What Is Our Strategic Endstate in Afghanistan?

[SWJED]

?

[Entropy]

You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

[Hacksaw]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

[Ron Humphrey]

?What Is Our Strategic Endstate in Afghanistan?



You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

The ones who WILL ultimately decide that probably aren't getting a whole lot of input into that particular discussion.

[Rank amateur]

If you keep asking these kind of questions, my presence here will serve absolutely no purpose whatsoever.:D

What it was: to remove the Taliban from government, which was obviously insufficient.

What our objective is now: to disrupt Al Qaeda, which arguably we are being somewhat successful at it, but there are still many problems and that objective does not include an end state.

What it should be: more or less what Hacksaw said, but in order to achieve that will need significantly more troops and it will need to deny the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan. (Dropping a few bombs, and launching a few raids won't do it; that's just makes it easier for the Taliban to gain support amongst Pakistani tribes.)

[Eden]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

Uhhh...looks like we'll need to invade Pakistan, too.

I would propose:

A place run by sons-a-bitches who don't like the Taliban and are in it strictly for the dough.

Not that it matters, since NATO is running the show now. Any government supported as legitimate by Afghanis would not pass muster with the Europeans.

[wm]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

I think that the third goal may well be a bridge too far. Suppose we throw that one out and recognize that the area we now call Aghanistan has had a long history of surviving by means of an economy based on subsistance agriculture/herding and banditry/law breaking of one sort or another.

The concern in point 2 is different, I submit. It has nothing to do with the amount of security forces (as "adequate" seems to imply) available. Rather it has to do with the will of those running the country to act in a way that we in the US (and the rest of NATO since ISAF is now in Afghanistan) want them to act. Pakistan has the means to handle the NWFP/FATA problem but not the desire. I suggest the Taleban were in a similar situation when they held sway in Kabul. I doubt our continued occupation of the country will change the national Afghan will (if there even is such a thing) in this area.

The need for Point 1 is a mystery to me. Did the Afghans have such a thing before we got there? Have they ever had such a thing?
I am also unclear why we need Afghanistan to be stable enough to resist adventurous takeover attempts by its neighbors (condition 4). As far as I can tell, these positions are a holdover from the England vs. Russia Great Game "### for tat" mentality which is now being re-enacted between the US and Russia with such things as NATO naval exercises in the Black Sea being countered by joint Russian-Venezuelan naval exercises in the Caribbean.

[Hacksaw]

Caveat first... the stated end state was more or less articulated to CENTCOM leadership in May '02 in response to a question in a briefing, but let me take some of these on...

What is the alternative to a legitimate government described as such by recognized as legitimate by its citizens? I didn't specify form - our sensibilities would prefer a mini-me democracy, but I agree that isn't in the cards... the government does need to be legitimate in order to avoid creating large swaths of ungoverned areas from which terrorists of all sorts of ilk can take refuge and plan future attacks. This seems self-evident, but if it needed stating so be it.

Why did you limit the term adequate to mean only quantity of security forces? Isn't adequacy in any situation a function of quality and quantity. Not sure why you would assume that a million man army unwilling to security its own territory would be deemed "adequate" because its large...

Something other than a narco-economy is tough but not a bridge too far? I'll note I didn't say poppy cultivation reduced to zero, I simply said it can't dominate economic activity, otherwise it prejudices all other activities to the point of irrelevance. Of course this means something other than a military solution -- imagine that..

As for able to resist military adventurism - this is important. The vestigages of the old grand game is that in some cases it is best to create instability in the neighboring nation to mitigate it as a threat, or to create instability on a rival's border to create another challenge for the rival. In any case Iran, Pakistan, India, and Russia all have a history of doing so -- ungoverned areas, failed state etc etc...

Now I'm not wedded to these by any stretch. To be honest I had to stretch to remember them in paraphrased form, but I don't think they are nearly as far off as you. You might ask why we chose to declare war on the Taliban, but once in these aren't so bad...

Now as for Pakistan and their ability but unwillingness to do something in the FATA, that is debatable and is really a US centric view. Could/should/would we like them to do more? Yep Is it necessarily feasible for them to do a lot more -- room for disagreement.

Live well and row

[wm]

Uhhh...looks like we'll need to invade Pakistan, too.

I would propose:

A place run by sons-a-bitches who don't like the Taliban and are in it strictly for the dough.

Not that it matters, since NATO is running the show now. Any government supported as legitimate by Afghanis would not pass muster with the Europeans.

Actually, I think we have a major violation of the principle of war Unity of command. We seem to have two different agendas running: the NATO one and the US one. Perhaps we cannot clearly identify a strategic endstate because of that fact.

[Hacksaw]

This should help...

General David D. McKiernan, United States Army, for reappointment to the rank of general and assignment as Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan. He is currently serving as Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan.


The dual hat puts him in charge of all forces... still doesn't fully address the myriad of problems - specifically national caveats - but its a start

[Eden]

It should help in many ways, though I suspect that for all practical purposes McKiernan had a great deal of influence over US forces in Afghanistan before being dual-hatted. Problem is, ISAF is an operational level headquarters. They don't get to pick strategy or end-state.

And to clarify a point about legitimacy. The type of government that most Afghans would consider legitimate - a very weak center that can nevertheless be used as a counterweight to the tribe upstream - is not the type of government that can prevent exploitation of ungoverned spaces. Therefore, to meet our strategic ends, we must foist on the Afghans a type of governance that is foreign to them. This is the disconnect. Its not impossible, but boy is it a long-term project (cf British in India)

[Hacksaw]

Weak center, while not the most effective in negating large swaths of ungoverned can still work, especially with tech help from big brother. If the stated policy is we won't allow terrorists to openly use our land as a place to plan and launch attacks... and the strong outside agree (both incentive and coersive reasons) you can deny terrorists freedom of maneuver - probably a lot better than you can in a society like our own. Tribe/Warlord/Elder/Mayor/Governor whatever and people just have to be OK with a little domestic head cracking of outsiders bringing bad attention.

Again, don't think these are mutually exclusive.

[William F. Owen]

What Is Our Strategic Endstate in Afghanistan?

Why do you have to decide on one now? Seriously, where has it ever been written that policies should be defined by "objectives," rather than "activities." If someone has biased everything towards "objectives" then it would seem to be a flawed idea, looking at history and human nature.

The "objectives" say "when we have done X, we will have won." - and you may not have.

Activities allow you to keep doing something in relation to some measure of success (reduction in violence, reduction in drugs production), and to exploit opportunities as and when they arise. Success is being better off. If it's not worth the price, then give up.

In combat you have to win, but when you do security, you have to maintain it, until it's not needed.

Strategy and it's related areas, are like washing, hunting for food, farming or maintaining fitness. It's not a sports event. You have to keep doing it, or decide to give up. Just like fitness training, some measure of success helps, but you can't keep getting fitter. You have to have a job and a life besides. Hope that analogy isn't a step too far.

