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Jedburgh
09-16-2008, 02:35 AM
USIP, Sep 08: Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr212.pdf)

Summary

- Afghanistan is at a crucial stage of transition. The Taliban, with sanctuaries and a support base in the tribal areas, has grown stronger, relying on a wide network of foreign fighters and Pakistani extremists who operate freely across the Afghan-Pakistani border.

- Present trends raise serious doubts about whether military solutions alone can defeat the insurgency and stem the expansion of terrorism. In short, reconciliation must also be a key element of comprehensive stabilization in Afghanistan.

- A multitude of factors suggest that the time is ripe for a reconciliatory process.

- The Taliban and the Hekmatyar Group will be key challenges to any reconciliation process as long as they enjoy sanctuaries and support outside of Afghanistan.

- An examination of past attempts at reconciliation with the Taliban reveals that the process has lacked consistency. The Afghan government and its international partners have offered conflicting messages, and there has been no consensual policy framework through which to pursue reconciliation in a cohesive manner.

- The goal of reconciliation in Afghanistan must be to achieve peace and long-term stability under the Afghan Constitution with full respect for the rule of law, social justice, and human rights. To successfully meet this goal, Afghanistan’s reconciliation program must be carefully targeted and guided by a clear set of principles.

- A comprehensive and coordinated political reconciliation process must be started. At the same time, significant progress must be made on the security front and on the international (regional) front. Without security and stability or cooperation from Afghanistan’s neighbors, reconciliation will not occur.

Featherock
09-16-2008, 07:20 PM
Thanks for the link. I don't think any plans to 'win' in Afghanistan can afford not to include robust reconciliation efforts, including allowing Taliban/ACM fighters to come in from the cold without reprisal (assuming they haven't committed any crimes against humanity).

Danny
09-18-2008, 09:14 PM
You would reconcile with the same ones who gave sanctuary to AQ prior to 9/11. And if we did this the point of Operation During Freedom would have been ... exactly ... what?

Compounding this is the emergence of the TTP in Pakistan, led by Baitullah Mehsud, who have clearly said that they are globalists, and you have an even bigger problem than before 9/11.

Reconciliation with this band of criminals is going to accomplish exactly what?

Rex Brynen
09-18-2008, 10:40 PM
Reconciliation with this band of criminals is going to accomplish exactly what?

One might have said the same thing about the Provisional IRA and the Good Friday Agreement, or for that matter those ex-Baathists and sundry other Sunni ex-insurgents currently now receiving USG support as part of the al-Anbar (etc) Awakening in Iraq.

There are Taliban, and there are Taliban. A key aspect of coalition and GoA COIN efforts should be to try to peel away the soft-liners and those motivated by a complex web of local, tribal, economic, and other pragmatic considerations from the hardline radical Islamist ideologues.

Danny
09-18-2008, 11:57 PM
No, one may not say the same thing about the Sunnis in Anbar, for instance. They fought AQ, the Taliban gave AQ safe haven. The Sunnis fought primarily for reasons other than religious, the Taliban, and in particular the TTP, fight for reasons purely religious. The Anbar awakening occurred alongside or after the most powerful tribes had already turned on AQ, and the Taliban have yet to express any disdain at all for AQ. To the contrary. They have called them brothers.

The analogy breaks down quickly, and so my question stands.

Rex Brynen
09-19-2008, 12:19 AM
The analogy breaks down quickly, and so my question stands.

Not quite so quickly--certainly a significant number of those who are now part of the Sons of Iraq were active in the earlier Sunni insurgency and in attacks against US personnel, and a portion were members of the various Islamic State of Iraq militias that were formal allies of AQI.

Moreover, many members of the current Afghan government, parliament, and local government administration were members of the Taliban or Taliban governmental administration at the time of 9/11.

I'm not suggesting that reconciliation with Mullah Omar is possible. I am suggesting that a significant portion of the neo-Taliban rank-and-file may not be primarily motivated by the grand ideological cause of armed jihad against the West, and can be potentially neutralized with some adroit politics. Indeed, one of the problems with the DDR and especially DIAG programmes in Afghanistan appears to be that this group has been rather poorly targeted.

Danny
09-19-2008, 02:04 AM
Well, the alliances in Anbar were ad hoc arrangements involving every rogue element across the planet, including AQ, AAS, former Ba'athists, unemployed teenagers, etc. It wasn't an alliance of belief. My own son killed Somalians, Chechens, "men with slanted eyes," and others.

The alliance between the Taliban and AQ is one of world view. The proof is that AQ found safe haven inside Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The ad hoc arrangement in Anbar was forced and quickly broke down.

I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

Rex Brynen
09-19-2008, 02:16 AM
I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

I hope you had fun with that, but it really doesn't pertain to the issue at hand. What is being suggested is that some of the Taliban's support can be peeled away.

It is hardly unusual to find former Taliban having switched sides (http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079359.html)—it happens literally every day, albeit often for murky reasons (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3174835.ece).

But that's COIN. Lots of murk.

Danny
09-19-2008, 02:25 AM
A sense of humor, my friend. A sense of humor.

I can't believe that you cited Salaam. It is exactly the wrong example and proves my point.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/01/14/our-deal-with-mullah-abdul-salaam/

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/07/20/the-example-of-musa-qala/

120mm
09-19-2008, 12:45 PM
So, is the the answer to kill everyone?;)

In the end, successful insurgency involves sitting down at a table whose guts you hate and you need to include them in the "solution".

I think that there are very few structural (I get to use a new word, yay!!!) insurgents/revolutionaries, that actually need to be made room temperature.

If Galula and others are correct, we should be able to separate the rebels with a cause from the hard-cases and then kill, isolate or make them irrelevant.

Entropy
09-19-2008, 01:09 PM
The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.

Danny
09-20-2008, 03:57 AM
Of course the solution is not killing everyone. Most Afghans are not fighting. The estimation is that there are 8000 - 20000 fighters in the South and East. We might be able to peel away a small percentage of them, but most of these fighters fight for reasons religious and world view, versus the largely indigenous insurgency in Anbar. When you think of Afghanistan, forget the Anbar awakening. It won't happen.

And even the ones that we peel away won't turn their guns on the hard core Taliban and AQ. Won't happen. Simply won't. I'll eat my hat if it does.

Jedburgh
09-20-2008, 01:37 PM
The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.
Earlier thread on Pulling Taliban Leaders into Government? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1292).

Ron Humphrey
09-20-2008, 06:20 PM
If the overall guidance is to convert or coopt whomever you can without regard to their historic practices, than not sure I agree.

If however we're talking about using those you have found those within the larger society who's opinions you can trust, then use them to determine which leaders were Tali just because the Taliban were in control and thus When the Roman's are here be Roman; Thats where I think you find the good side switches that could last.

If someone learns to play the system they are in well enough to be able to protect themselves and the interests of those who depend on them I'm not sure that's such a bad thing. Means their Adaptable. Key would seem to be figuring out how to know which is which.

Bill Moore
09-21-2008, 12:48 AM
Help me out here, we went into Afghanistan to kill those who perpretrated 9/11 and numerous other acts of war against the West and even their own people.

In the process of doing so we accidentlly acquired care taker status of a nation-state was that was a non-functioning nation in most respects. We quickly established a central government of meager means to exert control over its domain, and since then we have with some success expanded the central government's capability to exert it authority throughout Afghanistan (obviously a long ways from mission success). You can argue our mission to kill those who attacked us on 9/11 has been derailed to a large extent by the efforts to build a nation, but we won't go down that path, if the stated strategy is to build an effective nation are we on the right track?

If your you're stated goal is to empower the government of Afghanistan to reject deny terrorists safehaven (along with numerous other objectives related to economics, security, etc.), the clear intent then is to empower the central government to do this.

As stated by others, the concern about the Sons of Iraq, is that organizations are being empowered by the coalition, not the government, and these organizations in some cases challenge State authority. This is a bottom up approach, which is counter productive to a top down approach (working through the HN central government, regardless of how flaky it may be).

While all COIN is local (to a point), we should empower the government to empower these local organizations to defend and govern themselves. With this approach these local entities become an extension of government power, which is what our objective is, unless we're supporting the insurgents.

If the government of Afghanistan is reaching out and faciitating reconciliation more power to them, but if it is the coalition I think we need to take a step back and reassess.

tulanealum
09-30-2008, 05:31 PM
One of the key factors in any successful COIN op is to attract defectors and surrenders. This isn't happening in Afghanistan...no incentives are being created...and the truth is the bad guys don't necessarily think they are losing...once they begin to think that, some may want to jump ship...it's the Afghan way.

But to say the majority or to imply that the majority of the TB are religious ideologues is inaccurate...some are just fighting because of tribal isssues, some for a job...some because they don't understand what the situation is...mark my words, there will be no success in Afghanistan without defections, surrenders, and some kind of reconciliation...

h2harris
10-01-2008, 04:10 PM
"September 30, 2008
Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said today he has asked the king of Saudi Arabia to help facilitate peace talks with the Taliban in order to bring an end to the Afghan conflict.

Karzai said there has not yet been any negotiations, only requests for help. But he said that Afghan officials have traveled to both Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan in hopes of ending the conflict.

"For the last two years, I've sent letters to the king of Saudi Arabia, and I've sent messages, and I requested from him as the leader of the Islamic world, for the security and prosperity of Afghanistan and for reconciliation in Afghanistan ... he should help us," Karzai said."

Interesting. For more -

http://www.military.com/news/article/karzai-seeks-peace-talks-with-taliban.html?ESRC=eb.nl

Entropy
10-06-2008, 01:32 PM
Taliban to split itself from Al Qaeda and seek peace?
(http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/index.html)


Taliban leaders are holding Saudi-brokered talks with the Afghan government to end the country's bloody conflict -- and are severing their ties with al Qaeda, sources close to the historic discussions have told CNN.

The militia, which has been intensifying its attacks on the U.S.-led coalition that toppled it from power in 2001 for harboring Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, has been involved four days of talks hosted by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, says the source.

The talks -- the first of their kind aimed at resolving the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan -- mark a significant move by the Saudi leadership to take a direct role in Afghanistan, hosting delegates who have until recently been their enemies.

They also mark a sidestepping of key "war on terror" ally Pakistan, frequently accused of not doing enough to tackle militants sheltering on its territory, which has previously been a conduit for talks between the Saudis and Afghanistan.

According to the source, fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar -- high on the U.S. military's most-wanted list -- was not present, but his representatives were keen to stress the reclusive cleric is no longer allied to al Qaeda.

Details of the Taliban leader's split with al Qaeda have never been made public before, but the new claims confirm what another source with an intimate knowledge of the militia and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the past.

More at the link.

jmm99
10-12-2008, 05:09 AM
Here are two articles from the Telegraph and Financial Times.


Afghan president offers Taliban a role in governing country
President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end.
By Nick Meo in Kabul
Last Updated: 7:03PM BST 11 Oct 2008

The offer was made through his brother Qayoun at a secret meeting in Saudi Arabia of which Britain was aware.

Britain has been encouraging the Kabul government to talk to its Taliban enemies for more than two years and the Americans are thought to be coming round to the idea of a deal which would end the costly war in Afghanistan.

But The Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al-Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal.

Under the Saudi Arabian initiative more than a dozen former senior Taliban figures travelled to the kingdom with the approval of President Hamid Karzai's government. ....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/3179534/Afghan-president-offers-Taliban-a-role-in-governing-country.html


US open to Taliban peace talks
By James Blitz in London
Published: October 10 2008 03:00 | Last updated: October 10 2008 03:00

Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said last night that Washington could "ultimately" contemplate the idea of negotiating with the Taliban to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the Afghan government were to pursue such talks.

In comments that add to the growing sense across Nato that the alliance will never achieve a comprehensive military victory in Afghanistan, Mr Gates said a political settlement with the Taliban was conceivable.

However, he insisted the US would never negotiate with al-Qaeda forces, who are also seeking to destabilise Hamid Karzai's Afghan government.

"There has to be ultimately, and I'll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this," Mr Gates told reporters at a summit of Nato defence ministers in Budapest. "That's ultimately the exit strategy for all of us."

But when listing conditions for reconciliation, he said: "We have to be sure that we're not talking about any al-Qaeda."

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66faed7a-9666-11dd-9dce-000077b07658.html

One wonders how much events - the economic problems - are now driving foreign policy decisions.

Of course, these talks may come to nothing. After looking at the Taliban's history a bit extensively today and tonite, I find it hard to see why anyone would want them in a government. Despiration, I suppose.

Ron Humphrey
10-13-2008, 02:45 PM
how media tend to try to fit anything they hear into their own boxes.

With perhaps the exception of the Brit General whom I have know idea what he was thinking:confused:; most everyone else is simply talking about nothing more than what we already try to do.

Differentiate between the really bad guys and those who simply took on an affiliation in order to survive and/or protect their own. Much like Iraq just because someone belonged to the Bath party did not necessarily mean they were evil, but rather in many cases they had little choice should they want to at least be able to have some say in the lives of their families/Tribes/ etc.

How about we look at the number of Lawyers who belong to an organization because of its status in the legal world, or Holly/Bollywooders who join org's for what it represents status symbol wise, or people who join the HOA so that they can at least try to fight for their right to put a sign in their yard:wry:

Long and short: This ain't rocket science and Its probably about time some stop trying to make it so:(

reed11b
10-14-2008, 03:39 AM
Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? I know closing the border is a no-go since A. the topography is not an ally (mountains) B. The Paki's are not a reliable ally, but isolation seems like it might be more possible. From there efforts to reintegrate the disinfected tribes might make ground. Just a thought, would love feedback.
Reed

tulanealum
10-14-2008, 03:57 PM
Although these talks are welcome, the representatives of the Taliban are fringe guys...

Would the hardcore TB guys really want to talk? Probably not...however, district commanders in some areas may be amenable to such activities...the question is, what will the government have to give up to get the TB to stop fighting? I'm willing to bet more than it would compromise.

And does anyone really believe the TB and AQ will completely part ways?

I don't...

Key thing to remember is that the TB is not monolithic and is also not the only group fighting in Afghanistan.

MikeF
10-14-2008, 04:20 PM
Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? Reed

Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem. I think we'll need a five-pronged strategy:

1. FID/IW w/ Paki brothers
2. COIN in Afghanistan
3. Reconciliation with TB moderates
4. Massive reconstruction/humanitarian assistance to the area
5. Precise DA strikes- kill irreconciliables

Even if this approach was Pol/Mil feasible, the big elephant in the room would still be the drug trade.

Very difficult problem set.

v/r

Mike

reed11b
10-14-2008, 04:50 PM
Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem.

True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.

MikeF
10-14-2008, 04:53 PM
Occupation. As far-fetched as this sounds, it may work. Arguably, IMHO, the two most dangerous places in the world today are the FATA of Pakistan and Afghanistan border and Diyala Province in Iraq.

Again, very difficult problem set, but I thought I'd throw it out there.

v/r

Mike

Ron Humphrey
10-14-2008, 05:00 PM
True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.

Consider that in order for that to happen there would have to be sufficient capability to force all trafic through given checkpoints.
(Probably not possible, but if it were)

By isolating those areas you are isolating their populations from economic interaction with the rest of the markets.

1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country

2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.

3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)

Just a couple of more definitive ramblings

MikeF
10-14-2008, 05:00 PM
True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.

I would suggest that your recommendation is a definite consideration in Iraq, but not Afghanistan (given the current environment).

In Iraq, the "Surge" allowed us to create a secure enough environment that we can isolate diyala province and conduct reconstruction/stabilization ops throughout the rest of the country.

In Afghanistan, IMO, we have not shown the same ability to dominate, control the populace, secure the terrain, etc...IOT isolate problem areas.

v/r

mike

MikeF
10-14-2008, 05:04 PM
1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country

2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.

3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)

Just a couple of more definitive ramblings

Again, it is a very unstructured/wicked problem if you will.

Entropy
10-24-2008, 01:53 PM
An excellent piece on the history of negotiating with the Taliban (http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2008/10/20/a-brief-history-of-negotiating-with-the-taliban.html).


The Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani) pattern of behavior will hopefully be in the mind of any negotiator who finds himself opposite a Taliban representative claiming to deliver on the ground in Afghanistan. Assuming those at the negotiating table can actually make their field commanders comply with the political leaderships' decisions, the Afghan government/coalition would be foolish to offer too much up front.

At the moment there is great speculation about exploratory talks and negotiations, up to and including a comprehensive negotiated settlement. Beyond the issue of the Taliban's history of neglecting to deliver on agreed terms is this question: why would a force on the rise negotiate honestly and seriously with a force that still appears to be on the decline? I don't believe in assigning a rigid pattern of behavior to any social/historical entity and then expecting predictions based on that to be completely accurate. Variables, sometimes unseen, can change. However, the recurring pattern of the Taliban failing to honor agreements should instil wariness in any potential negotiator.

SWJED
11-01-2008, 06:42 AM
To Further Afghan Reconciliation
Fight Harder
by Joseph Collins, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/to-further-afghan-reconciliati/)


It’s official. Everyone from the Pentagon to Saudi Arabia thinks that reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government is a good idea and a step toward settling the conflict in Afghanistan. A few deluded analysts even see dealing with the Taliban as the Afghan equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. One wonders whether war weariness, success with reconciliation in Iraq, and a lack of familiarity with the Afghan context may not be pushing us toward a tactical error or worse, an endless round of talking with an illegitimate adversary that believes it has the upper hand.

Reconciliation in Afghanistan is fraught with complications. For one, there is no Taliban per se. In the south we have Mullah Omar’s “old” Taliban, but in the East, the toughest fighters come from the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, both of which work closely with Al Qaeda. Complicating the issue even more, there is now a multi-branch Pakistani Taliban, some of whom operate in both countries. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban and its friends seem to be well tolerated by Pakistani authorities who are now in conflict with their own Taliban...

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/to-further-afghan-reconciliati/)

davidbfpo
11-01-2008, 12:44 PM
Short, pithy and all too accurate analysis on talking to the Taliban. Encouraging defections from the Taliban, which is a coalition after all, may explain another motive for such talks.

Will the Saudi intermediaries impose their own conditions? Can the Taliban be seperated from AQ, in particular the Saudi in exile Bin Laden?

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
04-14-2009, 07:04 PM
CEIP, Apr 09: Reconciling With the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf)

Negotiating with the Taliban—who are convinced military victory is within sight—is the worst possible approach to stabilizing Afghanistan, and one that would fail. The author warns that U.S. signals of impatience and a desire for an early exit could motivate insurgents to maintain a hard line and outlast the international coalition. Though costly, a long-term commitment to building an effective Afghan state is the only way to achieve victory and defend U.S. national security objectives.

Key Conclusions:

Negotiation with the Taliban is premature and unnecessary.
A lasting peace in Afghanistan and defeat of the Taliban can only come from a political-military victory that diminishes the rewards for continued resistance.
The United States must reaffirm the goal of building a democratic and stable Afghan state.
Although counterterrorism cooperation by Pakistan is desirable for U.S. success in Afghanistan, American goals in Afghanistan can be—and if necessary must be—attained without Islamabad’s assistance.
Portending coalition defeat in the “graveyard of empires” is an inadequate analogy. Neither the British nor Soviet experience mimics the current situation.
President Obama’s recently announced “Af-Pak” strategy is courageous and responsible, but still incomplete.

Surferbeetle
04-14-2009, 07:55 PM
From the Washington Post by Greg Bruno The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html)


The decision to cut ties with AQI was dubbed the "Anbar Awakening" by Iraqi organizers, and has been hailed as a turning point in the U.S.-led war effort. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told lawmakers in Washington the uprising has reduced U.S. casualties, increased security, and even saved U.S. taxpayers money. "The savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence," the general said in April 2008, "far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts." Yet the future of the Awakening -- Sahwa in Arabic -- is a matter of increasing debate in foreign policy circles. Internal disputes within the predominantly Sunni groups have threatened the stability of the revolt, some experts say. Sunni groups have also complained about low pay and a lack of opportunities for employment within Iraq's army and police forces. CFR Senior Fellow Steven Simon writes in Foreign Affairs that while the Sahwa strategy may bring short-term stability to Iraq, the long-term effect could be runaway "tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism."

Wikipedia's entry on Paramilitaries in Colombia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia)


Paramilitary groups, whether of private or public origin, having legal or illegal support, were originally organized during the Cold War proxy wars as small groups, being created as either a preemptive or reactive consequence to the real or perceived growing threat represented by the actions of guerrillas and militant political activists of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Eden
04-15-2009, 01:12 PM
...what exactly do we have to offer?

In most cases where insurgents have been coopted or reconciled, they were enticed by either a share of political power, specific reforms that they had been fighting for, monetary rewards, or safety. I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.

Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?

I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.

Ron Humphrey
04-15-2009, 01:33 PM
Where this got so convoluted from the original intent?

"We should never fear to negotiate, but we should never negotiate from fear"

The Taliban(org) cannot and should not be negotiated with

1_ They have nothing to offer that is acceptable to a populace that seeks representative leadership

2_ They represent all that is oppressive and truly intolerant of self destination

Those who make up their ranks however are people and can be approached through their own self and societal interests.

I find myself completely perplexed by this apparent failure to connect those dots currectly in the public message

Surferbeetle
04-15-2009, 01:59 PM
From wikipedia Stakeholder Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis)


Stakeholder analysis is a term used in project management and business administration to describe a process where all the individuals or groups that are likely to be affected by the activities of a project are identified and then sorted according to how much they can affect the project and how much the project can affect them. This information is used to assess how the interests of those stakeholders should be addressed in the project plan.

marct
04-15-2009, 02:09 PM
Hi Eden,


I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.

We had the same problem with some troublesome colonies the the late 18th century.:cool:


Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?

I have to note an interesting point - why is this entire paragraph couched in terms of "would we"? I recognize the reality of the situation in Afghanistan vise vie the US forces, but you have the little problem of not claiming sovereignty there. This leads, inevitably, back to questioning about the "would we" statements since the only claims to political legitimacy in Afghanistan the US has are on force majeur.


I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.

I really don't think it is so much a case of having a dominant position so much as having political legitimacy. As far as dealing "with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity", I'll go back to those unruly colonists we had to deal with ;). Apparently, they had the gall to say that we (the British imperium) lacked the political legitimacy to engage in nation building and actually took up arms against us :eek:!

Moving out of the Devil's Advocate position...

One thing to keep in mind is that "the Taliban" don't exist as a single, unitary group; it has become a label of convenience for a multiplicity of groups and movements. The second thing to keep in mind is that the situation in Afghanistan is closer to a multi-party civil war with a lot of foreigners added to the mix. In some ways, there are parallels with the Russian civil war of 1917 - 21 and, politically, with the American Revolution and the establishment of the Tetrachy (~300 ce).

The position of negotiating with the Taliban is aimed at ending part of that civil war (i.e. part of the internal, Pashtun civil war), possibly as a prelude to getting some of the foreign fighters under control. Personally, I don't think the Karzai Gov't will be able to do so, but we'll have to wait and see what happens with the elections there.

Surferbeetle
04-15-2009, 02:13 PM
An Afghanistan Country Study from the Illinois Institute of Technology (http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/EthnicityAndTribe.html)


Afghanistan's rugged physical environment serves to isolate residential communities and to create microenvironments. Members of the same ethnic group and tribe who reside in different locations must adapt to their own microenvironment, which may result in different kin based groups within the same tribe and ethnic group using different modes of production.

Ken White
04-15-2009, 04:26 PM
"One thing to keep in mind is that "the Taliban" don't exist as a single, unitary group; it has become a label of convenience for a multiplicity of groups and movements. The second thing to keep in mind is that the situation in Afghanistan is closer to a multi-party civil war with a lot of foreigners added to the mix. In some ways, there are parallels with the Russian civil war of 1917 - 21 and, politically, with the American Revolution and the establishment of the Tetrachy (~300 ce)You're confronted with the harsh fact that any 'agreement' is going to be with only the temporarily and apparently (though not necessarily actually) dominant faction who likely will not be able to control all the other factions. That's just the Taliban.

Then extrapolate that to the corrupt (by our standards, not theirs) government, other Ethnicities, Tribes, Clans plus the Drug producers, smuggling gangs etc. No one is in charge there so with whom, precisely would 'we' make a deal. Far more importantly, who there would honor that deal -- not even considering that a 'deal' in western eyes and a deal in Afghan eyes are two different things -- as also is the concept of agreement between Muslim and non-Muslim not being binding...

Consider also that any deal is going to have the moral difficulties that Ron suggests -- plus there's Marc's original point -- it is NOT our call; it's up to the Afghans.

I'll also note that with regard to Marc's first comment to Eden, the solution was to leave the pesky colonies to quarrel among themselves about religion, the economy, the role of women and anything else that could be dreamed up...

Entropy
04-15-2009, 04:50 PM
Agree with MarcT and Ken.

I would add that several members of the Taliban did switch sides several years ago and are now serving in the Afghan legislature last I checked. So it can be done, but it's very situational.

goesh
04-16-2009, 01:23 PM
Just a citizen's opinion but if I were a senior TB commander, I would have no need to talk with anyone - the only state of flux I would be in is tactical adaptation whereas the Afghan government and NATO remains in tactical and ideological flux, so time is on my side, I have transgenerational assurance that my sons will continue the fight - what sustains me is the terrain and the opium, both are impervious to Western dominance. If you burn the opium, the farmer will fight with me, if you buy the opium, I will rob the farmer. The only thing I fear is development of infrastructure and irrigation that will give villagers viable alternatives worthy of defending against me.

wm
04-16-2009, 02:21 PM
Just a citizen's opinion but if I were a senior TB commander, I would have no need to talk with anyone - the only state of flux I would be in is tactical adaptation whereas the Afghan government and NATO remains in tactical and ideological flux, so time is on my side, I have transgenerational assurance that my sons will continue the fight - what sustains me is the terrain and the opium, both are impervious to Western dominance. If you burn the opium, the farmer will fight with me, if you buy the opium, I will rob the farmer. The only thing I fear is development of infrastructure and irrigation that will give villagers viable alternatives worthy of defending against me.

Goesh,
Are you channeling for Yul Brenner or for the village elder in "The Magnificent Seven"?

goesh
04-16-2009, 04:22 PM
No WM, but I've been trying to send a psychic message to General P and channel Ghengis Khan. When the Shining Path under Guzman in Peru was really doing its thing and its soliders were making too much headway in the small villages, a crew went down there and convinced a village that wanted to be left alone to 'protect' themselves my making their own amulets and tailsmans and putting them on high poles around the perimeter of the village. Guzman was essentially regarded as a powerful shaman by most country folk. I'm getting this vision of dog skulls stuck on black poles, lots of them, up on the mountain passes and trails used by the taliban where they cross over and I'm seeing crude pictures of black dogs painted on the rocks too near the skull poles. there is something about peasants and the extreme rigidity of fundamental beliefs that always allows one crease, one opening for manipulation. When the vision is real clear, I'll 'send it off' to General P.

Jedburgh
08-04-2009, 01:42 PM
The Other Side - Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks’ (http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/200907%20AAN%20Report%20Ruttig%20-%20The%20Other%20Side.PDF)

.....this paper advocates developing multilayered contacts (‘talks’) with different elements of the insurgency in order to differentiate between the motivations, aims and demands of its different components. A build-up of better mutual understanding and possibly some trust with reconcilable elements might be an early side-effect. But a ‘talks’ approach must be embedded in a broader ‘reconciliation’ strategy. A first step would be to differentiate between short term ‘talks’ and long-term reconciliation.

The kind of ‘reconciliation’ pursued up to date has failed because of wrong assumptions. Individual or groups of insurgents were urged to join the existing government. This ignores the fact that the character of the regime itself is one reason for many insurgents to take up arms. It cannot therefore be considered neutral and an arbiter itself. Reconciliation also cannot be approached in an ahistorical way, i.e. with some of those who either had been involved in past crimes (and contributed to the emergence of the Taleban as a ‘purification’ movement) or have later caused the alienation of many of those who have joined the insurgency setting the terms of reconciliation. The same goes for NATO and ISAF and even the UN mission in Afghanistan.

This requires a new, broader strategy on reconciliation and a political consensus about such a strategy, both internally amongst Afghan, amongst – at least – major international actors and, finally, between Afghan and external actors.......

Steve the Planner
11-05-2009, 11:58 PM
(Moderators note copied here from Strategic Intelligence thread, as appropriate).

Went to a Center for American Progress conference today.

Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (corrected), all non-US experts who have been in Afghanistan since before 2001.

Each had a presentation on their field. Most of you have heard some of this: Dorronsorro (secure the cities first, etc..), and Semple's work with the Taliban are pretty well known.

Nathan, an Australian, asked: What's this COIN thing about? I read the manual and it said Clear-Hold-Build, but all you ever do is Clear, Clear, Clear. No administrative purpose or capability. Why are you clearing unless you have civilian capacity to Hold and Build? Where has this strategy ever been applied?

Even Andrew Exum didn't take a stab at answering that.

The big question that all were asked to comment on: What do you think of these people who see one small part of the country, then try to exprapolte what they saw there to a bigger picture about the country? (Obviously, the Hoh question).

They were pretty devastating in explaining just a snippet of what they know about the whole country, and why that kind of speculation is not useful.

Like Exum said, DC is usually full of generalists, and it was a rare opportunity to have three leading specialists in one place.

Certainly worth hearing every word yourself to build or assess strategy.

http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/11/AfghanInsurgency.html/streaming.html

Steve

Woland
11-19-2009, 03:29 PM
I think that what is glossed over in the overall reconciliation debate is that GIRoA must be worth reconciling with. Given that the farcicial elections came part way through a relatively successful year in the south for the Taleban, it's pretty difficult to imagine any commanders whose lives are not in frequent danger giving it so much as a second thought.

Take a random Taleban leader esconced in Quetta. What precisely is his motivation? He never travels into Afghanistan so his life is not under threat that way. So long as he doesn't upset the Pakistanis, or other Talebs with ISI connections, he won't be arested in Quetta either. In addition, there is barely any chance for the drone strikes in Waziristan to be replicated in Quetta. He's as safe as safe can be. Correctly, we speak of the requirement for both carrot and stick in the context of reconciliation, but for a great many key individuals, nor we nor GIRoA can even locate a suitable tree, never mind find a stick.

This is an instance where the reality on the ground is about, at a conservative estimate, 7 or 8 years behind the public debate in London and Washington. OK, if the tide is shown to be turning in GIRoA's favour some individuals may flip, but let's be blunt, GIRoA is in a chronic state and the Quetta led Taleban, for the time being, is doing just fine, thank you.

Bob's World
11-19-2009, 03:45 PM
"Reconciliation" is a two-way street; and certainly should not be seen as the insurgent member of the populace simply dropping his cause and apologizing to the government member of the populace. That solves nothing except possibly keeping a questionable actor in office, and keeping what are likely many legitimate concerns of the larger populace unaddressed.

So reconciliation must be between the populace and the government, and the insurgent really need not be invited. Far better that those legitimate leaders within the populace step forward to sit with governmental leaders at the table to work out true reforms that address legitimate needs and put in place legitimate vehicles for the populace to address such concerns in the future short of rising up in insurgency.

The insurgent will have performed his function, providing the forcing function that got the government to evolve. This does not grant him some fiat of entitlement to a leadership role in either the negotiations or any future government...but it should not automatically preclude him either.

Family squabbles can get ugly, but when they are over you still have to live with each other and get on with life.

Jedburgh
12-01-2009, 01:53 PM
RFE/RL, 26 Nov 09: Ex-Taliban Ambassador Says Work Needed To Bring Taliban To Talks (http://www.rferl.org/content/ExTaliban_Ambassador_Says_Work_Needed_To_Bring_Tal iban_To_Talks/1888437.html)

Although the United Nations never formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as the country's legitimate government, Abdul Hakim Mujahid (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/25-1pdfs/mujahid.pdf) served as a Taliban representative and point of contact for the UN. He also served as the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan -- which was one of just several countries to recognize the Taliban government. Years ago, Mujahid reconciled with the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In an interview with RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan (http://www.azadiradio.org/) correspondent Ahmadullah Takal, Mujahid discusses the possibility of reconciling today's Taliban insurgents through a traditional Afghan Loya Jirga -- a grand assembly of elders.....

Steve the Planner
12-02-2009, 12:29 AM
From Jedburgh's post:

"Mujahid discusses the possibility of reconciling today's Taliban insurgents through a traditional Afghan Loya Jirga -- a grand assembly of elders..... "

Until we hear something on that front, the top will continue to spin.

How do you implement peace, and post-conflict stabilization/reconstruction until the majority parties reach an agreement?

