak in Canada seems relevant. He stated that General Sir Rupert Smith once told him that in counterinsurgency you should delay making a decision to the last possible moment and allow the conditions to develop. Reflecting on it, it's more of a "military art" than a "science" thing, as there are many examples where delayed decisions caused catastrophe as well as rapid ones.

I have great doubts about anything to do with science in war, which is why I am sceptical of science based approaches. I tend towards the idea that the Military is a craft, rather than an art. Semantics maybe.

Cavguy
09-04-2008, 03:48 PM
I have great doubts about anything to do with science in war, which is why I am sceptical of science based approaches. I tend towards the idea that the Military is a craft, rather than an art. Semantics maybe.

I think we agree completely.

Hacksaw
09-04-2008, 04:27 PM
Art and science to everything...

There is a large body of thinking related to the space/time realities of combat operations that require a sound education in the physics of battlefiled math...

(Science) I need x amount of gas at t time at grid location AB1234 to extend legs of air mobility mission to hop BCT(-) 150 km north...

(Art/craft) because I anticipate that my opponent will to use the poor weather conditions to mask the movement of an Armor Div that most pundits say my opponent will never do since it protects the family of the tyrant we are fighting to depose

One without the other is useless, no need to relegate either to the trash heep

selil
09-04-2008, 04:38 PM
I have great doubts about anything to do with science in war, which is why I am sceptical of science based approaches. I tend towards the idea that the Military is a craft, rather than an art. Semantics maybe.

I would put that opinion in the box of not understanding science and being woefully uneducated in the various epistemologies. Don't feel slighted though I've found in the last decade few people even in academia understand the difference between empiricism and observation or induction and deduction. You are likely using the tools you are skeptical over but haven't been given a good understanding of where they come from. The very word skeptic is indicative of the rules based approach you use to knowledge acquisition. Science is as much art and craft as it is based on faith and rules. In attempting to separate you actually illuminate a common mythos of understanding the world of military affairs.

wm
09-04-2008, 05:02 PM
I have great doubts about anything to do with science in war, which is why I am sceptical of science based approaches. I tend towards the idea that the Military is a craft, rather than an art. Semantics maybe.

Not merely semantics if you understand it the way the Greeks used the terms episteme and techne, which we usually translate, respectively as knowledge and craft/skill. The ancient Greeks included Art within the realm of craft/skill.

And with regard to art and warfare, I submit that even art has different possible aspects. As a painter, I could be a Realist, Impressionist, or Surrealist (among others). I submit that the best military leaders, were they painters, would paint from a style palette that included a mixture: a little Monet or Corot, some Courbet or Millet, plus a dash of Bosch or Dali.

William F. Owen
09-04-2008, 06:44 PM
I would put that opinion in the box of not understanding science and being woefully uneducated in the various epistemologies. Don't feel slighted though I've found in the last decade few people even in academia understand the difference between empiricism and observation or induction and deduction. You are likely using the tools you are skeptical over but haven't been given a good understanding of where they come from. The very word skeptic is indicative of the rules based approach you use to knowledge acquisition. Science is as much art and craft as it is based on faith and rules. In attempting to separate you actually illuminate a common mythos of understanding the world of military affairs.

Well I used to think I had a pretty good understanding of epistemologies, and especially empiricism... but apparently not.

My direct experience is that the study of war from a practitioners viewpoint pays little regard to empirical observation and even less to the origin and development of the bodies of knowledge and teaching they take for granted. Manoeuvre Warfare being an excellent example.

selil
09-04-2008, 07:53 PM
Well I used to think I had a pretty good understanding of epistemologies, and especially empiricism... but apparently not.

My direct experience is that the study of war from a practitioners viewpoint pays little regard to empirical observation and even less to the origin and development of the bodies of knowledge and teaching they take for granted. Manoeuvre Warfare being an excellent example.

Likely true. There is a big difference between simply using science or technology and studying the science or technology. Often when talking about the craft or art people are talking about the application of some set of principles that have been derived. Yet the second you turn around and start studying that application you move from application (technology) into science and the different methods and types that are inherent.

I know that is a bit circular. Consider this. When you are fighting a war and applying the principles and even defining new principles you are engaged in the craft and application. In this process you will be gathering evidence. When the battle is over and you are shaping your perceptions, gather ideas, and investigating and describing the way of war you are engaged in the science. There are a variety of ways to describe or use science in that process such as measure, test, gather results but there are others that are just as valid.

UrsaMaior
09-05-2008, 08:38 AM
To me this scientific vs art debate is like mental vs physical (or land vs air) . Well war requires both. Recently there was too much emphasis on measurable things (physical that is), the pendulum swings back now as we discover war is as much about mental/moral struggles as it is about physical and they are much more difficult to measure.

While mediocre leaders were excelling in one aspect, the ones who were able to combine both became historic figures. Lee, Patton, Rommel, Montgomery etc. were able to coordinate major operations and motivate their people at the same time. Former is pure science the latter is real art.

Just my 0.02 USD's.

William F. Owen
09-05-2008, 10:47 AM
To me this scientific vs art debate is like mental vs physical (or land vs air) . Well war requires both. Recently there was too much emphasis on measurable things (physical that is), the pendulum swings back now as we discover war is as much about mental/moral struggles as it is about physical and they are much more difficult to measure.


I don't think anyone would argue that it does not require both or that a synthesis of ideas and disciplines may be appropriate and useful.

My "emotional" beef is with the attempt to try and apply technology based approaches to the philosophy, art and craft, which makes up the thinking that militaries do as a professional body. To me this is like suggesting that paint by numbers will make you a great artist or that fine art all about the brush and the paint.

Modern military thought (like modern art) has mostly used pseudo-scientific language and even altered, or constantly changing definitions. I might even suggest that some folk out there lack good enough common language to make any progress on the subject at all.

Again like modern art, I know a dog turd on a brick (call it EBO), placed in a gallery is not art.

Yes technology is vital. I can only be a writer because of word processing technology. Without it, I'd be a pretty poor shop assistant somewhere. Word processing enables me to write, but as my readers know to their cost, there is a limit to my insights and the usefulness of my writing.

Sorry to be contentious, repetative and even boring, but at least you all know where I stand! ;) ...and I may also be very wrong.

120mm
09-05-2008, 02:27 PM
Art and science to everything...

There is a large body of thinking related to the space/time realities of combat operations that require a sound education in the physics of battlefiled math...

(Science) I need x amount of gas at t time at grid location AB1234 to extend legs of air mobility mission to hop BCT(-) 150 km north...

(Art/craft) because I anticipate that my opponent will to use the poor weather conditions to mask the movement of an Armor Div that most pundits say my opponent will never do since it protects the family of the tyrant we are fighting to depose

One without the other is useless, no need to relegate either to the trash heep

I think it is a human failing to always want an either/or exclusivity situation. Frankly, I don't "get" the need to label warfare as "science" or "art", either. I'm strongly an intuitive learner, but I "get" the need to "do the math", too.

pvebber
09-05-2008, 03:09 PM
This "art vs science" debate over empiricist epistemology has been with us since Kants "Critique of Pure Reason" and Hume's "problem of induction".

Basing knowledge on observing what happens and relating that to causes is great in situations where reductionist approaches to determining cause and effect work. But we are finding more and more cases where this causal network is changed by our attempt to tease out those relationships, making empirical approaches unproductive. There how however ways to think about such problems that are "methodolically logical" (something that is often confused with "scientific" - but under positivism "science" has boxed itself into an epistemological corner in many ways) but look at what happens when things work together (synthetic) rather trying to isolate parts and assume indepedance (analytic).

This focus on synthetic (or in C. S. Peirce's triadic scientific philosophy abductive) reasoning is someting that current reductionist methods of empiricism are having some trouble with. Popper's critical rationalism and Peirce's fallible pragmatism and semiotic provide some glimpses into how to deal with these issues, but "its not soup yet"...

These issues have bubbled up into JFCOMs "post EBO thinking: such as:

https://jko.cmil.org/usjfcom-jwfc-joint-operations-insights-and-best-practices-2nd-edition-july-2008-0

which wrestles with "design" (synthetic, pragmatic in approach) as a counterpoint to "engineering" (analytic, empiricist in approach) and manner in which a variable mix of the two is required to solve "wicked problems" - like those in warfare.

This may seem like a lot of semantic mumbo jumbo - but part of the problem is we have gotten used to use words like "analyze", "science", and "effect" sloppily.

selil
09-05-2008, 04:16 PM
This may seem like a lot of semantic mumbo jumbo - but part of the problem is we have gotten used to use words like "analyze", "science", and "effect" sloppily.

All very true. The synthesis of social, science, and intersection of technology create entire matrixes of implausibilities that can be observed but rarely explained.

At the suggestion of a council member I am currently reading Black Swan, which is interesting, and according to the author a new set of knowledge issues are appearing.

pvebber
09-05-2008, 07:29 PM
I enjoyed the Black Swan (and being an 'analyst' doing a lot of 'synthetic' reasoning in my work, particularly liked his pointed barbs at analysts which were like IT types and Dilbert cartoons to me - over the top - but with enough truth to evoke a "laugh or cry" response) though Talebs "skeptical empiricsm" approach seems incomplete and could do with some more discussion relative to Popper and Peirce (and similar skeptics of empericism).

What is needed to my mind is more study of what is going on when we have "aha moments", "flashes of intuition", "moments of genius" or whatever you want to call it when concepts in our heads merge to form new wholes.

To bring this back to OODA loops - that is what is going on in the "orient" box of the OODA loop, which, when you zoom into it in boyds depiction almost makes you look for the box labeld "then a miracle occurs" rather than amass of arrows captioned "an interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations and rejections".

This to me is where the "meat" of the OODA loop conceptualization is and its part most seem to miss to get to the "loopiness". "Getting inside your opponets OODA Loop is less about speed and more about geting inside his orientation process - understanding how he is constructing the context for what he is observing (which for organizations vice fighter pilots is effectively a continuum of data collection not a periodic "cockpit scan").

The reduction of this insightful framework of observation leading to action through a lens of contexual orientation that frames decision - and thus action to a mechanistic competition over information processing times, misses the point "its all about orientation" - properly understanding what you observe in context of what it is you are trying to accomplish. AND understanding that your adversaries are doing the same.

That we have reduced what Boyd characterizes as 'an evolving, open ended, far from equilibrium process of self-organization, emergence and natural selction" to "spinning our wheel faster" shows just how far ahead of his time Boyd was...(and may still be).

selil
09-05-2008, 07:49 PM
That we have reduced what Boyd characterizes as 'an evolving, open ended, far from equilibrium process of self-organization, emergence and natural selction" to "spinning our wheel faster" shows just how far ahead of his time Boyd was...(and may still be).

I'm going to be doing a review of a new Boyd book hitting the shelves soon.

I do have some thoughts though. Boyds OODA loop is very close to the drivers education IPDE, and motorcycle safety foundation SIPDE systems (search, identify, predict, execute). I think that is not a grand accident that these systems are similar though the Smith system (which IPDE/SIPDE are based on) pre-dates Boyd by 15 or so years. The systems are based originally in exercises/activities that are velocity oriented. Indecision or operational pauses do not occur in air to air combat or the traffic stream. Indecision in those cases is a decision to not act.

There are many risk/decision science models that attempt to insure "good" decisions are made and they usually do not include a "time" component. Balancing heuristic decision models against mathematical models each has an element of success in allowing fuzzy (gut feelings) logic into the model. None of them seem to really account for indecision or the need for instantaneous response.

In that void between the models is where I think the "black swan" lives. Where choice is either made for you by events, or discovered when pausing. I may not be explaining it very well but the symmetry has a particular appeal. Maybe after reading some more of Black Swan and even the new Boyd book I'll refute my own analysis, but maybe it will be an "aha" moment.

William F. Owen
09-06-2008, 06:15 AM
@I'm going to be doing a review of a new Boyd book hitting the shelves soon.

I do have some thoughts though. Boyds OODA loop is very close to the drivers education IPDE, and motorcycle safety foundation SIPDE systems (search, identify, predict, execute). I think that is not a grand accident that these systems are similar though the Smith system (which IPDE/SIPDE are based on) pre-dates Boyd by 15 or so years.

@ There's another book? Or is this the Osinga one? That would make 4 books on Boyd, meaning he has more biography's than Liddell-Hart or Fuller.

@ Close? I'd say it's very close. Can you aim me at some source work on this?

...and, thanks to you, I have ordered "Black Swan."

selil
09-06-2008, 02:41 PM
For SIPDE there is the wikipedia entry (pretty basic) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIPDE_Process)

Some crazy internet writer has an article on it from about 15 years ago (http://selil.com/?p=31)

Unfortunately the Smith System (http://www.smith-system.com/company.shtml) has been commercialized and is hidden behind costs to access (though the SIPDE wikipedia article has the five steps). IPDE and SIPDE both pre-date the Internet so you can find references to it from the past. IPDE was actually created by drivers education instructors attempting to expand on the Smith System.

