Hamas in Gaza (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

IDF report on Civilian Casualties here (http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/09/03/2602.htm)

I fully realise it makes no difference as the anti-Israel players will dismiss it, as a fabrication.
Welcome to the Middle East!

[jmm99]

Breakfast reading in part was an article on the IDF report and its counter report by the Palestinians. The IDF report has roughly 1150 casualties; the Palestinian has roughly 1450. The only way to compare the reports would be to do a name by name (the Palestinians claim their report has the names and other relevant data). The bottom line is that the two reports are in the same ballpark - whether in the Middle East or elsewhere.

The major issue will be one of classification - combatant vs. non-combatant. An example is Hamas police officers (something north of 100 were killed). I'd expect another issue to hinge on Hamas arm-bearers vs. Hamas infrastruture. There will be no resolution of these issues, since opinions will break along "party lines".

[patmc]

Apr 1, 2009 0:01 | Updated Apr 1, 2009 16:34
Hamas reportedly planning military staff college
By YAAKOV KATZ

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1238423655920&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

To counter their poor performance in the recent Gaza operation, Hamas is considering a command and staff college for its leaders. Only future promotion and command boards will determine if non-resident Hamas CGSC officers will stay competetive with their peers.

[Jedburgh]

HRW, 20 Apr 09: Under Cover of War: Hamas Political Violence in Gaza (http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0409webwcover.pdf)

After Israel began its major military offensive in Gaza on December 27, 2008, Hamas authorities in the territory took extraordinary steps to control, intimidate, punish, and at times eliminate their internal political rivals and those suspected of collaboration with Israel. The attacks continued throughout Israel’s campaign, and have slowed but not stopped since major hostilities ceased on January 18, 2009.

During the chaos of Israel’s offensive, which killed approximately 1,350 Palestinian civilians and combatants and wounded about 5,000, Hamas security forces or masked gunmen believed to be with Hamas extra-judicially executed 18 people, mainly those accused of collaborating with Israel. Masked gunmen also beat and maimed by shooting dozens of Hamas’s political opponents, especially members and supporters of its main political rival, Fatah.

The internal violence in Gaza has continued since Israel withdrew its forces. Palestinian human rights groups in Gaza have reported 14 more killings between January 18 and March 31, 2009....

[Rex Brynen]

Israel bans books, music and clothes from entering Gaza (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1086045.html)

By Amira Hass

Haaretz - 08:05 17/05/2009



Israel allows only food, medicine and detergent into the Gaza Strip. Thousands of items, including vital products for everyday activity, are forbidden.

Altogether only 30 to 40 select commercial items are now allowed into the Gaza Strip, compared to 4,000 that had been approved before the closure Israel imposed on Gaza following the abduction of Gilad Shalit, according to merchants and human rights activists.

...

The few items merchants are allowed to trade in are divided into three categories: food, medicine and detergent. Everything else is forbidden - including building materials (which are necessary to rehabilitate Gaza's ruins and rebuild its infrastructure), electric appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines, spare machine and car parts, fabrics, threads, needles, light bulbs, candles, matches, books, musical instruments, crayons, clothing, shoes, mattresses, sheets, blankets, cutlery, crockery, cups, glasses and animals. Many of the banned products are imported through the tunnels and can be found in Gaza's markets.

Pasta, which had been forbidden in the past, is now allowed, after U.S. Senator John Kerry expressed his astonishment at the ban during a visit to Gaza in February. But tea, coffee, sausages, semolina, milk products in large packages and most baking products are forbidden. So are industrial commodities for manufacturing food products, chocolate, sesame seeds and nuts. Israel does allow importing fruit, milk products in small packages and frozen food products as well as limited amounts of industrial fuel.

The blockade is a punitive measure intended to pressure Hamas into releasing Shalit, refrain from armed attacks, etc. It is also intended to weaken Hamas, and prevent the import of "dual use" items (err, like pasta). However, most analysts I speak with argue, correctly I think, that it creates such massive economic incentives for commercial smuggling that it makes it much easier for Hamas to smuggle in weapons too. When well over a hundred tunnels are bringing in basic supplies for 1.5 million each day--including perhaps 170,000 litres of fuel—its not so hard to slip some Grads in too.

[Rex Brynen]

Ha'aretz - 23:04 15/08/2009

Hamas: Head of Al-Qaida affiliate killed in Gaza (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1107639.html)

By Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz Correspondent, and Agencies



Hamas crushed an al-Qaida-inspired group in an hours-long standoff that came to a fiery end when a large explosion killed the radical Muslim group's leader inside his Gaza home on Saturday.

The fighting was sparked by a rebellious sermon by the group's leader, and his dramatic death put an end to the greatest internal challenge to Hamas' rule since it took control of Gaza two years ago.

