What insurgent strategy is the Taliban currently using?

[Cavguy]

All,

An interesting conversation was started in my workspace, and I'm interested in the opinion of the larger community.

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

[Steve Blair]

From what I've read and seen (granted from a sideline view) I'd say they were using a variation of the Mao strategy, with heavy overtones of Ho and Giap thrown in for good measure. Just my opinion, of course.

[davidbfpo]

The Kings of War wbsite (Wars Studies Dept, Kings College, London) also poses a similar question:

It cites this Canadian article, on a recent ambush: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080905.AFGHAN05//TPStory/Front and a previous comment (again Canadian): http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2008/08/28/westmore-out-land-ish/

My own view from this armchair is that the Taliban are relying on wearing down foriegn support for the Afghan government, following the tactics used to end the USSR's support.

davidbfpo

[Hacksaw]

First, I know I'm not supposed to think the enemy is stupid, but in this case they do seem a bit scitzo...

Anyhow, we can parse it out a little....

Political Wing - used to have one, do they still... yes but underdeveloped and largely underground

External support - yes at least in the form of sanctuary in the FATA, but not a nation-state and it doesn't confer legitimacy accept perhaps amongst Pashtuns... so yes but limited

Focus of attacks on AFG and Coalition forces and infrastructure - IO directed at populace

My SWAG is Phase II protracted, with a goal of transitioning to a subversive strategy but not able to position candidates to win / assume seats of government.

I shall return to building pretty slides boss

[reed11b]

From what I've read and seen (granted from a sideline view) I'd say they were using a variation of the Mao strategy, with heavy overtones of Ho and Giap thrown in for good measure. Just my opinion, of course.
Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

[Entropy]

To paraphrase a famous quote, "all insurgency is local." I would argue, therefore, that there is more than one strategy being implemented, depending on the region. I haven't followed Afghanistan closely for a few months now, but it seems to me there is quite a difference between the strategy in the N2K region and down south (Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan) to give one example. I won't pretend to know enough about insurgency theory to try to fit each piece into a particular model, so I'll leave that to others to hash out :)

[Rex Brynen]

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently?

I'm not sure how useful it is to try to understand Taliban strategy in terms of other doctrines—it is rather like asking whether US COIN strategy in Afghanistan is "Russian" or "Israeli."

I think that its a safe assumption that 95-99% of Taliban commanders have never read Mao, Giap, Lenin, Trotsky, Guevara, or Carlos Marighella (etc)--or, for that matter Saint Carl or Sun Tzu. Rather, their strategy and tactics arise fundamentally from the interaction of local social and geophysical conditions, weapons availability, experience with the Soviet occupation and civil war, and more recent learning. There is a real risk of miscasting its strengths, weaknesses, foundations, and implications if understood in other terms.

They will have "read" Muhammad—some aspects of the Prophet's rise to power in Arabia have some insurgent overtones in the early period. However, I wouldn't read much into this, given the very, very, very great differences.

Second, there are some key differences in fighting against an external occupier (as seen in Taliban eyes) and seeking to overthrow a rival domestic power, especially around the way in which one casts issues of legitimacy. (Of course, it depends on whether one is looking at CCP strategy in the 1937-45 period, or 1945-49).

Third, the Taliban probably suffers from far less unity of effort and command than did the CCP.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have to agree with Rex that this is not a popular uprising in the Maoist sense. My limited experience in the south and west indicated the average "man on the street" did not like the Taliban any better than they liked the coalition. This is a power struggle by a minority group not a mass popular uprising.

I will go one step further and suggest that to try to use any COIN doctrine outside the two major cities may be a mistake or at least a waisted effort. Certainly you must fight remembering that the ultimate goal is a stable pro-coalition government in place (i.e. don't randomly kill civilians, don't use airpower or artillery when you can do the same job with a more precision tools, don't appear to the locals that your life is worth any more than theirs is). We can certainly loose the war that way but I don't think that you will defeat the Taliban through attempts to win the hearts and minds of the average villager with a well or a road. I think you are going to have to defeat them by crushing, overwhelming force directed against the Taliban leadership.

[Norfolk]

In the sense that the Taleban (at least in certain areas of the country, first in parts of the South, and now parts of the East as well) like to build up over time from small guerrilla bands to pseudo-conventional light infantry companies and battalions, then I agree with Cavguy and Steve that they are following a hybrid Maoist/Vietnamese pattern, though in the manner in which they gain and maintain local support, they seem to follow more along the lines of the VC (I use these terms only in a loose sense). For some reason, the Taleban sometimes like to go big when they have amassed the means to do so. Strategically and operationally, of course, they are all about winning the Information War; but tactically, they like to have the capability (though employing that capability somewhat judiciously) to go toe-to-toe, mano-a-mano with their enemy.