Steve

Jedburgh
01-20-2010, 04:58 PM
CSRC, 19 Jan 09: Negotiating with the Taliban: Towards a Solution for the Afghan Conflict (http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP66.2.pdf)

This paper discusses the debate on reconciliation and negotiations with the Taliban, its future prospects and the role of the United Nations within it. It provides an outline of the current conflict as well as a discussion of the role of the UN and ISAF within it, from both a political and a legal perspective. We argue that the very fact the conflict in its various phases has been going on for so long offers opportunities for reconciliation. The bulk of the paper is inevitably dedicated to analysing the position of the different actors vis-à-vis negotiations. We deal with both pro-Afghan government and anti-government players, as well as with international actors. We review in detail past initiatives aimed towards reconciliation and explain why they did not succeed. In our conclusion we highlight some possible future steps to be taken.

davidbfpo
03-08-2010, 10:07 PM
Hat tip to Zenpundit and from Col. Joseph Collins, in AFJ:
(Last paragraph) Political reconciliation, first with individual fighters and then with the Taliban factions, will be difficult but not impossible. It represents a potential way to end the 32 years of war that have beset this land. It will require great Western political, military and economic efforts during the reconciliation period and close attention to U.S.-Afghan relations in the long-term future. The cooperation of regional partners, especially Pakistan, will be critical. This process is likely to take years, but it carries with it the promise of the first peace in Afghanistan in three decades. It will be risky, but it is a chance we should take.

Link:http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/03/4491210

Rex Brynen
03-23-2010, 11:10 PM
Insurgent Faction Presents Afghan Peace Plan (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/world/asia/24afghan.html?ref=global-home)
By CARLOTTA GALL
New York Times
Published: March 23, 2010


KABUL, Afghanistan — Representatives of a major insurgent faction have presented a formal 15-point peace plan to the Afghan government, the first concrete proposal to end hostilities since President Hamid Karzai said he would make reconciliation a priority after his reelection last year.

The delegation represents fighters loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 60, one of the most brutal of Afghanistan’s former resistance fighters who leads a part of the insurgency against American, NATO and Afghan forces in the north and northeast of the country.

His representatives met Monday with President Karzai and other Afghan officials in the first formal contact between a major insurgent group and the Afghan government after almost two years of backchannel communications, which diplomats say have been sanctioned by the United States.

davidbfpo
03-28-2010, 11:28 AM
A former insurgent in Afghanistan has told how he survived daily battles with British troops and why he decided to join the peace process in what is believed to be the first ever interview given by a member of the Helmand Taliban.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7530164/Taliban-fighters-are-conditioned-to-die-in-battle-claims-former-insurgent.html

Some interesting points made on reconciliation and other subjects, notably the presence of foreign fighters.

davidbfpo
05-30-2010, 08:17 PM
Hat tip to Randy Borum for highlighting a seminar at the USMC University a month ago, which did get a mention:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10266&highlight=emerald

I think we missed some nuggets, although a few did read that post. Notably the comments by the UK retired Major General Lamb, who is with ISAF and advising / leading on approaches to the Taliban, so check Randy's website: http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2010/04/reintegrating-neo-taliban.html

Lamb said:
The bulk of these fighters – young men who ISAF have previously and still occasionally categorize on a broad canvas of an enemy – the Afghans see as sad and upset brothers. Now, you might suggest they’re pretty upset. But that’s how they see them, many of them – sad and upset brothers. The term upset brother captures, rather nicely, the majority of those we need to convince that the cause for which they fight is a poor one by addressing their complaints head on. And understanding and situational awareness is not good enough.

Transcripts are available on this link (Randy's link is broken): http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/Pages/EE%20Symposium.aspx

Bob's World
05-31-2010, 09:14 AM
Just worth considering, is that TB senior leadership can continue, and have to answer to Pakistan; or reconcile and seek their own destiny within GIROA free from their current Pakistan strings.

I suspect the recent roll-up of a large chunk of the Qetta Shura was a message from Pakistan to TB senior leadership that "there is no quitting alllowed..."

We'll see. This is more complex and convaluted than any of us can imagine, and the main players probably don't lay awake at night worrying about what the US national interests are in all of this.

I remain with the position that Mr. Karzai's Peace Jirga (and the likely follow-on events) are our last, best bet for an honorable exit strategy that reasonably supports the interests we see to be at stake.

Dayuhan
05-31-2010, 12:41 PM
I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

Bob's World
06-01-2010, 07:10 AM
I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

Americans see Elections as the key to legitimacy; this Jirga thing is confusing or off the radar all together for "Americans", and not well appreciated for its full potential by many of our senor leaders either, IMO.

But you are right, Karzai may well blow it, he may stack the deck with his cronies, excluding oppositions voices. If he does, it should be a Regis Philbin moment for the US, as in asking "Is that your final answer?"

If he says "yes" then he has released us from any moral obligation to stay.

Dayuhan
06-01-2010, 08:23 AM
Americans see Elections as the key to legitimacy; this Jirga thing is confusing or off the radar all together for "Americans", and not well appreciated for its full potential by many of our senor leaders either, IMO.


Yes, the American electorate sees elections as the measure of legitimacy, but they're not the target. The target is the level of American military and civilian officialdom, and the global commentariat, that is actually engaged with the issue, specifically those who are questioning his legitimacy. At this level there's enough awareness of the jirga system to give it some leverage: an endorsement from the jirga will allow him to respond to any American pressure by claiming that Afghans have confirmed his legitimacy using their own method. In any event he can't hold another election; the jirga is about the only device he has to regain the ground he's lost. It may or may not succeed, but his options are limited.


But you are right, Karzai may well blow it, he may stack the deck with his cronies, excluding oppositions voices. If he does, it should be a Regis Philbin moment for the US, as in asking "Is that your final answer?"

If he says "yes" then he has released us from any moral obligation to stay.

We could argue that the open manipulation of the last election released us from any moral obligation to stay. Unfortunately we're not there out of moral obligation, we're there because we don't want the Taliban to return to power. If we fail to achieve that objective, we have to classify the whole effort as a defeat. I hope Karzai doesn't stuff it, because if he does we're in the scheisse whether we stay or go... but as I said, I'm not optimistic.

Steve the Planner
06-02-2010, 04:11 AM
Reports are that this semi-jirga is crumbling to dust before it even starts. It was just for us anyway.

If Abdullah and the other non-Pashtuns are not adeqautely and appropriatly represented, and the structure, focus and authority is more like a Karzai supporter brain storm session about "key questions" (TBA), then the whole thing is already beneath the level of justifying any credible outcomes. Just a side-show on the continuing path....

Steve the Planner
06-02-2010, 04:15 AM
PS: It is against this backdrop (one meaningless show after another), that folks really need to get focused on the events in the Gulf of Mexico.

Commentators from both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue about needing the troops, resources, and focus on this home-grown problem, the scope and dimension of which is only beginning to unfold.

The foreign wars are going to be more and more pivoted against this disaster.

Dayuhan
06-02-2010, 09:37 AM
Commentators from both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue about needing the troops, resources, and focus on this home-grown problem, the scope and dimension of which is only beginning to unfold.

Certainly the Gulf situation is a major problem, but I don't see how it competes with Afghanistan for resources or focus. The resources required and the individuals and institutions whose focus is needed are very different: the Gulf oil spill is not a military problem and the personnel and equipment in Afghanistan are not of a type that would be of much use in the Gulf.

Steve the Planner
06-02-2010, 12:57 PM
Don't disagree about alignment, but the linkage is being made, and the pretext is inherent.

It is actually quite staggering to hear folks comment about "what the government" either should or is going to need to do when, it reality, the government is no more structured or tasked to provide serious regional relief/reconstruction/environmental clean up, than is the military to, say, build schools in Afghanistan...

Ricks wrote yesterday about the Pentagon beginning to come to terms with economic realities (ie, the end of the blank check), and the President spoke of a new (?) concept of national power grounded in the power of the nation's own stability/prosperity (pre-Gulf, and shifting the signal away from foreign entanglements).

But we keep coming back to problems, like Haiti, where the military is shown to be the only tool available.

Pre-war Iraq's army was, in fact, not that unusual in being the entity responsible for bridge reconstruction and other civil works, following a tradition back to the Legions.

As the clock ticks down in Afghanistan, I will find it interesting to watch how the emerging redefinition of the military's role to the US government evolves.

That it is evolving is inherent in the COIN approach (at least, as COIN is advertised)...segue to COIN for America.

AdamG
06-02-2010, 06:06 PM
Strategy vs. Tactics in Afghanistan
Good counterinsurgency can't make up for the lack of a political plan.

BY ANN MARLOWE
Gen. Stanley McChrystal has embraced Hamid Karzai as part of the Obama administration's startling about-face on the Afghan president. Until recently, the Obama team seemed to understand that Mr. Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner," in the well-chosen words of our ambassador (and former general) Karl Eikenberry. Mr. Karzai's refusal to name cabinet ministers in the wake of the August 2009 election (as required by the constitution) so angered his own parliament that for several days last month they refused to conduct any business, instead sitting silent in protest.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575280340680176022.html?m od=djemEditorialPage_h

Ken White
06-02-2010, 09:03 PM
As the clock ticks down in Afghanistan, I will find it interesting to watch how the emerging redefinition of the military's role to the US government evolves.

That it is evolving is inherent in the COIN approach (at least, as COIN is advertised)...segue to COIN for America.Even dumb cycles repeat...

From way back (LINK) (http://www.usace.army.mil/History/Pages/Brief.aspx) through then (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_Conservation_Corps) 'til this (LINK) (http://www.factcheck.org/askfactcheck/is_obama_planning_a_gestapo-like_civilian_national.html) -- which I suspect is gone from view but not forgotten and which likely will morph in surprising ways...

Bob's World
06-03-2010, 03:37 AM
The military does three things pretty damn well:

1. Deterrence,

2. War fighting,

3. Military Support to Civil Authorities.


The problem currently for the US is that senior leadership over the past several administrations are being extremely slow in recognizing that U.S. Foreign Policy for Globalized Uni/multi-polar world of 2010 needs to look considerably different than U.S. Foreign Policy for a Bi-Polar, pre-globalized world of 1989.

So as the friction grows from a Foregin Policy that is more and more out of touch with reality, equally increasing pressure is placed upon the U.S. Military to "manage" that friction and the by products of the same.

The military, being full of can-do, mission oriented types, is all too willing to move out aggressively to make whatever changes or compromises are required to accomplish this ever changing mission that takes us farther and farther from our core mission sets laid out above. This is doubly true when civilian leadership characterizes the current dramas as a "war." That is like launching a mechanical rabbit out in front of a pack or greyhounds for the military. Sure they know it isn't a real rabbit, they just don't care. Any rabbit is worth the chase!

The latest announcement by Secretary Gates to embrace Population-Centric COIN / Capacity Building across DoD is the ultimate manifestation of this dynamic.

Stop.

It's just time to really stop, take a knee, drink some water, get your map out, re-plot that azimuth, talk to your squad leaders, and think about this for a second.

The problem is not that the world is changing; the problem is that the U.S. is not adapting well to that change. The time is not to continue to manipulate the military like a blind man on a rubic's cube; but to instead call for and execute a top-down, full specrum review and revision of U.S. approach to foreign policy. This should also include all international organizations of which the US is a major component of that were similarly designed to deal with the world emerging out of WWII.

My $.02

Steve the Planner
06-03-2010, 04:03 AM
Ken: Great Citations.

Bob: As a GIS guy, originally trained on real maps, I applaud your reference to hard maps, a stable basis.

Right. Our foreign service is trapped in the 1960's and can't find its way out of the thicket. Until it catches up (probably a generational recycling), and fills with people not trained in old school poli sci, they will stay in the thicket. The days of foreign service as a reporting tool are in the tail light. It needs to be much more robust, savvy and diverse in its engagements and results.

My girls at home are big Hillary boosters, but she was not able to provide inspired leadership for substantive change---just keep ing the organization happy in doing what it always did. Whatever Richard Holbrooke learned from Viet Nam forward has proven to be of little benefit in the present. Won't even mention his "protege..." (got any oil leases you want to cut a back room deal on?)

Absent substantial change, we are sure to accomplish more of the same if we continue to do the same thing over and over.

I have always loved Toynbee.

Dayuhan
06-04-2010, 12:25 AM
Right. Our foreign service is trapped in the 1960's and can't find its way out of the thicket. Until it catches up (probably a generational recycling), and fills with people not trained in old school poli sci, they will stay in the thicket. The days of foreign service as a reporting tool are in the tail light. It needs to be much more robust, savvy and diverse in its engagements and results.


I'd have said trapped in the 1860s. Too much of our Foreign Service seems convinced that the central function of a diplomat is exchanging erudite repartee in a rarefied salon, occasionally taking time out to negotiate a treaty.



The problem currently for the US is that senior leadership over the past several administrations are being extremely slow in recognizing that U.S. Foreign Policy for Globalized Uni/multi-polar world of 2010 needs to look considerably different than U.S. Foreign Policy for a Bi-Polar, pre-globalized world of 1989.


This I'm not so sure of. It might be more accurate, I think, to say that the US has struggled to come up with a viable post-Cold War policy in certain parts of the world, notably Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia west of India.

In much of the world there has been a significant and reasonably effective transition out of the Cold War paradigm.

In Latin America we've taken a big step away from interventionism, and accepted that "left" doesn't have to mean "communist", and that even when it does mean communist or something like it, that's not necessarily a threat. During the Cold War we'd never have accepted a Chavez or a Morales, and would likely have gone back to the Kirkpatrick shuffle: a sponsored coup, followed by support for an oafish dictator threatened by a left-wing insurgency. During the Cold War our relations with even moderate "left" governments such as those we have now in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile would have been very strained at best. All that has changed, I'd have to say for the better.

There's also been effective change in East Asia. Despite vestigial paranoia over "Chicoms" we've managed to engage China as something other than an enemy. We've accepted and dealt with the emergence of several East Asian nations as fully developed states. We deal reasonably productively with ASEAN. We haven't solved the North Korea problem, but we've managed it, and not every problem has an immediate solution.

Relations with Europe and the former Soviet states haven't always been ideal, but they have moved into a post Cold War phase without major transition problems. It's not realistic to expect that relations with everyone will always be smooth - interests diverge and there will always be tension - but there has been peace and in general the tensions have been managed.

Obviously you can't attribute everything that has gone well in the world to an effective US transition out of the Cold War paradigm, just as you can't attribute everything that's gone badly to an ineffective or absent US transition out of the Cold War paradigm. In most of the world, though, we've managed to move past the Cold War without making a complete mess.

Obviously there is a problem, and that problem effectively (though not universally) covers the area from Africa through the Middle East and on to Pakistan and the southern edge of the former Soviet sphere of influence. Again, I think the problem here is not that we're necessarily stuck in a Cold War rut, but that we've struggled to devise effective post-Cold War policies. That's not entirely our fault: it's a complicated area with enormous amounts of tension that have to be worked through, much of which is not a product of any US action or inaction. There's an abundance of complicating factors, including but not limited to oil, Islam, Israel, and a whole raft of colonial and Cold War legacies.

I don't think our problem is being stuck in the Cold War, I think our problem is an inability to devise and execute realistic, achievable post-Cold War policies that are simultaneously consistent with US interests and aspirations and consistent with local interests and aspirations. That failure is disturbing but understandable: it's a thorny problem with no clear answer and an extraordinary range of possible unintended consequences to any proposed action or inaction. We don't have a magic wand that will resolve the area's problems, and neither does anyone else.

Steve the Planner
06-04-2010, 01:40 AM
Dahayun:

At the risk of sounding like a supporter for the Foreign Service, the real problems are structural/organizational. There are some bright and dedicated people in the foreign service, but there is a profound inadequacy of "breadth" of experience and training, and much "making it up as they go."

But the problem, as with the big and never-ending diplomatic review, is the leadership and resource gap extending over the organization from above. How do you successfully take a relatively small group of specialized people trained in a very narrow and constraint organization, then assert their position (without resources and training) into huge and disparate goals?

It's great, for example, that a bunch of senior management should push for responsibility in challenging civ-mil environments, but does no good if the organization, in reality, can't deliver on its end. The hard work of organizational change (to accomplish the bit-off missions) is even further hampered by inter-governmental squabbling for which they have succeeded at little.

The "whole-of-government" thin, for example, is a race horse designed by committee in lieu of an actual Reconstruction/Stabilization Corps which congress would never actually fund for anything more than an unstaffed "coordinative" role. Whether State could ever properly manage such a task or structure (diplomacy AND development), which is the Congressional concern, is really an academic discussion because it was never funded.

In the meantime, the tasks at home are outpacing the willingness to fund ANY further serious commitments overseas, so it will be interesting to watch, but, like KWs' approach of watch what they do, not what they say, that diplomacy, at best, may evolve to marginally different outward appearances, but really isn;t going to change much absent substantial leadership effort. Better to bet that it will rain tomorrow if it is raining today, than to bet that State will become something magically different in any hurry.

Perhaps more effective to attack the training grounds (foreign service education, poli-sci education) and build incremental change, but there is no apparent shift of attitude there now.

Dayuhan
06-04-2010, 03:31 AM
Thought it worth adding that US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the degree to which we've moved beyond Cold War thinking. In the Cold War we'd never have dreamed of holding an election in either place: we'd have cut a deal with some superficially agreeable general or warlord, let them take over (or simply dropped them in the Palace) and proceeded to blindly support them against the inevitable insurgency.

We do things differently now... but the way we do them now hasn't been a resounding success either, a sobering reminder that simply rejecting a policy proven bad is no assurance that the new policy will be better. That's not a reason to stick with ways proven bad, but it suggests that new policies need a careful review with an eye toward real-world constraints.

Some might say that American willingness to engage with authoritarian governments indicates a continued Cold War mentality. I'm not sure that's the case. Authoritarian governments exist, so we deal with them; we've neither the right nor the duty to run about overthrowing or undermining other governments simply because they are autocratic. Our Cold War ways were characterized not by engagement of authoritarian governments, but by promotion and outright creation of authoritarian governments, and by aggressive assistance of authoritarian governments threatened by popular unrest. That trend hasn't been eliminated completely, but it is much less prominent than it once was.


At the risk of sounding like a supporter for the Foreign Service, the real problems are structural/organizational. There are some bright and dedicated people in the foreign service, but there is a profound inadequacy of "breadth" of experience and training, and much "making it up as they go."... Perhaps more effective to attack the training grounds (foreign service education, poli-sci education) and build incremental change, but there is no apparent shift of attitude there now.

Those people exist, but you have to actively seek them out and recruit them. State doesn't; they limit themselves to people in that "traditional diplomat" mold. I don't think there's a need to revise pol sci education, that skill set is still needed. The need is to supplement the people with that skill set by bringing in a wider variety of skill sets to work along with the traditional diplomats.


The "whole-of-government" thin, for example, is a race horse designed by committee in lieu of an actual Reconstruction/Stabilization Corps which congress would never actually fund for anything more than an unstaffed "coordinative" role. Whether State could ever properly manage such a task or structure (diplomacy AND development), which is the Congressional concern, is really an academic discussion because it was never funded.

Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Development are clearly outside State's current capacity, suggetsing that we need to wither massively upgrade and redirect the capacity, establish a new agency, or refrain from taking on those tasks. Ideally, of course, such an agency would be multilateral, but there's little chance of that.

Steve the Planner
06-04-2010, 04:30 AM
Dayahun:

True, the people exist outside the system, but none exist within the self-regenerating system of diplomats hiring diplomats.

In civilian planning, the first thing you learn to do is to understand and interpret the work of many different experts and specialists into any analysis. plan or program.

Core diplomats are not trained to work in multi-specialist environments so they are left to stumble around.

The foreign service is driven by a very rigid annual peer review process that, in so many ways is the core of it's weaknesses. You are not actually going to change anything in the foreign service until those annual peer reviewers understand and appreciate a junior doing something different than what they always did.

Decades ago, the foreign service was a very different thing, and some of those oldsters are some really bright and effective folks who spent their lives (along with their families) deeply embedded in many different communities, but they are they are almost all gone through retirement.

For many different reasons, the current foreign service is primarily drawn from a different well, and creates and perpetuates a very different ethos and culture. Changing that, with them, is the only path to changing the foreign service. There are some breakthrough/breakaway folks, but they don't get to a place to change things.

Dayuhan
06-04-2010, 06:12 AM
An excellent argument for creating a different institution altogether to manage reconstruction and stabilization work, rather than expecting State and the military to do something neither have the training or inclination to do. Not likely to happen, though.

Steve the Planner
06-05-2010, 03:36 AM
Right.

Things America could do, might do, must do.

Building an effective foreign reconstruction corps, to the regrets of many, is not in the must do column, and because of inter-agency competition and turf battles, never rises beyond could or might.

Pol-Mil FSO
06-05-2010, 09:15 AM
Speaking from an insider perspective, the real problem with the Foreign Service is cultural. At the individual level, I would guess that somewhere between 50-75 percent of FSOs are hoping that Iraq and Afghanistan are temporary events that will go away so that State can return to the traditional diplomacy of dealing with nation states and Foreign Ministries. This attitude is reinforced at the organizational level by the fact that the Foreign Service is dominated by the regional bureaus, with the European Affairs Bureau (EUR) being the first among equals. The regional bureaus possess this power because they control assignments to the desirable and career-enhancing overseas postings at Embassies and Consulates.

State has enhanced the incentives for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan service so that there is now a broader range of officers serving in these countries than the early Iraq and Afghanistan mix of inexperienced junior officers and senior officers enticed by the promise of an Ambassadorship. However, I suspect that for many officers it is primarily a ticket punch to enhance promotion prospects and a first-time experience in dealing with pol-mil issues and working in a conflict environment.

State does have an office (S/CRS) that deals with reconstruction and stabilization and that possess probably the only real planning capability in the State Department. Because of bureaucratic turf issues, S/CRS has received only begrudging cooperation from the regional bureaus. S/CRS was blocked from involvement in Iraq, and was only able to get involved in Afghanistan due to an invitation from the military (to be specific - the 82nd Airborne ADC for Support) over the initial opposition of the Embassy in Kabul.

Although it pains me (a little) to admit it, State probably is not capable of taking on the reconstruction and stabilization role. A stand-alone expeditionary corps is the logical solution but as others have noted it will never happen because of interagency turf issues.

Bob's World
06-05-2010, 12:56 PM
We don't need a State Department that:

1. Only works with "States"

2. Does CT

3. Does COIN

4. or does Stabilization and Reconstruction.

We need a Foreign Office that leads the designs and implements foreign policy.

The rest of that stuff largely falls under the same list of things that DoD is chasing as by products of having an outdated approach to foreign policy.

The following list is not an assessment of Afghan Populace Perspective currently of their Government, but in many regards it could be. Enough so, in fact to give one pause:

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.
He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.
He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected, whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.
He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
For protecting them, by a mock Trial from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:
For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
For depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury:
For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences:
For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies
For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:
For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & Perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.
He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.


(The above, is of course, a direct lift from the U.S. Declaration of Independence)

Steve the Planner
06-05-2010, 03:55 PM
Bob: Touche!

Pol-Mil: Right, its a deep cultural issue, and an open policy question as to whether Civ-Mil and R7S are, in fact, anything more than a temporary pick-up game, managed with limited resources on an ad hoc basis for the two assignments.

At one point, I had hopes for the SRCS, but, after reading their year end report, realized they had no possible staffing or funding beyond the ten or so 30 day SRCS "visits" and "planning" exercises. As a planner who has spent plenty of time monitoring Afghanistan, I know enough to know what I don't know. Even using "all my skills and powers," I could not expect to drop in for 30 days and accomplish anything productive, other than just legitimizing and regurgitating the info I picked up from ground folks. Then flying away with no relevant involvement in implementation, feedback/responses, or learning by doing.

We both know that there are some bright and capable folks in the FS, but (1) they need supplementation by other knowledge spheres; and (2) for them to reach beyond the present structure, activities, requires substantive changes in organization, resources, deployment, staffing and leadership/objectives. Not presently on the table.

My professional experience, on the other hand, is in a multi-expertise environment (planning, development) where all specialized parties are routinely engaged and deployed, across a background of defined expertises, to specialized tasks in a much more effective manner than present FS/AID.

Using better practices, in tune with 21st C. professional engagement techniques, and UN-style expert team deployments (not regular UN staffing), even the current FS/AID could accomplish much more than now, but that, too, isn't going to come from below.

Dayuhan
06-06-2010, 03:11 AM
Speaking from an insider perspective, the real problem with the Foreign Service is cultural.... This attitude is reinforced at the organizational level by the fact that the Foreign Service is dominated by the regional bureaus, with the European Affairs Bureau (EUR) being the first among equals.

That's consistent with my observations... and I suspect that the eurocentric culture is going to cause us some problems down the line, not only in matters of stabilization and reconstruction. The rest of the world is becoming ever more significant, Europe is not the center of the universe, and we badly need to develop new peer-to-peer approaches to emerging nations that we once treated as subordinates, threats, or simply as irritations.


Although it pains me (a little) to admit it, State probably is not capable of taking on the reconstruction and stabilization role. A stand-alone expeditionary corps is the logical solution but as others have noted it will never happen because of interagency turf issues.

The ideal would be a multilateral agency, which could tap a wider range of expertise and avoid much of the baggage associated with direct American involvement... but of course that's even less likely to happen.



1. Only works with "States"

2. Does CT

3. Does COIN

4. or does Stabilization and Reconstruction.

We need a Foreign Office that leads the designs and implements foreign policy.


That's what State does. I think they could do it a lot better, but that will require new directions from above and a conscious attempt to change the culture within.

State is at least theoretically equipped and tasked to develop and implement foreign policy. The military and to a lesser extent CIA are equipped and tasked to manage CT and COIN. Nobody is equipped and tasked to manage stabilization and reconstruction, so these tasks are simply ignored, or handed off piecemeal to those who have neither the capacity nor the inclination to perform them.

I quite agree with your assessment of local perceptions of the Karzai government, but what to do about that problem remains a problem. Of course we can dump him and bail, but that almsot certainly means the return of the Taliban and of AQ, which would sacrifice the objective of the entire operation.

This just underscores the difficulty of creating and installing governments in other countries. It's exceedingly difficult, and if the first go doesn't work you can't simply dissolve the government you've created and have another go. If it doesn't work as planned it's easy to end up strapped to a government that cannot stand, but which you cannot allow to fall. Bad place to be.

Bob's World
06-06-2010, 04:28 AM
That's consistent with my observations... and I suspect that the eurocentric culture is going to cause us some problems down the line, not only in matters of stabilization and reconstruction. The rest of the world is becoming ever more significant, Europe is not the center of the universe, and we badly need to develop new peer-to-peer approaches to emerging nations that we once treated as subordinates, threats, or simply as irritations.



The ideal would be a multilateral agency, which could tap a wider range of expertise and avoid much of the baggage associated with direct American involvement... but of course that's even less likely to happen.



That's what State does. I think they could do it a lot better, but that will require new directions from above and a conscious attempt to change the culture within.

State is at least theoretically equipped and tasked to develop and implement foreign policy. The military and to a lesser extent CIA are equipped and tasked to manage CT and COIN. Nobody is equipped and tasked to manage stabilization and reconstruction, so these tasks are simply ignored, or handed off piecemeal to those who have neither the capacity nor the inclination to perform them.

I quite agree with your assessment of local perceptions of the Karzai government, but what to do about that problem remains a problem. Of course we can dump him and bail, but that almsot certainly means the return of the Taliban and of AQ, which would sacrifice the objective of the entire operation.

This just underscores the difficulty of creating and installing governments in other countries. It's exceedingly difficult, and if the first go doesn't work you can't simply dissolve the government you've created and have another go. If it doesn't work as planned it's easy to end up strapped to a government that cannot stand, but which you cannot allow to fall. Bad place to be.

COIN is an effort by a govenment to resolve an insurgency with a hard and fast condition of maintaining the current government in power. When we think we are doing COIN, we too fall into the trap of buying into the condition of maintaining the current government in power. The tactics of "Population-Centric COIN do nothing to alleviate our commitment to that dangerous condition.

FID, on the other hand, creates enough intellectual maneuver room to allow a clearer perspective. When one appreciates that true success in COIN comes from addressing the perceptions of failure on the governments part within critical at risk segments of the populace, the FID actor can be more pragmatic. At the end of the day, the goal of FID is to preserve your national interests in a particular region and ANY government that is willing to work with you on those interests AND is also able to maintain stability among its populace is fine for your ends. This is what my work on Populace-Centric Engagement / Policy is about. It recgonizes our ends are best met by focusing on the needs of the populace, and not the needs of any particular government that happens to be in office.

BLUF: If our current efforts in Afghanistan have somehow morphed to being tied to preserving a particular form of government, or even particular personnel in office, it has become dangerously flawed at a strategic level.

Dayuhan
06-06-2010, 05:31 AM
COIN is an effort by a govenment to resolve an insurgency with a hard and fast condition of maintaining the current government in power. When we think we are doing COIN, we too fall into the trap of buying into the condition of maintaining the current government in power. The tactics of "Population-Centric COIN do nothing to alleviate our commitment to that dangerous condition.

FID, on the other hand, creates enough intellectual maneuver room to allow a clearer perspective. When one appreciates that true success in COIN comes from addressing the perceptions of failure on the governments part within critical at risk segments of the populace, the FID actor can be more pragmatic. At the end of the day, the goal of FID is to preserve your national interests in a particular region and ANY government that is willing to work with you on those interests AND is also able to maintain stability among its populace is fine for your ends. This is what my work on Populace-Centric Engagement / Policy is about. It recgonizes our ends are best met by focusing on the needs of the populace, and not the needs of any particular government that happens to be in office.

I appreciate the distinction and fundamentally agree. What the distinction overlooks in this case is that the government in question is our creation. We designed it, we built it, and we have publicly declared it legitimate. Those realities do bind us to that government to a much greater degree than would be present if we had stepped into a pre-existing conflict to assist a pre-existing government.

In theory, of course we could work with any government that is willing to work with us on our interests and is able to maintain stability among its populace. Realistically, our options are pretty limited. We cannot remove the Karzai government without completely de-legitimizing our involvement in the Afghan political process. If we cease to support the Karzai government and let it fall, it will almost certainly be replaced by a government that is totally unwilling to deal with us on anything.

Back in the Cold War days we'd have dealt with this sort of situation by letting it be known in certain circles that we would be willing to deal with an internal coup carried out by someone willing to work with us. That didn't work out so well for the most part. It will be interesting to see what we come up with this time round. The current policy seems to be to shape the Karzai government into something other than what it is. I'm not at all convinced that we can accomplish that. If we don't, there are a very limited number of options available, and none of them are very appealing.

davidbfpo
06-14-2010, 08:19 PM
His viewpoint, afteryears of experience in country:
The "Peace Jirgah" called by President Karzai convened amidst accusations that the process has being rigged. But rather than dismissing it as another government failure, Carlo Ungaro says it should be seen as an instrument to help reconcile respected and valid Afghan traditions to the country’s aspirations to be part of the modern family of nations.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/carlo-ungaro/is-afghan-jirgah-way-forward

AdamG
06-23-2010, 12:47 PM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37865973/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times


Officers and enlisted soldiers and Marines, typically speaking on the condition of anonymity to protect their jobs, speak of “being handcuffed,” of not being trusted by their bosses and of being asked to battle a canny and vicious insurgency “in a fair fight.”

Some rules meant to enshrine counterinsurgency principles into daily practices, they say, do not merely transfer risks away from civilians. They transfer risks away from the Taliban.

Rex Brynen
06-27-2010, 07:59 PM
C.I.A. Chief Sees Taliban Power-Sharing as Unlikely (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/world/asia/28taliban.html?ref=global-home)
By SCOTT SHANE
New York Times
Published: June 27, 2010


The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, expressed strong skepticism on Sunday about the prospects for an Afghanistan deal being pushed by Pakistan between the Afghan government and elements of the Taliban, saying militants do not yet have a reason to negotiate seriously.

“We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaida, where they would really try to become part of that society,” said Mr. Panetta in an interview on ABC’s news program “This Week.”

Mr. Panetta’s comments came amid reports, not yet confirmed by American officials, that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has met personally with Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network, a faction of the Afghan Taliban considered to be close to Al Qaeda.

Acknowledging that the American-led counterinsurgency effort is facing unexpected difficulty, Mr. Panetta said that the Taliban and its allies at this point have little motive to contemplate a power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan.

“We’ve seen no evidence of that and, very frankly, my view is that with regards to reconciliation, unless they’re convinced that the United States is going to win and that they’re going to be defeated, I think it’s very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that’s going to be meaningful,” he said.

...


Pretty much my view too, regarding the senior Taliban leadership. At the local level the prospects might be a little brighter--although not much more so if there is a sense of momentum being on the Taliban side.

