COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Wilf is correct in bringing this paper to SWJ users attention, but the perspective offered is very much based on the author's experience and would another senior officer say the same thing? It is a long time since I read Frank Kitson's Low Intensity Operations (I still have a copy) and suspect it says the same thing.

Both authors base their experiences on a hostile environment, in which the opposing minority (the enemy terrorist / insurgent etc) are within a local population - that are not citizens of the state facing the threat.

Perhaps that is why COIN is different from Counter-Terrorism (CT) in the Western democracies?

I like the six points made:

1) A political decision to defeat terrorism, stated explicitly and clearly to the security forces, and the willingness to bear the political cost of an offensive.
2) Acquiring control of the territory in and from which the terrorists operate.
3) Relevant intelligence.
4) Isolating the territory within which the counterterrorist fighting takes place.
5) Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations.
6) Separating the civilian population from the terrorists.

Here in the UK the national CT strategy has been publicised, yet remains little understood and has been marred by successive decisions (let alone what happened in Ulster). The ideological contest has hardly been started, even to the extent of refusing access to public buildings for meetings - a step advocated by some ex-radical / extremists.

Using the six points how do others score progress in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres pf conflict?

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

1) A political decision to defeat terrorism, stated explicitly and clearly to the security forces, and the willingness to bear the political cost of an offensive.Pretty straightforward and achievable if seldom realized due to political constraints in a democracy as well as for OpSec reasons in today's rapid global communications environment.
2) Acquiring control of the territory in and from which the terrorists operate.Logical but can be exceedingly difficult if there's a cross border problem...
3) Relevant intelligence.Always helpful if sometimes far from easy.
4) Isolating the territory within which the counterterrorist fighting takes place.Always helpful if sometimes far from easy. Highly dependent upon troops available and terrain.
5) Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations.An imperative frequently occluded by human nature...
6) Separating the civilian population from the terrorists.Exceedingly difficult in the best circumstances and highly likely today to be impossible due to 'human rights' considerations and public condemnation of harsh measures.

Seems to METT-TC applies; all situations are not identical to Malaya or Palestine. Being the government versus working with a host nation government colors many things quite differently.

All sounds great. Pity it isn't that simple...

[SWJED]

Is Counterinsurgency the Graduate Level of War? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/is-counterinsurgency-the-gradu/) by COL Dave Maxwell, SWJ Blog.

Some Random Thoughts on COIN Today


I have to respectfully disagree with the assertion that “counterinsurgency is the graduate level of war.”

Despite being an avid believer in and advocate of COIN (and FID and UW) for most of my nearly 30 year career I still believe that that the graduate level of war has to be full spectrum and those that are practicing the graduate level of war are those that can shift between major combat operations and stability operations and when necessary assist a friend, partner, and ally in the conduct of COIN. Now that everyone is chasing the shiny (but not really) “new” thing (COIN) and calling it the graduate level of war I it think is disparaging to our great general purpose forces out there who are still going to be required to conduct major combat operations in some form or fashion and will have to be able to combine those operations with stability operations once the battle is won.

The graduate level of war is any form of war because war is as complex in major combat operations as it is in stability operations. The real “PhDs of war” are those that are able to recognize that the actions they take in the beginning of conflict (e.g., March-May 2003) are going to have effects on the outcome and the post conflict phases (e.g., May 2003 to the present)...

[John T. Fishel]

While the metaphor that COIN is the "graduate level" of war was briefly useful, Dave Maxwell's comments are absolutelyon the mark. Small Wars - by any name - are what we have done for most of our history and will likely continue to do most of. But, as he says, the real PhDs in war will be able to transition to BIG wars and back again without missing a step. The PhD in war will folow the Clausewitzian maxim of knowing the kind of war one is fighting and not mistaking it for something it is not.

Hear, hear!!!!!:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

[Entropy]

I've never been a fan of the "graduate level of war" meme. Education level is a poor analogy for warfare, IMO. One might argue that all war is "graduate level" because if you lose you're just as dead.

[MSG Proctor]

One extremely important distinction between current COIN Ops and historical examples of insurgency is the central role of religion in the WoT. Wars always involve ideology and frequently contest competing theological visions. Yet this war is being waged against the west by those whose raison d'terre (sp) is 'God's will'.

In this sense, my humble opinion is not so much that COIN as a theory requires graduate level aptitude, but that COIN involving the complex dynamics of Islam (in the biblical location of the Garden of Eden, Abraham's birthplace, ancient Babylon, no less) requires a cognitive expertise exceeding previous wars because of the possibility of inflaming religious tensions that may/can instigate not only WW III, but perhaps the Apocalypse envisioned by all three Abrahamic Traditions.

See: Rand National Defense Research Institute's study: "Heads We Win: Improving Cognitive Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency (http://http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP168.pdf)".

[selil]

I cringe inwardly when the military absconds with academic titles and concepts as if the trappings of academia invoke legitimacy when more often they represent dusty thinking. "The graduate level of war" concept was briefly useful as memetic for effect. It got the concept of counter insurgency noticed, but only briefly truly reflected a graduate level of study and all that "graduate level" should mean.

When information assurance and security courses began to make inroads into the University they all occurred at the graduate level. The level of thinking, adapting and cognitive processing required was just not available in the undergraduate level. Partly this is because there was no base level of understanding and all of the learning was at a synthesis level rather than rote. As the processes and concepts were matured the courses were moved to earlier and earlier into the graduate curriculum and then into the undergraduate level. In the University there are a lot of reasons that faculty and administration like to keep courses at the graduate level ($$$$$) but the fact remains most of the high level stuff now is simplistic.

In a lot of ways that is similar to small wars, insurgency, and counter insurgency. That does not mean there is not a graduate level of war though. Consider that a bachelor or undergraduate program is the engineer, the do'er, the journeyman and you have a good idea of the breadth most practitioners of war need to be at. The undergraduate acquires knowledge, skills, and abilities to apply them to particular tasks.

The graduate level is about mastery, artistry, and even a little bit about expansion of the art. The graduate level of any program is about synthesis and the creation of knowledge. Any element of the spectrum of war and the methods/tactics used can have that higher level expectation beyond the practitioner. There can be problems when to tightly focusing on a single aspect. Much like computer science faculty spent way to much time on encryption giving over much of the practical research in information technology the master of military arts can focus on one aspect and lose some of their discipline in a myopic view.

A doctoral level of war is about the creation of knowledge and the rigorous application of the disciplines standards to the practice. The epistemology of the discipline is applied to validate the concepts, knowledge, contributions and the more rigorous that application the more valuable the knowledge.

The military should be wary of attempting to acquire the trappings of an academic metaphor in the application of knowledge and creative process. As a quip the "graduate level of war" can help to generalize the value of the ideas and concepts. As a rule academic rigor can stagnate and impede the evaluation and construction of knowledge.

We have all used the phrase "That is academic".

Consider that phrase and what it means. Often used in a derogatory sense it means something important. It is the application of knowledge tools against concepts that bear not only on the surface of meaning but the deeper philosophical and tangential issues of an idea. The construction of valued science must meet the highest standards or be ridiculed no matter the social value of a discovery. Semantical deconstruction of concepts and ideas is entirely to important to science to be thrown away. Is this idea ever going to be that important to the military that an academic metaphor would truly apply?

Look at the cultural negativity that the vast majority of military members show towards the academia, and especially the low esteem held by the military for academics. Last week as an academic another military member (major) mentioned that I was a widget builder. I was also referred to as a "pet academic". I find it a little humorous that a military that holds academia as such an inferior organization would then go about adopting the terms, traditions, trappings, and titles of the inferior institution. In fact you might say the roles are that of insurgent and counter insurgent. Don't be to hasty in where you judge those roles to reside. Who is adopting what traditions?

With the greatest respect to the members of the military this old, fat, ugly, slow former Marine corporal would suggest a few things for the elite officer corps to think about. If I pinned on an officer rank it would basely and rightly offend all members of the military. Yet the military would abscond with the traditions of academia and use terms like "graduate level", "doctorate level" without concern or respect for academe traditions. This is a deeper problem in the power roles between the entities. The question is do you call a colonel by his rank, or his academic title if he is also a doctor? Is it defined by geography, role or something else?

So it is interesting to see the perspectives and discussion about terms and memes that turn around the issue. Beyond civilian and military relations there is a deeper current between academic and military members. A search for legitimacy whether needed or not, and a shared communal fracture in the pathways of communication. I would suggest there is a current insurgency between the entities and let the individuals involved sort the roles each chooses.

[Bill Moore]

I prefer to debate COL Maxwell because I respect his intellect and I know I'll get schooled when I challenge him, but unfortunately this time I can find nothing to disagree with.

[120mm]

But if COIN were the graduate level of war, couldn't we choose to take 20 years to fight the "African-American Women's Issues Among Red-headed step-children born under a blue moon in Westchester County, New York Between 1920 and 1922?"

And would Grant Writers become the most important aspect of warfighting?

[UrsaMaior]

There is too much emphasis today on specialisation and on cases which are the extremities of any given system and, at least as far as I see it, woefully little to general knowledge and to 'common sense'. As a freshly graduated historian I just cannot understand why so many relevant historical examples are simply left out of consideration.

Examples like Mao's advices in Three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, or the roman legions' soft power activities so brilliantly summarised in Monthy Python: Brian's Life. If we speak of the legionnaires I would like also add that apart from buidling activities, they participated in the administration of the provinces, conducted road patrols, served as embedded advisors in indigenous armies etc. Now that's full spectrum.

We just don't have to reinvent the wheel all of the time.

[William F. Owen]

Examples like Mao's advices in Three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, or the roman legions' soft power activities so brilliantly summarised in Monthy Python: Brian's Life. If we speak of the legionnaires I would like also add that apart from buidling activities, they participated in the administration of the provinces, conducted road patrols, served as embedded advisors in indigenous armies etc. Now that's full spectrum.

I must just correct you. It is Monty Python's, Life of Brian which is a master work, and much revered here, amongst the majority secular community in Israel. Otherwise your point is excellent and well made.


We just don't have to reinvent the wheel all of the time.

Exactly! - and some folks should be confronted about the selective raiding the historic and operational record to support the latest bumper sticker idea, which usually has no merit.

[SWJED]

General Vincent Desportes
Small Wars Journal Interview
by Judah Grunstein

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/92-grunstein.pdf)


General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein’s SWJ review of The Likely War.

Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?

Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I’m defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it’s something that’s extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the “end state” is defined after we’ve sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an “end state.” So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I’m defining is an ideal schema. What’s certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we’ve launched the operation. So we’re pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.

Now, in France, it’s probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we’re missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d’Orsay) didn’t exist. Now, I don’t know if that center is functioning, but it’s probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an “end state” before launching the operation.

General Vincent DesportesThe Likely War
by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/91-grunstein.pdf)


Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Must agree that so called "counter-insurgency" is not graduate level warfare. Personally feel its graduate level diplomacy.

Disagree with the Colonel regarding "PhDs of war" being those who understand that their actions at the beginning have consequences later.

This is not too much to be asking of anyone at the undergraduate level. Everyone should know it not just the enlightened few, but everyone.

Roger, actions have consequences, decisions have ramifications, that's part of the challenge of leadership.

[Pattonmat89]

I've heard a lot about the supposed "Crusaders vs. Conservatives" argument over how we will be fighting wars in the future (I also heard a bit about how it was slightly contrived). So I decided to add my two cents, a decision which could be as ill-advised as my decision, at age 2-3, to stomp on a fire ant mound while wearing sandals. Anyway, here goes.

I find plausible the argument that our wars will be increasingly irregular and that we need to put a greater emphasis on COIN, but at the same time, we need to remember that conventional warfighting is not dead. I read a monograph (https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=882) at the Army Strategic Studies Institute about the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, and how Hizballah didn't fight a pure irregular war, and that some of the Israeli problems may have been due to loss of warfighting prowess while bogged down in the West Bank and Gaza.

I accept the argument that the military still needs conventional warfighting skills, as well as COIN skills. At the best of times, a good military should be well-rounded, am I right? So it makes sense, given that there are still nations with large militaries that could pose threats to us, to retain the ability to give them an old-style smackdown.

Think about it. An Army that focused too much on conventional combat and virtually ignored the problem of COIN is one of the big reasons why Iraq has been so bad. It would hardly be better to ignore conventional fighting in favor of COIN.

If any of this didn't make sense, well, it's almost 0000, and I have class at 0800. I don't have the time to think any more tonight. Good night.

One last thought: We should preserve conventional warfighting because no one knows what the future actually is. Before Iraq, people were saying, "Well, wars are going to get so technology-heavy, and we'll reduce the number of boots on the ground, because we have Tomahawks and magic PGMs, and the like." I'm only 19, but even I know that the term "conventional wisdom" was not intended as a compliment.

[SNW]

Are there posted course syllabi for CGSC courses (or other colleges)? I'm curious to see how courses, reading lists, etc. for staff colleges has changed during OIF/OEF.

I know they've changed, but I'd like to see specifically how.

Articles addressing the same would be appreciated as well.

Many thanks.

[Xenophon]

Is anyone else attending the Marine Corps University sponsored COIN Leadership Seminar in D.C. on September 23rd? I managed to get a spot but I don't know a soul going. It hasn't been publicized very much but if anyone else is going we can start a SWJ section, maybe do some heckling. I'll be the guy in the back with a high and tight trying to hide my tiny silver bars from all the flag officers.

http://www.cnas.org/node/3314 ----link goes to the CNAS info page on the event, as I can't find the Marine Corps one, if one exists.

[davidbfpo]

maybe do some heckling

Career enhancing move! Just being there will be enough and posing a few questions can impress - you can always blame what you read here, being such a vulnerable junior officer.

I enjoyed asking questions in Whitehall many years ago as they thought I was in the military, but wasn't.

davidbfpo

[SWJED]

I'm registered and will be attending. Registration is now full - here is the e-mail I got the other day:

Greetings ~

The Marine Corps University's Counterinsurgency Leadership Symposium is now just two weeks away. Owing to high demand, we had to close registration a month ago and we have accumulated a very long waiting list. Thus, if your plans have changed and you are unable to come, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to cancel your reservation so that someone else can attend.

A few reminders:

1. Seating at the event will be on a first come, first served basis, so you are strongly advised to arrive early. Check in opens at 7 am and the symposium begins at 8 am.

2. We have updated the list of books that can be signed during the event, as we have added a few speakers (http://www.federalconference.com/CLS/). You can bring any of these books with you for signature by the author, but no books will be for sale on the day of the event because of federal regulations.

3. You still have a few days to purchase the optional lunch. If you buy the lunch, you will have time to speak with the panelists and obtain book signatures that would otherwise be unavailable. To purchase the lunch, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to select and purchase your lunch.

4. Uniform: Military dress should be USMC Service "C" and Army Class "B" or equivalent / business attire for civilians.

5. Address:

National Press Club
529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
202-662-7500

6. Link to map: http://www.press.org/directions.cfm

7. Directions by Metro:


Take Metro to Metro Center.
Take the 13th Street Exit, take escalator to 13th Street; you should be at the corner of 13th and G Streets.
Walk one block south to F Street.
Turn right (West) and walk one block to 14th Street
Turn left and walk downhill to the National Press Building lobby.
Enter and take the elevators to the 13th Floor

8. Parking:


The PMI garage is located on the north side of G St between 13th and 14th Streets.
Car Park is located at the corner of 15th and F Streets.
Cost of parking in this area ranges from $20 to $35 per day.

9. Please direct any questions to paul AT nationalconference.com.

[davidbfpo]

David Betz, KOW plus, has written a journal article and Prof. Randy Borum has written a quick review on his blogsite:http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2009/11/virtual-counterinsurgency.html

Betz's four main points are:
First, we do not take it seriously enough and therefore the tools we try to fight with are not fit for purpose.

Second, to the extent we do engage in the virtual dimension we concentrate too much on shifting Muslim opinion on an aspect of their religious faith that we as outsiders cannot effectively voice an opinion on. This is not to say we have not a stake in the outcome of that debate. We obviously do. But the surest way to make it go against us is to get involved in it.

Third, we pay almost no attention to the audience to which we have access and understand: our own population, which includes Muslims in the West whose allegiance to global Jihad is what Islamists crave more than anything.

Fourth, our efforts at narrative construction falter because they lack vertical coherence.The basic problem – Betz explains – is that
What we say does not always align with what we do.His article is:Betz, D. (2008). The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19 (4), 510-540 DOI: 10.1080/09592310802462273 (I suspect this is behind a pay wall).

[War Hammer]

When we talk about COIN Population Centric strategy it usually involves a sheepdog mentality. In other words, we are the sheepdogs protecting the sheep "the population".

Thomas Marks in "Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam" noted that Maoist revolutionaries in post Vietnam Asia were defeated through citizen militias. These militias, such as in Peru, were sometimes spontaneous in nature. They were not developed by the government. Rather the population rose upon their own against the Shining Path in Peru.

According to Mao, the people are the weapon. The guerrilla walks into a village and does not see sheep that need to be protected but wolves that can be used as a weapon. When he sees an old man, he does not see someone who needs to be coddled and protected, he sees an offensive weapon that can be used against the enemy.

This mentality, modified, can be used .by the COIN structure to utilize the population as a weapon rather than a big blob of mass that is merely separated from the guerrillas to "dry the sea." (referring to Mao's fish and sea analogy). Think of all the energy the population can provide the COIN movement when it is utilized in an offensive fashion.

Think of it this way, an old woman in an Afghan village is taught to use a knife in self-defense. When a Taliban comes to visit her she takes the knife and stabs him in the bladder, the kidney and then the liver and watches him bleed out. The news spreads around campfires in Afghanistan that an old grandma has just gutted a Taliban. She becomes a personality hero to those who want to resist giving more people the courage to rise up.

What I described above is exactly the kind of stories that were spread in China around campfires during the SINO-Japanese wars of families using knives to kill Japanese. Evans Carlson was one of those who documented them.

The people, according to Clausewitz, are what give energy to the warfighting machine. Mao following this dictum saw the people as the weapon. So should we.

[slapout9]

When we talk about COIN Population Centric strategy it usually involves a sheepdog mentality. In other words, we are the sheepdogs protecting the sheep "the population".

Thomas Marks in "Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam" noted that Maoist revolutionaries in post Vietnam Asia were defeated through citizen militias. These militias, such as in Peru, were sometimes spontaneous in nature. They were not developed by the government. Rather the population rose upon their own against the Shining Path in Peru.

According to Mao, the people are the weapon. The guerrilla walks into a village and does not see sheep that need to be protected but wolves that can be used as a weapon. When he sees an old man, he does not see someone who needs to be coddled and protected, he sees an offensive weapon that can be used against the enemy.

This mentality, modified, can be used .by the COIN structure to utilize the population as a weapon rather than a big blob of mass that is merely separated from the guerrillas to "dry the sea." (referring to Mao's fish and sea analogy). Think of all the energy the population can provide the COIN movement when it is utilized in an offensive fashion.

Think of it this way, an old woman in an Afghan village is taught to use a knife in self-defense. When a Taliban comes to visit her she takes the knife and stabs him in the bladder, the kidney and then the liver and watches him bleed out. The news spreads around campfires in Afghanistan that an old grandma has just gutted a Taliban. She becomes a personality hero to those who want to resist giving more people the courage to rise up.

What I described above is exactly the kind of stories that were spread in China around campfires during the SINO-Japanese wars of families using knives to kill Japanese. Evans Carlson was one of those who documented them.

The people, according to Clausewitz, are what give energy to the warfighting machine. Mao following this dictum saw the people as the weapon. So should we.


Now your talking. They don't have to stand alone, but they have got to stand up. What is this bullstuff where they walk up to American soldiers and complain that the Taliban are mean to them? Why don't they kick the crap out of em.

[tequila]

For the same reason that you rarely hear about elderly women stabbing young men to death. Because most of the time if they tried to do so they would lose.

Members of my family on my mother's side fought in the Eighth Route Army. Do not confuse propaganda with fact. Most organized resistance to the IJA during the war was not based on village militia.

Also, Peruvian rondas did not start to fight the Shining Path, but instead to combat cattle rustlers. Rondas that did fight the Shining Path did so in close partnership with the Peruvian security services, and under Fujimori were often directly subordinate to or officially formed by the military.

[War Hammer]

Doc Holliday was a criple with TB. He maybe killed two people, yet he is renowned as killing many more. Holliday was a master of propaganda. He played on the myth that he was a deadlier gunfighter than perhaps he really was because it made people to scared to mess with him.

the point is that Taliban will think twice about going after a population that is gunning for them. Especially with stories about old women taking knives to the Taliban. And an armed population with the political goal to destroy an insurgency is as Thomas Marks said an insurgency's worst nightmare.

The fire camp stories I was referring to were of individuals in families taking knives to the enemy. I have no doubt that some of these stories are real, maybe exaggerated. The effect of these stories was good propaganda because it reinforced the political goal of resistance in the regular army as well as popular militia. The Red Chinese were all about reinforcing the political goal in their everyday soldiers (something we do not do)

I believe we should be training people to be the weapons, to use spears, rocks or knives to kill the enemy. Thats the way insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in other countries are won.

Thanks for the info on the Peruvian militia. I believe Thomas Marks documented spontaneous militias rising up against the Shining Path, I could be wrong but I'll have to research.

[Rex Brynen]

I believe we should be training people to be the weapons, to use spears, rocks or knives to kill the enemy. Thats the way insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in other countries are won.

I can just see how that would go over in a country where most households are armed. :rolleyes:

If southern Afghan Pashtuns universally despised the Taliban, and acquiesced in their activities only because of intimidation, we would be in a much happier place than we are at present. However, many of them sympathize with their goals, or reject our presence, or have a myriad of local grievances. An even larger proportion just want to be left alone, and generally are by the Taliban when they don't assist us. Why, in that case, risk their lives and those of their families to fight against a Taliban that they may not see as particularly threatening?

[Ken White]

I thought you know that if I saw the Taliban as threatening, EVERYONE must also do that...

Hmm. Wait. Something wrong. I don't think the Talibs are threatening.

Maybe that's because I'm not living in southern Afghanistan tonight...:rolleyes:

[tequila]

To get you started, here is a 1992 USSOUTHCOM cable (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/920908.pdf) on rondas from 1992.

[War Hammer]

The knives, rocks, spears comment is one of mindset rather than actual application. I am loosely quoting Mao here. The mindset is for the people to see themselves as the weapon and that any tool they put their hand on, be it a rock or knife or AK, becomes an extension of themselves. The mind is the weapon.

There are those in Afghanistan who oppose the Taliban. Keep in mind I am speaking of insurgencies and COIN in general here, not specifically Afghanistan. The main thesis, "The people are a primary source of power for the COIN movement." Thats if you can get them to support the COIN movement.

[slapout9]

The knives, rocks, spears comment is one of mindset rather than actual application. I am loosely quoting Mao here. The mindset is for the people to see themselves as the weapon and that any tool they put their hand on, be it a rock or knife or AK, becomes an extension of themselves. The mind is the weapon.

There are those in Afghanistan who oppose the Taliban. Keep in mind I am speaking of insurgencies and COIN in general here, not specifically Afghanistan. The main thesis, "The people are a primary source of power for the COIN movement." Thats if you can get them to support the COIN movement.

Send this lady overthere, women with knives are bad news.....aks that bobbit guy about women with knives.:eek:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPu6N0rGuXk

[M-A Lagrange]

One interresting experience has been conducted with some success in DRC about involving population as a pro active tool in COIN.
The idea has been to cut the funding sources of FDLR by provinding economical alternatives to populations.
The experience was eased by the fact that FDLR were (and are) depending on charcoal smuggling. So in addition to troops in the villages, some local NGO started to provide and train population to produce energy from other sources than wood. This had the double advantage to keep the populations away from the forests were FDLR have their bases. And to reduce FDLR sources of fundings.
This is for me a good way to integrate people as an active security tool. I believe we should look more into developing such actions.

[reed11b]

My experience is that if the concept can be reduced to a bumper sticker, it fails to be very useful. That goes for both the "people as weapons" and the Mao reference. Better to look at the situation at hand and go from there. That is all.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

I have been waiting and hoping that he would put his thoughts into a well-developed article, rather than the distilled versions that he was forced into by editorial constraints of newspaper op-eds. Behold...

A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army

by COL Gian P. Gentile

Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American Army’s new way of war. The principles and ideas that emerged out of the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM), FM 3-24, published in late 2006, have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond simple Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining characteristic of the Army’s new way of war. In the American Army today, everyone is a counterinsurgent. It is easy to find examples of FM 3-24’s permeating effect in other Army doctrinal manuals such as FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, the American Army general charged with writing the Army’s doctrine, recently stated:

The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.The idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is drawn directly from the pages of FM 3-24.2

In a sense, population-centric counterinsurgency has perverted a better way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation and practicality. Over the course of American history there have been strategic shifts in terms of the threats and enemies that the United States had faced. With each of these shifts came a different approach, or way, to fighting wars or preparing for them in peacetime. For example, in the American Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant carried out a strategy of exhausting the southern armies through large-scale combat. A quarter of a century later in the Philippines, the American Army improvised and adapted to fight and ultimately defeat an insurgency against the US colonial government. As historian Brian Linn has shown in criticism of Russell Weigley’s classic The American Way of War, the US military’s approach has not been an ideological one of only wanting to fight wars consisting of big battles. A close reading of Linn’s work shows that the true American way of war has been one of adaptation and flexibility, and not a rigid ideological attachment to seeking out the next Napoleonic battle of Austerlitz.

Regrettably, the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called population-centric counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool in the Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world. Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations that need to be exposed and considered.

Read the rest at Parameters (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09autumn/gentile.pdf)

[Rob Thornton]

It is a good read and it makes you think. But I don't think he is exactly right or exactly wrong.

One of the things he says is that because GEN Petraeus says - although Afghanistan is not Iraq, some of the principles wrt COIN learned in Iraq are applicable in Afghanistan - that this means those principles now drive our thinking on Afghanistan, and by extension drive all our operational thinking. For me, and for many I know, the idea expressed by GEN Petraeus is similar to other principles, or fundamental things you want to consider given conditions and objectives. There are similarities between the two operational environments I think when you consider we are the most foreign element there and that the enemy is using that to their advantage, and we may want to make it a disadvantage, or at least contest it. The desire to contest it or deny it to the enemy support multiple ways, however in light of political objectives (stated, inferred or likely to be acceptable) those ways are at least somewhat constrained for better or worse to an approach which secures the population and isolates it from the enemy - it is perhaps just who we are.

A second thing I disagree with is that COIN has become the issue which will define us as a military or an an army. While it may be the one which occupies a significant amount our current efforts this seems appropriate given that it has been the constituted the bulk of the chosen operational approach by the commanders charged with achieving some sort of political objective tolerable to the United States. This is the generating force responding to the operational requirements described by those CDRs - theaters which consume the bulk of our ground force structure, and drive force generation. COL Gentile can make the argument that their operational approaches are flawed, but he does not have the responsibility to solve the political problem that they do.

I'm not sure how much journalists and think tankers really drive operational thinking either. I believe to some degree they may believe they do, but I think generally they pick up on what they hear, or see being done and do a good (sometimes no so good) job at describing and articulating it. For those not in uniform, it may appear they have significant influence, but most of the ideas I've read from them I can trace back to some man or woman in uniform who was confronted with a problem and either started doing something that worked, or kept saying it loud enough till someone listened. What they do provide is a means to get things out to people who would not listen because they believe if it came from the military it can't possibly be right. To wit, innovation and adaptation are alive and well in the ranks - after all, platoon sergeants still teach lieutenants that in some cases its better to ask forgiveness than permission.

I'm not sure but I don't think there is a task breakdown for COIN that walks you from an overarching mission task to supporting collective tasks, leader tasks and individual tasks. If there is not I'm not sure we can really measure what COIN capabilities we have, or what capacities we have in those capabilities. So, I just don't see the evidence that that it has reshaped our thinking and our force management practices to a point where we are posturing to be a Pop-Centric COIN force to support nation building.

What I have seen is a push to ensure we plan for the range of things we may have to do because: we planned to do them; were told to do them; or created conditions which required us to do them. I've been seeing it in our experimentation, and in our PME - which I think is a good indication of how we are posturing for the future. I think our other DOTMLPF processes are following suit - and I believe this supports a more capable force.

Now - where I do agree with COL Gentile's argument. I have grown tired of hearing, "its the hardest thing we've ever done, or will ever do", and "its the graduate level of war". Really, so events like the amphibious landings in WWII and Inchon or even Grant's Wilderness campaign simply don't compare? WWII was a real cake walk right? "Hard" is a relative term. It may be the hardest thing we've done in a while, or the hardest thing we've done this year - it may even be harder than comparative operations - but it is a relative term. How about crossing the Zagros - would that be hard? How about fighting in N. Korea - would that be hard? Truth is I think its all hard, and I think war as opposed to training is the graduate level - meaning you've graduated from training and now your doing the work you trained for. Every man and woman who serves in combat gets a graduate degree in war.

I thank COL Gentile for continuing to stress our thinking on this issue, even while I disagree with him. The greatest danger may be that we get to comfortable with the status quo, and get intellectually lazy.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Particularly these four thoughts which all merit repetition:
A second thing I disagree with is that COIN has become the issue which will define us as a military or an an army.

For those not in uniform, (Think tanks and journalists) may appear they have significant influence, but most of the ideas I've read from them I can trace back to some man or woman in uniform...

"Hard" is a relative term.

The greatest danger may be that we get to comfortable with the status quo, and get intellectually lazy.All totally correct. The first item will not occur; simply look at how quickly the hard learned lessons of WW II, Korea and Viet Nam were discarded... :wry:

[Bill Moore]

I liked the article, I experienced the full range of emotion while reading it, during one paragraph I was cheering, during another I was shaking my fist, during another I was calllng the author a fool, then on another I said he was brilliant. If you haven't read it, I recommend it.

All quotes are from COL Gentile's article.


Good strategy, however, demands the consideration of alternatives, yet the American Army's fixation on population-centric COIN precludes choice. I couldn't agree more, and our attempt to frame this conflict as a global insurgency that in turn requires us to re-build the globe so every country will allow us to operate through, by and with their forces is a deeply flawed approach that can't be supported by our means or our diminishing diplomatic power in a multi-polar world. This approach is doomed, yet we're fixated on it and not exploring alternatives.


Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means other than the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan military. Yes and no, actually there was a considerable amount of population-centric supporting activities, and equally important what COL Gentile may not know is that the LTTE were largely a peer conventional force to the Sri Lankan Army as they had a large maneuver army, their own navy and few lame airplanes that they could throw grenades out of. The Chinese invested heavily in Sri Lanka and this funding enabled the Sri Lankan Army to sustain their fight against the LTTE this time around (they were successful many times in the past, but simply ran out of money and political will to drive the stake in the LTTE's heart). This was far from a classical COIN effort, it was more along the lines of mini American Civil War.


The term itself "counterinsurgency" is so heavily loaded with historical context, assumptions, myths, and aburdities that it has become almost meaningless. Three cheers! Now every problem is an insurgency, and we apply the same template blindly to solve it. We don't really bother figuring out what is really going on.

He talks about the number of articles challenging Army doctrine approximately 30 years ago compared to now when there is relatively little challenge and debate over the new COIN doctrine.
What has appeared is a series of articles touting the triumph of the Surge, a narrative that has steamrolled the American Army into accepting this new way of war. I find his repeated assertions that the surge wasn't effective to be the larger distractor from his otherwise good arguments. GEN Petraeus got it right with the surge. It isn't hubris to believe that a large security presence suppressed the level of violence and facilitated some political maneuvering. Thumbs down on these repeated unsubstantiated attacks on the surge, it was appropriate for the situation in Iraq. Give it its due and move on.


In fact, COIN is arguably less complex precisely because it is less "kinetic." I hate it when some fat guy who can't make it in combat arms loves to gloat about how smart he is because he read a book on COIN. On the other hand, COIN isn't less complex than conventional war. The level of complexity perhaps switches, for senior officers the complexity level for large scale war fighting such as WWII is more complex than COIN, while at the lower levels COIN is more complex for the foot soldier. Don't confuse complex with easier or harder, that isn't my point. The author misses the point when he claims the degree of politics is the same for the PLT Sgt talking to a village chief today as it was for a PLT Sgt charging the beach in Normandy. The complexity in COIN is the political and social aspects at the tactical level combined with the kinetic piece, so no the platoon sgt bravely storming the beach in Normandy isn't conducting political warfare, he is maneuvering to kill German conventional forces. The political aspect of the war is largely above his level (he has enough to deal with). The Platoon Sgt talking to a tribal chief in Afghanistan or Iraq is engaged in political-warfare at the tactical level. Both are hard, but they're not the same.


The COIN experts seem to believe that they are the "young Turks" who figured out the true political nature of war compared to the old, Well the Young Turks who actually shifted from a largely ineffective conventional strategy to a COIN strategy did figure out a better approach to fighting the war in Iraq. I like to know where the author thnks we would be if we didn't make the transition?


Intead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN classic texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history of the British Empire in the latter half of the 19th century.


the British Army and government did understand the value of strategy They understood the essence of linking means to ends.

I agree, in "addition" to reading the classic COIN texts, they should read about the demise of the British Empire. No doubt there are many relevant lessons.


The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns to nation-building and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan.

I know Rob and Ken didn't concur with this, but from where I sit, I tend to agree that DoD is getting pushed into this model, and it is now a blind assumption that it is the right approach globally without a lot of intellectual rigor being applied. I support his comment about the "new" COIN doctrine being an intellectual straight jacket to a large degree.

[William F. Owen]

Well it' no secret that I admire and respect Gian Gentile as solid historian and military thinker, so I am in strong agreement with the vast majority of the article. - So what? :eek:

What I felt was under emphasised was the intellectually lazy and faith based approach of those advocating "POP-COIN" in it's wonderfully context free nature.

The whole edifice of "POP-COIN" comes to rest on the assumption that "protecting the population" is a method in and of itself. Additionally it assumes that merely doing it, creates the desired end state. So why not protect the population by killing the insurgents?

"POP-COIN" manages to argue that killing insurgents equals killing innocent people in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare argued that doing stupid things was bad and past this off as insight.

Doing stupid things is always stupid. Killing the right people for the right reason, always works. We have 3,000 years of history to prove it.

The only quibble I would add is that of the "strategy built on tactics." Callwell accurately observed that if something was not "tactically feasible" it could not be used as part of a strategy - so the tactical feasibility does form strategy in a very real sense.

Poor tactics, as in irrelevant tactical action, is always bad - see Hannibal, as in his inability to destroy the Roman Army, by besieging Rome, despite beating them in battles. If besieging Rome was not tactically feasible, why go to Italy?

[Schmedlap]

For the most part, I agree with COL Gentile. However, I am not overly concerned largely for reasons that Rob stated about COIN not being as widely embraced as many seem to think it has. It was reassuring to read Rob's post. I still know a lot of combat arms, Active Duty Officers in the Army. Most of them are field grade officers. They all are pretty skeptical of COIN being the wave of the future. The good news, imo, is that they are now commanding battalions or doing the Leavenworth thing (not the jail!). Maybe the think tanks are full of the COIN stuff, but the guys who are actually leading Soldiers and shaping history and who will be the future leaders of the Army are the guys who are less star struck with the prospect of joining a think tank or publishing books.

One of my old BCs strongly considered getting out, but decided to stick around to take command of a BDE and told me that he intends to remain in as long as possible, in large part because "this generation of Officers will make it to Company Command and beyond without ever doing combined arms operations. We need to stick around to make sure the Army still knows how to do that stuff." I suspect he will have a lot more influence upon how the Army trains and fights than Nagl or Exum.

[Ken White]

Bill Moore:
I tend to agree that DoD is getting pushed into this model, and it is now a blind assumption that it is the right approach globally without a lot of intellectual rigor being applied. I support his comment about the "new" COIN doctrine being an intellectual straight jacket to a large degree. True in both cases but DoD being pushed by the flavor / Admin / Think Tankette du jour and DoD adopting are two very different things. Dead right on the strait jacket bit, it is that. Dumb, too...

Schmedlap:
Maybe the think tanks are full of the COIN stuff, but the guys who are actually leading Soldiers and shaping history and who will be the future leaders of the Army are the guys who are less star struck with the prospect of joining a think tank or publishing books.Yep...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Schmedlap


I am not overly concerned largely for reasons that Rob stated about COIN not being as widely embraced as many seem to think it has. It was reassuring to read Rob's post. I still know a lot of combat arms, Active Duty Officers in the Army. Most of them are field grade officers. They all are pretty skeptical of COIN being the wave of the future.


"this generation of Officers will make it to Company Command and beyond without ever doing combined arms operations. We need to stick around to make sure the Army still knows how to do that stuff." I suspect he will have a lot more influence upon how the Army trains and fights than Nagl or Exum.

I agree with you and Rob on the points above, BUT while many Army leaders have not have embraced COIN as the "end all be all", we have a generation of officers that have practiced nothing else. The risk isn't based on what mid and senior level officers believe (as you stated), but due to the cycle of rotations into the box, recovery, then pri mission training to go back into the COIN box, thus the high end combat skill sets are eroding, and in that sense our Army is becoming a defacto COIN force.

We still have our conventional high end combat ground capability, but that blade is getting increasingly dull. The danger is an entire generation of up and coming officers have missed their most important training/education opportunity, which is mentorship by senior officers during high end combat exercises. The risk isn't the think tanks (and their assumptions about the future, which are too often mistakenly stated as facts), but the very real OPTEMPO and the fact we don't have time to train on high end combat.

As an SF guy, I used to complain that we were too focused on conventional warfighting tasks (unilateral ODA missions), which was eroding our UW capabilities, now it seems that our GPF brothers are experiencing the same challenge from a different perspective.

The SECDEF stated we have to train and equip to win the war we're fighting today, but we also have to strive to maintain some semblance of balance. I'm not sure we're allowing the GPF to do that.

[Rob Thornton]

Bill,

Well said (and Happy Thanksgiving out there in the far west). I'm just not sure current conditions support training on much more than those tasks that support the current mission set (at least at the unit level). Doing a good MA at the unit level may better refine those tasks, and we'll probably see that many of the small unit battle drills are required - but I'm not sure the conditions will support much more as I suspect there are lots of other tasks that are probably close to the top.

However the classroom and experimentation still looks balanced from my perspective - that is good. It may be the one area where we can retain contact with those skills so when conditions support or require we can make a faster transition.

A couple of months ago I heard the CSA speak at Bragg about the rotational dwell he desires and believes the Army needs. He spoke candidly and we appreciated it - there are no firm predictions on when that dwell will be achievable. The military will geographically shift weight, but not really shift too far along the spectrum.

One thing I've not heard is what is the readiness level on combined arms tasks which we believe we cannot fall below? I'm not sure that has been identified, and I think you'd have to pull a random sampling of units and place them in the box to really measure their level of performance. Identification of such would give us a better idea of where we are really at, and as such what the gap is between there and where we should be. This will help us develop a generating force training plan (and place the right amount of emphasis in the other DOMLPF areas as well) to mitigate that risk when the conditions support it, or when we believe the risk is simply to high.

Best, Rob

[Bob's World]

While I will certainly concur that I cannot find any historical examples, and certainly no foundation in the fundamentals of insurgency for "population-centric" COIN to be a solution for insurgency (too rooted in the belief that effectiveness of governance and control of a populace that perceives itself to be experiencing injustice or disrespect with no means of effective legitimate redress will bring it into the fold); I also remain adament that the British approach of crushing every generation or so that element of a populace that you are exploiting for your own purposes that dares to rise up to challenge your presence and actions, is no COIN victory either. The first dabs at the symptoms of the governments shortcomings on the government side, and the second dabs at the symptoms of the governments shortcomings on on the populace's side. Neither bothers to attempt to identify and address the true grievances leading to insurgency.

A populace bribed by a government is not one which necessarily supports the same.

An insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has only been suppressed and never truly resolved.

Aspects of both approaches have a place in a good COIN campaign, but neither stands alone.

So I would say that Gian is right about what is wrong, but I would also say that he is wrong about what is right.

[Entropy]

Happy thanksgiving everyone! If this comment is incoherent, please blame the turkey and wine. :D

Overall I liked the piece.

The more I read Col. Gentile the more I tend to think he is really looking to the future and is trying to strangle the baby in the crib. I agree (as one who is not in the Army) with others that pop-centric COIN isn't as pervasive as Col. Gentile makes it out to be, but it really seems to have gained traction in some policy and pundit circles and they are the ones who will ultimately drive the bus.

[libertariansoldier]

My first day as a registered member and I am motivated to write something--as opposed to having something worth writing.
I greatly admire COL Gentile and his efforts; he reminds me of Fuller in the interwar years: got it right with tanks and maneuver; missed out on the primacy of the combined arms thingy.
I feel the colonel is absolutely correct in that we are losing our mid-intensity warfighting capability. We have guys becoming majors who may have never taken a company through unit tank gunnery or its field artillery counterpart. A friend of mine's son (FA) has spent two tours in Iraq and they haven't even brought their guns with them.
But, you have to prepare to fight the war you in, not the one you think you might be in in the future. The skill set--especially at the small unit level--is so different you have to pay your money and take your chances. However, the drawdown in Iraq (assuming it comes to fruition), and the differences in tactical operations between it and AFG are such that time may give us the opportunity to recover our non COIN skills.
I actually think the greatest damage done to the Army is the reorganization into small combat brigades, if only because--once we sit down in an environment where the overarching pressure is no longer rotations and dwell time--it will be more difficult and take longer to remedy the errors in it. There was a lot to said for the robustness of the ROAD division and its Division86 follow-on, although the eventual AOE division did give up some of that. But that is a different topic.
Back on thread, I applaud the colonel for doing everything he can to ensure there is perspective brought to the doctrinal/organizational fight.
OBTW, did you see the Ricks post where he called the colonel the COINhata?

[William F. Owen]

My first day as a registered member and I am motivated to write something--as opposed to having something worth writing.
I greatly admire COL Gentile and his efforts; he reminds me of Fuller in the interwar years: got it right with tanks and maneuver; missed out on the primacy of the combined arms thingy.

I think the big difference between Gentile and Fuller is that Fuller was more vocal than insightful and spent a great deal of his time being wrong.

The "Fullers" of this world can all be found reading FM3-24, and writing about COIN as if they've discovered gravity.

[Schmedlap]

I agree with you and Rob on the points above, BUT while many Army leaders have not have embraced COIN as the "end all be all", we have a generation of officers that have practiced nothing else. The risk isn't based on what mid and senior level officers believe (as you stated), but due to the cycle of rotations into the box, recovery, then pri mission training to go back into the COIN box, thus the high end combat skill sets are eroding, and in that sense our Army is becoming a defacto COIN force.

Good point.

I don't know if this is the analogy that you had in mind, but as I read your comment, I thought about why the Army opted to ignore Vietnam and focus on HIC in the 70s and 80s. A generation of leaders who did HIC in WWII and Korea found themselves in a war in Vietnam where HIC had less utility. They wanted to get back to what they knew. Likewise, we're now raising a generation of officers who are not only being ordered to execute COIN ops, but they are also a generation that (from what I can tell) chafes more readily at authority and revels more at the thought of being Lawrence of Arabia rather than George S Patton. It seems plausible that in ten years we could send a few brigades someplace to fight a regional HIC and get our balls stomped and then conclude that our mistake was failing to intervene in the region five years earlier via a COIN op.

[Bodhi]

For several years now, many Marines and Soldiers alike have bemoaned the lack of combined arms training that is occurring in our regular training cycles. This is certainly disconcerting since we all know that combined arms skills require continual fine-tuning, and they atrophy relatively quickly. Moreover, those skilled in the combined arms arena understand the challenges inherent in executing such operations and tend to take exception to the whole “COIN is the graduate level of warfare” credo for the reasons that Gian cites; such a statement demeans the difficulties associated with executing such missions. I doubt that is the intent, but it is the result nonetheless, and I don’t think that many will argue the intellectual prowess required to conduct truly effective combined arms warfare.

However, I’m not sure if our lack of maintaining rigorous combined arms training these days is as much a result of a fundamental shift in the manner in which we view warfare as it is simply an unfortunate by-product of our deployment schedules. Units in CONUS are essentially either getting ready to deploy or just returning from deployment, and so time really is a precious commodity. Eventually, OIF and OEF will wind down, and when that does happen, I suspect we will return to a more balanced approach to our training and preparedness. I sure hope so, anyway…

[Xenophon]

I too agree with COL Gentile's criticisms of POP-COIN, especially that it is an operational method rather than a strategy. I also take issue with "the population is the Center of Gravity" mantra that gets thrown around to mimic thought.

However, I don't think the current COIN chic culture is a crisis. Yes, the military has focused almost exclusively on COIN in recent years, but prior to September 11th our skills at COIN had atrophied to non-existence. We've been playing catch up, and eventually we'll be caught up and balance will be restored to the Force. We do need to be able to do both COIN and HIC. Only a Sith deals in absolutes.

At least, in the Marine Corps the COIN wave is beginning to crest. Not only is CAX coming back, but a new-improved CAX is coming. Maybe things are worse in the Army, I could be wrong.

[William F. Owen]

Likewise, we're now raising a generation of officers who are not only being ordered to execute COIN ops, but they are also a generation that (from what I can tell) chafes more readily at authority and revels more at the thought of being Lawrence of Arabia rather than George S Patton.
Someone has to get it beaten into the US military that T.E. Lawrence was a not a good soldier or that effective. He was invented by a US newspaper writer and then went on to drink his own bath water. The men who need to be studied and copied are men like Allenby, not Lawrence. T.E. Lawrence -himself- simply holds no lessons for the serious student of warfare.


It seems plausible that in ten years we could send a few brigades someplace to fight a regional HIC and get our balls stomped and then conclude that our mistake was failing to intervene in the region five years earlier via a COIN op.
So to conclude with hindsight, based on what evidence? The only folks who would want to think like that are those pumping the COIN agenda.

[Schmedlap]

Wilf,
We're not in disagreement. I'm just saying that I can see us going down those paths if the current crop of Soldiers who have done nothing but COIN react in the same way to a future HIC as the WWII/Korea folk who did nothing but HIC reacted to Vietnam.

[Tom Odom]

Someone has to get it beaten into the US military that T.E. Lawrence was a not a good soldier or that effective. He was invented by a US newspaper writer and then went on to drink his own bath water. The men who need to be studied and copied are men like Allenby, not Lawrence. T.E. Lawrence -himself- simply holds no lessons for the serious student of warfare.

Wilf

Not a good soldier in the mold of the day? Nope and Lawrence said that himself.

But I will disagree to the degree that you dismiss Lawrence. Inflated by the media, yes. Inflated by Lawrence, yes. But he did play a role in the arab Revolt and that role is quite worthy of study, albeit with a degree of scepticism.

As for the COIN agenda and the non-COIN agenda, they deserve each other. Personally I would rather have the think tanks AEI, CNAS, and others mud fight in speedos and bikinis. That would be more useful than listening to either continue to try and overstate their case.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
We're not in disagreement. I'm just saying that I can see us going down those paths if the current crop of Soldiers who have done nothing but COIN react in the same way to a future HIC as the WWII/Korea folk who did nothing but HIC reacted to Vietnam.
Point taken, well made.


But he did play a role in the arab Revolt and that role is quite worthy of study, albeit with a degree of scepticism.
Yes he did, but let's study the revolt, and not the man. The revolt was not his idea, and he was one of several tasked with the role.

As for the COIN agenda and the non-COIN agenda, they deserve each other. Personally I would rather have the think tanks AEI, CNAS, and others mud fight in speedos and bikinis. That would be more useful than listening to either continue to try and overstate their case.

I hear you, but if someone keeps telling that "COIN is the Future" or "the graduate level of war" or any of the statements that can do serious damage, then I need to get my bikini on and jump in - but having some class I only wrestle in Jell-O! :eek:

[Rob Thornton]

It seems growing anything worthwhile takes resources. A concern we might should have is related to the training infrastructure and other resources needed to maintain a readiness level in the use of combined arms.

While there are places like the CTCs (I'm going to lump the places like the WSMR, the Stumps, San Clemente Island, and some of the USN and USAF ranges in that category) that combine maneuver space with CALFX space, at home station where units are garrisoned there are few places (some MPRCs and MPTRs) that allow a greater integration of multi-service capabilities and the echelonment of supporting fires. Even fewer that don't shut down multiple other ranges which impact other folks training. Often to do such training one has to get lucky, commit other resources well in advance, or make tough decisions about training where other will not, cannot, or when they will not. All of those take resources as well.

I bring it up because understanding what is required to make combined arms training possible is something you learn by doing - and frequency plays a role. It is often installation specific - while there are regulations which standardize things like SDZs (Surface Danger Zones - there are often environmental impacts, or local policies which unit leaders need to know to make training possible and do it reasonably safely. For me I was lucky enough to have some great teachers who bother understood the requirements, the need to do it, and were willing to underwrite my mistakes (I had plenty, but none from which I was unable to recover)

Now, we've got some great small unit leaders who are employing combined arms to different degrees in theater, but as to how many of them have had the benefit of spending time thinking about the training aspect of it I don't know.

What concerns me is that we may have a gap in some of that experience based knowledge amongst the company grades, and more junior SNCOs - I honestly just don't know. I do know allot of our qualification processes have been streamlined to support making more time available to units for recovery, planning and preparation as they go through the pipe- which has its benefits. Perhaps those contracts and services will remain in place and we'll just extend them to an eventual post war environment until we catch up - again I don't know how big the gap is.

I guess that until we determine exactly how big the gaps are in our ability to execute the types of combined arms tasks we think may be required in the future as they relate to doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel and facilities, and how those DOTMLPF gaps relate to one another we really don't know how much our capabilities in those areas have atrophied, or what the rate of decay may be as they show up in the war fighting and/or joint functions. We probably also don't know what gaps we may have in the generating forces' capabilities to react to those gaps either.

We absolutely have some of the best leaders I've seen since I entered service in 1985 - maybe they were always there, but the conditions did not support (or require) us to let them live up to their potential - I don't know (but I do suspect). However, there are allot of systems that have to be sustained to support them shifting gears, and the broader system - the one that pays the bills - does not support balance, instead it equates effectiveness to efficiency - based of short term political goals vs. retaining capability to support national security (e.g. political vacillation).

As there seems to be concurrence (at least here on SWJ) that combined arms capabilities that support being able to execute the full range of our tactical tasks I could only recommend that the services (it really falls in their responsibilities as force and capability providers) think about a CBA (capabilities based assessment) to such end - pick a scenario that borders on unlikely (because those seem to be the ones that happen) and then run it all the way through over a 10 year period with all the stability and reconstruction life suckers we know will probably follow - and in between add in some other things that call into questions capability and capacity and then report it honestly - and make DOTMLPF adjustments as possible.

While I know our experimentation and exercises do cover a range of conditions and scenarios, I'm not sure if we really link it to a total review of our supporting systems. You'd think the QDR would, but I'm not sure it does so in a comprehensive manner that reaches down all the way down. We have allot of reporting systems on readiness, with allot of reporting requirements (probably too many). What I don't know that we have is a good way of linking all of them so they tell us what we need to know about ourselves in a way that allows us to make good decisions based on current and future requirements vs. always being in a react to contact mode.

Best, Rob

[Mark O'Neill]

Overall, like Bill M and many others, I largely enjoyed the argument put by Gian, albeit wishing he had used a few more facts and a little less assertion to justify his argument. Hence my view that it read liked a Post or Times opinion piece rather than an article in a refereed journal. (The Editor(s) chasing balance or controversy, perhaps?)

A couple of thoughts:

1. I think the term 'population centric COIN' refers to quite a specific set of circumstances, which, as identified by Gian, reflect an 'FM -24' centric view of COIN. Perhaps a clearer distinction is required. Gian applies the term with such broad brush that I think it becomes hard to distinguish whether his real problem is with the strategic choice that America's leadership has made to engage with insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan (and a few other places such as the Philippines) or merely the operational / tactical decision to pursue a 'population centric' strategy.

2. The depiction of Briggs' role in the article as supposedly view by 'COIN experts' is perhaps more than a little bit of artistic license in order to allow Gian to set up the contrived Briggs / Templar and Casey / Petraeus comparison. Any student of the Malayan campaign that does not recognise the 'Briggs Plan' as the operational scheme that both 'turned' the campaign and the plan that was largely carried out by Templar is missing the point.

3. It is a false argument to say that Casey didn't get the COIN problem. Whether one is doing it as a 'COIN expert' or a commentator.
Lets not forget the review(s) that he commissioned , nor the fact that he created 'COIN' aids like the MNF-I CFE in Taji. This makes the Casey 'not getting it argument' ring a little hollow to me - no matter whether it is coming from 'COIN experts' (who, bizarrely, increasingly appear to be journos, academics, ex-soldiers, political pundits and beltway think tankers - rather than actual soldiers) or authors seeking to contrive a point.

4. The point that Gian (and others) keep trying to make about strategy vs tactical / operational technique is cloudy. It is hampered by the association with the term 'population centric'. Indeed, 'population centric' is a 'way' , as identified by Gian. But that does not mean that there are not instances where counterinsurgency is a strategy (as I argued in my recent monograph, Confronting the Hydra (http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1159) ).

I think many of Gian's points about 'Population- centric COIN' (and 'COIN experts') have some merit. However, isolating 'population centric COIN ' and making it synonomous with all COIN to derive a view about COIN strategy or its general utility is a stretch.

Cheers,

Mark

[kingo1rtr]

I thought Col Gentile's article was both thought provoking and balanced - nothing less that one would expect from a knowledgable professional.

However: for my money he is guilty of a slightly narrow analysis. Whilst FM 3-24 has acted as the neon lamp for the counterinsurgency moths (I don't mean that dis-ingenuously)I think the Colonel would do well to broaden his narrative analysis to take account of work such as Rupert Smith's 'The Utility of Force' which majored on 'population centric warfare'. His closing point that we would do well to study the British experience in the second half of the 19th Century is apt. There is something poignant about the fact that we (British Army) are back where we were 150 odd years ago, in Baluchistan, with the Pashtuns, Waziris and others. Same same for Iraq (look at the Kut experiences of the British Army in 1916 - 18).

It is from this telling cycle of history that we should be drawing strategic conclusions from, not continuing to wallow in this tactical (and occasionally operational) level debate.

Nor ought we to take our eye off the Army Officers' traditional love for the intellectual pissing matches. Look at Monty in the Western desert in 1942 and the way that he used Dorman_Smith's plan (having dismissed him from post) but of course made sure that in his telling of that story it was his plan. Patten and Eisenhower were no different in that respect either. The professional jealousy that von Manstein encountered amongst other senior German Generals during [and after] the war is symptomatic of the same thing.

There is only so many times that Gallula, Kitson, Thompson et al can be reviewed by the 'military chatterati' and something new and relevant/timely/telling be drawn out - they are after all generally a series of tactical vignettes stitched together with a retrospective operational level narrative.

Lets raise the game and look at strategy and grand strategy. Is the coalition strategy right? Have we got an alliance campaign plan? Is the surge US thinking or is it a coalition game that we are in. When will we seize our Casablanca moment and get the senior coalition leaders on to a campaign footing and hold Karzai and the AfPak leadership to account.

I suspect that my great grandson will one day pull out FM 3-24, and Kitson, probably Petraeus and Ricks and others too, as part of his pre deployment training, before he strikes out onto the dusty plains of Kandahar; maybe he will take some good from those texts (as we do now because this game doesn't change that much)and then gently reflect on the irony of his great grandfather's generation of military leaders who failed to get 'the great game' and cut and ran on the basis of a 'sucessful surge' leaving in place a fragile peace, no better than how it was before they arrived.

[rborum]

The whole edifice of "POP-COIN" comes to rest on the assumption that "protecting the population" is a method in and of itself. Additionally it assumes that merely doing it, creates the desired end state. So why not protect the population by killing the insurgents?

"POP-COIN" manages to argue that killing insurgents equals killing innocent people in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare argued that doing stupid things was bad and past this off as insight.

Doing stupid things is always stupid. Killing the right people for the right reason, always works. We have 3,000 years of history to prove it.


wilf - This may be the most concise and clearest counter-POP-COIN statement I have heard yet. It circumvents the semantic quibbling about the aims (what we should be doing) and focuses on differences in the approach (how we should be doing it). Nicely stated.

Your comments about Lawrencian idolatry are also quite thought-provoking. I do not possess the knowledge of history that you, Gian and others here have, but the current COIN Wars seem to me to be heavily influenced by metaphor and symbolism (at least in their rhetoric) - TE Lawrence is clearly a standout icon in the Pro-POP-COIN discourse. If we have gotten lost in our tacit assumptions (like Lawrence as an aspirational ideal), then you are absolutely right to remind us to question - or at least to critically revisit them.

[jcustis]

The whole edifice of "POP-COIN" comes to rest on the assumption that "protecting the population" is a method in and of itself. Additionally it assumes that merely doing it, creates the desired end state. So why not protect the population by killing the insurgents?

And why not protect the population by getting rid of insurgents, but focusing on doing so by resolving the root causes of their insurgent ways?

The problem with simply killing insurgents is (in a similar vein to how I think you argue in your case against POP-COIN) that unless you have laid the link analysis chart against the fabric of a society and determined that each and every insurgent arose as an individual entity with zero ties to that fabric, you cannot just keep on killing and killing in a society so bound by honor and tribal ties and expect for the situation to remain static and stabile.

This matter of difference is critical to efforts involving our national interest. I have my own misgivings about where Afghanistan falls, and it would certainly be much easier to pack up and head home and call it a draw.

As a trigger puller, I am going to ensure that the fair share of knuckleheads are given dirt naps. The calculus to it all involves a determination of whether the host nation can sustain that same effort in your stead, and just who those knuckleheads are. When they do not readily present themselves to be put down, the calculus shifts then to the amount of carrots required to get the information to find them. It's all a remarkably simple cycle. The folks physically on the ground do not, rest assured, view population-centric COIN as a method in and of itself.

[Bill Moore]

Wilf,

Even if you're killing the insurgents, you still have to protect the populace. If you're fighting a conventional war, you're generally going to endeavor to defend key terrain that you currently have ownership over. The principle is take the terrain (the populace in this case, block by block, village by village), defend it, consolidate gains, then push on to take the next chunk of terrority. Consolidation is IMO the so what of defending the populace, it is achieving permanent gains. Of course you still have to kill bad guys, but prior to defending the populace in Iraq, we were only making limited gains with the killing piece. A lot more to it as you well know, but I don't understand the backlash against defending the populace. It is part, a key part, of the overall effort. If your point is what do you after you have your defense in place, then your point is well taken. If it is we shouldn't do it, then please clarify why not?

As for Lawrence being a bad soldier, please explain. I guess I'm in the crowd that holds him in rather high regard. Some folks consider a person a bad soldier if he doesn't shine his boots, rolls his sleeves up, or wears unauthorized head gear. If you're evaluating Lawrence negatively because he was a non-conformer I guess, but if you're telling us he was not that effective, then please enlighten us. Please tread lightly, this could be a hard pill for many of us to follow. :D

[Rex Brynen]

Actually, I don't think Pop-centric COIN is all about "protecting the population" at all.

Pop-centric COIN--done properly--is about seeing the political loyalties of the population as central to the COIN mission, and recognizing that defeating the insurgents requires that much of the population be shifted away from actively supporting them. In doing so, one can:

dry up insurgent recruitment
weaken insurgent resolve and motivation.
exacerbate splits and tensions among insurgent soft- and hard-liners.
inhibit the ability of insurgents to collect necessary resources from the local population
enhance the ability of the counter-insurgents to gather the intelligence critical to eliminating insurgent forces.


Often that requires protecting the population--or, at least, rendering them less vulnerable to insurgent pressures. However, it is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Pop-centric COIN certainly doesn't have anything against killing insurgents--indeed, it thinks it is rather desirable. It does suggest that killing insurgents in a way that generates even more insurgents, weakens the very government that one is trying to protect, and alters the regional and international environment in ways that further constrain the mission is not terribly helpful.

[jmm99]

with this:


Pop-centric COIN--done properly--is about seeing the political loyalties of the population as central to the COIN mission, and recognizing that defeating the insurgents requires that much of the population be shifted away from actively supporting them. In doing so, one can:

- dry up insurgent recruitment

- weaken insurgent resolve and motivation.

- exacerbate splits and tensions among insurgent soft- and hard-liners.
inhibit the ability of insurgents to collect necessary resources from the local population

- enhance the ability of the counter-insurgents to gather the intelligence critical to eliminating insurgent forces.

Often that requires protecting the population--or, at least, rendering them less vulnerable to insurgent pressures. However, it is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

And, if you have the right conditions, mobilize the population to provide active support in favor of the "counter-insurgency".