Up to a point; if they are restricting themselves to company-level attacks, and no higher, they may well win this war by continuing to avoid physical destruction while still being able to disperse easily enough to control the population while concentrating quickly enough to inflict the death of a thousand paper cuts on the will of NATO countries. I think they may have learned at Second Panjwai in 2006 that operating much above company-level would be too costly and lead to repeated setbacks. Going no higher than company-level lets them elude detection and destruction while still marshalling enough fighting power to do real damage, politically as well as tactically, at their chosen time and place. And to continue growing in strength.

[reed11b]

I have to agree with Rex that this is not a popular uprising in the Maoist sense. My limited experience in the south and west indicated the average "man on the street" did not like the Taliban any better than they liked the coalition. This is a power struggle by a minority group not a mass popular uprising.

I will go one step further and suggest that to try to use any COIN doctrine outside the two major cities may be a mistake or at least a waisted effort. Certainly you must fight remembering that the ultimate goal is a stable pro-coalition government in place (i.e. don't randomly kill civilians, don't use airpower or artillery when you can do the same job with a more precision tools, don't appear to the locals that your life is worth any more than theirs is). We can certainly loose the war that way but I don't think that you will defeat the Taliban through attempts to win the hearts and minds of the average villager with a well or a road. I think you are going to have to defeat them by crushing, overwhelming force directed against the Taliban leadership.
I would have to disagree almost 100%. What leadership are you going to strike at? Taliban is fueled by out-of-power tribes, not by a charasmatic leadership with over-arching goals AFAIK. COIN may be exactly the way to beat them since while unpopular, they are still funded by "taxing" the countryside. Create security for the countryside, and you sap their support. Find a way to get the disaffected tribes to "buy in" the Kazari goverment and you sap there manpower. The question then is, how the heck do you do that? Wish I had an idea, but I do not.
Reed

[reed11b]

Curmudgeon, I do agree with your assesment and observations, just not with your stated course of action. Hope that helps clarify.
Reed

[TheCurmudgeon]

No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.

You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not because they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.

As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.

Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.

[Ron Humphrey]

No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.

You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not becuase they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.

As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.

Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.

Some COIN practices from recent experience will work very well in certain more concentrated areas, more out-lying areas jab and move jab and move while developing "understandings with local leaders and make them and us accountable for those agreements (long and short offer them alternatives (when they tire of the Taleb's again they'll come to you), do whatever possible to work with the Pakistanis on border concentrations hard and relentlessly.

Lot's of time, whole lots of money, little bit of luck and a whole lot of sweat.

[William F. Owen]

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

Probably not Maoist. Back in the 1990's Ahmad Shah Massoud met with an Australian Journalist who had stuided Mao's writings in China in the 1970's.

(I know the guy and he knows more about Maoist insurgency philosophy than anyone I have ever met.)

He wanted to use the Maoist model against the Taliban. It failed early on because basically, Confucian constructs do not work in Afghan culture.

Why? I really couldn't tell you but I know a man that can.

[carl]

I wonder the right question is being asked. Perhaps we should be asking what insurgent strategy the ISI is currently using?

If the ISI is trying to run the same game on us they ran on the Russians, I don't think there is an ultimate goal beyond Afghanistan in chaos and most any strategy will do.

[reed11b]

I wonder the right question is being asked. Perhaps we should be asking what insurgent strategy the ISI is currently using?

If the ISI is trying to run the same game on us they ran on the Russians, I don't think there is an ultimate goal beyond Afghanistan in chaos and most any strategy will do.

I find myself nodding my head in agreement. But what are our options w/ Pak? Any funding we pull out the Chinese will be more then happy to replace. Supporting India would do little to help us in A-stan, and other neighbours are either outright hostile (Iran) or have such limited infrastructure as to be of limited assistance. Not being defeatist, just admitting I have no idea what could be done. I would love to hear ideas on this.
Reed

[carl]

Ultimately, the Pakistanis will have to realize the wishes of the ISI are probably not to the long term benefit of the country. They are the ones who will have to reign them in, or reign the military in, or both. Apparently, much of what drives them is the perceived need to confront India, Kashmir, revenge for past defeats etc; and a weak Afghanistan is a flank they won't have to worry about. So somehow, there has to be a change in that attitude. How we can effect that, I haven't a clue.

It has to be done somehow though because if the de-facto sanctuary that exists in Pakistan isn't removed, I don't see how we can win in Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

Reigning in the Pakistani military and or the Pakistani ISI? Who is going to do this?

IMHO Pakistan's politicians invariably allow the military to decide national security policy - for all manner of reasons and history. The ISI has long followed a policy in line with the military's direction. I'm not immersed in what has happened there recently, but recall it was the decision of a senior prosecutor or judge to call for all ISI's prisoners to be released that prompted Musharraf's declaration of an emergency (on another thread at the time).

