I need some quick help on Russian Rockets

[Stan]

Dear Members, I could use your extensive knowledge and immediate assistance with the following:

Russian rocket, nose down in the dirt, approx. 7 meters long, with the following markings:

9 M 79 M (ending with a 5-pointed star)

Remaining symbols/numerics:
79 C? 866 793 (ending with a five-pointed star with a numeric 4 in the center)

While we know it's a SS21 SCARAB, we don't know from the markings if it is an A or B version, and more importantly, what fuse is on the nose.

Is it much like those found in Israel and Northern Africa "unguided" or worse, proximity fused ?

Destruction procedures and safe distance tables very much welcomed.

If you don't want to post, please PM me. Suspense is tomorrow AM my time (Zulu plus 4).

Thanks in advance !

EDIT: This is no joke, please do not link me to Wiki. Anyone have a Janes account ?

[Entropy]

The 9M79M means it's a scarab A ("9M79-1" is the B variant designator). The other numbers don't tell me much. The warhead designations are "9M123" followed by a letter - the two most common are 9M123F - unitary warhead and 9M123K - submunition warhead.

Almost all of these missiles use a laser-altimeter fuse on the nose to allow for airburst or submunition dispense. I'm unaware of any kind of proximity fuse for these weapons and I have no information on how individual submunitions are fused. I do have access to Janes and the only alternative warhead fusing appears to be for a penetrating warhead for hard targets - a rare variant.

Hope that helps.

BTW, two sites to bookmark for future reference:

Aviation.ru (http://www.aviation.ru/GRAU/)
Master missile list (http://faculty.fordham.edu/siddiqi/sws/missiles/master_list/master_list.html)

Both are handy for identifying missiles by their designator numbers.

[Stan]

Thanks, Entropy !
Great info and good links that I've passed on to our team.

Would indeed be interested in what your Janes account reveals regarding warhead capacities. What we have now from our former Soviet friends indicates up to 1,000 kilograms of HE, and several other variations are possible. Unlikely that Putin dumped more than HE, but you just never know for sure. Hence our concerns with the additional markings... Never hurts to ask.

Regards, Stan

[Entropy]

PM sent

[Stan]

From a locally-based friend (think tanker and keen observer). I will pass on your comments in the hopes he joins SWC and defends his words :)


Russian Air Campaign Observations:
The Georgian air campaign like all Russian administration and bureaucracy was incompetent but effective! They succeeded.
Aircraft were shot down by Manpads (man portable air defence systems). In one case a Tu-22M3-R was downed probably by a 9K37 Buk (SA-11), perhaps sourced from Ukraine.

From discussions with Israelis and others, in person, SA-11s are easily out manoeuvred by turning beyond the tracking parameters of the missile, particularly by crossing fighter pairs. One Israeli AD manufacturer said “I have seen it many times over the Golan.”

That the Russians were unable to out run their own missiles, which they designed, is somewhat of a poor reflection!
One of the main reasons for these losses is that Russian pilots are still forbidden tactical manoeuvre autonomy. Russian strictness was instituted during WWII to prevent pilots from avoiding anti-aircraft protected targets or dumping their bombs in lakes or elsewhere and turning back.

From my own point of view, from a doctrine perspective, the question arises what is the current interpretation of the Russian operational requirement for local air supremacy or dominance over the area of tactical manoeuvre and re-supply? With modern systems this protective area needs now to be hundreds rather than tens of kilometres across.

Although being deposited into Russian and benign South Ossetian territory and with pre-positioned stores, what we have seen in Georgia is the revisiting, written large, of the ‘OMG’, (1980s cutting-edge Operational Manoeuvre Group), in the form of 14,000 paratroopers airlifted 2,000 kilometres, within 36 hours.

This is the distance in the other direction from Leningrad or Moscow MDs to Southampton, Paris, Belfast, Rome, or anywhere in the Balkans or Scandinavia. If the threat arose; how specifically would it be stopped and by whom; especially collectively?


Hat Tips to Bruce !!!

[Entropy]

I don't really have enough information on the Russian air campaign to make any conclusions or observations. Hopefully more information will be forthcoming.

As for specific comments by your friend, I'll offer a few:


From discussions with Israelis and others, in person, SA-11s are easily out manoeuvred by turning beyond the tracking parameters of the missile, particularly by crossing fighter pairs. One Israeli AD manufacturer said “I have seen it many times over the Golan.”

I think if the Israeli's had tried to out-turn an SA-11 with a Backfire over the Golan, their conclusions might be different. There are many other factors to consider as well.


That the Russians were unable to out run their own missiles, which they designed, is somewhat of a poor reflection!

Well, look at the combat record of the Patriot against coalition aircraft in OIF. The only aircraft and pilot that survived did so only because he had a HARM to take out the engagement radar.

Not knowledgeable to comment on anything else at this point. Hopefully your friend will join - the more, the merrier!

[Rex Brynen]

From discussions with Israelis and others, in person, SA-11s are easily out manoeuvred by turning beyond the tracking parameters of the missile, particularly by crossing fighter pairs. One Israeli AD manufacturer said “I have seen it many times over the Golan.”


I think if the Israeli's had tried to out-turn an SA-11 with a Backfire over the Golan, their conclusions might be different. There are many other factors to consider as well.

This really isn't my speciality (and so I stand to be corrected), but I'm rather confused as to when the Syrians would have been firing SA-11s over the Golan. I would have thought that at the time of the 1982 war in Lebanon they were still deploying SA-6s, and I'm not aware of "many" times that Syrian AD have fired at Israeli aircraft since then (and especially not over the Golan Heights).

[Entropy]

This really isn't my speciality (and so I stand to be corrected), but I'm rather confused as to when the Syrians would have been firing SA-11s over the Golan. I would have thought that at the time of the 1982 war in Lebanon they were still deploying SA-6s, and I'm not aware of "many" times that Syrian AD have fired at Israeli aircraft since then (and especially not over the Golan Heights).

That's a good point. I don't really know the history myself.

[Stan]

Bruce briefly responded to your posts this morning. He had consulted with local experts, not just Israelis, but will indeed check his information base once again using your comments and posts.

I have two ppt presentations, but have not been able to post them due in part to size (and perhaps my limited capabilities with forums :o )

If interested, please PM me your email addresses this evening (I will otherwise be on leave for one week at an undisclosed location in southern Europe in search of beaches (yeah, you got it), beer and sunshine) :D.

Regards, Stan

[SWCAdmin]

While Stan frolics somewhere nice, here I am slaving away. Two interesting documents provided by Stan as mentioned earlier this thread, now posted here.

The first is a summary of the Georgia conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iqpc-berlin-geo-air-scr.pdf) presented here with the kind permission of the author, Bruce Jones. Any re-use is subject to his copyright, which is clearly marked in the presentation.

The second is a translated brief on the Georgian National Guard (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/geo-natl-guard-1.pdf). It is in the public domain to the best of our knowledge.

[William F. Owen]

This really isn't my speciality (and so I stand to be corrected), but I'm rather confused as to when the Syrians would have been firing SA-11s over the Golan. I would have thought that at the time of the 1982 war in Lebanon they were still deploying SA-6s, and I'm not aware of "many" times that Syrian AD have fired at Israeli aircraft since then (and especially not over the Golan Heights).

I think what the Israeli source may be referring to is the general tactic against an SA-6 type threat. I think the SA-11 uses the same basic guidance system, and is probably spoofed in the same way.

[Stan]

Finally received some released images. Still working on what they ended up doing though. We understand they may have actually tried to take it apart :o

[Entropy]

Great picks Stan! It's crazy to see it sticking straight up from the ground like that!