COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 3

jmm99

07-27-2010, 02:48 AM

Again a note of thanks to Slap for the 1962 book "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology" (in 9 pdf parts, linked in my post here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=103726&postcount=16)), which takes us back to the Genesis of the present controversy - Counterinsurgency and its Discontents.

The following jpg image is from the 1962 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency An Anthology 01.pdf (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/217/2171701001a.pdf) (the file on my drive, originally at the link 2171701001a.pdf):

1162

The jpg quote above (the "new" inter-departmental definitions) are found in and explained in the link above as the 4 page Introduction (pdf pp. 7-10) written by Richard M. Leighton, Chairman of the ICAF Counterinsurgency Committee. I've attached a 2-page pdf (1962 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency An Anthology 01, 7-8.pdf), which has the key explanatory caveats - the forgetting of which may be some of today's problem.

The 1962 introduction of the "new" (according to the author) term "counter-insurgency" is self-explanatory. So also, the revised definition of "insurgency" and the definition of the new term "counter-insurgency", for US inter-departmental use.

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Turning now to some pedantic points.

As to the point that "insurgency" has centuries old validity in international law, consider Fr. insurger, "to revolt, to rebel, to rise" (Larousse); the source of our English "insurgent" and "insurgency", as well as our English "insurrection" (Oxford; both go back to Lat. insurgere, "to rise up"). The Lat. insurgere had two slightly different meanings (Hinds-Hayden): "to increase in power" as in Caesar paulatim insurgere, Tacitus; and "to rise up against" as in insurgere suis regnis, Ovid).

IMO: insurgency, insurrection, revolution, rebellion and rising are fundamentally cognate, although variations in meaning may be asserted by their variant users. The variations in meaning are based on the users' variant ideas - the magic, if any, lies in the supporting content in context, not in the buzzword used or misused.

Truth in Lending: The terms "insurgency, insurrection, revolution, rebellion and rising" do paint somewhat different mind pictures for me - no doubt based on how others have used those words in what I've read and how I've perceived their apparent meanings.

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If you are serious about making an argument about how the terms "insurgency" and "counter-insurgency" developed meanings in 1962 - and then further morphed over the last 48 years, the entire 1962 book "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology" is a must read.

To it, I'd add a number of manuals from 1951-1963 - which, if you are interested, are probably all still online (as .pdfs) and can be found by a bit of Googling).

These old (I'd say "vintage") manuals have much to commend themselves, as successors to and expanders of the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual.

1951 FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare.pdf
1955 FM 31-20 US Army Special Forces Group.pdf
1958 FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.pdf
1961 FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular Forces.pdf
1961 FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.pdf
1962 (rev 1964-65) FMFM 8-2 USMC Operations Against Guerrilla Units.pdf
1963 FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations.pdf
1963 FM 31-22 US Army Counterinsurgency Forces.pdf

Note that Counterinsurgency (as a title) enters the manuals in 1963.

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Another part of this topic is classification of "insurgencies". Back in 1993, our Steve Metz suggested that we would see two basic types, presented in the Summary of his short (29-page) article, The Future of Insurgency (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub344.pdf) (emphasis added by JMM):

Insurgency will persist even after the end of the cold war. But as insurgent strategists recognize the bankruptcy of old techniques, especially protracted, rural "people's war," they will innovate. It is vital for those interested in preventing or controlling insurgency to think creatively, speculate on the new forms that will emerge, and craft new frames of reference to serve as the foundation for strategy and doctrine.

The key to post-cold war insurgency is its psychological component. The greatest shortcoming of Third World states (including most of the former Soviet bloc) is their inability to meet the psychological needs of their populations, especially a sense of meaning during the stressful periods of rapid change associated with development. This shortcoming will generate frustration and discontent which can be used by insurgent strategists.