[Bill Moore]

Seriously, where has it ever been written that policies should be defined by "objectives," rather than "activities." If someone has biased everything towards "objectives" then it would seem to be a flawed idea, looking at history and human nature.

The "objectives" say "when we have done X, we will have won." - and you may not have.

Policy is not defined by objectives, but doctrinally we use objectives for military planning, which supports policy, so there is a correlation, at least to the M in DIME.

The post-Vietnam War doctrine, the so called Powell doctrine was to restrict the use of the military to operations where we could use overwhelming force to obtain clear militarily acheivable objectives(really a request for a policy to limit the use of the military to specific types of operations). The pleas for no more quagmires, so operations (where conventional forces were used) started looking more pristine like Grenada, Just Cause, and Desert Storm. Clear objectives that were achievable with over whelming force.

Yet in the shadows during the Cold War the USG continued activities on a regular long term basis in the pursuit of policy. For example, the use of Special Forces to support host nations fight communism was known, but it was a low visibility activity and not overly politically sensitive. There is a big difference politically between deploying a hand full of Special Forces Soldiers to help a host nation battle a communist insurgency and deploying a battalion or larger of conventional forces to fight.

When we deploy conventional forces America generally wants to see results, or political will tends to wane rather rapidly. Some politicians like Bill Clinton had the political skill to maintain the national and international will (barely) to stay in Bosnia and Kosovo. On the other hand, he didn't even attempt to sustain the political will to stay in Somalia. In irregular warfare the only decisive operation is sustained, long term engagement. We can do that with the other elements in DImE, but normally need to restrict long term military engagements to SOF and a few conventional enablers. By long term I mean at least five years, normally much more (use El Salvador as an example).

Using militarily obtainable objectives is an American way of fighting a war, because it allows us to define victory and show we're on the path to do so, which makes the employment of conventional military forces politically sustainable.

I'm no expert on Afghanistan, but I suspect we need to focus the conventional forces on clearing areas of Taliban maneuver elements, so they are incapable of over running combat outposts employed to protect the populace. That would set the conditions for SOF to combat advise Afghan security forces in securing the populace, promoting HN government legitimacy and clearing out the remaining insurgent underground.

I'll stand by for the Afghan experts to tell me why that won't work.

[UrsaMaior]

It would be superfluous to raise your esteemed attention but NATO <> EU or WEU (if it still exists). USA and Canada lies on the continent of America and Turkey is in Asia. ;)

For me irrespective of the fate of Afghanistan a real endstate would be a strong and unified NATO. Sooner or later the western world (that means from California to Estonia, from Texas to Poland, and from the UK to AUS/NZ) will face serious economical, political, social and even military challanges.

I wish EU leaders would stop being such "bunnies" in military issues, and US leaders would stop seeing us as REMFs at the same time. Now that would be an endstate.

[Ken White]

...Using militarily obtainable objectives is an American way of fighting a war, because it allows us to define victory and show we're on the path to do so, which makes the employment of conventional military forces politically sustainable.the results in Korea, Viet Nam and those likely in Afghanistan and Iraq mean that your statement, while arguably correct as worded, is an example of a nation (us) not facing the reality that the world has changed... :D

My greater fear is that there are some in high places in the Armed Forces who don't realize that particular change has occurred.

[Bill Moore]

Some senior leaders get, some still believe they are defending us from future Vietnams, but regardless of their position SWED's question, "what is our strategic endstate in Afghanistan?" is critically important.

Relatively speaking, if our goal is to defeat the Taliban, that is a lot easier than attempting to reform Afghanistan's social, political and economic structure.

If our goal is to establish a stable (relative to what) nation where democracy and capitialism can self-sustain, that implies a couple of things that we really should debate seriously:

1. Do you have to create a stable democracy and market economy to defeat the enemy? (If I recall the Islamists won a couple of free elections in recent years, because they promised to put the nation under Sharia law, Algeria being one example. I think we're too quick to correlate buzz phrases wtih endstates, and we assume the book "The End of History" is fact versus opinion.)

2. Assuming we're going to pursue this, are we prepared to go the distance to achieve this? In the long run is this very expensive investment (effort, time, money, manpower) in our national interests? You can make the argument that rebuilding Germany and Japan definitely supported our long term strategic interests, but is there a parallel to Afghanistan?

3. Strategic endstates imply using all the elements of DIME. Once we defeat the Taliban (assuming we take away his safehaven in Pakistan), then what? Do we have a feasible plan for "transformation"? Will it get funded and supported on both sides of the aisle? Will be able to garner and sustain critical international support?

Someone wrote we just need to get to "good enough", but still requires determining what good enough is.

[jmm99]

in most cases.

Read Bill Moore's and Ken White's comments while sitting here thinking (trying to be a smart, lazy guy) about METT-TC as an analogy to trial work - and applying it to case strategy (the "law" is the policy part, which shapes the case strategy - which also depends on the facts).

Anyway, got to thinking about the "M" part. What is my mission in a case. I came up with:

1. to win (judge or jury verdict); or

2. to reach an acceptable settlement.

Surrender has never been an option - in cases I've taken on; or have been forced to take, for that matter.

I suspect, from other things he's said, that Ken's reference to "the results in Korea, Viet Nam and those likely in Afghanistan and Iraq" boils down to the need to consider "an acceptable settlement" - "War of 1812 Redux" ?

[Ski]

We look at DIME as being the tools to define the endstate, but they might be the wrong tools.

It might be as simple as getting the Afghan people to actually believe there is a country of Afghanista and not a kluge of tribes.

This requires a feeling of nationalism which is going to be absent as long as there Taliban, AQ, HiG, and other armed elements running around the country. The idea of allegiance to a national cause has not been developed fully.

We can talk about DIME until we are blue in the face, but until the Afghan people believe in a national cause, a national government and national unity, it's a mess. We are trying to define the problem through our lens.

[Bill Moore]

Ski I wasn't trying to use DIME to describe our endstate (though it may have read that way), I was attempting to make the argument that a realistic endstate is one we can achieve using our elements of national power.

I'm not totally sold on your argument, but let's say your correct, and since we're the ones there attempting to encourage that "transformational" change, how do "we" help the Afghan people develop and embrace the idea of nationalism? Information? Diplomacy? Economic incentives? Using the military to neutralize those who oppose it?

The problem presented is to define our desired endstate. You identified a problem that we may have to solve to get to the endstate.