A writer/rider Keith Code (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Code) has written pretty extensively on the use of the different systems (and created his own (http://www.rubbermag.com/news/0707/070720_01.html)).

Ron Humphrey
09-06-2008, 06:26 PM
Found a book at the second hand shop called:

A WAY TO VICTORY- The annotated book of five rings
(Miyamoto's Mushashi's classic guide to strategy)

Was I wrong to think it might be another descendant of some of our "great ideas

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 04:43 PM
I think I've captured all the relevant complaints about the OODA Loop concept and hope to publish a series of postings here and in the other OODA Loop thread (they'll be mirroring each other for starters) to hopefully lend some clarity to the issue, at least WRT how we in the Marine Corps intended to deal with it. That said, the concept is grossly misunderstood, mistaught, misapplied, and misused...and weeding through all that is going to be difficult. But separating all that chaff to get the germ of the wheat should be productive, if nothing else but to cast some light on what the issues behind the OODA Loop concept really are. Like any other concept, OODA has uses in situations best suited for it--and it is irrelevant in others or just plain dangerous in the hands of the unskilled. It's very difficult to make generalities regarding the concept outside of situations/scenarios. But I'll make that attempt. You'll find, however, that in a philosophical/conceptual disagreement I'll quickly "go to ground" in specific scenarios and situations, both to illustrate what I think your qualms are and what I think the proper understanding and utility of the concept is.

As an intelligence officer, I have a particular interest in the concept/model from a practical standpoint in designing intelligence architectures, systems, techniques and procedures, and in training Marines. How the OODA Loop concept helps me do this is something I probably won't get to for some time, because I've got to lay a helluva lot of conceptual foundation/groundwork to establish before I get there.

The complaints I see in the threads revolve around two areas:

The validity of the OODA Loop Concept
The utility of the OODA Loop Concept.

If you don't buy the validity of the concept, you generally don't think much of its utility. Even if you buy the validity of the concept, you may still think it's not terribly useful from a practical standpoint.

My Particular Bents and Biases on the Subject:

First, I am a "German School" Maneuver Warfare advocate for reasons established in other threads that I won't repeat here. I was also an armor officer with a light armored vehicle battalion commander in my tank battalion at one time (he retired a three-star general)--he was pretty big on deliberately designing shorter decision cycles with no compromises made on quality of judgments, even though mistakes were generally tolerated. But more to the point, I also learned "Soviet School" MW when in grad school--I got fairly engrossed in Soviet tactical cybernetic theory (what they termed "Troop Control" theory) which had very much of a mirror concept to the OODA Loop. Interestingly, the Soviets spent a huge amount of effort on the "Orientation" piece, trying to simultaneously shorten the time required to achieve it and increase the quality of the understanding to be achieved in that phase. Most of my judgments on the utility of OODA Loop theory is going to be founded on Soviet School MW practice, although there is quite a bit of German School MW utility as well. I'll cover both, but the German School applications appear relatively squishy in comparison.

Secondly, I was and still am a big fan of MW influences in commercial hobby historical wargame design and development. There have been a number of efforts to model OODA loop processes for various historical periods, but the "German School" MW applications of C2--decentralized command to facilitate tighter OODA cycle time--has been the most problematic to model. So far the most successful effort I have seen (but still not the most perfect) is the Tactical Combat Series (TCS) games (http://www.multimanpublishing.com/theGamers/tcs.php)published by The Gamers and Multi-Man Publishing. Repeated play of these games--which are overwhelmingly focused on WWII, naturally--provides some compelling insights into what is theoretically (and practically) possible with the concept in ground warfare at the tactical level. There are other titles and game design systems that also do a good job, but a little more abstractly which makes them harder to visualize what is happening and accept some of the game outcomes. I'll get into that as well much, much later--probably at the end of my discussion.

Lastly, there are limitations and issues regarding the OODA Loop concept, and my interest here is to increase the understanding of what those truly are as opposed to what many perceive them to be. I may not be convincing enough as much depends on your particular background and desires. But it's worth a shot. If anything, if you fail to agree with how I lay this out, at least you understand why I'm thinking in the way that I do...and if we agree to disagree, it's because we're coming at the idea with widely differing assumptions borne from widely different experiences.

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 06:18 PM
If you are familiar with my posts in discussion threads elsewhere, you can perhaps better appreciate why I used the terms I did in the title.

Instead of plunging into Osinga's description of Boyd's concepts of the OODA Loop and "fast transients," I thought I'd start with the foundational MW theory as Marines understand it and work backwards. That way I can uncover the issues regarding validity and utility one onion layer at a time so we maintain some coherence in approach and cohesiveness in discussions. We'll eventually cover everything mentioned so far (and I expect a good deal more besides), but it's a very large subject and it must be tackled in layers. Each layer is going to build on the other layers.

Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.

MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characterstics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.

What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.

MW Essential Premise #4: Where agility and action quality in executing "fast transients" have been historically seen as important and improvements made in weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operations, and training to accomplish these have been made, the explicit intent to design all aspects of military command and control around this idea is a relatively recent occurrence.

What does this mean? Command and control--in all its components and aspects--is to be explicitly designed to execute fast transients. What differentiates German School and Soviet School MW is how command and control is designed to achieve it; each reflects differing requirements, restraints, constraints, and compromises made between tempo and quality. German School MW uses Boyd's decision cycle as its means of explanation/analysis, whereas Soviet School uses a similar conceptual device but with different emphases in the subcomponents.

My next post will catalogue and investigate the challenges to these premises before we move on. Once that is done, we'll delve into the Bill Lind and the USMC interpretions of the OODA loop and the various challenges to the validity and utility of the concept.

reed11b
09-30-2008, 06:35 PM
MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.

What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.



The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory. The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint. Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E
Reed

wm
09-30-2008, 07:01 PM
Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.

As I see it, the foundational beliefs postulated are all different ways of describing one thing: exploiting asymmetry with one's opponent. If you have done a good job, you are able to leverage your strengths against your opponent's weaknesses to win That does not necessarily equate to maneuver warfare. And it is no great feat of brilliance to saty that you can probably beat your opponent if you use your advantage well. However, your advantage has to be one upon which you can actually capitalize.
Some examples:
Rommel was able to maneuver much better than the British in N. Africa. He neded to execute all of his operational efforts quickly because he had a limited logistics base to resupply him. He well knew that he could not hope to beat the British once the American industrial base kicked into gear and started delivering. Once that happened, it matter little how well and how quickly Rommel could observe, orient, decide, and attack--he no longer had enough "stuff" in his arsenal to win against the industrial juggernaut whose products were lumbering across the Atlantic. If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.
I submit that a similar analysis applies to Napoleon's Russian campaign--no matter how quickly the French were able to campaign, they were unable to overcome the sheer geographical size of the Russian Empire. The asymmetry between "how fast" and "how far" resulted in a mismatch that French speed could never overcome.

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 07:57 PM
WM writes:


If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.

Yes, and the best case of this that I think you are alluding to (and I intend to get to this later) is Rommel in the aftermath of the December 1941 CRUSADER (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crusader) battles. I honestly believe there are more examples than just this and we can talk about those.

Which is why in this particular premise we use the "initial" preference of maneuver over strike and protect when uncertainty is high. It may not always stay that way. But you go in that way first. Of course, this means you must have the capacity to transition into those those other modes effectively--and ideally when your opponent is relatively unready for them. Ideally is the operative word. It doesn't always happen that way. In fact, it won't happen that way with uncomfortable frequency. The idea is that it happens often enough that--on balance--you end up gaining advantage more than you lose it and end up with net gain. And this is one of the implicit things about the OODA loop, particularly WRT the quality of decisions.

Indeed, some of the most interesting things about the CRUSADER battles is how often wrong the Axis was, especially in decentralized C2 modes. Fritz von Mellenthin is pretty blunt about that in his chapter in Panzer Battles. Yet because C2 was decentralized and because the commanders had an implicit understanding of intent, the mistakes were generally self-correcting. The most important Higher Headquarters intervention was when the operations and intelligence officers countermanded Rommel's orders during his "dash to the wire"--incredibly, German two-star and Italian three and four-star generals deferred to the orders of lieutenant colonel and major on the staff when Rommel couldn't be raised on the radio. Still, all that improvisation brilliance won the tactical battles but at the cost of the operational position. Hmmmm.

As the example and discussion points out, all is for naught if (1) you have no capacity for switching between strike, maneuver, and protect (again, a tip of the hat to Robert Leonhard for that insight); and (2) you neglect the essentials of Opertional Art/Campaigning--the sinews of which tend to be on side of force sustainment/survivability over the long haul. The first I hope to cover later, the latter I won't but it's worth noting because we see a number of other examples of this. I should point out, however, an institutional bias in the Marine Corps that papers over this last shortfall. We win battles. We are a purely tactical organization with only limited capability in campaigning compared to other outfits like the Army and Air Force. So it's perhaps natural that you don't see much discussion of this in Marine circles.

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 08:20 PM
reed11b writes regarding the MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.


The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory. The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint. Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E
Reed

Hmmm. I probably need to talk about a SPECIFIC example here. Some will say that airborne operations were not historical failures. Even the German air assault on Crete in 1941 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete)--catastrophic in casualties as it was--proved an operational success.

The crux of the issue here is "maneuver" in the MW sense of the term and "decisive maneuver" which is what most airborne operations sought to accomplish on the battlefield, which was generally confined to a single, decisive, vertical envelopment. This is not what MW "maneuver" means, particularly when we are talking about the OODA loop. What "maneuver" means in this context is the imagery of two wrestlers, each seeking leverage over his opponent. There are many, many maneuvers--not just one that is judged to be decisive ahead of time. Indeed, the wrestlers aren't sure what pin or hold is going to win the match for them...or whether they're going to win on points.

Most airborne operations sought to achieve a military fait accompli on the battlefield--and this requires a very high degree of certainty regarding the situation to pull off. That's quite different from MW/OODA, which is designed to work in situations of relatively poor certainty/high uncertainty. The problem with airborne operations is that, once the troopers are on the ground, their ability to execute fast transients is extremely limited against certain kinds of enemies. So you want to ensure that the blow truly is decisive just by landing it where you land it, and not depend on the flexibility of the airborne force to overcome signficant opposition once it's on the ground.

Bottom line--you can't execute just ONE "fast transient." In this MW essential premise, the OODA Loop is judged to be an interative process that constantly repeats/cycles, and you have to execute "faster" and "focused" overall/in aggregate, if not in any single iteration. Airborne ops execute one fast transient (operational-level insertion to tactical employment on the ground) and then they can have severe difficulties after that.

Lest anyone think I'm poking the paratroopers in the chest here, let me just say that it works very much the same way for amphibious operations. The one crutch that amphib forces have that airborne forces don't is the potential for very high throughput of follow-on reinforcement and logistical sustainment, provided sufficient facilities are seized early on, compared to purely vertical envelopment. Interestingly, the USMC's initial and tentative forays into Distributed Operations and Ship To Objective Maneuver tended to be much more reminsicient of airborne operations, with all the attendant advantages and disadvantages regarding being able to mount consecutive "fast transients" once on the ground....

Ken White
09-30-2008, 09:04 PM
The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory.but do not agree that all failed; that's a rather broad and sweeping statement. However, we've already argued that to no solution or agreement so, for the sake of thread continuity, let's ignore it this time.
The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint.I understand this and generally agree but I'm not sure what your point is.
Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&EI don't understand this at all...

Do you mean that decentralized control can harm the ability to mass???

reed11b
09-30-2008, 09:20 PM
Do you mean that decentralized control can harm the ability to mass???

No no no...I am a proponent of decentralized command! My argument was that it was more effective to improve "maneuverability", then reducing force structure and firepower as was implied by Col. Walters statement that "If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed..."
Reed

reed11b
09-30-2008, 09:36 PM
but do not agree that all failed; that's a rather broad and sweeping statement. However, we've already argued that to no solution or agreement so, for the sake of thread continuity, let's ignore it this time.I understand this and generally agree but I'm not sure what your point is.I don't understand this at all...



To further my earlier statement, an AH Battalion is a MW wet dream. Maneuverable and capable off fast transits, check. Massed firepower at point of decision, check. Direct C2, check. Yet the failure of the AH Battalion's deep strike operations in OIF are well documented. Why? Combined Arms and effective tactical doctrine still mean more in HIC. In COIN, I think everyone here is agreement that "slow is steady and steady is fast". To me MW just doesn’t quite "click".
Reed
P.S. I have read most of Boyd's works and agree with many aspects of his observations, I just don't buy Lind's "finished product".
P.S.S. I have still learned heaps from Mr. Walters writings, please keep it up sir.

Ken White
09-30-2008, 10:09 PM
That wet dreams contribute much to a conversation but that's just me.