However, all this avoids the questions which are not answered by the various debaters:

1. What if the HN government is a bunch of knockleheads themselves ?

2. Is a Strategy of Tactics ("best practices COIN") capable of defeating the insurgency under that condition ?

3. If so, what is the recipe ?

Mark of the Red Hand of Ulser (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Hand_of_Ulster), you write a good monograph on insurgency (genetic, no doubt :D); and lay out in more detail Rex's bullet points. And, you emphasize the importance of the narrative. What if the narrative in truth stinks ?

Regards to all

Mike

[Backwards Observer]

This 1952 Time cover may have helped paint Field Marshal Templer as the face of hearts and minds. Check out the steely gaze.


Templer was a hands-on manager and was famous for flying to trouble spots. Sometimes his chastising of the villagers had humorous consequences. Noel Barber mentions such a case after a guerrilla ambush caused Templer to immediately fly to the nearest village where he harangued the collected inhabitants:

"You're a bunch of bastards," shouted Templer; and Rice, who spoke Chinese, listened carefully as the translator announced without emotion: "His Excellency informs you that he knows that none of your mothers and fathers were married when you were born."

Templer waited, then, pointing a finger at the astonished villagers to show them who was the "Tuan," added "You may be bastards, but you'll find out that I can be a bigger one." Missing the point of the threat completely, the translator said politely, "His Excellency does admit, however, that his father was also not married to his mother."

Pictures and quote from the highly informative Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, page at psywar.org.

http://www.psywar.org/malaya.php

Another colourful chap was C.C. Too, first local chief of the Psychological Warfare Section.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._C._Too

[Mark O'Neill]

Mike, If the narrative is a dud then...


with this:
Mark of the Red Hand of Ulser (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Hand_of_Ulster), you write a good monograph on insurgency (genetic, no doubt :D); and lay out in more detail Rex's bullet points. And, you emphasize the importance of the narrative. What if the narrative in truth stinks ?

Regards to all

Mike

...it is time for a new one, as soon as possible. I think (and the record shows) that you can do all sorts of clunky / stupid things for a fair while in counterinsurgency /small wars and still recover. However, one of the hardest errors to fix / recover from is a dud narrative.

I tried to emphasis this in the monograph by linking it with the adjective 'compelling' - having a story is one thing, having a story that motivates sufficient passion (good or bad) to get people to act is another thing all together.

Whilst we are straying from Gian's post about 'population centric COIN' , in a way I think there is a link between the platitudes of that approach and the platitudes we receive about the development of a narrative. I find it kind of amusing that 'population centric' is shortened to 'pop centric' - a bit like 'pop art'. The analogy brings to mind superificiality and light weight 'art' - and the result is sound bite doctrine and shallow thought.

I think that doctrine like FM3-24 (or any other doctrine) has little utility with respect to 'narrative' beyond merely highlighting that one is needed. The peculiarities (political , cultural and social) of each war make it impossible to provide a 'how to' guide for the narrative.

Picking the narrative requires something that I suspect only intellect, experience and appropriate political nous can provide. It is my observation that these traits are apparently in short supply as many of the narratives that our political leaders and IO people are offering are risible, barely making the grade against ill-informed domestic audiences and often being down right funny (in a sad way..) when played to a 'target' audience. That is not to say that it can't be done - the example of the Indonesian Goverment's counter JI narrative strikes me as one that hit the mark- but it does seem all to rare.

I will also assume that your question was less than rhetorical and will take the bait about some contemporary narratives.

I think the current Iraq narrative is essentially sound, but given the US price paid and the ongoing costs, cedes just a little to much to the 'Iraqi Sovereignty' LOO.

I think that the Afghanistan narrative is a contradictory mess - and that is just to the US/UK/ Canadian/ Aus /NATO domestic audiences. The narrative to the locals is truly off message. But we are getting way off post and topic now...

BTW, thanks for the feedback on the paper - although I had never regarded the art of 'Blarney' as a genetic trait!

regards,

Mark

[Dayuhan]

What if the narrative in truth stinks ?


The usual solution to that problem would be to impose a more attractive narrative. Once upon a time the default choice would have been "Communism vs Capitalism", nowadays it would more likely be "Islamic Extremism vs The West".

[Backwards Observer]

The usual solution to that problem would be to impose a more attractive narrative. Once upon a time the default choice would have been "Communism vs Capitalism",

Or to turn a phrase, a la Lee Kuan Yew, getting air-conditioners or getting "ventilated".

[Ratzel]

People always point out how we lost COIN knowledge after Vietnam. I think this was a matter of trading off for the bigger threat. The threat of the Soviets invading W. Europe was world changing. Military planners could have created a COIN type Army but doing so would have been dangerous.

Today, there is no Soviet threat or anything close. So developing a COIN Army is an option. It would be nice having COIN capabilities to clean up threats 1) near our energy needs 2) along our sea lanes 3) in Mexico 4) and in other places in Latin America.

Right now I don't see any major HIC threat. And if there is, I believe having proper air power and control of space is a bigger concern than how we configure our ground forces. American ground forces are much more dynamic compared with "weapons platforms." So the best thing to do is to create a high tech air force and navy for HIC, and configure our ground forces for COIN. If a HIC threat emerges, then we can start to retrain the ground force accordingly. Six months of intense ground combat training will probably suffice?

This would leave our "weak-spot" as being any HIC enemy that could achieve its goals in our six month retrain window. And this enemy would have to deal with our air power, special operations, and naval force (not to mention any ground forces who, while being under-trained for HIC, would still be combat hardened enough to at least stop any potnetical enemy from achieving anymore gains).

The key here is that we must control the sea, air, and space (and hopefully cyberspace) before anything else.

[Dayuhan]

It would be nice having COIN capabilities to clean up threats 1) near our energy needs 2) along our sea lanes 3) in Mexico 4) and in other places in Latin America.


It would certainly be nice to have the capability to "clean up threats" in all of these areas, but wouldn't it take rather more than upgraded COIN capabilities to do that? At the very least it would require meddling in a whole bunch of very murky local conflicts, not an entirely attractive prospect.

[Bob's World]

The only places the U.S. really need worry about insurgencies are where they coincide with our critical national interests.

"Fortunately" a focus of U.S. foreign policy over the past 60 years has been to heavily shape the politics and governances of those same regions to support/enable those same interests, making it much easier to identify the essential insurgencies as they tend to target us as phase 1 to their primary nationalist goals at home.

All forms of COIN are tactics. If you want to talk strategically, then lets discuss the policy changes requried to engage these areas where our critical national interests will likely remain for the foreseeable future in a way that is less intrusive to the governance of the region and is more sensitive to the right of the populace over the rights of a particular ruling class to remain in power.

This is the essence of "Populace-Centric" engagement, which is a far different animal indeed to the current fad of population centric COIN. Insurgencies are won in the halls of government, not the homes of the populace; and when an insurgency goes "global" (god, I hate the misnomer of global insurgency) it is fixed in the halls of the government under that collective attack. The problem being of course, that governments are made of politicians, and politicans don't typically step to the front of the line to take responsibility when things turn to crap on their watch.

[Ratzel]

It would certainly be nice to have the capability to "clean up threats" in all of these areas, but wouldn't it take rather more than upgraded COIN capabilities to do that? At the very least it would require meddling in a whole bunch of very murky local conflicts, not an entirely attractive prospect.

If the US Army is considering creating a COIN centric force, then by default its admitting that "meddling in a whole bunch of murky local conflicts" is exactly what it plans on doing. In the cold war we built a force that could fight the Soviets in a conventional war in Western Europe. The Soviet threat was what we built the force around. In we build a COIN force, we're saying that we believe small wars and insurgencies to be our biggest threat.

Any talk on the future of the force must contain some sort of analysis of what the future threat environment will look like. At the very least, even if we're unsure of what the future will look like, I think we can all agree that we must always control the sea, air, space , and if possible cyberspace. This is easy and will benefit us no matter what future threats will look like.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

Even if you're killing the insurgents, you still have to protect the populace. If you're fighting a conventional war, you're generally going to endeavor to defend key terrain that you currently have ownership over. The principle is take the terrain (the populace in this case, block by block, village by village), defend it, consolidate gains, then push on to take the next chunk of terrority.
You may well be right. I think it is very context dependant, but at the most basic level I want to bad guys to fear me. I want to break their hearts and weaken their minds. I have limited resources, I want to focus it on hunting the problem, not protecting some folk, and leaving others un-protected. The issue is allocation and use of resources.


As for Lawrence being a bad soldier, please explain. I guess I'm in the crowd that holds him in rather high regard. Some folks consider a person a bad soldier if he doesn't shine his boots, rolls his sleeves up, or wears unauthorized head gear. If you're evaluating Lawrence negatively because he was a non-conformer I guess, but if you're telling us he was not that effective, then please enlighten us. Please tread lightly, this could be a hard pill for many of us to follow. :D
I'll tread as lightly as the evidence allows me to do. There are at least 7 biographies on Lawrence, and not so much good or objective military history. As a soldier and UK national, T.E.'s job was to enact British Policy. If that meant lying and cheating, then so be it. His job was explicitly to deliver Palestine to the British. No the Arabs.
I greatly admire some non-conformers. It really depends on how their lack of conformity actually helps. To date a rational and objective, relevant and evidence based measure of T.E. actual contribution is lacking - thus, good soldier or not, I do not see him as being really relevant to current debates or issues.



Actually, I don't think Pop-centric COIN is all about "protecting the population" at all.

Pop-centric COIN--done properly--is about seeing the political loyalties of the population as central to the COIN mission, and recognizing that defeating the insurgents requires that much of the population be shifted away from actively supporting them.
.... but that's a a very context specific assumption. It's actually the ideal, that almost never occurs in reality. Defeating insurgents requires that the insurgents realise they can never win using violence. How and why they come to believe normally results from their being stopped from being able to conduct effective violent action in pursuit of their goal.

It does suggest that killing insurgents in a way that generates even more insurgents, weakens the very government that one is trying to protect, and alters the regional and international environment in ways that further constrain the mission is not terribly helpful.
So doing stupid things in counter-productive? OK. We can agree. It still doesn't make the case for "POP-COIN". As I have said before, I want to involve as few of the population in the fight as possible.

As concerns political loyalty, I don't care who they vote for. When they do vote, I want to make it clear, there is no hope of casting a vote for an agenda or idea promoted by violence.

We'll all look pretty silly if the Taliban get voted into power in A'stan....,

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf's Comment:

"As concerns political loyalty, I don't care who they vote for. When they do vote, I want to make it clear, there is no hope of casting a vote for an agenda or idea promoted by violence.

We'll all look pretty silly if the Taliban get voted into power in A'stan...., "

Somehow, we got back to this voting thing, and the possible idea that the Taliban might win. If it were the case, shouldn't COIN and our diplomatic efforts be focused on the majority??? (Back to jmm's challenge: What of the truth stinks?)

I keep looking back to square one: You need to find substantial concensus before peace and stability can begin. The essence of that concensus is a national Loya Jirga, and not any more of this silly Western voting stuff. (Great concept for later).

I'm thinking of a real one, and not the paper tiger proposed by His Honor. Absent a real concensus of the elders and influencers (including Taliban), we are chasing our tails there.

Why do we need more forces and police? To fight the opposition. If the opposition is the majority, and the majority, at the least, is accomodated, then the whole forces and police thing goes away. No.

Then, they (not us) have a straight-up political problem that, at the least, needs to be brokered out between themselves.

A key comment I heard loudly was that the original constitution has deep flaws, and needs to be fixed if there is any hope of a viable Afghanistan. If that is the case, how does it get addressed.

Another is that a strong Pkistan commitment is essential. That for a President who narrowly survived ouster for old corruption charges and, according to India, doesn't run the country anyway.

The latest Ricks post cites a Guardian article where Amb. Holbrooke is trying to build support for an international super-czar to take provisional control---a work-around of Karzai and the UN, but NATO won't buy in.

Let's see. Holbrooke wants to work around UN and the President of Afghanistan. Eikenberry opposes the troop build-up, and, according the the International Crisis Group, UNAMA is ineffective.

With Hobrooke's gauntlet on the table, it seems like his latest confrontation of Karzai may be his last Hurrah if it fails. All their bridges will be burned.

Perhaps we could get the US conflicts ironed out first, then tackle the Afghan problem (what ever it actually is), and the Pakistani one. (As the brainless pageant bimbo says: "I pray for World peace!")

Back to the Pop Corn (oops. COIN?) matter. I keep trying to find a clearly-defined military problem to which a military solution can be applied. (No, we are all too grown up to buy into the "AQ will attack my shopping mall if Karzai isn't protected and trained" thing).

I'm really looking forward to someone who can answer jmm's questions:

"1. What if the HN government is a bunch of knockleheads themselves ?

2. Is a Strategy of Tactics ("best practices COIN") capable of defeating the insurgency under that condition ?

3. If so, what is the recipe ?"

[Steve the Planner]

From my little perch in Tikrit in Dec 2007 to June 2008, the snapshot looked like this:

Sunni fighters fleeing the Shias in Baghdad, and using the blackmarket and cross-border smuggling.

Sunni fighters being squeezed between SF snipers in the outlands and major house-to-house operations in and around any insurgent, sniper or IED activities.

A non-representative provincial elected govt stocked ala the Sunni boycott. (All removed after the elections, same as in Ninewa).

Provincial administrators aching for help from their Shia controlled national ministries, and tolerating US mil/civ assistance (but with some serious loathing).

A public anxious for fighting to stop and an economy and services to emerge.

This was the "set" into which various tactics were adopted and applied to stabilize the conflict and improve public services and the reach of govt (non-representative).

In most instances, I sat and commiserated with gov't officials about the devastation, and the continued military interruptions, and we tried (with some success) to use the military movement and convening authorities to bring connections between the central and provincial/local governments.

Most Iraqis that I spent time with were, in fact, anxious for us to go, and them to take charge. They were just looking for us, as the babysitters, to make connections and betterments while we were there (anybody need a school building?).

Northern Iraq was tough at that time, and the military, in my opinion, did an excellent job under the circumstances.

But I really can't identify any COIN strategy that seemed to work or succeed. Just a lot of intensive innovation and reactions aimed at a strategy of stabilization. No flower petals on our way out. No hearts and minds significantly won. Just the Giterdun thingon everybodies' part.

By the summer, I was working with the UN Disputed Boundaries Team for the rest of 2008. Still, I didn't see much difference except for less fighting us.

For Sunnis in Northern Iraq, especially, the central government was no piece of cake, but they were anxious to go to try and take bites out of it, not us. Wasn't that the point?

How does all that related to the "Strategy of Tactics?" Was COIN really applied? Would COIN have succeeded?

Wouldn't know.

Steve

[jmm99]

I'd amend Rex's statement to delete the "pop-centric" adjective (which leads to debate as to what it means) and simply say:


Rex as amended
COIN--done properly--is about seeing the political loyalties of the population as central to the COIN mission, and recognizing that defeating the insurgents requires that much of the population be shifted away from actively supporting them.

That, of course, must take into account that we are not talking electoral politics in a Canadian ryding or Chicago ward - the bad guys have guns, etc. But, the bad guys consist of more than combatants with guns, unless they are simply bandits living off the countryside with no political organization.

The basic "political" insurgency can be reduced to three main groups, which are interactive and which may shape shift back and forth as to roles.

1. The combatant group - legally irregular combatants.

2. The infrastructure group - legally ?; should they be treated as combatants or as civilians ?

3. The supporting group - generally, legally civilians. The source of logistics, financing, personnel and intelligence.

How do you deal with those three groups ? We have three basic paradigms (all from Southeast Asia of the 50s-60s).

One is the "kinder and gentler" British approach in Malaya where group 1 was handled primarily by military means (although there was a conversion effort which had some success, especially when that insurgency fell apart). Groups 2 and 3 were handled politically by the in-place civil administration and judicial system, along with various population control measures.

The second is the authoritarian approach used in Indonesia ca. 1965-1966 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_killings_of_1965%E2%80%931966). There Group 1 (the IndoCom combatants) was easily handled because they attempted a coup and not a mass-based revolution. So, how to handle Groups 2 and 3 ? The third largest Communist party in the world, the PKI had approximately 300,000 cadres and a full membership of around two million. The answer was to kill ca. 500K and detain ca. 1000K.

The third is the Philippines under Ramon Magsaysay (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramon_Magsaysay), which was more akin to the Malaya model, but which had a separate Third Way flavor. In rhetoric and popular perception, Magsaysay's program was both revolutionary (it broke with some establishment norms) and also counter-revolutionary (vs. the Huks).

My point is that any counter-insurgency must deal with both the military and political side of the insurgents; unless they have no political side and are simply bandits. How to deal with the insurgents' political side (Groups 2 and 3) has varied; but in one way or the other, their political side has to be neutralized (kill, detain or convert).

I'm often confused, Wilf, by what you write. At times, it seems you are saying that the military effort is the only material factor; but are you really advocating the Indonesian model ?

At other times, you seem to be saying that both the military effort and the political effort are material; but that the military forces should not be involved in the political effort, leaving that to the civil administration.

The US model (whatever it might end up) is not likely to follow the Indonesian model. The amount of emphasis on the military effort vs the political effort, and who does the political effort, seem the relevant issues to the US.

And, my three questions as cited by STP are still on the floor here and in the "Winning the War in Afghanistan" thread.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I'm often confused, Wilf, by what you write. At times, it seems you are saying that the military effort is the only material factor; but are you really advocating the Indonesian model ?


Well then I am at fault for being unable to progress my idea, in clear and simple terms. Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.
B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.
C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.
E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.
F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

... and nothing we see today is new, in terms of the nature of war. Warfare yes, but the purpose to which it is put.

...and Carl Von Clausewitz, said everything I say, better and said it long ago.

[Tom Odom]

Well then I am at fault for being unable to progress my idea, in clear and simple terms. Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.
B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.
C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.
E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.
F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

... and nothing we see today is new, in terms of the nature of war. Warfare yes, but the purpose to which it is put.

...and Carl Von Clausewitz, said everything I say, better and said it long ago.

Your best post ever, Wilf

"Cept for the CvC stuff...:D

Tom

[libertariansoldier]

I'd amend Rex's statement to delete the "pop-centric" adjective (which leads to debate as to what it means) and simply say:


The basic "political" insurgency can be reduced to three main groups, which are interactive and which may shape shift back and forth as to roles.

1. The combatant group - legally irregular combatants.

2. The infrastructure group - legally ?; should they be treated as combatants or as civilians ?

3. The supporting group - generally, legally civilians. The source of logistics, financing, personnel and intelligence.



But it is rarely basic, rarely falls into such neat categories, and that is what makes POP COIN problematic. There are also criminal gangs (such as narcotraffickers here in AFG or oil smugglers in the Niger Delta), there are corrupt officials playing both sides of the fence with their own private militias (and their name is Legion in AFG), there are part time fighters, who also raise crops or work in businesses and trade, and there are groups who will not actively seek to overthrow a central government, but fight ferociously for regional/local autonomy.

If your focus is targeting bad guys doing bad things, then the target set is relatively clean, if difficult to find. But if your focus is protecting the population, then you can find yourself in a bind (what percent of the time must x be doing things we don't like before we intervene? And is refusing to obey a corrupt official and firing him up a bad thing or a good thing, especially if there are no Good Governance/Rule of Law alternatives for the populace?).

So, I think that while POP COIN can be good tactics, like any good tactic its utility is situationally dependant. But once you make it your strategy, you are tied to it regardless of its applicability.
Regards.

[Fuchs]

I think it's legal to intern non-combatant supporters.

[William F. Owen]

Your best post ever, Wilf

"Cept for the CvC stuff...:D

Tom
Coming from you Tom, I don't take such a compliment lightly. - and if it wasn't for some of your more challenging observations, I do not think I'd have been forced to really examine these issues to the degree I now find necessary.

You've made me a better Clausewitian! (http://www.tackfilm.se/en/?id=1259671569056RA66&q=low) :eek:

[marct]

Really great layout, Wilf!


A.) Use military force to confront military problems.

More on this, but generally agree.....


B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.

On the whole, I agree, but there is a fuzzy zone surrounding "military means". For example, look at the early 20th century use of military tactics by unions.


C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.

Hmmm, I might shift that somewhat. In a few cases, there is plausible evidence that the "political agendas" are only surface solutions to deeper social / ecological problems, and that combatants can accept the same political agendas but still fight - the Aztec Flowery wars (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flower_war) are a possible example of this.


D.)

????


E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.

Interesting and, IMO, accurate in some ways. I'm not sure how exactly to untangle this, but if there are competing political agendas, then they are probably vying for popular support before conflict breaks out. This means that they will be idealized via the use of political and interpretive rhetoric. So, for example, the real political agenda may be to keep a small group of people in power while the rhetoric may be to bring power "to the people". In some cases, the underlying reality may be the same, just with different players and rhetorical rationales (cf here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rp6-wG5LLqE)).

As I said, I'm still thinking about this one.....

Oh, yeah, I would boot that back to 6000 years, since there is some very good evidence of a MAJOR war back in about 3450 bce.


F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

I'm not, quite, in agreement with the equation implied between morality and politics. I think that morality operates at a slightly different level (what Durkheim called "intermediary groups") and, while politics operates at that level, it also operates at larger levels. Having quibbled, I don't really have an argument that politics, wrfare, morality and individual ethics are all entwined.

Great post, Wilf :D!

[Graycap]

You've made me a better Clausewitian! (http://www.tackfilm.se/en/?id=1259671569056RA66&q=low) :eek:

This one is really great!!! :eek::eek::eek:

Wilf, how could you find it?

[jmm99]

This


from Fuchs
I think it's legal to intern non-combatant supporters.

is correct - under GC IV, if they present a security risk, as supporters would.

That being said, many (e.g., Robert Thompson) recommend that both infrastructure and supporters be tried in the normal civilian court system to emphasize the Rule of Law. That apparently worked most of the time (not all of the time) in Malaya.

One problem that recurs is where the detainees have to be handed over to an HN court system which is a revolving door (examples in both Iraq and Astan).

Have to run now, but I do have some added comments on Wilf's response, which did not fully answer my question. It does nicely set out the theory behind the military effort. It does not take into account the political effort and who is supposed to do that.

Separate post to follow this afternoon.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Wilf, that was a great video, and I see now it will be more challenging than ever to convince you that the "hero" didn't discover everything about war and conflict as it is practiced in the 21st Century. While I will keep attempting, I see clearly now this effort will be as difficult as convincing a Japanese teenager that Michael Jackson, in addition to being a great artist, also had some flaws. :D

BREAK

If it is even possible can anyone define what political means in a useful manner?

Kilcullen wrote in his book "Accidental Guerrillas" that the current conflict with extremist Islam (Takfiri) is about politics, not religion. What does that mean to you? The responses will let us know if we're generally in agreement, or if there are significant differences in interpretation of what we mean by political.

I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach). That is why it is frequently characterized as a war of infiltration and subversion (which Jmm captures to a large degree in his comments). Quite different from two conventional armies meeting on the battlefield. Political agendas are being pursued not through the local populace, but rather on the field of battle in an attempt to impose one State's will upon another through military force (e.g. pushing Saddam out of Kuwait). Of course there are political aspects to both forms of conflict, but there are considerable differences in how the political aspects of the conflict are pursued.

IMHO this is the real difference between unconventional and conventional warfare, and there is a large gray area in the middle. Did Clausewitz capture this?

[slapout9]

I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach).

That is the problem. We were attacked by an Enemy organization (system) not a country!!! Until we understand that there will be no true progress IMO.

[jmm99]

this:



from Wilf

Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.

B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.

C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.

E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.

F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

Point F muddies the waters, and is not material to my presentation - so, for the present, I place it on the shelf.

Points A, B and E correctly state CvC's: War is a continuation of Politik (inclusive of both politics and policy in German) by other means. So, no argument there since CvC is one of my favorite law books. :)

Point C ("People only use military means to promote political agendas.") is simply wrong on its face.

------------------------------
I am happy enough to use the term "political agenda" as a good starting and end point. Might as well start with Lenin, Mao and Giap as examples for use of the political effort and the military effort (in their terms, the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle).

As to the Political Struggle, use of your Points A and B is appropriate by changing a few words:


A.) Use political means to confront political problems.

B.) If someone/your enemy, is using political means, then it's a political problem.

Also your Point E (should be "D" ?) is valid in the Political Struggle:


E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about.

although "struggling" (closer to CvC's "wrestling match duel") is probably a better term.

OK so far - we are following CvC (as our Com friends did also, starting with Lenin), and now have to ask: What was the common political agenda of Lenin, Mao and Giap ?

The basic answer is that their political agenda was a desired end state which would see the coming of the dictatorship of the proletariat which would in turn wither away leading to the utopian communist paradise. None of them deviated from that end goal; but they all realized that the precise paths to be followed were dependent on the particular conditions and contradictions of the country in which they worked.

This brings us to the political effort, which must be distinguished from the overriding political agenda. The political effort is framed by The Narrative (the apparent ideology, cause, slogan - which may be multiple and which does not necessarily include explicit reference to the political agenda).

For example, The Narrative in Russia, China and Vietnam focused on anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism (a different set of messages for each country based on its particular conditions). The Narrative is more operational and tactical than strategic; but The Narrative must in the end lead to the end goal of the political agenda (in the Com case, the dictatorship of the proletariat).

The nuts and bolts of the Com political effort was ideally to develop broad popular fronts encompassing causes that appealed to a broad spectrum of the populace. The Coms did not try to sell full-blown Communism to the masses (knowing they would not understand it), leaving that field of study for education of the Party infrastructure. In short, their political effort did not include their political agenda; but the Party kept in control of that political effort (e.g., the NLF in Vietnam via COSVN controlled by the Lao Dong).

However, The Narrative (which defines the political effort) had to be flexible enough to allow development into the political agenda's end goal. Example, land reform: kill or drive out those greedy landlords; distribute their lands to the tenant farmers; raise the political consciousness of the farmers (e.g., we gave you land, you give us your sons and also logistics, etc., help); and mobilize the farmers (note that "mobilize" goes beyond neutrality or even passive support) into active supporters of the revolution (even if they don't know what the political agenda calls for once the revolution succeeds). Of course, collective farms were the end goal of the Com's political agenda re: agrarian reform, but that knowledge was kept to the cadre (the "well-educated" party members).

Since The Narrative (apparent ideology, cause, slogan) is not the political agenda, The Narrative can (and will) morph as the revolutionary situation gets nearer and nearer to success. That is the doctrine of the Manipulation of the Cause (or Slogan). The Political Struggle (like the Military Struggle) may be viewed as a series of political engagements (each with its own character as determined by situational awareness), which are strung together as beads of pearls into a necklace which culminates in the end goal determined by the political agenda (the true ideology).

Now, since the political agenda (the Politik in CvC's words) controls both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle by defining the end goal, both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle have to end up at the same place. They also have to support each other during the period when they are stringing their respective engagements together to reach the common end goal.

The bottom line is that the political agenda should be distinguished from the political effort - they may be the same (as I view Malaya) or they may differ in apparent ideology, cause or slogan.

I am also not saying that the political effort can or should be used in all situations. The Indonesians saw no real need for a political effort; and Sri Lanka seems to also fit that mold.

Anyhowways, that's my take on the political agenda and the political effort. The latter, in a revolutionary insurgency, is basically Saul Alinsky + armed propaganda teams (convert and if not, then kill).

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The problem with insurgency, of course, is that it is a Civilian government problem, not a "military problem."

The confusion comes because most civilian governments are slow to address the inadequacies of their approach to governance in the eyes of the populace (usually written off as the grumblings of crackpots and criminals) until it gets so out of control that it exceeds their capacity to address. At this point they dial 911 for the military to come in and "defeat the insurgency."

Nice to have a well behaved military who will respond to such calls. Some places the military comes in and simply defeats the government instead.

Always dangerous though to think of insurgency as a military problem. The problem for the military is how to best assist the civil government in restoring order. Certainly some of that must address the violence, but that should always be with the ultimate purpose in mind of repairing, or creating maneuver room for the repairing of governance and restoring a trusting relationship between the popualce and the government.

Merely sicking your military on the wayward populace like a well trained attack dog has never produced more than temporary success that I am aware of. And an insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has never been won at all, and is typically because of an inappropriate use of the military based upon an misplaced belief that COIN is warfare. Insurgency is warfare. If your vote doesn't count, your bullets may. But COIN is governance.

How you see the problem shapes how you address the problem, and my personal opinion is that most focus far too much on the symptoms that manifest in violence and turmoil, rather than on the root causes. Looking at the root causes is to look in the mirror as often as not.

[Mark O'Neill]

Great post Bob,

Mark

[Entropy]

The problem with insurgency, of course, is that it is a Civilian government problem, not a "military problem."


Is that still true when a country comes in, deposes the old regime and puts in a new regime, which the insurgents oppose? In that case the goal, it seems, is not simply to restore order, but to recreate it from scratch using a different recipe.

[William F. Owen]

Wow, what a response. OK, taking ALL of you as best I can....

a.) I don't differentiate between Religion and Politics. When they create "policy" they are both the same. Crime can also do the same thing. - and Clausewitz knew this. He knew all about the wars of "religion" in Europe.

- thus with all respect to Dave Kilcullen's, observation that the current conflict with extremist Islam (Takfiri) is about politics, not religion, is banal and obvious. ALL CONFLICT IS ABOUT POLITICS! - and How do you differentiate?
How does making that statement get you further forward?
Name me one violent Muslim group that does not have a clear political policy to set forth? A Caliphate is political!

b.) Military means using organised violence for the purpose of furthering policy. "Legally" that can include "criminal acts" but this speaks to intent. - but police enforce the law and the military enforce/resist policy.

c.) People only advance the political agenda they see as right. No one has political beliefs that they know are wrong. Hitler had a moral compass, and so did Mao and Stalin. People may do immoral things in war, but they are convinced that they are doing them for the right reason. - and thus Clausewitz just always assumes the moral purpose of war is right. - why would it not be?

Jmm:
War is a continuation of Politik (inclusive of both politics and policy in German) by other means.
Well I read that as "War is a setting forth of Policy with an admixture of other means" - but basically what you cannot get by diplomacy, argument and discussion, you force using violence. - and you may or may not keep talking while you do it - so basically "Had enough yet? - or do you want some more?"

So, Bob's World, you use military force to address the military problem. No conflict is purely military. WW2 certainly wasn't - ask the Italians and the Finns for the more obvious examples!
In so called "COIN", you are merely using force to confront a competing use of force. As I have said many time before, the political agenda will always still run - and will even be altered by the use of force - as when the US bomb's a village, and the ROE tighten to restrict the use of force, or troops loses cause you to re-evaluate the campaign objectives and thus the limits of what can be achieved. Ways Ends and Means, all alter as they are employed.