Two forms of insurgency are likely to dominate the post-cold war world. [U]Spiritual insurgency is the descendant of the cold war-era revolutionary insurgency. It will be driven by the problems of modernization, the search for meaning, and the pursuit of justice. The other form will be [U]commercial insurgency. This will be driven less by the desire for justice than wealth. Its psychological foundation is a warped translation of Western popular culture which equates wealth, personal meaning, and power.

The dominance of one of these two forms will vary from region to region. Latin America is likely to suffer more from continued and expanded commercial insurgency than from spiritual. Sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly prone to insurgency. Initially the spiritual form will be pervasive, with the potential for commercial insurgency to develop later. The likelihood of spiritual insurgency is also high in the Middle East (including Arab North Africa). The Asia/Pacific region and the former Soviet bloc will probably experience both spiritual and commercial insurgency.

IMO: This is a remarkable 4-paragraph analysis from 17 years ago, whose basic construct seems still valid to this armchair observer.

Steve "Roadkill" Metz may now have a different take on his 1993 BLUF. RSVP.

Regards

Mike

slapout9

07-27-2010, 05:05 AM

jmm99, the real beginning is in the table of contents.

1-Guerrilla warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas
2-Introduction to Counterinsurgency
3-Unconventional warfare

Article 1 really describes what is happening now. Guerrilla warfare in Underdeveloped areas not necessarily what we would call states.

Article 3 is by Frank Lindsay who was not only a theoretician but a SUCCESSFUL practitioner of UW. Lindsay has been rediscovered by SF and is the primary subject of the "Unconventional Warfare Leaders Handbook" that I posted just a while back. This was really astounding to me when I first read it because it has only been out a short time, but what is being rediscovered used to be the standard SF theory (7 steps from hell as I learned it) how it got lost I don't know but at least they found it again:wry:.

It also blends in nicely with the Question of Command theory by Mayor. Lindsay talks quite a bit about how selection of Guerrilla leaders Underground leaders and Axillary leaders are the key to victory and the Establishment of the future leadership of the new government.

Like I said we are not "Virgins writing a sex manual" we are "Sex therapist with amnesia" We know how to do it, we have just forgotten how.

slapout9

07-27-2010, 05:55 AM

I think there are just as many or more here who may over believe in government. Certainly the elite educated crew now in power has no qualms about expanding the role of government.

Dosen't matter if they are on the right or the left, they all went to the same Law School:rolleyes:

jmm99

07-27-2010, 06:28 AM

from Slap

jmm99, the real beginning is in the table of contents.

1-Guerrilla warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas
2-Introduction to Counterinsurgency
3-Unconventional warfare

The real beginning of the substance starts there. I was talking about the beginning of the terms ("insurgency" and "counter-insurgency") which some find offensive, used too much as buzzwords, etc.

I'd rather go with the substance myself, but some folks like to argue about what are akin to "legalisms".

Can't Google up much on Franklin Lindsay (something of a "Prince Charming" in 1946 when he was only 30) - OSS and CIA, but left for private sector.

Regards

Mike

Dayuhan

07-27-2010, 08:48 AM

Bob's World

07-27-2010, 10:37 AM

Just because something is older, louder, or more persistent does not also imply that it is more correct.

These 1962 inputs are a great addition to the debate on how we see these things now, as they help to clarify how we saw them then.

Just reading it as a lawyer, I would suggest that in addition to the definitions of "Insurgency" and "counterinsurgency" one would also have to have the definition of "Subversion" to have the full picture of what they mean by COIN.

The definition they give for insurgency describes insurgency in general, and then focuses in on what they call "subversive insurgency", which would apparently be a distinct subset from insurgency as a whole.

Then, the definition for COIN is specifically focused on subversive insurgency, which in turn suggest that other forms of insurgency are not addressed with COIN at all.