To further my earlier statement, an AH Battalion is a MW wet dream. Maneuverable and capable off fast transits, check. Massed firepower at point of decision, check. Direct C2, check. Yet the failure of the AH Battalion's deep strike operations in OIF are well documented. Why? Combined Arms and effective tactical doctrine still mean more in HIC.I'm also not at all sure that decision to launch a bunch of Helicopters at a fortified location passes the common sense test, much less has anything at all to do with maneuver warfare. In any level of war, dumb moves and poor tactics will get people killed.
In COIN, I think everyone here is agreement that "slow is steady and steady is fast". To me MW just doesn’t quite "click".It's like any other theory, you cannot apply it in combat to the exclusion of common sense; it's neither good nor evil, it just is. Use it when it makes sense and don't use it if it doesn't.

I'm still not sure what you meant by the other comment but then, I took Eric's comment a little differently than you did; I think by 'purchase,' he just meant local operational or tactical trade offs, not actual force structure changes.

ericmwalters
10-04-2008, 04:39 PM
Ken White wrote:


I'm still not sure what you meant by the other comment but then, I took Eric's comment a little differently than you did; I think by 'purchase,' he just meant local operational or tactical trade offs, not actual force structure changes.
Exactly so.

ericmwalters
10-04-2008, 04:41 PM
To recap:


MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characteristics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

So here are the quibbles/challenges to this idea and the USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrinal responses:

Challenge: Speed alone is not enough. Even speed with focus means little if the focus is misdirected and/or speed only is in a single spurt and cannot be sustained.

Response. MW/OODA Loop theory has no argument with this particular challenge, but nevertheless maintains that an uncertain environment puts a premium on capabilities to enjoy greater speed of action/response than one’s opponent and the ability to focus that action effectively. The theory does not encourage reckless speed in a number of instances:

MCDP 1 Warfighting says (pages 62-64):


In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must consider the closely related factor of timing….Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving….A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace which events are happening….We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.

Additionally, MCDP 1 argues (pages 65-66


As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily onlyl if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

I’d like interject here that most of the complaints I’ve read in the threads are about acting so fast that no good judgments are possible. Nobody is talking about the other half of the way to win the OODA Loop contest, which is by slowing the enemy down. If you think your force is going too fast to effectively understand what it’s doing before it does it, then there’s the other option of getting the enemy to slow down to the point where this is less of a risk to your force.


Challenge: An overemphasis on speed/tempo in this sense means there is little provision for times when it is best to wait for the situation to develop out of uncertainty.

Response: The MW/OODA Loop is designed to help us concentrate on building capacity for speed/tempo and focus in execution of operations. There is a difference between the German and Soviet schools on how this works in planning, which we’ll have to cover in the future. But USMC MW theory admits that knowing when to act—and when not to—is part of the speed/focus emphasis. Again, from MDCP 1 Warfighting (pages 64-66):


Timing means knowing when to act, and equally important, when NOT to act [Emphasis in the original—EMW]…If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action….Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.

As has been said, simply using speed and focus is no panacea for effective thinking. Discrimination in application matters--and practice/experience in doing so is essential.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:13 AM
To recap:


MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?

Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.

Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.

But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:15 AM
Challenge: What makes us think the OODA Loop concept—if we believe it works to explain single entity versus single entity conflict—can apply to understanding aggregates of entities fighting aggregate of entities?

Response: This is perhaps the most important question regarding the applicability of the OODA Loop. Certainly a number of thread posters have expressed doubt about this. So this deserves a lengthier response.

We’ve already talked about the wrestler analogy—this is perhaps most akin to air combat maneuvering. A single decisionmaker pitted against another single decisionmaker. I need to elaborate a bit here, because Wilf and others have brought up chess players as an analogy—where does application of the OODA Loop work for chess?

I’d ague it doesn’t. For the simple reason that chess play is regulated by turns. Each side will ALWAYS get to react to the move of the opponent’s last move. There are no possibilities to get in two moves instead of just one. I get a move, you get a move. So the pace/tempo of the game is regulated by the rules.

Now, it’s been brought up that, given timed moves, a player that exhibits superior OODA capabilities should be able to apply this to win. True, but irrelevant to OODA loop implications that I’ll get into in a bit. Sure, expert players can “orient” and “decide” better and faster. But the issue is ultimately about quality of the moves. The players (or the tournament) decide ahead of time how long the chess clock limits are. Those limits never change. And the question comes down to quality of decisions made in that never-changing time limit. I just don’t think this equates to war very well.

Now, for those familiar with Ed Glabus and Aegis Corporation’s old InfoChess game, elements of the OODA are introduced. It’s a double-blind game with the ability to buy Information Operations capabilities. It’s very possible in that game that the opponent won’t get to execute his move when it’s his turn, particularly if he’s the victim of a successful Electronic Attack (EA) mounted by his opponent. But this is relatively rare—most of the issues in InfoChess involve quality of the moves. Players are bent on deception and operations security versus intelligence and counterintelligence most commonly. Even in InfoChess, there is still that pacing function. Sure, you have a better shot at getting into two moves to the opponent’s one given a successful EA operation, but this is an example of lengthening the enemy’s OODA Loop and not tightening your own and dealing with the consequences of that.

Maneuverists do talk a good bit about chess masters. But mostly it’s about expertise—and how that expertise means that true experts take much less time to orient and decide. That’s why MW is so difficult. You need experts—and you need to develop them. The maneuverists argue that the results are worth the cost. If you disagree with that—that the U.S. military cannot grow that many experts—then the argument is pretty much over. You and the “German School” maneuverists have different assumptions and value systems; you aren’t going to be able to agree on anything. However, you may have something in common with the Soviet school, more on that later.

Anyway, back to the issue at hand--

An understanding of OODA Loop theory, developed from F-86 versus MiG-15 dogfights, explains much regarding why some ACM matchups in Vietnam worked the way they did. And Boyd certainly applied this understanding to E-M theory, which revolutionized how we design and evaluate fighter aircraft. Okay. If somebody wants to attack that idea, I’d welcome it. But let’s assume for a minute that this is true. What makes Boyd make the leap into other realms of war, particularly those involving larger formations?

Most of the maneuverists will point to how basketball players play basketball. Or soccer players play soccer. Or hockey players play hockey. Or so on. Sure, offensive/scoring ability counts, defensive skills count, but being able to manipulate the tempo of the game is something each team strives to achieve. In “blowout” games, usually it’s pretty clear the winning team completely dominated the opposition, being able to pre-empt, dislocate, and disorient the other team. Those maneuverists, such as John Schmitt, will explain this effect in OODA Loop terms. IN such instances, Schmitt points to the lateral communication between the team members—the coach is unable to influence much of the play from the sidelines compared to other games such as American football or baseball. The game is in the hands of the players. These kinds of games show recon-pull in action. When gaps or holes in the defense are found, players naturally gravitate to it/exploit it without waiting for someone (like the coach or the team captain) to tell them.

The question is whether you can believe that this analogy will hold for larger aggregates of units in violent competitions where there are higher levels of uncertainty.

Both the German and Soviet school advocates will concede that this holds—the OODA Loop is applicable in such instances. The difference between them is with regard to where the experts are. For example, to use the basketball analogy—do I have a team that’s played several seasons together? If I do, the players are able to decentralize command and control and implement “recon pull” to immediately exploit discovered gaps. The commander doesn’t have to explicitly direct such exploitation. Soviet school pretty much assumes you have a “pick up”/”back lot” basketball team—team members don’t know each other, implicit communication is at a minimum, and so on. So there’s much more emphasis put on preparation—speed and focus is achieved through better planning BEFORE the operation, as opposed to German school which depends on speed and focus occurring DURING the operation.

So the basic question that differentiates the two schools boils down to this: do you have people that can make independent decisions? If you believe that can’t happen at lower levels—such independence is reserved for senior levels—then you are a Soviet school advocate. If you think you can grow that kind of effective independence at low levels, then you’ll lean to the German school.

Commercial wargaming provide some potential insights. My favorite system to explore this is the MMP/The Gamers Tactical Combat System. In this game, players have to write operations orders with sketches in order for units to conduct operations. You must designate objectives, provide control measures (where to move, what unit boundaries are, etc), and so on. The interesting thing about the game system is that units don’t obey orders as soon as they get them. A number of variables come into play. The first (and some say the most important) variable is how quickly the inherent command and control system accepts new instructions. There are other variables, such as whether the formation is currently in contact or is out of contact (better). And so on. Every turn that an new order is levied against a formation, a die is rolled. The player cannot possibly be sure WHEN a formation will accept and then execute a given order. Playing the numerous games in this series leads players to prefer the sides that have the lowest implementation values. In other words, players want to play the side that accepts and executes orders faster. While they can’t predict when orders will be accepted and executed, there is the possibility that one side will accept and execute orders faster than the other side. While there are exceptions on a case by case basis (i.e., occasionally luck will cause the slower unit to execute orders faster than the faster unit), overall the faster implementing side will get the majority of “jumps” on the opponent in conducting operations. This is a huge insight and leads to a depth of understanding regarding how the OODA Loop works in practice.

But this won’t be convincing to a number of people who will want to judge how well this works given historical examples. Maneuverists will point to a number of well-worn examples where shorter OODA cycles (for the German School, this typically involves recon-pull examples) contribute to situations where the enemy’s actions are rendered “too little, too late.”

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:16 AM
Challenge: If one admits that the OODA Loop concept does apply to aggregates of entities fighting aggregates of entities (i.e., it is indeed valid), how can one know that one is being effectively faster in such a context? By the time you detect/see the results of your speed, isn’t it too late to effectively exploit it?

Response: This is another extremely serious question. The kind of answer you get depends on which MW school you belong to—German school or Soviet school.

First of all, Boyd wasn’t the only one who believed the OODA Loop concept applied to aggregates. The Soviets believed much the same thing as articulated in their “Troop Control” algorithms. Their basic equation for Troop Control ran like this: Tcon (Time needed for effective Troop Control) was equal to T1 (time for effective reports to HQ) + T2 (Headquarters functioning, to include direction from higher headquarters) +T3 (time for orders and signals for the headquarters to reach the unit of action. According to the Soviets, C2 was operative if “Tcon (T1 + T2+ T3) + Top (the time it took for the receiving unit to execute) < Tcrit…with Tcrit being the “critical time” or the time within which the operation must be executed to have the intended effect. A great deal of foundation work in this regard was laid out by Altukhov in “Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control” in 1984. It’s difficult to say whether Altukhov was influenced by Boyd or not. We just don’t know.

So, given the Soviet algorithm. T1 = Observation. T2 had elements of Orientation and decision contained within. T3 and Top were the “action” elements of the OODA. It is very clear they understood that you had to tighten the Tcon loop to beat the Tcrit parameter.

Here is where the German school diverges from the Soviet school. To the Soviet school, the problem of detecting change in time to effectively take advantage of it is huge. Basically, they admit that it can’t be reliably done—and “reliably” is the operative term. So the focus is on preparation before the operation. Likely outcomes are calculated ahead of time and when conditions roughly approximate the preconditions for one of the options, then that option is chosen and pushed through. Here the idea is that the high command will be ready for certain sets of conditions with a “branch plan” or “sequel” ready for execution. If something unexpected comes up, it isn’t seized upon, even if it appears to be advantageous. That’s just how it is. So if you believe that a command and control system cannot possibly take advantage of the unforeseen in a reliable way, you tend to subscribe to Soviet school MW. The way to deal with uncertainty is to prepare like nobody’s business and execute violently but according to the plan (with all its branches and sequels).

On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—units see local conditions and act immediately, consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization buys the required speed—the cost is possibly the unity of effort. Commander’s intent is supposed to provide that unity of effort. Sometimes that occurs, sometimes it doesn’t. The criticism against German school MW is basically that you may not be able to rely on commander’s intent to govern initiative. If you don’t have cohesion, if you don’t have practiced experts, then I’d agree that they are right.

Of course, the requirements for expertise and cohesion throughout the system to accomplish this are much higher than it is for the Soviet school. It’s a lot less efficient but judged to be more effective. Like the basketball team, the players move the ball down the court and make the shots—there’s not much the coach can do on game day. His role was getting the team ready to play.

The German school advocates have a number of illustrations to show what they mean—and let’s admit it, these examples are pretty much a “best case” solution set. My favorite is SSgt Ruhbarth on the Meuse in 1940, pretty much pulling Guderian’s river crossing behind him (you can read all about that in Robert Doughty’s excellent book, The Breaking Point). And there are other equally compelling examples. But what is lacking are case studies that show breakdowns in this kind of command and control system. We have no shortage of cases showing the failures of Soviet School Maneuver Warfare (and I can provide those if anyone is interested). But we lack a comprehensive body of cases that show the risks in German school MW. Robert Leonhard tried to suggest one—Guderian’s conduct of the Battle of Yelnia in 1941—but I’d argue it’s not a good case (and I can provide my rationale why to anyone who asks—just send me a Private Message and I’ll send you a paper on it). Yet, I bet there are others. That said, I sense that these cases are illustrating poor applications of the theory rather than flaws in the theory itself. Of course, one might say the same thing about the Soviet school failures.