NONE OF THIS is "How to." It's all WHY, not how - and it's all been written down before by men far smarter than me.

[Firn]

I just wanted to add a second take on the most quoted phrase by CvC with some more contest.

CvC (Book 8, Chapter 6B):



Now, this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.

We maintain, on the contrary: that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say, mixed with other means, in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place.

Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.


a) I agree with Wilf, perhaps because I also see religion just as culture or a economic system mostly in the context of the (political) intercourse when concerning organized violence. The degree of their (perceived) influence differs greatly in time, space and society but are as a whole part of the game of politics.

If we think about the reasons of the choice of a poor farmer's son in the tribal areas of Pakistan to join the fight in Afghanistan this might not seem easily understandable. He might be attracted by the strict religious beliefs, a hate for the immoral and yet rich West, the shining guns, the booty, the bread to feed his family, the social acceptance of parts of the society, spirit of adventure, power, security, friendship - the list goes on and on. But their is no doubt he is and becomes part of a political game. A game fueled by dire economic conditions, specific views of a religion, a conservative culture, an explosive demography, tribal and family alliances, a game full of self-interest and interest into the well being of one's family, friends, village and tribe. A game with shifting alliances, internal and external conflicts and a lot of goals. Politics in the broad German sense seems to be sole sensible overarching term of the processes which initiate war and which permeate it.

To reduce this to 'culture', 'religion' or 'economy' is at best naive, but war is such a dangerous business that such mistakes can be among the very worst.


Firn

P.S: @Jmm99. Can we not see the 'political agenda' as the purpose, the 'way' or 'effort'as means and the goals as goals? Other than that I pretty much agree with your thoughts.

[jmm99]

My take on this:


from firn
P.S: @Jmm99. Can we not see the 'political agenda' as the purpose, the 'way' or 'effort'as means and the goals as goals? Other than that I pretty much agree with your thoughts.

The political agenda (policy) sets the initial purpose (the end goal or endstate), which is subject to policy changes. I look at means as the capabilities which determine and constrain the ways available to reach the end goal set by the initial purpose. So, the effort (whether military or political) consists of the means and the ways selected. Of course, there may be intermediate goals: engagement 1 > engagement 2 > engagement 3, etc.

CvC put down his sword and took pen in hand to write a philosophy of conflict. Since he was a soldier and general, he focused on military history and exemplified his concepts by using military examples. Of course politics is also a conflict, but not an armed conflict (as we presently define that in the GCs); although politics may include an element of violence, just as a "peaceful society" (one not in armed conflict) includes some measure of violence. Litigation is also a conflict, although on a much more micro-scale than either politics or war.

The passages you quote (Book 8, Chapter 6B) point to the unity of war and politics as part of the larger German concept of Politik. The last two paragraphs of the same chapter also make the same point:


Also auch die wirklichen Veränderungen der Kriegskunst sind eine Folge der veränderten Politik, und weit entfernt, für die mögliche Trennung beider zu beweisen, sind sie vielmehr ein starker Beweis ihrer innigen Vereinigung.

Also noch einmal: der Krieg ist ein Instrument der Politik; er muß notwendig ihren Charakter tragen, er muß mit ihrem Maße messen; die Führung des Krieges in seinen Hauptumrissen ist daher die Politik selbst, welche die Feder mit dem Degen vertauscht, aber darum nicht aufgehört hat, nach ihren eigenen Gesetzen zu denken.

Therefore, the actual changes in the art of war are a consequence of alterations in policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two, they are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connexion.

Therefore, once more: war is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of war, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.

Taking this and moving to the concepts of a Political Struggle and a Military Struggle (which must have a common endstate set by policy), each struggle has different means (capabilities) and ways to reach the common endstate set by policy. Because the means and ways are different, the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle each has its own character and laws; but each of them has to incorporate the basic character and laws of the overriding Politik. Otherwise, there is a disconnect (in Marxist terms, a contradiction) between the two struggles. They have to work together in an armed conflict, unless one finds it impossible, needless or counter-productive to use the Political Struggle (for which, a number of historical examples have been cited).

As to the relative use of the the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle, I turn to Bill Moore:


from Bill
I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach). That is why it is frequently characterized as a war of infiltration and subversion (which Jmm captures to a large degree in his comments). Quite different from two conventional armies meeting on the battlefield. Political agendas are being pursued not through the local populace, but rather on the field of battle in an attempt to impose one State's will upon another through military force (e.g. pushing Saddam out of Kuwait). Of course there are political aspects to both forms of conflict, but there are considerable differences in how the political aspects of the conflict are pursued.

Consider, at the far end of the spectrum, Thermonuclear War where, once the policy decision is made by one party to turn the missile keys, politics disappears from the picture.

In the much larger grey area of lower-intensity armed conflicts, the decision has to made as to whether to engage in both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle, or in the Military Struggle alone.

As to that, I look to your example:


from firn
If we think about the reasons of the choice of a poor farmer's son in the tribal areas of Pakistan to join the fight in Afghanistan this might not seem easily understandable. He might be attracted by the strict religious beliefs, a hate for the immoral and yet rich West, the shining guns, the booty, the bread to feed his family, the social acceptance of parts of the society, spirit of adventure, power, security, friendship - the list goes on and on. But their is no doubt he is and becomes part of a political game. A game fueled by dire economic conditions, specific views of a religion, a conservative culture, an explosive demography, tribal and family alliances, a game full of self-interest and interest into the well being of one's family, friends, village and tribe. A game with shifting alliances, internal and external conflicts and a lot of goals. Politics in the broad German sense seems to be sole sensible overarching term of the processes which initiate war and which permeate it.

where the Political Struggle is very likely to be pursued by at least one of the parties. If pursued by one, must or should it be pursued by the other ?

As to that question, there are many differing views - across the spectrum here, we have:


from wilf
... basically what you cannot get by diplomacy, argument and discussion, you force using violence. - and you may or may not keep talking while you do it - so basically "Had enough yet? - or do you want some more?"

and


from Bob
Merely sicking your military on the wayward populace like a well trained attack dog has never produced more than temporary success that I am aware of. And an insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has never been won at all, and is typically because of an inappropriate use of the military based upon an misplaced belief that COIN is warfare. Insurgency is warfare. If your vote doesn't count, your bullets may. But COIN is governance.

Despite this divergence of views, I'd hope that there is agreement that merely stringing together a bunch of TTPs does not equal a strategy.

[jmm99]

My quote of CvC re: War is a continuation of Politik by other means, is derived from his notes, see Nachricht (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/Nachricht.htm) and Notice (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Notice.htm) (in pertinent part; emphasis as in origiinal):


Nachricht
....
Außer diesem faktisch bestehenden Unterschied in den Kriegen muß noch der ebenfalls praktisch notwendige Gesichtspunkt ausdrücklich und genau festgestellt werden, daß der Krieg nichts ist als die fortgesetzte Staatspolitik mit anderen Mitteln. Dieser Gesichtspunkt, überall festgehalten, wird vielmehr Einheit in die Betrachtung bringen, und es wird sich alles leichter auseinanderwirren. Obgleich dieser Gesichtspunkt hauptsächlich erst im achten Buche seine Wirksamkeit haben wird, so muß er doch schon im ersten Buche vollständig entwickelt werden und auch bei der Umarbeitung der sechs ersten Bücher mitwirken. Mit einer solchen Umarbeitung werden die sechs ersten Bücher manche Schlacke loswerden, manche Spalte und Kluft wird sich zusammenziehen, und manche Allgemeinheit wird in bestimmtere Gedanken und Formen übergehen können.
....
Berlin, den 10. Juli 1827

NOTICE
.....
Besides establishing this real difference in Wars, another practically necessary point of view must at the same time be established, which is, that WAR IS ONLY A CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. This point of view being adhered to everywhere, will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from each other. Although the chief application of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book, still it must be completely developed in the first book, and also lend assistance throughout the revision of the first six books. Through such a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross, many rents and chasms will be closed up, and much that is of a general nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms.
....
Berlin, 10th July, 1827.

Trusting this will clear up any issues as to my source.

The Notice is also a reminder that On War is not a finished product. In present Joint terms, it would be a well-worked "concept", but not quite a "doctrine".

Regards to all

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello everybody,

Coming late in the debate, I took the time to read most of the post (My apologies to those I did not read).
As first comment, I would say: one thing that stunned me is how COIN has became the model of war rather than one way to do war. COIN is just one way to do war. What is different is the war among the people (And it's an old history) rather than COIN.

Secondly, not here but sometime ago, most of the authors, including P Gentil, were found of Algeria war. And here we have the exact opposite of Wilf position: Algeria war was a defeat despite a military victory. At the end of the war, most of FNL were jailed and FNL was no more a threat. OAS was a threat and a real one.

This to come to several thoughts:
1) Military action is the main part of war but not all of it. War has several fields, including military. Politic is one of them. Algeria or Suez just prove that you may military win a war and politically lost it (which is in accordance to Clausewitz but not with Wilf post). I'll take Suez as it was an attempt from France and UK to re enforce their political position through military operation. But they just forgot they were no more the world power they used to be at that time. So even with political will you may loose a war on the political field.
2) Nature of the insurgents may change even during war. Iraq is a good example of a multi nature enemy conducting multiple insurgencies. To caricature a complex situation: Us fought an insurgency lead by Sadam and at the same time several insurgencies lead by various groups who did not agree with the fact to be colonized by US, by Al Quada and finally by the government they putted in power (may be the easiest one). Some may even add that this turned, at some stage into civil war… COIN was the requested tool for the US but was not the nature of war.
3) It is too easy to say all who is against a state power is an insurgent. The qualification of insurgent is not a neutral term, unlike enemy. There was even an article in SWJ stating that civilian non violent actions to overthrow a government could be seen as an insurgency. Gandhi was an insurgent for the British but not for the Indian. (And he was not non violent neither).
4) Tomorrow's war will be something we did not see coming and the response still has to be invented. As theoretical example, if an enemy overflows US with fake money, conducting to massive economical break down and violence among civilian be an insurgency? Would the response be a COIN operation? Not sure. But here, I go out of Wilf mantra: war is just a military operation between military.
5) Insurgency as in Afghanistan and Iraq, from my point of view, comes more from an approximately planed occupation/stabilization phase rather than a purposely planned operation from the enemy. COIN has been a way to adapt to an enemy using terror and irregular warfare from the US but insurgency takes its roots elsewhere.
6) War is hard and tuff for everyone who lives it, including civilian. Personally I prefer that others did land on D Day rather than me. But I am not sure the average WWII soldier would have liked to be involved into internal fights between armed villagers for a reason he barlly understand. Neither would a nowadays soldier like to go, unarmed, to explain to unfriendly crowed that he is coming to help him and build a school and reinforce the central power they are against. At war, everyone task in not easy and dangerous even just being there is dangerous.
What COIN acknowledged is the fact that war do not end up in occupying a land and putting all the heads down. But this is a comment from Gallieni in 1898. And I am sure that looking into historical records, we would find a guy saying the same thing during the Roman Empire.
But what makes COIN or its extension in future interesting is the development of interaction between civilian and military power to achieve the same goal while they internally oppose to each others. (This may be taken as too think tanker… I which I could be one. I would be in a cozy office rather than a dirty container.)

Hope I am not too much out of the target.

[slapout9]

Always dangerous though to think of insurgency as a military problem. The problem for the military is how to best assist the civil government in restoring order. Certainly some of that must address the violence, but that should always be with the ultimate purpose in mind of repairing, or creating maneuver room for the repairing of governance and restoring a trusting relationship between the populace and the government.



The military just needs to be concerned with guard duty. In the 1975 guard manual I posted a while back under Exterior Guard there is even a short section on how this is there primary purpose during Guerrilla Warfare, to include special orders (rules of engagement) for how to handle them. This myth of COIN being some graduate PHD level of War is the biggest Con game going out there now. As Wilf said it is nothing but a way to rip off taxpayers with big consultancy contracts.

Link to the Real COIN Manual FM 22-6 Guard Duty aka How To Protect The Population.
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11675-1/fm/22-6/toc.htm

[jmm99]

From Bk 1, Ch 1, pt. 24:


24. Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln

So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln. Was dem Kriege nun noch eigentümlich bleibt, bezieht sich bloß auf die eigentümliche Natur seiner Mittel. Daß die Richtungen und Absichten der Politik mit diesen Mitteln nicht in Widerspruch treten, das kann die Kriegskunst im allgemeinen und der Feldherr in jedem einzelnen Falle fordern, und dieser Anspruch ist wahrlich nicht gering; aber wie stark er auch in einzelnen Fällen auf die politischen Absichten zurückwirkt, so muß dies doch immer nur als eine Modifikation derselben gedacht werden, denn die politische Absicht ist der Zweck, der Krieg ist das Mittel, und niemals kann das Mittel ohne Zweck gedacht werden.

24.—War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.

We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

Fortsetzung = continuation, pursuit.

bloße = mere, simple (in the sense of nichts ... als, as in the Nachricht-Notice = nothing but)

[jmm99]

How to handle "insurgencies" - what I've learned so far are that there are two main branches (the second with two sub-branches):

1. Employ the Military Struggle, with or without diplomacy, argument and discussion (which to me suggests dealing with leaders, not the masses ) - as per Wilf.

2. Employ both the Military Struggle and the Political Struggle and reach down to the people in either of two ways:

2a. Population-centric, which looks more to the physical separation of the population from the insurgents, and control of the population; along with a large number of TTPs which look to reinforcing the legitimacy of the HN government - as in FM 3-24 et al.

2b Populace-centric (the term coined by Bob Jones, but what follows is not claimed as a summary of his theories), which is more a reverse-Mao approach using such concepts as "from the masses, back to the masses" (as to the Narrative) and "mobilization of the masses" (turning them into active strugglers, either military or political, against the insurgents). Basically, this follows the concepts from the 1960s of John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (good book; reprint available from Hailer Publishing).

As to 2a, a problem exists if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads cuz the HN Narrative (if truthfully framed) is not likely to gain purchase among the masses; and if not truthfully framed, its contradictions will cause it to sink. So, in the absence of a valid Narrative, population-centric COIN is left with the Military Struggle and a bunch of TTPs. The problem is multiplied where third-party COIN is involved cuz the Assisting Nation has to not only swallow the HN Narrative without puking, but also prepare and sell an AN Narrative acceptable to its own population - a difficult task if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads.

As to 2b, the HN Narrative will be acceptable to the masses cuz that where it came from ("from the masses, back to the masses" - an interactive process of the masses, the HN government and the AN government if on scene). But, if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads, the narrative from the masses is not likely to be accepted. E.g., the masses say we want an anti-corruption, anti-feudal and anti-foreign agenda. The HN government cannot grant that agenda if it is corrupt, controlled by vested interests and in bed with a foreign power. If the AN government takes up the causes of the masses, it in effect would be mounting a revolution against the incumbant HN government.

In any event, those are the three major counter-insurgency strategies which I have learned here (albeit as I see them). All of those strategies are subject to Bill Moore's caveats about the spectrum of conventional and unconventional warfare.

There is a fourth strategy not much discussed here (given the overwhelming emphasis on COIN ), which is that of Peace Enforcement, whose doctrine is found in Joint Pub 3-07.3 (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3073.pdf), Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Chap III), and in a host of other publications.

That strategy is quite flexible and can be very robust and conventional (e.g., the Korean War). The advantage to the Assisting Nation is that it can frame its AN Narrative in peace enforcement terms; and it can call both sides knuckleheads and attribute fault and harm where it is deserved; and direct its big bores and small bores at whichever side needs knocking.

Perhaps, we (US) should be looking at Peace Enforcement as a primary option when we are deciding on the COA to take in our foreign interventions (or force projections, if that term is preferred).

Credits to Jon Custis for the term "knuckleheads" - I like that. :)

Attached is a chart illustrating my view of the Political Struggle and Military Struggle:

983

It is strategy-neutral (the law follows the strategy selected).

Regards

Mike
----------------------

To this civilian, COL Gentile's concerns (valid in part) seem overkill - a type of argument worthy of a lawyer's brief - e.g., emphasis added:


But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from the new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy. Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of COIN principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the media, emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians. The result is a strategy of tactics and principles.

Really; is it "really nothing more" ? I don't get that from the myriad of Joint publication; and I believe that our Soldiers and Marines will get it right, despite everyone's inability to predict what the "next war" will look like.

Anyway, the proper mix of conventional and unconventional training and readiness is not my province; but an issue for the Army and Corps to resolve.

See this thread started by Cavguy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=88241#post88241).

[slapout9]

jmm99, there is the fifth and most successful option raise a Guerrilla army and kick the hell out of the insurgency/terrorist/criminal organizations and then help them build a country.

[jmm99]

Well, as to your fifth option (waging traditional uncoventional warfare using special ops people assisting an indigenous guerrilla force), you can prove it was a successful option in Astan. That's exactly what we did in 2001 with the Northern Alliance.

Aside from not capping our AQ brethren at Tora Bora, where (in your opinion) did we go wrong in strategy after the initial 2001 successes ?

Half the World was then "helping" them "build a country". Where did that strategy go wrong ?

The intent of the questions is not to knock your fifth option, but to establish some lessons learned if the strategy were employed in the present or future.

In a sense, Jim Gant is suggesting a form of unconventional warfare on a local level; but still ties that kind of local effort to the existing Astan government. An obvious option to his suggestion would be to delink it from the present Astan government and develop key strategic base areas for our own purposes.

What groups could be co-opted to provide the guerrilla fighters at the present time ?

A number of different sub-branches could be posited for that strategy (whole country, regions, key enclaves) (link or not to present government) (juncture or not with conventional US forces) - and more if conventional forces are involved, such as Peace Enforcement or not (if not, what is the status of forces, especially if the existing Astan government is de-linked).

Cheers

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Wasn't that Gentile's premise: There are lots of other options that get overlooked if we focus too hard on one paradigm.

Steve

[slapout9]

jmm99,STP, I just had oral surgery and really feel like ........so I will respond later as I can. But the short answer is BIG Military screwed it up. Link to the new JFQ edition with the greatest article ever written about A'stan so far.
Double H/T to Colonel Gurney for publishing it and General Warner for writing it. And the Intelligence Operator who gave the interview:)
http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/2.pdf

I will talk some about my own experinces with UW as I was taught back then. STP, Gentile is right about a lot of things and we should pay more attention to him. Bedtime guys.

[William F. Owen]

As first comment, I would say: one thing that stunned me is how COIN has became the model of war rather than one way to do war. COIN is just one way to do war. What is different is the war among the people (And it's an old history) rather than COIN.
COIN is a imprecise description of the political context of some conflicts - Countering an Insurgency"
It's not a way to do "war" - do you mean warfare?
Nor is in necessarily among the "people" - and what does this mean? The Battles of Okinawa and Hue were among "people". So what? If you mean that harming civilians might undermine the political objective of the conflict, then OK.


Secondly, not here but sometime ago, most of the authors, including P Gentil, were found of Algeria war. And here we have the exact opposite of Wilf position: Algeria war was a defeat despite a military victory. At the end of the war, most of FNL were jailed and FNL was no more a threat. OAS was a threat and a real one.
You can add in Rhodesia and Vietnam as well. How is that the opposite of Clausewitz or me? It is an exact demonstration of the phenomena that Clausewitz refers to. No one has ever said military victory always gains the desired political outcome. War is a continuation of politics, not a substitute. If military success comes at too higher cost or cannot be sustained, then it fails as an extension of policy. Rhodesia being an excellent example of military success, but political defeat.


1) Military action is the main part of war but not all of it. War has several fields, including military. Politic is one of them. Algeria or Suez just prove that you may military win a war and politically lost it (which is in accordance to Clausewitz but not with Wilf post).
What I said was military force can only be applied in the context of a military problem. That statement in no way differs from Clausewitz. How successfully this is done is extremely context specific. That it gets done badly is not evidence of it not being true.


Gandhi was an insurgent for the British but not for the Indian. (And he was not non violent neither).
Not true. Gandhi did not use violence and therefore was not an insurgent. He deliberately set out not to be an insurgent. The Brits fought numerous insurgencies in India, all of which failed. Gandhi was not an insurgent, by any stretch of the imagination.


As theoretical example, if an enemy overflows US with fake money, conducting to massive economical break down and violence among civilian be an insurgency? Would the response be a COIN operation? Not sure. But here, I go out of Wilf mantra: war is just a military operation between military.
No it's not an insurgency. Was the violence after Katrina an insurgency? Of course not. Football riots are not insurgencies either.
I never said "war is just a military operation between military." I said military force should be applied to military problems. - I never defined a military problem, because I assumed that was self-evident from the rest of the points I made.... apparently not. :mad:

Hope I am not too much out of the target.
You can hope.

[Cavguy]

jmm99,STP, I just had oral surgery and really feel like ........so I will respond later as I can. But the short answer is BIG Military screwed it up. Link to the new JFQ edition with the greatest article ever written about A'stan so far.
Double H/T to Colonel Gurney for publishing it and General Warner for writing it. And the Intelligence Operator who gave the interview:)
http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/2.pdf

I will talk some about my own experinces with UW as I was taught back then. STP, Gentile is right about a lot of things and we should pay more attention to him. Bedtime guys.

Great find, Slap!

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

Ditto to Cavguy.

I've spent the last few months listening to presentations by knowledgeable Afghan specialists, and reading a lot.

It all fits.

Steve

[Ken White]

because it is totally unrealistic due to current US political, educational, social and military constructs. IOW, it's not going to happen.

Most of what's proposed in the "interview" by GEN Warner are not Armed Forces issues. I think there's an intended message in that. An intel-operator centric view is offered and it is noted that introduction of the Army and Marines -- the 'conventional' armed forces fouled up the effort. While I do not totally agree, there is some merit in that assertion. The real issue is that the force introduced had NO training in the mission they were to perform.

Lot of dreamers out there. It's noteworthy that said dreamers always know what 'should' be done AFTER the fact...

The solution is to provide the government of the US with a permanent set of truly competent strategic planners who can do long term strategizing. That requires us to better educate the US populace (unlikely), destroy the current social fabric by pushing diversity (likely) while espousing fairness and merit equally (not possible), rebuild and de-bureaucracize the Armed Forces (unlikely).

To do all those things, you need a revised US political system and that is not going to happen in our lifetimes.

It also does not need to happen. We have ways of effectively using the forces we have to accomplish our aims; the problem is a lack of will compounded by significant shortfalls in strategic thinking and a system that insists everyone has to be involved in order to maintain the budget and garner more ribbons or advance. We always forget the old cliche about too many cooks...

The real overarching issue is that one should use the various elements of ones Armed Forces for the purpose for which they were designed, equipped and trained recalling that if it takes five years to make a really tactically competent junior NCO or Officer and twenty to make truly effective senior people then it'll take that long to switch gears. Use your purpose designed force for other things and you are going to get less than satisfactory results. We need to learn that just throwing people and money at a problem is no substitute for PPP. I'm unsure why that's so hard for many to comprehend.

This one's on autopilot and it will work out; the Great Thinkers ought to quit wasting time on Afghanistan and devote their time to preventing or at least better planning and prepping for the next one...

[jmm99]

Hi Ken,

As usual, you provoke thinking - here first on a current local issue (the intel-operator centric interview), and second on the much broader future issue. So, briefly on both.

-----------------------------
Mr C

Mr C's factual analysis of Astan seems largely on point taken as a whole. The problems are more political than military (Astan does not fit into the neat little box of a Westphalian nation-state, and probably never will). So, many of the current doctrinal solutions (based on that construct) won't work.

Mr C's solutions (all 11 of them) are something of a grab-bag running from the general to the specific. Here are the bullet points:


1. Immediately initiate a three pronged PSYOP [psychological operation] program using all media—Internet, radio, television, and discussion forums ...

2. Appoint Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian ambassadors, businessmen/scholars conversant with the diversity of Islamic culture and history. ...

3. Open a private dialogue with Iran, initially working toward NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] partnership to assist Iran in gaining recognition and respectability in the Middle East. ....

4. Encourage Iranian and Tajik economic exchanges, even fund them if necessary, to further fence and contain Afghanistan.

5. Encourage cultivation of foodstuffs, biofuel, and plants for fabrics and industrial uses as alternatives to cocaine poppies and drug production.

6. Encourage mutual interests of Tajikistan, China, and India to diplomatically squeeze Pakistan.

7. Enlist China’s aid to cool off Kashmir and further politically squeeze Pakistan.

8. As a political—not military—statement, increase significantly the number of armed Predator and Hellfire strikes on Taliban strongholds and movements in the FATA. ....

9. Treble the covert action special operations and paramil forces we have operating in FATA forward and deploy also into the rear areas of North and South Waziristan and Tribal Agencies of Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur. ...

10. Accept no logistic routes offered through or controlled by [Vladimir] Putin and company. Recognize that he remains KGB/Federal Security Service with the burning ambition to restore the Soviet hegemony.

11. Secure the Afghan eastern “border” in Afghanistan with U.S. combat troops but allow no incursions by them into the FATA. ....

Each of these proposals, and many of the issues raised in the body of the interview, could be discussed in the specific context of Astan until the cows come home.

----------------------------
The Future

However, whatever our COA is going to be in Astan (which will established by our actions, not rhetoric); that COA, though not carved in stone, is carved (it may well include some of Mr C's proposals).


from Ken
This one's on autopilot and it will work out; the Great Thinkers ought to quit wasting time on Afghanistan and devote their time to preventing or at least better planning and prepping for the next one...

And that, of course, is what COL Gentile and others in that debate, and many other debates about the future, are pointing to. Ken, in his typically optimistic approach (:D :D), points out some of the problems in developing and implementing a long-term strategic vision for the US. I agree.

Perhaps, Ken and others would also agree that everyone lacks the ability to predict what the "next one" will look like, unless he or she lucks out ?

In any event, the odds against calling the "next one" correctly are evidenced by many examples in Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle. That book has become my "nightstand" reader (re-reading snips), along with John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Those are not "bibles", but a source of identifying issues - and then thinking them through by reference to their sources and others they do not mention.

What I've learned (and frankly re-inforcing my own ideas developed over the last 50 years) is rather trite: US strategy (rarely worked out before the event) has been determined by the US Worldview and the actions taken to carry out that Worldview. What have been the US Worldviews ?

I see two (painted with broad brush strokes):

1. Prior to WWII, the US Worldview focused on the Americas (as to continental landmasses) and to the littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific (as to the limits of force projection). While I can't resurrect John Pershing to ask him, I suspect his answer to the question ("General, how would our Soldiers and Marines be best employed in Astan ?") would be along the line of "You need to have your head examined".

2. During and after WWII, the US Worldview became Global - in essence, a New World Order, as exemplified by the UN and a much larger international structure (over which the US sought to exercise some measure of control). Concomitant with that global geo-political view, the limits of force projection were extended not only to all littorals, but to all continental landmasses as well.

Currently, we are still in New World Order mode, certainly as to our elected officials where the concept of less than full use of Global DIME is rare. The arguments in the Beltway hinge on different views of how the New World Order should be administered. A majority of the public (of those who think about geo-political issues and Worldviews) probably generally support some form of New World Order.

Now, there are old dinosaurs (like JMM) who believe that the pre-WWII US was at the height of its power. The engineering metaphor is that of the power contained in a compressed spring. Once the spring expands, it loses power (gives up energy). And, if it is extended too far beyond its capabilities, the spring either snaps or becomes flacid.

There is no doubt that the Worldview can change. Whether the present situation is a watershed akin to WWII, I dunno. I expect the current New World Order mode may well continue for the duration of Ken's and my lives. However, you younger guys may see a sea change in how the US views its role in the World. May you live in Interesting Times. :)

Regards to all

Mike

[slapout9]

Admiral Mullen interview on Al Jerzeera TV......Oh Yea we got a plan:rolleyes::eek::confused: Still feeling a little weak so be back later. All I can say is waterboarding ain't nothing compared to a Dentists. I would have confessed to anything.



http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/12/200912424926404830.html

[Ken White]

Hi Ken,

As usual, you provoke thinking - here first on a current local issue (the intel-operator centric interview), and second on the much broader future issue. So, briefly on both.

-----------------------------
Mr CSelected items only:

2. Appoint Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian ambassadors, businessmen/scholars conversant with the diversity of Islamic culture and history. ...

Fix our education and political milieus to enable that, let me know when we're ready...

4. Encourage Iranian and Tajik economic exchanges, even fund them if necessary, to further fence and contain Afghanistan.

Fencing and containing Afghansitan is not a good plan. People who are fenced and contained tend to rebel at their nominal fate -- and can do that in strange and unpredictable ways.

6. Encourage mutual interests of Tajikistan, China, and India to diplomatically squeeze Pakistan.

Once you get past the antipathy between China and India, good luck with that...

9. Treble the covert action special operations and paramil forces we have operating in FATA forward and deploy also into the rear areas of North and South Waziristan and Tribal Agencies of Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur. ...

Uh, good idea -- Ummm, where do those extra folks come from? Who cares if the Pakistanis get upset...

10. Accept no logistic routes offered through or controlled by [Vladimir] Putin and company. Recognize that he remains KGB/Federal Security Service with the burning ambition to restore the Soviet hegemony.

While others want to restore US hegemony??? Sounds like a pot / kettle thing to me...

11. Secure the Afghan eastern “border” in Afghanistan with U.S. combat troops but allow no incursions by them into the FATA. ....

Dreaming -- we do not have enough troops to do that. We and NATO do not have enough Troops to do that (even including Turkey who probably wouldn't play) and forget about tours and rotations. :rolleyes:

----------------------------

The Future
. . .
Perhaps, Ken and others would also agree that everyone lacks the ability to predict what the "next one" will look like, unless he or she lucks out ?No way to tell what it will look like -- what we can and should do is a great deal more to insure it doesn't look like the last three big stellar successes...:mad:
There is no doubt that the Worldview can change. Whether the present situation is a watershed akin to WWII, I dunno. I expect the current New World Order mode may well continue for the duration of Ken's and my lives. However, you younger guys may see a sea change in how the US views its role in the World. May you live in Interesting Times. :)I do believe they probably will (to both mayhaps)... :D

[Steve the Planner]

Ken's criticisms are on point.

What I read was consistent with what a lot of experts have indicated---it all fits.

But a lot of it is so much "wishing for World Peace."

Stanford U had a conference on December 4, accidentally after the President's speech.

http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/november30/afghanistan-pakistan-conference-120409.html

But that put Dorronsoro and others on a stage right afterwards.