Jedburgh
07-02-2010, 01:59 PM
Century Foundation, 21 Jun 10: Negotiating With the Taliban: Issues and Prospects (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/TCF-Negotiating-with-the-Taliban-Issues-Prospects.pdf)

....This report tries to lay out how the Taliban are structured and organized, with an eye to assessing the impact of their organization and modus operandi on their willingness to negotiate and to reach a political settlement. There is considerable controversy over the way the Taliban function, which is inevitable given the limited information available. The different points of view can be summarized (with some simplification) as follows:

• the Taliban operate as a “franchiser” business, allowing disparate groups of insurgents to display the Taliban brand while retaining complete autonomy on the ground;

• the Taliban are not organized to the same extent as the Marxist movements
that had been the main worry of Western counterinsurgents until the end of the cold war, but nonetheless have a discernible organizational structure (decentralized).

As the reader will realize while going through the paper, this author tends to follow the second line of thinking. One reason for the failure to understand the modus operandi of the Taliban is the lack of in-depth studies of the 1980s jihad in Afghanistan; if such studies had been carried out, understanding the Taliban would be much easier now....

davidbfpo
07-03-2010, 12:57 PM
Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP and ex-UK Army officer, took part in a short radio discussion today on Afghanistan; he has been an advocate of an accommodation with the insurgents since 2008.

Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b00sw3sc (available for a week).

He made two particular comments:
The insurgents are hundreds of local groups united by a hatred of foreign troops and an unwanted corrupt central government....In Helmand 80% of bodies we recover after an engagement have died within twenty miles of where they live. That should tell you who we are really fighting here.

The second belongs better on 'The UK in Afghanistan' thread and will be posted there too:
The big threat (to the UK) is the video pictures on the websites of the global Jihad. Afghanistan is a massive driver of radicalisation across the region and in our northern mill towns.

I asked the head of the Afghan secret service a while back how many hard core AQ operatives were in Afghanistan, he said he didn't know it was less than the number of British citizens of Pakistani origin who were working with the Taliban...

(Commenting himself ) AQ are long gone from Afghanistan...

I know the Taliban this week decried negotiations, my question is how will the presence of non-Afghans fighting alongside the locals influence any accommodation?

Lorraine
08-01-2010, 02:59 AM
The US Senate on Foreign Relations conducted a hearing on reconciliation options in Afghanistan on July 27. Though the testimony was posted on the SWJ blog, it seems to have been drowned out by the WikiLeaks drama.

Video and transcripts are found here (http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=d8605299-5056-a032-5273-667a814db0c8). Though 169 minutes long, the discussion remains thoughtful, intelligent and genuine throughout. (A refreshing change from recent confirmation hearings....) It kept me engaged the entire time. (Note: the video doesn't actually start until 20 minutes in -- so you'll have to manually move the cursor forward.)

The panel included former Ambassador Ryan Crocker, David Kilcullen, and Ms. Zainab Salbi, Founder and CEO, Women for Women International.

Key points shared by the three panelists --
1) Leaving by 2011 is a bad idea. Even talking about leaving is a bad idea
2) Other regional partners besides Pakistan need to part of the long-term solution
3) The US's poor influence in the region reflects our shallow commitment historically...a cycle which seems to be repeating itself again in real time right now.

One big surprise -- Kilcullen announces that the effort in Afghanistan is NOT counterinsurgency...but rather stability ops. First time I've heard that. Could be true story.

Jedburgh
09-22-2010, 03:31 PM
USIP, 21 Sep 10: Navigating Negotiations in Afghanistan (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2052%20Navigating%20Negotiations%20in%20Afghani stan.pdf)

Summary

• There are reasons for skepticism about government-insurgent talks, especially as both sides are known for abusive, unjust and discriminatory policies. However, given the constraints of counterinsurgency, obstacles to an anticipated security transition, and the threat of worsening conflict, the potential for negotiations should be explored.

• Field research indicates that the coalition’s military surge is intensifying the conflict, and compounding enmity and mistrust between the parties. It is therefore reducing the prospects of negotiations, which require confidence-building measures that should be incremental, structured and reciprocal.

• Strategies should be developed to deal with powerful spoilers, on all sides, that may try to disrupt the process. The form of pre-talks, and the effectiveness of mediators and “track two” interlocutors, will be critical.

• Pakistan provides assistance to, and has significant influence over, the Taliban. Talks require Pakistan’s support, but giving its officials excessive influence over the process could trigger opposition within Afghanistan and countermeasures from regional states. The perceived threat from India is driving Pakistan’s geostrategic policies, thus concerted efforts are required to improve Pakistan-India relations.

• Negotiations could lead to a power-sharing agreement, but implementation would be highly challenging, especially due to multifarious factional and other power struggles. An agreement could also involve constitutional or legislative changes that curtail fundamental civil and political rights, especially those of women and girls.

• Genuine reconciliation efforts are required to build better relations between hostile groups. For legitimacy and viability, any settlement must be both inclusive and just: it should therefore seek to reflect the aspirations of all elements of Afghanistan’s diverse society. It should also seek to address underlying causes of the conflict, especially the abuse of power.

Bob's World
09-22-2010, 10:13 PM
If the U.S. had a pair of brass ones it would do the following:

a. Declare an end of calling Afghanistan a war (at least for us).

b. Make Reconciliation and a follow-on constitutional Loya Jirga the prerequisite to a single additional dollar or Euro going to GIROA, or a single additional trooper getting on a plane to head into country.

c. Tell Mr. Karzai straight to his face that we don't care who is in charge of Afghanistan, and that we will work with whoever is.

d. Tell Pakistan that we recognize that their national interests are very different than U.S. national interests and to return their focus to those things they need to do to maintain balance in their Cold War with India.

c. Release NATO from any obligation to send support to Afghanistan beyond what they desire to send; and to cut our own efforts there by some 60% as well; leaving a capacity building capability for security forces; security for a much more focused and narrow development activity; and a small, ruthless CT capability that is missioned to focus on AQ leadership, but also any network nodes that they try to establish there as well.

It's time to stop being scared. It's time to stop being a bully. It's time to stop trying to control outcomes all around the world. We have bigger fish to fry, and they aren't in South Asia.

Dayuhan
09-23-2010, 12:34 AM
If we don't care who runs Afghanistan, why did we go there... and why did we stay? And while it's all well and good to say we'll work with whoever runs it, we have no assurance that whoever runs it will be remotely interested in working with us.

In many ways dumping Karzai and allowing the existing dysfunctional government structure to collapse makes perfect sense, though it begs the question of why we put that structure there in the first place. The question is whether we can do that without surrendering the objectives that led us to go there in the first place.

Bob's World
09-23-2010, 10:23 AM
If we don't care who runs Afghanistan, why did we go there... and why did we stay? And while it's all well and good to say we'll work with whoever runs it, we have no assurance that whoever runs it will be remotely interested in working with us.

In many ways dumping Karzai and allowing the existing dysfunctional government structure to collapse makes perfect sense, though it begs the question of why we put that structure there in the first place. The question is whether we can do that without surrendering the objectives that led us to go there in the first place.

Perhaps it could have worked. Certainly if we would have helped them get a better Constitution it would have had a better chance. The current constitution virtually guarantees insurgency, corruption and the conversion of the government into a virtual dictatorship.

Consider the sole purpose for this huge Afghan Army we are working to build. Is it to deter or defeat foreign state militarize? No, it is primarily to hold back the very citizens of the state from storming the palace. Now, certainly Pakistan and AQ and a handful of others are conducting UW to varying degrees; and many of the Pastu populace that resists Karzai's regime may well be technically Pakistani citizens. That line on the map means little to the affected populace. We give it meanings that just aren't relevant to the affected populace. It is a Western fiction, and we create friction when we enforce such fiction. (The same was true with the line that Western governments drew to form the states of North and South Vietnam. Meant a lot to us Westerners and shaped our understanding of the problem there, but I strongly suspect it did little to change the intent or perspective of an insurgent movement that was hell bent on ousting Western Colonial governance and its local stooges. We just gave them a legal sanctuary to execute it from and gave them access to international diplomatic venues as well).


Good intentions count for a lot; but the road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions. The Afghan Constitution turned the government there into a giant Ponzi scheme. Foreign investment, Drug profits, and the protection of foreign armies are all keeping the facade of normalcy artificially alive. Pull the plug and watch this collapse faster than Bernie Madoff's house of cards. But freeze all of the accounts in the UAE where Karzai and his cohorts have been stashing our cash for years first.

Insurgencies are fought in the countryside, they are won and lost in the Capital. This one was lost when the Constitution was enacted.

Rex Brynen
11-23-2010, 03:35 AM
Well, this is a little embarrassing... :eek:


Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Impostor (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/world/asia/23kabul.html?ref=global-home)
By DEXTER FILKINS and CARLOTTA GALL
Published: November 22, 2010


KABUL, Afghanistan — For months, the secret talks unfolding between Taliban and Afghan leaders to end the war appeared to be showing promise, if only because of the repeated appearance of a certain insurgent leader at one end of the table: Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, one of the most senior commanders in the Taliban movement.

But now, it turns out, Mr. Mansour was apparently not Mr. Mansour at all. In an episode that could have been lifted from a spy novel, United States and Afghan officials now say the Afghan man was an impostor, and high-level discussions conducted with the assistance of NATO appear to have achieved little.

“It’s not him,” said a Western diplomat in Kabul intimately involved in the discussions. “And we gave him a lot of money.”

Cavguy
11-23-2010, 04:25 AM
Well, this is a little embarrassing... :eek:


Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Impostor (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/world/asia/23kabul.html?ref=global-home)
By DEXTER FILKINS and CARLOTTA GALL
Published: November 22, 2010

http://uvtblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/picard-facepalm.jpg

jcustis
11-25-2010, 10:01 PM
Afghans are reportedly known for sending in emissaries who aren't the person but represent that person, in order to flush out the intentions of the other side.

I experienced this once, and wonder if we have the same thing happening here.

slapout9
11-26-2010, 02:22 PM
Washington Post article claiming it was the UK that brought the impostor forward.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/25/AR2010112503577.html

Jedburgh
01-14-2011, 12:20 PM
USIP, 12 Jan 11: Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB74-Afghan_High_Peace_Council_Fails_to_Reflect_Afghan_ Civil_Society.pdf)

Summary

• The Afghan public, along with the international community, appears increasingly supportive of opening negotiations with the Taliban to end the war. The Karzai administration also supports this, as reflected by the June 2010 Peace Jirga held in Kabul and the 70-member High Peace Council that was formed thereafter.

• In spite of the talks, no one in Washington or Kabul has clarified what reconciliation means in practice, particularly with respect to accountability for abuses that occurred during the rule of the Taliban as well as those that occurred when rival factions fought with each other before the Taliban came to power.

• On November 10, 2010 representatives from Afghan and international NGOs, as well as the UN, gathered for a one-day Conference on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice in Kabul to revitalize public discussion on peace and reconciliation among the government of Afghanistan, the international community, and Afghan civil society.

• The discussions revealed a troubling disconnect between the High Peace Council and Afghan civil society representatives who strongly criticized the Council’s inclusion of former militia leaders among its members, the lack of transparency in its activities, and the lack of clarity in its objectives.

• These criticisms indicate that for a peace process to have broad, popular support, the Afghan government and the international community must make greater efforts to engage local leaders in a dialogue and account for the interests of communities and interest groups that are not represented in the High Peace Council.

davidbfpo
01-21-2011, 10:35 PM
Thanks to Canadian pointer. Wilton Park, a UK conference centre, held a meeting a month ago on 'Talking while fighting: conditions and modalities' and has now released a summary and podcasts.

Link:http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/news/?view=News&id=532534382

Introduction:
The conference examined a wide range of internal conflicts, including thematically focused case study sessions on Iraq, Nepal, Nagaland (Northeast India), Tajikistan, Darfur, El Salvador, and Afghanistan during the 1980’s. We concluded with an assessment of the generalised lessons from these case studies that might be of most relevance to Afghanistan.

The podcasts features: Ashok Mehta, Independent Security Analyst and retired lieutenant general, Noida, India; Mukkhidin Kabiri, Chairman, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Dushanbe; Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Mediator-in–Residence, United Nations, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), New York.

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 07:48 PM
As SWC regulars (and irregulars) appreciate I am a big believer in the criticality of reconciliation of the issues of poor governance that are at the heart of causation for the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan. This to be followed up by Constitutional Loya Jirga that is focused on producing a constitution that prevents any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power (create trust) and identify and protect key individual rights, and defining a trusted, certain and legal construct that makes sense to these people for selecting leaders and enacting laws at all levels.

Vocal opponents to such logic stand, proclaim "Why would the Taliban negotiate?!" and sit back down, their argument made and their business complete.

Why indeed. The Taliban are proving to be quite resilient to the Coalition's surge, and according to many reports are actually gaining in strength and influence. Either they will "win" outright; or perhaps, if the West is willing to settle for a "decent interval" to declare success, break contact and return home, they can surge then in their own right a seize power by force. This is all quite logical.

But how long could they hold such power once they surrendered the sanctuary of their non-state status for the vulnerability of a sovereign state? How long would it take the U.S. to go back in and conduct a strategic raid to send them fleeing right back into Pakistan. Days? Perhaps weeks?

It is this misunderstanding of "sanctuary" that drives a fault line of illogic through our entire current approach to this operation. The Taliban can win Afghanistan, but in so doing loses their sanctuary and are quickly defeated. The same is true for AQ and the Caliphate. If AQ ever gained even a single state, they would lose the sanctuary of their status and merely become another weak state and be quickly defeated. THEY understand this, it is the West that for whatever reason fails to grasp this essential point.

So, the entire argument that we must stay and prop up Karzai's regime regardless of how outrageous his behavior or corrupt and "poor" his governance is for fear that the Taliban may return to power and grant AQ the sanctuary of the sovereign Taliban State is specious. They could only do so for those few day or weeks, then they would all be on the run once again back to their caves. The same is true for the argument that we must prop up despotic leaders across the Arab world and help them build capacity to suppress the nationalist insurgencies within thier populaces for fear that AQ will form a Caliphate.

We are like the sheriff in blazing saddles, holding a gun to our own heads:

"[the Johnsons load their guns and point them at Bart. Bart then points his own pistol at his head]
Bart: [low voice] Hold it! Next man makes a move, the nigger gets it!
Olson Johnson: Hold it, men. He's not bluffing.
Dr. Sam Johnson: Listen to him, men. He's just crazy enough to do it!
Bart: [low voice] Drop it! Or I swear I'll blow this nigger's head all over this town!
Bart: [high-pitched voice] Oh, lo'dy, lo'd, he's desp'it! Do what he sayyyy, do what he sayyyy!
[Townspeople drop their guns. Bart jams the gun into his neck and drags himself through the crowd towards the station]
Harriet Johnson: Isn't anybody going to help that poor man?
Dr. Sam Johnson: Hush, Harriet! That's a sure way to get him killed!
Bart: [high-pitched voice] Oooh! He'p me, he'p me! Somebody he'p me! He'p me! He'p me! He'p me!
Bart: [low voice] Shut up!
[Bart places his hand over his own mouth, then drags himself through the door into his office]
Bart: Ooh, baby, you are so talented!
[looks into the camera]
Bart: And they are so *dumb*!"


Only no one's going to help us either, only we aren't so clever as the good sheriff. We're more like the townspeople.

Be firm with Karzai and demand reconciliation and a new constitution to protect the populace from the government. At the same time open talks with the Taliban (realize not a monolith, but no major group will want to get cut out of the final deal) support their re-entry into Afghan political process so long as they turn over key AQ figures and evict the rest, along with the various groups of foreign fighters. Remind them that while we are quite willing to support whatever form of self-determined government comes out of the loya jirga, that if the Taliban try to pull a fast one and return to their old ways we will be back with a vengeance, and not nearly so many will be able to escape the next time. They can gain power without us, but they can only retain it with our blessing once the lose the sanctuary of non-state status.

If Karzai refuses to play ball? Go home. It will be him who abandoned us, not the other way around.

Dayuhan
01-26-2011, 08:56 AM
As SWC regulars (and irregulars) appreciate I am a big believer in the criticality of reconciliation of the issues of poor governance that are at the heart of causation for the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan.

This assumes what has yet to be established. How do we know that "poor governance", rather than the simple desire to reclaim the sole power that they once had, is "at the heart of causation for the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan"? I suspect that if Karzai were an Afghan Thomas Jefferson the Taliban leadership would still want him off the chair, because they want the chair themselves. Of course if Karzai were an Afghan Thomas Jefferson the Taliban leadership would probably not be able to draw enough followers to get the job done, but it wouldn't be for want of trying.


This to be followed up by Constitutional Loya Jirga that is focused on producing a constitution that prevents any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power (create trust) and identify and protect key individual rights, and defining a trusted, certain and legal construct that makes sense to these people for selecting leaders and enacting laws at all levels.

Do you really, truly believe that trust can be created among people who have been killing each other continuously for 2 decades simply by adopting a new Constitution? Do you really, truly believe that a Constitution can "prevent any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power", if the groups in question decide to abandon or ignore it as soon as it is to their advantage to do so? More to the point, do you think the Afghans believe it?

More important, why should we think that a Constitutional Loya Jirga would in fact be "focused on producing a constitution that prevents any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power (create trust) and identify and protect key individual rights, and defining a trusted, certain and legal construct that makes sense to these people for selecting leaders and enacting laws at all levels". Unless we control the process, thus rendering it irrelevant, we cannot expect it to be any such thing. More likely each group involved would be focused on protecting itself and finding an opportunity to stab the others in the back, or in the front if opportunity presents itself. Why should the prevailing political culture vanish simply because we decide that they are going to have a Loya Jirga and we decide that this Loya Jirga is going to produce a Constitution that's going to solve all the problems? Why, based on precedent, should we think that they will decide what we decided they should decide?


But how long could they hold such power once they surrendered the sanctuary of their non-state status for the vulnerability of a sovereign state? How long would it take the U.S. to go back in and conduct a strategic raid to send them fleeing right back into Pakistan. Days? Perhaps weeks?

Are you so sure we'd go back? We didn't go back into Vietnam when the GRVN crumbled. It takes a whole lot of political will to go back into a place where we just had a long, costly, unpopular and unsuccessful war (if we have to go back, then it was by definition unsuccessful). How do we know the Taliban aren't betting that if they force us out we won't come back? How do we know they're not right?

Of course there's some divergence in interests here between AQ and the Taliban: the Taliban want us gone, AQ need to have a foreign aggressor in Muslim lands to justify their existence. A problem, but not insurmountable. If we're forced out of Afghanistan or simply worn out, AQ can always try to bait us into Yemen or Somalia instead of Afghanistan.


The same is true for the argument that we must prop up despotic leaders across the Arab world and help them build capacity to suppress the nationalist insurgencies within thier populaces for fear that AQ will form a Caliphate.

Possibly a bit of a straw man there: who, if anyone, is arguing that position?

Personally, I think that we went wrong on Afghan governance issues the moment we decided to try to govern Afghanistan, or to determine how Afghanistan would be governed. It is simply not within our capacity to bring anything that we would call "good governance" to Afghanistan. Any government we install will end up being, by our standards, bad. The political culture in place assures this. The Afghans may in time evolve something that they can agree on as "good governance", but it's not likely to resemble anything we would call "good governance" and we can't do it for them, or make them do it.

Our task from the start should have been not to embark on a futile quest to bring "good governance" to Afghanistan, but to make absolutely sure that whoever ended up governing Afghanistan badly knew beyond doubt that attacking us or sheltering those who do will bring immediate and horrible consequences. That would have been done more effectively if we'd made our point very vigorously and left, before a prolonged occupation could remind everyone of our limitations and weaknesses.

Entropy
01-26-2011, 10:52 PM
BW,


As SWC regulars (and irregulars) appreciate I am a big believer in the criticality of reconciliation of the issues of poor governance that are at the heart of causation for the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan. This to be followed up by Constitutional Loya Jirga that is focused on producing a constitution that prevents any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power (create trust) and identify and protect key individual rights, and defining a trusted, certain and legal construct that makes sense to these people for selecting leaders and enacting laws at all levels.

You often bring up the US Constitution as a model for bringing about good governance. I agree to a point - however, I (and others) have often tried to point out to you the problem of irreconcilable divisions within a nation or society and this is a point you've pretty much ignored in your responses. So let me illustrate this position by looking at the US and the US Constitution.

While I agree that US Constitution is a great model for governance in the United States we need to remember that it failed, spectacularly, in preventing a civil war. We had a civil war because the Constitution was unable to peacefully reconcile the deep, irreconcilable divisions within this country. Lord knows we tried and the Constitution was instrumental in delaying the day of reckoning by allowing a host of political compromises - however, all of them proved to be temporary and inadequate. All the features of the Constitution that were carefully and specifically crafted to satisfy the diversity of interests in America failed and the consequence was war.

My skepticism of your faith in a Constitutional and "good governance" solution to Afghanistan's many internal problems stems in part from this history in the US. A good Constitution is no guarantee that differences within a political structure can be resolved peacefully. This is especially the case with Afghanistan, whose borders are the unnatural result of colonial ambitions that arbitrarily divided ethnic groups. Consequently, Afghanistan's neighbors and outsiders have plenty of incentive to intervene in Afghanistan's internal affairs which only makes governance more difficult. What, exactly, makes you think that an agreeable construct is presently possible, much less the specific fix you have in mind? Your advocacy seems to be based solely on your theory of governance and insurgency which doesn't account for conditions where good governance is not possible, nor does it account for weak states that are kept weak thanks to constant foreign meddling.

In my estimation, the differences in Afghan society are deep enough to at least give one a measure of skepticism regarding the potential for mutually-agreeable power sharing in a "nation" as dysfunctional and broken as Afghanistan. My skepticism is further deepened by the consideration that these ideas about how Afghans should govern themselves come from foreigners with different cultural traditions and mores who are pursuing their own interests and are likely engaging in cultural mirror-imaging.

On that last point, advice to Afghans should be tempered by an appreciation of the circumstances, culture and history of Afghanistan. I studied Afghanistan both professionally and personally pretty much non-stop for about six years and the one thing I learned from that effort is just how much I still don't know. In other words, studying Afghanistan taught me just enough to scratch the surface and understand the depth of my ignorance - ignorance which was previously hidden to me. For me, the result was that I finally knew enough to put aside all my paternal presumptions about how Afghan's ought to organize their society. It finally put to rest the little remaining sympathy I had for the idea that the US has the power to create democracy and rearrange societies through force of arms. It made me very skeptical that we in the US can determine what is best for them, much less the process required to get them where we think they should be. On this point I am in 110% agreement with Dayuhan, who, legitimately in my view, brings this point up time and again in response to your solutions for fixing other people's governance problems whether that's Tunisia, Saudi or Afghanistan.

So to me the idea that Karzai, the Taliban or whatever faction within Afghanistan can be pressured by an outside power to create some semblance of what we would consider fair and equitable governance is unlikely to succeed. The entire notion that one government can successfully pressure another government to fundamentally alter its governance structure is wishful thinking to me. When has such an effort ever succeeded? Karzai will do what every leader in that position will do and has done in response to similar US pressure.

And Afghanistan is only part of the problem - the governance issues are almost as bad in Pakistan. Are we next to pressure the Pakistanis to hold alter their constitution to address the lack of governance in the tribal and border areas? We can try and they will laugh at our arrogance and then tell us politely to sod off.

In short, we need to quit trying to change the governance structures of other nations and instead deal with them as they are.

Ken White
01-26-2011, 11:20 PM
On this point I am in 110% agreement with Dayuhan, who, legitimately in my view, brings this point up time and again in response to your solutions for fixing other people's governance problems whether that's Tunisia, Saudi or Afghanistan.As have I and Bill Moore for the last couple of tears. There've been others from time to time. You tend to just ignore it. However, it is a recurring point made by several here.
In short, we need to quit trying to change the governance structures of other nations and instead deal with them as they are.True and we need to understand that the US is not and has never been a beacon of truth, liberty and justice regardless of what some would like to believe -- and, far more importantly, that it is not a likely model for most nations. In fact, I submit almost no other nation could make it work -- not that we do all that well... :wry:

Dayuhan
01-27-2011, 12:22 AM
RCJ, with reference to that other thread, can Ken, Bill, and Entropy be on the jury? :D

Bob's World
01-27-2011, 12:28 PM
Dayuhan,

As a prosecutor I was never concerned about having smart, thinking people on the jury (many DAs are), so those three are certainly welcome.

As to Entropy, I would need to bring him up to speed a bit on his understanding of the debate that drove the constitution. Realizing that the jury members trust each other more than they do any of the lawyers (again, juries are smart) I'd ask the jury panel during voir dire (selection - the only time a lawyer gets to have a conversation with the jury) if anyone in the room had ever been divorced. They would look at me funny, and then (because people want to participate) some one would raise their hand and say "yes". From there I would have 3-4 share there experiences, focusing on why they followed this legal process rather than just walking out, killing the spouse, or other illegal options. Then I would get to slavery and the constitution in my closing argument. (SWC jury members feel free to pile on here if you have anything to add)

The Constitution pointedly avoided that issue as it was too divisive. Everyone there understood it was the 800 lb gorilla in the room, but also that it was at that time an unsolvable problem, and to attempt to do so would have derailed the entire effort. So, not surprisingly, rich white men focused on what was important to rich white men, knowing that the current status of poor black people was unsustainable, but that it would have to be solved later.

So, point in fact, the Constitution did not "fail" on this issue, in fact that issue provided the greatest imaginable test possible to the document and the concepts it held up and the Constitution survived. It was the constitution that allowed state assemblies across the south to come together and democratically vote to succeed from the Union. This was no insurgency, this was a divorce. A legal action by one party to separate permanently from the other. They could have gone with "illegal politics" (my definition of insurgency), but did not have to, they had the constitution to provide them legal venues.

Problem was, as there often is in a divorce, that the North disagreed with the South's interpretation of the law (Andrew Jackson had only fairly recently added the rule that States were not allowed to succeed, and is often the case in the law, reasonable minds can differ). The highest courtroom of such national disputes is the battlefield, so that is where this case ended up. The North ultimately "won" and the parties reconciled, but as is often the case, the children suffered and finances were a mess for years after. But the constitution and the nation endured.

I suspect, that as the Northern Alliance and the diverse parties they represent and the Taliban, and the more homogeneous, but still diverse parties they represent sit down to talk, they too may have an issue or two that is as unresolvable today for them as slavery was for our founding fathers in 1787. I would advise them to learn from the American experience. Make a compromise (such as the 3/5th rule was) and stay focused on the big prize and keep moving. If I could offer our own founding fathers any advice, it would be to have put an expiration date on that compromise. I believe that they could have agreed that this was an issue that had to be addressed, and that they could have also agreed to some date. They probably could have agreed to a suspense of 100 years from ratification. If they would have done so "hope" would have been on the table, and it would have forced both sides to work toward a legal, mutually agreeable solution rather than ignoring the looming problem.

As to "fixing other peoples problems" that is never what I have stood for. I do, however understand some basic "truths" of human nature. Karzai and the Northern Alliance "won" and have the power, so why should they compromise? No reason if we are going to dedicate ourselves to not only winning the fight for them, but also to protecting and keeping them in power as well regardless of how they act. They know what they are doing is wrong, but hey, its great for them, so they will not change of their own volition. We see this across the Middle East with similar governments that have come to be enabled in their perspectives of impunity in how they address their own people. Tunisia is giving hope to the populaces of the region and striking fear into the governments.

Sometimes such parties, particularly those with a tremendous disparity of legal power, need a more powerful 3rd party to act as Mediator or even Arbitrator. To provide the balance, trust and protection that the current imbalance Denys. To empower the parties to have the conversation that their current position and recent actions prevent. This is not dictating to others HOW they should govern. It is in our current COA that we do that (without much success though, making us look weak. We demand that bad governments improve womens rights, become more democratic, etc and they ignore us and we continue to protect them anyway out of fear for what might happen if they nationalize some oil facility, raise their prices, favor the Chinese, close access to a LOC or port, etc.) The US far too often looks impotent over the issue of making moral demands on others that our own fiscal and security fears prevent us from backing up. That is not a smart approach to foreign policy. Either don't make the demands, or be willing to back them up if you do. Pick one.

It is time for us to stop taking counsel from those who proclaim that we have "existential threats" in AFPAK. We don't.

It is time for us to stop thinking a Karzai regime that excludes that Taliban is the best answer to govern Afghanistan. It isn't.

It is time for us to stop fearing that a Taliban influenced Afghanistan will become a "sanctuary for AQ." they can't. (The Taliban as a non-state actor is immune to most tools of statecraft and takes sanctuary in that status far more than the do in the physical terrain of the FATA. Once they become a state they have all of the burdens and vulnerabilities of statehood and would have too much to risk to continue to offer their sanctuary to AQ. They also know that we could do any number of major strategic raids to punish them that would cost the fraction of a single year of "nation building.")

Most people don't understand the many layers of meaning and effects of our constitution. I read it as both an attorney and as a special forces officer who has spent years working and thinking about insurgency. Our founding fathers had an experience that none of us can truly empathize with.

1. They grew up oppressed (mildly at times) second class citizens of their own King and kingdom.

2. They became subversives, and then Insurgents to throw off that government that they felt to be illegitimate ("no island should rule a continent"), unjust, disrespectful, and that denied any legal recourse to their reasonable complaints. These were the the wealthy, landed, ruling class of a people enjoying the highest standard of living on Earth at that time. And they became insurgents, engaging in illegal politics, betting everything they owned (their reputations, their wealth, and their very lives) over the powerful human nature factors of causation at work.

3. Then, from the day of the surrender at Yorktown, they became Counterinsurgents. The effectiveness of British governance stripped away, the upstart nation spiraled into economic despair and near anarchy under the chaos of nearly pure democracy. The decision by a few of these former insurgents to secretly scrap the Articles and to come together to form a new constitution was in itself a bit of insurgency, but for the sole purpose of counterinsurgency. That was their goal in the issues they addressed and the purpose of the document. To protect the role of the landed, educated minority in government, and to put dampers on democracy designed to prevent abuses of government power within a central authority necessary to coordinate and lead the efforts of the diverse states. Then wisely added the personal protections in the Bill of Rights. This was genius COIN.

Afghans would have their own issues and their own solutions. As always, it is the principles of the law rather than the black letter that matters most. They won't do it on their own though.

Ken White
01-27-2011, 05:34 PM
Problem was...The North ultimately "won" and the parties reconciled...Slap and I agree, grudgingly, with the first part, not with the second!
As to "fixing other peoples problems" that is never what I have stood for.That may be true but you often seem to advocate our entry into disputes in this manner:
Sometimes such parties, particularly those with a tremendous disparity of legal power, need a more powerful 3rd party to act as Mediator or even Arbitrator. To provide the balance, trust and protection that the current imbalance Denys. To empower the parties to have the conversation that their current position and recent actions prevent. This is not dictating to others HOW they should govern.When you advocate our participation -- or unilateral action -- in such cases, that is in every sense interference in the affairs of others.

When you follow that sort of idea with this:
It is in our current COA that we do that (without much success though, making us look weak. We demand that bad governments improve womens rights, become more democratic, etc and they ignore us and we continue to protect them anyway out of fear for what might happen if they nationalize some oil facility, raise their prices, favor the Chinese, close access to a LOC or port, etc.) The US far too often looks impotent over the issue of making moral demands on others that our own fiscal and security fears prevent us from backing up. That is not a smart approach to foreign policy.You are advocating a course or courses of action in accordance with your personal beliefs and thus you, in appearance if not in fact, are opting for "fixing other peoples problems" and in a certain way at thaty.

As you say:
Either don't make the demands, or be willing to back them up if you do. Pick one.That may not be advocating undue interference in the affairs of others but it sure comes terribly close...