There are a number of cases that suggest the disadvantages of the German school approach that I will get into later. As far as the Soviet school failures, I would hope these are relatively self evident, but they may not be to some reading this thread. All I will say is that--despite these failures--they were good enough against the Germans and Japanese at the operational level of war to achieve success. This why Soviet School MW (and their understanding of the OODA Loop) is alive and well, even to this day.

There was no way the Soviets could attempt a German school solution. They had too many languages, conscription (even for NCOs) meant only a two to three year obligation, professionals were only to be found in the officer class—and of these, only at the field grade level (if at that) and above. The operative Soviet school problem was the risk that the situation would outrun the plan. They solved that through the echelon concept—basically, units would only be asked to do one thing and one thing only. Once they were done with that one thing, other units would follow them and carry on the fight. Therefore there was a huge emphasis on reconnaissance so units could prepare and plan to do that “one thing” and nothing more. Once units completed their mission, they were “expended.” Nothing further was asked of them. Other units continued the operation.

I’d hope this illuminates the effective challenges to this very key “MW Essential Premise.” Much depends on your particular experiences, studies, biases, and preferences as to whether you buy into Soviet or German school interpretations of the OODA Loop and how to implement it, or reject it altogether.

reed11b
10-06-2008, 03:49 AM
German school of doctrine has two interesting dynamics that the American school has never adopted. One is the "General Staff" that created fairly concise strategic planning and guidance and the other is the decentrilization discussd in depth on this thread. American military has always paid lip service to decentrilization but never IMO actully utilized it well. What are the positives and negatives of there two concepts and why have American forces never truly adopted them?
Reed

William F. Owen
10-06-2008, 08:43 AM
On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—

Is the "exploitation of opportunity" the same as Recon Pull?

The words "Recon Pull" were dropped from UK ADP Land OPs, because of the argument of two Officers, both of whom had served with the German Army and one of whom had attended their Staff Collage.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 09:51 AM
Wilf writes:


Is the "exploitation of opportunity" the same as Recon Pull?

Not at all. One can find and exploit opportunity without recon-pull. It's just slower. Reconnaissance pull means that your picket line/recon screen/forward elements find the gaps in the enemy disposition and immediately contact adjacent units laterally...these adjacent move towards and through the gaps if not given the mission to fix a particular enemy formation. Nobody is waiting for the commander to tell people to move in that direction. They just go. The unit commander will show up if the gap persists, potentially committing reserves and calling his adjacent commanders to follow him through.

Lind provides a very brief encapsulation in Maneuver Warfare Handbook on pages 18-19:


For a platoon, company, or even battalion commander, an enemy weakness is likely to be a physical gap in the enemy's position. How can he find the gap? Through what we call "reconnaissance pull" or "recon-pull."

Currently, most Marine units use the opposite of recon-pull tactics, called "command push." The axis of advance is chosen before the operation begins, and it is seldom altered. The commander pushes however many forces are needed down that axis to make the attack successful. Of course, this often results in throwing strength against strength. With recon-pull, the axis of advance is determined by the results of reconaissance rather than being fixed by command from above, and it shifts in response to what the recon finds.

An exapmle of one type of attack may be helpful in understanding this. Your forward element is a reconnaissance screen. Its job is to look for surfaces and gaps. When it finds a gap, it goes through, and calls other forces to follow. [my emphasis--EMW] If the gap seems to be promising, the unit commander commits more forces through it. Some of the forces widen the gap and roll out behind the enemy position that has been penetrated, collapsing it from the rear. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance screen continues to move forward, always seeking the path of least resistance. The recon pulls the main force around the enemy surfaces and ever more deeply into the enemy position.

Recon-pull requires a different type of reconnaissance from what Marines are used to. Today, most recon forces are committed deep, along the axis of advance chosen for the "command push." There is no reconnaissance screen. For recon-pull, you must have a recon screen. It is different from a security screen, in that it orients on the enemy, not on your own unit. It must be strong. Indeed, all your forward forces must be a part of it. In maneuver warfare, recon is everyone's responsibility.

The key to empower this recon-pull is lateral communications, as MCDP 1-3 Tactics instructs on page 75-76:


If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level communicate laterally--if we, as leaders, talk directly to other leaders--action moves much faster....It results from the confidence of the higher commander who through past experiences has found that subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and the commander's stated intent.

A good example of lateral communication comes from aviation. In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course. A pilot who needs to talk to another does so. A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot. Events would quickly outpace communication if pilots tried to talk that way. The same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics units as well.This is very messy, as Lind points out (page 7):


The "reconnaissance pull"...tactics of the German Blitzkrieg were inherently disorderly. Higher headquarters could neither direct nor predict the exact path of the advance. But the multitude of German reconnaissance trusts generated massive confusion among the French in 1940. Each was reported as a new attack. The Germans seemed to be everywhere, and the French, whose system demanded certainty before making any decisions, were paralyzed.

Or course, a number of those gaps are going to turn out to be traps. Yep. And follow-on forces that survive will in turn recon-pull their way through newly developed gaps that perhaps aren't traps. And some will be traps. This is one of the reasons why MW can be so expensive in terms of casualties--particularly those of junior leaders who generally are at the front end, positioning themselves where they can change the direction/mission of these units.

But against a slower acting enemy, reconnaissance pull can have some devastating effects as the friendly force quickly infiltrates/penetrates/flanks/envelops faster than the other side can react, much less drive the situation.

Against an enemy that as just as agile, you get a very high-tempo battle and a lot of attrition!

Kiwigrunt
10-06-2008, 11:08 AM
Let me first of all say that I’m loving these threads. A lot of it goes over my head but I’m learning plenty.




Or course, a number of those gaps are going to turn out to be traps. Yep. And follow-on forces that survive will in turn recon-pull their way through newly developed gaps that perhaps aren't traps. And some will be traps. This is one of the reasons why MW can be so expensive in terms of casualties--particularly those of junior leaders who generally are at the front end, positioning themselves where they can change the direction/mission of these units.

Is there not also a danger that if it is a trap, and you pull your lateral ‘friendlies’ into that black hole, you leave your flanks wide open for the enemy to recon pull all over you? Especially since recon pull appears to be based on committing a lot of your strength ‘up’ at the front in this recon role. That might suggest little weight in depth. Or am I seeing this wrong? Is this forward line thin enough to leave enough reserves? I suppose this is where my confusion is. At what point does recon pull default into command push?


Against an enemy that as just as agile, you get a very high-tempo battle and a lot of attrition!

A lot of attrition in MV? Hmmm... It appears that this would suggest ‘full circle’, which would support Wilf’s concerns against differentiating between the two.

Steve Blair
10-06-2008, 02:36 PM
German school of doctrine has two interesting dynamics that the American school has never adopted. One is the "General Staff" that created fairly concise strategic planning and guidance and the other is the decentrilization discussd in depth on this thread. American military has always paid lip service to decentrilization but never IMO actully utilized it well. What are the positives and negatives of there two concepts and why have American forces never truly adopted them?
Reed

I think that some of the reasons go back to the innate distrust that existed for many, many years between the government (and public in many cases) and the standing military. Prior to World War II the thrust was always to keep the army as small as possible (and often so small that it couldn't perform its duties well), and any attempt to professionalize the officer corps was seen as "Prussianism" (a derogatory term in those days) and a threat to democracy in the case of some extremists. There was also a distinct separation between the line and the staff, with the staff seen by the line as a bunch of lazy bastards using their political connections (most staff assignments were in Washington) to avoid doing any real work. Heck, back then the general in chief didn't really command a fair part of the army. With structure like that, how could you have a general staff?

In terms of decentralized control, I'd argue that the army did practice this to a great degree during the Indian Wars period and also before World War I, but out of necessity rather than any doctrinal planning or thrust. It varied from regiment to regiment, but in many cases junior officers (and NCOs) were left to conduct their local affairs based on very general guidance from their superiors (an early version of commander's intent?). Interestingly, as communication methods improved, such decentralized control went away. I'd argue that part of this also had to do with the view of the army as a nucleus that large "volunteer forces" would grow around in time of national emergency (as sort of happened during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and in an altered fashion during World War I). Faced with a large influx of unskilled men in command positions, centralized control became the order of the day.

Positives and negatives? Well...I'd say that both a good general staff and decentralized control depend to a great degree on personalities, so there's a possible positive and negative right there. Both depend on a well-educated and professional officer corps, as well as solid NCOs, to achieve maximum results. You also have to view staff duty as something of an honor and not a "staff puke."

I'd say in the German experience the general staff model led to a fixation on the operational level of war and something of tunnel vision when it came to anything other than ground operations. With the French it led to extremes in theoretical thinking. The British had issues, I think, based more on the historical composition of their officer corps (at least prior to and during World War I), but I'm not an expert on either the French or British militaries, so I'll leave more detailed comment (and rebuttal of my generalizations) to those who are....:)

William F. Owen
10-06-2008, 03:08 PM
One can find and exploit opportunity without recon-pull. It's just slower. Reconnaissance pull means that your picket line/recon screen/forward elements find the gaps in the enemy disposition and immediately contact adjacent units laterally...these adjacent move towards and through the gaps if not given the mission to fix a particular enemy formation. Nobody is waiting for the commander to tell people to move in that direction. They just go. The unit commander will show up if the gap persists, potentially committing reserves and calling his adjacent commanders to follow him through.

I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Lind's examples always seem very selective and even archaic to me. I'm not sure how "Recon Pull" would work in a formation level meeting engagement.

I understand the theory. I just don't see practical application.

Steve Blair
10-06-2008, 03:27 PM
I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Lind's examples always seem very selective and even archaic to me. I'm not sure how "Recon Pull" would work in a formation level meeting engagement.

I understand the theory. I just don't see practical application.

There's plenty of application if you're looking to move where the enemy isn't. Part of the point of recon pull in the MW context as I understand it is to avoid the meeting engagement by moving where the enemy either isn't or where he's so weak that you can punch through quickly. Granted it's most useful in either mobile warfare or some sort of deep raiding activity (just to wet your "archaic example" whistle I'd submit that most successful Civil War cavalry raids are good examples of lower level recon pull...as their point was to move to an objective by avoiding contact), but that's also its practical application. It all depends on what your overall objective is.

Examples are always selective. It's kinda their nature.

William F. Owen
10-06-2008, 03:44 PM
It all depends on what your overall objective is.



My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian! :)

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.

wm
10-06-2008, 04:19 PM
My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian! :)

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.

Unless we are talking about the mercenary armies that characterized warfare in Italy during the Renaissance, I concur with Wilf. Even then, the concept was to put one's army in a position such that the opponent would choose to surrender rather than fight and be destroyed--that to me is the essence of maneuver.

BTW, F2T2EA seems to have replaced OODA as the buzzword of choice in certain circles (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess). Recon pull can support this model easily. The main difference is, again as Wilf pointed out, that what your reconnaissance efforts uncover is used to pull your forces to engage, not to avoid, the enemy.

Others have commented on the problem of the trap--pushing forces into a gap could easily turn into a modern day Cannae. I worked for a guy who planned to conduct a number of Bde-sized L-shaped ambushes during WWIII in Germany. His idea was to allow the bad guys' recon assets to find a "boundary" to exploit (their doctrine). He had massed forces in vertical arrays on the real boundary with a small blocking forces (sort of like Hannibal at Lake Trasimene)--he tested out his theory during a REFORGER and was wildly successful--got a star as a result.

The picture of the scouts strung along across the entire force's front, probing for holes in the enemy defense reminds me too much of linear static warfare like WWI and the later phases of WWII in Europe--certainly seems likely to devolve very quickly into attrition warfare. And, as danced around in earlier posts, still no discussion of how to protect a force's support echelons once the battlefield becomes non-linear as combat power "pours" through a hole (that isn't a trap). 507th Maint Co at Nasiryah, anyone?

reed11b
10-06-2008, 04:24 PM
My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian! :)

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.
I think Wilf has a good point, particularly once you go beyond HIC. What I DO like about the reconn-pull concept, as I have stated before, is that it requires a reduction of the upper-level micro-managmnet that can currently ham-string our forces. The concept of lateral communications I think could still be a force multi-plier. This would also, IMHO, require greater organic firepower at the unit level, since air-power and artillery will remain cued into higher echelon control by necessity. Of course I'm biased since I have a nearly complete small unit infantry doctrine theory.
Reed

Steve Blair
10-06-2008, 04:40 PM
My point is simply that recon pull has its uses, and to reject it out of hand smacks of "either/or-ism," which seems to be one of the major banes to American thinking (military and otherwise). It may also be germane to consider that as recon forces are weakened (or made lighter), their ability to find and fix anything decreases. They may well FIND it, but if they're swatted aside it's not likely that they'll report back with anything useful....