I find his point on governance interesting in that it clearly draws the contrasts between our local versus central reconstruction efforts, ie, we can stable some "oil spots," but in doing so, we might further undermine a central government needed for an expeditious exit.

Dorronsoro predicted:
There will be local successes in the next year. After that, the problem will be that the legitimacy of the central government will be totally dead.

We cannot withdraw, because there will be nothing left...The next step will be negotiating with the Taliban.

His points about the Kashmir problem, addressed by Warner's article, are pretty simple:


The U.S. has not the power to broker the deal. We don't have time. The Afghan war will be lost or won in the next 18 months.

So where, on a spectrum of accurate analysis versus praying for world peace does a functional strategy lie?

[slapout9]

Well, as to your fifth option (waging traditional uncoventional warfare using special ops people assisting an indigenous guerrilla force), you can prove it was a successful option in Astan. That's exactly what we did in 2001 with the Northern Alliance.

Aside from not capping our AQ brethren at Tora Bora, where (in your opinion) did we go wrong in strategy after the initial 2001 successes ?

Cheers

Mike

Time to catch up some. jmm99 we actually did it twice. We have won in A'stan twice by UW means first in 1989 when the USSR left and 2001 when the Taliban/AQ left. We didn't hold or build anything, we kicked the Hell out of the enemy with combined Guerrilla Forces and US support and yes there is most definitely some lessons to learn. Where we messed up both times was not having a Peace Plan to follow the War Plan. And I don't mean nation building I mean Diplomatic relations followed by proper Economic support for supplying the needed future Intelligence access we need to avoid future problems/attacks. UW is offensive the mission is to win (Defeat the Enemy) COIN is defensive and has expensive long term resource requirements and there is no good way to win, just avoid losing.


Good link for UW as I was taught it,especially the 7 step operational method. Sometimes called the 7 steps from Hell.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_warfare_(United_States_Department_o f_Defense_doctrine)

[slapout9]

Latest 2 part interview of Lawrence Wilkerson. Part 2 has maps of the planned pipeline through Helmand Province in A'stan.




http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=74&jumival=485

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Back from the Dead? Did you see the light at the end of the tunnel?

You and Wilkerson are following that stupid map problem that I keep thinking about---that the accidental map of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan has other dimensions and issues, and will find a solution, one way or another.

Question arises whether we are on the verge of seeing a few super-giants, one of which (India) doesn't yet have all the land area/resources it needs yet. Fingers crossed that the competition will be economic, not necessarily by warfare.

Back to the issue of "Alexander's Dream of Empire"---if India, at the time and after, was the dominant player (including over Pakistan and large parts of Iran) ex Persians, whether history points through the past to a future.

Steve

[slapout9]

Slapout:

Back from the Dead? Did you see the light at the end of the tunnel?



Steve

STP, no light but I saw ALABAMA beat the Florida Tebow Taliban 32-13:D

You know what Karzid did before he became Prez of A'stan? Consultant to UNICAL:eek: Your Map problem is intriguing.

[slapout9]

STP,speaking of map problems check this one out per Ralph Peters:eek:


http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3882

[Steve the Planner]

So, one day last year, I was sitting in a UN office in Baghdad looking at a stack of maps---all the variations on the supposed Green Line between KRG and the rest of the known and actually definable world.

The most stubborn to displace were the early 1990's NIMA maps, because, having been uploaded on the internet, plus coming from the US government itself, must have been gospel---sure.

Personally and professionally, I see drawing a line on a map, especially one which might end up on the internet, as a sacred and dangerous act, because somebody some day might fight and die over it.

Instead, we get all these stupid maps, especially one that somebody is actually playing with at War Colleges.

I was looking at a cool little map of Armenia (c.1895) that shows the southern boundary of Armenia (before the Armenian and Assyrian Genocides), the three lower sub-districts of one Armenian province (Hakkari) appear to be what we now call parts of Dohuk (Iraq).

I just tried (briefly) to imagine the mass genocidexs and migrations that would happen to make that map a reality. Who makes up this stuff?

In these areas of, arguably, Western Asia, (from the Mediterranean to India), one hardly needs to make up a map. The grim comedies of history have done it all before.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

For comparison, here is a map of Ninewa using the district and sub-district maps from the legislatively adopted maps (through 1976).


Steve

[Wargames Mark]

...Amen.

[slapout9]

For comparison, here is a map of Ninewa using the district and sub-district maps from the legislatively adopted maps (through 1976).


Steve

STP,need a map of the water and irrigation system. Where would you put the system control points? They are going to control the water which controls the food and the drugs and the people......which gives you the country........In theory anyway:eek:

[Steve the Planner]

I have the systems for Iraq, but not for Afghanistan.

I believe some of the reachback folks have screen shots of some bits and pieces, but there is no systemic analysis or plan, to my knowledge.

Can put you in touch with some folks if you have a particularly focused purpose. PM

Steve

[slapout9]

I have the systems for Iraq, but not for Afghanistan.

I believe some of the reachback folks have screen shots of some bits and pieces, but there is no systemic analysis or plan, to my knowledge.

Can put you in touch with some folks if you have a particularly focused purpose. PM

Steve

No, it was just for general dsicussion. Everything is online so I figured it was out there in Cyber-Space along with the list of Tiger Woods X-Girlfriends:D

[Steve the Planner]

You'll have to check with Tiger's HR department about the girlfriends. I understand it is quite a large operation with lots of staff and long-term pension obligations.

Steve

[Bob's World]

Had to chuckle at the title of this thread.

If we could have strategy of logistics in Iraq ('the surge"), why can't we have a strategy of tactics ("pop centric") in Afghanistan?

Hell what was WWII, a strategy of politics (Ok boys, Europe first, then everyone get on line and frontal assualt our way from Normandy to the Rhine to avoid anyone looking like they are any more effective than anyone else)?

I guess strategy can manifest in a lot of seemingly silly ways, that are typically rooted far more in policy/politics than in what is most effective on the ground.

[William F. Owen]

Had to chuckle at the title of this thread.

If we could have strategy of logistics in Iraq ('the surge"), why can't we have a strategy of tactics ("pop centric") in Afghanistan?

Hell what was WWII, a strategy of politics (Ok boys, Europe first, then everyone get on line and frontal assualt our way from Normandy to the Rhine to avoid anyone looking like they are any more effective than anyone else)?

I guess strategy can manifest in a lot of seemingly silly ways, that are typically rooted far more in policy/politics than in what is most effective on the ground.

All jokes aside Bob, you point indicates that most folks do not understand the relationship between "Strategy" and "Tactics" or even what they are-

....and don't even get me started on "Operations."

The problem in Afghanistan is the tactical feasibility of the strategy, not helped by the very variable emphasis on so-called COIN.

[slapout9]

Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan:eek:


http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/12/the_militarys_plan_for_the_afghan_war_surge_in_one .php

[MikeF]

Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan:eek:

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/12/the_militarys_plan_for_the_afghan_war_surge_in_one .php

Slap,

You found the matrix:D. One problem with causal loop diagrams such as this is the 'so what' question. Yes, it defines the problem, but it can confuse and complicate more than it helps.

Mike

[Hacksaw]

OK...

I have developed some really messed up stuff that only I understood...

But this is the epitome of just how far we've lost our way...

If you want to claim that the real value was the journey that resulted in the creation of this "thing" - I'm underwhelmed...

I think they'd be better off pasting together a whole bunch of unit status and contact reports and doing a wordle...

I know there is a whole community of thought out there about the earth shattering emergence of Design...

But in the end... this has to be translated into orders and logical tactical action... and while the development of something like this doesn't flip my switch

Live well and row

[slapout9]

But in the end... this has to be translated into orders and logical tactical action... and while the development of something like this doesn't flip my switch



How about the SBW 7 S's-Strategy.

1-surround the village
2-search the village
3-secure cooperation from village leaders
4-separate the bad buys form the good guys
5-shelter the good population
6-safeguard them from future attacks
7-speedily integrate into a national village system

[Hacksaw]

good enough...

[MikeF]

How about the SBW 7 S's-Strategy.

1-surround the village
2-search the village
3-secure cooperation from village leaders
4-separate the bad buys form the good guys
5-shelter the good population
6-safeguard them from future attacks
7-speedily integrate into a national village system

Slap,

A year ago, I would have agreed with you. SBW worked in portions of Iraq, but it worked b/c most of the ethnic/sectarian cleansing was already complete. In Afghanistan, I fear that you're approach will cause more unintended consequences than intended consequences.

1. Surround the village. Two issues. First, when massive amounts of coalition or Taliban forces descend into an area, civilians will flee in order to avoid the inevitable violence. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, these displaced persons move to refugee camps. These camps are underesourced, undermanaged, and underfunded, and they potentially become breeding grounds and recruitment centers for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Plus, even if we're successful in clearing, then we have to deal with the displaced persons on the back-end. Extremely messy business particularly when the educated middle-class decides not to stay in country anymore and the meager intellectual capital of the area leaves. Second, when armed foreigners surround a village, some men will rebel to defend themselves. It happens. Dr. Kilcullen calls them the Accidental Guerilla.

2. Search the village. We simply break too many of the cultural norms of privacy in our searches causing feeling of broken honor and resentment. These emotions equate to additional grievances often producing more guerillas.

So, what do we do? I like Jim Gant's idea. It starts with SBW #3.

1. Secure cooperation from village elders. Do this through messengers, hold a jirga, and drink lots of tea.
2. Secure treaties with the Tribes.
2a. Establish paramilitary force for self-protection through SFA and FID.
2b. Bring in the Greg Mortenson's to build the schools.
3. Speedily integrate into national village system. Probably won't be speedy, but it is feasible.
4. Work with centralized gov't to integrate tribal govt's into big gov't. Hold centralized gov't and tribes accountable for treaties and promises.

If we work in a manner similar to this, many of those circles and lines will go away:eek:.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Are you suggesting that there needs to be more of a strategy, or just a collection of more adapted popultion-oriented success tactics?

Steve

[slapout9]

MikeF, surround was probably to strong a word. Probably should have used surveillance.

Starting with leadership is always the best approach but I was assuming that we may not always have that option, so I thought it would be better to surround and conduct surveillance and try and figure out what is going on before going into the village.

Searching is always a problem but somehow I think you would have to do it. It could be done slowly as in have the village leader show you around the area....maybe build up to more detailed searches later with the local villagers in the lead.

Leadership again, if you had or new of relatives from other secured villages it would be helpful to be introduced into the village.....instead of going in cold. But again I wrote this from a worst case scenario. Sometimes you just have to start somewhere. Thoughts?

I probably shouldn't have numbered them, the order needs to be more flexible based upon the situation.

[MikeF]

Are you suggesting that there needs to be more of a strategy, or just a collection of more adapted popultion-oriented success tactics?

Steve,

Neither. I'm almost finished with Stones into Schools (http://www.amazon.com/Stones-into-Schools-Promoting-Afghanistan/dp/0670021156/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1260470750&sr=8-1), and I am putting together an Afghanistan training package for my former platoon leaders who are now company commanders likely to be deployed during the A'stan surge.

Their questions are:
- What will we be doing?
- What should we be doing?
- How is this different from Diyala?
- What should we hope to accomplish?

I responded to Slap's comments as I thought they applied. In Diyla circa 2006-2007, I used SBW with a high degree of success. In A'stan, I think we're better off doing less. If I only submitted 3 critical tasks regarding villages, I would suggest:

1. Build Relationships
2. Build Relationships
3. Build Relationships

Slap added:


MikeF, surround was probably to strong a word. Probably should have used surveillance.

Starting with leadership is always the best approach but I was assuming that we may not always have that option, so I thought it would be better to surround and conduct surveillance and try and figure out what is going on before going into the village.

Searching is always a problem but somehow I think you would have to do it. It could be done slowly as in have the village leader show you around the area....maybe build up to more detailed searches later with the local villagers in the lead.

Leadership again, if you had or new of relatives from other secured villages it would be helpful to be introduced into the village.....instead of going in cold. But again I wrote this from a worst case scenario. Sometimes you just have to start somewhere. Thoughts?

I probably shouldn't have numbered them, the order needs to be more flexible based upon the situation. Emphasis added mine.

Slap,

I think you nailed it. First, start with what works or as Surferbeetle would say, work with the wave not against it. Exhaust all measures of the ink-spots theory to establish working relationships with the tribes. Expand your control and sphere of influence through jirgas and tea not JDAMs. Arm them and allow them to defend themselves. Assist them with education and employment. Integrate them into a national tribal system.

Once you positively identify irreconciliable tribes that refuse to work with the gov't, then you go kinetic with SBW and become the biggest tribe forcing the enemy to a breaking point.

This is grassroots, decentralized. It's also the most efficient and cheapest approach.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

I have an arab speaking friend---had dinner last friday as he was on his way back to A.

He has two advantages. Mostly can be understood, and wears civ clothes.

As part of his pitch to get me to join him, he assured me that if you can break through all the bull####---to make friends---the folks he meets will give him the clothes off their backs. That comparison is the same with our mutual experience in Iraq.

But he pointed out what you did. If the troops go in too big, everybody scatters and its is down hill from there. Plus, their reasons for staying aloof and away are far deeper than in Iraq, so it takes more work.

Sounds the same from your more kinetic side.

Steve

[Rob Thornton]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map (http://www.mathematik.uni-bielefeld.de/~sillke/Twister/rules/), and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.


Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/new...rge_in_one.php

Slap,

You found the matrix. One problem with causal loop diagrams such as this is the 'so what' question. Yes, it defines the problem, but it can confuse and complicate more than it helps.

Mike

[slapout9]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map (http://www.mathematik.uni-bielefeld.de/~sillke/Twister/rules/), and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.

Rob, thanks it is all so clear now:rolleyes:

[slapout9]

But he pointed out what you did. If the troops go in too big, everybody scatters and its is down hill from there. Plus, their reasons for staying aloof and away are far deeper than in Iraq, so it takes more work.

Steve

Sure that is why the first step of UW is psychological preparation of the target. In my case the operation started with ONE MAN.....the A-Team leader literally was dropped out of a plan in the middle of the night and then had to go into the AO and make friends with the ruling elite, then he brought in the rest of the A-team and then began to raise and train the guerrilla force, the axillary and the underground. Even though it was training the realism was rather astounding.....no wonder the Big Army feels threatened. Even in training if you pick a local cause that people will support you can move mountains. A lot of what the Tea Party is doing is based on UW. A small group that is well funded and uses Psyops can create the appearance of being a majority when in fact they are not even close. It is one of the vulnerabilities of a Democracy.:(

[MikeF]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map (http://www.mathematik.uni-bielefeld.de/~sillke/Twister/rules/), and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.

Rob- so wrong, but so right. We need to STOP playing these small wars games and become the referee.

I'll provide an example to show Mike's game plan using Nuristan and Korengal Valley, and then y'all can critique it. If only SWC had a dry erase board, this would be much easier.

Concise History of Nuristan and Korengal Valley- the end of the road of modernization
- Marco Polo used this area as a crossing point into India.
- Some of the toughest Mujahadeen fought against the Russians live here in retirement.
- During the 1990's, AQ established training camps here due to the inhospitable terrain
- Some of the toughest battles of OEF were fought here to include COP Wanat, OP Bari Alai, COP Keating, and a Chinook down.

Current Situation:
- Denied area.
- Taliban controlled using coersive tactics.
- Tribal leaders ignored by gov't.
- Greg Mortenson built a high school there.
- Col. Kolenda, former BN CDR and AO owner, is working on the higher staff. He has connections with tribal elders.

Mission. X BN, as part of Afghan Surge, will conduct COIN operations in Nuristan Province IOT secure the populace and set conditions for transfer of authority to Gov't of Afghanstan.

COA ONE: Slap Based Warfare

Task: Clear, Clear, Clear. Hands across Nuristan to clear of all enemy forces and secure terrain.

Intent: Secure Terrain

Method: Direct- Employ mass to overwhelm and set conditions for Pop-Centric COIN

Scheme of Maneuver. Covertly infiltrate behind enemy lines to FIND enemy training camps. Main Body conducts combined ground and air unilateral assualts on key villages to FIX and FINISH. Blocking forces deploy to prevent enemy exfiltration. Small outpost will be left in place to hold ground. Once violence is mitigated, then stabilization and reconstruction operations can begin. Examples, Iraq Surge in Diyala Province and Baghdad.

Likely Outcome: High casualty rates with little success. Unintended consequences will result in perpetual violence as grievances increase exponentially.

COA TWO: Gant Based Warfare

Task: Develop coaltion of tribes to secure Nuristan.

Intent: Employ sphere of influence through social networks to overwhelm enemy

Method: Indirect- By, With, and Through Indigenous Forces.

Scheme of Maneuver. COL Kolenda and Greg Mortenson deploy as advanced reconnaissance element to broker jirga (meeting) with tribal elders. At jirga, negotiations are made on the design, equipment, and training of paramilitary forces, local tribal militias. Additionally, through the Central Asia Institute, plans are brokered to build schools in the area at a sufficient cost using local labor. Finally, communications plan is set in place to facilitate share of information. Once the deals are in place, coalition forces will supervise training and employment of militia groups. Moreover, CF will provide ISR, indirect fires, QRF, and Casevac to assist locals defending their villages. Over time, as more and more villages are secure, real progress is made.

Likely Outcome: Low cost, Low manpower will potential for huge return on investment.

COA THREE: Do Nothing. Abandon Nuristan and hope that the Taliban does not take over and re-establish AQ training camps.

Thoughts?

Mike

[slapout9]

Mike, SBW doesn't do terrain......people cause crimes,wars and problems. They are also the solution. I may want to control certain types of Process Infrastructure but don't fight over ground fight over the people.

First thing to do is map the system with SBW 5 rings of UW (just invented this:wry:) to show the utility of systems thinking.

Ring1 Leadership
a) obvious all village leaders

Ring2 Processes
a) people who can recruit,train or finance guerrillas

Ring3 Infrastructure
a) in UW most infrastructure is dual use civilian stuff
b) find out WHO owns all the infrastructure

Ring4 Population
a) Family,Friends,Enemies

Ring5 Action units
a)guerrillas
b) axillary
c)underground

Now go save the country let them build it with our help IF they want it. All we want is for them not to support Terrorist Organizations that would attack USA.

[MikeF]

Mike, SBW doesn't do terrain......people cause crimes,wars and problems. They are also the solution. I may want to control certain types of Process Infrastructure but don't fight over ground fight over the people.

First thing to do is map the system with SBW 5 rings of UW (just invented this:wry:) to show the utility of systems thinking.

Ring1 Leadership
a) obvious all village leaders

Ring2 Processes
a) people who can recruit,train or finance guerrillas

Ring3 Infrastructure
a) in UW most infrastructure is dual use civilian stuff
b) find out WHO owns all the infrastructure

Ring4 Population
a) Family,Friends,Enemies

Ring5 Action units
a)guerrillas
b) axillary
c)underground

Now go save the country let them build it with our help IF they want it. All we want is for them not to support Terrorist Organizations that would attack USA.

Sorry Slap. Didn't mean to misrepresent SBW in my COA One. My post was off the cuff too. Looking back at both our responses, I think we're saying the same thing. It's a matter of HOW to do it. I've been looking for a low cost, high pay-off solution. Jim Gant offers "a way" of doing that.

Here's some additional assumptions driving my thinking:

-Bypass the populace and Influence the tribal leaders
1. Low national literacy rate.
2. Tribal Leaders have the power, and the people listen.
3. Nobody likes a plan that they didn't contribute to. So, if you covertly/unilaterally invade an area to secure the populace without first consulting those local leaders, then you're probably going to make more enemies than friends. (Look at the push-back in our own populace right now of Big Gov't trying to fix all the problems:eek:).

Mike

[slapout9]

Sorry Slap. Didn't mean to misrepresent SBW in my COA One. My post was off the cuff too. Looking back at both our responses, I think we're saying the same thing. It's a matter of HOW to do it. I've been looking for a low cost, high pay-off solution. Jim Gant offers "a way" of doing that.

Here's some additional assumptions driving my thinking:

-Bypass the populace and Influence the tribal leaders
1. Low national literacy rate.
2. Tribal Leaders have the power, and the people listen.
3. Nobody likes a plan that they didn't contribute to. So, if you covertly/unilaterally invade an area to secure the populace without first consulting those local leaders, then you're probably going to make more enemies than friends. (Look at the push-back in our own populace right now of Big Gov't trying to fix all the problems:eek:).

Mike


Mike, no need to be sorry it's all a good learning experience under the Twister Rule Set:eek: Besides you may have to do something like COA 1 when it comes to larger cities.....???? may have to clear,hold and bring em back after the shooting is over if you are dealing with hard core radicals. To a certain extent this is what happens when a gang takes over a neighborhood, you get a lot of displacement until you get rid of the bad guys.

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

You are getting dangerously close to creating a bottom-up cohesive strategy.

Need to watch your step?

Steve

[Bob's World]

Guys,

I won't make any substantive comments as to goings on here in Afghanistan for several obvious reasons, but I will offer a comment on how to think about framing your strategic thinking.

Step one: Step back. You can't look at a map of Afghanistan and develop a strategy for afghanistan. So step back until your area of operations is the entire greater middle east, and your area of influence/interest is the entire globe.

Step two: Remember your task and purpose. Defeat AQ to Secure the Homeland (In that context, Afghanistan is a supporting operation at best, not existential to the survival of the US, let alone the task and purpose of the larger mission).

Step three: Develop a strategy for that larger mission, a plan to implement it, and then a supporting plan to address operations in Afghanistan within that context.

Lack of understanding of the true nature of the current surge in violent resistence to existing governance in communities around the globe; complicated with the politics of the many governments experiencing or dealling with the same has all compiled to push the full weight and blame for the problem into the farthest corner of the globe from their respective offices. Both are very natural tendencies, and should not surprise anyone, but should certainly be understood by everyone as well.

Step four: Remember that everyone who joins together is that farthest corner of the globe is sent there by, and is representing their repspective governments very different concerns and perspectives.

Step five: Develop a true empathy for the populace of that farthest corner of the globe, and be willing to subjugate your own selfish national concerns to those of the populace whose lives you are affecting so dramatically by your presence, and shape the objectives and the nature of your engagement to help enable a resolution that is best for them while also supporting your larger concerns from your many diverse national perspectives.

Lastly, while the flame that burns the brightest draws your undivided attention to the flames and provides a certain comfort, it also blinds you to what is going on in the dark around you. As a strategist, focus on what is going on in the dark, and how it affects the flame, not the other way around.

Just a few thoughts from the farthest corner of the globe...

[slapout9]

BW, that was some Strategic Stuff you just wrote;) All The Way,Sir

[Pete]

Last August Richard H. Sinnreich (Colonel, USA, Ret) cast some doubt on COIN doctrine in his column in the Lawton Constitution, Lawton, Oklahoma. He's a doctrine writer from way back but to the best of my knowledge he has not entered into the COIN debate in a major way.


In line with his view of counterinsurgency doctrine, McChrystal proposes to concentrate on protecting Afghanistan's populated areas rather than chasing after insurgents in the hinterlands. As he commented in a recent Los Angeles Times interview, "What I don't think you will see as much of is big unit sweeps or operations where you sweep them, then come out. Historically it doesn't work, but almost every counterinsurgency tries it and relearns the lesson."

Actually, he's only half right. He's right to conclude that insulating the Afghan population from insurgent intimidation and support is essential. He's wrong if he believes that it can be accomplished in any enduring way without offensive operations. On the contrary, even were NATO forces sufficiently reinforced to position troops wherever civilians are at risk - no small chore in itself - adopting such a purely defensive posture effectively would concede the initiative to the insurgents.

Nothing could be more dangerous, and in the long run less likely to succeed, especially against an enemy that already has demonstrated quite convincingly its ability to reconstitute after every local defeat.

His entire column can be read using the link below.

http://www.swoknews.com/main.asp?Search=1&ArticleID=18760&SectionID=45&SubSectionID=293&S=1

[William F. Owen]

Pick on the discussion here:-

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/olson-counterinsurgency-ops-sh/#comments

Which IMO, should be going on here, in the forum.

No secret where I stand. Focus on destroying the enemy, so that they have to resort to non-violent resolutions. Use Armed Force against Armed Force, and do so skilfully and decisively, in a way that sets forth the policy.

[JMA]

Pick on the discussion here:-

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/olson-counterinsurgency-ops-sh/#comments

Which IMO, should be going on here, in the forum.

No secret where I stand. Focus on destroying the enemy, so that they have to resort to non-violent resolutions. Use Armed Force against Armed Force, and do so skilfully and decisively, in a way that sets forth the policy.

Someone said there should be a balance.

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important and if "they" have unlimited numbers them you just have to kill more and figure out how best to do this.

Yes there are most certainly actions which need to be taken with respect to the population. This effort should not be balanced with aggressive action but rather carried out in parallel.

When you have restricted resources for the killing part then you still have a chance if your military can show initiative an be innovative (Rhodesia) however if you have no money to throw at the "hearts and minds" part then you are onto a loser (Rhodesia).

[William F. Owen]

Someone said there should be a balance.
Concur. All war is political. The military instrument is but one instrument.

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important and if "they" have unlimited numbers them you just have to kill more and figure out how best to do this.
Again, concur. It is about breaking will and killing does that better than anything else.

[Schmedlap]

There is the insurgency, as a movement, and the individual insurgents. I think whether your actions are taken to counter one or both depends on the situation - primarily what stage of development the insurgency is at. Some members of an insurgency are just disagreeable jerks who will always find reasons to militate against the established order. If they are the face of the movement and can be discredited early on, then the movement may die with their credibility. Clamp down on them too quickly and harshly and you risk turning them into martyrs whose faults are overshadowed by the perception of a disproportionate response.

I throw this out there as a general idea - not a solid proposition that I've thought long and hard about.

[JMA]

There is the insurgency, as a movement, and the individual insurgents. I think whether your actions are taken to counter one or both depends on the situation - primarily what stage of development the insurgency is at. Some members of an insurgency are just disagreeable jerks who will always find reasons to militate against the established order. If they are the face of the movement and can be discredited early on, then the movement may die with their credibility. Clamp down on them too quickly and harshly and you risk turning them into martyrs whose faults are overshadowed by the perception of a disproportionate response.

I throw this out there as a general idea - not a solid proposition that I've thought long and hard about.

By the time the military gets involved the political process is probably already out of hand. If there is an armed insurgency already on the go then the military must be relentless in tracking down every last one of any groups contacted. Let them have thousands of martyrs if thats what they want but just hope that the idiot politicians don't hold show trials and put the leaders in jail. That's when you get martyrs... remember the "Free Mandela" campaign.

My honest opinion is that yes let the USMC and others sweep through an area a few times to break the back of the military wing of the insurgency but thereafter they need to be replaced by forces not bound by the same ROE that are effectively emasculating the ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

[Greyhawk]

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important...

ISAF apparently agrees. Or at least CJTF 82. FINAL UPDATE: 16 insurgents killed and 5 detained after a targeted attack against Bagram (http://www.cjtf101.com/press-releases-mainmenu-326/2818-final-update-16-insurgents-killed-and-5-detained-after-a-targeted-attack-against-bagram.html).

Or maybe some days they are more important than others? :wry:

[Fuchs]

Again, concur. It is about breaking will and killing does that better than anything else.


I know that "to break" is the official and historical version in this regard, but I think it's more useful to speak to "to break or to bend", for "to break" seems to imply total victory.

Few historical wars ended with total victories - in fact, governments/kings usually even survived losing a war.
Most wars meant merely that the loser lost some stretch of agricultural area or had to pay in gold.

The West has become used to think of wars in more absolute terms, as if war were about all-or-nothing. Sometimes it's better to achieve a compromise than to keep fighting till a much more expensive total victory was achieved.

"bending" the enemy's will seems to fit to the idea of a minor victory or compromise peace; "bend" their will to a point you can agree with an it's fine. There's no need to "break" their will (or even the whole enemy) completely in most cases.

I know that "to break" can be understood to meet the "compromise" case, but it's leading the thoughts towards total war/total victory thinking in my opinion.



Now about the "Counterinsurgency Ops Should 'Involve Countering the Insurgents' ":

Well, maybe. Maybe the path to a good peace doesn't require significant direct progress against the enemy, though.
I think that there's no general rule, "it depends".

I'm a minimalist in the case of Afghanistan. Assuming that we keep intervening there (and I would pull out if I was in command), I'd follow a minimalist strategy that merely keeps the enemy in the underground.
It's quite pointless to fight them in the underground with such a poor force:population ratio, and it's much easier and cheaper to focus on keeping them from overtly controlling areas than to hunt them down.
Let the Afghans handle the political and criminal aspects of the conflict and build up enough military might (warlord-style if necessary; no reason to build an army on the industrialised countries model).
The non-enemy Afghans can then proceed to break or bend the TB's will or whatever - it's their conflict then (and should always have been, save for the winter of 01/02).

[Dayuhan]

If you're talking only about the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, then yes, it's solely about using armed force against armed force, finding and killing insurgents, etc. I would suggest, though, that looking only at the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, is completely pointless.

Three things you have to know before walking into an insurgency...

Know your enemy. Why are these people insurging? Are they fighting for something they want, or are they defending themselves against a perceived threat? What motivates the leadership? What motivates the individuals with the guns? What's their desired end state? What do they want?

Know your ally. If you're American and fighting an insurgency, you're fighting on behalf of an allied government. You have to assess that government honestly: what are their capacities, their weaknesses. Can they govern? How are they perceived by their own supporters? By those who support the insurgents? By the neutrals? Do you really want to commit yourself to supporting these people?

Know yourself. Why are you going into this fight? What interests are at stake? What's your goal, what's your desired end state? Is that goal realistically achievable with the resources and within the time frame at your disposal? Do you have the political support on the home front to sustain the fight once you commit to it?

If you've been through all of these, honestly and realistically, you can begin to devise a combination of military and non-military tactics to support your goal. That combination will be different for every situation.

Knowing those three things doesn't assure success, but not knowing any of them is an excellent first step on the road to failure.

[JMA]

If you're talking only about the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, then yes, it's solely about using armed force against armed force, finding and killing insurgents, etc. I would suggest, though, that looking only at the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, is completely pointless.

Three things you have to know before walking into an insurgency...

Know your enemy. Why are these people insurging? Are they fighting for something they want, or are they defending themselves against a perceived threat? What motivates the leadership? What motivates the individuals with the guns? What's their desired end state? What do they want?