[Ken White]

... SWED's question, "what is our strategic endstate in Afghanistan?" is critically important.I am quite sure we are not yet in a position to provide an answer not least because there are too many other players involved.
Relatively speaking, if our goal is to defeat the Taliban, that is a lot easier than attempting to reform Afghanistan's social, political and economic structure.Relatively speaking, that's correct -- that doesn't mean that either is achievable by us -- or that either needs to be achieved at all.
If our goal is to establish a stable (relative to what)...Relative to world and regional norms; that's all you can get -- there will no western liberal democracy there.
... nation where democracy and capitialism can self-sustain, that implies a couple of things that we really should debate seriously:

1. Do you have to create a stable democracy and market economy to defeat the enemy? (If I recall the Islamists won a couple of free elections in recent years, because they promised to put the nation under Sharia law, Algeria being one example. I think we're too quick to correlate buzz phrases wtih endstates, and we assume the book "The End of History" is fact versus opinion.)Define defeat. There's not going to be any defeat in Afghanistan, of us or them (whoever they are); hopefully an acceptable outcome will be achieved; that's all you'll ever get in any COIN operation. There may be much trumpeting and foolishness on either or both sides about wins, losses, etc but it'll just be noise, the reality will be no defeats -- or victories in the classic sense.
2. Assuming we're going to pursue this, are we prepared to go the distance to achieve this? In the long run is this very expensive investment (effort, time, money, manpower) in our national interests? You can make the argument that rebuilding Germany and Japan definitely supported our long term strategic interests, but is there a parallel to Afghanistan?Probably not but I don't think that will affect many decisions.
3. Strategic endstates imply using all the elements of DIME. Once we defeat the Taliban (assuming we take away his safehaven in Pakistan), then what? Do we have a feasible plan for "transformation"? Will it get funded and supported on both sides of the aisle? Will be able to garner and sustain critical international support?I again cite Korea and Viet Nam as harbingers of the lack of such a strategic end state... :D

[Ski]

What I 'm saying is that any "transformational" change cannot be pushed from us, rather it must be created at the grassroots level within the Afghan nation.

There is a large populace of people who will not touch anything the US "creates" simply because it is American.

With opposition like that, now try and define a strategic endstate.




Ski I wasn't trying to use DIME to describe our endstate (though it may have read that way), I was attempting to make the argument that a realistic endstate is one we can achieve using our elements of national power.

I'm not totally sold on your argument, but let's say your correct, and since we're the ones there attempting to encourage that "transformational" change, how do "we" help the Afghan people develop and embrace the idea of nationalism? Information? Diplomacy? Economic incentives? Using the military to neutralize those who oppose it?

The problem presented is to define our desired endstate. You identified a problem that we may have to solve to get to the endstate.

[Bill Moore]

Excerpt from, "All Counterinsurgency Is Local" in the OCT issue of The Atlantic:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/afghan


The Taliban are well aware that the center of gravity in Afghanistan is the rural Pashtun district and village, and that Afghan army and coalition forces are seldom seen there. With one hand, the Taliban threaten tribal elders who do not welcome them. With the other, they offer assistance. (As one U.S. officer recently noted, they’re “taking a page from the Hezbollah organizations in Lebanon, with their own public works to assist the tribes in villages that are deep in the inaccessible regions of the country. This helps support their cause with the population, making it hard to turn the population in support of the Afghan government and the coalition.”)

The rural Pashtun south has its own systems of tribal governance and law, and its people don’t want Western styles of either. But nor are they predisposed to support the Taliban, which espouses an alien and intolerant form of Islam, and goes against the grain of traditional respect for elders and decision by consensus. Re-empowering the village coun*cils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way to re-create the traditional check against the powerful political network of rural mullahs, who have been radicalized by the Taliban. But the elders won’t commit to opposing the Taliban if they and their families are vulnerable to Taliban torture and murder, and they can hardly be blamed for that.

Ski, I agree that we naively attempt to make other countries mirror our political, social, economic and security systems, assuming that if we simply overlayed an American Style template of any country, their problems would magically go away. As you pointed out, this creates an entirely new set of problems.

The authors above point out a more feasible approach to pacify the country to establish conditions where we're reasonably ensured that the Taliban will not be welcome. However, the strategy we apply depends upon our strategic end state (if there is one). Again if the desired end state is a stable, democratic government that practices free market capitalism, the approach offered above may not get us there.

[Ski]

Bill

Our endstate is almost irrelveant. The Afghans must be able to formulate what their endstate is going to be, and if that is exatly the same as ours or heavily overlaps with ours, then that's all for the good.

If it doesn't, then what?


Excerpt from, "All Counterinsurgency Is Local" in the OCT issue of The Atlantic:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/afghan



Ski, I agree that we naively attempt to make other countries mirror our political, social, economic and security systems, assuming that if we simply overlayed an American Style template of any country, their problems would magically go away. As you pointed out, this creates an entirely new set of problems.

The authors above point out a more feasible approach to pacify the country to establish conditions where we're reasonably ensured that the Taliban will not be welcome. However, the strategy we apply depends upon our strategic end state (if there is one). Again if the desired end state is a stable, democratic government that practices free market capitalism, the approach offered above may not get us there.

[Ron Humphrey]

Perhaps if we look at this from a more comparative albeit somewhat theoretical point of view (in that no one really "knows for sure). With the way things are right now what type of situation does the average Afghan(and this is in the most generic form) find themselves in.

Food, shelter, water, jobs, schools, faith, fiction, literacy, leadership, hope, lack of hope; we know all these things tend to add up to actions by those with or without power in order to maintain, or change things. Rather than try to develop an outright statement of where we want to be in ten years with this how about we look at where we were ten years ago, where we are now and draw the line so we can at least tell what direction we are really headed.

We are well aware of the arenas in which we excel against opponents, so its a given that we capitalize on those areas. We should be aware of the areas we're not so good in so how about trying something different. And everything else( and I mean EVERYTHING else) is up to the folks who live and will live there.

[Bill Moore]

Ski and Ron, I agree that the locals will ultimately determine their own so called end state (of course even the phrase end state is misleading, as there is never an end state), but that isn't the question, the question is what end state will "we" accept before we call "our" mission complete?

Perhaps contrary to the prevailing view, I think there is much we can do (and have done) to shape the direction the locals will go in. Yes we're a foreign body in Afghanistan, but so is the Taliban. The Taliban way of life is not the norm, yet they are now having success based on their strategy, not because they're local. We need to study their strategy and counter it. I know it sounds simplistic, but it doesn't appear we're doing that. Our strategy, or the perception if it, went astray somewhere relatively recently.

The Taliban have upped their game considerably in recent months based on what I have been reading open source, so it is probably a safe bet to assume that they are now getting some degree of State sponsorship (directly or indirectly), and the list of possible sponsors are quite numerous. For our competitors it is desirable to have a U.S. and NATO tied up in Afghanistan, so they can maneuver elsewhere with less threat of U.S. intervention.