Thus, you may not intend to advocate "fixing other peoples problems" but your words IMO imply otherwise, often quite strongly. Add that IMO, your words often appear to recommend, suggest or demand (it varies from post to post) that such 'fixing' be in accordance with your -- or general enlightened Western -- precepts which in the opinion of many others may not be desirable or even feasible. That "51st State" comment by Omar applies...:o

On your understanding of the 'Founding Fathers and the Document they wrought:
1. They grew up oppressed (mildly at times) second class citizens of their own King and kingdom.That's not really true. They were second class citizens due to the vagaries of human nature -- it's noteworthy that in the eyes of many current Europeans, Americans of today are generally accorded Second Class (if not Third Class... :D ) status. Indeed, in the eyes of some Americans today, other Americans are lesser beings (that's a broad brush with much and varied applicability...). IOW, the 'status' was a vagary of human nature as much as it was anything. Most of the myths spread by the Sons of Liberty et.al. were just that, myths. The protests against tax and tax policies had some merit but it was quite similar to today's crowd who want the deficit chopped, taxes not increased -- while all the 'entitlements' remain untouched or are increased. People are selfish. The British had a right to ask the Colonies to pay for their own defense, the fact they went about it in a ham handed way doesn't eliminate the selfishness of the Colonists -- and the quest for power -- of those "oppressed" Citizens.
2. They became subversives, and then Insurgents to throw off that government that they felt to be illegitimate ("no island should rule a continent"), unjust, disrespectful, and that denied any legal recourse to their reasonable complaints. These were the the wealthy, landed, ruling class of a people enjoying the highest standard of living on Earth at that time. And they became insurgents, engaging in illegal politics, betting everything they owned (their reputations, their wealth, and their very lives) over the powerful human nature factors of causation at work.In assigning causation to the American Revolution, one should ponder at great length the juxtaposition of the words "disrespectful" and "wealthy, landed, ruling class of a people." ;)
3. Then, from the day of the surrender at Yorktown, they became Counterinsurgents ... This was genius COIN.The problem with having a hammer is that every problem must resemble a nail. The problem with the belief that one has the only correct answers to 'insurgency' is that one tends to see every problem as an insurgency, incipient or otherwise. :D

Sometimes a Constitution is just a reasonably well designed document of governance produced by folks who are willing to compromise to achieve a solution that will work for the good of most -- rarely possible to get to all -- people as they see it at the time...

As an Attorney, you will appreciate the Scottish verdict (and the legal subtleties thereunto pertaining) of this humble juror: Not Proven

Infanteer
01-27-2011, 08:17 PM
1. The discussion of the U.S. Constitution is interesting (I recommend Reed's "biography" of that document to anyone interested) but irrelevant. It is so unique to American political culture that it should stay there. I come from a country that has had over a century of stable government and only in the last 20-30 years has possessed a formal written constitution. The UK has had centuries of uninterrupted Parliamentary Democracy sans constitution. I don't think there is much use tarrying around this uniquly liberal western political construct and its various .

2. What is "good governance"? For the average Pashtun, it probably means being a good muslim and having a nice scooter. What's constitutionalism got to do with all of this? Probably about the same as elections and universal sufferage. This seems like a "bottom-up" vice a "top-down" issue.

3. BW mentions it, but I'm not entirely convinced by his assumption that the insurgents are concerned about the viability of a future Taliban state. As stated above, it is probably erroneous to assume that anybody in the west will want to come charging back to the Arghandab once we've pulled out. If this assumption isn't a given, then the Taliban understand that, as a worst possible case, they can at least dictate terms to Kabul. Even as a worst case this is far better for them (ideologically) than falling in line with NATOs terms.

4. So, if the assumption that the Taliban's only option is to negotiate isn't true, than why would they come to the table, especially considering the postion they are in? Would American revolutionaries have come to the table after Saratoga in exchange for the repeal of a few statutes by Whitehall?

Dayuhan
01-27-2011, 10:24 PM
Sometimes such parties, particularly those with a tremendous disparity of legal power, need a more powerful 3rd party to act as Mediator or even Arbitrator. To provide the balance, trust and protection that the current imbalance Denys. To empower the parties to have the conversation that their current position and recent actions prevent. This is not dictating to others HOW they should govern.

Possibly so, but how is the US qualified to serve as a mediator? Isn't it pretty much axiomatic that a mediator has to be a neutral party acceptable to all other parties? Our status as a combatant pretty much disqualifies us, no?



It is time for us to stop taking counsel from those who proclaim that we have "existential threats" in AFPAK. We don't.

It is time for us to stop thinking a Karzai regime that excludes that Taliban is the best answer to govern Afghanistan. It isn't.

Agreed, but I'd add one:

It is time for us to stop pretending that the various contesting parties in Afghanistan are going to sit down and negotiate a peaceful solution to their issues just because that's what suits us. They won't.


Afghans would have their own issues and their own solutions. As always, it is the principles of the law rather than the black letter that matters most. They won't do it on their own though.

They won't do it on their own right now. They will, alas, have to do it on their own eventually, because neither we nor anyone else can do it for them, or force them to do it.


It is time for us to stop fearing that a Taliban influenced Afghanistan will become a "sanctuary for AQ." they can't. (The Taliban as a non-state actor is immune to most tools of statecraft and takes sanctuary in that status far more than the do in the physical terrain of the FATA. Once they become a state they have all of the burdens and vulnerabilities of statehood and would have too much to risk to continue to offer their sanctuary to AQ. They also know that we could do any number of major strategic raids to punish them that would cost the fraction of a single year of "nation building.")

This remains speculative. They did it before, they may be able to do it again... and they certainly might believe they can do it again.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I see two underlying assumptions in your argument

1. The only thing the Afghans need to settle their issues is the right Constitution.

2. If we sit them down in a Loya Jirga and tell them what to do, they will create that Constitution.

I think those assumptions are highly optimistic, to say the least. I think an effort at negotiating "peace" and generating a new Constitution might serve as a marginally face-saving device to toss the non-Pashtun minorities under the bus and get us out of there, but I don't see it producing anything like peace.

Bob's World
01-27-2011, 10:37 PM
First of all, Canada gets away with not having all kinds of things that other similarly situated nations find necessary. Comes from having oceans on three sides, a high resource to populace ratio and only sharing borders with a trusted, and very powerful neighbor.

Second, I have never proclaimed that a constitution is some magic cure-all for insurgency. What I have stated, and stand by, is:

A. That the US Constitution is a masterpiece of COIN and that it was designed by a group of former insurgents for the express purpose of preventing the nation from succumbing to insurgency. Preventative COIN, which is far superior to reactive COIN.

and

B. That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

C. It is therefore my stated position that Reconciliation is the #1 Critical task to attaining stability in Afghanistan; and that such reconciliation MUST be accompanied by a constitutional loya jirga. Not because a constitution is a cure-all; but because the current constitution is the primary source of insurgency and instability and must be replaced.

Lastly on this topic I have suggested that,

D. That when viewed through the lens of insurgency and COIN there are tremendous lessons to be learned from both the process the produced the US constitution (I highly recommend David O Stewart's "The Summer of 1787") and from the intent and nature of the content (rather than the specific terms of the provisions.

I studied Constitutional law in law school and we never talked about insurgency or counterinsurgency either one. I think law schools get so focused in subsequent case law that they miss out on a very significant and amazing aspect of this document.

Dayuhan
01-28-2011, 01:05 AM
That the US Constitution is a masterpiece of COIN and that it was designed by a group of former insurgents for the express purpose of preventing the nation from succumbing to insurgency. Preventative COIN, which is far superior to reactive COIN.


Agreed, but I see no particular relevance to Afghanistan. Just because it worked for us doesn't mean a similar process will work for them. The situations are very, very different.


That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

Is the Constitution the primary driver? I'd have said the primary causal driver was the removal of a more powerful party from a position of governance and its replacement by a less powerful party imposed by a foreign invader. The Constitution is window dressing: the base reality here is that we threw the Taliban out and replaced them with the Karzai administration, because that's what we wanted to do. The Taliban want power back, and they think they can get it: Karzai is weak and dependent and our commitment is limited. It's not about documents: the issue is power. Compromise and sharing won't happen because we want them to happen.

Whoever takes power in Afghanistan will be corrupt and will exclude their rivals no matter what the Constitution says. That's the way they govern. That's the prevailing political culture; it's what they know and what they do. A new political culture may evolve over time, but a document will not create it.


It is therefore my stated position that Reconciliation is the #1 Critical task to attaining stability in Afghanistan; and that such reconciliation MUST be accompanied by a constitutional loya jirga. Not because a constitution is a cure-all; but because the current constitution is the primary source of insurgency and instability and must be replaced.

Reconciliation suits our interests and we want it, because it would let us leave an awkward and expensive situation. Do the parties we propose to reconcile really want reconciliation? Do they see it as anything more than a way to advance their own interests and seize power for themselves? If they don't want to reconcile, it ain't happening, no matter what we want and what we do. It's not something we can force them to do.

Steve the Planner
01-28-2011, 05:07 AM
Whoa!!!!

This is getting pretty thick: The US Constitution is the product of COIN by former insurgents????? Just like we should do in Afghanistan.

Is this just so much eating soup with knives to delude ourselves into believing we have co-opted the poor bastards we are assigned to share an AO with?

As the product of a very small island (Isle of Man) with the oldest parliament in the world (Tynwald, a Viking Parliament), I was schooled in Virginia and taught a great deal about all those great American heroes, including some of the non-heroic stuff (the local gossip passed down about the local patriots).

The Va. planters were up to their eyeballs in debt to London money lenders for all the furniture to outfit their colonial palaces up and down the James River, at a time of serious economic turmoil. Repudiation of debt was a really great feature built into our freedom. Doesn't diminish their heroic accomplishments, but brings that back to earth (self-interest).

Britain was in another one of those "Blood and Treasure" economic reversals, and folks back home were tired of paying for those global experiments. Taxes to support the outrageous costs of protecting those far-off colonies (and costs reduction measures like quartering of troops in people's homes) were the order of the day, and colonists weren't up for it. If they had to pay for their own defenses, they might as well do it themselves and cut King George out of the loop, but that was just some folks. Not everyone was on board.

The insurgents did take the bull by the horns, and throw those foreign minions (including Hessian mercs) from a far-off and out-of-context empire out of their country in favor of home rule.

They could never have done it without widespread public support (WIIFM), and had to build a case amongst cohorts, many of whom had fled Europe?Britain due to persecution, poverty, etc..., trading strenuous and dangerous self-initiative to escape poverty and oppression.

What does all of this have to do with Afghanistan?

How does the fact that it was devastated by decades of foreign occupation/interference, followed by warlords and drugs, and land and resource mismanagement and decline, relate to the American experience?

How do we, the heathen foreign occupier, become the saviour of an arguable nation with one of its prior governments (indigenous even if nasty) still in exile and fighting to destabilize the heathen foreign occupier's corrupt puppet regime?

There was a fragile and fleeting opportunity for domestic home rule through the old king, who knew that "national power" in Afghanistan was, at best, only achieved through fractious local coalitions. But that assumes that he was up to the task, others did not have different ideas, and outside forces were not poised to derail any Afghan self-determination.

Fast forward to today. We know that military success cannot bring an end to active conflict in Afghanistan, so where is the end game?

Somewhere in Kabul? Somewhere in Quetta?

Is the end game going to create the kind of "nation" that we are trying to establish, or a fractured paper nation, or no nation at all?

I suspect that events in Northern Africa today, driven opposition to graft, corruption and poverty, and by realistic or unrealistic expectations of positive alternatives, or hope for them, paints an alternative path for Pakistan and Afghanistan (and even Iraq) if leaders cannot get their acts together.

What if folks in these places simply say: I'm mad as hell and not going to take it anymore!?

What other scenarios exist that are both realistic and outside of our current radar screens (which seem to be murky at best)?

I'm far from proposing any great unified, and overly simple, theory to solve this problem, but it is clear that our COIN theories and tactics are not going to accomplish minimal functional reconciliation. So, what's next?

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 11:36 AM
Steve, You just need to connect your final sentence back to your first one.

"COIN" (as defined in U.S doctrine currently) and CT tactics are not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan. In fact, our efforts in those two areas have contributed significantly to the current state of affairs there. Layering on a tremendous "Development" line of operation will not fix this either. Nor will continuing to ignore the severe problems of the Karzai government while attempting to "build legitimacy from the bottom up" in a small fraction of the total villages in the country.

We cannot turn back the clock and erase everything that followed the initial strategic raid to punish AQ and the Taliban for their accomplice liability in the events of 9/11. We are where we are. We move forward from here.

We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Task one must be some form of reconciliation at the leadership level. (Focus on reintegration of local fighters is like bailing out the Titanic with a teacup. Or in this case perhaps "3 cups of tea."

Task two must be a new constitution. Not because a constitution is a guarantee of stability, but because the current constitution is a guarantee of instability.

(and yes, the U.S. constitution, being written by a group of former insurgents provides some valuable insights into this process; and yes, as it prevented the decline of the new nation into growing insurgency, from splitting into several small weak nations, or returning in part or whole back to British rule, it absolutely was the best and most powerful kind of COIN. It focused on fixing government rather than fixing the populace, and it was proactive rather than waiting for the situation to devolve out of the control of civil authorities).

All of our current efforts in Afghanistan have good aspects to them, those just need to be re-prioritized and resized to fit under a new construct. Recognizing that the US faces no truly "existential threat" in AFPAK is also important as we gain a clearer perspective and priority. Also recognizing that while the US is definitely in combat in Afghanistan, it is not a "US War." Labeling such activities as "wars" has pros and cons, but the biggest con is the strategic risk to our national influence associated with "losing" a war colors our thinking and leads to poor choices. We worry more about securing our "win" on our terms than we do about empowering a stability that works for the people in question.

We got to this point by increments, one decision, one event at a time. It will require a landmark decision to get it back on track though. Currently we are avoiding that and taking an incremental approach to our efforts to get back on track and "win."

Fuchs
01-28-2011, 01:34 PM
We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Too late.

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 02:12 PM
It's never too late to do the right thing.

"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

A variation on that bit of "Bobism" might be:

"While it may sometimes be too early to do the right thing, it is never too late."

Steve the Planner
01-28-2011, 04:21 PM
Bob:

That's an interesting hodgepodge of responses.

It's not our war? Whose is it?

Left to their own devices, the factions would establish their own dominions by force and conflict. Something would come out of it, but nothing you have ever identified as our intended outcome.

In Kabul, for example, I do not see a well of uprising to reform anything substantive, or to do much of anything. Where are the Afghan parties insisting that they are mad as hell and not going to take it anymore? What is there intended goal (s)?

This is very much a US war, with a particular (if muddled) agenda.

The question is either how we identify and support widespread Afghan issues, or find strong support for ours?

Lawrence did not foment Arabs to drive out the Turks. They hated each other for generations. He only piggybacked on those hatreds, helped the Arabs to focus on defeating their common enemy, and provided guns and ammo.

No amount of tea cups and soup eating has, to date, proven a viable strategy to win over enough zealots to pursue our objectives. Either they join us for a bit, then find out we are with the corrupt guys, or they join us because they are the corrupt guys.

This is not a capable people, culled from brave or desperate goal-setters, confronted, as americans were, with vast resources to exploit. Over time, the thin economy of Afghanistan, built of many shell-shocked survivors, struggling in foreign aid dependency.

Drilling down to authentic communities and tribes just reopens the old culture of incessant conflicts for different reasons. Plus the foreign aid flows that have so distorted any credible hope for a straight-line answer.

My guess is that you could start by turning down US aid, refocusing people on "their" governance systems, support homegrown, sustainable and authentic local/regional needs (not our programs), incentivize and empower allies that embrace a productive path, and, as a coordinated effort, support major change in Kabul while removing the safety nets and protections for those in power now.

None of that is a path to thirteen states on the US East Coast.

It might make more sense to delve into the coping strategies of communities/regions/peoples in a perennial geographic conflict zone (the actual circumstances of Iraq and Afghanistan), to identify and pursue the most applicable of their prior historical strategies & tactics. It's all about interim deal-making, shifting alliances, and, in short, making do with the realities that are present at the moment.

I just don't get the analogies to the US War of Independence. It is a Non-Sequitor.

Infanteer
01-28-2011, 07:43 PM
B. That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

At the risk of getting into "what ifs" would the insurgency, especially in the Pashtun Belt, be of the same intensity if there was no Constitution?

This takes me back to a discussion we had about the 10 and 90% belonging to the revolutionary and resistance insurgencies in the Pashtun belt. Are the 90% really disputing constitutional issues or are they more concerned with hundreds of thousands of western folk barrelling around their country, armed to the teeth?

Would an amiable constitution bring the 10% to the table with Kabul or was that rubicon crossed when Kabul threw its hat in with (or had its hat thrown in by) NATO.

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 08:53 PM
Steve,

Please, just because we are in combat some place does not make it a US "war." Any conflict you can just quit and walk away from without setting your own nation up for defeat is not a "war."

Look out your window. Do you see a nation at war? No. We may provide our servicemembers with greater support by demanding such a status, but we place our nation at strategic risk of losing influence (with little upside potential on that same criteria); and we constrain our options and approaches that could otherwise be more reasonably considered.

As to "where are the Afghans?" Are you F'n kidding me? You have heard of the Taliban, right?

As to Infanteer, you ask a great question regarding the rural insurgency, that I contend is largely a resistance movement and apolitical. Clearly the constitution is not their primary concern directly, but it is the constitution that denies them the right to pick their own District and Provincial leadership. Once our presence is reduced much of this resistance insurgency will die down as well.

The other half of that equation, however is the upper tier of the insurgency that is VERY political and makes up the various leadership groups taking sanctuary in Pakistan. Reconciliation is the key task here, the new constitution is merely the very important supporting task. There is no way that the Northern Alliance is going to reconcile with the Taliban under the current constitution because they know precisely how controlling and destructive of local legitmacy that it is. They would fear that the Taliban would use that some tool to opress them as they use it to oppress the Taliban.

But the hard fact is, we cannot resolve the lower tier of the insurgency without first resolving the upper tier of the insurgency. It is the upper tier that keeps the movement alive and that pays the fighters you dealt with there outside of Kandahar to lay ambushes and plant IEDs.

So Step one is reconcile the issues driving the political revolutionary insurgency of the top tier and then craft a new constitution together as a unified approach to how the country moves out together. Once this is complete the Coalition can vastly reduce its presence and the Taliban will also stop funding the lower tier, and it will subside naturally.

There is just a whole lot of very bad analysis out there, and we have built faulty plans of engagement upon that analysis. That made the situation bad. We then reacted by clinging to the analysis and plans and simply adjusting tactics a bit and piling on even more foreign presence, and that is make the problems with BOTH tiers of the insurgency worse.

Dayuhan
01-28-2011, 09:38 PM
There is no way that the Northern Alliance is going to reconcile with the Taliban under the current constitution because they know precisely how controlling and destructive of local legitmacy that it is. They would fear that the Taliban would use that some tool to opress them as they use it to oppress the Taliban.

The tool of oppression is physical force. It will be used no matter what the Constitution says. Whoever gains power will oppress no matter what the Constitution says. Whoever gains power will be corrupt no matter what the Constitution says. If the Constitution is not compatible with the prevailing political culture it will simply be ignored.

Even if we were able to get the contending parties to sit down together (unlikely in itself) and write their names on a piece of paper that we like, what makes you think they will pay any attention to it once they have an opportunity to seize power? The Constitution isn't the problem, the underlying political culture is the problem... and that's something we cannot change.


We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Task one must be some form of reconciliation at the leadership level. (Focus on reintegration of local fighters is like bailing out the Titanic with a teacup. Or in this case perhaps "3 cups of tea."

Task two must be a new constitution. Not because a constitution is a guarantee of stability, but because the current constitution is a guarantee of instability.

I honestly think you place too much stress on the leadership level, and I can't see any reason to assume that the leadership wants to reconcile and would be willing to share power. What if they want to win, and rule, and they think they can?

In any event we can't force a reconciliation among parties who don't want to reconcile... they aren't going to do it just because it suits us.

This is the corner we painted ourselves into when we chose to try to bring good governance to Afghanistan. Bad decision. I don't see any reason to think a second attempt would work any better than the first: it's simply something that's not within our power to do. Good governance has to evolve, it isn't installed, like a light bulb or spare tire... and in Afghanistan the evolutionary process has a long way to go. Our job is not to direct or initiate that process, but simply to convince all parties to that process that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea. Unfortunately we took our eye off the ball early on, and now we're deep in the scheisse.

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 11:06 PM
Dayuhan,

I base my positions on my training, experience and instincts. I could be wrong, but I doubt I am by much. I do listen to your counters, but I don't agree with them. I think you (reasonably) focus on the wrong criteria, but that generally your instincts are good. I also think we agree far more than you know. I also appreciate that I am not going to change you any more than you are going to change me, so that is why I feel no compulsion to meet your counters point for point. We offer two valuable perspectives and (unlike so many in the middle east) we are able to have such discourse openly allowing many others to here a variety of positions and shape their own perspectives.

zenvagabond
02-01-2011, 03:23 PM
USIP, Sep 08: Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr212.pdf)

The problem with the whole Afghan issue is the fact the allies actually won the war, which was back in 2001. There should never have been any attempt at the ridiculous concept of nation building; this is now the same as the Soviet situation and the South Vietnamese war. The allies will continue to win the battles, but will lose the war because the enemy will simply keep fighting, they don't have to actually win anything significant in order to win the end-game.

Political opportunism has supserseded the reality on the ground in this 'country', which is not actually a country but merely a mish-mash of disparate tribes and ethnic clans; most of whom hate each other for one reason or another and will continue to do so until the end of time.

Afghanistan is not developing for several reasons, mainly since there is no national identity amongst others; how an you unite people who don't want to be united?

Also, the US has simply no idea how to (i) manage and win a guerilla war/insurgency and (ii) no idea how to conduct nation building. They have no recent success stories to draw upon and they continually fail to understand history or learn lessons from their historic failures (Vietnam: hello).

The US government has all but mastered the art of bureaucracy and has ensured that their military, intelligence agencies and other agencies such as the State Dept. actively work against each rather than vice cersa, thereby ensuring defeat.

Jihadi doctrine also ensures there will be an endless supply of cannon fodder from Central Asia, the Caucaus and Arab countries. There is no success story here, the allies will simply withdraw under some form of 'negotiated peace' if that, and then Afghanistan will revert to what is was before; a chaotic wasteland.

Dayuhan
02-03-2011, 06:59 AM
I base my positions on my training, experience and instincts. I could be wrong, but I doubt I am by much. I do listen to your counters, but I don't agree with them. I think you (reasonably) focus on the wrong criteria, but that generally your instincts are good. I also think we agree far more than you know. I also appreciate that I am not going to change you any more than you are going to change me, so that is why I feel no compulsion to meet your counters point for point. We offer two valuable perspectives and (unlike so many in the middle east) we are able to have such discourse openly allowing many others to here a variety of positions and shape their own perspectives.

Instinct vs instinct is a tough debate, but my instincts tell me that you're offering an American solution to an Afghan problem, and that the prospects for success lie on a long string of questionable assumptions. My instincts tell me that it is not within our power to bring anything that we would recognize as "good governance" to Afghanistan. If we try we'll be biting off way more than we can chew, and we're likely to choke on it.

My instincts tell me that trying to govern Afghanistan, or to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, was an enormous mistake, and that we should have set "nation building" aside from the start, focusing instead on demonstrating that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea, and on departing once that message was delivered.

Of course I've always preferred the limited, achievable objective; it seems to me a good way to succeed. Nothing advances the prospects for failure as effectively as setting unrealistic objectives.

Of course I could be wrong. I actually kind of hope I am wrong... but I don't think I am.

Offline a few days, lot of catching up to do...

Bob's World
02-03-2011, 09:44 AM
Welcome back. But remember, I do not promote American solutions, I promote self determination as shaped by the cultures, values, and histories of the people in question for the same.

I am guilty of believing that America should act in a manner more in line with our professed principles as a nation. I am guilty of believing that their are tremendous lessons to be learned from the American experience in our own pursuit of liberty and stability (the universality of which is born out by vast diversity of people who have leveraged those same ideals in their similar pursuits of liberty around the globe over the past 200+ years). I am also guilty of believing that America can shift from dedicating our considerable talents, wealth and influence to create and preserve some particular government to one of helping to create an environment in which people can shape their own guard for their future security.

And as I have said, a good constitution will not necessarily resolve an insurgency in of itself; but a bad one will guarantee that insurgency happens. As the American constitution was written by a group of former insurgents fighting to pull their new nation out of its dive into anarchy and insurgency once again, it was written expressly for the purpose of COIN (true COIN, not the colonial intervention brand marketed in FM 3-24 and the dozens of COIN books published by European and American colonial soldiers over the years). I believe in the promise of America, but I do not allow that to blind me to the lie of many of our words and actions over the years. I am indeed guilty of believing in the power of the promise, and advocate that we can indeed be a positive force for good if we get back on azimuth with our moral compass contained in that trifecta of good governance enshrined at the National Archives.

tequila
02-04-2011, 01:19 AM
My instincts tell me that trying to govern Afghanistan, or to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, was an enormous mistake, and that we should have set "nation building" aside from the start, focusing instead on demonstrating that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea, and on departing once that message was delivered.


I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 11:23 PM
I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

A couple of thoughts:

First, the Northern Alliance did not "flip to our side," we jumped on their side, thereby altering the balance of power and empowering their victory. This was classic UW.

Second. Pakistan would not have done anything overt to assist the Taliban then, just as, and for the same reasons, that they don't do anything to overtly help them now. They would have covertly done so just as they covertly do so now. Why would we expect anything else?

Third. The Taliban were never the issue, AQ was. It is quite likely that key elements of the Taliban would have folded back into Afghan society under the Northern Alliance. Others would have began to form a resistance movement much as they do now. The difference being that the US would not be there creating an artificial, unsustainable environment and spending $100+B/year.

We just wanted a base of operations to hunt AQ from, but because we were there we got into the business of forming and protecting the Afghan government. As we got deeper and deeper into that role and were clearly influencing the rise of Karzai and the nature of the constitution, the insurgency began to grow.

But all of that is moot, we did what we did and we are where we are. How forward from here? AQ will never have the Afghan sanctuary they had before, and truth be told, they did not need it then to be an effective non-state UW force in today's information environment. We have taught them that even if we have not learned it yet ourselves. We should assume risk that they might come back and be willing to leave, and shift our focus to getting the Northern Alliance to seriously reconcile the issues between them and the Taliban. Once that is done they can then scrap the current abortion of a constitution and form new guards for their future security together.

Our current approach is much like a team of SF candidates dragging 100 lbs of personal gear each and a couple of jeeps across several miles of North Carolina Sandhills, collapsing short of the finish point while some some cagey old SF NCO (like Ken White) lounging in the shade of a pine tree asks "Did any of you think to see if you could get one of them to start?" We're pretty good at hard work, but sometimes the smart answer seems too easy to try.

Dayuhan
02-05-2011, 04:30 AM
Welcome back. But remember, I do not promote American solutions, I promote self determination as shaped by the cultures, values, and histories of the people in question for the same.

I have a hard time reconciling this statement with your oft-stated insistence that the core of the problem lies in the Constitution, rather than the political culture, and with the apparent belief that the contending parties will coexist peacefully if only the right Constitution is in place. The whole idea of resolving this conflict by mediating an agreement that would produce shared power under an effective Constitution seems to me to be a quintessentially American solution that is largely incompatible with Afghan political culture and tradition.


I am guilty of believing that America should act in a manner more in line with our professed principles as a nation. I am guilty of believing that their are tremendous lessons to be learned from the American experience in our own pursuit of liberty and stability (the universality of which is born out by vast diversity of people who have leveraged those same ideals in their similar pursuits of liberty around the globe over the past 200+ years). I am also guilty of believing that America can shift from dedicating our considerable talents, wealth and influence to create and preserve some particular government to one of helping to create an environment in which people can shape their own guard for their future security.

I see nothing in America's professed principles that asks us to assume that our principles or ways are applicable to other nations, or that expects us to impose or promote our principles elsewhere in the world.

I believe, as I've said before, that you consistently and dangerously overestimate the extent to which current conditions around the world have been "created and preserved" by the US. Our influence, let alone control, is not what you make it out to be, and our ability to reshape or recreate conditions is very limited. If we assume that the world as it is was created by US policy we can easily conclude that the world can be reshaped by adjusting US policy. If that assumption proves incorrect - as I suspect it quickly would be - any action based on that assumption would have consequences very different from those anticipated.


And as I have said, a good constitution will not necessarily resolve an insurgency in of itself; but a bad one will guarantee that insurgency happens.

I think you look at Constitutions too often as the source and origin of political culture, rather than the other way round. If we hand the Afghans a Constitution that is not compatible with their political culture they will ignore it. If we expect the Afghans to create a Constitution that is not a reflection of their political culture, we will be disappointed. People aren't going to put their differences aside and resolve their disputes simply because we want them to or because we believe that it's in their interests to do so. They will follow their perception of their interests, which is generally different from ours.


I believe in the promise of America, but I do not allow that to blind me to the lie of many of our words and actions over the years. I am indeed guilty of believing in the power of the promise, and advocate that we can indeed be a positive force for good if we get back on azimuth with our moral compass contained in that trifecta of good governance enshrined at the National Archives.

Again, that compass pointed the way for us, but we can't expect it to solve other people's problems... here, again, I think you're assuming that America's solution is everybody's solution... a very risky assumption. There are few things so dangerous as a great power trying to be a positive force for its own perception of good.


I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

As RCJ says, the Taliban were never the problem. AQ was the problem.

Yes, when we leave the Taliban will probably come back to power. When we entered the fight the Northern Alliance was crumbling and facing imminent defeat; there's little reason to believe that this will not happen again upon our departure. That was true in 2001 and it's true now, despite the lives and the hundreds of billions spent in the interim.

My point is that our mission from the first should not have been to prevent the Taliban from ever returning, but to convince the Taliban - or whoever else came to power in Afghanistan - that the penalties of hosting AQ are too high to bear. I realize that revenge and punishment don't play well to the American populace, but I suspect that they would be more reasonable to Afghans than nation-building and democracy promotion. They'd also be a whole lot quicker and a whole lot cheaper.

davidbfpo
02-16-2011, 09:23 AM
An odd article, especially as it coincides with the appearance in London of an ex-Taliban minister, Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, for talks.


The deal that Zaeef is thought to have discussed with Foreign Office officials is this: in return for power in parts of southern Afghanistan, the Taliban would accept the authority of the Kabul government and expel al-Qaeda and its jihadist affiliates.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8326606/Why-talks-with-the-Taliban-are-likely-to-fail.html

For once a couple of the comments are worth reading - those by permare.

Tukhachevskii
02-16-2011, 09:52 AM
1.
2. What is "good governance"? For the average Pashtun, it probably means being a good muslim and having a nice scooter. What's constitutionalism got to do with all of this? Probably about the same as elections and universal sufferage. This seems like a "bottom-up" vice a "top-down" issue.

Exactly, we tend to forget that there are alternative forms of governancethat don't fit into our preconceived notions of how a polity (as opposed to a state) is meant to function. There are/were innumerable tribal networks of authority and consultation (the pre-Revolutionary loya Jirga was one) that help form, develop and direct consensus. The fact that these processes dont seem to fit the Weberian ideal type of a rational organisation confounds us especially where we seek to "interface" withnthem (i.e., CIMIC). Which brings me to this...


That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

Wasn't the push for a constituion part and parcel of the CIMIC measures we forced/suggested to them? Which brings me to this....


We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.


Our colonial perspective isn't just about the "form" of government "we'd" like to see. It's much deeper than you acknowledge. The "state" as a rational, bureaucratic (never could spell that!) actor as we understand it and foist on others is as much part of the problem and is a collonial one to boot. We have a "standard of civlisation" which, when others fail to meet it, we assume it is because their "states" are imperfect (there's a functionalist bias in there somewhere) which we assume social engineering and legal machinery can "fix". You only need to puruse our COIN manuals to see that "state building"- the re-creation of ther states into "our" image- seems to be more important than working through existing structures...and then we wonder why there's "friction": military and otherwise, when our rival systems don't "gell" and when the "natives" revolt!!!. But you can only do that by either destroying the very structure/fabric of "Afghan" life and totally re-educating the "Afghans" or by superimposing "Western" state structures (and that entails) on top of an existing diffuse system of authority/value allocation. Our greatets successes have worked when we have ourselves adopted their system of tribal networks. Our failures (politically) have resulted from ignorance of that. The American system of governance works because it is American; it was an organic development in which all participants to that particular revolt were able to make their voices felt.

Bob's World
02-16-2011, 12:55 PM
Tuk,

I'd never say to recreate governance for anyone else in our image. I stand for the principle of Self-determination, and that means I might not like what the guy I am helping comes up with.

But that does not preclude setting certain parameters as the condition of my support. The current constitution is the primary cause of insurgency in Afghanistan. I would be happy to debate any expert on constitutional law or COIN or Islamic studies on that point (I might lose, but I would enjoy the fight!) We must remove that thorn from the paw of the lion that is the Pashtun populace of Afghanistan. Even the Northern Alliance would reject the current constitution if roles were reversed, as they know full well that it is designed to control and oppress enemies of the state rather than to empower and liberate the people as a whole.

A good constitution is indeed tailored to the culture and needs of the people it defends and supports. If not, they will not in turn defend and support it. It must do a few things, how it does them is moot.