Know your ally. If you're American and fighting an insurgency, you're fighting on behalf of an allied government. You have to assess that government honestly: what are their capacities, their weaknesses. Can they govern? How are they perceived by their own supporters? By those who support the insurgents? By the neutrals? Do you really want to commit yourself to supporting these people?

Know yourself. Why are you going into this fight? What interests are at stake? What's your goal, what's your desired end state? Is that goal realistically achievable with the resources and within the time frame at your disposal? Do you have the political support on the home front to sustain the fight once you commit to it?

If you've been through all of these, honestly and realistically, you can begin to devise a combination of military and non-military tactics to support your goal. That combination will be different for every situation.

Knowing those three things doesn't assure success, but not knowing any of them is an excellent first step on the road to failure.

What level are you talking about? Not too many soldiers get to make an input into the decision whether to get involved or not. Most soldiers would decline getting involved in an insurgency where the ROE make the whole thing a sick joke. Afghanistan is getting close to that. The decision there is how to neutralise the potential threat out of Afghanistan while managing to coexist with a corrupt and incompetent and now unelected government. The Afghan army is a joke so the need irregular forces who can operate without the restrictions of the current US imposed ROE is vital to setting the scene for a withdrawal by US and NATO forces.

[jmm99]

What are you proposing here:


from JMA
The Afghan army is a joke so the need [for ?] irregular forces who can operate without the restrictions of the current US imposed ROE is vital to setting the scene for a withdrawal by US and NATO forces.

What is the outline for the "irregular forces" and their ROEs ? Another of my oddball interests.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I know that "to break" is the official and historical version in this regard, but I think it's more useful to speak to "to break or to bend", for "to break" seems to imply total victory.

Well yes, this is imprecise language, but for me, "break" means get the other side to halt armed action. - the the politics kicks in. Political outcomes are the only outcomes that count. That has always been the way.

Generally, and never absolutely, the quickest and most assured way of breaking any ones will to persist in armed action is to kill folks. Generally speaking, it is a factions tolerance to casualties that defines their will to persist in combat. The reasons for that tolerance are many and varied and may change over time.

[JMA]

Well yes, this is imprecise language, but for me, "break" means get the other side to halt armed action. - the the politics kicks in. Political outcomes are the only outcomes that count. That has always been the way.

Generally, and never absolutely, the quickest and most assured way of breaking any ones will to persist in armed action is to kill folks. Generally speaking, it is a factions tolerance to casualties that defines their will to persist in combat. The reasons for that tolerance are many and varied and may change over time.

Perhaps Fuchs means "to crush the spirit" rather than merely "to break the will" to continue. Its a question of degree.

There are some that would need to be crushed in order to be beaten while others will fold under a less absolute pressure. As a soldier I believe you can't beat your enemy enough. Its a bit like a pub fight. You don't hit a man then wait to see if he gets up, you keep hitting him until you are sure he can't get up again.

[JMA]

What are you proposing here:

What is the outline for the "irregular forces" and their ROEs ? Another of my oddball interests.

Regards

Mike

Just to get some context I would refresh myself by saying that the reason for the military effort in Afghanistan is to prevent it being used (again) as a springboard for aggressive (terrorist) action against the west. A secondary aim would be to destroy the heroin industry while there.

Funny how things change. We now seem to want to make a western style democracy out of Afghanistan and the aim seems more to build schools for Afghan girls than to defeat the Taliban or destroy the poppy production. Absolute madness.

The first principle of war I learned was "Selection and maintenance of the aim".

How do we achieve the original aims?

In 2001 it took two months to dislodge the Taliban government with the help of the Northern Alliance.

The aim must surely be maintained. No springboard for terror and no production of heroin.

Now that is a lot more simple than we are making of it now (when did schools for girls get added to the list?).

We just need to let the current (and any future) regime know that like in 2001 it took just two months to unseat the government in a relatively simple low risk bombing campaign. The Afghan tribal culture is so basic that with a brief case full of dollars any tribal chief will switch sides in an instant (probably sell his own mother too). Can't be trusted.

So in the meantime we need forces on the ground to defeat the Taliban insurgency.

Large scale ops by the US seem to have some albeit temporary effect. Bit like putting your hand into a bucket of water, when you withdraw it, all returns to how it was.

So there is a void that needs to be filled once ISAF forces move on. Who will that be? Afghan army? That's a joke right?

So we need a "third force" to fill the gap... and of course this force would have no rules of engagement (or at least nothing lijke those of ISAF).

Mike if we are on the same page we can pursue this line of thinking.

[William F. Owen]

So we need a "third force" to fill the gap... and of course this force would have no rules of engagement (or at least nothing lijke those of ISAF).

You'll need to explain that because ROE are almost always a military requirement, to ensure that violence is applied in line with policy.
Good ROE make violence more useful, not less.

[Fuchs]

Perhaps Fuchs means "to crush the spirit" rather than merely "to break the will" to continue. Its a question of degree.

To "break the will" sounds too total.
Sometimes it's enough to just make him think that he won't reach his maximum goal without unacceptable costs. That could be the foundation for a peace agreement without any "total" or "decisive" outcome.

In fact, it's not even necessary to "break the will" such as to make him no more seek additional territory or power. It may be enough to merely let him postpone his ambitions.

[jmm99]

this:


from JMA
So we need a "third force" to fill the gap... and of course this force would have no rules of engagement (or at least nothing lijke those of ISAF).

Mike if we are on the same page we can pursue this line of thinking.

We have discussed use of irregular forces and various pseudo-ops, primarily in the legal and ROE area - Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7332) (typo in the thread title).

You might want to glance through that thread and see what "same pages" exist. If you are talking about using "warlord armies" (i.e., as some of the Northern Alliance groups were used by our special ops folks in 2001-2002 to wage unconventional warfare in its true sense), similar concepts apply.

Fascinating area, really, since you can dream up your own mythological forces and ROEs (getting around the fact that real ROEs are classified, and special ops ROEs even more so).

The "pseudo-ops" thread would seem a more specific place to discuss use of irregular forces in unconventional warfare.

Cheers

Mike

[davidbfpo]

In an earlier post Wilf stated:
It is about breaking will and killing does that better than anything else.

From my armchair betrayal (one word for a host) and a reduction in public support are far better. In the Northern Ireland context (not strictly COIN), but pretty intensive 'small war' this was a general factor and Toby Harbenden writes on the closing phase in South Armagh very well.

Obtaining betrayal and declining public support is a bigger issue - which has been touched upon in a variety of threads.

[Dayuhan]

What level are you talking about?

I was talking about the level at which the initial decision to participate is made... but if you were arriving in a village planning to "do COIN", those same three levels of understanding would be an excellent place to start.

Wilf says this...


No secret where I stand. Focus on destroying the enemy, so that they have to resort to non-violent resolutions.

...but in many cases those who insurge have no access to non-violent resolutions. There's always the possibility that they are insurging precisely because they don't have access to non-violent resolutions. In that case finding and using a non-violent resolution may remove the incentive to insurge with much less trouble than might be involved in finding and killing.

I sometimes get the feeling (yes, oversimplified) that Wilf sees all insurgents as by definition bad guys who need to be killed, and Col, Jones sees all insurgents as by definition basically good guys with legitimate grievances that need to be addressed. Either assumption may be valid, neither is necessarily valid, reality often lies somewhere in between. That's why it's so important, on both the policy level and the local level, to know what's really going on with your enemies, your allies, and yourself.

An illustrative case...

In the 1980s the area just north and east of where I'm sitting was the scene of an ugly little war. The war started with a Philippine Gov't/World Bank plan to dam the Chico river, which would have necessitated the removal of several dozen tribal villages. The villagers declined to be removed. Initial resistance was non-violent. The Government declined to be persuaded. Violence ensued, and escalated. Lots of people were killed. The killing did not break will or spirit, partly because the indigenous people in question were a warrior culture with a deeply implanted revenge ethic, partly because the villagers saw the conflict as existential: when submission means extinction, tolerance for casualties rises. At the end of the day the Philippine Army got a pretty good spanking. The insurgency was resolved when the World Bank withdrew funding and the dam project was abandoned... there was no longer any reason to fight, so the villagers stopped fighting.

Sometimes giving 'em what they want is an easier resolution than killing them.

[William F. Owen]

Obtaining betrayal and declining public support is a bigger issue - which has been touched upon in a variety of threads.
Concur. This was the case under "police primacy." The Army provided an environment in which the Police arrested and imprisoned terrorists. The reason Police primacy could work was that the Army suppressed any level of IRA military action - mainly by the use of Special Forces.


...but in many cases those who insurge have no access to non-violent resolutions. There's always the possibility that they are insurging precisely because they don't have access to non-violent resolutions. In that case finding and using a non-violent resolution may remove the incentive to insurge with much less trouble than might be involved in finding and killing.
....and what's the policy? You may well be right, but the policy is what will drive the answer. If the Rebels want something you see as legitimate, how come they had to rebel?

I sometimes get the feeling (yes, oversimplified) that Wilf sees all insurgents as by definition bad guys who need to be killed, and Col, Jones sees all insurgents as by definition basically good guys with legitimate grievances that need to be addressed.
I would only add that I do not place any ethical dimension onto the issue. I am purely concerned with policy. No one ever advance a policy they see as "un-ethical." There is simply no good or bad guys where I stand. I just see violence as instrumental.

Sometimes giving 'em what they want is an easier resolution than killing them.
....and the policy is? If your policy allows for that then OK. It did not need setting forth by violence.

[Dayuhan]

....and what's the policy?

The policy is what has to be developed, and if the enterprise is to have any significant chance of success it has to be on accurate assessment of conditions, motivations, and capacities of all the players in the picture.

Policy isn't graven on stone by supernatural beings and carried down from a mountaintop by Ken White. It's based on choices, it's developed, and it can be changed. Effective policy has to be the basis for any effective counterinsurgency operation; why would you want to omit the policy development process from the discussion?

[William F. Owen]

The policy is what has to be developed.
..and once it has been developed has to be set forth. If that policy is violently opposed you have the choice to change it. That always has additional implications.

Policy isn't graven on stone by supernatural beings and carried down from a mountaintop by Ken White. It's based on choices, it's developed, and it can be changed. I am very well aware of what policy and is not. My point here is that policy informs the strategy. You do not change policy simple because people oppose it, but you may have to, when the strategy fails to deliver.

Effective policy has to be the basis for any effective counterinsurgency operation; why would you want to omit the policy development process from the discussion?
Strategy alters policy and vice versa. CvC and common sense tells us this. I never said anything about omitting "the policy development process from the discussion?"

If you can solve the problem without killing folks, then fine. That is politics. If you are happy for them to kill your people, to get you to do what they want you to do, then OK. Generally that is called surrender. It may work. It may serve policy. Usually Policy makers find it unacceptable.

The bit I never seem to be able to get across is "I do not care about the policy." It can be making IKEA a world power for all I care.
Col Bob Jones cares about the policy, and the Jones model - as far as I can see - is a policy. It is not a strategy or even an operation, let alone tactics. He has framed the problem to suit his solution, or vice versa.

My interest is Warfare. I study it and write about it. Therefore I have to study ad understand the instrumental use of violence, to set forth policy. (War) That is what Strategy is.

Once it has nothing to do with killing, it is politics. It is no longer War.

[JMA]

this:
We have discussed use of irregular forces and various pseudo-ops, primarily in the legal and ROE area - Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7332) (typo in the thread title).

You might want to glance through that thread and see what "same pages" exist. If you are talking about using "warlord armies" (i.e., as some of the Northern Alliance groups were used by our special ops folks in 2001-2002 to wage unconventional warfare in its true sense), similar concepts apply.

Fascinating area, really, since you can dream up your own mythological forces and ROEs (getting around the fact that real ROEs are classified, and special ops ROEs even more so).

The "pseudo-ops" thread would seem a more specific place to discuss use of irregular forces in unconventional warfare.

Cheers

Mike

Pseudo ops is only one possibility in the war-chest of irregular forces (or "special forces" if you want to play with semantics).

Warlords have their place but the limitation is normally that they do not have the same aim and siding with you will be for only as long as it suits their purpose.

As to ROEs I came from a war where there was no such thing.

What I am essentially trying to say is that the irregular forces (whatever form they may take) should not be encumbered by the restrictive ROEs the ISAF are. One has to explore mechanisms to prevent and deal with excesses without emasculating the forces. I guess this would generally rule out US or UK involvement with such irregular forces as they have no means of opting out of such restrictive ROEs.

[JMA]

You'll need to explain that because ROE are almost always a military requirement, to ensure that violence is applied in line with policy.
Good ROE make violence more useful, not less.

This is an area which needs to be explored. The ROE are not published so I have to rely on snippets of info here and there.

We don't have a base document to analyse but this type of release NATO/ISAF publication (http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf) helps

Perhaps more important from my point of view is to communicate to the population where their risk lies if they are found in close proximity to the enemy (TB) when we find them and strike. If anyone seriously thinks that the villages are going to side with the infidel even if they hate the TB we are seeing some sad wishful thinking here.

So other than discuss aspects which are out in the public domain piecemeal I don't think any discussion on the ROE will be productive.

That said maybe you would be so kind as to expand on the following: "Good ROE make violence more useful, not less."

[William F. Owen]

That said maybe you would be so kind as to expand on the following: "Good ROE make violence more useful, not less."
ROE are to ensure that the policy is not damaged by un-restricted violence. Good ROE are written with that in mind. Bad ROE just say "thou shalt not." Good ROE say, "Do not if..." - thus judgement and training are required.

[Fuchs]

Actually, I do sometimes wonder why ROE are necessary at all.

There are missions, there's the criminal code with its restrictions and there's the judgment of hopefully competent leaders.
That should cover it, unless you assume that your junior leaders are incompetent and ROE issued by senior leadership need to substitute for the junior leadership's judgment.


Then again I only need to recall certain NCOs and lieutenants to understand why senior leadership lacks the necessary trust in them. On the other hand, I do doubt that said 'special' people would be kept in check by ROEs if other junior leaders fail in their job.

[William F. Owen]

Actually, I do sometimes wonder why ROE are necessary at all.

There are missions, there's the criminal code with its restrictions and there's the judgment of hopefully competent leaders.
That should cover it, unless you assume that your junior leaders are incompetent and ROE issued by senior leadership need to substitute for the junior leadership's judgment.

I absolutely agree. ROE are actually just a form "operationalised" guidance for "rules" that should already be in place. It needs to be taught from Basic training onwards, but very rarely, if ever, is.

[jmm99]

as to this:


from JMA
"As to ROEs I came from a war where there was no such thing."

because all wars (and all forms of warfare) have rules of engagement - the need to define and distinguish the enemy; and to neutralize the enemy (kill, capture or convert). Someone has to call those shots and therefore rules of engagement exist (not necessarily in written form).

Of course, what you are saying (and presumably advocating) is the absence of the legalistic reams of modern ROEs that even I can't understand or see the logic of. We could do with the absence of many of those. So, "ROEs" that are trained-in, not imposed on.

We also could do without the excessive reliance on criminal law in this area, which should be reserved for grave breaches. There are grey areas which are not suitable for application of criminal law, which requires bright line law and bright line facts in order to be effective. That is why we have such concepts as "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "specific intent to commit the crime".

BTW: I think "regular forces" and "irregular forces" are fine semantics - defined by Callwell circa 1900; but going back into the late 1700s as well-defined concepts in US and UK military law (as to which, Wilf and I came to the same sources just after the French & Indian War in some PMs a while back). No need for new terminology.

Regards

Mike

[Schmedlap]

I'd be curious to know which aspects of our ROE in Afghanistan are unacceptable and why. Specifically, I would like to see either...
a) the quoted portion from the unclassified version
b) a clear explanation of what the classified version is rumored to say

In nearly nine years, I have not heard a legitimate gripe about ROE from Iraq or Afghanistan. What I have heard is a lot of whining by understandably frustrated Soldiers who are looking for something to blame their difficulties on.

[Fuchs]

The situation varies depending on nationality.

[Schmedlap]

That's a good point. I should clarify - I'm looking for an example from the US experience.

[Kiwigrunt]

Actually, I do sometimes wonder why ROE are necessary at all.

There are missions, there's the criminal code with its restrictions and there's the judgment of hopefully competent leaders.
That should cover it, unless you assume that your junior leaders are incompetent and ROE issued by senior leadership need to substitute for the junior leadership's judgment.



That never ending spiral of a paternalistic bureaucracy? Where we lack the spine and the confidence to do what we know is right (enough?) based on training and intuition. Not sure if I should add competence to the list….. I don’t actually think that we lack competence as such (well, some do), we just seem to have a strange relationship with it. I think the competence is present, it just seems to be overshadowed by all this other stuff that we have complicated society with. Some of it probably necessary, some of it definitely not.

I am definitely with jmm99:


Of course, what you are saying (and presumably advocating) is the absence of the legalistic reams of modern ROEs that even I can't understand or see the logic of. We could do with the absence of many of those. So, "ROEs" that are trained-in, not imposed on.

[Dayuhan]

"I do not care about the policy." ... My interest is Warfare. I study it and write about it. Therefore I have to study ad understand the instrumental use of violence, to set forth policy. (War) That is what Strategy is.

Once it has nothing to do with killing, it is politics. It is no longer War.

I don't see how a discussion of counterinsurgency operations in general, or of any specific counterinsurgency operation, can be complete, or relevant, without review of the underlying policy issues.

[William F. Owen]

I don't see how a discussion of counterinsurgency operations in general, or of any specific counterinsurgency operation, can be complete, or relevant, without review of the underlying policy issues.

I'm not sure I agree. You can prepare Soldiers to fight almost any type of irregular on the planet and lack a specific policy. Policy is really only relevant to ROE, as it is the violent expression of policy. Would we say the same given other forms of warfare? Once you have to apply violence, the options are not exactly endless, or that varied.

Now, if you want to discuss specific operations, or specific strategies, then yes you have to have a policy. Again, if you are committing to the use of force, the options are not that many, as concerns stupid or sensible applications.

[Dayuhan]

You can prepare Soldiers to fight almost any type of irregular on the planet and lack a specific policy.

Probably true. But if you're going to actually join a fight you're going to need a policy, and you're going to have to evaluate that policy carefully to be sure it's realistic and that it reflects the actual circumstances of the fight. If you've already joined a fight and it's not working out and expected, the first step toward determining why is to review and reevaluate the policy that got you into the fight.

It still seems to me that any discussion of COIN, general or specific, that doesn't include the policy aspect is going to be incomplete.

[William F. Owen]

Probably true. But if you're going to actually join a fight you're going to need a policy, and you're going to have to evaluate that policy carefully to be sure it's realistic and that it reflects the actual circumstances of the fight. If you've already joined a fight and it's not working out and expected, the first step toward determining why is to review and reevaluate the policy that got you into the fight.

It still seems to me that any discussion of COIN, general or specific, that doesn't include the policy aspect is going to be incomplete.
Concur. No policy, no strategy. No Strategy, no military force.

[Rex Brynen]

I absolutely agree. ROE are actually just a form "operationalised" guidance for "rules" that should already be in place. It needs to be taught from Basic training onwards, but very rarely, if ever, is.

Not entirely. The political requirements of the mission, operation, or campaign may well require that soldiers not use force in cases where they would otherwise be justified in using it under the general laws of war. In other words, it isn't simply a case of operationalizing LoW and IHL, but doing in a way that is contextually sensitive to political, diplomatic, and other requirements.

[William F. Owen]

The political requirements of the mission, operation, or campaign may well require that soldiers not use force in cases where they would otherwise be justified in using it under the general laws of war.
That is precisely my point. You need to train for that from the word go. You cannot just dump it on the boys at the last minute, and hope they'll muddle through (well you can, but why do that?). You need to give folks a basic tool set, that remains largely constant.

[Commando Spirit]

This is the UK's Afghan COIN Centre's recommended reading list.

AFGHAN COIN CENTRE RECOMMENDED READING LIST

Introduction

1. There is now a wealth of literature focussing on Afghanistan and the Taliban, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This Recommended Reading List aims to highlight those that the Afghan COIN Centre considers to be the most useful for individuals with limited time preparing for deployment. As such, the books are listed in priority order in each thematic area.

On Afghanistan



Ahmed Rashid, Taleban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, London: I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010 and Descent into Chaos, London: Penguin, 2009. Rashid is one of the leading writers on the situation in South-West Asia. Well-connected in Afghanistan and Pakistan, his book Taleban, was the first really authoritative and readable account of its rise and subsequent removal from power. Descent into Chaos provides a provocative assessment of the region and the causes of and possible outcomes of instability.

Antonio Giustozzi (ed), Decoding the New Taliban, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2009. Giustozzi builds on the success of his book The Laptop, Koran and the Kalashnikov to edit this timely book providing a detailed insight into the ‘New Taliban’ via a series of case studies across Afghanistan and Pakistan. Contributors include David Kilcullen, Thomas Ruttig and Giustozzi himself.

Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Short History, London: Longman, 2002. McCauley draws on his vast knowledge of the region and its history to provide a clear and highly readable account of Afghanistan and the other Central Asian republics from their medieval pasts to the unpredictable present. He examines the rise of militant Islam and its impact on the region, the push and pull of global economics and politics, and possibilities for stability in an inherently unstable part of the world.

Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, Walking the Frontline of the War on Terror With a Woman Who Has Made it Her Home, London: Portabello Books Ltd, 2007. This excellent book provides a detailed insight into the Afghan mindset as well as that of the Taliban. Chayes examines the Afghan in an affectionate and understanding manner. It is an excellent source for troops deploying to work closely with the ANSF in a partnering capacity.

On Insurgency and Counterinsurgency


AFM Volume 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency, January 2010. This is the core text and all personnel deploying on a COIN operation must be familiar with it and commanders even more so. It is the conceptual bedrock for the conduct of COIN operations.
JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, November 2009. This Joint Doctrine Publication sets the strategic context for the military contribution to Stability Operations which includes the COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Commanders and planning staff at Battle Group level and above must be familiar with its content.

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Kilcullen argues a classical approach to COIN but sets it in a contemporary context. It is highly readable and Kilcullen makes full use of his operational experience to bring the hypothesis to life.

John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, London: Hurst & Company, 2009. Mackinlay’s careful analysis of the contemporary insurgent, and his thesis of post-Maoist, information age, religiously motivated insurgency is the most compelling British academic publication since Kitson. His arguments, particularly in the last third of the book, are provocative and presented in a lively, very readable style.

Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber &Faber, 1977. Bunch of Five is the more readable, arguably more interesting sequel to the comprehensive but inevitably academic Low Intensity Operations (1972). Kitson explains, using his own extensive experience, why low-level, bottom-up intelligence is so crucial to successful COIN.

Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Delete the word ‘communist’ from Thompson’s classic analysis, and his arguments are as relevant and applicable today as they were nearly fifty years ago: politics, law and legitimacy, planning, intelligence, strategic communications, and security operations to protect the population. His principles still have a profound effect on COIN theory.

Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges, London: Routledge, 2010. Rid has collected essays by the leading writers in the field to examine how thinking about COIN has developed in the West, what COIN means to the armed services and indigenous forces, and the challenges COIN faces: governance, culture, ethics, information operations, civil-military integration and time.

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Oxford: Osprey, April 2008. Marston and Malkasian present expertly written, succinct analyses of thirteen crucial counter-insurgency campaigns: Afghanistan today, Iraq, Ireland 1919-21, the US in the Philippines and Vietnam, the French in Algeria and Indo-China, the British totems of Malaya and Northern Ireland and its nadir in Aden, Rhodesia 1962-80, and the Israeli response to the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War, London: William Kimber, 1980, republished HarperCollins, 2000. Although not as historically detailed as John Akehurst’s We Won A War, Jeapes describes the SAS operation to raise and train the Firqa. His insights into the cross-discipline approach to civil and military development, PSYOPS and the tribal dimension of the campaign are of direct relevance to operations in Afghanistan.

The US Dimension

US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 – Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006. Commanders deploying on COIN operations need to know what the manual which prompted such a widespread reform of COIN, and so influenced commanders in the US and British Armies, actually says, and how it differs from the UK AFM on COIN.

Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008. Robinson’s book details Gen Petraeus, the US Army’s COIN revolution, and the Surge in Iraq. It is a lively, accurate and very well-informed account which brings the turning point of the war in Iraq, and the practical challenges of ‘Securing the Population’ to life.

Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American Surge In Iraq, 2006-2008, London: Allen Lane, 2009. The Gamble is a balanced counterpoint to his previous book Fiasco. He explains how the case for the Surge was developed in 2006 and, against all evidence and advice, was accepted and then implemented successfully in 2007. He focuses on the central role of Gen Petraeus and his leadership.

Further Guidance

16. Further reference material and guidance can be found at the Afghan COIN Centre Webpage on the Army Knowledge Exchange (AKX) at the link below or direct from the Afghan COIN Centre via the contact details on the AKX page.



Afghan COIN Centre
LWC, Warminster

[Cavguy]

There is one block of "COIN" in CGSC, I believe it is the O300 block in the curricula. There is a bright spot, CGSC filled its COIN Chair this January with Dr. Daniel Marston, who is published in the field (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-Companion-Marston/dp/1846032814) and a noted COIN scholar. So changes may be coming. I also hope BG MacFarland (of Ramadi (http://achanceinhellbook.com/)fame) will make some improvements as the new Deputy Commandant of the college.

There is no reading list. COIN instruction in CGSC is limited and disjointed. See my article "Overdue Bill (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/326-smith.pdf)" here on SWJ and article "Educating the Army in its Own COIN (http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/month.asp?ID=286)" in the February 2010 issue of USNI Proceedings (subscription required, try your library)

[Rex Brynen]

The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/khalili.html)

Laleh Khalili

Middle East Report 255 (Summer 2010)

...



In the 1930s handbook for British imperial officers, Imperial Policing, Maj. Gen. Charles Gwynn, who had seen action in both West Africa and Sudan, writes:


When armed rebellion occurs, it presents a very different military problem from that of a deliberate small-war campaign. There is an absence of a definite objective, and the conditions are those of guerrilla warfare, in which elusive rebel bands must be hunted down and protective measures are needed to deprive them of opportunities. The admixture of rebels with a neutral or loyal element of the population adds to the difficulties of the task. Excessive severity may antagonize this element, add to the number of the rebels and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. On the other hand, the power and resolution of the government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good terms with the rebels.

Gwynn distinguishes the policing role of occupying powers from conventional warfare and even from asymmetric “small wars” against irregulars, which he defines as “deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control” and in which “[no] limitations are placed on the amount of force which can be legitimately exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the terrain permits.”[1] Pitched closer to civil governance, policing occurs where the government expects to continue ruling a population after hostilities have ended and, as such, wishes to avoid antagonizing the civilians from whom nascent rebel groups can recruit members and receive logistical and moral support.

The precise calibration of lethal force advocated in Imperial Policing is embraced as the primary tactic of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States, as most clearly set out in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006),[2] whose free Army-published online version has been downloaded by over 2 million people.[3] Since the Manual’s dissemination, which roughly coincided with the 2007 “surge” in Iraq, counterinsurgency doctrine has become a cottage industry with numerous admirers in the press corps. A key achievement of counterinsurgency doctrine, in fact, has been to bring the majority of American foreign and military affairs reporters back on board the careening bandwagon of Washington’s post-September 11 wars.

...

Also of possible SWC interest in this MER special issue on "Weapons of the Strong":



Iraq Moves Backward (http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/035028AE24BF9D81C1257742004384E7/$file/visser255.pdf)
Reidar Visser

“Culture as a Weapon System” (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/davis.html)
Rochelle Davis

The Problem with “Hearts and Minds” in Afghanistan
B. D. Hopkins

Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War
Steve Niva

You'll need a print subscription to read most of the others.

[Bob's World]

There is one block of "COIN" in CGSC, I believe it is the O300 block in the curricula. There is a bright spot, CGSC filled its COIN Chair this January with Dr. Daniel Marston, who is published in the field (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Modern-Warfare-Companion-Marston/dp/1846032814) and a noted COIN scholar. So changes may be coming. I also hope BG MacFarland (of Ramadi (http://achanceinhellbook.com/)fame) will make some improvements as the new Deputy Commandant of the college.

There is no reading list. COIN instruction in CGSC is limited and disjointed. See my article "Overdue Bill (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/326-smith.pdf)" here on SWJ and article "Educating the Army in its Own COIN (http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/month.asp?ID=286)" in the February 2010 issue of USNI Proceedings (subscription required, try your library)

LTC Brian Petit is coming to Leavenworth soon as the SOF Chair. With multiple tours to Iraq, and having led his SF Battalion in the Philippines, and now in Afghanistan, he will be a gold star resource for COIN for CGSC students and cadre alike.

[William F. Owen]

If Laleh is going to quote Gwynn, then reading the WHOLE BOOK will help.


Revolutionary movements, again, may be divided into violent and, professedly, non- violent movements. The former may be on a scale which amounts to fully organised rebellion, necessitating operations in which the Government forces employ all the ordinary methods of warfare.
and,

Before closing this chapter my non-military readers may wish me to say a little about the use of modern weapons and equipment in connection with police duties.When armed rebellion is encountered, the only limitations to their use, as I have said, are those imposed by the nature of the terrain and the characteristics of the enemy.

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War." I have the 1934 Edition.

Interested in some of the other articles though. One writer in particular has a reputation for mostly completely wrong, when writing on military matters. :mad:

[Dayuhan]

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War."

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.

[William F. Owen]

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.
I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

[Bob's World]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?

If anything, the Europeans (though obviously they all approached the mission differently) were more intellectually honest in their approach. They were there to subjugate a land and its people to their ends; to reap profits personally, corporately, and for their home nations; and didn't delude themselves so completely as America does that they are "the good guy" bringing modernity and democracy and "universal values" (as created and determined in current US culture) and rule of law to those who are currently oppressed and denied the same by their leadership, culture and/or religion.

A little objectivity would go a long way in cleaning up the policy of US approaches to such places, and in turn US strategy and tactics for managing our national interests there as well.


As I look at this, I cannot help but see the parallels with my own experience as an earnest, motivated, but hopelessly untrained and unprepared 2LT of Field Artillery making well intended, but tragic all the same, mistakes at Ranger School while a burly Ranger instructor loomed over me screaming "Ranger! Are you as F#%&*D up as you want to be??!"

There's no good answer to that question, (which even my malnourished, sleep-deprived brain could appreciate the irony of as my equally malnourished, sleep-deprived skinny frame attempted to sustain a front leaning rest position in full kit with my rifle across the backs of my hands). This is where we are today as a nation. We know we can't hold this position forever, we feel the tremors beginning to build even now. We appreciate that the question is rhetorical (ok, now I do), and that quitting is not an (acceptable) option, we can't go back, and can only go forward.