I'm not there, so I can't feel or see the frustrations you're dealing with, but I think we can do better than we're doing now. I like Ron's idea, it would be worthwhile to show a graph of Afghanistan's social, political, economic, security, conditions from say 1975 to the present (and then somehow portray this to the Afghan people in a meaningful way for them). I suspect there were would be some rapid sharp increases starting in 2002/03 time frame; however localized they may be. As the article suggests, it may now be time to push into the hinterland and spread the wealth. You can't effectively oppose the Taliban by dropping bombs on villages they're occupying.

[Eden]

The Taliban way of life is not the norm, yet they are now having success based on their strategy, not because they're local. We need to study their strategy and counter it. I know it sounds simplistic, but it doesn't appear we're doing that. Our strategy, or the perception if it, went astray somewhere relatively recently.

One of the problems in Afghanistan is that we are not fighting a single insurgency; we are struggling against several insurgencies and numerous criminal organizations and the remnants of old regional kleptocracies struggling to regain their influence. In other words, not one war but many inthe same geographical space.

This may explain why we have trouble divining an 'enemy strategy'. I can remember thinking, time and again, when confronted with some enemy action, "What the hell are they trying to accomplish?" By the end of my last tour, I had come to the conclusion that there is no Taliban master plan in Afghanistan, only ceaseless and disorganized activity. How do you counter a formless enemy? How do you formulate a strategy for multiple wars aganst disparate foes?

My time in Afghanistan sent me back to The Art of War - I'm beginning to get Master Sun.

[reed11b]

My fear of focusing on an "end state" In the 'Stan is that this might take the place of "operational planning". I point ot 05-06 in Iraq as an example. The military is there to defeat the Taliban and destroy it's ability to exist and to train the current Afghan forces. State department & NATO needs to get active as far a creating a stable goverment if that is the goal. They are sepperate missions and this should be kept in mind even if they both effect each other. Just my .02cents.
Reed

[Ken White]

One of the problems in Afghanistan is that we are not fighting a single insurgency; we are struggling against several insurgencies and numerous criminal organizations and the remnants of old regional kleptocracies struggling to regain their influence. In other words, not one war but many inthe same geographical space.The same thing was / is true in Iraq (and elsewhere) -- those cussed Easterners just will not fight nice tidy western wars. A part of our problem outside European war is our lack of understanding of the psyche of our opponents; that coupled with our impatience to get the job done and just fix things so we can move on to the next challenge has not stood us in good stead in a number of places over the last 60 or so years.
...By the end of my last tour, I had come to the conclusion that there is no Taliban master plan in Afghanistan, only ceaseless and disorganized activity. How do you counter a formless enemy? How do you formulate a strategy for multiple wars aganst disparate foes?There are only two options; you outfight him at his own game -- which we can do but will not due to the casualties of all types thus incurred -- or you can do what we're doing and play whack a mole. It's inefficient but it does work; it just requires patience and stamina.

[Ron Humphrey]

Ski and Ron, I agree that the locals will ultimately determine their own so called end state (of course even the phrase end state is misleading, as there is never an end state), but that isn't the question, the question is what end state will "we" accept before we call "our" mission complete? .


If we consider Iraq as an example of deciding what we will accept it seems a lot lot calling audibles at the line. The circumstances will consistently change in the back and forth between ourselves and the enemy. In the end you call em as you see em.

The key it would seem would be to accept that we won't really know whats quote acceptable until we've established whats doable and then we have to see a crack in the opponents armor at which point we turn upfield and give it all we've got. An unfortunate fact but I have yet to see the crystal ball which shows us the play before the other teams lines up.




Perhaps contrary to the prevailing view, I think there is much we can do (and have done) to shape the direction the locals will go in. Yes we're a foreign body in Afghanistan, but so is the Taliban. The Taliban way of life is not the norm, yet they are now having success based on their strategy, not because they're local. We need to study their strategy and counter it. I know it sounds simplistic, but it doesn't appear we're doing that. Our strategy, or the perception if it, went astray somewhere relatively recently. .

I might propose that although the Tali way is not the norm it is however a condition with which the populous find themselves quite unfortunately very famililiar. In that sense perhaps the old adage (better the enemy known, then the friend you don't know.) applies. That comfort zone that so inundates cultures which exist for long periods under dictatorial type governments is something we really have to keep in mind. Think ( Stockholm Syndrome) on a massive scale.

Not sure about this just thinking about it?




The Taliban have upped their game considerably in recent months based on what I have been reading open source, so it is probably a safe bet to assume that they are now getting some degree of State sponsorship (directly or indirectly), and the list of possible sponsors are quite numerous. For our competitors it is desirable to have a U.S. and NATO tied up in Afghanistan, so they can maneuver elsewhere with less threat of U.S. intervention.

Unfortunately just about everything I've seen open source also seems to reflect this:(




I'm not there, so I can't feel or see the frustrations you're dealing with, but I think we can do better than we're doing now. I like Ron's idea, it would be worthwhile to show a graph of Afghanistan's social, political, economic, security, conditions from say 1975 to the present (and then somehow portray this to the Afghan people in a meaningful way for them). I suspect there were would be some rapid sharp increases starting in 2002/03 time frame; however localized they may be. As the article suggests, it may now be time to push into the hinterland and spread the wealth. You can't effectively oppose the Taliban by dropping bombs on villages they're occupying.

Just so theres no confusion niether am I, I have seen quite a few that are there express that frustration and others. I know we're trying hard to see what doing better would entail and thus the suggestions I made. I think your probably right about the hinterland somewhat but I still don't know that it's going to be anything like Iraq. IT would seem that this country has been controlled by governments that pretty much commuted to areas to reinforce or gain control and otherwise used mostly fear of informants to maintain their grips.

So whats to say we might not find ourselves in a situation where Larger regional FOB's:eek: might actually be in order for those areas further out?

Once again just trying to keep everything in mind and not necessarily count out a more effective blend of COIN/CON with constant adaptation to situation.

[Ken White]

...The key it would seem would be to accept that we won't really know whats quote acceptable until we've established whats doable and then we have to see a crack in the opponents armor at which point we turn upfield and give it all we've got. An unfortunate fact but I have yet to see the crystal ball which shows us the play before the other teams lines up.To which I'd add that our own position will change over time due to domestic and international events and thus further muddy the water.

It's tempting to to lay out a 'strategy' (more correctly an operational plan to achieve a desired end state) and head for a 'successful' conclusion but the issues and the world are more complex than that and, in the case of Afghanistan, there are entirely too many players in the scrum. We are forced to adapt and cobble -- and I'm pretty comfortable with that, we do that sort of thing better than anyone else in the world while OTOH our ability to adhere to finite plans is not particularly good... :D

[Hacksaw]

I think I was the first who proposed an answer to the question this thread posed. Whether it is the stated end state or a proposed end state matters little for my purposes. As a reminder, this is what was proposed (more or less) back in 2002...