1. It must design a government that clearly
A. represents the entire populace equitably
B. selects representatives in a manner and for a time that is recognized and accepted by the populace
C. has built in, un bypassable obstacles to efficiency that prevents any one element of government from abusing its power.

It must also identify and protect the human rights and principles that this populace believes to be essential.
A. The rights of information, (press, speech, assembly) and to remain armed (keep and bear arms) in some form are critical as the "4th branch" of government; that ever pressent reminder to all who enter government that if they violate the people's trust, that the people will ultimately find out, organize, and violate them in turn.
B. It must allow for values to adjust over time. Certainly American values have changed radically over the years, but the principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability.

Tukhachevskii
02-17-2011, 11:33 AM
Col.,
I have to say that, though I may not agree with a large amount of what you have to say, I have to admit liking the way you say it. The expertly interlocked contradictory propositions that can be spun to fit any argument depending on the reception of them and the ability to formulate sentences that negate their own predicates is amazing. If I didn’t know any better I’d think your dialectical flourishes betrayed a deep adherence to Marxism! Anyway, let’s crack on. (p.s. forgive the length of the reply, when I get a bee in my bonnet...ahem, sorry, I mean beret. I’d never wear a bonnet you understand! )



I'd never say to recreate governance for anyone else in our image. I stand for the principle of Self-determination, and that means I might not like what the guy I am helping comes up with. But that does not preclude setting certain parameters as the condition of my support.
(Note the opening contradiction in the above proposition!) Self-determination is not a universal covering law or some kind of value free nomothetic principle of political science but a politically motivated and ideologically understood concept. Standing for it is advocating an understanding of how the world works and how it should work. Self-determination was our mantra after WWI when we dismantled and “acquired” large tracts of the Ottoman Empire in the name of self-determination (after a suitable mandate period you understand). Some of the more hot-headed Muslims out there consider self-determination to be a colonial plot to destroy the caliphate or any chance of resuscitating it (and I’m not sure they’re wrong on that score either. In fact I’m sure the USSR had the same problem with the concept). Language is not value free or neutral; freedom may be your mantra and it may invoke a whole semantic chain of fuzzy warm signifiers that are central to your culture/ideology but to Muslims- not Arabs per se, but Muslims- that word (hurriyya) signifies chaos (it also means prostitute in one of its forms). You may as well be an anarchist! Further, the fact that your recognition (Oh, Hegel [pbuh], where art thou?) of a polity’s self-image is dependent upon your acceptance of it as congruent with whatever vision you have of how the world (should) works merely undermines the whole concept of “self” determination and thus agency broadly speaking (at least in the international realm). Cf. Taliban state-making below.


The current constitution is the primary cause of insurgency in Afghanistan. I would be happy to debate any expert on constitutional law or COIN or Islamic studies on that point (I might lose, but I would enjoy the fight!) We must remove that thorn from the paw of the lion that is the Pashtun populace of Afghanistan. Even the Northern Alliance would reject the current constitution if roles were reversed, as they know full well that it is designed to control and oppress enemies of the state rather than to empower and liberate the people as a whole.
Forget about international law (jmm’s field that) or COIN (talk to Ken White or Wilf) let’s talk about “enemies of the state” (what state? Is there one? Who are the “enemies? The people ISAF/Taliban is/were trying to steamroll into some bureaucratic monstrosity? ), “empowerment”, “liberation”, and even “the people” shall we? (That’s a rhetorical question by the way).


A good constitution is indeed tailored to the culture and needs of the people it defends and supports. If not, they will not in turn defend and support it. It must do a few things, how it does them is moot.
Weber (pbuh) you’re legacy lives on! Methinks I detect the age old legal positivist mantra of a codified and/or written constitution underlying your argument here and below. The idea of people defending a constitution is a peculiarly American conceit. Most other people would defend their state or even their fellow citizens but a document (yah rub!). Well in that case doesn’t the Shari‘a(h) count (which incorporates local ‘urf or customary tribal laws and maqasid (http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?6176-Maqasid-al-Shariah-The-Objectives-of-Islamic-Law))? Or the Quran for that matter? They are the only legal elements within that culture that achieve the hallowed status that the US Constitution does (...now isn’t that suggestive!?) and which, for that matter, similarly delineates the responsibilities of rulers and ruled, of justice, rights, and responsibilities. To see the Islamic version of the US constitution I refer you to Muhammad’s Constitution of Medina (http://www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm) the ideal type (speaking in Weberian terms) to which Muslims refer when a “modern” constitution needs to be formulated. Anyway, in the words of Burke(pbuh), “men are not tied to one another by paper and seals, they are tied by sentiments, bonds forged in blood (&c, or some such)”.


1. It must design [Ugh! Really?! What’s wrong with outline, delinate, or demarcate or instil or create, &c?- T] a government that clearly

A. represents the entire populace equitably [now there’s another loaded term- T]
B. selects representatives in a manner and for a time that is recognized and accepted by the populace .
C. has built in, un-bypassable obstacles to efficiency [another loaded term- T] that prevents any one element of government from abusing [nah, I’ll let that one slide- T] its power.

A. “Equitably”, means all things to all men. Perhaps a system of ethnic quotas? And how did that work out in Lebanon? ( http://ipac.kacst.edu.sa/eDoc/2006/159617_1.pdf) That kind of weighting of votes along with the census it would need to be effective would (if they told you the truth in the first place) only create deep societal anxiety at numerical weakness and create a demographic security dilemma the knock on effect of which would be to further depress the status of women (if that were possible). The size and power of the Pashtun’s, extending as it does across the border into Pakistan, would merely cause further rifts thereby creating a “cleft” state with “Pashtunland” facing off against a loose tribal coalition bifurcating Afghanistan. Keeping the tribal system means that internal Pashtun rivalries can be kept in check without destabilising the entire (admittedly shaky) edifice. A shura at which all tribal heads can wheel and deal sounds much more “equitable” than one based upon the size of one’s population (hardly conducive to creating a sense of “nation” now is it?). Number crunching and head counting may work where everyone is equal (and considers himself equal to his fellow citizen) but it is a recipe for serious doo doo there.

B. But tribal structures already do that incorporating charismatic and traditional authority (as opposed to the rational type) within them! Ever heard of a Shura? (http://www.ijtihad.org/shura.htm) Even the Shi‘a have such a representative mechanism in the concept of emulation in which a cleric must appeal to worshippers to get a following and thus a living and status, honour and reputation. As soon as he loses that he no longer represents them (political competition). Tribal authority works in similar ways (at least in Islamic cultures). However, the key word here is “consent” and what that means to different cultures and political structures.

C. Ah, I wondered when you’d get to that, the separation of powers...everyone lower heads reverentially. Again, both the traditional tribal system of governance, normatively and practically, contains strictures against the overweening power of any one group/jamaat/tribe (why do you think they change sides so often?). The shari‘a(h) contains provisions for ‘urf (http://theiau.com/blog/muslema-purmul/the-role-of-custom-in-islamic-law-part-1/) (customary law) which enables tribes to coexist and appeal to shari‘a when ‘urf fails. Furthermore, the shari‘a(h) sets definite limits to political authority (it must be religiously based, must not oppress unduly its subjects, etc.). In fact the history of Islam attests to this concept with the numerous civil wars between various sects/parties (can’t be one without the other) railing (sp?) against “tyranny” on an appeal to shari‘a law. In fact the Ikhwan’s “resistance” to Mubarak, and the subsequent doctrine of shirk and jahilliyya that Arab rulers were said to have fallen into, was based precisely on a system of laws which you ignore (at your peril I might add). Cf. below...

Tukhachevskii
02-17-2011, 11:38 AM
Within the context of Pashtun tribal society, warlordism could find little space. As in most other regions of Afghanistan, the competition coming from ideological groups was modest until the mid-1990s and they were certainly not favoured by the patronage politics adopted by the political leadership of the parties based in Peshawar. However, at the same time warlordism faced competition from tribalism, which ended up imposing a logic different from militarism, even when warlords did emerge to play an important if often temporary role. In the more general terms of the study of warlordism as a social process, the experience of southern Afghanistan suggests that warlords can only prosper in social environments that allow them to easily acquire political control over a territory [part of the process of state-building- T]. It is the intrinsic political role of the tribes that prevented warlordism from finding a fertile ground. Warlordism, since it implies the existence of autonomous players not bound by political or social loyalties, could not find roots in Pashtun territory. The closest thing to a pure warlord to be seen in the south, the Khalqi commanders Allah Noor and Khano after the fall of Najibullah’s government, were also forced into seeking to establish tribal connections. However, they were ultimately perceived as strangers by local society and this, coupled with their lack of social knowledge, prevented their re-legitimisation and led to the formation of a large alliance against them. (my italics) (my italics, p. 17) (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=58063)


It must also identify and protect the human rights and principles that this populace believes to be essential [therein lies the rub-T].
A. The rights of information, (press, speech, assembly) and to remain armed (keep and bear arms) in some form are critical as the "4th branch" of government; that ever present reminder to all who enter government that if they violate the people's trust, that the people will ultimately find out, organize, and violate them in turn.
B. It must allow for values to adjust over time Certainly American values have changed radically over the years, but the principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability.

Again, what exactly are “human rights”? Are we speaking of Natural Law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law) here? In which case- if it’s the theological rather than the secular humanist version- then I think I know what the Muslim reply will be. In fact, even it’s the secular version I think the reply will be the same. This also reveals your ideological understanding (though you won’t see it that way, which is part of an ideology’s charms) of the meaning of good governance (I don’t think “commanding the good and forbidding the wrong” ( http://www.amazon.com/Commanding-Right-Forbidding-Islamic-Thought/dp/0521661749) are part of it, at least in terms of what Muslims call good governance). What “this populace believes to be essential”, then, is diametrically opposed to what you do.

A. “Right to bear arms”? That’s a universal given is it? Norms and values such as the ones you point out operate already in far subtler forms such as badal/revenge ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA479934) for instance which help to “balance” the “(over)authoritative allocation of values”. Furthermore, shura councils are held at every “level” or “circle” (a more precise term) of “Afghan” society (which, of course, spills over into surrounding “states”. Is Pakistan a state? Or an Army occupying some land? Now what was the original quote about Prussia...? Answers on a postcard please). As for rights to information, speech and assembly I wonder exactly what you mean by a “right”. I know of no polity on earth that allows its citizens to assemble, speak or seek information without simultaneous putting certain restrictions upon them without which their “rights” would become null and void. Apparently where you come from rights are antecedent to obligations and duties. “Restraint”, said Paul Vincent, “is a moveable feast in Liberal thought”. Meditate upon that if you will.

B. The idea that values (and other things) change over time sounds awfully “whiggish” to me. The idea of progress is ingrained in “western” thought (and in American thought even more deeply). Remember Plato(pbuh)? “If you wish to understand a polis, understand its people”. In Islamic cultures the very idea of change is suspicious; given the religion and its followers are already perfect by definition why, fi ardihi, would they want to change? My god man, nothing much has changed since the Raj! (All right, that’s a bit polemical). In Islamic thought bid’a/innovation is frowned upon (but not wholly out of the question so long as it is not anything Islamic that changes). Religion is what passes for a common denominator out there, it’s the one thing holding them together as a “people”, it provides them with a lingua fraca if you will. You can’t mobilise the “people” behind the state without some glue (nationalism in Europe provided this) meaning it only gets a tighter grip. They’ve got a whole panoply of values/norms (like Pashtunwali, or more importantly, sulh’ ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulh), et al). As you say, “The principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability”, but you seem, again, to want to ignore the “solid foundation for stability” that exist in Afghanistan because you don’t like it.

(I might be rambling a bit here but I’ll leave it anyway). A strong case can be made for the Taliban as a state-creating ( http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FFI_TheTalibanInsurgencyInAfghanistan_Organization LeadershipWorldview.pdf) force that sought to utilise Islam’s egalitarian aspects (even though it also legitimises tribalism) to circumvent and ultimately loosen and sunder tribal bonds. Only then could the Taliban create a “national” movement that transcended the very tribal structures that acted as a breaking mechanism (against tyranny no less, surely that resonates with your American ideology and myth of origins! [mythomoteur (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mythomoteur)]). The very processes of state-making creating a “national” (“confessional” may be more accurate) movement that was “representative” of all “Afghans”, thereby masking what was essentially Pashtun “nationalism”, required the lowest common denominator taken to the extreme as the only means to suture the asocial (tribal) fabric of Afghan society beyond their core Pashtun following and thereby resemble something like “national” (i.e., state) representatives (the Taliban are thus to an extent “Modernists” in accepting the idea of the “state” like the Shi‘a of Iran under Khomeini) and thus gain some kind of “legitimacy” based on that common denominator. Yet, that intensified, as in Soviet Russia, the need to be Islamic and seen to be explicitly so. Moreover, the Taliban’s adopting of or interpretation of Islam was consciously different from the tribes (whose adherence was “lax”) thereby supervening upon tribal authority structures. Again, like in Russia under Communism, the only way to enforce the legitimacy of the regime was to become ever more stringent (even in contradiction to the Shari‘a’s acceptance of tribal laws). This intensification would have led to the creation of a modern state which, after a period of time, may have collapsed under tribal opposition but which would have left, at least a “state” structure for them to contend with and which they had some experience with in handling as opposed to tribal structures. Remember, the rest of the world got on fine without states long after the state became the only beast in Europe.



There, I’ve said my peace. Let the contradictory sophistic literary wizardry of the Col. flow... (nah, you’re alright;), it's probably just envy speaking!).

Steve the Planner
02-17-2011, 02:16 PM
Tukhachevskii:

Stunning post.

Here is the great riddle: There is no riddle at all.

Cast aside our misperceptions and a lot of things become a lot clearer.

Where, I think there is a continuing revolution/evolution is in urban populations, and especially more technically sophisticated young people and professionals, where their "tribe" is still in transition.

Brezinski's great tome "The Technotronic Era" envisioned a world where even far-flung rural populations would have a radio to "listen" to brief news broadcasts. It was never understood, at that time, that the level of contact and access would include wiki-ing the actual historical documents and maps of the sulh' Versailles, their national budget, pictures of Mubarak's yacht (and figures on his estimated wealth). Let alone that they could interact....

From my perspective, I read what you described as the formal empire/nation governance systems being a "tail" wagging the dog, which makes a great deal of sense for populations defined through generations of colonial occupation---a "gray market" for social structure, norm setting, and control.

We are committed to driving from the Tail, and can't understand why the dog won't go that way.

davidbfpo
08-14-2011, 12:00 PM
The former DNS chief sacked by Karzai has given an interview, which gives some context to what is happening and remarks like:
Very simply, the Taliban are our killers, they are not our brothers...

The Taliban say they have a licence from God to kill, to torture, to marginalise women...That we don't accept. No Taliban will say my licence comes from Mullah Omar, their leader: they say my licence comes from God. Settlement with that type of group is a disaster for Afghanistan

His response, as part of an ex-Northern Alliance bloc:
.. he and his allies were preparing for a worst-case scenario where the Taliban were allowed to keep southern provinces with "weapons and structure intact" after agreeing to a ceasefire with Mr Karzai. "That will mean fragmentation of authority within Afghanistan, emergence of another state. In that situation we will rise..It will only be a matter of time before Taliban jump into other areas."

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8700028/Afghanistans-former-spy-chief-Never-trust-the-Taliban.html

Bob's World
08-14-2011, 12:54 PM
To attempt to create two states is not "reconciliation." Members of the Northern Alliance, who dominate GIRoA, fear any compromise with the Taliban for good reason. This is why they accepted our aid in driving the Taliban out, and why they are quite content for us to stay forever and dedicate our wealth and energy to keeping them out. This representative from that community of Hazara, Uzbek and Tajiks is correct, IMO, of his assessment that to create a Taliban-led Pashtun state in the south would merely be a step toward that state ultimately acting to re-establish their historic control over the whole. That control has always subjugated the ethnic groups of the Northern Alliance.

How does one create trust where no trust exists? This is the real question, and this should be the focal point of US operations in Afghanistan. Not how do we help one side to prevail, for there is no permanent stability in forcing such a victory.

The current constitution of Afghanistan is rooted in this historic distrust. It is designed to ensure that no one outside the Northern Alliance circle of trust has any legal means to compete with them for either political or economic (which in this patronage society are one and the same) success. Once that gauntlet was thrown down, behind the protection of the Coalition, the insurgency began to grow in earnest. Once we ramped up our efforts to "defeat" that insurgency the resistance element among the largely apolitical populace began to grow as well.

I wheel out the US Constitution because I recognize it for what it really is. A masterpiece of COIN; an effort to create and preserve trust among a similarly diverse and divided populace to help them learn to work together toward a better future for all. To have a system that they could trust in, even when they could not trust in each other. This is the true genius of the US Constitution, all of the mechanics and rights woven into it are simply interlocking elements of blocking any loopholes to trust. Many of these same mechanisms are equally disruptive of governmental efficiency. Efficient governments are governments that come to abuse the people over time. To control the people over time. Inefficient governments are governments that the people are able to retain control over.

Our recent buffoonery in Congress and the White House over the deficit, budgets, etc, are a great example of this. Curse their inefficiency, but praise the constitution for doing what it was always intended to do.

I do not advocate for any other people to adopt the US constitution. That would be a disaster of illegitimacy in action. I do advocate for others to come together to debate their distrust for each other and for government and to find a system that works for them to overcome the same. That is reconciliation.

(Of note, the one issue too thorny to resolve, slavery, was rarely mentioned in the formal debates of 1787, and was simply set aside to resolve later. That was a big mistake. I think those assembled all realized that while this was an issue that they could not resolve then, that it was one that had to be resolved someday. I think they could have agreed to a date well in the future, 50-100 years down the road, for that institution to end. That is a lesson learned. Do not ignore the elephant in the room, but do not let it drive you out of the room either. Note it, agree to deal with it later, and drive on. Every society has such elephants, certainly Afghanistan does.)

jcustis
08-14-2011, 11:21 PM
Our current approach is much like a team of SF candidates dragging 100 lbs of personal gear each and a couple of jeeps across several miles of North Carolina Sandhills, collapsing short of the finish point while some some cagey old SF NCO (like Ken White) lounging in the shade of a pine tree asks "Did any of you think to see if you could get one of them to start?"

I just caught this, and have to say that it is one of the funniest things I have heard in some time, regardless of the thrust of the argument :D.

Dayuhan
08-15-2011, 05:06 AM
How does one create trust where no trust exists? This is the real question, and this should be the focal point of US operations in Afghanistan. Not how do we help one side to prevail, for there is no permanent stability in forcing such a victory.

Trying to make that the focal point of US operations seems to me a repeat of a mistake we've made before in Afghanistan: handing our people on the ground nebulous and unspecific goals that they are ill equipped to accomplish... if indeed those tasks can be accomplished at all. Armies can't build nations and armies can't create trust. Why ask them to do what they cannot do?

Do we need "permanent stability" in Afghanistan? Is there some more moderate and more achievable goal that we can set?


The current constitution of Afghanistan is rooted in this historic distrust. It is designed to ensure that no one outside the Northern Alliance circle of trust has any legal means to compete with them for either political or economic (which in this patronage society are one and the same) success. Once that gauntlet was thrown down, behind the protection of the Coalition, the insurgency began to grow in earnest. Once we ramped up our efforts to "defeat" that insurgency the resistance element among the largely apolitical populace began to grow as well.

I remain unconvinced that any other Constitution would have made a difference. Whoever is in power will exclude, marginalize, and oppress whoever is out of power. Whoever is out of power will fight back. This is Afghanistan. A document is not going to change it. It can change, over time, as the people involved seek other ways... but until they take that initiative themselves, it won't happen. We can't make it happen.


I wheel out the US Constitution because I recognize it for what it really is. A masterpiece of COIN; an effort to create and preserve trust among a similarly diverse and divided populace to help them learn to work together toward a better future for all.

"Similarly divided" seems a rather enormous stretch. The founding fathers were in fact a remarkably homogeneous group with rather similar interests, and they did not have anything like the recent history of conflict and oppression that the contending parties in Afghanistan have.


I do advocate for others to come together to debate their distrust for each other and for government and to find a system that works for them to overcome the same. That is reconciliation.

Advocating it won't make it happen. We may be able to bribe or bully people into making a show of negotiation, but if they don't really want to be there and they don't trust the parties they are negotiating with and they have no confidence in anyone's commitment to follow whatever "agreement" is reached... well, that's not reconciliation either. That's a facade.

We're in this mess in Afghanistan because we took on the absurdly impractical task of trying to dictate how Afghanistan is going to be governed. We will not get out of that hole by digging ourselves deeper into it. IMO, as always.

Bob's World
08-15-2011, 02:29 PM
Dayuhan,

I realize you don't understand or agree with my points.

I stand by them all the same. We either focus on building some degree of trust that allows this country to come together and move on, or we simply go home. Frankly I am fine with the latter, except for the small fact that if we just do that it will be those who placed trust in us that we have been pleading for, who will suffer the most.

We don't need trust in us, we need them to trust in each other. That demands a proper legal framework and a neutral system of enforcement. We built the wrong legal framework, and then backed it with a one-sided system of enforcement.

Entropy
08-15-2011, 04:48 PM
Bob,

I generally agree with your points about the constitution. The flaws in it were obvious from almost the beginning. I just did a search and found that I mentioned the issues you're talking about on this forum over 2 1/2 years ago (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=63721#post63721) and it's something I've discussed elsewhere and was even part of my pre-deployment IPB in 2005. I think, even at this late date, that changing the constitution would help, though I don't think it would be as decisive as you seem to think.

The problem is that the constitution isn't going to be changed. Even if you, me and other like-minded people could band together and use the underpants gnome strategy to convince the US government that this needs to be the focus of our policy, the Afghans will reject it. I'm not confident that there is any amount of outside pressure will get them to consider, much less implement, such changes even assuming we can change US policy. It would require the current leadership to voluntarily give up most of their power, money and influence - how likely is that? This is a society that runs on patronage and the Afghan government is the mother-of-all patronage networks.

I hate to say it, but this is an idea that needs to be filed with a picture of a pink unicorn on it because I will probably see one of those before I ever see the current Afghan government reform the constitution. There are too many entrenched interests, in both the US and Afghanistan, that support the status quo. Here, I think, the US is actually a hindrance since our money is feeding this beast and our own systems are dependent on the Afghan top-down power structure. We would have to fundamentally alter the way we do business in Afghanistan which, again, at this late stage, is bloody unlikely.

I wish I was wrong about this, but I'm pretty confident in my estimate. The flaws were blatantly obvious for at least the last five years, yet talk of reform is still a side issue. I don't see anything on the horizon that's going to give this proposal new life or alter the basic status quo. Maybe it's my lack of vision, or maybe it's my cynicism, which I admit clouds just about all my thinking on Afghanistan, but I just don't see it happening.

Dayuhan
08-16-2011, 07:15 AM
We either focus on building some degree of trust that allows this country to come together and move on, or we simply go home. Frankly I am fine with the latter, except for the small fact that if we just do that it will be those who placed trust in us that we have been pleading for, who will suffer the most.

We don't need trust in us, we need them to trust in each other. That demands a proper legal framework and a neutral system of enforcement. We built the wrong legal framework, and then backed it with a one-sided system of enforcement.

Actually I agree with you: if we could create trust and fix the politics we could solve the problems. If we could make people trust each other and fix other people's politics we could bring peace to Mindanao, build a government in Somalia, democratize Saudi Arabia and China, and have the Israelis and Palestinians dancing cheek to cheek. The problem is in that big little if.

I don't think Americans can or should try to build "a proper legal framework" or "a neutral system of enforcement" for Afghans. Those are governance functions and if we take them on we are, like it or not, governing. I don't think for a minute that the contending parties in Afghanistan are going to trust each other, work with each other, or stop trying to take power for themselves just because we want them to.

Most of all, I am not comfortable with the idea of assigning our people yet another nebulous, non-specific, and probably unachievable "nation-building" task. Our presence in Afghanistan is dominated by the army, and asking an army to build a legal framework, install a neutral system of enforcement, and make people trust each other is like asking an engineer to do surgery. They aren't trained or equipped to do that (I'm not sure anyone is) and the attempt will end badly. I know they will try, if asked, but it doesn't make sense to ask.

I'd also have to point out that as an engaged combatant we are not well positioned to act as a mediator.

It seems to me that we need to slow it down with the grand, noble, and unachievable goals, and ratchet the aim back to something specific, practical, and achievable. Do we really "need" them to trust each other? Is there no way to meet our minimum goals and still acknowledge the reality that they don't trust each other, and will not no matter what we say or do?

davidbfpo
09-21-2011, 08:57 AM
The murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, ex-Northern Alliance leader, a Tajik, suggests IMHO that the Taliban and others have no wish to reconcile.

An in-country BBC reporter's profile and commentary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14996850

From Watandost:
The killing was a strong statement of Taliban opposition to peace talks, and as the latest in a string of high-profile assassinations will increase the apprehension of ordinary Afghans about their future as the insurgency gathers pace.

Link:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2011/09/who-killed-burhanuddin-rabbani.html

Bob's World
09-21-2011, 10:29 AM
The murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, ex-Northern Alliance leader, a Tajik, suggests IMHO that the Taliban and others have no wish to reconcile.

An in-country BBC reporter's profile and commentary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14996850

From Watandost:

Link:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2011/09/who-killed-burhanuddin-rabbani.html


We really don't know who put the hit on Rabbani, now do we? Based on the interests of the parties I would offer that it is every bit as likely that it came from GIRoA as from the Taliban if political in nature; if not political, then the pool of candidates widens significantly.

An alternative assumption, that is IMO more likely, is that Rabanni was making headway and that the outcome was going to shift the distribution of power in ways that someone who felt he and his affiliates would be net losers in. This is almost any Hazara or Uzbek; or even those Pashtuns whose tribes were able to move into power positions on the skirts of the US invasion (like for example the current Kandahar COP Razik and his tribe that gained control of the cash machine of the border crossing between Spin Boldak and Qetta from the very large and powerful Noorzai tribe in Kandahar).

After 10 years, we are still babes in Afghanistan when it comes to understanding the dynamics of power, its employment, and the competition to gain and hold it. The Taliban are just one group of one aspect of this.

Steve the Planner
09-21-2011, 01:19 PM
Bob:

We seldom agree, but not on this one.

Does it really matter who pulled the trigger, which most say was Haqqani?

The storm was brewing around this chaotic concept of peace talks not supported by the Mullah, raising substantial unaddressed issues for non-Pashtuns, and, in the end, threatening to unravel the instability that so many important players depend on for their status and continued wealth.

How was this initiative really supposed to accomplish anything but, in the end, an assassination? Especially when viewed through the overall strategy of high-profile targeting in Kabul to continually demonstrate the weaknesses of the central government.

Instead, the obvious question is: Who's next?

Bob's World
09-21-2011, 01:45 PM
There are only two paths to "stability" in Afghanistan:

1. Reconciliation by GIRoA that bring the various Taliban factions into legal political competition for influence. (This is best, but as many point out, those who have power don't want to share, and those who don't have power will equally attempt to sieze all as well. This is the Afghan way.)

2. We leave and allow whomever is naturally strongest to rise to power. We created an artificial solution, as such will never be legitimate or sustainable. A natural solution must occur, and that will be messy and will not be anything we can or should control. We would then simply be willing to have open relations with whomever prevails as the best way to support our interests there.

Both of those options are better than the one we currently pursue.

As to who is taken out next? That really depends on who is seeking to create what advantage for themself. There is tremendous friction within both the Taliban and GIRoA, possibly as much as there is between the two. This is a no-trust environment.

This is the genius of the US Constitution (and why it is a masterpiece of COIN) is that it was specifically designed to create trust where no trust existed, and allow 13 diverse and separate sovereign parties work and move forward together as a collective.

Everything I learned about the Constitution in 8th Grade Civics and later in Law School totally missed the true essence, purpose, and power of the document.

Bob's World
09-21-2011, 08:06 PM
An insightful quote off of Al Jazeera today:


Amrullah Saleh, a former Afghan intelligence chief who fought against the Taliban under Rabbani, told Al Jazeera the attacks showed the government's failure in protecting high-profile figures.

These attacks tell us that the policy of appeasement and deal making with the Taliban and Pakistan is not going to lead to peace.

By adapting a vague policy of so called reconciliation, [the government] has created confusion in our society and weakened the government to the extent that they can't even protect high-profiled leaders in the capital.

Rabbani's death could also unleash the resentment building up among some senior Northern Alliance members, who have criticised Karzai for his peace efforts with the Taliban, Saleh said.

If Karzai wants to keep Afghanistan united, he has to launch massive massive investigations and bring the culprits to justice.

One can see his words dripping with contempt for the idea of reconciliation. As I have said, this is the critical task, ISAF has left it to GIRoA to accomplish, and it is not in the interest of GIRoA to make it happen.

But a news flash for Mr. Saleh: A government cannot "appease" its own populace by making concessions to address their reasonable grievances. That is simply government doing its job to govern the entire populace, and not just certain segments at the expense of others.

Appeasement is when a government makes concessions to some foreign body at the expense of their own populace. Certainly Pakistan sees their interests in Afghanistan best represented through the Taliban, but the Taliban are a nationalist insurgency that draws from a populace that just happens to overlap the border between these two countries. The Taliban do not attack GIRoA because Pakistan tells them to, they attack GIRoA because GIRoA denies them full participation in their own country's politics and economy.

It is fully within the capability of GIRoA to resolve this insurgency on reasonable terms now. It will not be about one side "winning" or one "losing" but rather about moving from a biased, polarized government established by our intervention there to a more balanced government established by Afghans for Afghans. But it is not in the interest of GIRoA to do this so long as they can rely on ISAF to protect their current unsustainable model.

The fast road to peace and stability in Afghanistan is for ISAF to pack up and go home. At that point GIRoA's interests will make an amazing swing, and we will see an amazing growth of interest in such things as reconciliation and security force capacity that seem lacking now.

Dayuhan
09-21-2011, 11:15 PM
The Taliban do not attack GIRoA because Pakistan tells them to, they attack GIRoA because GIRoA denies them full participation in their own country's politics and economy.

What basis do you have for stating this as fact?

Seems to me the Taliban attack the GIRoA because they want power. They had it, they lost it, and they want it back. When they had it, they excluded and oppressed other groups. When they lost it, they were excluded and oppressed. If they get it back, they will exclude and oppress. They're not likely to accept anything short of full control unless they see it as a tactical step toward gaining full control.

What tangible evidence have we to suggest anything but a winner-take-all outcome?


It is fully within the capability of GIRoA to resolve this insurgency on reasonable terms now. It will not be about one side "winning" or one "losing" but rather about moving from a biased, polarized government established by our intervention there to a more balanced government established by Afghans for Afghans. But it is not in the interest of GIRoA to do this so long as they can rely on ISAF to protect their current unsustainable model.

Again you state this as fact, but why? Why would you think a balanced, inclusive government has any chance among bitter enemies who loathe and distrust each other? Why would they share? Given the obvious conflict over patronage, corruption, and the privilege of running technically illegal enterprises without interference, why would they just get along? Doesn't it seem more likely that they will fight over the goodies until somebody wins?


The fast road to peace and stability in Afghanistan is for ISAF to pack up and go home. At that point GIRoA's interests will make an amazing swing, and we will see an amazing growth of interest in such things as reconciliation and security force capacity that seem lacking now.

I don't see GIRoA's interests changing at all. The interest will be in survival and profit, just as it is now, though with survival less likely short term profit and exit strategies will become more important. I don't see any evidence that anyone in either party sees shared power as viable, except as a transitory tactical step toward gaining full control.

I can't see the Taliban agenda changing either. With the US gone they'd see all the marbles ripe for the picking, and why would they settle for half when they can have all? You might de-motivate elements driven purely by resistance to the foreign invader, but you'd re-motivate opportunistic elements who see the Taliban as likely to win and want to get in on the side of the new distributors of largesse.

It would be wonderful if a US withdrawal would deprive the AQ narrative of strength, but at this point it wouldn't. AQ draws most of its support from opposition to foreign military intervention in Muslim lands, and if the US had declined any extensive and lasting involvement in Afghanistan from the start, that would have hurt AQ badly. Too late to make that work now, though: we exit now, AQ spins it as victory... and the spin will be believed.

Unfortunately, our own bad decisions have boxed us into a place where we're stuck supporting a government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to let fall, and where the only rational step for us to take can be credibly claimed as victory by our opponent. This was forseeable, but we didn't want to see. I don't see any very good end; least bad is all we can hope for... and hopefully we learn a thing or two.