The question is simply what must we change as we go forward from here? A change of tactics is less than a half-measure. A change of Generals even less so. This is why I argue for a change of perspective. We must first change how we see ourselves, only then will be be able to achieve a clearer vision of how others see us, and in turn how we must see them. I'm optimistic, now as then, but the only guarantee is that succeed or fail, it won't be easy.

[William F. Owen]

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?
No. In terms of the Colonies functioning as colonies, the French, British, Belgian, Italian, and Germans, were the Governments. The men running India, were British, not Indian. The Government of India was the British Government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and A'Stan are VERY different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

[Bob's World]

no. In terms of the colonies functioning as colonies, the french, british, belgian, italian, and germans, were the governments. The men running india, were british, not indian. The government of india was the british government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and a'stan are very different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

[William F. Owen]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...
It's not a uniquely American problem. :eek:

[Red Rat]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

[Bob's World]

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

[wm]

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.

[Dayuhan]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

I've thought from the start of this current round of conflict that it was not wise to run about trying to install governments in other countries.

[jmm99]

reason to have a resident philosopher on board - :)

Besides your overall look at "legitimacy" (I won't ask you to define what I can only exemplify), I was reminded from this point:


from wm
If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails.

of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

I wonder if we shouldn't be reading the Small Wars manual and do what it says instead of all this other stuff?

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Establish a US Military Government and make them pay for it.
4-Hold an election and turn the Military government over to the people.
5-Celebrate victory and come home.

It's more honest and forthright instead of all this build them a country and they will like us stuff?!.

[jmm99]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.

(I have to confess, while I read Hobbes in the War College, I couldn't hold a 30 second conversation on what he's all about).

But I don't think that "government" is necessary, so much as I believe that "governance" is inevitable in some form. This may be very informal and tribal in nature; with little regard or care for Western concerns such as defining and defending hard borders, or having a single over-arching leader that can sign international treaties and speak for the whole.

But I also believe:

that whatever form governance takes, any form chosen by the governed is better that any form imposed upon the governed;

that when a populace perceives their governance as legitimate, they will forgive small sins, and even major ones (as TJ spoke to in the US Declaration of independence); and

that if this same populace has a trusted, certain, and legal means to shape governance they will employ it, staying away from drastic, illegal forms of changing governance unless forced to do so by that same governance; and

that the majority of the US's current challenges around the world with what we (inacurately, IMO) call "wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the entire phenom of "Global Terror" are in fact related directly to the US taking policy positions that intercede in the "legitimacy of governance process" of many populaces around the world as we work to establish, promote, and protect governments that are willing to subjugate themselves to US interests over the interests of their own populaces (typically while serving the personal interests of a handful of elites at the same time); and then also turn a blind eye to the elimination of the processes of Hope because, while we know we wouldn't want that in America, its ok elsewhere so long as it increases the likelihood of our friendly government staying in power.


This really is not rocket science. In the most simple terms we just need to be a little less cavalier about how we go about serving our national interests around the globe. By accepting a little more risk in terms of having to continualy deal with new leaders and governments (just like the entire globe has to do with the US, btw), and getting out of the business of thwarting Popular Sovereignty and propping up of dictators who have lost their local legitimacy, we win.

[slapout9]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

That will work just fine;)

[wm]

I was reminded . . .of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

Could not have said it better. I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).

[jmm99]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) (1912)


Laws and regulations are instruments for procuring happiness. If the laws and regulations are good, the happiness of our people will certainly be great. Our people fear only that the laws and regulations will not be promulgated, or that, if promulgated, they will not be effective. It is essential that every effort be devoted to the task of guaranteeing and upholding such laws, never ceasing until the objective of perfection is obtained. The government and the people are mutually dependent and interconnected, so how can there be any reason for distrust? On the other hand, if the laws and regulations are not good, then not only will there be no happiness to speak of, but there will also be a threat of harm, and our people should exert their utmost efforts to obstruct such laws and regulations. Even though you want us to have confidence, why should we have confidence? But how can one explain the fact that Shang Yang encountered the opposition of so large a proportion of the people of Qin?

The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (1919)


It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person - the 'emperor'- was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of 'heaven'. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice.

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay. . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:


I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).
Regards

Mike

[wm]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) (1912)



The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (1919)



So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:


Regards

Mike

Mike,

Nice pairs of quotations from the Chairman. Just shows to go you, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

As I recall the writings of Lord Shang, he was an early Chinerse equivalent of Hobbes--believed that people were basically bad and that they needed a government to keep them in line. That thread runs throughout the Legalist School of China, IIRC. The Legalists took the view, from Hsun Tzu, that people are basically bad and mixed in the principles of utilitarianism taught by Mo Tzu. This synthesis yielded the view that, to maximize happiness (true happiness, not selfish,egoistic hapiness), one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government. No wonder that Mao drew a teaching point from a Legalist. Stalin probably would have as well, had the Russians had an equivalent to the Chinese Legalist Philosphers.

[Backwards Observer]

...one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government.

As I learned growing up in a Hakka Chinese family concerning the carrot and the stick; one gets hit just as hard with the carrot. Usually harder, just so one doesn't get any funny ideas.

[William F. Owen]

OK, I'm starting this because otherwise it'll die in the Blog.

Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents (http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/07/counterinsurgency-and-its-discontents/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+KingsOfWar+%28Kings+of+War%29&utm_content=FaceBook)

IMO, this article is attempting to try and forgive how "COIN" has been turned into a pseudo-science. The reason folks are kicking back against it, is most of the folks who claimed to be experts turned out not to understand how to fight a war and saddled us "pet-rock" social engineering theories.

[Fuchs]

My understanding is that the hearts & minds stuff belonged to 2002-2004 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq. We could have used that to quickly expand a Humint network for gaining control and surveillance.

The human mind becomes entrenched with its opinion and hardly changes his mind (cognitive dissonance problem), even closes his mind to the offers and influence of the "other team". War furthermore includes hardship and rumours - both can all too often work against the "other side", as they get blamed even for things they didn't while the own side can even get away with inflated claims.

To turn hostiles or their supporters around in a later stage would have required more classic Afghan diplomacy - and some of their options were not available to us.


or in short: The soft COIN strategies were probably not so much wrong as they were late, and not so much military as they were civilian.

[David Ucko]

William F. Owen wrote


IMO, this article is attempting to try and forgive how "COIN" has been turned into a pseudo-science. The reason folks are kicking back against it, is most of the folks who claimed to be experts turned out not to understand how to fight a war and saddled us "pet-rock" social engineering theories.

William (if I may),
The article attempted to provide some reasons why a concept that once was welcomed as a breath of fresh air after a decade plus of RMA-talk and transformation lingo so quickly lost its shine. It did not attempt to forgive 'COIN's turning into a pseudo-science'.

But, has COIN turned into a pseudo-science? I don't agree. There may be those who perceive counterinsurgency theory as a science of warfare, but do they own the right to define this concept? Can the interpretation of some be used to discredit the entire concept, any more than Jomini could be used to discredit the entire field of strategic studies (with his arguably 'scientific' understanding of war)?

I see a a need for greater specificity in your broadside against counterinsurgency researchers and scholars. Sure, some of it is awful, misleading, ahistorical, but much like in any field, some of it is also valuable, not least for the five reasons that I cited in the conclusion of the blog post.

[William F. Owen]

But, has COIN turned into a pseudo-science? I don't agree. There may be those who perceive counterinsurgency theory as a science of warfare, but do they own the right to define this concept? ?
War is war. There are varying types of warfare, but defeating an irregular enemy is rooted in some fairly well understood methods of applying military force. What we see with "counterinsurgency theory" is a collection of fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason.
If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him.


I see a a need for greater specificity in your broadside against counterinsurgency researchers and scholars. Sure, some of it is awful, misleading, ahistorical, but much like in any field, some of it is also valuable, not least for the five reasons that I cited in the conclusion of the blog post.
Well it's the awful, misleading, ahistorical, parts I have run out of patience on, as any examination of my many posts would reveal. How specific do you wish me to be? I simply reject the idea that there is merit in inventing an area of study and theory predicated on a woolly idea like COIN.
I submit that understanding is best enabled by studying war AND warfare in depth and breadth. There may be merit is studying regular warfare or irregular warfare, each in some specific detail, but you have to be well versed in one to talk about the other.

To quote your article,

To me, counterinsurgency retains value because it:
reaffirms the need to understand the social, cultural and political dimensions of the operating environment;
All war is political. You have to understand the enemy you are fighting. How is this unique to something called COIN?

reaffirms the significant requirements of effective intervention in foreign polities;
You have to resource wars properly and fight win?

emphasises the political essence of armed conflict;
So again, nothing unique to COIN

recognises the local population as a significant player, rather than as an obstacle to circumvent;
The population is relevant because war is political. Politics is power over people. The relevance of the population lies in the policy.

recommends a more-than-military approach to the problem of political violence.
As in all War, - not just so called COIN- but unless you defeat the enemies armed force you will suffer armed defeat. War and warfare is primarily a military activity, albeit for a wholly political purpose.

[David Ucko]

Well you may be surprised to hear I agree with pretty much everything you said, particularly the bit about the need to study war AND warfare in depth and breadth. The problem is that by and large, the study of war and warfare prior to the COIN revival was so deeply flawed, ahistorical, apolitical, scientific -- I am talking about the tendency to see intrinsic value either in 1) RMA technology or 2) overwhelming force as strategies in their own right, and thereby to subordinate war's political essence. That's why I feel that the introduction of COIN was a good thing, for the five reasons that you cite in your post.

As I mention in the conclusion to the article, if we can agree on an understanding of war that is more integral, more politically-informed, then we can also dispense with 'COIN' and talk about war being war. The problem, as I see it, is that a lot of people who talk about war still see it in very reductionist terms and 'COIN' is a good means of reinforcing the point that war remains a political phenomenon, doesn't occur on some isolated battlefield, and doesn't end neatly, and roll the credits.

The one part I don't quite agree with is this:

fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason
... mostly because I think there are many means of defeating an irregular force, not all of which are dominated or specifically marked by the application of lethal force.

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that by and large, the study of war and warfare prior to the COIN revival was so deeply flawed, ahistorical, apolitical, scientific -- I am talking about the tendency to see intrinsic value either in 1) RMA technology or 2) overwhelming force as strategies in their own right, and thereby to subordinate war's political essence.
Yes, the study of war and warfare is mostly woeful. In the English language this lies at the door or people such as Fuller and Liddell-Hart, and good many others who are still revered due to lack of rigour.

That's why I feel that the introduction of COIN was a good thing, for the five reasons that you cite in your post.
...so actually the answer would have lain in suggesting greater understanding of Clausewitian observations, and holding the study of military history to greater rigour - something the "War Studies" community has failed to do. We didn't need something like "COIN" to do that.

The problem, as I see it, is that a lot of people who talk about war still see it in very reductionist terms and 'COIN' is a good means of reinforcing the point that war remains a political phenomenon, doesn't occur on some isolated battlefield, and doesn't end neatly, and roll the credits.
Well then the problem is that COIN is a very bad way to do that, for all the reasons I cite and many more.

The one part I don't quite agree with is this:

fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason
... mostly because I think there are many means of defeating an irregular force, not all of which are dominated or specifically marked by the application of lethal force.
I agree to an extent, but lethal force has to have primacy of place in breaking will. Killing, capturing the resultant breaking of will, is what creates success. Building schools and hospitals is mostly utterly irrelevant, as is competing to be the Government.
You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.

....and welcome to SWC. :wry:

[slapout9]

You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.


Quote of the week nomination.

[Polarbear1605]

but lethal force has to have primacy of place in breaking will. Killing, capturing the resultant breaking of will, is what creates success. Building schools and hospitals is mostly utterly irrelevant, as is competing to be the Government.
You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.

....and welcome to SWC. :wry:

I have to agree with Wilf here on the lethal force. We have been avoiding killing bad guys in Afghanistan for a while under the requirement to avoid collateral damage, eg –civilian deaths, from supporting arms and small unit actions. Because we have not been focused on killing and hunting down the bad guys we have allowed these characters to operate to their advantage. Consequently, Afghanistan civilian casualties from enemy action have increase approximately 40% per year since the 2008. My argument is because we are not hunting down and killing the bad guys we are actually causing more civilian casualties then we are preventing. If the enemy is killing civilians at will, we are never going to be able to provide the security they desire to support our current efforts. COIN is not popular because all this PC academic smoke cloud stuff is not working. Yes it is nice to have later in the war after you let the enemy know if he operates it will cost him. I think another issue is why is the US military idea of COIN being discussed…the US just does not have the stomach for COIN because the opposition party will always apply for political purposes the US “Boy Scout “ standards of trustworthy, brave, clear and reverent. For example, the current US COIN manual that has been written by the two best COIN generals the US has (in theory). The manual presents some glaring holes in this general approach to COIN. Kitson's pseudo ops (never mentioned) would be political suicide for a US general.

[Ken White]

I have to agree with Wilf here on the lethal force...the US just does not have the stomach for COIN because the opposition party will always apply for political purposes the US “Boy Scout “ standards of trustworthy, brave, clear and reverent... Kitson's pseudo ops (never mentioned) would be political suicide for a US general. (emphasis added /kw)Good points all.

We have not done and will not ever do this COIN (or even Heavy FID...) bit well due to the factor noted by your comment I placed in bold.

We really need to develop Plans E-Z because our Plans A-D don't ever work... :wry:

[MikeF]

Good discussion. Only one comment to add.

This current post-modern counter-insurgency theory only studies very limited case studies over a sixty year period. Guerrilla warfare (Rebellion, Revolutionary, Separatist) have been around since the first gov't formed.

My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight :eek:.

Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.

Mike

[Steve Blair]

Good discussion. Only one comment to add.

This current post-modern counter-insurgency theory only studies very limited case studies over a sixty year period. Guerrilla warfare (Rebellion, Revolutionary, Separatist) have been around since the first gov't formed.

My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight :eek:.

Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.

Mike

I can only second Mike's comment. The current fixation on Vietnam and so on really shortchanges historical COIN/Small Wars and ensures that we ignore many of the institutional blindspots that have existed regarding this sort of warfare. We either need to widen our scope or own up to the blindspots and go from there.

I actually consider the USMC Small Wars Manual to be a touch more intellectually honest than many of the current studies in that the SWM was very up-front about its focus as well as its limitations. Mountain Scouting (http://www.amazon.com/Mountain-Scouting-Handbook-Officers-Frontiers/dp/0806132094/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1279911561&sr=8-1) is something of an earlier counterpart, although the author spends a shade too much time advertising products and does make claims about the universality of his experiences that might not hold up (he campaigned mostly in the Pacific Northwest, so his observations might not have total utility for either the Southwest or the campaigns in Texas and Montana, for example). But there's stuff to be learned from those works, which avoid politics for the most part and focus on the nuts and bolts on the ground.

[MikeF]

I can only second Mike's comment. The current fixation on Vietnam and so on really shortchanges historical COIN/Small Wars and ensures that we ignore many of the institutional blindspots that have existed regarding this sort of warfare. We either need to widen our scope or own up to the blindspots and go from there.

I actually consider the USMC Small Wars Manual to be a touch more intellectually honest than many of the current studies in that the SWM was very up-front about its focus as well as its limitations. Mountain Scouting (http://www.amazon.com/Mountain-Scouting-Handbook-Officers-Frontiers/dp/0806132094/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1279911561&sr=8-1) is something of an earlier counterpart, although the author spends a shade too much time advertising products and does make claims about the universality of his experiences that might not hold up (he campaigned mostly in the Pacific Northwest, so his observations might not have total utility for either the Southwest or the campaigns in Texas and Montana, for example). But there's stuff to be learned from those works, which avoid politics for the most part and focus on the nuts and bolts on the ground.

Which reminds me of my favorite bumper sticker,

Trust the Government? Ask the Native Americans :D.

David Ucko- Sir, good to see you here.

[slapout9]

The only people who have been successful not once but twice are the CIA (in A'Stan). The first Problem is by using their UW/Guerrilla warfare methods it makes the whole DOD expensive and obsolete so big Army had to come up with some kind of theory/doctrine to justify this. So they got a bunch of PH'D's to write a bunch of stuff to justify their existence.

Which led to the second problem, which is the enemy dosen't care about any of that. They just just keep right on using basic Simple Guerrilla's in the mist to win.

[jmm99]

You may call "it" an insurgency, revolution or several other alternatives (including an "armed conflict not of an international character"); and then add "counter-" to show you're against "it". But, whatever you suggest, pontificate, etc., will have merit (if any) based on its content, and not on the label you attach to the piece.

So The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1966) by Jack McCuen (RIP, COL) works fine for me - not because magic lies in the phrase "counter-revolutionary warfare" (he might as well have entitled it "Examples and Lessons from Recent Irregular Warfare"); but because he captures the military lessons and the political lessons (especially the political lessons) from the then-recent armed conflicts he analysed.

That "counter-insurgency" literature is not dead is easily evidenced in a couple of other recent articles from SWJ.

E.g., John A. Kendall, Afghanistan: The Importance of Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/478-kendall.pdf) (SWJ 2010):


Summary

Any commander operating in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment is besieged by the constant need to make numerous and varied decisions critical to the successful execution of a COIN campaign. While all military and political campaigns are challenging due to the “fog of war”, COIN campaigns can prove particularly difficult for military personnel due to a military culture that does not understand how to politically maneuver in semi to non-permissive environments.[1] This paper demonstrates the need for military organizations to gain a better understanding of their operational environment before executing political maneuver in a full spectrum COIN campaign.

[1] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: NY, Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 71. Political Maneuver is defined by Dr. Kilcullen as an operational plan that seeks to separate the insurgents from the people by finding local allies amongst the power players, connecting the government to the population, and increasing local governance capacity in order to generate progress across the four principle dimensions of counterinsurgency (security, governance, development, and information).

Co-ordination of the political struggle with the military struggle follows the approach taken by MAJ Jim Gant - e.g., Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/451-gant.pdf) (SWJ 2010).

Some revisionism seems to be entering the "COIN" literature - at least where the political effort must mesh with the military effort - as in CPT Kendell's citation of none other than Roger Trinquier:


Police action will therefore be actual operational warfare. It will be methodically pursued until the enemy organization has been entirely annihilated. It will not end until we have organized the population and created an efficient intelligence service to enable it to defend itself.

--Roger Trinquier

What we are talking about is the civil side (the police and its intelligence service of "Special Branch" talents and networks) operating under the Laws of War in a paramilitary fashion, until it can transition with stability to the Rule of Law.

Still sticking with the shades of a revisionist past we have a 2010 book review, A Third COIN Course of Action (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/475-strickland.pdf), of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (2009), by Mark Moyar (Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Moyar)):


As a military professional who has read most recent works that have been heralded as "must-reads" or as works providing unusual or original insights into counterinsurgency, I have been disappointed the vast-majority of the time. Rarely have I read anything on counterinsurgency that provided true "food-for-thought" other than that which was produced by Galula, Kitson, or Thompson. But Dr Moyar has produced a volume that may be as influential as those written by the Big 3 COIN savants. The book is very well organized, and it provides overwhelming evidence for the author's hypothesis in a manner that does not become repetitive and boring. While those currently benefitting from the lack of original thought within counterinsurgency circles may deride this work and Dr Moyar personally, he is an expert, and his assertions deserve further examination and your considered thought. For all true military or national security professionals, take my advice - take a week of leave and digest all three of Dr Moyar's books.

LtCol Adam Strickland is a Marine Infantry Officer with previous combat tours in Iraq. During his last tour, he engaged daily with former insurgents, members of the former regime, and civic leaders as part of Marine counterinsurgency efforts in Anbar Province, Iraq. He is a graduate of USMC Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting, and MIT’s National Security Studies Seminar XXI Program. He is scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011 in support of continuing USMC counterinsurgency efforts.

It is scarcely surprising that Moyar would suggest a "leader-centric" approach since his first literary effort of consequence was Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (1997) ISBN 1557505934; republished in 2007 as Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam with a foreword by Harry Summers and a new preface and chapter; ISBN 0803216025.

Bringing in Roger Trinquier (for his counter-organizational theories, not his torture theory) and CORDS-Phoenix (with its neutralization of - kill, capture or convert - political cadres), might be too much for the "Boy Scout" image; but perhaps we should realize that we have not been Boy Scouts, and that there are constraints and restraints (short of merit badge qualification) that still accord with our principles.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, here is 3 for you from 1962. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency an Anthology. Done for the Industrial War College.


http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001a.pdf

[jmm99]

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency:An Anthology from the beginning of the use of the term "counterinsurgency" (1962) - and so, before Galula, Kitson, Thompson, McCuen, SORO, et al published.

For the rest of the book, change the end letter before the pdf

http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001a.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001b.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001c.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001d.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001e.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001f.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001g.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001h.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001i.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001j.pdf

Tanks a lot. :)

The last part has a order re: a SF 1961 village level operation in Laos. The much larger Laos operation, providing for Ho Chi Minh Trail interdiction and more, was shelved. From Dave Petraeus' thesis:

1160

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight :eek:.

Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.

I think Major Few nailed it!!

[Bob's World]

I think Major Few nailed it!!

Facilitated an ugly breakup with one abusive partner, then set up a deal to move in on some other poor unsuspecting bastard and take everything he had.

[max161]

This discussion brings to mind two quotes worth pondering I think:

"Before a war military science seems a real science, like astronomy; but after a war it seems more like astrology." 
Rebecca West

"Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who receives it, in the belief that such writing will be clear and certain, must be exceedingly simple-minded." 
— Plato, Phaedrus

And my own contribution for your amusement:

"we can characterize such conflicts as in the Philippines (or Colombia or Afghanistan or in Africa, etc) as playing monopoly on a 3 dimensional chess board with one side playing rugby and the other is using soccer rules."

[slapout9]

Listen to the words.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8fQDV18PR0



Colors lyrics by Ice T
Yo Ease let's do this...

I am a nightmare walking, psychopath talking
King of my jungle just a gangster stalking
Living life like a firecracker quick is my fuse
Then dead as a deathpack the colors I choose
Red or Blue, Cuz or Blood, it just don't matter
Sucker die for your life when my shotgun scatters
We gangs of L.A. will never die - just multiply

You see they hit us then we hit them
Then we hit them and they hit us, man
It's like a war, ya know what I'm sayin'
People dont even understand
They don't even know what they dealing with
You wanna get rid of the gangs it's gonna take a lotta work
But people don't understand the size of this
This is no joke man, this is real

You don't know me, fool
You disown me, cool
I don't need your assistance, social persistance
Any problem I got I just put my fist in
My life is violent but violent is life
Peace is a dream, reality is a knife
My colors, my honour, my colors, my all
With my colors upon me one soldier stands tall
Tell me what have you left me, what have I got
Last night in cold blood my young brother got shot
My home got jacked
My mother's on crack
My sister can't work cause her arms show trax
Madness insanity live in profanity
Then some punk claimin' they understandin' me
Give me a break, what world do you live in
Death is my sect, guess my religion

Yo my brother was a gang banger
and all my homeboys bang
I don't know why I do it man, I just do it
I never had much of nuffin man
Look at you man, you've got everything going for yourself
and I ain't got nuffin man, I've got nuffin
I'm living in the ghetto man
just look at me man, look at me

My pants are saggin braided hair
suckers stare but I don't care
my game ain't knowelgde my game's fear
I've no remorse so squares beware

But my true mission is just revenge
you ain't in my sect, you ain't my friend
wear the wrong color your life could end
homocides my favorite venge

Listen to me man
no matter whatcha do don't ever join a gang
you don't wanna be in it man,
You're just gonna end up in a mix of dead freinds and time in jail I
know, if
I had a chance like you,
I would never be in a gang man
but I didn't have a chance
You know I wish i did

I'll just walk like a giant police defiant
you'll say to stop but I'll say that I cant
my gangs my family its all that I have
I'm a star, on the walls is my autograph

You don't like it, so you know where you can go
cause the streets are my stage and terror's my show
phsyco-analize tried diognising me wise
It was a joke brother the brutally died

But it was mine, so let me define
my territory don't cross the line
Don't try to act crazy
cause the bitch dont thank me
you can be read like a punk
it wouldn'ta made me
cause my colors death
thou we all want peace
but our war won't end,
they'll always see

See the wars of the street gangs will always get to me man
But I don't wanna be down with this situation man
but I'm in here, if I had something betta to do I think I'd do it but
right
now I'm just down here boye
I'm trying to get money cause I'm smart
I'm gunna get paid while I'm out here
I'm gunna get that paper, ya know what I'm saying
If I had a chance like you,
maybe I would be in school
but I'm not, I'm out here living day to day surviving
and I'm willing to die for my colors

Yo'll please stop, cause I want ya all to live.
This is Ice-T, Peace...

[MikeF]

Listen to the words.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8fQDV18PR0


Careful Slap. You're venturing into my world. In the Salinas project (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/14/AR2009111400915.html), I didn't talk to a single police officer or government official. I went to see the gang leaders. I wanted to hear their truth first.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lexLAjh8fPA&feature=PlayList&p=CCEA225EC27EA451&playnext=1&index=27

[slapout9]

Careful Slap. You're venturing into my world. In the Salinas project (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/14/AR2009111400915.html), I didn't talk to a single police officer or government official. I went to see the gang leaders. I wanted to hear their truth first.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lexLAjh8fPA&feature=PlayList&p=CCEA225EC27EA451&playnext=1&index=27

Mike,I remember and I think we exchanged a few PM's over it. My point is how many people in Government would even think of or be willing to do such a thing? There are some out there but not many.

Now for COIN discontent.
The COIN manual is better for inside America:eek: for outside maybe we should go back to the Small Wars Manual?

[JMA]

I have to agree with Wilf here on the lethal force. We have been avoiding killing bad guys in Afghanistan for a while under the requirement to avoid collateral damage, eg –civilian deaths, from supporting arms and small unit actions. Because we have not been focused on killing and hunting down the bad guys we have allowed these characters to operate to their advantage. Consequently, Afghanistan civilian casualties from enemy action have increase approximately 40% per year since the 2008. My argument is because we are not hunting down and killing the bad guys we are actually causing more civilian casualties then we are preventing. If the enemy is killing civilians at will, we are never going to be able to provide the security they desire to support our current efforts. COIN is not popular because all this PC academic smoke cloud stuff is not working. Yes it is nice to have later in the war after you let the enemy know if he operates it will cost him. I think another issue is why is the US military idea of COIN being discussed…the US just does not have the stomach for COIN because the opposition party will always apply for political purposes the US “Boy Scout “ standards of trustworthy, brave, clear and reverent. For example, the current US COIN manual that has been written by the two best COIN generals the US has (in theory). The manual presents some glaring holes in this general approach to COIN. Kitson's pseudo ops (never mentioned) would be political suicide for a US general.

I would like to return to a matter I raised in another thread for which I got little or no support. This is the single biggest error being made by both US and NATO forces in Afghanistan and that is the short duration of the operational "tours".

The Brits at 6 months is absolutely laughable with the US army's 12 months sounding almost respectable by comparison. There is no way that any force can navigate their way through the human and geographical terrain that is Afghanistan to the extent that they can take on the Taliban by hunting them down and killing them.

Perhaps COIN is not popular in certain quarters because it is more difficult to execute than the more conventional warfare. There lies the crunch of this matter. You just can't make a difference by swinging by for a quick 6 month tour every two years. If anyone thinks it does they need their head read.

I suggested the potential of raising specialised battalions along the lines of the US's Merrill’s Marauders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrill's_Marauders) of the past for permanent deployment in Afghanistan. Again the response to this concept was a predictable... its new, therefore strange, therefore frightening, and therefore too scary to be supported. The only objection that was raised was the theoretical threat of an increased incidence of PTSD.

This is why all bold military actions of this nature are carried out by senior officers with vision and not through a committee of middle level field officers and self styled "analysts".

Essentially what it will take for progress in Afghanistan is (first) the political will in Washington to seize the initiative then (second) a commander like Templer (supported by the likes of Thompson in Malaya) or a Patton or a Kitchener (of Omdurman and the 2nd Boer War fame) to take the situation by the scruff of the neck. Sad to say Patraeus is not that type of leader.

A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?

[jmm99]

but I don't see where the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) fits into the present picture. According to the Wiki (I didn't check Bidwell's book on my shelf), they began operations in February 1944 and ended in August 1944:


A week after Myitkyina fell, on August 10, 1944, the 5307th was disbanded with a final total of 130 combat-effective officers and men (out of the original 2,997). Of the 2,750 to enter Burma, only 2 were left alive who had never been hospitalized with wounds or major illness. [39]

39. ^ Hunter, Charles N. (Col.), Galahad, Naylor Press (1963) p. 215

This looks like a 6-month tour to me, with very little institutional memory to pass on at the end since almost everyone belonged in a hospital bed.

That is not to pi$$ on your parade (re: the length of tours), as that is not my SME; but merely to point out that you might come up with a better long-term tour example which was not used up in the course of the tour (your RLI ?).

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?

that is a very good question.

[William F. Owen]

I would like to return to a matter I raised in another thread for which I got little or no support.
Is this what this thread is about?

The Brits at 6 months is absolutely laughable with the US army's 12 months sounding almost respectable by comparison. There is no way that any force can navigate their way through the human and geographical terrain that is Afghanistan to the extent that they can take on the Taliban by hunting them down and killing them.
Says who? As long as the G2 effort is coherent, I can see no evidence that giving people 18+ month tours would increase unit effectiveness.

Perhaps COIN is not popular in certain quarters because it is more difficult to execute than the more conventional warfare. There lies the crunch of this matter.
Not popular with who?
So so-called "COIN" is more difficult to fight than the Falklands, Korea, or Fighting in 21st Army Group 1944-45? Sorry, that's just not true. No COIN operation in history has had to worry about being DF'ed by Corps level artillery, FGA or taking on a Company of MBTs. Psychological casualties in Normandy eventually rose 10-15% of men requiring evacuation. I've never seen a figure like that from a conflict in which the enemy was solely irregular. Regular warfare against competent enemies is the gold standard of skill.

I suggested the potential of raising specialised battalions along the lines of the US's Merrill’s Marauders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrill's_Marauders) of the past for permanent deployment in Afghanistan.
This makes no sense. You have an Army use it. Why is the UK only deploying 10,000 men? Because that is all the strategic risk the UK wants to run. It is NOTHING to do with manpower availability.