A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

I've been following the thread since and I'm somewhat surprised the turn that it has made. It seems unless I'm mistaken, that the collective wisdom of the council is "do we need, or can we know" the end state.

WHAT!!!!!

An end state provides the word picture for the commander's intent... It gives ultimate purpose and direction to all activity -- or should. If we are unable or unwilling to pose an end state for fear that we will need to adjust that end state should conditions change, than shame on us and everyone who put someone in harm's way. Stealing a phrase from another recent thread -- Fuzzy or Fraud, I go with Fraud!!!

Maybe I missed something along the way in this thread, but I think we collectively somehow allowed ourselves to get into group think mode.

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????

If the arguement is we started without an idea of how it ends in either IZ or AFG - agreed. If we think we ought to continue to muddle along until an idea of how it ends emerges - you be on the wrong side of that discussion

Live well and row

[Steve Blair]

To dip my toe in the waters, I do think you need to have some sort of end state in mind, informed by local conditions and what actually might be achievable (or feasible) in the region. "Muddling through" has never served us well in the past, and I've seen no breakthrough that will change that.

Having said that, I think that we will most likely not be able to form a good vision of an end state because our domestic and political conditions simply don't allow for the sort of enclosed planning that used to take place. We fixate on short-term goals, unable (or unwilling) to grasp that these sorts of things take years. Looking back to our own history, the Frontier took decades to pacify (a full century really-if not more-given the changing nature of what was considered the Frontier). The Philippines took over ten, and many of the so-called Banana Wars lasted longer than our efforts to date in Afghanistan. In all those efforts, the operational planning shifted many times, but the end state focus remained pretty consistent. Granted, all these examples would be considered Imperial efforts...and that's why I feel that we can no longer plan this way.

Any end state vision that would take longer than two years to attain will be labeled "Imperialist" by every talking head and typing hand out there with the inclination to do so. It doesn't matter if the end state vision is or isn't imperialist...once the accusation is made the burden of proof swings immediately to the planners, and they'll run for cover (especially on the political side).

So, Hacksaw, I agree we desperately need a realistic end state vision, but I doubt our ability to produce one based on the factors I mentioned. I'd love to be pleasantly surprised....

[William F. Owen]

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????


Excellent question. I subscribe to both CvC and Delbruk, in terms of either annihilation or exhaustion. If COIN is biased away from Combat and more to Security, then I would suggest you aim to exhaust as nothing decisive can be done, in terms of annihilation.

To exhaust, keep doing what works and try not to do those things that do not (killing civilians). As I said it is like maintenance, and not construction. You've won when the other guy cannot go on. The desired end state will appear. You'll recognise it because it will look very different to the undesired end state, and you know what they look like.

[Cavguy]

You've won when the other guy cannot go on. The desired end state will appear. You'll recognise it because it will look very different to the undesired end state, and you know what they look like.

Wilf - What kind of mumbo-jumbo is that?!?!?! Come on! You're the person always asking "so what?"

What Hacksaw is articulating is the need for a Commander's Intent for Afghanistan - something to focus all operations against. He is asking what that should look like?

We should muddle along until something magically appears?!?!?!

Since it seems to be lost in the "it's hard" - what should our intent/endstate be?

Similar to the 2002 articulation or changed?

[Ken White]

...I've been following the thread since and I'm somewhat surprised the turn that it has made. It seems unless I'm mistaken, that the collective wisdom of the council is "do we need, or can we know" the end state.Are they saying that or saying this in a different way:
"... If we are unable or unwilling to pose an end state for fear that we will need to adjust that end state should conditions change..."Seems the latter to me...

I also think this statement of yours is interesting:
An end state provides the word picture for the commander's intent... It gives ultimate purpose and direction to all activity -- or should...While I totally agree with that militarily, my perception has long been that geopolitically on the macro level that is a confining and too often unachievable dictum and, regrettably, the issue transcends the military and enters the political realm.
Maybe I missed something along the way in this thread, but I think we collectively somehow allowed ourselves to get into group think mode.

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????We go to the war our political masters send us to and we fight hopefully well and as best we can with an idea of 'winning' -- until they say stop. That may be short of a 'win.' Again, I say look at both Korea and Viet Nam, neither ended in any sense the way the US Army would have liked -- or tried to achieve. What we want and what the Politicians get are often two very different things...
If the arguement is we started without an idea of how it ends in either IZ or AFG - agreed. If we think we ought to continue to muddle along until an idea of how it ends emerges - you be on the wrong side of that discussion.I think you have it backwards. We started with an idea on how it would end and have to backfill and adapt, to downshift, to changing (and unconsidered) circumstances.

We can and do have an idea how we'd like it to end and my perception is that in Afghanistan, that state tracks broadly with your comments above. The issue, I think is will all the varied players, internal and peripheral allow that to happen -- we may have more votes than most but we do not have them all. Shame we can't have nice clean simple wars anymore... :wry:

[Entropy]

You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

We're not even in agreement over whether we can have an endstate, much less what it could or should be.

Maybe it's better to examine our priorities instead. What are they in Afghanistan? Instead of an endstate, I think we need to reexamine our fundamental purpose for being there.

But returning to "endstates" briefly, we've already had a few of them. Here's my very abbreviated history of Afghanistan:

Our first end state, going back to the mid-1990's, was the end of an AQ safehaven in Afghanistan. When you look at the history it becomes clear the US didn't have much interest in Afghanistan in general, or the Taliban in particular, except for its associating with and harboring of AQ. The goal of eliminating the AQ safehaven was basically accomplished by the spring of 2002

Once the Taliban and AQ were initially defeated, the goal changed and became all about preventing the return of a safehaven for AQ - that became our "new" endstate. Since the Taliban were still allied with AQ, our goal included preventing their return as well. We've pursued this goal since.

At some point in the past year or two a consensus has grown that our desired endstate of an enduring Afghanistan hostile to AQ and its associates cannot be acheived without also eliminating the safehaven in Pakistan, which the Pakistanis are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do. So now our political leadership and potential future leadership seem to be advocating for and acting on that growing consensus.

So we are, in a sense, at a crossroads, because eliminating the safehaven in Pakistan is not nearly the same as eliminating it in Afghanistan for a host of reasons I won't go into here, but which should be apparent to anyone with any knowledge of south Asia.

What has stayed consistent, though, at the root of everything, is AQ and the threat it poses to the US. We can and do and should debate on what policy and amount of blood and treasure should meet that threat, but I think it's fair to say that our "endstate" is ultimately about AQ. So far, the importance of AQ in our policy and desired end states has remained preeminent.

What I suspect will happen is that at some point that calculus will change, maybe when UBL and AAZ are killed/captured, for example, and when that happens all the supporting goals and polices and "endstates" will change too. This gets back to what I was talking about before in mentioning "priorities." If AQ goes away as a priority, then those goals and policies may fall like a house of cards without that foundation unless something else replaces it. We shall see.