I also think another factor in this discussion (and one that seems to fade from view from time to time) is the question of space. Something like recon pull becomes less useful in constricted areas like Western Europe, but as you get more space maneuver becomes more important. Probing for holes can degenerate into attrition warfare, but so can using your recon to find the enemy and then going at him. And if you're fighting on a restricted front, finding those holes isn't necessarily useful. But if you shift the example to more open spaces (say Russia or the majority of the Western Theater in the Civil War) you start having to consider more things. And if your operational objective is to damage your opponent's logistics, then recon pull can certainly help you find clear paths to your objective.

Recon pull seems to me to be quite useful at the operational level, but less so as you move up and down the combat food chain. But it's also just one of many tools in the box, and "either/or" usually ends up sounding dogmatic and over time becomes very predictable to any opponent.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 04:54 PM
Wilf writes:


I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Probably can't articulate a better example of the Soviet School MW perspective than this, although it also applies to the Attrition style of warfare. What betrays Wilf's perspective is the focus on maneuver and recon as a precursor to application of destructive power first and foremost--at least the way this comes across in print. I also find it interesting that recon forces are fixing forces that actively reduce freedom of action. Well, I suppose cavalry units do that. But I'm thinking of a more all-encompassing concept that this. I'm thinking of recon screens/pickets made up of all sorts of units. And there are some dedicated recon units I want to keep stealthy--I don't want them doing "direct action" or other target acquisition efforts. In recon-pull, there's certainly plenty of "tooth and claw," but only to facilitate gap creating and getting people through the gaps (if we're talking about holes in spatial dispositions here).

This is why Soviet School MW does not recognize the utility of reconnaissance-pull; certainly attrition style warfare does not either. Soviet School MW decides where the opportunities are ahead of time, during planning. Exploitation of those opportunities are already programmed into the plan. There is little to no provision for creating the unexpected and taking advantage of it at the scene. This is because of the risk that the operation will lose focus and coherence. That's a real risk. If you don't have the expertise, the self-disciplined forces, the cohesion to execute reconnaissance pull, then you are left with this kind of approach if you are going to do MW.

Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.

Steve.Blair writes:


Part of the point of recon pull in the MW context as I understand it is to avoid the meeting engagement by moving where the enemy either isn't or where he's so weak that you can punch through quickly.

Not exactly true. It's not that you want to avoid the meeting engagement every time. There are some times you want the meeting engagement--you just want it on your terms. You hope to shape it in such a way you uncover a weakness you can exploit. This issue here is how that would be done. Wilf isn't sure of how a "formation-level meeting engagement" would work under recon-pull concepts. I'll try to provide a very general illustration below--and even give Wilf his wish to apply some "tooth and claw" against it...

Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.

If we're waiting for the commander to make the call, it's going to be too late.

Recon pull doesn't wait. If we are units in the recon screen, we look at the mission and the intent and decide what to do. In the above example, there's all kinds of gaps/weaknesses. Imagine that out of six elements in the recon screen, three see enemy units in column with nothing that looks promising and three spot gaps--one sees the arty uncovered by flankers, one sees the log train uncovered by air defense, and one sees the big hole to "the green fields beyond" into the enemy depth. Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."

There are issues with this, however, and that is on maintaining coherence. Recon-pull will naturally cause disunity if leaders aren't ruthless in sticking to commander's intent (at minimum) and where the main effort is aimed against.

Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively.

Are there ways to "exploit opportunity" without doing recon-pull? Sure. Recon pull is but one way to exploit opportunity, but what that particular command technique brings to the table is timing and ambiguity of action, perhaps more so than other methods.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 05:09 PM
Steve.Blair writes:


I also think another factor in this discussion (and one that seems to fade from view from time to time) is the question of space. Something like recon pull becomes less useful in constricted areas like Western Europe, but as you get more space maneuver becomes more important. Probing for holes can degenerate into attrition warfare, but so can using your recon to find the enemy and then going at him. And if you're fighting on a restricted front, finding those holes isn't necessarily useful. But if you shift the example to more open spaces (say Russia or the majority of the Western Theater in the Civil War) you start having to consider more things. And if your operational objective is to damage your opponent's logistics, then recon pull can certainly help you find clear paths to your objective.

I will argue that recon-pull was adopted at an extremely decentralized level BECAUSE of higher troop densities and "less maneuver space" in Western Europe. What space affects would seem to be what level recon-pull is practiced at--the more open the space for maneuver, the higher such prerogatives are held. The development of infiltration tactics at the small unit level--down to the platoon and squad using recon-pull technique--was in response to the incredibly high troop densities characteristic of WW I Western Front warfare (although it is true, it made its debut at Riga, on the Eastern Front, and later at Caporetto on the Italian/Austrian Front).

The reason I bring this up is that it illustrates the problem with the term "maneuver," which all too often is understood purely in terms of movement and mobility. If I substitute those terms for "maneuver" in Steve.Blair's complaint, I'm more ready to agree with him. Mostly because while movement/mobility as maneuver was achieved at the tactical level with stosstruppen despite the relative troop densities, such movement/mobility just could not be sustained at the operational level (particularly given the rail networks of the defenders).

And that hearkens back to one of the major difficulties with doing recon-pull...you can easily recon-pull yourself into tactical successes at the cost of operational failure. We can get into that kind of discussion, but I feel we're getting into a tangent away from the OODA Loop; maybe this should be a new thread?

wm
10-06-2008, 05:32 PM
Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.
The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?


Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.
Examples again look like active defense (or meeting engagement as part of active defense). How about cases for deliberate attack or movement to contact where our side starts on the offensive--perhaps something more like Marines storming ashore at Tarawa.



Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."
What keeps this from becoming a series of piecemeal attacks that get defeated in detail? By the time the formation commander has enough situational awareness to "command 'by negation,'" things may have gone too far to extract some or all of the committed elements that got the commander's intent wrong, misread the situation, or just plain got surrounded by "Indians at the end of that box canyon they stormed into" because the bad guys reacted/acted faster than our own forces did.


Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively. Are these situations more likely to be the exception or the rule? I suspect that as the size of the formations grows, the likelihood of such "moments of decision" will be fewer and fewer.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 05:33 PM
Reed11b writes about the utility of recon-pull:


This would also, IMHO, require greater organic firepower at the unit level, since air-power and artillery will remain cued into higher echelon control by necessity.

Okay, at the risk of completely hijacking this thread into a detailed discussion of reconnaissance-pull, I've simply got to address this observation by Reed11b. I do this for two major reasons: (1) he is touching on something that Robert Leonhard goes into great detail discussing in his fine book, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War, and (2) this is the essence of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfare, which aims at getting air and artillery support as far down the food chain as we can. We don't WANT it "leashed" to "higher echelon control by necessity." Our whole "Enhanced Company Operations" effort is trying to bash down those kinds of inhibiting controls. I won't go into that here. But I do want to elaborate on where Reed11b and Robert Leonhard seem to agree.

First, Leonhard observes in Chapter Seven entitled "Opportunity" that higher level commanders can delegate all they want, but they still hold the resources. He tells a humorous story about a mother giving "commander's intent to a teenage daughter prior to a shopping trip, and of course the clothes she picks are not the ones mom is willing to buy. And she holds the cash. I'd argue in this case mom didn't do a good job of communicating intent, but you get the idea. Even if mom did a good job, if she's not willing to part with the cash/credit card, such delegation is more symbolic than real. Leonhard then goes into a very detailed discussion of what this means in a military context--and I strongly advise people to read it. He and I have gotten into a good bit of strong argument/heated discussion about a good deal of this, but we don't disagree on the premise or theory. What we disagree on is on the practice.

To hearken back to my earlier recon-pull example, recall six elements finding three weaknesses/gaps in a situation involving an enemy probe in a meeting engagement kind of situation. One of those weaknesses involved getting behind the force and launching into the enemy's operational depth "to the green fields beyond." Well, even if the commander's intent allowed--yea, even encouraged--that course of action, if on-scene unit commanders don't have the means or sustainment to pull that kind of bold maneuver off, it doesn't matter that they were told they could take such risks. They physically aren't able to until the higher level commander gives them the assets.

One has to go back to stosstruppen/infiltration tactics and the Soviet/German idea from the 1930s about "all-arms" formations. If you are going to build mobile units that practice recon-pull, you got to let them have a lot of stuff. That means decentralizing assets as well as command authorities. So the stosstruppen got flamethrowers and machine guns and trench mortars and all kinds of toys they never had as line rifle infantry before. And Guderian got his radio in every tank...and air-ground links to Stuka aircraft...and infantry on wheels/tracks...and light artillery that could keep up...and--you get the idea. The key is that units at the front end could cobble together tactical solutions with assets at hand rather than wait for higher headquarters to direct such cooperation.

So, if you are evaluating a military force based purely on what it says in its doctrine, see what they are doing in practice. Leonhard makes this point in The Art of Maneuver and it's the same one Reed11b has made elsewhere:


...it is important to note that while our doctrine and culture favor an appoach to command and control along the lines of Auftragstaktik and small-unit initiative, Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down. There was no room for initiative, or even for significant maneuver options, below corps level. Commanders at all levels were instructed where and when to move and were not permitted to find their own way to the objectives. In essence, the coalition arms simply lined up and swept forward, careful to maintain contact with the friendly forces on their flanks. Like rigidly disciplined Macedonian phalanxes, divisions and brigades had to march and stay dressed to the flanks throughout the advance, crashing through both strong and weak points in the enemy's defenses.

I have maintained previously that this command-push approach to warfare is not necessarily a violation of maneuver warfare theory. Indeed, in many cases, as in Operation Desert Storm, it can easily overwhelm an enemy at small cost in time and lives. It is a method of fighting that emphasizes momentum (mass times velocity) instead of force (mass times acceleration), and it has a view towards unity of command rather than small-unit initiative. It descends from the Soviet school of maneuver warfare developed and perfected in World War II, and in Operation Desert Storm it found almost flawless expression....

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 05:43 PM
wm writes:


Quoting me: "Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance."

The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?

I will give you a different scenario later on. I wasn't thinking of Active Defense here, quite honestly. Certainly I see why you might.

The difference between the above and Soviet MW in OODA application is that the USMC concept of "wanting them to happen as automatically as I can make it" is that it's non-formulaic and decided upon by the man on the spot given the situation as he sees it. The Soviet MW approach, in contrast, is a preplanned response that is not conceived of on the spot, but merely applied on the spot. The Soviets distrusted initiative as not being "scientifically substantiated" at the tactical level and only allowed this at might higher formations--and even then, only during planning. Leonhard discusses this at length in The Art of Maneuver (pp. 113-121). I can cite the Soviet open source works on this issue, particularly Vladimir Lefebvre's notion of "reflexive control" which just doesn't work the same as what the West thinks of when we say "initiative."

Ken White
10-06-2008, 05:48 PM
Desert Storm. That thing was an aberration in so very many respects. Well done? Yep -- but still an aberration. One should be exceedingly careful in drawing any lessons from that 'war.'

Not least because it was the only time since the Civil War other than early WW II in North Africa where the US actually fought at Division level -- the rest of the time, it's been by Bde / RCT and that is due essentially to terrain and nothing more. We actually do decentralized command and execution pretty well once the peacetime attitude and chains are broken -- and I'd note the current wars are just barely on the cusp of a tempo adequate to force that delegation on some reluctant Commanders...

METT-TC rules and DS/DS is as bad a military example as is Malaya

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 05:52 PM
wm writes:


How about cases for deliberate attack or movement to contact where our side starts on the offensive--perhaps something more like Marines storming ashore at Tarawa.

Tarawa is actually a terrific case of recon-pull. I could also cite Omaha Beach. When the whole plan went to hell, local leaders took charge and improvised solutions with what they had on hand, finding gaps and exploiting them to establish toe-holds inland. "There are two kinds of people on this beach--those who are dead, and those who are gonna die if they don't get off it." I can cite instances and sources if you want.

I only talked about the "meeting engagement" because Wilf was asking the question on how that might work. Recon pull also works in the defense--in fact, this is where the Germans first got the idea for it as they were economizing forces on the Western Front in WWI. I'd refer you to Bruce I Gudmundsson's excellent Stormtroop Tactics for a detailed discussion, but even Tim Lupfer traces this in his Fort Leavenworth monograph, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Does this answer your question? They key here is that the situation is uncertain--it doesn't matter what your force mission is (attack, defense, etc).

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 05:56 PM
wm asks:


What keeps this from becoming a series of piecemeal attacks that get defeated in detail? By the time the formation commander has enough situational awareness to "command 'by negation,'" things may have gone too far to extract some or all of the committed elements that got the commander's intent wrong, misread the situation, or just plain got surrounded by "Indians at the end of that box canyon they stormed into" because the bad guys reacted/acted faster than our own forces did.