In all, the fighting claimed 24 lives - including that of a senior Hamas official who Israel says masterminded the abduction of Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit. It was the highest death toll in the territory since the Israel-Hamas war earlier this year.

The crackdown targeted Jund Ansar Allah, or the "Soldiers of the Companions of God," one of a number of small, shadowy groups that are even more radical than Hamas. The decisive confrontation, in which 95 group members were arrested, solidified Hamas' iron rule in Gaza.

[Jedburgh]

WINEP, Oct 09: Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus97.pdf)

In Hamas in Combat, Yoram Cohen, former deputy director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), and Jeffrey White, a career Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, focus on the military features of Hamas that have traditionally received little attention analytically: the movement's plans, forces, weapons, doctrine, and combat qualities.

The writers conclude that despite the violent threat it poses to regional stability, Hamas's fundamental military strength should not be overestimated.

[phoenix80]

There is an excellent article by famous terror expert Lawrence Wright this week in the New Yorker magazine about Gaza.

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/09/091109fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all

[davidbfpo]

Phoenix80,

A good catch and a long, grim read. Hardly a glimmer of hope too, both sides are so far apart and the Israeli government formed since the Gaza crisis is even less inclined to negoitate. Only the extremists appear to be "winning".

davidbfpo

[Rex Brynen]

Their military performance during Operation Cast Lead may have been rather unimpressive, but as I have my morning coffee and watch a contingent of Hamas security forces change guard at a nearby post, I have to say: they march more crisply than the Fateh guys ever did!

[davidbfpo]

Rex,

I look forward to your insight into wider matters than drill in the Gaza Strip upon your return. Aside from the continuing low intensity conflict along the border, with Israeli air strikes on tunnels and lately Egyptian actions too on hindering tunnels - there is very little media coverage.

Just read SWJ Daily News Summary and the last item is on Gaza: http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-gaza-violence9-2010jan09,0,3690866.story

[Rex Brynen]

The overwhelming impression (on a short and rather limited visit) is a profound sense of dysfunctional stasis.

The economy is in tatters. Only a handful of goods (about 3 dozen) are allowed in by Israel, under strictly limited conditions. Almost everything else—car parts, shoes, cigarettes, livestock, chocolate bars, stationary, bathroom fittings, you name it, for 1.5 million people—comes in through the tunnels. The tunnels, coupled with UN emergency relief, prevents serious malnutrition, effectively providing a sort of safety net for what is in effect a massive case of collective punishment.

As for Hamas, it is certainly deterred from attacking Israel, but is firmly entrenched in power. It does face lively internal debates between Islamist softliners (who believe that Gazans should be largely free to choose more religious or secular lifestyles as a matter of personal choice) and hardliners (who believe that, having won power, the movement should now use that power to assertively transform society). It certainly isn't Iran or Saudi Arabia (yet).

Hamas militants chafe at Israeli deterrent threats, but the movement also feels it has a strong hand in negotiations for the release of prisoners/Shalit.

There are some dangers of the movement being corrupted by the attractions of wealth and power, but to date I've seen little evidence that this has happened in a major way, and certainly not on the scale that it once afflicted Fateh here.

There are also small groups of al-Qaida wannabes, and the danger that disaffected Hamas elements, unhappy with the movement's lack of Islamist radicalism, will join hardline jihadist splinters. On the other hand, Hamas clearly views this as a threat, and responds to the danger with quite forceful suppression of such groups. For much the same reason, we also have a little contingent of Hamas guards outside where I'm staying.

Finally, having come here for years, I am struck by the strikingly inverse correlation between the sophistication of the Israeli side of the Erez crossing point and the state of the "peace process." In the mid-1990s, not long after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and when political optimism was high, there was almost no crossing at all. (Indeed, my confused taxi driver once turned into an IDF military post by mistake, surprising several sleepy sentries who compensated by pointing rifles at us and shouting in alarm). As the peace process encountered difficulties, a trailer-like portacabin was installed... then, as things grew worse, a few potted plants and signposts. Then it became a slightly larger (but still temporary-looking) structure, at a time when it was becoming harder and harder to enter and exit. Now, it is something akin to a glassy airport terminal.. except that it stands almost empty, since almost no one can use it.