[Hacksaw]

Entropy

Just because a group of knuckleheads (is that ad hominem) on a public website can't come to consensus over -- whether we can have an endstate, much less what it could or should be -- does not mean we shoud eschew this time honored method of describing the "conditions that define the achievement of the Commander's Objectives" Joint Definitions JP 3-0 and 1-02...

This doesn't change whether we are speaking in terms of Commander-in-Chief or BCT CDR Objectives... What differs is scope and available ways/means.

Not sure why you insist on priorities (from a military perspective I'd equate that with logical lines of Operation), to my way of thinking this is out of logical sequence.

All the way up and down the chain of command we need to be able to describe the conditions that define success... When the commander isn't sure his staff or subordinates develop a proposed end state and dialogue until each share the same vision/intent.

I must be the hanging chad because I don't see we couldn't wouldn't shouldn't do this.

and if in fact AQ is the center piece of describing those conditions, then I think the following is broad enough to allow individual initiative and account for changing conditions, as well as guide priorities/logical lines of operation...

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either"

The dead horse is now butchered, fried and served hot....
Hence we shall whip it again tomorrow

[Render]

If the Taliban/Al-Q, (or the Pakistani government), succeed in closing the Pakistani-Afghan border crossings, then the war, at least as far as Coalition forces within Afghanistan are concerned, is over.

If the Pakistani military actually does fire on US/NATO forces, then the war expands into a new theatre.

NO
MSG
PLS,
R

[Ken White]

...does not mean we shoud eschew this time honored method of describing the "conditions that define the achievement of the Commander's Objectives" Joint Definitions JP 3-0 and 1-02...

This doesn't change whether we are speaking in terms of Commander-in-Chief or BCT CDR Objectives... What differs is scope and available ways/means.It does change if the Commander in Chief says "Don't bother me with that, I want X and Y, period and you are not to do Z." Militarily, you're right on track -- the problem is that the effort is only partly military, it's mostly political, like it or not.

[Ken White]

If the Taliban/Al-Q, (or the Pakistani government), succeed in closing the Pakistani-Afghan border crossings, then the war, at least as far as Coalition forces within Afghanistan are concerned, is over.

If the Pakistani military actually does fire on US/NATO forces, then the war expands into a new theatre.My son has two tours there, the first in OEF 2 (2002); the Pakistanis were sporadically but fairly regularly firing on US troops then, were still doing that when he went back for OEF 4 and are doing it today.

[Ski]

The key to any strategy or endstate, in my opinion, is that it has to be feasible.

I don't think the following are feasible:

"A legitimate government" What does a legitimate government look like in a land that hasn't seen one since the early 1970's? And don't describe it from an American point of view, describe it from an Afghan point of view.

"Adequate security forces" - What's the definition of adequate? The entire country, plus the FATA is ungoverned. Karzai's span of control is measured in kilometers.

"an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production" - please identify legitimate options in a country with 85% illiteracy, few natural resources and literally no infrastructure. And then identify the length and costs of rehabilitating and educating the Afghan people and then implementing the plan.

"Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors" - see above. How long, how much will it cost, and what is the definition of stability? Three armored corps with T72's, BMP-2's and 2S3's? An Air Force with more than three help pilots and a maintenance system that can sustain jet engines?

Time and money are political issues, and will drive the endstate and the strategy.

If we had unlimited time and money, you could really attack the issues of why Afghanistan is a mess. They would be:
1. reducing illiteracy and widening education. a 30 year process at minimum
2. with that, you can start limited infrastucture improvements, and then as more educated Afghans come into the workforce, start to teach them how to build and maintain infrastructure
3. With a more educated populace, Imam Hussain at the mosque can be countered and defeated within the propaganda and IO realm.
4. At home, any talk of quick or decisive action would be squelched. The loss of credibility from the political level to the individual voter level can almost never be rebuilt (see, no new taxes, mission accomplished, what is the definition of "is")

The political endstate is unacheviable because there is no short term relief for Afghanistan. With the amount of money and patience required, we can make it state #51 because that's about the only way it's going to happen.




Entropy

.

and if in fact AQ is the center piece of describing those conditions, then I think the following is broad enough to allow individual initiative and account for changing conditions, as well as guide priorities/logical lines of operation...

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either"

The dead horse is now butchered, fried and served hot....
Hence we shall whip it again tomorrow

[Bill Moore]

Quotes are by Hacksaw

You propose these vague ideas as viable endstates that are supposed to give clarity to the military?


- A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

The military doesn't achieve this, at best they can contribute to it (and they can distract from it). If legitimate only means recognized by the locals, then we may not like what that looks like. I think this one is pretty lame.


- Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

You specified a capability, but the capability without the political will and finances to use it means nothing.


- an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Why? What does this have to do with the war on terrorism? Yea, you can make loose ties, but is this a military end state for the war on terror?


- Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

What does this mean? If that was an endstate given to me that could be interpreted a lot of ways, and once stable will it stay that way once we leave?

The problem is you defined several strategic level nice to have objectives that have little to do with the original purpose for going to war. Most of proposed endstates bullets are political and economic in nature, not military.

Of course there is no endstate to political and economic evolution, so that isn't realistic. We mold and remold our government and economic policies continuously to adapt to a changing world, as do other governments. Getting back to Afghanistan, the military can be used to help set conditions that allow other elements our national power, and most importantly host nation elements of national power, to implement their policies. One of those conditions is the defeat of the Taliban, yet that isn't even mentioned in your strategic endstate? Defeat can take many forms from physical, to mobilizing the population against them to political reconciliation. Presumably the military is there is to address a security problem, yet only one of your proposed bullets even addressed the military. What you addressed should perhaps be include in the Ambassador's goals for the country, what he or she wants to help the Afghani government with. They are endstates for the military, and they are not helpful to us.


An end state provides the word picture for the commander's intent... It gives ultimate purpose and direction to all activity -- or should. If we are unable or unwilling to pose an end state for fear that we will need to adjust that end state should conditions change, than shame on us and everyone who put someone in harm's way. Stealing a phrase from another recent thread -- Fuzzy or Fraud, I go with Fraud!!!

I thought this at one time, it was part of the Vietnam syndrome, yet in hindsight it has very little to do with reality. I can't think of too many historical examples where an endstate contributed too much at the strategic level of war, and that is what we're talking about here. Policies may be enduring, but an endstate assumes that reality freezes in time, which of course is false. Conditions change every day, the entire nature of the war can change, along with our strategic interests (China's intervention into the Korean War). Using endstates may be a point of weakness in our doctrine we need to reassess. It is nothing more than an attempt to find a clean break away point in a not so clean world. In some limited situations it applies, but in very few.


Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????