That indeed is the difficulty with the concept--a good intent, a common understanding between element leaders of who or what the main effort is, and strong lateral communications are an absolute must to prevent this from happening. Many believe that establishing this is just too hard to rely upon. But we've got plenty of cases to show how it can work and why. I'll get into the cases later about when it doesn't. Certainly the Soviets felt much the same way as you do--and Leonhard (and I) would also agree that the United States ground forces often feel the same way as well. The question is whether we'll ever do better. The Marines are trying--thus their adoption of "German School MW" as doctrine.

William F. Owen
10-06-2008, 06:02 PM
What betrays Wilf's perspective is the focus on maneuver and recon as a precursor to application of destructive power first and foremost--at least the way this comes across in print. I also find it interesting that recon forces are fixing forces that actively reduce freedom of action. Well, I suppose cavalry units do that.

You got me! Yes, that is where I am coming from. I do see Recon as Cavalry - horse archers, or Lancers. This is where I part company with UK doctrine and all the "Recce by Stealth" nonsense. Screening Force battle is essential both in Offence and Defence.

Cavguy
10-06-2008, 06:31 PM
You got me! Yes, that is where I am coming from. I do see Recon as Cavalry - horse archers, or Lancers. This is where I part company with UK doctrine and all the "Recce by Stealth" nonsense. Screening Force battle is essential both in Offence and Defence.

Case in point #1 - 1st day at the Battle of Gettysburg, with Buford's 1st Cav Regiment holding the initial high ground against a division assault. First of many "turning points" that decided that battle.

We have gutted our Cav units of the ability to organically guard (and really screen without significant air/arty support), which I am not sure is a good thing.

Steve Blair
10-06-2008, 06:49 PM
Case in point #1 - 1st day at the Battle of Gettysburg, with Buford's 1st Cav Regiment holding the initial high ground against a division assault. First of many "turning points" that decided that battle.

We have gutted our Cav units of the ability to organically guard (and really screen without significant air/arty support), which I am not sure is a good thing.

Different thread, perhaps, but I'm convinced it's not a good thing.

reed11b
10-06-2008, 07:15 PM
Okay, at the risk of completely hijacking this thread into a detailed discussion of reconnaissance-pull, I've simply got to address this observation by Reed11b. I do this for two major reasons: (1) he is touching on something that Robert Leonhard goes into great detail discussing in his fine book, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War, and (2) this is the essence of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfare, which aims at getting air and artillery support as far down the food chain as we can. We don't WANT it "leashed" to "higher echelon control by necessity." Our whole "Enhanced Company Operations" effort is trying to bash down those kinds of inhibiting controls.

That is an interesting observation and an interesting choice of doctrine. I am a huge decentralization and combined arms fan, but my efforts to crunch the numbers on air-power and arty distributed to Batt. and lower formations has convinced me that this is a BAD idea. I did a study a few years ago when the ARH and LUH competition was going on, to show that an armed utility helicopter at Batt. or Co. echelon, replacing both the ARH and LUH in function and acquisition and a large number of "mid" echelon UAVs would be cost effective as well as tactically preferable. The tactically preferable is still debatable, but cost effective it was not. The duplication of maintenance and support billets and equipment escalated to the point were they swallowed up the cost savings. (the study was based on the MD explorer since #s existed for it from the CG.) Fast movers are even worse cost wise. On top of that you lose the ability entirely for any concentration of effort w/ these assets. There are other means of improving the utility and firepower of the "line" units.
Reed
P.S. One surprising find of my study (unpublished) was that Batt and BCT echelon UAVs also have a bad cost-to-effectiveness ratio. Larger, longer ranged UAV's grouped in an aviation unit would be a better idea IMO.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 08:49 PM
Reed11b writes:


I am a huge decentralization and combined arms fan, but my efforts to crunch the numbers on air-power and arty distributed to Batt. and lower formations has convinced me that this is a BAD idea.

When I was working the Counterinsurgency Targeting and ISR study for the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) here in Joint Forces Command, we looked at much the same cost-benefit analysis and the solutions are varied. Pick your poison. There is certainly an awareness that overhead may not be worth the coast of bringing the asset down. If you aren't going to do that, then you need to find a way to shorten the "observe" cycle time since requesting the asset eats up precious moments. That's mostly what we're working on for the Enhanced Company Operations concept.

Certainly the problem of "penny-packeting" or "peanut butter spread" of resources/assets is germane, but we expect the higher level commander to set the rules on that, based on the situation. If the scenario requires the ability to quickly mass such assets, then the C2 rig must allow it. If not, then it's not a problem. Currently we're doing COIN and not feeling any ill effects in this realm.

Soviets had that wonderful C2 machinery for taking ownership of assets at a stroke--a Division-level Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) on the Division staff could, with just a call on the Division Fires net, get control of every artillery and mortar tube in the Division to fire on a particular target within range. Not something they did very often, but they could. They also were able to put disparate, dispersed, and discrete elements of various penetrating forces onto one comm net...and put everyone under a single Operational Maneuver Group commander when required so that these forces could congeal in the depth of the NATO defenses and attack vulnerable targets in the rear in a concerted way. Great theory--and I'm glad to say we never had to see how good they were at doing this in practice!

As Marines, we're somewhat luckier than the U.S. Army in getting responsive air support, be it UAVs/UASs or fixed wing aircraft. These are flown by Marines for Marines and there's a lot of professional pressure put on the aviators by the ground guys to provide good service. Reputations are made and broken in this very clubby Marine Corps through successes and failures in this. Our issues generally are on streamlining procedures--but we do "det out" rotary wing aviation packets based out of Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) for days at a time...almost like decentralizing assets!

reed11b
10-07-2008, 12:02 AM
As Marines, we're somewhat luckier than the U.S. Army in getting responsive air support, be it UAVs/UASs or fixed wing aircraft. These are flown by Marines for Marines and there's a lot of professional pressure put on the aviators by the ground guys to provide good service. Reputations are made and broken in this very clubby Marine Corps through successes and failures in this. Our issues generally are on streamlining procedures--but we do "det out" rotary wing aviation packets based out of Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) for days at a time...almost like decentralizing assets!
My point was that there are other means of gaining the intangibles of the non-complimentary supports that are being pushed down to lower echelons then are ideal to support them. UAVs are a good example. Completely different fuel, parts, skill sets and equipment from anything else in the Co. and Bat. They do provide timely recon information however. There is other equipment that can provide this as well however. FLIR masts on tactical vehicles have become small enough to be included on non-dedicated platforms. There are parachute equipped cameras that can be fired from any 40mm GL. There is a mature DARPA program for an 81mm or 120mm mortar launched LTA UAV. Thrown recon balls instead of "micro backpack robots", etc etc. All these systems can be operated by infantrymen, do not create long logistical tails, or reduce unit mobility like Co and Batt. UAV's do. More firepower? XM-109 payload rifle is fantastic! 2000m point target range, combined w/ the potential for air burst fused rounds and an AP round that can defeat most light armor. Precision mortar rounds are another firepower bonus that does not create new skill sets and upkeep. Yep, a Marine can call on the awesome firepower of an F/A-18 fighter-bomber by calling for it on the radio, but they better be able to cope if that fighter-bomber has a higher priority mission. Sorry for the quick sloppy post, but hopefully the intent is readable. Happy to answer any questions.
Reed

ericmwalters
10-07-2008, 01:05 AM
Reed11b wrote:


My point was that there are other means of gaining the intangibles of the non-complementary supports that are being pushed down to lower echelons then are ideal to support them.

Because we Marines typically live hand-to-mouth, we've been pretty inventive and innovative in rigging field expedient means. I wish the institution was better at formalizing some of these very successful arrangements.

With regard to UASs, it's been a mixed bag. DRAGON EYE hasn't been as good as we wanted for a battalion-level disposable UAV--mostly because it's not truly disposable. One goes down, we often send out a patrol to recover it. That really bugs me. WASP has been much better for the companies. Sure, we don't have the parts, maintenance tail. But our rationale has been to treat these assets as expendables, like batteries or ammunition.

Regarding air support, we pretty much live in a different world than anyone else. We generally don't find our fixed wing close air support pulled off for any "higher priority mission." If we lose air support, it's usually due to low visibility/adverse weather, even with the vaunted F/A-18D "All-Weather" fighter/bomber. Marine air exists to support ground forces--it's our "flying artillery." It exists for that purpose first and foremost. This is usually hard for our Army brethren to get used to. Trust me, I've seen the kind of close air support the USAF provides in wartime. It cannot possibly compare. USAF air has a bazillion competing missions. We don't.

When I was the G2 of 3d MAW in OIF I, we had scores and scores of targets for "joint air" over 3d ID/V Corps on the "March Up" to Baghdad. These aircraft would be burning gas in CAS stacks waiting for a target. The ASOC either wasn't getting many nominations or couldn't process them fast enough--I defer to any knowledgable USAF readers who were there to explain what happened. But these A/C would be running low on fuel and then "cross the line" over our boundary and we'd hand them a target. 3d ID only had a couple of divisions to deal with outside of Baghdad. I MEF had a bunch--I think I can recall roughly eight or so. We had no shortage of stuff to shoot up.

Still, there's lot of OODA Loop reducing measures we can take. When I was a tank officer, I had no Forward Air Controller (FAC). I also had no Forward Observer (FO). We had nothing like a FIST. I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target. The infantry had FACs and had FOs. I didn't. My tank loader would help me work up the calls for fire and close air support missions while I was on the platoon net running my other four tanks, or talking to the company commander on the company net, or yakking to my tank crew as I was maneuvering (and sometimes shooting) my tank. I was a pretty busy guy as platoon commander with all the "turret tasks" I had to execute. But I could (and did) bring down my own fire support, thank you very much. And if I could do it, there's no reason why a squad leader or platoon sergeant/platoon leader can't. Without at FAC. Without a FO. We need to expand this to include ISR support--UASs tied to Off the Shelf Video Receiver Terminals (OSVRTs) and--even better--ROVER III with laptops and a voice comm link (NOT mIRC Chat!) to the sensor payload operator/UAS pilot/mission commander.

But I imagine "stosstruppen on steroids" these days, where sergeants can collaborate and cooperate in ground operations to execute recon-pull type operations. We're a long way from doing that across the USMC. Maybe some day. I'm hoping Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) will point the way. I could be grossly naive, but a man can dream, can't he?

reed11b
10-07-2008, 03:07 AM
Reed11b wrote:



Because we Marines typically live hand-to-mouth, we've been pretty inventive and innovative in rigging field expedient means. I wish the institution was better at formalizing some of these very successful arrangements.
True, of course how much was squandered on items such as MARPAT and Marine Body Armor? Small ticket items yes, but certainly not ones that needed to be Marine unique.



With regard to UASs, it's been a mixed bag. DRAGON EYE hasn't been as good as we wanted for a battalion-level disposable UAV--mostly because it's not truly disposable. One goes down, we often send out a patrol to recover it. That really bugs me. WASP has been much better for the companies. Sure, we don't have the parts, maintenance tail. But our rationale has been to treat these assets as expendables, like batteries or ammunition.

So, what do you think of the non-UAS options I outlined? Dragon Eye and WASP may be disposable, but they were still large eneough to require a dedicated soldier that lost alot of his "manueverability", far more then the differance betweeen the SAW and the new Marine LAR replacement options.


Regarding air support, we pretty much live in a different world than anyone else. We generally don't find our fixed wing close air support pulled off for any "higher priority mission." If we lose air support, it's usually due to low visibility/adverse weather, even with the vaunted F/A-18D "All-Weather" fighter/bomber. Marine air exists to support ground forces--it's our "flying artillery." It exists for that purpose first and foremost. This is usually hard for our Army brethren to get used to. Trust me, I've seen the kind of close air support the USAF provides in wartime. It cannot possibly compare. USAF air has a bazillion competing missions. We don't.




Still, there's lot of OODA Loop reducing measures we can take. When I was a tank officer, I had no Forward Air Controller (FAC). I also had no Forward Observer (FO). We had nothing like a FIST. I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target. The infantry had FACs and had FOs. I didn't. My tank loader would help me work up the calls for fire and close air support missions while I was on the platoon net running my other four tanks, or talking to the company commander on the company net, or yakking to my tank crew as I was maneuvering (and sometimes shooting) my tank. I was a pretty busy guy as platoon commander with all the "turret tasks" I had to execute. But I could (and did) bring down my own fire support, thank you very much. And if I could do it, there's no reason why a squad leader or platoon sergeant/platoon leader can't. Without at FAC. Without a FO. We need to expand this to include ISR support--UASs tied to Off the Shelf Video Receiver Terminals (OSVRTs) and--even better--ROVER III with laptops and a voice comm link (NOT mIRC Chat!) to the sensor payload operator/UAS pilot/mission commander.
Jeez, if I wouldn't have to go back through basic (boot) you would almost have me recruited. Higher tasking includes other Marines in higher need however, and I do believe that happens. There are also times when you need precision fires at less then 1,000kg of HE. As you mention earlier, calling in 9-line air support is fairly complicated, organic fires tend to be simplier, since the system operator is already "in the loop" and does not need as much situational description to act. Talk about OODA Loop reducing times.Also, as I mentioned earlier, instead of increasing the tasking on the PlSgt a great deal by making them operate a complicated ISR platform, just use a simpler one, ort better utilize the existing ones. Micro UAV's just don't add up for me, no matter how many times I do the math.