This time, while I was waiting for my preclearance to be cleared (the Israeli end can also be a testament to universality of bureaucracy), I noticed that the handle of the border police officer's exit stamp itself was adorned with a Winnie-the-Pooh sticker. Far from being out of place, this somehow seemed as appropriate as any other recent analysis I knew of the peace process. To quote E. E. Milne:

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

[Jedburgh]

Berghof Center, 27 Jan 09: Mediating Identity Conflicts: Potential and Challenges of Engaging with Hamas (http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/boc30e.pdf)

....this paper offers some astute insights into the dynamics of one of the most protracted conflicts of the past century, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from the specific perspective of its most controversial, but also most crucial stakeholder, whose voice is very often excluded or demonised, that of the Hamas movement. Through her so-called “scenario interviews” with several Hamas members in Syria, the author offers some valuable clues into the movement’s understanding of resistance, identity, radicalism, but also its readiness to accept third-party mediation efforts in order to explore possible resolution options. Most crucially, it shows that while demands for de-radicalisation as a pre-condition to talks can be futile and counter-productive, engaging with Hamas through the toolbox of mediation might well turn out to be the most effective strategy to encourage its path towards strategic moderation....

[Rex Brynen]

I'm not opposed to engaging Hamas, actually—I think there is significant evidence that a portion of both its cadres and supporters would accept a two state peace agreement with Israel, and I think that's a trend that should be encouraged. It is also clear that current policies of complete isolation aren't helping much.

That being said, this paper seems to focus on mediation for mediation's sake, and says strikingly little about who exactly would be targeted for what purposes. It not only says little about mediation and negotiation theory, but it also fails completely to contextualize Hamas, or its current political position. Most strikingly, it seems to ignore a decade of detailed attitudinal survey data from the West Bank and Gaza on what Hamas supporters think, what issues are important for them, attitudes to violence and Israel, etc.

[William F. Owen]

That being said, this paper seems to focus on mediation for mediation's sake, and says strikingly little about who exactly would be targeted for what purposes. It not only says little about mediation and negotiation theory, but it also fails completely to contextualize Hamas, or its current political position. Most strikingly, it seems to ignore a decade of detailed attitudinal survey data from the West Bank and Gaza on what Hamas supporters think, what issues are important for them, attitudes to violence and Israel, etc.
I concur.
I also wonder who the paper is aimed at?

[davidbfpo]

The Israeli think tank on terrorism Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center have released a large (10 Mb), 300 pg. plus report 'Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza Strip', which is a response to the Goldstone Report.

Link: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/home/default.asp

[Rex Brynen]

And it would appear that, again this year, the UN's "summer camps of debauchery" are proving much more popular than Hamas' own summer camps (to the latter's annoyance):

Hamas, UNRWA compete over entertaining Gaza children (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/7027109.html)
Xinhua
12:13, June 16, 2010


Mohamed Atallah, a teacher and one of the mentors in a major summer camp run by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) on Gaza beachside insisted that mentors are not teaching school children any politics, but only entertaining them.

On Sunday, UNRWA inaugurated its own summer camps in the Gaza Strip to entertain refugees' schoolchildren. Streets of Gaza City saw UNRWA vehicles and hundreds of UNRWA children holding summer camps flame.

UNRWA summer camps were inaugurated a day before Gaza-ruling Islamic Hamas movement started its own camps. Hamas said in a banner that its camps "are religious and cultural and not summer camps of debauchery," in reference to UNRWA camps.

"Here, it's not allowed to think or talk about politics, we differ from other summer camps run by other organizations," Atallah said, adding "we are not linked to any political group, but we try our best to help the children to get out of the horrible situation they had passed over the past several years."

Attallah was speaking to Xinhua as dozens of UN blue flags, placed on top of a huge square blue tent, were fluttering, and hundreds of Gaza refugees' schoolchildren were enjoying a good time on the white-sand beach.

...

Last year the kids at the UNRWA Gaza summer camps set the world record for the most kites flown simultaneously. This year they're trying for the world record for the most basketballs bounced at once (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gazas-boys-and-girls-come-out-to-play-1996141.html). Clever stuff by some very dedicated UN staff, for some kids who could certainly do with the chance to enjoy themselves.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 24 Mar 11: Gaza: The Next Israeli-Palestinian War? (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/B30%20Gaza%20--%20The%20Next%20Israeli-Palestinian%20War.ashx)

Will the next Middle East conflagration involve Israelis and Palestinians? After the serious escalation of the past week in which eight Gazans, including children, were killed in a single day, and the 23 March 2011 bombing in Jerusalem, that took the life of one and wounded dozens, there is real reason to worry. The sharp deterioration on this front is not directly related, nor is it in any way similar to the events that have engulfed the Middle East and North Africa. But the overall context of instability and uncertainty undoubtedly has made a volatile situation even more so. Israelis’ anxiety is rising and with it the fear that outside parties might seek to provoke hostilities to divert attention from domestic problems and shift the focus back to Israel. Hamas has been emboldened by regional events and is therefore less likely to back down from a challenge. The combination, as recent days have shown, has proven combustible....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 29 Mar 11: Radical Islam in Gaza (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.ashx)