Statements that the Taliban are fighting for inclusion and participation, rather than control, or that an American withdrawal would produce reconciliation, are far from self-evident and cannot be stated as self-evident truth. They need to be supported with evidence and reasoning: what exactly makes you think that these parties are going to suddenly trust each other and share power, given the recent history and current positions of the contending parties?

omarali50
09-22-2011, 01:17 AM
The notion that the taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want
"reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesnt know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.

Ken White
09-22-2011, 02:09 AM
The notion that the taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want "reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesnt know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.Particularly on that "...one side doesn't know what the fight is..." aspect. :o

That's been true ever since we decided to 'stay' a while...

Bill Moore
09-22-2011, 05:53 AM
Posted by Bob,


2. We leave and allow whomever is naturally strongest to rise to power. We created an artificial solution, as such will never be legitimate or sustainable. A natural solution must occur, and that will be messy and will not be anything we can or should control. We would then simply be willing to have open relations with whomever prevails as the best way to support our interests there.

Agree with the intent, but I suspect the reality is there will be an Afghan (I suspect that is what you mean by natural) solution. Just because we leave, doesn't mean other State Actors will stop supporting their favorite surrogate. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to assume the solution to the problems in Afghanistan simply reside in Afghanistan.

Bob's World
09-22-2011, 12:09 PM
The notion that the Taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want
"Reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesn’t know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.

No single faction can force a solution that is designed to oppress the losers without immediately finding themselves in a COIN campaign of their own. Those who believe that they are somehow exempt from this reality are dreamers.

Of course Pakistan wants their interests to prevail, why should they be any different than us?

Of course the Taliban want total control, why should they be any different than the Northern Alliance?

All of those desires are true and natural and reasonable. They just won't work. The culture and history of Afghanistan has been one of such swings of power, often forced by the intervention of some external power tipping the balance to allow those on the outside to step to the inside. Once inside, the prevailing party then does to the losers what was done to them, and the cycle continues.

All we are currently doing is artificially perpetuating this cycle in favor of a particular side. Any who believe that our current approaches will lead to "democracy" or a "modern Afghan state" or "stability" simply do not understand insurgency, its causes and its cures.

Insurgency is caused by government, and when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable. By type I mean one that does not treat the entire populace equitably, one that does not ensure that there is justice under the rule of law for the entire populace, one that is not perceived as having the right to govern by the entire populace, and one that does not allow legal vehicles and venues for the populace to shape or address their concerns about governance.


Which brings us back to the two points I made above. We cannot force a solution that is any better or more enduring than what would occur if we simply left. By us forcing a solution that is unacceptable to half we make the US susceptible to acts of transnational terrorism from members of that populace, and increasingly, from individuals around the globe who are sympathetic to that populace (i.e., "homegrown terrorists").

So, we either force the two sides to reconcile and craft some form of shared governance and focus on enforcing trust between the two (rather than enforcing the ability of one side to dominate over the other); or we leave, let it sort out, and work with whomever emerges (regardless of who might have helped them to get there).

Certainly Britain ultimately worked with the US even though France helped us to emerge.

We are too focused on trying to control an outcome, and that is a fool's errand.

Steve the Planner
09-22-2011, 12:27 PM
Bill:

It's like debating the CPA's actions in Baghdad. So much water under the damn.

The Afghan solution in 2002 or 2005 may have been remarkably different than what will result in 2013 or 2014 amongst heavily militarized and drug & war-enriched militias.

I still struggle with the demographics of Afghanistan, given the trans-national nature of Pashtuns, and the shear number of displaced Afghans in Pakistan.

Assuming, without benefit of census, that Pashtuns in Afghanistan are 40% of 24 or 26 million, and there are 2-3 million Afghan Pashtuns in Pakistan, aren't they not just a large minority, but, in fact, the majority under a reasonable post-conflict voting pattern which includes refugees abroad. (Further complicated by trans-national fluctuations as with Kurds---are they Turkish or Iranian Kurds brought home to vote?).

The circumstances do not align for the "old ways" of a traditional Loya Jirga of brokering regional/factional differences against a weak, but cordial and accommodating central government ( a veneer for international aid, etc...), but for a combative winner takes all system.

The inherent fears and risks of non-Pashtuns cannot, as in the past, be weighed out by tea, tribute and intermarriage.

The question, between now and 2014 (at the latest), is whether the inherent conflicts can be managed-down to something less brutal and cataclysmic than current trends suggest.

Cordesman and other think tankers have argued to strengthen regions and provinces before the deluge (I mean transition), but that, in many ways, simply reinforces the risks of truly bloody fractures.

This is just plain hard---a real mess with (obviously) continuing next shoes to drop over a potentially long period of time.

Our dwindling ability to influence downstream circumstances (which always happens once departure is expected) just adds to the confusion.

Bob always likes to rattle with bold historical propositions: the US Constitution is the remarkable crowing achievement of COIN. God created COIN as a blessing for his people on Earth, etc...

Isn't this greatly bewildering mess, too, the remarkable product of COIN?

Bob's World
09-22-2011, 02:09 PM
Steve, don't be an F-tard. Insurgency is natural, and Man created COIN to attempt to stem this natural process.

One of man's best efforts at COIN is our Constitution. I stand by that assessment. It is preventative and addresses the roots, while most military COIN doctrine and TTPs only seeks to manage or mitigate the symptoms while leaving (protecting even) the roots to flourish and resprout.

You may find that to be "rattling" or prattling. But it is an important, underrepresented perspective all the same.

Cheers!

bob

omarali50
09-22-2011, 02:27 PM
Bob, I dont get what is "artificial" about US intervention, but "natural" about Pakistani or Indian or Iranian intervention? Unless you mean that neighbors have a "natural" right to intervene but the distant USA does not? (that debate would lead on to others, as you can well imagine).
The distinction is not about "natural" vs "artificial". Its about knowing what you want and having some sort of plan to get it.
But I dont want to leave you with the impression that I think the ISI not only knows what it wants but that what it wants also makes good sense. I think it makes no sense at all for Pakistanis in general to wish that the US supported Afghan state should collapse into civil war....the blowback and the price paid by Pakistan will be astronomical. It would have made much more sense to use the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the US with big bucks and firepower to fundamentally change course in the region. America may have had its own (sometimes silly, maybe sometimes evil) notions of what it wants, but that doesnt mean it couldnt be used for some good for a change. A different Afghanistan and Pakistan were possible (not easy, but possible). The hardcore rejectionists in the Jihadi party were on the back foot. Their plan for the region was going to lead to endless war and much bigger disasters. It was a plan idiots in GHQ had supported because of their juvenile notions of national identity, Indian-threat, strategic depth and other bull#### (much of the mess can be ascribed to teaching "strategy" to overgrown kids in NDU, with no adult supervision)...they had a chance to change course. Instead, Musharraf and company opted for a "lets put one foot in every boat" strategy and messed it up.
A particular strand (and its only one strand, but a dangerous and deep rooted one) of Muslim separatism and "the ideology of Pakistan" is also involved. The whole complicated mess has other aspects, too numerous to cover in one post...
I can see that our "priors" are very different. All I can do right now is hint at some of the differences. In all such debates, the real differences lie deeper and only become apparent over time with much back and forth. And then too, maybe only to third parties who are not already invested in either position. In short, I have to run. But more later..
Meanwhile, see: http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sugexp=pfwc&cp=21&gs_id=2c&xhr=t&q=omar+ali+3quarksdaily&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&source=hp&pbx=1&oq=omar+ali+3quarksdaily&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=&gs_upl=&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=30c34a24a8264e6b&biw=1280&bih=894

and: http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&source=hp&q=%22omar+ali%22+brownpundits.com&pbx=1&oq=%22omar+ali%22+brownpundits.com&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=25404l26506l6l26826l4l3l0l0l0l0l97l282l3l3l 0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=30c34a24a8264e6b&biw=1280&bih=894

omarali50
09-22-2011, 02:50 PM
See: http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C09%5C22%5Cstory_22-9-2011_pg3_2

Steve the Planner
09-22-2011, 05:41 PM
Bob, now I get it. God didn't create COIN as a blessing for his people on Earth. It pre-existed God, the big bang and everything else.

So only Chuck Norris could ever defy COIN and live to tell about it?

I was pleasantly surprised to read Rory Stewart's positive report on the emerging situation in Libya (not democracy, but surprisingly free from the chaos, violence and strife of the COIN countries.

His view was that: (1) it was a unique outcome resulting from unique circumstances which, in part, (2) included the domestic and civilian nature of the effort (free from foreign interference on the ground).

He didn't mention anything about the role of COIN. What's up with that?

Bob's World
09-22-2011, 05:46 PM
COIN is an operation. A program of activity designed, defined and implemented by governments to deal with a popualce in insurgency.

Insurgency is a dynamic or phenomina. A naturally occuring event when certain conditions exist.

Some people use "COIN" and "Insurgency" interchangably I guess. Explains alot about our challenges in getting our hands on the problem over the past forever.

Frankly, I don't think God much cares one way or the other. He created man to have an independent will, and within that will one finds the essence of insurgency.

Steve the Planner
09-22-2011, 05:47 PM
PS: My mistake: Chuck Norris or Ken White.

PPS: Omarali: Bob is a lawyer, so you can't contest his credibility (except about Pakistan with a Pakistani lawyer). Agree that whatever happens next in Afghanistan will have substantial repercussions and interactions on/with the nuclear neighbors.

Bob's World
09-22-2011, 05:55 PM
Bob, I dont get what is "artificial" about US intervention, but "natural" about Pakistani or Indian or Iranian intervention? Unless you mean that neighbors have a "natural" right to intervene but the distant USA does not? (that debate would lead on to others, as you can well imagine).
The distinction is not about "natural" vs "artificial". Its about knowing what you want and having some sort of plan to get it.
But I dont want to leave you with the impression that I think the ISI not only knows what it wants but that what it wants also makes good sense. I think it makes no sense at all for Pakistanis in general to wish that the US supported Afghan state should collapse into civil war....the blowback and the price paid by Pakistan will be astronomical. It would have made much more sense to use the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the US with big bucks and firepower to fundamentally change course in the region. America may have had its own (sometimes silly, maybe sometimes evil) notions of what it wants, but that doesnt mean it couldnt be used for some good for a change. A different Afghanistan and Pakistan were possible (not easy, but possible). The hardcore rejectionists in the Jihadi party were on the back foot. Their plan for the region was going to lead to endless war and much bigger disasters. It was a plan idiots in GHQ had supported because of their juvenile notions of national identity, Indian-threat, strategic depth and other bull#### (much of the mess can be ascribed to teaching "strategy" to overgrown kids in NDU, with no adult supervision)...they had a chance to change course. Instead, Musharraf and company opted for a "lets put one foot in every boat" strategy and messed it up.
A particular strand (and its only one strand, but a dangerous and deep rooted one) of Muslim separatism and "the ideology of Pakistan" is also involved. The whole complicated mess has other aspects, too numerous to cover in one post...
I can see that our "priors" are very different. All I can do right now is hint at some of the differences. In all such debates, the real differences lie deeper and only become apparent over time with much back and forth. And then too, maybe only to third parties who are not already invested in either position. In short, I have to run. But more later..
Meanwhile, see: http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sugexp=pfwc&cp=21&gs_id=2c&xhr=t&q=omar+ali+3quarksdaily&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&source=hp&pbx=1&oq=omar+ali+3quarksdaily&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=&gs_upl=&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=30c34a24a8264e6b&biw=1280&bih=894

and: http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&source=hp&q=%22omar+ali%22+brownpundits.com&pbx=1&oq=%22omar+ali%22+brownpundits.com&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=25404l26506l6l26826l4l3l0l0l0l0l97l282l3l3l 0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=30c34a24a8264e6b&biw=1280&bih=894


I did not mean to imply that any intervention is natural, only that insurgency is. If the Pakistanis intervene to force an artificial solution (which they certainly will attempt to do) it to will be an artificial solution of their proxies act to freeze out the populaces currently represented by GIRoA/Northern Alliance. But then it will be Pakistan's problem to maintain, and not ours.

We win by taking a neutral position and working with whomever it is that happens to prevail. Remember why we are in Afghanistan, it is not to make Karzai and his friends and family rich and famous (though we have), it was to prevent AQ from using the region as a safe haven to attack American interests from. We can work that through any government. The populaces of that region tolerate Arabs, but have little inclination (beyond a Pashtunwali duty to protect a guest) to put their own interests at risk to support organizations such as AQ.

We've just gotten ourselves sucked into this internal power struggle, and we are not well served by working to sort out any particular side prevailing over another. Such advocacy makes us a target of the opposition, regardless of which side we pick. Better to pick neither and to work with either.

Steve the Planner
09-22-2011, 06:57 PM
Bob:

Suggest you review the BBC videos: "Secret Iraq." Good source is Musings on Iraq blog.

Show the perspective of Iraqis to the events that unfolded: Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, and the emergence of domestic opposition to US occupation (the same foreign troops issues at play in Afghanistan).

It is neither a pretty, simplistic, or heroic tale from an Iraqi perspective, with ample pretexts, justifications and drivers to legitimize opposition activities.

I suggest that the complete after action analysis of all this stuff (the second and third drafts of history) will cast substantially more gray on the black and white versions of the first drafts.

History, at some point, will tell whether COIN, whatever it actually is deciphered as, did, or did not, help to address the underlying problems it was targeted at.

Same in Afghanistan:We have, perhaps, been sucked into an internal power struggle (your words) in which the current parties we back are greatly enriching themselves, but win by ultimately aligning ourselves with which ever party prevails (most likely Pashtun, and possibly via Pak-backed Taliban), so long as they keep AQ at bay.

It just doesn't sound like the COIN Manual to me. Wouldn't even know how to identify the target to be shot/bribed/be-hearted.

davidbfpo
09-22-2011, 09:26 PM
Steve the Planner stated in Post 144:
Assuming, without benefit of census, that Pashtuns in Afghanistan are 40% of 24 or 26 million, and there are 2-3 million Afghan Pashtuns in Pakistan...

My understanding, based on UN reports and other sources, is that many of the Afghan refugees - who remained in Pakistan and Iran - returned to Afghanistan, largely facilitated by the UN and others.

The large Afghan refugee suburbs of Peshawar pre-2001 I believe have shrunk; those who migrated further afield, notably to Karachi and gained employment did not return. Afghans incidentally dominate the road haulage industry.

A good number of the initial Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, after the Soviet invasion, were not Pashtun, they came later when rural and mountain Pashtun populations fled the Soviet-Afghan onslaught.

Dayuhan
09-22-2011, 11:00 PM
No single faction can force a solution that is designed to oppress the losers without immediately finding themselves in a COIN campaign of their own. Those who believe that they are somehow exempt from this reality are dreamers.

Of course Pakistan wants their interests to prevail, why should they be any different than us?

Of course the Taliban want total control, why should they be any different than the Northern Alliance?

It is possible - indeed likely - that the Pakistanis and the Taliban understand that their preferred outcome will involve a COIN campaign, and that they find this acceptable.


All of those desires are true and natural and reasonable. They just won't work.

That depends on how you define work. If you assume that any given party wants to break the cycle, then no, it won't work. If they accept the cycle as a given and believe that they can sustain their turn on top, then it works for them, and that's what matters.


Insurgency is caused by government, and when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable. By type I mean one that does not treat the entire populace equitably, one that does not ensure that there is justice under the rule of law for the entire populace, one that is not perceived as having the right to govern by the entire populace, and one that does not allow legal vehicles and venues for the populace to shape or address their concerns about governance.

When you say "when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable", you have to look at who "one" is. If we are producing a government in Afghanistan, insurgency is inevitable no matter what we produce. Acceptability to "the entire populace" is easy to say, but in many circumstances impossible to achieve, especially when various parts of the populace all see "we rule" as the only acceptable form of governance.


So, we either force the two sides to reconcile and craft some form of shared governance and focus on enforcing trust between the two (rather than enforcing the ability of one side to dominate over the other); or we leave, let it sort out, and work with whomever emerges (regardless of who might have helped them to get there).

This is the corner we've painted ourselves into. Reconciliation and trust cannot be achieved under duress. All we could force would be a brief facade... that might be enough to buy us a marginally credible exit point, but we shouldn't delude ourselves into thinking it would last, or that our exit would force reconciliation.

If we just leave, most of the world will perceive that as defeat. We can probably live with that, and we'll probably have to, sooner or later.


We are too focused on trying to control an outcome, and that is a fool's errand.

Well, yes, but focusing on trying to "force the two sides to reconcile" or on "enforcing trust" is also trying to control an outcome, and possibly even more a fool's errand, as we have no capacity to force anyone to reconcile or trust.


We win by taking a neutral position and working with whomever it is that happens to prevail.

Neutrality is like virginity: once you lose it, you can't get it back. We lost our neutrality in Afghanistan a long time ago and we have not even a shred of credibility as neutral mediator.


We've just gotten ourselves sucked into this internal power struggle, and we are not well served by working to sort out any particular side prevailing over another. Such advocacy makes us a target of the opposition, regardless of which side we pick. Better to pick neither and to work with either.

We weren't sucked into it, we created it, when we chose to install and maintain a Government in Afghanistan.

omarali50
09-23-2011, 02:49 AM
Now that the #### has hit the fan, what next? I want to throw out some over-the-top options (I can think of no "not-over-the-top" options):

1. Pakistan cries uncle (Sam). Goes after "Haqqani network" or some such and the US expresses satisfaction.
Doesnt look very likely. As far as I can tell, the generals really believe the US is on the verge of collapse and they know what they are doing. And who knows, it may not be the best outcome for the US, since it means they have to stay in Afghanistan, take care of Pakistan's endless "needs" and somehow translate this tactical victory into a lasting peace..not easily done. Why would we expect that the same people who failed to figure out things for 10 years suddenly have a plan?

2. The US finds it has overplayed its hand. Tries to arrange some suitable propaganda and expresses satisfaction with whatever Pakistan pretends to do. Gets the hell out. Fast. Throws up a smokescreen of made-up stories and tries to change the subject.
Not easily carried off, and there is no conceivable way in which Kiyani sahib can arrange for the various taliban and haqqanis and whatnot to permit an "honorable exit". The Mujahideen will want their pound of flesh and want people hanging from rope ladders as helicopters take off from the embassy. That may well stick in the craw of American politicians and officers (unless the casualty count reaches Vietnam levels and we are nowhere close to that point). So this too seems unlikely.

3. The US carries out some symbolic action against Pakistan. Pakistan pretends to explode in fury. Zardari is kicked out as a result and "patriotic officers" take over. Then both sides feel honor has been satisfied and go back to the status quo ante. But what does that change in the long run?

Seems hard to believe, but 3 looks the most likely of 3 unbelievably difficult options. And all three seem unsatisfactory.

I have no idea what comes next.

Levi
09-23-2011, 04:01 PM
Here's what I have thought for a while.

1. The U.S. withdraws, whenever and however. Makes no difference IMO if it is announced or not.

2. Whoever is the largest and best supplied force in country starts taking ground. Maybe the Taliban, I don't know who has the most capable force after we leave.

3. Pakistan has internal problems, and the legitimate government is controlled by any party with a Taliban or like minded leadership. I think voted in.

4. India prepares for the worst, and masses troops on the border of where ever that one place they are always fighting about is. You know where I mean.

5. So, constant internal strife in Afghanistan bleeds over into Pakistan, destabilizing the region. Maybe it goes nuclear with India.

omarali50
09-23-2011, 05:07 PM
I wrote this comment on the New Yorker website, but it seems relevant here:
I dont think US policymakers have (even now) a sufficient notion of what the problem is, a solution therefore seems unlikely.
In a different world, the US would admit it is in over its head and would pull out very quickly and let the locals and various regional powers fight it out. it will be extremely nasty in the region, but at least the US will not be directly involved...
Since it is actually unlikely that the US is ready to just pull out and leave the entire region to its own devices (what kind of worldcop would do that?), the most likely thing is that we will see more of the same. GHQ understands the US better than the US understands GHQ
Unless some miracle has happened, it is the US that is likely to find itself being frustrated and blundering from friend to enemy to friend with no good plan either way Making loud noises (the current accusations would normally constitute an act of war) while searching for a way to get out without humiliation. Pakistan will hurt even more, but the elite will find new sources of cash (China? Saudi Arabia?...not as generous and careless with money as Uncle Sam, but good enough for bad times) and will not suffer too much (poor people will suffer horribly, but who cares about them?). Eventually, the elite will also go down (or escape to the big bad United States), probably complaining about Zionist-Hindu-American plots until someone pries the microphone from their cold dead hands..but it will be an unpleasant mess and a long drawn out death, not a clean and clear "endgame". Too pessimistic?

Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

Steve the Planner
09-24-2011, 03:12 AM
Omar:

Interested in your comment that there is no way pakistan makes it out safely.

Care to elaborate?

Bob's World
09-24-2011, 01:07 PM
Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

I do think the US worries about its image if perceived to have left on any terms other than our own. I wish we were equally concerned about how our current course of operations affects our reputation. Like the nature of the threat in that region, like the vitalness of our interests in that region, we also over estimate the damage to our reputation. We need to reassess.

As to Pakistan, this is a country that has grown increasingly unstable during and DUE TO the past 10 years of US operations in AF/PAK. We blame all of the instability on the "bad guys," but we are not just distilled water poured into this complex system. We are a large and powerful foreign agent inserted into the mix, and most of the disruption is reasonably attributed to our actions, regardless of how well intended. I think that Pakistan will quickly settle back into a reasonably stable country, with the government largely focusing once again on the Indus valley and leaving those in the mountains once again to their own traditional self-governance. It is a system that has worked reasonably well historically and certainly will again once everyone stops stirring the pot with Western ideas of "exercising sovereignty," etc.

Iran and Pakistan will always exercise a great deal of influence into Afghanistan, how can that not be so with the populaces that they share? How can that not be so with the traditional expectation and reality that the government does not intrude much into a populace that has few expectations of government, and leaves the populace to be largely self-governed at the local level through local processes of religious, tribal, family, and village leadership? This is not a bad thing. Afghanistan is not America, and efforts to make it a "Little America" are misguided.

ganulv
09-24-2011, 01:53 PM
Pakistan will hurt even more, but the elite will find new sources of cash (China? Saudi Arabia?...not as generous and careless with money as Uncle Sam, but good enough for bad times) and will not suffer too much (poor people will suffer horribly, but who cares about them?). Eventually, the elite will also go down (or escape to the big bad United States), probably complaining about Zionist-Hindu-American plots until someone pries the microphone from their cold dead hands..but it will be an unpleasant mess and a long drawn out death, not a clean and clear "endgame". Too pessimistic?

Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

The notion that there are any real threats to the rule of the Pakistani nepocracy not originating with the Union Government strikes me as unlikely and perhaps as wishful thinking. There are domestic tensions to be managed to be sure, but that kind of chaos isn’t necessarily bad for entrenched political types (see contemporary America, United States of). To echo Steve’s question, care to elaborate?

omarali50
09-24-2011, 06:33 PM
I will bite; We can look at things at many levels, and all are valid in their own way. In this case, I was not looking at either the details of administration or military tactics and capacity (e.g. how corrupt is Zardari? how competent is Rahman Malik? what is the tactical plan for conquering Afghanistan? etc etc), I was looking at what I imagine to be "deeper trends" whose actual working out can be very unexpected and even paradoxical. My thinking is based on some extension of the following:

1. There is a certain network of ideas that is built around the "two-nation theory"and "an Islamic system of government". These ideas (like all such ideas) are partly someone's idea of "this works well to achieve my immediate and practical political aims", but they do have their own momentum and some sort of elastic but not infinitely elastic limits about what can be done in their name.
2. The second is a live issue in all Muslim countries and may eventually develop into a workable system (Iranians claim they have one example, though I personally think its workable parts are derived from Western sources and its problem areas from Shia theology and the two have not been fused as successfully as the Iranian regime sometimes claims). The first is a peculiarly Pakistani (or Indian) issue and is much shallower than the second. The second will eventually throw up workable systems, the first cannot bear the weight of any actual contact with reality and all attempts to align it too closely with actual practice run into brick walls that are visible to outsiders but sometimes invisible to true believers. These are large claims. I can write a book about them and not answer all possible questions. But with time we can clarify what I mean.

3. These ideas (two nation theory or TNT in all its manifestations, and “Islamic system of govt” as currently imagined in Pakistan though not necessarily in all future forms) are inherently illiberal (in the classic sense of the word liberal) and difficult to reconcile with currently fashionable notions of nation states and their permissible aims and methods. To make Pakistan work as a modern nation state, they have to be "defanged", e.g. by being relegated to meaningless propaganda rather than being used as actual guides for decision making. The Pakistani state initially ignored some of their implications because the administrative apparatus and political forces were creations of British India and in practice (if not always in name) they functioned like any other post-colonial state derived from the British empire (naturally, with many local variations and historical contingencies). But over time, the karma of British raj is fading and what is being put in its place is insufficiently imagined (and, in my view, see 2 above, the Pakistani elite cannot possibly find the a way to make it “sufficiently imagined”).

4. The army, for various reasons, has systematically undermined the British colonial administration and the parliamentary system created in Pakistan in 1969 (and formalized in 1973). But it has nothing to put in its place except its own organizational strength and a superficial and shallow ideology of “Paknationalism”. Not only is this inherently flawed, the army leadership lacks the intellectual ability to even comprehend what the problem may be. It is constantly surprised by the fact that its “patriotic” attempts to save Pakistan reliably end with public upheaval and ever more serious fractures in the ideological foundations of the state. But over time, the army has improved and perfected its levers for manipulating public opinion and politics at least within the Pakistani elite. The entire elite (not just the army high command) tends to mindlessly repeat some (but never all) of the army’s own shallow and self-destructive worldview.


5. In the 1980s, general Zia and his henchmen added a more potent form of Islamism to the army’s toolkit. This new addition was never a majority view, even within the army. Its hardcore is relatively small and their full set of beliefs still has the capacity to shock naïve bystanders. But this jihadist hardcore has successfully manipulated the anti-Indian obsessions of the majority (those derived in turn from the so-called “two nation theory”) to get its way. For example, what sane military high command would actively encourage, support and facilitate the creation of multiple militant armies WITHIN its own state, all led by fanatical ideologues and all protected from “ordinary” law enforcement by the army and its ubiquitous intelligence agencies? Yet that is exactly what the “secular” officers of the Pak army did in the 1990s (see the moron Musharraf for details). EVERY village has some youngsters who were trained in jihadi camps and madressas that provide new recruits. Dozens of such organizations long ago escaped from their controllers and creators and became autonomous. Even those that are still in control (e.g. LET) are committed to an ideology that is completely at odds with the existing “system”. Many armed men have become professional kidnappers, extortionists etc. It’s a recipe for disaster and its STILL cooking.

6. 9-11 created an opportunity to bring this monster under control. That attempt was undermined by continued to commitment to the (irrational) anti-Indian component of Paknationalism, which in turn led to policy decisions that distinguished between “good” and “bad” jihadis and aimed for a vision of “India-free Afghanistan” that doomed the entire enterprise.


7. Departure of American forces and receding American influence will be followed by a return to “full-frontal” paknationalism. This will initially look like an improvement to many people. Maybe there will be more effective administration in the core areas. But the jihadi problem will become even more acute. It has been built up as an alternative to the existing (barely existing) political system based on parliamentary democracy and the “Wesphalian” state. The army imagines that everything will be fine because their own organization will run the country so there is no need for “bloody politicians”. They have no idea with which to provide legitimacy to that state beyond their juvenile notion of paknationalism. They don’t know what disasters await them once the “bloody politicians” are all put in their place and the existing decaying state structure is further undermined. They also have no idea of the differences between their own position and the position of the Chinese communist party in China. They also think their Chinese patrons will take up the slack where Uncle Sam left off. That will not happen. The effects of operating without a near-coherent ideology are not immediate, but they are very persistent and cumulative. Disaster will follow.

Got to run, but you may be starting to see what I mean….more to follow.

omarali50
09-24-2011, 07:41 PM
http://tribune.com.pk/story/259459/what-pakistan-should-do/

davidbfpo
10-01-2011, 09:19 AM
The BBC's headline and some appropriate quotes:
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said his government will no longer hold peace talks with the Taliban. He said the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani had convinced him to focus on dialogue with Pakistan.

Mr Karzai, speaking to a group of religious leaders, said there were no partners for dialogue among the Taliban. It was not possible to find the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, he added. "Where is he? We cannot find the Taliban Council. Where is it?" he said.

"A messenger comes disguised as a Taliban Council member and kills, and they neither confirm nor reject it. Therefore, we cannot talk to anyone but to Pakistan," Mr Karzai told the meeting.

"Who is the other side in the peace process? I do not have any other answer but to say Pakistan is the other side in the peace talks with us."

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15134128

Being unable to phone Mullah Omar is a potentially new factor, given the previous reported history of all Afghan power-brokers being able to call each other. Is this a spin-off from drone avoidance?

Bob's World
10-01-2011, 04:03 PM
Not saying that politicians lie... but I question both the veracity and the purpose of this announcement.

If I was a cop working a murder investigation on Rabanni, Mr K. would definitely be a person of interest. He has far more motive than the Taliban does in sidelining the reconciiation process.

I also find it odd, that a man who freely admits to meeting with Taliban leaders, and who has threatened to join the Taliban last April when frustrated with his ISAF allies pressuring him to implement governmental reforms; suddenly has no idea how to make contact. Right.

davidbfpo
10-01-2011, 05:37 PM
Robert,

Perhaps I should amend my comment:
Is this a spin-off from drone avoidance? To is this a spin-off from responsibility avoidance?

The new inability to call the Taliban struck me as laughable; Afghan tradition of talking to all, including your enemy, maybe amended slightly as others listen in.

Bob's World
10-01-2011, 06:41 PM
I believe that GIRoA has pretty firmly established that they have no intent to expand governance beyond the control of the former Northern Alliance, or to share in any way with those who we helped them to displace. So long as we are dedicated to protecting the status quo with ISAF I believe that they will tell us what we want to hear, and then generally let it ride.

Perhaps if we left they would get serious about talks to avoid open civil war; but that is impossible to predict.

The key thing for the West to stay focused on is that we went there to punish AQ, and that the key to evicting AQ from AF/PAK lies with the Taliban, not with GIRoA or Pakistan. Nieither government can, nor sees it in their interest to do so. Efforts to preserve GIRoA or create some sort of mini-me modern state in Afghanistan are well intended, but I don't see how they are cost effective or helpful toward reaching our primary goal.

Dayuhan
10-02-2011, 12:24 PM
I believe that GIRoA has pretty firmly established that they have no intent to expand governance beyond the control of the former Northern Alliance, or to share in any way with those who we helped them to displace.

Surely nobody expected that sharing was ever going to be part of this picture.


Perhaps if we left they would get serious about talks to avoid open civil war; but that is impossible to predict.

Since neither side would see "talks" as anything but a device to advance their own plans for victory and control, it hardly matters. As Omar has pointed out (correctly IMO) the Taliban aren't after reconciliation, they're after victory. There's little reason to think an American departure would change that.


The key thing for the West to stay focused on is that we went there to punish AQ, and that the key to evicting AQ from AF/PAK lies with the Taliban, not with GIRoA or Pakistan.

The Taliban could probably evict AQ, but they aren't going to do it because we want them to. They may be a key, but it's not a key that has any incentive to cooperate with us.

davidbfpo
10-02-2011, 02:13 PM
As we ponder where the Afghan roadmap is heading today it is fitting to look back before 9/11/2001 and the linked article looks at the late Abdul Haq's Afghan solution:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/7204783/the-road-not-taken.thtml

From my faraway armchair I paused reading this:
The West’s decision to work with (and pay) Afghan strongmen or warlords was flawed from the start. It revealed a complete failure to understand the desires and needs of the ordinary Afghans who would in the end determine the outcome of the war. Ordinary Afghans wanted justice, security, good governance involving the local leadership, and services. Instead, the West is perceived to have delivered an unwanted regime, visceral corruption and spiralling insecurity. By ignoring ordinary Afghans, the West drove many of them back to the Taleban.

The author is Lucy Morgan Edwards, a former political aviser to the EU ambassador in Kabul and author of 'The Afghan Solution: the Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and How Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan':http://lucymorganedwards.com/

Steve the Planner
10-02-2011, 07:23 PM
David:

The same identical story, along with the pro-King structure, is what is consistently referenced by the Harvard/Carr School cohort, whose knowledge base extends before 2001, and beyond US/ISAF.

The core problem is: Given this, then what?

It keeps coming back to this idea of a very loose national structure (that may, actually dissolve or become irrelevant), and a very de-centralized structure (some of which will be terrible (in our eyes).