But I imagine "stosstruppen on steroids" these days, where sergeants can collaborate and cooperate in ground operations to execute recon-pull type operations. We're a long way from doing that across the USMC. Maybe some day. I'm hoping Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) will point the way. I could be grossly naive, but a man can dream, can't he?
I must admit that I like alot of what ECO has to offer.I still feel that EBO (Enchanced Battalion Opperations, not the "other" EBO) makes more sense. Pushing assets down the line beyond where they can be effectivly supported smacks of the big mistakes your big green brother made with the BCTs. Improving the human resources makes more sense IMO, though I know the MC has made big strides in this direction (actually the Army seems to be making big gains in this department too). The reason I want to nit-pick the details with you, is the same reason I nit-pick the details with Wilf, I really like your basic concept.
Reed

Entropy
10-07-2008, 03:14 AM
Wow, what a fantastic thread, especially for a ground-ignorant guy like me. I'm learning a lot about this MW thing.

I do have to say that Eric's detailed posts on MW remind me of some naval history - Lord Admiral Nelsen in particular. The battle of the Nile in particular strikes me as a sort of naval variant of a recon pull, and Nelsen's plan at Trafalgar to split the line at the enemy flagship to disrupt fleet signals might be thought of as an OODA loop disruption - if I'm understanding the general concepts correctly.

One question on Soviet vs German school - is it possible to practice both at the same time? For example, could one "decide where the opportunities are ahead of time," as you put it earlier, in the planning process, yet allow for exploitation of those laterally-coordinated serendipitous opportunities should they appear?

Another question(s):


I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target.

Was there a Marine-wide standard procedure you followed? If so, did you get to actually train beforehand, especially with actual aircraft?

Entropy
10-07-2008, 03:37 AM
We need to expand this to include ISR support--UASs tied to Off the Shelf Video Receiver Terminals (OSVRTs) and--even better--ROVER III with laptops and a voice comm link (NOT mIRC Chat!) to the sensor payload operator/UAS pilot/mission commander.


Here is a paper (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/Articles/Rethinking_Combined_Force.mht) I read this weekend that makes recommendations along those general lines - essentially using the CAS model for most ISR assets to reduce the peanut-butter spread you mentioned.

Cavguy
10-07-2008, 04:45 AM
With regard to UASs, it's been a mixed bag. DRAGON EYE hasn't been as good as we wanted for a battalion-level disposable UAV--mostly because it's not truly disposable. One goes down, we often send out a patrol to recover it. That really bugs me. WASP has been much better for the companies. Sure, we don't have the parts, maintenance tail. But our rationale has been to treat these assets as expendables, like batteries or ammunition.


I had a "disposable" TACMAV UAV (similar to Wasp) go down in Tal Afar. Required to send a patrol out to find it. They couldn't, so I called the sheiks of the area where we thought it went down and offered $50 to anyone who turned it in. :D My BCT CDR said it saved me a $10k survey, because I didn't have approval to fly it yet.

It showed up at the front gate to my COP an hour later from a kid. I paid the $50 out of pocket. I guess it looked like a toy plane to them. Funny thing was it became a MNC-I SIGACT, since ANY UAV loss was a CCIR at the time, even a small one. :wry:

wm
10-07-2008, 12:45 PM
Tarawa is actually a terrific case of recon-pull. I could also cite Omaha Beach. When the whole plan went to hell, local leaders took charge and improvised solutions with what they had on hand, finding gaps and exploiting them to establish toe-holds inland. "There are two kinds of people on this beach--those who are dead, and those who are gonna die if they don't get off it."

While Tarawa may be a good example of recon pull, I doubt that it fills the bill as an MW example--pretty tough for me to consider it MW given the size of the available maneuver space,the fact that you outnumber your opponent about 7 to 1, and the opponent really has no place to go to get reinforcements to alter the balance of power.
Omaha might be a better case but I doubt it. In the context of the entire Normandy operation I think it well to remember Utah Beach and the other great quotation by TR Jr from "The Longest Day"; "The reinforcements will have to follow us wherever we are. We're starting the war from right here. Head inland." Had 4ID forces reconned, found the weak spot, and then maneuvered, great. But they didn't--they were landed at a weakly defended area by pure luck. The great thing about it was that TR Jr recognized the opportunity and directed the rest of the division to follow on rather than follow the original landing plan. Adroit follow on actions cleared the beachhead with far fewer causualties than on any other beach IIRC--this, I think, is the essence of what has been categorized as German Style MW. But, I also think that it really is nothing more than good operational level combat leadership About the only other places that I am aware it happened on the scale that warrants calling it anything other than small unit tactics were in the "lead from the front" battles fought by Rommel in the 1940 Blitzkreig and in N. Africa before Alam Halfa. (Alam Halfa could have been another great victory for Rommel except that, unbeknowst to him, Ultra had already stacked the deck against him.)
I think, BTW, that the organization of Rommel's recon units in N. Africa propbably had much to do with the ability to conduct successful MW. As Cavguy laments below, US Cav has been eviscerated to such an extent that it seems hardly likely that it can do the economy of force missions of fix, screen, or guard that MW really seems to require. After Alam Halfa, Rommel no longer had the force structure to do much more than minimal MW to cover the retreat of his foot-borne Italian allies across Cyrenaica and Tripolitana. and that success was possible only because of the methodical plodding (timidity?) of Montgomery's 8th Army.

Perhaps we might be better off by just identifying MW as a flexible state of mind, one that recognizes that the best offensive solution is not always a "3 yards and a cloud of dust fullback smash up the middle." That seems to be the lesson from both Omaha and Utah (and maybe Tarawa as well).

Ken White
10-07-2008, 06:28 PM
...Perhaps we might be better off by just identifying MW as a flexible state of mind, one that recognizes that the best offensive solution is not always a "3 yards and a cloud of dust fullback smash up the middle." That seems to be the lesson from both Omaha and Utah (and maybe Tarawa as well).Dare I say it yet again? :D

METT-TC. Takes space to maneuver and it should make sense to do so. Innovative, intuitive and flexible commanders will generally use the appropriate tactic or operational technique. Selection of the right people for command is a far more important discriminator of success in combat than all the 'improvements' in doctrine. Lacking the desire to do that selection properly, we're forced to try technique modification looking for girls. Er, grails... :wry:

ericmwalters
10-07-2008, 07:59 PM
wm writes:


While Tarawa may be a good example of recon pull, I doubt that it fills the bill as an MW example--pretty tough for me to consider it MW given the size of the available maneuver space, the fact that you outnumber your opponent about 7 to 1, and the opponent really has no place to go to get reinforcements to alter the balance of power. Omaha might be a better case but I doubt it.

Whose definition of MW are we using (Leonhard's? USMC? Other?). And at what scale? Tarawa and Omaha can possibly be justified as MW cases at the operational level, even if they are attritional contests at the tactical level, but we'd need to agree on whose definition we want to use.

But this is a theoretical/academic exercise. Tarawa or Omaha battles weren't PLANNED or INTENDED to go the way that they did. U.S. forces weren't DESIGNED to execute recon-pull in those battles, they just did it under the extreme exigencies of combat. Sure, this is why I wouldn't want to use them as MW examples either...especially when compared to other assaults on heavily fortified areas, such as the Michael Offensives against Hough's Fifth Army in March 1918. German stosstrupp units were planned, intended, and designed to use recon-pull, so that makes it a better example to use.

wm also suggests that:


Perhaps we might be better off by just identifying MW as a flexible state of mind, one that recognizes that the best offensive solution is not always a "3 yards and a cloud of dust fullback smash up the middle."

Well, once you make that association, then what is the difference between MW and "The Art of War?" This gets back to an original complaint of Wilf--and one I am sympathetic to. If MW is nothing more than "common-sense tactics," then what is the Art of War at the tactical level? I think Boyd was right to classify styles of war: MW being one of them and Attrition Warfare and Moral Warfare being the other two.

Thus, if I make the answer to "Isn't MW just good leadership?" an affirmative response, then what do I say to the proposition, "Isn't the Art of War just good leadership?" If I say yes to that, where does this leave me?

We think of leadership in a lot more ways than just tactical and technical proficiency in doing operations/tactics. I'd argue you can have terrific leaders who fall short in the MW department (to say nothing of the Art of War), and there are plenty of MW and/or "Art of War" advocates/fans/ students who aren't terribly capable in the leadership department (I know, I wargame against some of them).

Just my two cents on that.

ericmwalters
10-07-2008, 08:10 PM
Entropy asks:


One question on Soviet vs German school - is it possible to practice both at the same time? For example, could one "decide where the opportunities are ahead of time," as you put it earlier, in the planning process, yet allow for exploitation of those laterally-coordinated serendipitous opportunities should they appear?
While one can do that in the plan/concept of the operation, it's very hard to design, equip, and train to do one and still do well at the other. And if you do, you probably need to spend equal time practicing to do both. Typically, we talk about one but do the other (see previous thread postings on that)

The Germans could do either Soviet or German school MW in some cases, and that's what amazes me to this day. The march through the Ardennes was intensely planned and supervised using detailed/centralized control (anyone violating the road control parameters regarding scheduling and utilization would be shot), yet within hours/days of major contact, German forces could transition into a much looser "recon-pull" framework. Given the demands for detailed/centralized control for amphibious operations in getting "feet dry" from "feet wet," I'd love a very similar effect--once we make contact, we'd be able to fluidly transition to a recon-pull approach. So you ask a very good question.


Entropy also asks:


Was there a Marine-wide standard procedure you followed? If so, did you get to actually train beforehand, especially with actual aircraft?
Oh yes, we had a common standard and we trained it "live fire" at 29 Palms and at live-fire ranges in Korea and elsewhere. I personally loved bringing in the old A-6 because it could carry so many bombs. Never failed to pump me up. A-4 Skyhawks just could not compare. F-4 Phantoms were a bit better, but nothing beat an A-6 for suppressive effect!

ericmwalters
10-07-2008, 08:25 PM
Reed11b:

I don't mind the nitpicking and we do this kind of stuff around here all the time--but I'd suggest we move it into another thread or do it via PM. It's hard enough keeping people on the OODA Loop subject (and I'm just as guilty--if not more guilty) for creating tangent after tangent...many of your issues/questions are ours as well. Some are things people are working (redesiging TACP/JTAC air request target "talk ons"), others (MARPAT and MTV) they're not (I'm still lamenting 5.56mm over 7.62mm myself). We can debate whether micro-UAVs really are cost-effective or not and do it for quite a long time. But the real issue is this--and I'm jumping ahead a good bit of where I'd hope to go (and how I hoped to get there) regarding the OODA Loop "utility" issue.

Before we had the OODA Loop, we might have been grappling with these kinds of issues, but the mental model wasn't there, wasn't widely understood and agreed upon, and certainly wasn't something that people tried to design equipment, processes, procedures, and techniques to. When we talk about saving time in these kinds of discussions, we move along relatively quickly because we use common terms, a common understanding, and be comfortable that we know what we're really talking about. Typical intelligence issue before Boyd Loop: Combat information vs. intelligence. Pick a process. How much of one? How much of the other? Now, we look at problems differently with the Boyd Cycle. Regarding the question of whether 'tis better for a particular process to be supported with combat information or with intelligence, we now mount our enquiries with a bit more saavy. How much "orientation" is needed with the information? Is it minimal? Are the "decisions" easy to make/relatively simple (e.g., shoot or don't shoot)? If the answer is that the supported OODA loop doesn't require much context/understanding supplied with the information to aid orientation and decsion, then combat information may be enough. But if a good bit of context is necessary or the intuitive answer will get you the WRONG answer--and thus you need a good bit of analysis to steer you the right way, despite what your tummy is telling you--then you need more intelligence, not so much combat information.

Hopefully this makes some degree of sense.

slapout9
10-07-2008, 11:06 PM
The Germans could do either Soviet or German school MW in some cases, and that's what amazes me to this day. The march through the Ardennes was intensely planned and supervised using detailed/centralized control (anyone violating the road control parameters regarding scheduling and utilization would be shot), yet within hours/days of major contact, German forces could transition into a much looser "recon-pull" framework.