The recent Israel-Hamas escalation returns a spotlight to Gaza and the Islamist movement’s relationship with more militant organisations. Gaza arouses multiple concerns: does Hamas seeks to impose religious law; has its purported Islamisation stimulated growth of Salafi-Jihadi groups; and will al-Qaeda offshoots find a foothold there? Hamas faces competition from more radical Islamist groups, though their numbers are few, organisation poor, achievements against Israel so far minor and chances of threatening Gaza’s government slight. The significance of Gaza’s Salafi-Jihadis is less military capability than constraints they impose on Hamas: they are an ideological challenge; they appeal to members of its military wing, a powerful constituency; through attacks within and from Gaza, they threaten security; by criticising Hamas for not fighting Israel or implementing Sharia, they exert pressure for more militancy and Islamisation. The policy of isolating Gaza and ignoring Hamas exacerbates this problem. As the international community seeks new ways to address political Islam in the Arab upheaval’s wake, Gaza is not the worst place to start....

[davidbfpo]

I expect the role of Hamas has cropped up before and there appear to be several related threads. This week Kings of War have a commentary 'What to make of Hamas?', which opens with:
Hamas this week announced a shift in its ‘emphasis from armed struggle to non-violent resistance‘.

Link, with several links to sources:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/12/what-to-make-of-hamas/


After all, Hamas emerged as a radical splinter from a more moderate movement; who is to say it cannot evolve in the opposite direction. But is this what is happening?

Clearly, it will depend on who you ask: much like everything else in the Middle East, or in politics in general,

And ends with:let’s find opportunities to deal with the challenges.

Nowhere is static, some will argue the 'Arab Spring' has shown that all too vividly and why should a movement like Hamas not change?

[davidbfpo]

A KoW podcast by Nina Musgrave, a Ph.D. student:http://warstudies.podomatic.com/entry/2012-11-24T02_56_47-08_00

Her thesis is:
An analysis of the politics, tactics and strategy of Hamas since January 2006, when it became a democratically elected political party. It aims to analyse the political trajectory and internal dynamics of Hamas in light of its electoral success, and explore the extent to which Hamas’s new role as an elected entity has expanded its strategic options or constrained its movement.

Link:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/phd/musgrave.aspx

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Lawfare for an excellent article, which the editor introduces with:
The United States rightly regards the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Palestinian organization Hamas as a terrorist group, but Hamas is also the de facto government of the Gaza Strip. There it juggles the responsibilities of governing Gaza and the associated need to mollify Israel with its self-image as an Islamic “resistance” movement. Making this difficult act even harder, Hamas faces a terrorism problem of its own. Gaza is home to a range of groups that see Hamas as too accommodating toward Israel and too lenient when it comes to imposing Islamic law at home. Beverley Milton-Edwards, a professor at Queen’s University Belfast and renowned expert on Hamas, assesses these Islamist rivals and the risks for Hamas of being too confrontational or too passive in dealing with them.

The author concludes:
Although the challenge Hamas faces from its Islamist foes at present is limited, it is unlikely that this Islamist opposition will wither away, and in the current regional climate, the criticism they lay at Hamas’s feet may be ignored at their peril. As with neighboring North Sinai, Gaza could eventually succumb to proliferating takfiri jihadist forces, further undermining the delicate security balance currently prevailing in that part of the Middle East region.

Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/05/the-foreign-policy-essay-hamass-islamist-foes/

Interesting interplay outside Gaza with Egypt too, which has its own problems in the Sinai.

[davidbfpo]

As the tension rises between Hamas in Gaza and Israel, with rockets fired into Israel and IDF missile strikes on 'militants' this review popped up via Twitter. There's also the murders in the West Bank and reprisals alongside the street rioting:
Given the current crisis, it is worth thinking through what a new Gaza war would look like based on evidence drawn from the 2008 war. In what follows then I conduct a type of thought experiment. I offer a summary of the Gaza War/Op. Cast Lead. I then provide some preliminary thoughts on the contours/outcome of a new IDF invasion into Gaza.

Link:http://zurilinetsky.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/those-who-dont-learn-from-the-past-are-doomed-to-repeat-it/

[davidbfpo]

A concise 2012 blog article by Professor John Schindler 'Gaza and the Utility of Force'. He starts with:
The recent winding down of the latest round of fighting over Gaza, the week of stand-off strikes which the Israelis have termed Operation Pillar of Defense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pillar_of_Defense), ought to raise questions for all Western militaries about what exactly force is for these days.

(It ends with) If Israel wants to find a happier fate it needs to think hard, and fast, about solutions to the Palestinian problem which do not center on the IDF.

Link:http://20committee.com/2012/11/23/gaza-and-the-utility-of-force/

[davidbfpo]

An intriguing report in the WaPo, a tactic that sometimes does not work for the IDF nor the local people and residents:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/09/roof-knocking-the-israeli-mjilitarys-tactic-of-phoning-palestinians-it-is-about-to-bomb/