But to talk about two legs while ignoring the third leg on this problem is to miss perhaps the most critical aspect of all, and that is the leg made up of Unconventional Warfare, or UW. UW is the art of the third party who come into a country for reasons of his own to incite and promote subversive insurgency. This, of course, is what AQ is doing in so many communities across Northern Africa, the Middle East, and to a far lesser degree with far less success, South and South East Asia. (that last part should be a thread unto itself, as to why Muslim dominated populaces that have already resolved their issues with external colonial influences are largely immune to AQ's message, while those who have remained under such influences are so easily susceptible to the same. Again, Insurgency is about getting rid of some form of governance far more than it is about promoting some form of governance. Like in many relationships, the one you grab first on the rebound is often more transition than permanent. Mr./Miss "right now", rather than Mr./Miss "right.")

UW is not only critical in that it helps clear the fog of this crazy talk of "Terrorism" and "Counterterrorism" (note, the SOF community could completely drop CT from its mission list and not lose a single skill set or capability. That is a fact too often ignored and misunderstood. Just as "Terrorism" is a tactic and not a mission; so is "Counterterrorism" IMO).

An operation would be "Counter UW", but we don't have that operation on the books, so instead we focus on tactics rather than operations, and it results in a very tactical, Intel driven focus that is not helpful; in fact, it is a very dangerous focus as it leads us to see those who commit acts of Terrorism as the enemy, when in fact they may well be the party on the right side of the problem in many cases that we, rather than AQ, should be conducting UW with to have the best effects on bringing stability to these troubled regions.

This leads to the $60,000 question: Is our goal to bring stability to the region and thereby by promote our various Western interest there; or, is our goal to preserve the current governments that we have long relations with at any cost, and hope that we can somehow build stability around them?

I argue that we have taken on the latter of those two options, and that the Intel driven threat-focus of the CT tactical construct help drive us there; and has also led in turn to this perversion of COIN that presumes the maintaining of these current governments in power which arguably is the greatest cause of these many insurgencies in the first place.

By focusing on the goal of Stability and creating conditions that also support Western interests (we are not charities, this is serious, selfish business) We should probably argue far less about what is COIN and where do we do that operation; but rather on:

"Where do we counter the AQ UW operations; and where do we Co-opt them and conduct UW ourselves."

Now, there will be some governments who will be willing to get serious about understanding and addressing their shortcomings with their own populaces that make them vulnerable to UW to begin with. They can do this by targeting and reducing the level of insurgent potential in their populace (on the Jones Model I try to show this by the curve that moves up and to the right out of Phase 0 pre-insurgency, and into the realm of Phase I Insurgency). A populace deep in Phase 0 is largely immune to UW. One cannot "radicalize" or "Pied Piper" a satisfied populace into insurgency. To think so is to adopt classic "addict" or "victim" mentality, that places all blame for ones problems on some external bad actor, when in fact those bad actors merely took advantage of your own vulnerability.

This is getting too long, but this is important. I'll drill on this a bit at work this week, so please, feel free to weigh in.

Backwards Observer

07-27-2010, 10:56 AM

A coin campaign that seems relatively hard to find extensive information on is the PAVN effort in Cambodia. I do recall a brief interview a couple of years ago with a PAVN Colonel who said the most important thing was to fix the government. In this case, he meant the Cambodian government.

When I visited Hanoi in the late '90s, my cab driver, who "spoke American", told me he had been a sergeant in the PAVN and his company had taken heavy casualties. Before it became uncomfortable, he added with a smile, "In Cambodia." He went on to say the fighting there had been very bad.

I ran into him again in a coffee shop around the corner from the Hoa Binh Hotel, where I was staying. He told me that the survivors of his company had a reunion there every year. I asked, "Oh, you guys book the whole restaurant?" He said, "No, the reunion is at this table...and there is one stool left over!" The table seated four. Then he laughed, but his eyes bored straight into mine.

Dayuhan

07-27-2010, 12:33 PM

This leads to the $60,000 question: Is our goal to bring stability to the region and thereby by promote our various Western interest there; or, is our goal to preserve the current governments that we have long relations with at any cost, and hope that we can somehow build stability around them?