Eric, do you have any idea why the Germans could do both? Did they train that way?

ericmwalters
10-08-2008, 12:28 AM
Slap, I think some of this is cultural. That is, the Germans still had that "residue" (and I don't know what else to call it) from the era of Frederick the Great. That is, obedience--particularly regarding petty details--was everything. Hitler actually admired that; one of the things he begrudgingly gave the Brits in World War II, based on his World War I experience. So while the army system preached recon pull, initiative, and German School MW, anytime you wanted to hearken back to "the good ole days," it was pretty easy and everybody fell into line. How they so easily transitioned out of that is what befuddles me. Simply amazing, quite honestly. I wish we were that supple.

CR6
10-08-2008, 01:29 AM
I am in learning mode here, with nothing empirical to add, but could it be the Germans could excel in situations requiring directive control simply because that was what was ordered in that situation, i.e. "Ive been ordered to use my initiative to support the commander's intent in this situation therefore I will do so to the best of my ability." Perhaps cultural influences made performing under detailed or directive control two sides of the same coin in the case of the Germans. Pure speculation, but thoughts?

wm
10-08-2008, 12:38 PM
Whose definition of MW are we using (Leonhard's? USMC? Other?). And at what scale? Tarawa and Omaha can possibly be justified as MW cases at the operational level, even if they are attritional contests at the tactical level, but we'd need to agree on whose definition we want to use.
I suspect that MW is a concept with applicability at the operational level. Now that requires some level of debate about what constitutes the operational level of warfare. Once upon a time, I would have tried to draw that distinction based on the size of the headquarters conducting the effort {with the caveat that headquarters implicitly have a set of support forces/functions associated with them--e.g, a division has a fire support element (DIVARTY w 3/4 firing Bns,, a recon element (Cav squadron), a maneuver support element (Engineers, Intel/EW, AD, MP) and a sustinment base of supply, maintenance, trans (DISCOM)}. Now I think I'd draw the line at the force's ability to be self-sustaining for a duration of time that I am open to discuss, but about a month seems right to me.

Below that level of command/force structure we are talking tactics and above it we are talking strategy or even grand strategy. So Tarawa on the ground was tactical application of standard fire and maneuver--the kind of stuff that hapens as low as the squad level using two fire teams. Leading up to the landings one might see MW at play (if US Forces were actively probing the whole area of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas, looking for the "soft" spot to attack and draw the greatest Japanese response into a fire pocket of annihilation). But that seems not to have been what actually happened. In fact at least one perspective is that we made the Japanese think they needed a build up on Tarawa--apparently we needed Tarawa out of the way so we could have free supply lines to island hop up to the Phillipines. But I'll drop the historical discussion as tangential to the main point being discussed here.


But this is a theoretical/academic exercise. Tarawa or Omaha battles weren't PLANNED or INTENDED to go the way that they did. U.S. forces weren't DESIGNED to execute recon-pull in those battles, they just did it under the extreme exigencies of combat. Sure, this is why I wouldn't want to use them as MW examples either...especially when compared to other assaults on heavily fortified areas, such as the Michael Offensives against Hough's Fifth Army in March 1918. German stosstrupp units were planned, intended, and designed to use recon-pull, so that makes it a better example to use. I submit that no battle/operation/campaign goes at it was planned to, which makes suspect any discussion of what really happened (as compared to what was planned to have happened).

I think we could say that understanding MW based on the German Spring 1918 series of offensives is a case of recognizing that maybe the game plan ought to be to let the QB call a lot of audibles rather than try to coach from the sidelines. Sometimes, we just hand the halfback the ball and let him pick his own hole to run through; sometimes we use a fullback dive through the 3 hole; sometimes we even quick kick. That's all fine provided you have a Glenn Davis and an Arnold tucker and not just a Doc Blanchard (1947 Army backfield). But it goes back to the point that Ken White and I have made in many places on these discussions (Ken recently in this thread)--you make your plans and execute based on METT-TC.
And that answers the following:

Well, once you make that association, then what is the difference between MW and "The Art of War?" This gets back to an original complaint of Wilf--and one I am sympathetic to. If MW is nothing more than "common-sense tactics," then what is the Art of War at the tactical level? I think Boyd was right to classify styles of war: MW being one of them and Attrition Warfare and Moral Warfare being the other two.

Thus, if I make the answer to "Isn't MW just good leadership?" an affirmative response, then what do I say to the proposition, "Isn't the Art of War just good leadership?" If I say yes to that, where does this leave me?

We think of leadership in a lot more ways than just tactical and technical proficiency in doing operations/tactics. I'd argue you can have terrific leaders who fall short in the MW department (to say nothing of the Art of War), and there are plenty of MW and/or "Art of War" advocates/fans/ students who aren't terribly capable in the leadership department (I know, I wargame against some of them).

Just my two cents on that.

First let me say that the "art of war" is not applicable at the tactical level. Second, Boyd's categorizations may be valuable shorthand, but being shorthand descriptions, they are as likely to cause confusion as to clarify--to simplify is to inject error.
Next, I assert that great leaders are able to motivate those who work for them to get great results. (Good leaders get good results; poor leaders, poor results.) Part of the process of doing that is being able to evaluate what one has to do in terms of what one has to do it with. To place that in an OODA context, think of Observe and Orient as being not only looking and understanding the other guy. One must also observe and orient oneself to the area in which he is operating and the forces with which he operates. One's staff is part of that force. So are the logistics assets available to the force.
The difference between Good Leadership and the Art of War is in the ability to make the best of what you have--that's good leadership--and providing a force that has the capabilities leaders need to fight and win--that's the art of war. On another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=57795&postcount=8), I suggested that prior to reading Clauswitz one ought to read Machiavelli's Art of War--most of that book is about building an army and then organizing it in garrison, camp and on the march so that it can react effectively on enemy contact. It's been a while, but I seem to recall that Vegetius spends a lot of time on the same types of subjects as Machiavelli.

BTW, my biggest heartburn with wargaming is that the problem of motivating subordinates, the real challenge of leadership, is usually not included in the sim. I'll quote Vizzini in The Princess Bride, "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! The most famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia, but only slightly less well-known is this: never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line!" How does any wargame simulate that vital piece of war?

selil
10-08-2008, 01:20 PM
...I submit that no battle/operation/campaign goes at it was planned to...

I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.

First, it by reference it suggests there really is no point in planning. I'm not going to believe that planning has no place and I think the cliche comes from large battle formation high intensity warfare where communication was limited. I like dead Prussian writers as much as the next guy but the over use of homilies erodes the discussion as much as religious pandering and zealotry would.

Second, it is to often used as an excuse or a sideways attack against discussing strategy. It gets trotted out anytime somebody wants to shut somebody else up working through a set of strategies.

Third, we have high speed, high density, high reliability communications and it is a matter of fact that broad intentions can have as much relevance to planning while relying on technology for coordination. Mogadishu swarm attacks anybody?

WM I don't think you were trying to use that trite cliche as overly broad but I have noticed it getting trotted out more and more lately. I think that the meaning of it has been lost and it has become a stop sign for debate. Cliches can often take on new meanings that were never intended.

Eden
10-08-2008, 01:23 PM
Before we had the OODA Loop, we might have been grappling with these kinds of issues, but the mental model wasn't there, wasn't widely understood and agreed upon, and certainly wasn't something that people tried to design equipment, processes, procedures, and techniques to. When we talk about saving time in these kinds of discussions, we move along relatively quickly because we use common terms, a common understanding, and be comfortable that we know what we're really talking about. Typical intelligence issue before Boyd Loop: Combat information vs. intelligence. Pick a process. How much of one? How much of the other? Now, we look at problems differently with the Boyd Cycle. Regarding the question of whether 'tis better for a particular process to be supported with combat information or with intelligence, we now mount our enquiries with a bit more saavy. How much "orientation" is needed with the information? Is it minimal? Are the "decisions" easy to make/relatively simple (e.g., shoot or don't shoot)? If the answer is that the supported OODA loop doesn't require much context/understanding supplied with the information to aid orientation and decsion, then combat information may be enough. But if a good bit of context is necessary or the intuitive answer will get you the WRONG answer--and thus you need a good bit of analysis to steer you the right way, despite what your tummy is telling you--then you need more intelligence, not so much combat information.

...but that influence has, at times, been pernicious. My experience has been, at both the tactical and operational levels, that the best commanders are those who can selectively ignore the enemy. Napoleon commented that, "there are many good generals in Europe, but they see too many things at the same time." I have seen the same fault handicap operations in Afghanistan.

I know, I know, the OODA-loop doesn't require us to react to every enemy action; unfortunately, the mind-set it engenders encourages the average commander or staffer to do just that. It takes moral courage to ignore enemy actions, and using the OODA-loop as a paradigm for warfighting (as opposed to dogfighting) saps that courage. As a result, we have great difficulty in massing fires, boots on the ground, whatever, and end up dissipating resources.

CR6
10-08-2008, 01:43 PM
I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.



If anyone relies on that quote to justify not planning, they should be excised with extreme prejudice!

You make a good point Sam, but I think thst the value of Moltke's quote stems from the idea that commanders and staffs cannot remain wedded to their plan in conditions on the ground prove their assumptions to be invalid or if things have changed to the point where the plan is irrelevant. You plan in order to be prepared to achieve your objective, but it needs to be flexible enough to deal with changes rather than serve as a script to be adhered to at all costs. As Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything."

selil
10-08-2008, 01:56 PM
If anyone relies on that quote to justify not planning, they should be excised with extreme prejudice!

You make a good point Sam, but I think thst the value of Moltke's quote stems from the idea that commanders and staffs cannot remain wedded to their plan in conditions on the ground prove their assumptions to be invalid or if things have changed to the point where the plan is irrelevant. You plan in order to be prepared to achieve your objective, but it needs to be flexible enough to deal with changes rather than serve as a script to be adhered to at all costs. As Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything."

That is very true. I have been seeing the "No plan withstands contact" meme so much lately in regards to the financial crisis, the recent flood in my region (FEMA), and discussion on how to handle Afghanistan. It seems to have become an excuse for poor planning or lack of planning.

slapout9
10-08-2008, 02:25 PM
I have posted this before, but it still applies. "Plans That Survive First Contact" by Major John Garrett
Point 2. That wasn't exactly what Moltke said as is explained in the paper. Link to paper is posted below.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=491&filename=492.pdf#search=%22Plans that survive first contact%22

wm
10-08-2008, 02:38 PM
I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.

First, it by reference it suggests there really is no point in planning. I'm not going to believe that planning has no place and I think the cliche comes from large battle formation high intensity warfare where communication was limited. I like dead Prussian writers as much as the next guy but the over use of homilies erodes the discussion as much as religious pandering and zealotry would.

Second, it is to often used as an excuse or a sideways attack against discussing strategy. It gets trotted out anytime somebody wants to shut somebody else up working through a set of strategies.

Third, we have high speed, high density, high reliability communications and it is a matter of fact that broad intentions can have as much relevance to planning while relying on technology for coordination. Mogadishu swarm attacks anybody?

WM I don't think you were trying to use that trite cliche as overly broad but I have noticed it getting trotted out more and more lately. I think that the meaning of it has been lost and it has become a stop sign for debate. Cliches can often take on new meanings that were never intended.

Sam,
Thanks. You're right that was not how I was using it. I was instead using it to point ought how trite EMW's response was about Tarawa and Normandy not going as planned.
BTW, the use of the Michael Offensive as a postivie example is subject to the same rebuttal--the plan to do recon pull MW didn't quite come off as expected. If it had, folks might all be speaking German in what is now France, Belgium and the Netherlands, a guy named Adolf Hitler may not have been able to orchestra a holocaust, we might not be embroiled in the GWOT because the French and Brits wouldn't have screwed up the Mid-East so badly as a result of their execution of provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and Lausanne, and Georgia might not have been invaded because the former Soviet Union might have had to actually honor the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

But we really shouldn't be doing "what if" history now, should we?

I'd say that the real point is that one needs to be prepared for the unexpected and be nimble enough to react to it. Planning is not a "done once and over" effort--it is a continuous process informed by developing situational awareness as things go forward. (This is where the disparaged chess analogy comes into sharp focus IMHO.) While one may not be able to plan for every contingency, one can plan for the fact that things may (probably will) not go exactly as expected and have a reaction capability on call.

selil
10-08-2008, 03:03 PM
I have posted this before, but it still applies. "Plans That Survive First Contact" by Major John Garrett
Point 2. That wasn't exactly what Moltke said as is explained in the paper. Link to paper is posted below.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=491&filename=492.pdf#search=%22Plans that survive first contact%22

I hadn't seen this before but read the first pages. Looks like I might be on the right track maybe going the wrong direction. I'll add it to the read pile for today.

William F. Owen
10-08-2008, 04:22 PM
.

Moltke the Elder stated in his book War Lessons;
The tactical outcome of any engagement forms a guiding post for new decisions
...The material and moral consequences of each and every larger engagement are so far-reaching, that in most cases an entirely new situation will be created by them, a new basis for new measures to be taken.

Is this the OODA Loop?

Ken White
10-08-2008, 10:17 PM
.............