Again the response to this concept was a predictable... its new, therefore strange, therefore frightening, and therefore too scary to be supported.
Not strange, or frightening, or original. It's just not a good idea.

[JMA]

but I don't see where the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) fits into the present picture. According to the Wiki (I didn't check Bidwell's book on my shelf), they began operations in February 1944 and ended in August 1944:

I used Merrill’s Marauders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrill's_Marauders) purely as an example of a specialised unit that was raised for a specific task during that war.


In the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) of August 1943, Allied leaders decided to form a US deep penetration unit that would attack Japanese troops in Burma... [snip] ...A call for volunteers attracted around 3,000 men.

This unit was not considered a success but I raised the example to illustrate a concept. So lets focus on the concept shall we?

In the thread Fire with Fire (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10871) the idea was flighted of a need to raise a force that can take the war to the Taliban. This requirement to actually try to kill the Taliban rather than hold ground or whatever the ROE allows is becoming a recurring theme. This seems in the main driven by frustration at the restrictions imposed through the ROE. This is only half the story though as probably an equal limitation on military performance in Afghanistan is the almost total lack of knowledge of the people and culture, the terrain and the enemy (or roughly in the new language METT-TC).

(Now before someone says they have done 2 six month tours over the past four years and sets themselves up as some sort of "old hand" expert on Afghanistan please just think about just how pathetic that experience level is against the Taliban. It is not close to an even fight.)

So to me it seems obvious that the METT-TC aspect also needs to be addressed rather than just hearing the increasing wining about the ROE.

So how does one act to ensure that there is a radical improvement in the METT-TC aspect of OEF in Afghanistan?

It is quite honestly appalling that while ISAF forces are reeling under the double whammy of restrictive ROEs and almost total and universal ignorance of METT-TC the majority just unquestioningly go with the flow in true lemmings fashion.

Where is the MacArthur? Where is the Patton? Where is the Roberts or Kitchener? Where is the Templer? Where is the Guderian? Where is the Allenby? Perhaps it is this absolute lack of inspired military leadership that is the undoing of the ISAF efforts in Afghanistan.

Oh yes... we were talking about six month/nine month tours. This war after nine years has got beyond amateur hour and now as the death toll rises demands a move to a more professional approach. Truly a war in search of inspired leadership.

[Fuchs]

One thing which I'll never get about all the COIN theories is why they're so militaristic.

It's obvious that the military power in place is powerful enough to minimise the (para)military options and effectiveness of the enemy.


The two major shortcomings are the coverage (military numbers) and the political effort. I doubt that an increased hunting activity would have a good chance of strategic success.

The greater problem was the political effort. The military only deserves the rank of a sideshow once it's suppressed the bold open resistance.

The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.

TB might move into a village and fore the village to cooperate superficially - but there's no way how TB could force them to really cooperate. Even hostages cannot ensure 100% cooperation. The minimum objective is to ensure that the population uses its remaining freedom of action to assist us.


The whole thing lasts way too long, though. It seems as if it becomes impossible to solve such conflicts in a smart way after a few years.
It seems to take the internal decay of one party or a heavy dose of brute force to end such conflicts if they already burned for years.

[davidbfpo]

JMA asked this:
A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?

I asked a friend who studies local culture along the Durand Line and in reply came this:
The first rule of thumb in Afghanistan, eradicate the outer menace before you turn the guns on yourself. Outside influence in the land of Roh is considered sacrilege and must at all costs be defended.

Hewad is detailed in Pashtunwali as defence of culture and land, the Coalition is viewed as the invader, once this has been settled they'll turn on themselves.

We need to understand the pyschology of occupation and in this case the occupied, if Britons were murdered by a fellow white Briton would this cause more of or less of a stir than if the perpetrator happens to be a Muslim occupier.

Now multiply that scenario a hundred times and you may begin to understand the stance of a tribal Pashtun, a fella who probably takes courage from his ancient code, thrity years of instability, killing of local civilians, his religion and a heap of other local grievances

There are several posts on Pashtunwali, but on a quick check I could not find an answer there.

[Bob's World]

"Difficulty" and "Danger" are two very separate things. While conventional combat is typically much more dangerous than Insurgency is, it is also very simple in its measures of success or failure. To defeat armies, or seize terrain is relatively simple to understand when one is failing or succeeding at what they are doing.

Similarly, there are estimates that as many as 50,000 French civilians were killed, primarily by allied bombing, during June-July 1944 operations in France. Such casualties are of small impact on an Army liberating the same populace from an earlier invader. A cost of freedom. Now put those same civilian casualties being caused by an outside force coming in to help a country suppress an insurgency among its own populace. Disaster! The insurgency would grow in support from such heavy-handed tactics.

To even look at insurgency as a form of warfare leads to dangerous assumptions. Perhaps insurgency is indeed warfare by a populace against its government; but COIN addressed as warfare in turn is to sink into a quagmire of waging war against one's own populace in order provide peace and good governance to the same. In the law such situations are described as "the slippery slope." Slippery indeed.

Far better that the military take the position that COIN is not warfare at all. That it is the business of civil governance and that it will lend its capacity and capabilities to augment the same under the rules of MSCA whenever tasked, but that lead, and responsibility must always remain with the civil authorities; and focus also must likewise remain on the repair of the failures of governance rather than on the punishment of those who dare to complain about the same.

[slapout9]

It is not that the COIN manual is wrong, it is that here is no Insurgency to counter. We were attacked from Afghanistan and they refused to cooperate and our people were killed and our property was destroyed by means of a Guerrilla Warfare Air Strike.

Time to give them a Hells Angels Air Campaign, the only civilians we are going to protect are Americans. As CvC would say:
"What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means -- either completely or enough to make him stop fighting. . . . The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole object of all engagements. . . . Direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration."

After that we should use Jewish Kung Fu (put them in a headlock and shake all their money out of them until they have paid us back).

[JMA]

"Difficulty" and "Danger" are two very separate things. While conventional combat is typically much more dangerous than Insurgency is, it is also very simple in its measures of success or failure. To defeat armies, or seize terrain is relatively simple to understand when one is failing or succeeding at what they are doing.

Yes, exactly.

[JMA]

One thing which I'll never get about all the COIN theories is why they're so militaristic.

It's obvious that the military power in place is powerful enough to minimise the (para)military options and effectiveness of the enemy.

The two major shortcomings are the coverage (military numbers) and the political effort. I doubt that an increased hunting activity would have a good chance of strategic success.

The greater problem was the political effort. The military only deserves the rank of a sideshow once it's suppressed the bold open resistance.

The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.

TB might move into a village and fore the village to cooperate superficially - but there's no way how TB could force them to really cooperate. Even hostages cannot ensure 100% cooperation. The minimum objective is to ensure that the population uses its remaining freedom of action to assist us.

The whole thing lasts way too long, though. It seems as if it becomes impossible to solve such conflicts in a smart way after a few years.
It seems to take the internal decay of one party or a heavy dose of brute force to end such conflicts if they already burned for years.

I believe we are getting closer to it now.

Yes I agree that the military component of a modern COIN war is minor indeed and I also agree that sending young infantry-trained officers into villages to "win the hearts and minds" of the locals is laughable. Use whoever you like for this task but don't expect results from young soldiers fresh out of New York City or London.

That said have you noted how it is the soldiers that get more confused about COIN than do the politicians? Is it not madness to see soldiers starting to talk and act like at company, platoon and section level the effort should be no more than 20% military stuff and 80% civil/political/other stuff?

Can someone please tell soldiers that 100% of their efforts fall within the 20% (military component) of the total COIN effort. Certainly killing civilians will not help the main COIN effort so soldiers will be expected (by the ROE) to avoid this as much as possible but for the rest they need to be formed up on muster parade everyday and reminded that their role in the COIN campaign is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Those soldiers who would prefer to be handing out Mars bars and helping to build schools and clinics should resign and join either some civil action unit or the Peace Corps. It seems that there are a lot of "sheep" in "wolfs" clothing out there turning the military into a weak and (in the case of Helmand in Afghanistan) an ineffective force. Use soldiers to do the 20% which requires military action and civvies to do the remainder.

In most cases an insurgency does not begin unless there are grounds for genuine "unhappiness" among a section of the population. The current regime will not make the required concessions until they are forced to do so. This will always take time. Sending in the troops to ruthlessly crush a revolt is a less likely option nowadays.

[jmm99]

Not all soldiers are suited for the political struggle, especially in forces such as the US and UK (e.g., Brig. "Trotsky" Davies in WWII, link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_Resistance_of_World_War_II#Sources) and link (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_%22Trotsky%22_Davies) - to Envar Hoxha in explanation for Davies' refusal to discuss politics: "Because I am a soldier and not a politician"; and Allenby, for that matter, in WWI) who take some pride in being non-poltical.

I also think that some believe that, by simplistic application of the national policy (to which, the military struggle is one continuation by other means; the political struggle is another continuation by still other means), the political struggle is satisfactorily waged.

I'd suggest that the situation is more complicated; and that these soundbites, while partially correct, are misleading:


from Fuchs
The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.


from JMA
Those soldiers who would prefer to be handing out Mars bars and helping to build schools and clinics should resign and join either some civil action unit or the Peace Corps. It seems that there are a lot of "sheep" in "wolfs" clothing out there turning the military into a weak and (in the case of Helmand in Afghanistan) an ineffective force. Use soldiers to do the 20% which requires military action and civvies to do the remainder.

The basics (and the advanced lessons) of the Political Struggle were laid out by both sides in Vietnam, whether one tagged it "Armed Propaganda" (Giap's original unit from 1944) or Pacification (as in ARVN BG Tran's definitive book (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm), from his perspective ;) ).

The bottom line is that the Political Struggle is still a violent world of neutralization (kill, capture or convert) - and is not domestic politics, the Peace Corps, or merely spending billions on reconstruction projects. Since the effort must extend to the grassroots (villages and hamlets), it requires lower level Os and NCOs (whether they are military or paramilitary); and they must be able to at least protect themselves. I'd have them doing quite a bit more than that; but all those are the details which have been laid out better by many who wrote about it at the time.

Regards

Mike

[tom_mancino]

Is it possible that we have been talking a good COIN game, but not really doing enough COIN to be effective? I ask you, how can we keep approx. 1/2 of our potential combat power (~40 K soldiers) in just two FOBs (Kandahar and Bagram ) in Afghanistan and realistically say we are giving population centric COIN (a hugely manpower intensive effort) a fair shot?

[JMA]

Is this what this thread is about?

This thread stems from your posting of the blog entry Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents by David Ucko. Counterinsurgency is becoming unpopular and is getting a bad name because IMHO the way it is being implemented in Afghanistan. So therefore if one can address why it is not working in Afghanistan one can get some clarity on this issue, yes?


Says who? As long as the G2 effort is coherent, I can see no evidence that giving people 18+ month tours would increase unit effectiveness.

I said 6 month tours of the Brits are laughable. I understand that the ability to think laterally is not a British trait. It is plain insanity to squeeze a 6 month tour of Afghanistan into an otherwise busy two-year cycle for units. Apart from the obvious message that the war is not being taken seriously or merely being used to rapidly rotate Bde HQs and units through the theatre to spread a bit of operational and combat experience around the army.

Do a little mental comparison for yourself. Compare the knowledge of terrain and population (METT-TC if you like) between the Taliban and the ISAF forces. Taliban continues to improve being in theatre most of the time and due to the low kill rate per contact while ISAF with its tours and rotations is rather like doing the Harvard Step Test (http://www.topendsports.com/testing/tests/step-harvard.htm) (which tires you out but takes you nowhere).

Not surprised that no alternatives to the Brit 6 month tours has been forthcoming. Just going with the flow and not rocking the boat is good career advice.


Not popular with who?

The same people classed as discontents in the article you posted - Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents (http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/07/counterinsurgency-and-its-discontents/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+KingsOfWar+(Kings+of+War)&utm_content=FaceBook)


So so-called "COIN" is more difficult to fight than the Falklands, Korea, or Fighting in 21st Army Group 1944-45? Sorry, that's just not true. No COIN operation in history has had to worry about being DF'ed by Corps level artillery, FGA or taking on a Company of MBTs. Psychological casualties in Normandy eventually rose 10-15% of men requiring evacuation. I've never seen a figure like that from a conflict in which the enemy was solely irregular. Regular warfare against competent enemies is the gold standard of skill.

Difficult as opposed to dangerous or risky... and yes it is true.


This makes no sense. You have an Army use it. Why is the UK only deploying 10,000 men? Because that is all the strategic risk the UK wants to run. It is NOTHING to do with manpower availability.

You need a specialised unit because certainly in the Brit Army the units come attached with their historical baggage on how they fight. under the subheading Regimental culture in Anthony King's Understanding the Helmand campaign (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf) he explains how in this case (Afghanistan) the regimental history of the British regiments deployed serves to be a drawback rather than than a benefit.

It makes sense to lateral thinkers that given the nature and duration of these insurgencies all parties would be better served at a troop level of around 10,000 troops to raise units that can provide soldiers in the field with a continually growing knowledge of the country, its people, their cultures and of the terrain.

Four years on I would be so bold as to state that the Brits would have been well served by such a force of brigade strength comprising 3-4 battalions (increasing by one battalion per year).


Not strange, or frightening, or original. It's just not a good idea.

The Brits are suffering in Helmand, yet they cling to a failed strategy and approach as if it were the Holy Grail.

[jmm99]

if you are talking about something akin to the Vietnam Pacification Program (which, in one form or another, spanned the Second Indochina War 1959-1975). The USG lacks much of the horsepower it had then in MACV, CIA, USAID and USIA; and, say all the bad you want of the GSV, the GoA has it beat all to hell and back in negatives. So, first, the horses are missing.

Second, the remaining timetable is too short. We are not talking Vietnam 1964 (where the questions of what paths to take and how far to walk them were still on the table); but Vietnam 1968-1969 (the transition from Johnson to Nixon), where the question is how best to depart. That will become more apparent once the 2010 US election results come in and the Powers That Be and Them What Wants to Be face off for 2012.

Regards

Mike

PS: Tom Mancino - I notice from your other post (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=103782&postcount=2)) that you're reading Mark Moyar's new book, "A Question of Command", which I've ordered following Strickland's recommendation. I'm trying to catch up with you. :D

[JMA]

Is it possible that we have been talking a good COIN game, but not really doing enough COIN to be effective? I ask you, how can we keep approx. 1/2 of our potential combat power (~40 K soldiers) in just two FOBs (Kandahar and Bagram ) in Afghanistan and realistically say we are giving population centric COIN (a hugely manpower intensive effort) a fair shot?

The military takes care of 20% of the effort in COIN. To be successful you need to have a legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population and can begin to provide civil/police/paramilitary link between the government and the ISAF forces. Not being provided... so quite frankly there is no hope of success beyond the narrow confines of battlefield successes where the Taliban are stupid enough to stand and fight, which is no success other than a temporary one at best.

[JMA]

if you are talking about something akin to the Vietnam Pacification Program (which, in one form or another, spanned the Second Indochina War 1959-1975). The USG lacks much of the horsepower it had then in MACV, CIA, USAID and USIA; and, say all the bad you want of the GSV, the GoA has it beat all to hell and back in negatives. So, first, the horses are missing.

Second, the remaining timetable is too short. We are not talking Vietnam 1964 (where the questions of what paths to take and how far to walk them were still on the table); but Vietnam 1968-1969 (the transition from Johnson to Nixon), where the question is how best to depart. That will become more apparent once the 2010 US election results come in and the Powers That Be and Them What Wants to Be face off for 2012.

Regards

Mike


So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.

[JMA]

Not all soldiers are suited for the political struggle, especially in forces such as the US and UK (e.g., Brig. "Trotsky" Davies in WWII, link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_Resistance_of_World_War_II#Sources) and link (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_%22Trotsky%22_Davies) - to Envar Hoxha in explanation for Davies' refusal to discuss politics: "Because I am a soldier and not a politician"; and Allenby, for that matter, in WWI) who take some pride in being non-poltical.

That was back in WWII and WWI for the Brits. Lot has changed since then. Now most all the senior officers do a spel at MoD or Foreign Office to make sure that they are adequately politicised and will not let any moral or ethical concerns ever get in the way of carrying out government policy (unless they want to commit career suicide).


I also think that some believe that, by simplistic application of the national policy (to which, the military struggle is one continuation by other means; the political struggle is another continuation by still other means), the political struggle is satisfactorily waged.

I'd suggest that the situation is more complicated; and that these soundbites, while partially correct, are misleading:

The basics (and the advanced lessons) of the Political Struggle were laid out by both sides in Vietnam, whether one tagged it "Armed Propaganda" (Giap's original unit from 1944) or Pacification (as in ARVN BG Tran's definitive book (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm), from his perspective ;) ).

The bottom line is that the Political Struggle is still a violent world of neutralization (kill, capture or convert) - and is not domestic politics, the Peace Corps, or merely spending billions on reconstruction projects. Since the effort must extend to the grassroots (villages and hamlets), it requires lower level Os and NCOs (whether they are military or paramilitary); and they must be able to at least protect themselves. I'd have them doing quite a bit more than that; but all those are the details which have been laid out better by many who wrote about it at the time.

Regards

Mike

What I said was essentially that soldiers deal with the 20% in a violent military fashion. The other 80% gets to be done by the politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs. Don't expect a combat soldier to become multi-skilled to the point where today he is involved in close quarter battle and killing or being killed and the next he is handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish.

Of course soldiers are confused by this nonsensical COIN strategy, they should be. Those that claim that they actually know whats going on probably need to take a polygraph.

[davidbfpo]

A second view on JMA's question:
A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?

Cross refer an earlier answer on Post 29.

Now from another observer:
In some cases that will happen but Talibs are much more careful not to hit civilians (+they don't use airpower artillery etc) - but there a number of reasons why Talibs may have fewer problems wiith this than US forces:

1. Being more sensitive to local custom the Talibs speedily pay the appropriate amount of blood money for civilian deaths (the Yanks do to - but too clumsily).
2. The Talibs have local war lords giving them protection - if a tribal leader and to a lesser extent local mullah says Talibs are right to fight then people will see deaths of "US spies" for example as justified.
3. When the US kill an innocent person revenge will be taken on any foreign soldier - with Talibs it is more difficult as local people are sensitive to different factions etc so who should they hit back at? They would not want to kill an Uzbek if a Chechen was responsible for fear -even Afghans get scared sometimes.

[jmm99]

whether a "COIN" strategy ever existed in Astan; and whatever the "Plan", the political side of the ledger was feeble at best ("lipstick on a pig" and the the rest of the cliches).

That didn't bother me cuz my rationale for being in Astan in the first place (and I never saw a reason to change the rationale) was to mount direct action operations against the AQ leadership cadres in Astan and Pstan (more a matter of "rental" operations), based on principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

Other folks at much higher pay grades than mine, had different ideas.

Anyway, agreed: alia jacta est - and we are now in the period of Afghanization and exit strategy(ies).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

with this:


from JMA
What I said was essentially that soldiers deal with the 20% in a violent military fashion. The other 80% gets to be done by the politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs. Don't expect a combat soldier to become multi-skilled to the point where today he is involved in close quarter battle and killing or being killed and the next he is handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish.

an overly-simplified (bright line transition) from a denied (or at least contested) military environment to a permissive (non-contested) political environment where the "politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs" can operate in their normal fashion.

Truth is that the Political Struggle often must accompany the Military Struggle; and as the Military Struggle abates, the Political Struggle intensifies - unless, of course, the Military Struggle manages to sweep the board clean of everyone who supported the "insurgents" with military or political effort.

I'd suspect we are not really at odds (since we both seem to like Jack McCuen); but your use of "handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish" tends to rankle a bit. That may soundbite your views on current affairs; but it is not my view of how the political effort must be conducted (nor was it COL McCuen's).

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.There is lip service to one but there is no dedication to actually implementing the effort as, frankly, there is no real need for it to protect US interests. There are those here who wish one to be implemented but they're losing the argument. Actually, they lost it before it started. :wry:

Many of your suggestions are valid. Provided there is political will to do what's required and see it through. That is lacking in both the UK and the US (for good reason IMO). Lacking that will, your good suggestions, much less the bad ones, are not going to be implemented simply because at high levels no need to do so is seen. Nor is there adequate troop strength in the proper types of units to do it right. Tom Mancino's accurate post above shows how serious we are not... :mad:

One could say that committing troops to the operation under such restraints is immoral -- I'd just say it's stupid. Perhaps I'm too conditioned to watching the US do dumb things but I accept it as the price we pay for the way we operate and the many benefits that flow from that. I spent a number of years in various vacation spots fighting bugs, cold, heat and unfriendly locals. Many of those fights were unnecessary, a number were really dumb -- but that was what I got paid to do so I did it and well enough to be still be here pushing 80. The kids in the UK and US Armies in Afghanistan today are in the same boat. They're fighting for pay and each other; there is no cause, per se. That makes a difference. :(

The US has not been at War since 1945. The US Army has not been at war since 1945. The Nation and the Army have sent forces into combat many places since then but there has been no commitment of the nation or Army to a war. None. In WW II, we totally committed and spent over 36% of our GDP each year on the war. We only recently retired all that debt. No war since then has bitten out more than 4% (Korea), Viet Nam was only about 2% and the rest have been about 1% or less. We're willing to fight but we're also willing to do it half heartedly. Dumb but there you are...

Both nations field large hidebound and bureaucratic forces -- not just Armies -- that are slow to adapt and resist change. You're correct in that assessment but you can beat the drum for change all you wish and you'll just be wasting your time and pixels. Lacking a major crisis to break that trend, there will be little or no change in that condition. That's okay IMO, the resilience to cope is there if it becomes necessary. :cool:

All that is to say, again, you have some valid points but they are not ever going to be implemented for a variety of political and cultural reasons and in the absence of an existential war -- that latter makes a huge difference. Really huge...

So yes, the exit strategy is next up on the agenda -- has been since late 2003. The delay? In the western nations, domestic politics. Things in Af-Pak? Sort of a secondary concern but with really some minor concern -- and most of the emphasis -- on the latter nation, not so much on Afghanistan...

[jmm99]

than Ken and I (don't know about you, JMA), are the deciders - From this AM SWJBlog, Petraeus Scraps Plan to Secure Kandahar (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/07/petraeus-scraps-plan-to-secure/):


The International Herald Tribune (http://tribune.com.pk/story/30925/petraeus-scraps-mcchrystals-plan-to-secure-kandahar/) and Daily Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7907186/Gen-Petraeus-scraps-) are reporting this morning that General David Petraeus "has decided that a full-scale military encirclement and invasion of Kandahar was not an appropriate model to tackle the Taliban". Via the Daily Telegraph:

... Gen McChrystal had planned a summer conquest of the Taliban in Kandahar to reinvigorate the battle against the Taliban. But the operation has been repeatedly delayed by concerns that it would not adequately restore the confidence of city residents in the security forces.

Gen Petraeus is reported to believe that the operation must be a broad-ranging counter-insurgency campaign, involving more troops working with local militias. The plan he inherited was criticised for placing too much emphasis on targeted assassinations of key insurgent leaders and not enough on winning over local residents. Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said yesterday that the US-led strategy in southern Afghanistan was undergoing sweeping changes...

And so it goes as the National Command Authorities deal with exit strategies.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.

I'm still trying to figure out what the entrance strategy was.

I sometimes think we focus too much on trying to establish a perception that the existing government is legitimate or beneficial and ignore the perception of survivability. Even if people think the current government is superior to or more legitimate than those challenging it, they are likely to back the side they expect to win. Even those who nominally "support" our side are likely to be hedging their bets with equal "support" for the other side. They aren't trying to get the best or most legitimate government, they are trying to protect themselves from potentially fatal repercussions if they choose the side that eventually loses. We tend to assume that all people are seeking good and legitimate government, when in fact many are seeking to gain whatever advantage they can for themselves and their own immediate group while protecting themselves from negative outcomes. In much of the world "good government" is effectively defined as "bad government that benefits me and mine".


Where is the MacArthur? Where is the Patton? Where is the Roberts or Kitchener? Where is the Templer? Where is the Guderian? Where is the Allenby? Perhaps it is this absolute lack of inspired military leadership that is the undoing of the ISAF efforts in Afghanistan.

I suspect that the lack of inspired leadership is closely related to the lack of clear policy objectives. What's the goal? What's the desired end state? Nobody seems to know... and it's difficult to provide inspired leadership if you don't know where we're trying to go.


The first rule of thumb in Afghanistan, eradicate the outer menace before you turn the guns on yourself. Outside influence in the land of Roh is considered sacrilege and must at all costs be defended.

Hewad is detailed in Pashtunwali as defence of culture and land, the Coalition is viewed as the invader, once this has been settled they'll turn on themselves.

This I believe to be a quite accurate assessment of the "why don't the villagers turn on the Taliban" question... except that when the outsiders are gone I suspect they will turn on each other, not themselves.

[William F. Owen]

Counterinsurgency is becoming unpopular and is getting a bad name because IMHO the way it is being implemented in Afghanistan.
It's got a bad name because "COIN" is now a pseudo-science.

I said 6 month tours of the Brits are laughable.
Your opinion. That's not really a basis for discussion. What evidence are you showing that effectiveness increases given a 1 year tour

Not surprised that no alternatives to the Brit 6 month tours has been forthcoming. Just going with the flow and not rocking the boat is good career advice.
Actually a whole lot of discussion is on-going and has been for last 3 years.


Difficult as opposed to dangerous or risky... and yes it is true.
Sorry, but I cannot take seriously the idea that Regular Warfare against a competent opponent is any more difficult or dangerous chasing a bunch of men in sandals carrying AKs.
A bad decision in Regular warfare can loose you a unit. That makes it both far more difficult and far more dangerous.
Irregular warfare may seem less strategically decisive, but that is irrelevant to far greater difficulty and danger or regular formation level combat operations.

You need a specialised unit because certainly in the Brit Army the units come attached with their historical baggage on how they fight. under the subheading Regimental culture in Anthony King's Understanding the Helmand campaign (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf) he explains how in this case (Afghanistan) the regimental history of the British regiments deployed serves to be a drawback rather than than a benefit.
Rubbish. The Tony King paper is not good evidence, and it seems few here actually know what so-called "Regimental Culture" actually is!

The Brits are suffering in Helmand, yet they cling to a failed strategy and approach as if it were the Holy Grail.
I agree that the UK is suffering, and that the strategy is poor. - so why do you not talk about the strategy instead of drifting into area where you lack the knowledge to effectively discuss what is actually going on?

[William F. Owen]

The military takes care of 20% of the effort in COIN. To be successful you need to have a legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population and can begin to provide civil/police/paramilitary link between the government and the ISAF forces. Not being provided... so quite frankly there is no hope of success beyond the narrow confines of battlefield successes where the Taliban are stupid enough to stand and fight, which is no success other than a temporary one at best.
And now JMA turns into one of the "New-COIN" boys??

An armed rebellion is a 90% a military problem! = Armed force needs to be countered by armed force. If you don't defeat the men with guns, you loose! - not 20%, but 100%.

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in. - "legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population." All those things are for the men in suits - and all of it is political. The military can only set the conditions. No conditions, no suits.
Anyone here an Afghan politician? Silence?
Military force can put in place any policy it wishes. It's politically blind. How military force is applied should reflect the policy being set forth. Legitimacy is nothing to do with success. It's a liberal construct that ignores history. Cutting the hands of kids and stoning women IS LEGITIMATE for about 200 million people on the planet.
"We" the west just wish to force the Afghan people to accept out "our brand" of legitimacy.

This 80% political 20% military rubbish is "99%" of the problem. Military force sets military conditions. It sets forth the policy, by denying the opponent the means to set forth his, as in the opponent ceases to use military force. If the politicians cannot work it out, that is NOTHING to do with the efficacy of armed force.

[Fuchs]

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in.

And that should have happened in 2002.
The tragedy is that the non-combat aspect only got halfway due attention when the Taliban had their comeback.

The window of opportunity was 2002-2004, maybe into 2005 - the time when the wrong people focused on the wrong country.

The West may still defeat the Taliban, but the price will be unnecessarily and unacceptably high. It is already both simply because Afghanistan is extremely irrelevant and unnecessary, even for AQ.

[Bob's World]

And now JMA turns into one of the "New-COIN" boys??

An armed rebellion is a 90% a military problem! = Armed force needs to be countered by armed force. If you don't defeat the men with guns, you loose! - not 20%, but 100%.

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in. - "legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population." All those things are for the men in suits - and all of it is political. The military can only set the conditions. No conditions, no suits.
Anyone here an Afghan politician? Silence?
Military force can put in place any policy it wishes. It's politically blind. How military force is applied should reflect the policy being set forth. Legitimacy is nothing to do with success. It's a liberal construct that ignores history. Cutting the hands of kids and stoning women IS LEGITIMATE for about 200 million people on the planet.
"We" the west just wish to force the Afghan people to accept out "our brand" of legitimacy.

This 80% political 20% military rubbish is "99%" of the problem. Military force sets military conditions. It sets forth the policy, by denying the opponent the means to set forth his, as in the opponent ceases to use military force. If the politicians cannot work it out, that is NOTHING to do with the efficacy of armed force.

Is this then a "conservative construct" that does the same? I'm looking for examples of where military operations to defeat an insurgent movement actually defeated the insurgency as well.

Malaysia? One has to ask, did the military operations of the Brits set conditions for political success; or rather was it the military operations of the communist insurgents who set the conditions for independence and withdrawal of the illegitimate British Colonial government? Even though one group of combatants was defeated, insurgency is about the government and not the bands that rise up to challenge it. One band was defeated under one leader and one line of ideology. That is not the greater insurgency though. Insurgency is the perceptions of the populace as a whole, many who never even consider taking up arms directly, toward their system of governance. The actual resistance will manifest in many forms. To crush any one such manifestation and declare victory is naive at best and delusional.

The post WWII insurgencies in SEA were not about expanding communism, but rather about expelling colonialism.

Similarly, the Post Cold War insurgencies are not about expanding democracy in East Europe, or expanding Islamism in Africa and the Middle east; but rather about expelling overt and unwanted Soviet and Western influences respectively.


We need to evolve to a more sophisticated understanding of insurgencies. I can't get on board with what guys like Doc Nagl is selling, you can't buy off a populace in insurgency; but neither can I get on board with the position represented here, as you can't beat the desire for liberty out of a people either. Neither one makes any sense. Both are approaches rooted in ignoring changing what really needs changing, and then busting your butt to get the populace to stop complaining about it.

What history shows is that the populace may pause, but they will not stop.