The Lords of Kandahar. The Mayor of Kabul. The Northern Alliance. None is 9or possibly has any interest in) national or nation-state issues, except to the extent they affect their turf.

Bob's World
10-02-2011, 10:01 PM
Surely nobody expected that sharing was ever going to be part of this picture.



Since neither side would see "talks" as anything but a device to advance their own plans for victory and control, it hardly matters. As Omar has pointed out (correctly IMO) the Taliban aren't after reconciliation, they're after victory. There's little reason to think an American departure would change that.



The Taliban could probably evict AQ, but they aren't going to do it because we want them to. They may be a key, but it's not a key that has any incentive to cooperate with us.

"Sharing" is the essence of stabilty. They either share or they fight, their choice. Similarly with talks, but this is a culture that is much more open to talking with opponents that our own is. "Victory" is not ours to define, and I doubt Omar's definition is an all or nothing one. He knows he has a broad powerful base of support in Afghanistan that has historically dominated. Really not our concern. I do think they can learn to adopt more balanced approaches than the historic all or nothing, but it is not our job to make that happen.

As to the Taliban motivation to evict AQ, if we make them the right offer, they will take it. Happened in Anbar, happened in Mindanao, it can happen in AF/PAK. None of those had much to do with military tactics. Karzai abandoned the US years ago. I feel no loyalty there. Same with Pakistan. We dragged the Paks into this against their will and interests and now get upset when they don't do what we want. Silly. We need to just be as pragmatic as all the other players in the region are.

Dayuhan
10-03-2011, 12:30 AM
"Sharing" is the essence of stabilty. They either share or they fight, their choice. Similarly with talks, but this is a culture that is much more open to talking with opponents that our own is. "Victory" is not ours to define, and I doubt Omar's definition is an all or nothing one. He knows he has a broad powerful base of support in Afghanistan that has historically dominated. Really not our concern. I do think they can learn to adopt more balanced approaches than the historic all or nothing, but it is not our job to make that happen.

Sharing may be the essence of stability, but stability may not be everybody's preferred outcome. I very much doubt that sharing power with the Karzai government is on any of the Taliban agendas, except as a transitory step toward full control.

Of course it's not our problem. We can walk away. This will be chalked up as defeat, especially if (as is likely) the Taliban win and AQ resettle, but we've survived that before and we'll survive it again. In some ways that most pragmatic outcome would be to impose something resembling a negotiated solution for just long enough to declare victory and bolt, knowing full well that it will collapse... but of course that will be pretty transparent.


As to the Taliban motivation to evict AQ, if we make them the right offer, they will take it. Happened in Anbar, happened in Mindanao, it can happen in AF/PAK.

No such thing has happened in Mindanao.

If we leave with tail between legs, what are we supposed to offer to a new government that will produce a renunciation of AQ. What's to stop them from doing exactly what the Pakistanis are doing now: accepting the deal, taking whatever we offer, and not delivering on their end of the deal?

I would not count on being able to negotiate the Taliban into renouncing AQ,

Steve the Planner
10-03-2011, 03:59 AM
Dayuhan:

The right deal for the Taliban: Leave and don't come back. Leave it to us.

The problem of face-saving. How do we make this look like a win-win?

Dayuhan
10-03-2011, 04:09 AM
Dayuhan:

The right deal for the Taliban: Leave and don't come back. Leave it to us.

The problem of face-saving. How do we make this look like a win-win?

Since we've already publicly embraced the goal of keeping the Taliban out, it would be hard to pitch that deal as a win-win in any credible way. If the Taliban actually did keep AQ out we could claim that as a win... but would they? Maybe, if they believed we'd come back if they didn't, but would they believe that?

If we had gone the Ken White route, come in, kicked some backside, and left while we were still fearsome... then yes, the possibility of a return would be very real and there would be real concern about not provoking a return. If the prevailing belief is that we were driven out, that sentiment is unlikely to prevail.

Steve the Planner
10-03-2011, 12:25 PM
Right.

My understanding is that "the" Taliban long-ago indicated that it would not sponsor AQ IF we left (Leave first, trust us).

The problem of unscrambling who the Taliban actually is remains as local fighters bring long traditions of opposition to foreign forces, the official Taliban was already on its last legs in Afghanistan before we came along, and, as with Karzai's latest pronouncements, Pakistan is probably the controlling factor to negotiate with anyway (as most on this site have known for a long time).

omarali50
10-03-2011, 02:09 PM
I think there is a substrate of Afghans who just hate infidels and foreigners ruling them and there are local grievances in the Pashtoon areas and so on, but the eye does not see what the mind does not know: I think most "sensible" commentators in the West have a very incomplete notion of the Islamist and paknationalist ideals that flow FROM educated modern Islamists in Pakistan (and beyond) down to the Afghans, not the other way round. Traditional notions of pakhtoon hospitality, honor and religious pride are used by these higher order forces to secure a physical base for a dream that extends beyond that rather primitive base. It certainly extends to central Asia and India, and in the next phase, to Iran and China, but does not necessarily extend to the US in any realistic way...so the argument that its not America's problem is still an argument that can be made. But at the same time, it would be silly to think that the cadres (and their mentors in factions in higher level positions in Pakistan) who determinedly resisted the "de-quaida-fication" of Waziristan and other tribal agencies in the face of drone attacks, monetary rewards, Pak army double dealing and so on, will suddenly want to "de-quaida-fy" their newly liberated Islamic state of talibanistan once NATO pulls out of Eastern Afghanistan? No way.
Again, an argument could be made that its not really America's problem. Vigorous (and frequently unconstitutional) law enforcement, spying on people with freshly sprouted beards, reducing contacts with Pakistan and Afghanistan, drones and so on, all that would make it difficult for anyone to "repeat 9-11" even if the liberated "first Islamic soviet zone" extended further into Afghanistan. But if anyone (hint hint, Robert sahib) is imagining that you can negotiate a deal with the Taliban where they win and still change their policy towards hardcore Islamist militants..that is unrealistic. Local Afghan issues are irretrievably entangled with larger Islamist dreams in the hardcore Islamist faction in the region..and (shades of the Bolsheviks), the hardcore is more likely to grab power than any softer alternative...useful idiots will be used, but will not remain in charge for too long.

Bob's World
10-03-2011, 03:01 PM
No such thing has happened in Mindanao.



Actually it did, but such things are very temporary in nature when not followed up with significant changes in governance. One can rent stability, but not buy it.

Dayuhan
10-04-2011, 12:59 AM
Actually it did, but such things are very temporary in nature when not followed up with significant changes in governance. One can rent stability, but not buy it.

If we're talking about anyone renouncing AQ or anyone else in return for a US offer of favors, no such thing has happened in Mindanao.

The overt AQ presence in Mindanao withdrew by 94/95, not because of any US offer but because they'd lost control of the ASG and Manila operations had been rolled up. Contact and limited cooperation with elements of the MILF continued, but with little actual AQ presence.

JI presence has continued and continues to this day; it fluctuates largely according to the degree of heat JI people are feeling in Indonesia, not according to anything the US does.

ASG recruitment and manpower has been impacted not by the carrot but by the stick: shutting down the KFR and banditry operations has largely removed the profit motive that drew fighters to ASG in the first place. Popular sympathy continues, not because anyone in Basilan or Jolo gives a flying &%$# about a jihadi agenda, but because any Muslim fighting the government will always have support: that's about clan, tribe, and blood affiliation, us and them, not ideology.

At no point has the US (or for that matter the Philippine Government) ever made a deal leading to the severing of ties with international terror groups, explicitly or implicitly.

A long way from Afghanistan, yes, but if we're going to cite a precedent there ought to be one. In this case there isn't.

davidbfpo
11-26-2011, 10:16 PM
A long press article, which includes pro & con views of the reconciliation programme:
More than 2,700 insurgents have been reintegrated into mainstream Afghan society since October 2010, with 800 now described as “showing interest in leaving the Taliban”. Of those, about 90 are from Helmand...The reintegration policy has already produced some startling results. In northern Afghanistan, about 900 former Taliban have left the insurgency and violence has decreased by 30 per cent.

This quote has a wider application as it concerns the motivation to fight:
Research had shown that many join the insurgency because of a grievance that is not addressed by central government. Some Afghan men turn to the Taliban for help. In Helmand, for example, the governor of the province believes that the insurgency could be reduced by 25 per cent if disputes over land rights could be resolved.

The contrary view:
Hanif Atmar, a former interior minister, said last week: “Of around 30,000 insurgents, only eight per cent have reconciled so far — and 99 per cent of them are not from the south. “Frankly speaking, it does not work. The eight per cent that are reconciled, most of them are not genuine insurgents, particularly not from the regions that matter.”

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8901151/Taliban-paid-100-a-month-to-stop-fighting.html

davidbfpo
01-02-2012, 06:40 PM
An odd article in the Daily Telegraph, I say odd as it has no author or cited source, it opens with:
Prominent al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters asked Pakistani militants in a pair of rare meetings to set aside their differences and step up support for the battle against US-led forces in Afghanistan, militant commanders said on Monday.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8988301/Al-Qaeda-and-Taliban-commanders-seek-Pakistani-militants-help-to-fight-US-forces.

It's almost as if AQ & PTT have issued a press release.

I note the calls for unity, stopping factional violence and that the PTT should help more in Afghanistan - the small matter of which many expect ISI would echo, if not facilitate.

This could be posted on a Pakistani thread and of late I've posted contrary information on dissension between the Taliban and PTT. See Post 188: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8689&page=10

davidbfpo
01-05-2012, 09:37 PM
An interesting Reuters article, hat tip to the Lowy Institute, in part reflective on the situation in Afghanistan and after reading a new book (due out on the 18th January 2012):http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2012/01/04/talking-to-the-talibanan-elusive-peace-in-afghanistan/



But what are we actually looking at here? A quick-fix settlement that could provide just about enough cover for war-weary western governments to pull their troops out before Afghanistan descends again into civil war? Or a serious process which might offer an enduring peace? Do we believe the Taliban are now more amenable to talks than they were before? Or rather that domestic political compulsions in the United States are driving it more rapidly towards the exit?

Let’s be clear. The idea the Taliban would be willing to negotiate some kind of power-sharing deal, and that talks could be helped by measures like the release of prisoners, has been around for a couple of years, if not longer. Moreover, a lasting settlement would require not just a deal with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, but also reconciliation among all the different actors inside Afghanistan as well as deep-rooted governance reform.

One hopes that the ISAF tactic of eliminating parts of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan has considered this point:
Arguably the chances of reaching a lasting settlement are less now than they were before the United States sent extra troops to Afghanistan in 2010 aiming to decisively turn the tide and force the Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Since then, the military campaign has splintered the Taliban, making it harder for its Pakistan-based leadership to bring younger and more radicalised fighters into an overall settlement.

The new book is:
... by Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn could hardly be better timed. “An Enemy We Created, The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010” should be compulsory reading for anyone trying to separate reality from political spin. It is also an essential guide to what might yet be achieved through talks, and what might have been achieved had serious talks been held earlier.

Link to publisher's notice, with some impressive reviewers quoted:http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?BookId=661 and the book's website:http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_Enemy_We_Created/Welcome.html

I know there is a long-running SWC thread 'Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan', but for now this deserves a new thread. For reference the thread is on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6048

davidbfpo
01-07-2012, 02:39 PM
An optimistic comment from ICSR:http://icsr.info/blog/Reintegrating-Taliban

davidbfpo
01-07-2012, 04:06 PM
Hat tip to Watandost for the pointer to an intriguing Indian commentary, that opens with:
The Taliban have reportedly agreed to open a representative office in Qatar. What is unclear is who are these ‘Taliban’. There is deafening silence in Pakistan, which should have been bestir with excitement that a defining moment has been reached in the Afghan endgame. The silence needs to be interpreted.

Not seen this leader being mentioned:
The crunch time comes when the Taliban’s former commander-in-chief Mullah Mohammed Fazl arrives in Qatar on a long tiring flight with mid-air refuelling from Guantanamo Bay.

Timing is important, especially for Europeans partners:
What is crystal clear is that the Barack Obama administration is in tearing hurry to take peace parleys to some visible point by the time the NATO summit is held in Chicago in May. Or else, it will become increasingly difficult to persuade the Europeans to take any more interest in the war at such a time when their own house is on fire.

Link:http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2012/01/03/the-taliban-come-to-roost-in-qatar/

davidbfpo
01-13-2012, 12:39 PM
Hat tip to Open Democracy a comment by an ex-Northern Alliance that has some points, which IIRC have been seen here before:
There seems to be an understanding that to be sustainable and to enjoy popular support, talks or agreements with the Taliban need to happen under several conditions.

Firstly, the Taliban have to be fully disarmed, just like other major militias after the international intervention in 2001.
Secondly, the Taliban must break all relations with Al Qaeda.
Lastly, they must accept and embrace the constitution of Afghanistan to protect basic political freedoms and diversity in the country.
Without a full acceptance of these strict but essential terms, a political settlement that has the capacity to last cannot come to fruition.


What is likely to follow power-sharing with the Taliban has thus potential to put enormous economic and political pressure on the country and turn the Afghans further away from their government. In fact, political unrest and dissatisfaction within political circles as well as on the streets of Afghanistan may escalate into another civil war.

Ends with:
However, it has to be universally understood that a rushed and compromised settlement with the Taliban is not the solution. Until the real backbone of the Taliban – which is, at the moment, in Pakistan – is broken and the Afghan government is strong enough to enforce conditionality, negotiations and power-sharing with the Taliban are doomed to become a new quick-fix with enormous risks for the Afghans and the rest of the world.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/yahya-massoud-djeyhoun-ostowar/perspectives-and-prospects-of-negotiating-with-taliban

From my faraway, safe viewpoint neither of the last two points, breaking the backbone of the Taliban or a strong GIRoA simply will not happen. As exhaustion with Afghanistan sets in, within Western electorates, partly matched by a reduced military role, but with a steady future flow of aid envisaged some of the assumptions made by think tanks and governments appear to be "leaps of faith".

There is a SWJ article on an IISS review of Afghanistan's future, which illustrates the assumptions made and what is likely to happen:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/adelphi-425-6-afghanistan-to-2015-and-beyond

davidbfpo
01-28-2012, 07:35 PM
Hat tip to Kings of War blog for providing a link to a new paper ' Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001-2011' by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. Note the duo have recently published a book (see Post 111 Talking to the Taliban:an elusive peace in Afghanistan).

It is a very short paper and the Executive Summary states:

This paper aims to answer the question of what the Taliban wants. In doing so it illuminates some important points about the Taliban as an organisation – it is neither a unified nor a static organisation. The fluidity of people of influence within the Taliban, the shifts in views that can be seen to be core to it, and the mystery surrounding its figurehead, Mullah Omar, are all aspects that can only usefully be brought out by experiences gleaned within Afghanistan. This paper provides an historical context to the current position, and then goes onto explore some of the Taliban’s strategic goals, offering some valuable context in which future negotiations with the Taliban might occur.

Link:http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/About/Policy/Documents/LessonsLearntTaliban.pdf

davidbfpo
02-12-2012, 10:58 AM
A newspaper report which is not unexpected:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9076121/The-truth-about-Taliban-reintegration.html

A taster:
New figures have now shown that over the last 18 months the "reintegration" scheme which Britain has funded with £7 million has attracted only 19 militants in Helmand province, where British troops are fighting.

Bob's World
02-12-2012, 02:20 PM
A newspaper report which is not unexpected:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9076121/The-truth-about-Taliban-reintegration.html

A taster:

Reports like this should not surprise anyone.

Reintegration of resistance fighters without reconciliation of the revolutionary drivers of conflict between the Northern Alliance government in power, and the Taliban government in exile is a well intentioned waste of time and money.

We design and implement so many tactical programs in an effort to push success from the bottom up, but revolution is driven from the top down, so all we can do at the bottom is suppress/mitigate symptoms. Time for a refresh on the strategic design.

Kevin23
03-15-2012, 06:43 PM
The Taliban has announced that is is suspending talks with the US and the government in Kabul.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/15/taliban-talks-united-states_n_1346946.html?icid=maing-grid7|maing8|dl12|sec3_lnk1%26pLid%3D143689#s77709 7

82redleg
03-16-2012, 06:34 AM
The Taliban has announced that is is suspending talks with the US and the government in Kabul.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/15/taliban-talks-united-states_n_1346946.html?icid=maing-grid7|maing8|dl12|sec3_lnk1%26pLid%3D143689#s77709 7

Did anyone believe that they were really serious in the first place?

Kevin23
03-19-2012, 01:35 AM
Did anyone believe that they were really serious in the first place?

82redleg,

In my personal IMO no not really.

However, even though I'm not schooled on the exact details of Afpak/ I haven't been to the region or dealed with the Taliban in any capacity. But looking at things from the Taliban POV, I figure they did have at least some incentive to seriously talk to the Coalition/Afghan Government. Because if we were willing to consider talking to them in the first place, the Taliban could only gain from such an exercise. Even though I think they were unlikely to follow through on their end of the bargain/give anything back in return.

Kind of along the lines of how North Vietnam benefited from talks with the US/S. Vietnam back in the late 60's/early 70's.

davidbfpo
04-06-2012, 09:41 PM
Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for a pointer to an ICG report, 48 pgs. long:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/221-talking-about-talks-toward-a-political-settlement-in-afghanistan.pdf

Circling the Lion's Den summary:
...negotiations could even lead to further destabilisation of the country. The Afghan security forces will find it hard to fill the power vacuum following the withdrawal of foreign troops and growing political differences within the country will undermine the prospects for peace. The ICG recommends the appointment of a UN-mandated mediation team and the adoption of a more realistic approach to resolving the conflict.
The report says President Karzai's government and its international backers have adopted a "market bazaar" approach to negotiations: "Bargains are being cut with any and all comers, regardless of their political relevance or ability to influence outcomes. Far from being Afghan-led, the negotiating agenda has been dominated by Washington’s desire to obtain a decent interval between the planned U.S. troop drawdown and the possibility of another bloody chapter in the conflict."

The ICG report adds that efforts to start negotiations have been half-hearted and haphazard, stoking fears among ethnic minorities, civil society and women: "A thorough reassessment of Karzai’s national reconciliation policy, the role of the High Peace Council and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is urgently needed. The program has faced staunch resistance from local security officials mistrustful of participants’ motives, and its impact has been minimal at best."

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/current-peace-talks-unlikely-to-build.html

davidbfpo
04-20-2012, 06:27 PM
From an earlier post (No. 184) and edited down: ' Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001-2011' by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn.

The authors spoke at IISS in February and a podcast (1hr 2 mins)is on:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/2012-events-archive/february-2012/the-myth-of-the-taliban-al-qaeda-merger/ (http:bit.ly/yaqtDY)

davidbfpo
05-13-2012, 11:50 AM
A BBC News report:
Arsala Rahmani was a former Taliban minister and a key member of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which leads Afghan efforts to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban.....Mr Rahmani was responsible for the committee within the peace council that considers the release of Taliban prisoners from Bagram and other Afghan prisons....The Taliban have denied involvement in the killing of Mr Rahmani.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049265

davidbfpo
07-27-2012, 09:42 PM
Must have missed these developments:
Abdul Ghani Baradar, who, together with Motasim, was later arrested by the Pakistan military. What lay behind this was the fact that Motasim was prepared to consider negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan, whilst Baradar was more reticent. Both men were released last year following pressure from the United States and soon after Motasim was shot several times in Karachi by members of the Taliban.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/motasim-removed-from-un-sanctions-list.html

davidbfpo
07-28-2012, 12:00 AM
Anatol Lieven has been in Dubai and has some surprising lessons:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/45b83f50-d59b-11e1-af40-00144feabdc0.html

Like:
perhaps the most striking thing to emerge from our discussions was that three of our four interviewees said the Taliban would consider agreeing to US bases and military advisers in Afghanistan after 2014 – something that contradicts every previous Taliban statement.

They want a strong national army – even one trained by the US – to hold Afghanistan together, prevent a return to warlord rule and deter interference by neighbours.

TheCurmudgeon
07-28-2012, 01:28 AM
Isn't it a bit optimistic to assume that the Taliban is that united to accept keeping the US in the country after 2014 considering the recent assassination of Arsala Rahmani?

Bob's World
07-28-2012, 10:20 AM
They are arguably "united" in their opposition to what exists, but I am sure there are conservatively dozens of competing concepts for what should replace it.

Revolution is not about what comes next, it is about what exists now. Fix the current and one need not worry so much about the next.

But it is not ours to "fix" and GIRoA is quite happy to stay just the way they are, with their little Northern Alliance monopoly and a constitution that consolidates all patronage in Kabul, with the US led coalition protecting this unsustainable model and fueling it with cash.

It is not in GIRoA's interest currently to reconcile. I suspect that will change if we seriously cut them off and leave, but by then it will be too late.

TheCurmudgeon
07-28-2012, 06:40 PM
Revolution is not about what comes next, it is about what exists now. Fix the current and one need not worry so much about the next.

I am almost certain there can be no "fix" for the current government. They have no legitimacy and our current doctrine ain't getting them any closer.

That is the primary advantage of the Taliban. Religion offers them an instant and universally recognized form of legitimacy. They will always have that advantage and the current GIRoA has nothing to compare with that.

Bill Moore
07-28-2012, 06:54 PM
Revolution is not about what comes next, it is about what exists now. Fix the current and one need not worry so much about the next.

Bob, food for thought, this idea is still rough, but it was pointed out by some astute historians that the American Revolution happened long before the conflict with the Mother Ship England. The actual revolution was a series of memes, core beliefs, social/poltical norms that emerged, and all these eventually ran into the "state" and triggered a conflict. The fight was NOT the revolution, that was the war, which was the result of the revolution that already happened. This is a paradigm shift from our doctrinal view of revolution.

Not sure what this implies for Afghanistan. Is the Taliban really a revolutionary force, or are they just a resilient system that will eventually oust the foreign system we established and rule Afghanistan again because there was no real revolution in Afghanistan in the first place?

Surferbeetle
07-28-2012, 07:04 PM
... it was pointed out by some astute historians that the American Revolution happened long before the conflict with the Mother Ship England. The actual revolution was a series of memes, core beliefs, social/poltical norms that emerged, and all these eventually ran into the "state" and triggered a conflict. The fight was the revolution, that was the war, which was the result of the revolution that already happened. This is a paradigm shift from our doctrinal view of revolution.

Not sure what this implies for Afghanistan. Is the Taliban really a revolutionary force, or are they just a resilient system that will eventually oust the foreign system we established and rule Afghanistan again because there was no real revolution in Afghanistan in the first place?

What's old is new again...

'There are not enough armies in all of the world which can kill an idea whose time has come.' Victor Hugo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Hugo)

jcustis
07-28-2012, 09:46 PM
Bob, food for thought, this idea is still rough, but it was pointed out by some astute historians that the American Revolution happened long before the conflict with the Mother Ship England. The actual revolution was a series of memes, core beliefs, social/poltical norms that emerged, and all these eventually ran into the "state" and triggered a conflict. The fight was the revolution, that was the war, which was the result of the revolution that already happened. This is a paradigm shift from our doctrinal view of revolution.

Not sure what this implies for Afghanistan. Is the Taliban really a revolutionary force, or are they just a resilient system that will eventually oust the foreign system we established and rule Afghanistan again because there was no real revolution in Afghanistan in the first place?

Absolutely, and unfortunately too many competing interests are preventing policy-makers from seeing this fact as clearly as they should.

TheCurmudgeon
07-28-2012, 10:59 PM
Bob, food for thought, this idea is still rough, but it was pointed out by some astute historians that the American Revolution happened long before the conflict with the Mother Ship England. The actual revolution was a series of memes, core beliefs, social/poltical norms that emerged, and all these eventually ran into the "state" and triggered a conflict. The fight was NOT the revolution, that was the war, which was the result of the revolution that already happened. This is a paradigm shift from our doctrinal view of revolution.

Not really a new paradigm. Take, for example, the Davies J-Curve that predicts political unrest resulting from an economic downswing.

"Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary. The evidence from Dorr's Rebellion, the Russian Revolution, and the Egyptian Revolution supports this notion; tentatively, so do data on other civil disturbances. Various statistics—as on rural uprisings, industrial strikes, unemployment, and cost of living—may serve as crude indexes of popular mood. More useful, though less easy to obtain, are direct questions in cross-sectional interviews. The goal of predicting revolution is conceived but not yet born or matured."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Chowning_Davies

Broadened out it really predicts revolution based on a continuing disjunction between a society's expectation of what they should have and the reality of what they do have.

I should note that these ideas are generally attacked by the anti pop-centric COIN crowd.

I am not sure this model is applicable. The model here will be a power vacuum that will be filled by whomever has the ability to coerce others, has charismatic influence backed by followers with weapons, or can bribe others to maintain influence.

Bob's World
07-28-2012, 11:41 PM
Ok, A few points.

1. The Taliban and GIRoA share the same religion. This is not about religion, it is about power. We tipped the scales so that the naturally more powerful party was displaced by the weaker. Then we enabled the weaker to create a form of government designed to elevate and centralize patronage, allowing them to exercise an unnatural degree of control across the country in an effort to preserve a monopoly that would keep those affiliated with the ousted party from being able to worm their way back in. Once that was done the revolutionary insurgency began to grow. Once we began countering the revolution it led to the growth of the resistance.

As to the US, yes, the fight was "the final argument of kings" but still, the revolution was not about the ideas being advanced, it was the intolerable situation being challenged. The new ideas did, however, lead to a growing sense of discontent with a system that had been in place for generations. Kind of a chicken or egg argument. Bottom line is that the populace in the new world evolved to the point where the status quo of British governance was no longer adequate and the British were unwilling to evolve to meet those new requirements. We see the same dynamic across the Middle East today with the Arab Spring movement.

TheCurmudgeon
07-29-2012, 12:05 AM
Ok, A few points.

1. The Taliban and GIRoA share the same religion. This is not about religion, it is about power.

True enough, it is not about religion, but governance is about a base of legitimacy.

GIRoA's legitimacy is based on the consent of the people, which is really just an illusion. The people voted based on tribal alliances or a belief they would get something in return. The Taliban can claim legitimacy based in the word of God, a word shared by all. The difference between democracy and theocracy.

But you are ultimately correct; when the vacuum is created, it will be about who has the power. But that power will be limited and localized. To unit the country, it will take more than naked force. And even if a single warlord could unit the various fiefdoms somehow it would only last as long as his charisma held. It would exist because of his force of personality. To institutionalize it will take more.

TheCurmudgeon
07-29-2012, 01:50 PM
Two points:

1. Going back the the American revolution, it wasn't a revolution; it was a revolt. A revolution would require a change in the political landscape and while that was the result it was not really the spark that initiated the action. Most colonists were only demanding that their rights as Englishmen be recognized. An Englishman already had the right to vote for their representatives in parliament. our complaint was that we were being charged like Englishmen but not receiving the same benefits. "Taxation without Representation." The absolute monarchy had been abolished for almost a hundred years in England. So while the system that resulted was "revolutionary" from the perspective that it did not revolve around a constitutional monarchy, discontent amongst the colonists about being denied the rights they felt they already had was the impetuous for action.

Unfortunately, my second point will have to wait. The dogs need to go for a walk.:D

Bob's World
07-29-2012, 02:16 PM
Most accurately it was a separatist insurgency. A distinct populace had formed over the generations, separated by much more than distance, but by the tremendous differences between living in the colonies and living in Great Britain. The fact that Colonials were perceived as a lower class of citizen, had little say in their governance, and as their grievances grew, their increasing perception that they had no legal recourse to address the same all contributed to the ultimate "revolution."

The King had several opportunities to apply small, reasonable measures to "reconcile" the differences, but he scoffed at the idea. Better to simply "enforce the rule of law." This is the typical perspective of government in these situations.

Regarding "Legitimacy" of government in Afghanistan, both sides of the the contest share the requisite religious legitimacy. GIRoA possess Western-granted "legal legitimacy," but such legitimacy is like an honorary college degree, it looks good on the wall but won't get you a job. No, the aspect of legitimacy that is in question in this, and most all insurgencies, is the simple recognition by the governed of the right of government to govern them. When foreign regime change takes one party out and places another party in, it is damn hard to get to effective political legitimacy across the entire populace from such an illegitimate start point.

We in the west often miss the main point on legitimacy because we apply the wrong definition. We apply the one that supports and validates our actions. That is not the one that rules among the affected populaces in these places where we opt to intervene. Political legitimacy cannot be granted or declared, it must be earned. Our very presence is perhaps the greatest obstacle to getting to stability in Afghanistan. That is is a pill we need to swallow (along with our pride).

The "experts" have been very, very wrong on this.

TheCurmudgeon
07-29-2012, 02:31 PM
I agree, and you even beat me to my second point.

Comparing the situations in Afghanistan and say, Libya or Syria, legitimacy helps clarify the distinction. In Syria the government was seen as legitimate but lost that legitimacy over years as the population's ideas on legitimacy changed from an ethnic monarchy to ... I am not really sure. Something more representative perhaps, but only time will really tell.

In the case of Afghanistan the people's idea of legitimacy probably never changed. A foreign power created a government built on a representative form of legitimacy but that is not really what the people want. In both cases there is a disconnect, but in the case of Syria the people's view changed but the government did not change with it. In the case of Afghanistan the government's form of legitimacy changed but the population's concept did not change with it.

The lesson to be learned is that the people trump the government. You can maintain a government through power but power does not grant legitimacy. Even dictators (or invading armies) endeavor to claim some form of legitimacy.

Bill Moore
07-29-2012, 05:46 PM
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=263

Some excerpts from the link above, I don't have time to transpose links from some relatively new historical texts that provide what is a relatively new view (at least compared to the common view) that a social and political revolution already took place in the Colonies long before the war started. It was very much a true revolution, but a war between kings.


The American Revolution was much more than a war for national independence. The American Revolution was truly the first modern revolution. It enjoyed widespread popular support and marked the first time in history that a people fought for their independence in the name of certain universal principles of human rights and civil liberties.


The American Revolution touched off an "age of revolution." The ideas fought for were popular sovereignty, equality before the law, and rule of law.


The Revolution was, in part, the consequence of long-term social, political, and cultural transformations. Between 1680 and 1776, a distinctly American society emerged, a society that differed significantly from Britain. In the course of a century, the colonies had diverged markedly from Britain. A variety of long-run trends gave the 13 American colonies certain common characteristics which made them very different from England.

The absence of a titled aristocracy
Widespread ownership of property
Religious diversity
Relative absence of poverty
Lack of urban development
Relative lack of deference to authority
Presence of slavery


Unlike many modern revolutions, the American Revolution was not rooted in economic deprivation or in the struggle of an oppressed class against an entrenched elite.

The Revolution was the product of 40 years of abuses by the British authorities that many colonists regarded as a threat to their liberty and property. But people do not act simply in response to objective reality but according to the meaning that they give to events. The Revolution resulted from the way the colonists interpreted events.

The American patriots were alarmed by what they saw as a conspiracy against their liberty. They feared that the corruption and the abuses of power by the British government would taint their own society.

Contrary to the arguments above, I think an argument can be made that the American Revolution was a true revolution that created something new. It was waged largely by citizens of England who developed a separate culture and ideas. Most of what we tend to call revolutions today are often post WWII anti-colonial movements were less a revolution and more about ousting foreign occupiers.

There are a lot of gray areas that can be argued either way in many revolutions, which points to our lack of understanding and simple COIN/political/revolution models that RAND and others want to promote to facilitate understanding, often act as blinders that lead to misunderstanding because they lead to cherry picking pieces of history that support the model, while ignoring the rest. This form of arrogance is a human trait that we'll unlikely overcome, but we should at least beaware of it so we minimize decisions based on our hubris views that convince us that we know the real underlying causes of conflict and worse then assume we have the solution.

TheCurmudgeon
07-29-2012, 07:28 PM
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=263
Contrary to the arguments above, I think an argument can be made that the American Revolution was a true revolution that created something new.

That may have been the result, and it certainly is the popular myth that American's like to believe, but in the throws of the events they were not looking to create a new government. Case in point, Sam Adams' (of brewing fame) comments on the Stamp Act:

For if our Trade may be taxed why not our Lands? Why not the Produce of our Lands & every thing we possess or make use of? This we apprehend annihilates our Charter Right to govern & tax ourselves – It strikes our British Privileges, which as we have never forfeited them, we hold in common with our Fellow Subjects who are Natives of Britain: If Taxes are laid upon us in any shape without our having a legal Representation where they are laid, are we not reduced from the Character of free Subjects to the miserable State of tributary Slaves.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stamp_Act_1765

It is true that in the end we created something new, but it did not start out that way. The ideas of popular sovereignty, equality before the law (as long as you were a free citizen, slaves could make no such claim), and the rule of law, were nothing new.


http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=263This form of arrogance is a human trait that we'll unlikely overcome, but we should at least beaware of it so we minimize decisions based on our hubris views that convince us that we know the real underlying causes of conflict and worse then assume we have the solution.