The policies followed by the USA and the UK have avoided confronting this question - who decides what the soldiers / spies do? Hence the "stop, go" policies of Musharraf, so well described in the NYT story: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin

In some respects Afghanistan is a "sideshow" to Pakistan.

I cannot see the Pakistani military changing to our benefit their policy stance; so what can the Pakistani politicians do? Clearly mobilising popular support is easier on "softer" issues and history indicates the public know their politicians are weak - often leading to military intervention.

The solution escapes me.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

In some respects Afghanistan is a "sideshow" to Pakistan.

I cannot see the Pakistani military changing to our benefit their policy stance; so what can the Pakistani politicians do? Clearly mobilising popular support is easier on "softer" issues and history indicates the public know their politicians are weak - often leading to military intervention.

The solution escapes me.

davidbfpo

beyond anyone considering it would seem to come down to making the border region the Pak military's problem rather than diversion. That however may be more readily accomplished by our common enemy there long before we figure out how to accomplish that?

If it all comes down to priorities how do you encourage another countries priorities to come more in line with your own?

[Steve Blair]

Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

I don't know that you can write off the Giap/Ho model as being simply a communistic model. While the leadership was certainly communist, the framework proved pretty flexible. That and the model itself could be easily lifted and modified to follow any number of settings and/or ideologies. I tend to think it's a mistake to assume that any model is automatically restricted based on the ideology of either those who created it or the leanings of the most famous practitioner. Restrictions or limitations based on social organization (i.e., the Cuban model or aspects of the National Socialist strategy) make more sense to me.

[Van]

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that "NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security.", Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey (http://www.savethefalcons.org/home.aspx).

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

[Cavguy]

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that , Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey (http://www.savethefalcons.org/home.aspx).

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

Van,

Great analysis, the kind I was looking for. As to your last - is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?

Niel

[Van]

is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?
Ya' know, the moment I mashed the 'post' button, I had a feeling this would come up.

The short answer is that under communist (or any other political ideology), when you're dead, you're dead. Under a Christian or Jewish theological ideology, there's an after-life, but suicide is a ticket right to the bottom of the eternal cludgie.

With the taliban's flavor of Islam, the desire to live is sinful if it doesn't expressly support Jihad. And if a young man dies in Jihad, his chances for finding romance improve dramaticly. Normally, I'm all about fighting an enemy who is ready to die for his cause, we have the same endstate in mind. These guys take it all the way around the bend.

[Hacksaw]

Van,

I can see your point as it pertains to the pointy end of the spear, but I'd argue we just be talkin' tactics with regard to the differences.

[Van]

Hacksaw,
The strategies are fundamentally different. In classic insurgency, you build up a structure in an environment controlled by an existing political structure; AQ's new model is to undermine an existing structure with a barely coordinated/semi-viral organization until it collapses, then move in. At first glance the AQ seems nihilistic, but the apparent nihilism is step 1... At this level, one major difference is that most historic insurgencies had a political campaign but that is optional for Islamic based insurgency, as they do not distinguish between matters of religion and matters of politics.

Islamic aspirations to Caliphate are their 'supreme ultimate' under divine guidance, where communist ideologues were at best useful-idiot true believers. Given that the communist followers were under the impression that they were fighting for workers, equality, etc, there was common ground to undercut the ideology through negotiation. AQ does not allow that; convert and accept the caliphate, or die.

[Hacksaw]

Van,

Are we talking of the Taliban in AFG, or are we talking AQ and some sort of "global insurgency"? You seem to float between the two.
I know the two are related in some ways but they are not synonymous.

To characterize the AQ ideology (movement if you want) writ large as a Global insurgency would seem to stretch the definition of insurgency beyond its useful purpose. AQ is most at odds with the muslim world most of all. It seeks a fundamental revival that it sees as only possible with the removal of western influence.

Taliban is fighting the newly constituted government, it serves the purposes of AQ, but it can more properly be characterized as an insurgency. However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN

[wm]

However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN

I have to agree with Hacksaw here. An analog is the use of Kamikazee attqcks by the Japanese in WWII. Simply another way of attacking ships that required more air defense firepower to blow the plane completely out of the air before it could be flown into a ship.

Now, American perceptions that the Japanese would fight and die to the last person in defending the home islands caused the US to select a different strategic approach to ending the war in the Pacific--use a stand off attack of massive destructive capability rather than storm ashore and fight toe to toe in a conventional way. If all Afghan insurgents/Taleban were also suicide bombers, Van's point about a strategic difference would get more purchase, IMO. However, doesn't appear to be any compelling evidence for seeing the adversary from that point of view.

[Ron Humphrey]

human beings, whats the difference between IED's,VBIED's, SB's except the preparation and deployment process.

Wouldn't you still want to focus on the Pre-prep and prep phases just the same. It may sound callous but is it not still a reality?