It doesn't have to end. The Brits fought in Northern Ireland for how long? How long has the Italian police been battling the mafia? In irregular warfare you are not focused on defeating a state, so the picture remains blurry. Look at it like crime, can a police force in any town say they reached their endstate? All crime has ceased, we're all going home to become farmers now?

The military stays as long as necessary to enable policy, and elected officials will tell us when we're done (it isn't an ideal way to wage a war, but it is our way), and it may have more to do with politics on the homefront than it does in the location we're fighting (Vietnam, Somalia). Instead of endstates we can develop militarily achievable phases and objectives in support of policy objectives, but an endstate will remain a moving target. Is it still useful? Perhaps, but only as long as we don't take it too seriously. I think we're getting back to one of our major strategic planning shortfalls and that is the inability to "effectively" integrate the interagency. Although we're better (much better) than we were in recent years past, can State effectively clarify what conditions they need the military to establish to facilitate the pursuit of a particular policy? It tends to work at the local level when you have the right personalties in place, but I haven't seen any doctrine that enables the interagency (Treasury, State, Intelligence Community, Defense) to do this. Most of it is none via a hand shake downrange.


If the arguement is we started without an idea of how it ends in either IZ or AFG - agreed. If we think we ought to continue to muddle along until an idea of how it ends emerges - you be on the wrong side of that discussion

Are we muddling? We (the military) are if we're focused on drugs, economics, etc. unless that ties in directly with defeating our foes and securing the populace. I'm tired, so I'll clean this response up this weekend, but contrary to your allegation, opposing endstates is counter to popular opinion, so I don't think it is group think. So I wanted to counter punch before I went to bed, I'm not scared of your 2X4. :)

What seems to be missing from your proposed strategic endstates are two things. First the defeat (broadly defined) of the enemy, and second the translation from strategic to viable operational level military objectives.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf - What kind of mumbo-jumbo is that?!?!?! Come on! You're the person always asking "so what?"

What Hacksaw is articulating is the need for a Commander's Intent for Afghanistan - something to focus all operations against. He is asking what that should look like?


Which Commander are you asking about? There seems to be an assumption that the Afghan people (many and diverse) the Afghan Government, and US administration ( about to change) are all in agreement. Regardless this leaves the actual military commanders with a job to do.

"What is OUR strategic End State In Afghanistan" - so let's assume US Govt.

My point is that I do not know what a good "strategic end state for US is." Even if I did, I doubt it is very realistic, right now. I doubt Barak Obama agrees with John McCain or Hamid Karzai. So what to do?

HOWEVER, if you conduct operations to ensure that Afghan civilians are not suffering or being killed/starved and are generally safe,(conduct an activity) then you should be helping the creation of a better outcome (objective).
Will it lead to the defeat of the Taliban? I don't know.
Will it make Afghanisatn a functioing democracy? I doubt it.
Will it wipe out the drugs trade? Probably not.

Making the population safe is an activity, not an end state, because if you stop doing it, the end state goes away. To assume you can predict the end state, or that your actions create it, is like saving a child from a fire in the belief that he will someday cure cancer.

[wm]

The key to any strategy or endstate, in my opinion, is that it has to be feasible.

I don't think the following are feasible:

"A legitimate government" What does a legitimate government look like in a land that hasn't seen one since the early 1970's? And don't describe it from an American point of view, describe it from an Afghan point of view.

"Adequate security forces" - What's the definition of adequate? The entire country, plus the FATA is ungoverned. Karzai's span of control is measured in kilometers.

"an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production" - please identify legitimate options in a country with 85% illiteracy, few natural resources and literally no infrastructure. And then identify the length and costs of rehabilitating and educating the Afghan people and then implementing the plan.

"Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors" - see above. How long, how much will it cost, and what is the definition of stability? Three armored corps with T72's, BMP-2's and 2S3's? An Air Force with more than three help pilots and a maintenance system that can sustain jet engines?

Time and money are political issues, and will drive the endstate and the strategy.

If we had unlimited time and money, you could really attack the issues of why Afghanistan is a mess.

In post 7 of this thread, I thought I raised the issue of feasibility for the points Hacksaw posted. (Please remember he acknowledged he was only the messenger--not his vision of an endstate.) Looks like Ski has pretty much the same concerns.

However, the culmination of Ski's quotation brings up a very different point--whether Afghanistan is a "mess." That answer depends very much on one's frame of reference.

America has this habit of showing up in various places around the world and trying to force its values and way of life on other folks. Is it any wonder that those other folks don't like us? One great piece of instruction I received growing up was that the worst kind of advice was unasked for advice. Is that not what America is giving out in places across the globe?

An appropriate end state for American/NATO intervention in Afghanistan?
Provide an environment that allows the natives of the region constrained by the country's current borders to exercise self-determination.

This solution does address the real problem, however: that the folks who may want self-determination are not constrained by those borders. Just like the Kurds, they live in a region that overlaps several countries.

A second problem lies with deciding how to define the groups that may be self-determining. Should the "bright line" be drawn based on clan, tribe, principle language spoken, religious sect (e.g Shi'a vs Sunni), higher-level religion( e.g. Islam vs Jainism), number of spouses one thinks it is appropriate to have, form of acceptable legal code, etc ad nauseum.

"Golly Mr. Wizard, that sure is hard problem. Think science can solve it for us?" (Channeling for Jimmy the neighbor kid)

[Hacksaw]

Ken/Bill, not sure how I gave the impression that the proposed end state conditions were military only. Clearly, military forces can not achieve all those or any of those by itself. I suppose I assumed (we all know what assumptions make of 'u' and 'me') since we were addressing "Strategic End State" that we were talking a more holistic perspective. However, that doesn't mean that contributing to the realiziation of those conditions aren't at least partially (or primarily) a function of military activity. I would hardly call the use of an end state (a description of conditions that achieve commander's vision) to achieve some degree of unity of purpose/action as dogmatic. Rather, I'd call it a useful principle of organizing the activity of a disparate group actors towards any common goal - military, whole of government, commercial - don't care. Without something similar we are left with a series of "locally" optimized activities that may very well work to counter purposes of the larger aim.

Ski/Bill,
Granted the conditions I described as being offered are rather broad and may lack some specificity, of course that's the nature of defining conditions for multiple agencies and nations...

- A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens... Doesn't the caveat as recognized by its citizens imply that we are talking about from an Afghan perspective. I suppose we would have to ask them that question -- I suppose it means using their mechanisms (such as Loya Jirga) to elect officials and respect how central government relates to regions...

- Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities... Ski, adequate is defined as function of capability and and intent to... preclude ungoverned areas that host terrorist staging activities (that's pretty explicit). Bill, for our purposes here adequate is a function of force size, enabling capability, funding and will. This is a discussion board, not the CENTCOM plans shop -- I usually don't get too specific for brevity sake.