Actually, that is kind of my point. We chose to see what we want to see. We cherry pic history to create the myth of a revolution. The United Stated may have started down the road towards a belief in inalienable human rights but it certainly was not built on it. Slavery was still present and women could not vote. For that matter, you pretty much needed to be landed to have rights. Even after the drafting of the Constitution in 1789 we still were not a "free" nation under Freedom House standards.

We reinterpret events to met the narrative that we prefer. Otherwise the colonists were simply a bunch of arrogant stingy tax evaders.

Surferbeetle
07-29-2012, 07:41 PM
Good Lord, what are they teaching the kids in history class these days? :wry:

Magna Carta, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_Carta


Magna Carta, also called Magna Carta Libertatum or The Great Charter of the Liberties of England, is an English charter, originally issued in Latin in the year 1215, translated into vernacular-French as early as 1219,[1] and reissued later in the 13th century in modified versions. The later versions excluded the most direct challenges to the monarch's authority that had been present in the 1215 charter. The charter first passed into law in 1225; the 1297 version, with the long title (originally in Latin) "The Great Charter of the Liberties of England, and of the Liberties of the Forest," still remains on the statute books of England and Wales.

The 1215 charter required King John of England to proclaim certain liberties and accept that his will was not arbitrary, for example by explicitly accepting that no "freeman" (in the sense of non-serf) could be punished except through the law of the land, a right which is still in existence today.

Magna Carta was the first document forced onto an English King by a group of his subjects, the feudal barons, in an attempt to limit his powers by law and protect their privileges. It was preceded and directly influenced by the Charter of Liberties in 1100, in which King Henry I had specified particular areas wherein his powers would be limited.

Bill Moore
07-29-2012, 10:29 PM
Good Lord, what are they teaching the kids in history class these days?

One wonders, especially if you believe the Magna Carta was a revolutionary document or idea. This charter was intended to only resolve the conflict between King John and the Barrons. All it did was compell the King to allow the Barrons (who represented the feudal system, not the people) to provide input to his decisions. The Barrons didn't like the King's taxes, that was the genius of the Magna Carta. Hardly a revolution, simply a document that facilitate the peace between the Barrons and the King. Over time the ideas in Magna Carta came to mean more, but the revolution didn't happen in England.

Surferbeetle
07-29-2012, 11:50 PM
One wonders, especially if you believe the Magna Carta was a revolutionary document or idea.

Never did buy into that 'new history' foolishness. Let's chase some secondary and primary sources instead and see for ourselves. :wry:

Featured Document: The Magna Carta, National Archives & Records Administration, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/index.html


"The democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase in human history . . . It was written in Magna Carta."

--Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1941 Inaugural address


The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ("no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.") is a direct descendent of Magna Carta's guarantee of proceedings according to the "law of the land."

Magna Charta and American Law, http://www.magnacharta.com/bomc/magna-charta-and-american-law/


What has Magna Carta meant for American law? It is the source of many of our most fundamental concepts of law. Indeed, the very concept of a written constitution stems from Magna Carta. In over one hundred decisions, the United States Supreme Court has traced our dependence on Magna Carta for our understanding of due process of law, trial by jury of one’s peers, the importance of a speedy and unbiased trial, and protection against excessive bail or fines or cruel and unusual punishment.


Magna Carta gave intellectual underpinning to the American Revolution. Americans claimed the right to trial by jury and no taxation without representation because Magna Carta gave them those rights. The Stamp Acts and other legislation had shifted jurisdiction for many offenses to the Admiralty courts, where there is no jury trial, correctly foreseeing that local juries would be loathe to convict their neighbors and enforce “foreign” taxes on our soil. The colonists in 1776 were more English than the English in protecting these rights.

The Bronze Doors of the US Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/bronzedoors.pdf

Right hand door, panel five (eight panels total)


5. MAGNA CARTA
King John of England is coerced by the Barons to place his seal upon the Magna Carta in 1215.

Document Deep Dive: What Does the Magna Carta Really Say? By Megan Gambino, March 2012, Smithsonian magazine, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Document-Deep-Dive-What-Does-the-Magna-Carta-Really-Say.html#ixzz223e8Y9Fz


Rubenstein, co-founder of the Carlyle Group, purchased one of four existing originals of the 1297 Magna Carta at auction in 2007 for $21.3 million.

Constitution of the United States, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html

Bill Moore
07-29-2012, 11:52 PM
Posted by Bob's World


As to the US, yes, the fight was "the final argument of kings" but still, the revolution was not about the ideas being advanced, it was the intolerable situation being challenged. The new ideas did, however, lead to a growing sense of discontent with a system that had been in place for generations. Kind of a chicken or egg argument. Bottom line is that the populace in the new world evolved to the point where the status quo of British governance was no longer adequate and the British were unwilling to evolve to meet those new requirements. We see the same dynamic across the Middle East today with the Arab Spring movement.

Generally agree, my point is the American Colonies and England evolved in a bifurcated manner socially, economically, and politically. Many if not most Americans were loyal to England until (I believe) certain actions highlighted the difference between them, and they recognized their differences were irresovable I'm arguing that there was quiet revolution happening years before 1776 that created the fertile soil that enabled the revolutionary war.

It shouldn't be forgotten that people generally immigrated to the colonies to pursue social, religious and economic freedoms. The Declaration of Independence was not a collection of new ideas, but ideas that were generally widely held in the colonies.

The paragraphs below generally ring true to me, but I don't recall anyone at the time saying the Declaration of Independence would serve as model for the world?

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=268


The struggle for American independence was led by prominent lawyers, merchants, and planters. But the Revolution's success ultimately depended on the willingness of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Americans to risk their lives and economic well-being in the patriot cause. The Revolution represented a conservative effort to preserve liberties that British policies seemed to threaten. But the Revolution was accompanied by social and intellectual transformations that fundamentally altered the nature of American politics and involved ordinary people in politics to an unprecedented degree.

The Revolution was truly multifaceted. There was a rebellion of the colonial gentry against British aristocrats who refused to accept them as equals and who viewed them with condescension. There was also a rebellion by merchants and shippers who chafed at British trade restrictions and royal monopolies. There was a conservative revolution, which sought to defend traditional liberties against British encroachments. There was a radical revolution, inspired by the call for liberty and equality in the Declaration of Independence, which sought to create a society that could serve as a model of freedom for the rest of the world.

There many points that can be debated, the one point I was attempting to highlight without opening a debate over our revolution is that cultural norms among other conditions will either make a people receptive to particular revolutionary ideas or not. Tying it specifically to Afghanistan the point is it is debatable if that fertile soil was in place for what we're attempting to grow.

Bill Moore
07-29-2012, 11:59 PM
Never did buy into that 'new history' foolishness. Let's chase some secondary and primary sources instead and see for ourselves.

Your primary sources do nothing but support my assertion that the Magna Carta was not a revolution when it was written. In England it supported the feudal system, only over time did its ideas manifest into a representative government. The idea itself is not the revolution it is the catalyst. It isn't a revolution until it happens, so a hat tip to our revolutionary founders.

I seem to recall ideas of democracy and Republics dating back to Greece and Rome? Utopia is also a radical idea, but it led to a revolution where?

I agree with you the ideas in the Magna Carta were fundamental to our revolution, but the revolution that actualized those ideas did not happen in the 13th Century.

Ken White
07-30-2012, 12:09 AM
...For that matter, you pretty much needed to be landed to have rights. Even after the drafting of the Constitution in 1789 we still were not a "free" nation under Freedom House standards.

We reinterpret events to met the narrative that we prefer. Otherwise the colonists were simply a bunch of arrogant stingy tax evaders.Many of the Colonists were indeed stingy tax evaders. As many or more had other causes. The Southern (and New Hampshire) Scotch Irish just didn't like the British (or the wealthy Virginians and they thought rather haughty New England Colonists -- but they disliked the British more).

Freedom House did not exist in 1775 or 1789. You cannot credibly judge events and mores of over 200 years ago by today's standards.

That is indeed reinterpreting events to meet a narrative one prefers... ;)

Bob's World
07-30-2012, 12:31 AM
True that Freedom House did not exist in that era, but I for one endorse the criteria they apply as being as good a set of timeless, universal metric as any.

What specific situation will "trip the trigger" of a populace varies widely from place to place, culture to culture, and from era to era...but the perceptions that spark a populace to rise up are pretty damn constant. Freedom House does not set out to make that case, but the set of factors they apply to measure "freedom" are definitely in the beaten zone.

Surferbeetle
07-30-2012, 12:46 AM
Your primary sources do nothing but support my assertion that the Magna Carta was not a revolution when it was written.

Walk me through the passages which support your argument if you would...


The idea itself is not the revolution it is the catalyst. It isn't a revolution until it happens, so a hat tip to our revolutionary founders.


I agree with you the ideas in the Magna Carta were fundamental to our revolution, but the revolution that actualized those ideas did not happen in the 13th Century.

The American Revolution did not spontaneously spring from American Soil, fully formed and independent of the history that preceded it.

Recall that the Great Schism, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment followed the Magna Carta and preceded our Revolution by a few hundred years. The associated revolutionary thinkers (motivators of the foot soldiers who forced the issue and paid many of the associated costs) bypassed the middle man (royalty) and instead challenged who controlled the primary source...divine right. A very big deal if one considers the context of the times...


John Wycliffe (1328-1384), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Wycliffe
Martin Luther (1483-1546), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Luther
Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huldrych_Zwingli
John Calvin (1509-1564), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Calvin
Charles Montesquieu (1689-1755), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montesquieu
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques_Rousseau


If you run the Scientific Revolution back through the ages one sees a similar track:


Artistotle, (384 BC – 322 BC), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle
Ptolemy, (AD 90 – c. AD 168), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ptolemy
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1573), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolaus_Copernicus
Galileo Galilei, (1564-1642), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo_Galilei
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rene_Descartes
Issac Newton (1642-1727), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Issac_newton


'If I can see further it is because I stand upon the shoulders of giants.' Issac Newton

Bill Moore
07-30-2012, 01:53 AM
The American Revolution did not spontaneously spring from American Soil,

No one ever said it the ideas that were the basis for the revolution sprung spontaneously from American soil. I specifically pointed out that people migrated to the colonies to pursue certain freedoms, so obviously the "idea" existed before they arrived. A man in Mao's China can dream about being free, but he nor others pursued a revolution to realize their dream, so the idea wasn't a revolution. If enough men in China had the dream and a catalyst drove them to action, then we would see a revolution. The idea created the fertile soil the revolution evolved from.

Your posts on the Magna Carta were about its impact on the American Revolution and its subsequent development as a nation based on the rule of law. However, as I stated when the Magna Carta was written that wasn't the idea, it was simply a document resolve a conflict between the King and the Barrons. It didn't change the feudal system in England. That happened many, many years later. Was it part of the historic thread that contributed to the revolution? Definitely. Was it a revolution when it was written? No.


Recall that the Great Schism, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment followed the Magna Carta and preceded our Revolution by a few hundred years.

And your point is? Of course world history existed before our revolution and the ideas from the these movements contributed to our revolutionary thought, but in know way does that subtract from the significance of our revolution.

Off topic, but I find it interested you list a series of Protestant Revolutions and then show the Scientific Revolution thread. Putting it in context it is amazing that science eventually flourished in a society where free thinking was oppressed by religious ideology. That to me is the most amazing aspect. Whether revolutions or transitions societies are always undergoing deep change, but often it is not recognized until it is the rear view mirror.

Surferbeetle
07-30-2012, 02:47 AM
And your point is?

The revolutionary idea and the act, although separated in time, are inseparably linked.

In this particular case, the American Revolution, we are the ones who fully operationalized the idea (Magna Carta - 1215) of telling royalty that their services were not required (1776).

That's why I hopped in with the Victor Hugo quote way back when.

Done. :wry:

Ken White
07-30-2012, 03:00 AM
True that Freedom House did not exist in that era, but I for one endorse the criteria they apply as being as good a set of timeless, universal metric as any.Well of course you do. Most folks around today would agree. So would have many from circa 1789. Your agreement with their criteria though might have more credibility had you been an adult back then. Or not -- you may have disagreed on some points. :eek:

We'll never know, will we... :rolleyes:

We do know you just proved you also can cherry pick, howsomeever... :D

ganulv
07-30-2012, 03:08 AM
The revolutionary idea and the act, although separated in time, are inseparably linked.

In this particular case, the American Revolution, we are the ones who fully operationalized the idea (Magna Carta - 1215) of telling royalty that their services were not required (1776).

The resemblance of 13th century England to the 13th century England imagined by the Founding Fathers is perhaps better than the resemblance of 7th century Arabia to the 7th century Arabia imagined by the Taliban. Perhaps.

Bill Moore
07-30-2012, 03:09 AM
The revolutionary idea and the act, although separated in time, are inseparably linked.

Agreed and also done on that point.

However, getting back to my original point I think there is something else we may be missing that permits the idea to be operationalized. There are conditions in society that create the will to act, and those conditions must be more than an abusive government because many people don't rise up against abusive governments. I suspect those conditions vary significantly in each case, but a topic worth discussing if it leads to greater understanding.

While revolution may not be right word, it is close. In my view we "imposed" a social and political revolution upon both Iraq and Afghanistan. The conditions were not right in either country for synergy to develop with their populace, thus no shinning city on the hill after years of sacrifice. In our UW Doctrine we used to teach (suspect they still do) you as the foreigner can't start a revolution, but you can support one. Not so sure that is a law, but rather something that is generally true, yet if we're going to continue to pursue these idealistic foreign policies, then it may be worth considering how to make a population receptive to revolutionary ideas and ready to act when the catalyst is presented (JDAMs dropping their nation's security forces). I know this is an extreme idea, but maybe extreme ideas are called for if this continues to be our mission. I don't think our current approach is working well if at all.

Bob's World
07-30-2012, 06:34 AM
America likes stability and certainty in the locations around the planet where we perceive our interests to manifest.

One major component of our current challenges in the post Cold War era is that in many of those locations populaces are evolving in their expectations of governance more rapidly than the "US-approved" systems of governance that serve them. Those systems that have the flexibility to evolve in nature along with the evolving expectations of their populaces are doing better than those that rigidly seek to sustain some status quo of governance as defined by those who control the government. But changes are so rapid that all systems are struggling to some degree. Flexible systems are being bent, rigid systems are breaking.

All of that leads to instability and uncertainty, and that makes America nervous, so we launch into a massive program of excessive engagement to seek to re-establish the stability and certainty that we have come to see as so essential to our interests. It is an unsustainable situation.

We are fairly flexible at home, but very rigid abroad. A mix of domestic bending and foreign breaking. If we could only learn to allow others the same fundamental principles we demand for ourselves we would be less compelled to overly engage those breaking systems abroad, and there would likely then be less bending at home. Instead we over-engage and see the solution as pushing modern US values rather than simply allowing classic US principles. But to allow the latter is to relinquish the control and certainty we see as so essential to making our current system work.

We need to think about "stability" differently. It is not just a "phase" or an "operation" that we can conduct to "fix" an unstable situation. In fact, such operations more often than not only serve to suppress the current set of challengers to the existing unstable situation. They freeze instability rather than produce stability, then require constant input of energy to sustain that unnatural condition.

We also need to learn to deal better with, and fear less, "uncertainty." Become less of a control freak. The problem is that we have become so intertwined in the governances of some places that relinquishing control is labeled as "abandonment." Big corporations love certainty as well, and the pressure they apply to sustain status quo relationships does not help either.

I don't know what the answer is, but I do believe we need a new model better tuned for the world we live in today. That the model we apply was designed for a world that no longer exists. It demands too much energy (measured in money, engagement, influence, etc) to sustain, and as it is inappropriate for the emerging world it actually serves to make us less secure rather than more secure through its execution.

This leads us back to Afghanistan and this thread. We emplaced and now protect a system that we think will give us the stability and certainty WE "need" and are therefore reluctant to pull way back on all of the programs we are applying there to make the current system work, and to instead focus our energy on an approach designed to allow the current system to evolve to a more natural state.

davidbfpo
07-30-2012, 09:25 AM
Meantime after the recent diversion back to Afghanistan:
In a rare interview, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the powerful northern warlord who was a key US ally against the Taliban and threw his support behind President Karzai at the last election, gives an interview at his Kabul home.

Slightly strange IMO, but as General Dostum rarely gets such attention worth adding here. Plus I thought he was taking a sabbatical in Turkey.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9435387/Taking-tea-with-Afghanistans-most-fearsome-warlord-General-Abdul-Rashid-Dostum.html

I am sure the General is well versed in Afghanistan's equivalent of constitutional and social propriety.

TheCurmudgeon
07-30-2012, 04:00 PM
Afghans, Crocker said, have "been there and done that. ... No one wants to go back to that." Instead, he said, major politicians from various ethnic groups want to have a voice in their nation's affairs — but not at the point of a gun. And, said Crocker, because the Taliban and its allies "are equal opportunity killers" who victimize all groups, they have "actually been a unifying factor" in Afghanistan. http://www.npr.org/2012/07/30/157580692/crocker-on-afghanistans-extraordinary-achievement

See also: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/07/30/157587420/afghan-reconstruction-projects-may-be-counterproductive-report-warns?ft=1&f=1001

That is where the actual quote is above is from. Second article is on a report that indicates that our nation building efforts are largely for naught since they will come to fruition too late and they are unsustainable by the Afghans.


the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction warned in a report released today that U.S.-funded construction projects now underway in Afghanistan that are costing hundreds of millions of dollars are behind schedule and may not be finished before U.S. combat forces depart. And that means, the report said, that the projects may not be "viable or sustained by the Afghan government after completion."

"Implementing projects that the Afghan government is unable to sustain may be counterproductive to the [counterinsurgency] strategy," the inspector general reported, as they raise Afghans' hopes for electricity and other basic necessities only to dash them later.

jcustis
07-30-2012, 06:45 PM
Col Jones, that is an excellent explanation of the problems we incur and endure. It makes for the stuff of a political science textbook that you really ought to get around to writing, because it makes for a very resilient predictive model.

davidbfpo
08-16-2012, 11:22 AM
Part One was Post 194 and Anatol Lieven had a podcast interview a week ago, courtesy of the Australian Lowy Institute:
Yesterday the noted expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Anatol Lieven, spoke at the Lowy Institute. In this interview, he shared with me some extraordinary insights into some of the streams of Taliban thinking about the prospects for peace in Afghanistan, including surprising speculations on whether the Taliban would ever tolerate US military bases in a post-conflict settlement.

Podcast link, it is nine minutes long:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/08/09/Lieven-New-insights-into-Taliban.aspx

davidbfpo
08-16-2012, 11:48 AM
There are parts of Professor Lieven's interview that jarred with me, especially having read this long article by Dexter Filkins; hat tip to Carl who added it to a SWJ discussion:http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/07/09/120709fa_fact_filkins?currentPage=all

davidbfpo
11-14-2012, 01:23 PM
Positive, calculated gesture by Pakistan?


Details emerged after Afghanistan's High Peace Council met military and civilian leaders in Islamabad....seven "mid-ranking" Taliban figures had been released. It is understood that Mullah Nooruddin Toorabi, the former hardline Taliban justice minister who ordered men to grow beards, is among the names agreed for release but not Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, deputy to Mullah Omar.

Why do I use calculated? This helps:
Toorabi, notorious hardliner during the Taliban regime .....he was said to have mellowed in exile after 2001 and in 2005 met his previous colleagues in Abbottabad and Peshawar to consider making peace with Kabul. He was arrested soon afterwards.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9677227/Pakistan-agrees-Taliban-release-to-help-Afghan-peace-process.html

Slightly different report:http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/11/2012111462050926816.html

Somehow I doubt release actually means free to travel, just a nicer compound bungalow.

davidbfpo
11-15-2012, 08:52 PM
Pakistan will consider freeing former Afghan Taliban second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, if current releases of lower level members help to advance peace efforts, officials from both countries told Reuters on Thursday

Link:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-pakistan-afghanistan-taliban-idUSBRE8AE13B20121115

Bob's World
12-08-2012, 11:13 PM
http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghanistan/us-troops-can-have-immunity-in-exchange-for-sovereignty-1.199872#.UMN6sRoveeM.twitter

Until we are willing to subjugate our tactical goals to the pursuit of our strategic ends, we are simply not going to get in front of this conflict.

Not only are Mr. Karzai's demands reasonable, their is no way any one can perceive his government as sovereign if we persist in denying this, and similar, fundamental and legal requests.

Our message is clear. We believe it is more important to roll up Taliban Squad leaders unconstrained by GIRoA's rules, than we it is to support GIRoA's pursuit of the sovereignty that is absolutely necessary to the achieving any kind of true stability.

We say we promote democracy, yet we are dedicated to preventing any Taliban influence in the government of Afghanistan.

We say we promote sovereignty, yet we allow our general's to tell a sitting national President "no" in his own country to a legal request.

That is neither democracy nor sovereignty. When Gian Gentile says we pursue a "strategy of tactics" this may not be what he means, but this is absolutely a campaign that places a cobbled together mix of tactical programs over the very strategic ends critical to resolving the conflict. We have lost our way.

jmm99
12-09-2012, 02:49 AM
Reminds one a bit of the Iraq situation where 2008 Agreement signed; impasse reached on permanent agreement with Maliki; and US troops leave Iraq.

Will Karzai and his Krooks "succeed" as well as Maliki and his Muggers ?

It wouldn't break my heart if no US troops remained in Astan at the end of 2014.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
12-09-2012, 12:00 PM
Mike,

I doubt very much that GIRoA as we have helped create and sustain over the past 11 years will last long after we leave. It was never a sustainable model to begin with, but then the Northern Alliance core of GIRoA has always known that, even if we have deluded ourselves by the trappings of modern governance that we have draped over it.

The Northern Alliance is dedicated to the exclusion of Taliban influence, or more accurately, the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek minorities will make any compromise - to include allowing US-led NATO forces occupy their land in pursuit of defeat, deny, disruption of AQ - to the end of not being second to the Pashtun majority. Similarly those Pashtun tribes out of patronage under the Taliban were quick to sign up with the Northern Alliance to turn those tables as well.

After all in a patronage society such as Afghanistan, there is no second place. Particularly under the clever constitution we help Mr Karzai and his inner circle put in place. The constitution takes traditional patronage and centralizes and elevates it as never seen before in Afghanistan. The Loya Jirga members reacted with outrage to this concept, but deals were made and the document was ratified. Western analysts by and large lauded it as a great advance toward modernity and democracy. In reality it was a grand scheme to control the country and exclude the return of any influence of those so recently excluded.

For the Taliban government in exile this was the throwing down of the proverbial gauntlet. The revolutionary insurgency began to grow as soon as the Constitution became a reality. No longer could they just bide their time for the foreigners to leave and regain power through traditional means. The rest is history, we countered the revolution, and those actions began to grow a resistance among average, apolitical Afghans increasingly affected by our COIN efforts. The Revolutionaries provided support to the resistance, we conflated both as one in our mind, and continued to pile in more and more effort to "defeat" what we had in many ways created.

Better we just pull the plug. Not pull the plug as in leaving, but pull the plug on that damn constitution. We should tell Mr. Karzai that we will agree to all of his demands regarding his sovereignty immediately if does one simple thing: Follow through on his promise to hold a true reconciliation and constitutional loya jirga. The new constitution can take many forms, but it needs to ensure fundamental rights in the context of this culture, it needs to guarantee quotas of power across the major groups, it probably also needs to disempower the central government with a central army and put the majority of power down to the province level to governors with regionally recruited and operating national guard forces. IE, something sustainable and closer to the context of the place.

The constitution is the key, and yet we not only don't see that, we do the opposite. We continue to protect and laud that document.

jmm99
12-09-2012, 09:19 PM
I'd suggest that "Reconciliation" in Astan is a horse no more alive today then it was five years ago - or will be five years from now. The term "COIN" may or may not be used five years from now in Astan (except as it might have propaganda value). I'd bet on the notion of "Civil War" as being the more accurate.

We'll see old and new "Northern Alliance" people - e.g., Ismail Khan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ismail_Khan) and Abdul Dostum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Rashid_Dostum) of the "old", if they manage to stay alive. I'm not an Astan analyst and won't even attempt to ID the "new" people. Karzai and his Krooks should have enough assets now to live well anywhere in the World.

The Astan Bonn Constitution is not the problem. It's a mere piece of paper which has no materiality to Astan governance. That is based on its real constitution, which is what its people do - acts, not words, govern Astan.

I wouldn't negotiate with any of these ba$tards - none of whom are worth the little finger of any one of our people in Astan. Anything that we (the USA specifically and solely, not including any allies) need to get done in Astan, can get done quietly, clandestinely and covertly (if we still are able to act according to those concepts ?).

I'm sure you believe this:


from BW
We should tell Mr. Karzai that we will agree to all of his demands regarding his sovereignty immediately if does one simple thing: Follow through on his promise to hold a true reconciliation and constitutional loya jirga. The new constitution can take many forms, but it needs to ensure fundamental rights in the context of this culture, it needs to guarantee quotas of power across the major groups, it probably also needs to disempower the central government with a central army and put the majority of power down to the province level to governors with regionally recruited and operating national guard forces.

but, it's so far removed from my position that I can't even address its assertions.

So, I guess I'll just have to plead the "general issue (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/General+issue)", and let the jury decide. :)

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
12-09-2012, 11:26 PM
Mike,

So a constitution is a "mere piece of paper"? A Certificate for a million shares of Goggle is "mere paper" as well. President Obama's birth certificate is "mere paper."

Fact is, some paper is more important than others. I know you know that, so I find your position odd.

The "mere paper" of the Afghan constitution vested in one man virtually all Afghan patronage. The King did not have that power in the "good old days" of Afghanistan. No leader before Karzai has had such power to my knowledge has. Perhaps Genghis...

Karzai got "elected" in a process that is perceived globally as being highly fraudulent. Probably not quite as bad as the process the garnered Diem 110% of the vote in Saigon when he rose to the presidency in a US supervised election there, but close.

Then once elected he picks 1/3 of the Jirga; all the supreme court, all the ministers, all the Provincial and District Governors and Chiefs of Police - and they in turn all owe their patronage up to him and his cronies. This is a Ponzi scheme that is the root of the scale of Afghan corruption we all complain about. Everyone who buys a positing in this scheme (good rumors are that the latest minister of defense paid $2 million US for his appointment) are then in competition with each other, not just to enrich themselves and their friends and families, but also their patrons, in hopes of earning even better positions where they can make more money.

This means all of those who had such positions prior to the constitution were immediately kicked to the curb. Entire tribal structures were disempowered, while those they had lorded over stepped up to take their jobs, their farms, their power. This is not the type of turmoil that occurs in DC where one party leaves their appointments to go to think tanks, and vise versa. This is like if every member of a particular party that just lost acorss the country had to surrender they homes, their businesses and their pride.

Just a piece of paper? Hardly. And now, as a price of "reintegration" that we offer to the Taliban is that "all" they have to do to come back in from the cold is to swear allegiance to this "piece of paper." Essentially agree to a life of second class citizenry in a country where there is no second class.

I think the Billy Bean quote in money ball applies in his answer to "what the problem is"

"The problem we're trying to solve is that there are rich teams and there are poor teams, then there's fifty feet of crap, and then there's us."

This is the same conversation that formerly powerful people who are the core of the insurgency in Afghanistan have around their campfires...

Oh, and I am curious. When is it that an insurgency becomes a civil war? People like to say that the insurgency in Syria is a civil war; like it is a degree of violence that is the critical distinction. That a civil war is by its nature worse than an insurgency. I think either one can be "worse" than the other, depending on how it unfolds. Certainly historians are very casual about what gets called a civil war vs what gets called an insurgency

For me, it is like cellular biology. if there is once cell, and the conflict is internal to that cell, it is insurgency. When the cell divides, each with all the working parts of a full cell, and those two cells then go into competition with each other to see which will grow to fill the entire space, then it is civil war. Degree of violence is, IMO, moot.

jmm99
12-10-2012, 02:20 AM
is that I don't well tolerate people who attempt to twist my words - as in this assertion:


So a constitution is a "mere piece of paper"? A Certificate for a million shares of Goggle is "mere paper" as well. President Obama's birth certificate is "mere paper."

Exactly what I said (specific to one and only one document) was:


The Astan Bonn Constitution is not the problem. It's a mere piece of paper which has no materiality to Astan governance.

Karzai does what Karzai does because he has power to do so enabled by the realities of the situation in Astan - he and his cronies can get away with and profit from corruption to the nth degree. I measure Karzai by his acts which are organic to him; and not by the process initiated in Bonn, Germany (the document itself was later enacted in Astan).

As to the Astan constitutions (plural), I've managed to look at them. In fact, I did a thread on them (+ Astan's diplomatic history, the status of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, etc.), Defending Hamdan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118) (a couple of dozen posts are material to this thread). As to "insurgency", Advanced Search (limited to JMM99) gives 166 hits; as to "civil + war", Advanced Search (limited to JMM99) gives 165 hits.

I'm not going to regurgitate that stuff. One can read it or not as one wishes, making up one's mind or non-mind in the process.

I'm not going to engage in a debate with you. Dayuhan can have that pleasure. You are, without a doubt, very articulate.

Regards

Mike


In fact, I grew to despise and hate lawyers who were inveterate word twisters par excellance. Trials and appeals, where a third party renders the decision, were thus a great satisfaction because they usually gave me payback. But, retiring and getting away from the buzzards was the best of all. :)

Bob's World
12-10-2012, 11:33 AM
Mike,

My point is that "Karzai acts as Karzai acts" within the legal context as framed by the Constitution we helped him and his Northern Alliance design and put in to effect. He does not act IAW the historic context of the culture and historic governance of the region. We saw central governance, increased democracy and modernity. The Northern Alliance saw a solidification of their patronage power, centralized control that disempowered the populace as well as any rising regional power brokers. We both saw exclusion of the return to legal power of those associated with the recently dispossessed Taliban.

There was little insurgency prior to this document going into effect, but it has grown ever since. Certain aspects are temporarily suppressed by the weight of our surge in a few places, but I doubt very much any changes made in that manner will stick. The problem will return to its natural state once the weight of our presence is removed.

My prediction is that the resistance aspect of the insurgency will actually die down as we continue to draw down; but that the revolutionary aspect will build up steam. GIRoA will either cut a deal, or they will face a push that will be bloody and likely cannot win.

Once the Taliban rise to power they will see the value of this constitution to legitimize their own dominion over the country, just as the Northern Alliance has. We will find ourselves in a tough spot, because suddenly the document we have lauded and protected for so long as it helped us serve our interests will become very problematic indeed as we see it works equally well to counter our interests. We outsmarted ourselves on this one.

So my point is simple. Perceptions of the sovereignty of governance for any of our partners is vitally important. We need to do a better job of promoting and respecting those perceptions. The nurturing of some aspect of democracy that allows a populace to have reasonable means to legally address their concerns with their government in the context of their own culture and history is vitally important as well. We need to nurture that most of all.

In Afghanistan our fixation on our tactical programs, our fears, and our perception of "what right looks like" lead us to positions that run very counter to both of those critical perceptions.

I am not the one "twisting words," our government is. I am merely pointing out the twist and attempting to explain why untwisting those words is so important. When we twist words such as "sovereignty" and "democracy" as the United States of America to serve our perceived interests, who have we become as a nation??

davidbfpo
01-13-2013, 10:52 PM
After having little success playing it safe, the Afghan government is gambling on a risky new strategy to convince the Taliban that the road to peace runs through Kabul.

In recent months, scores of Taliban officials and rank-and-file have been freed from prisons in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Now, Afghanistan is upping the ante with the expected release of thousands more within its borders while pushing Islamabad to free some of the Islamist militant group's most dangerous characters.

The prisoner releases are seen as a signal of good faith from the administration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who is wary of peace efforts not led by Kabul but whose overtures for direct talks with the Taliban have been refused.

Link:http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-taliban-release-strategy-high-risk-low-reward/24822610.html

One US analyst, with time on the ground in Helmand, ends with:
The incentives do exist for them to talk about talking in a way to get concessions and cause friction between the Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force and within the Afghan government...we cannot create these incentives for them to make a deal while we are leaving.

In the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) that led to a form of peace in Northern Ireland, the status of convicted prisoners was a critical issue and it became clear later an easing of parole leading to early release helped to gain the prisoners support for the GFA.

I fully accept Afghanistan is very different from Northern Ireland, but is such a mass release seemingly without condition wise?