- An economic system not reliant upon narcotic production... Ski, that fact that this is a long-term challenge doesn't make it unachievable, but if you don't do this than none of the other conditions are possible. There is an observable trend that highlights a nexus between crime, corruption, and violence (South America, Mexico, Russia, Iraq...) all of which create the conditions fertile for terrorist exploitation. This is tough not undoable, and if you ask whether its necessary - my retort is 9/11...

- Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors... Ski & Bill, again perhaps a shortcoming of discussion board brevity, but let me clarify. They ought to be able to reasonably prevent their neighbors from conducting unwanted and excessive cross-boarder shenanigans/influence. How long, the training wheels come off when we think they are ready to??? Function of political will, yeah - say the same for our southern border.

Bill, this is where you really lose me...
(about endstates)
"I thought this at one time, it was part of the Vietnam syndrome, yet in hindsight it has very little to do with reality. I can't think of too many historical examples where an endstate contributed too much at the strategic level of war, and that is what we're talking about here." -- WWII comes to mind - unconditional surrender (seems that ways and means shifted wildly as conditions changed but ends were fairly fixed)

"Policies may be enduring, but an endstate assumes that reality freezes in time, which of course is false. Conditions change every day, the entire nature of the war can change, along with our strategic interests (China's intervention into the Korean War). -- End state assumes nothing of the sort, an end state describes conditions that achieve intent, intents invariably change (see OIF) causing a shift in described conditions -- how does this invalidate the principle of using end state to achieve unity of effort??

"Using endstates may be a point of weakness in our doctrine we need to reassess. It is nothing more than an attempt to find a clean break away point in a not so clean world. In some limited situations it applies, but in very few." I would argue it is you who has self-limited. In Army terms, endstate is a part of the concept of operations -- these change regularly, but you have added the quality of being fixed in time and unchanging. I would hope it endures beyond the first branch in the plan, but the weakness you ascribe is one you've appended yourself.

Tom & Ken (The Ad Hominem sic) Beat Officers: This was an honest attempt to stay out of that minefield, my apologies if I tiptoed along the edges.

I will now do something totally unfair -- I will excuse myself from this discussion regardless of the backlash... We will have to agree to disagree.

Live well and row

[Ken White]

Ken/Bill, not sure how I gave the impression that the proposed end state conditions were military only.You didn't, you were specifric in saying it was the gamut from Super CinC to Bn level. If I read Bill right, he agrees with me that while that is desirable, you cannot constrain the national effort to that extent; too many political considerations domestic and international get in the way. IOW, militarily highly desirable, politically generally not possible -- and thus the military has to adapt; civilian control and all that...
...I would hardly call the use of an end state (a description of conditions that achieve commander's vision) to achieve some degree of unity of purpose/action as dogmatic.I wouldn't either. I would suggest that it approaches the dogmatic to insist on the desired military clarity of effort in the face of historically demonstrated political fallibility and even efforts to avoid just such clarity. Yet again, Korea and Viet Nam are examples of political expedience overruling military considerations.
Rather, I'd call it a useful principle of organizing the activity of a disparate group actors towards any common goal - military, whole of government, commercial - don't care. Without something similar we are left with a series of "locally" optimized activities that may very well work to counter purposes of the larger aim.Agree -- but what is desirable is not always achievable. a number of US Army GOs over a great many years have been forced to operate at less than optimum level in this regard. For example:
(about endstates) ... WWII comes to mind - unconditional surrender (seems that ways and means shifted wildly as conditions changed but ends were fairly fixed)Other than minor incursions by us since WW II, can you name another US military effort where the end state was known, stated and reached?
...In Army terms, endstate is a part of the concept of operations -- these change regularly, but you have added the quality of being fixed in time and unchanging. I would hope it endures beyond the first branch in the plan, but the weakness you ascribe is one you've appended yourself.I agree -- in Army terms. The problem is that Afghanistan (a great deal more so than is true in Iraq; it's a totally different ball game in almost all respects) is far more than an Army problem, it's even more than a US national problem.
Tom & Ken (The Ad Hominem sic) Beat Officers: This was an honest attempt to stay out of that minefield, my apologies if I tiptoed along the edges.Didn't even come close IMO; you have some excellent points and contributed to what I thought and think was a valid and worthwhile discussion, however:
I will now do something totally unfair -- I will excuse myself from this discussion regardless of the backlash... We will have to agree to disagree.If you must, you must and we can do that hopefully without being disagreeable... ;)

[slapout9]

Link to Colonel Warden's Blog on how to develop possible Endstates (options) for Afghanistan.


http://strategydevelopment.net/wordpress/

[Ken White]

"This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation."I can sort of agree with that.

I do have two questions though. :confused:

How do we get to the point where there is an effective Afghan government able to make and enforce such a guarantee?

What strategic targets exist within the nation that will serve even slightly as levers to sway most Afghans?

[Rob Thornton]

Good thread. I had to go back and re-read it to see the ground the discussion has covered.


In terms of a strategic endstate - I think it should be about getting something to the point where it supports your interests with an acceptable sustained effort and does not jeopordize other policy objecitves. Now the ends, ways and means available will frame how you go about getting to that point - particualrly when you consider them against the other objectives you are trying to achieve elsewhere (at home or abroad). You can attempt to go outside of them, but there are consequences.That is a big box, I think we want to keep it that way.


With respect to Afghanistan, there seems to be three motivations at work:

First, when there is no longer a direct threat like 9/11 that we are concerned about that either currently resides there or is likely to originate from Afghanistan or some area that we can affect by being there, the nature of our foreign policy goals there is likely to change.

Second, since our involvement there other things have happened that we now consider relevant to our broader objectives. They may have happened anyway, we will never know for sure. But, other interests outside of a direct threat to the United States homeland now seem to be related to how things turn out in Afghanistan, and the areas we associate with it.

Third, there is the issue of what we accomplish or don't accomplish in that area, and what it means in terms of influence outside of the immediate region.

I consider what Hacksaw originally posted is what we find acceptable in terms of those things we believe are required to be accomplished in order to get to a strategic endstate we can live with. They are things you can operationalize if you have the means to do so. It does not guarentee you will acieve them because there are conditions that must be addressed, but you can begin to lay them out and create a theory that allows you to consider the environment, and what is feasible. It also does not guarentee the outcome and as such policies must be created which help sustain your interests.

Best, Rob

[Entropy]

How do we get to the point where there is an effective Afghan government able to make and enforce such a guarantee?

What strategic targets exist within the nation that will serve even slightly as levers to sway most Afghans?

Increasingly, my sense is that the first may be unattainable. Just look next door at Pakistan - with a big Army, nukes and still unable to control large portions of its own territory). How can we expect Afghanistan to achieve what Pakistan cannot?

As to your second question, there are not many such "strategic targets" since Afghanistan remains a tribal society. There are probably "micro-strategic" targets among the various groups, but Afghanistan as a whole? Hard to identify any at this point.