I'm not sure we're doing either. It seems to me that our post Cold War policies in the relevant areas (and arguably many of our Cold War policies) are less a pursuit of goals than an often incoherent backlash against real or perceived threats, with little thought for a desired end state.

I can't think of a single case post Cold War where we've fought to preserve a Middle East government we have long relations with. We didn't fight Gulf I to preserve Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, we fought it to prevent Saddam from seizing the Gulf oil supplies. Not an unreasonable response; that would have been a highly undesirable outcome.

Since then... certainly we're not fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan to preserve any allied government. In Iraq... well, I've never been entirely sure why we went into that fight, beyond the domestic political window of opportunity provided by 9/11. We went to Afghanistan because people who had attacked us were taking refuge there... again, not unreasonable, but I'm still not sure why we stayed or what we're trying to accomplish.

Where are we trying to "preserve the current governments that we have long relations with"? Are any of these governments threatened by insurgency? If not, where does COIN come into it?

I argue that we have taken on the latter of those two options, and that the Intel driven threat-focus of the CT tactical construct help drive us there; and has also led in turn to this perversion of COIN that presumes the maintaining of these current governments in power which arguably is the greatest cause of these many insurgencies in the first place.

The insurgencies we are fighting were not caused by our maintenance of governments in power, they were caused by our (delusional, IMO) idea that we could install governments in places where we removed governments we disliked.

By focusing on the goal of Stability and creating conditions that also support Western interests (we are not charities, this is serious, selfish business)

Where is there a government in the Middle East that supports western interests? I can't think of one, except to the extent that they perceive a common interest... in which case the motivating interest is theirs, not ours.

"Where do we counter the AQ UW operations; and where do we Co-opt them and conduct UW ourselves."

Are you proposing that we conduct UW operations against governments in the ME? If so, where? Unconventional war is still war, and making war against another government is not something to be undertaken lightly.

there will be some governments who will be willing to get serious about understanding and addressing their shortcomings with their own populaces that make them vulnerable to UW to begin with. They can do this by targeting and reducing the level of insurgent potential in their populace (on the Jones Model I try to show this by the curve that moves up and to the right out of Phase 0 pre-insurgency, and into the realm of Phase I Insurgency).

Possibly so, but how and when they do it is entirely their own business. Lecturing other governments on their own relationships with their populaces is something we've no right or reason to do, especially when the governments in question are not dependent on us. We generally don't know anything about it anyway, and in most cases they've little reason or inclination to listen to us. The populace isn't going to appreciate it either: in much of the world the fastest way to rally the populace behind an oppressive government is for Americans to criticize that government.

A populace deep in Phase 0 is largely immune to UW. One cannot "radicalize" or "Pied Piper" a satisfied populace into insurgency.

Very true... but it do us no good to assume that there must be an insurgent populace because the conditions in a country are those that we think ought to produce insurgency.

Red Rat

07-27-2010, 07:16 PM

I suggested the potential of raising specialised battalions along the lines of the US's Merrill’s Marauders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrill's_Marauders) of the past for permanent deployment in Afghanistan. Again the response to this concept was a predictable... its new, therefore strange, therefore frightening, and therefore too scary to be supported. The only objection that was raised was the theoretical threat of an increased incidence of PTSD. The UK has done this. The 'Helmandi Scouts' which has been in the field for at least 2 years. The objection to raising a UK regular unit was (as well as the possible risk of increased PTSD rates) mostly that in a limited war we are only allowed and able to do limited things!

A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban? Because the insurgents make themselves the dominant force in the community by co-opting or killing any rivals in the community. There is therefore no-one in a position to fight back. While the community may want to fight back, it might not be able to.

Red Rat

07-27-2010, 07:35 PM

I'm not sure we're doing either. It seems to me that our post Cold War policies in the relevant areas (and arguably many of our Cold War policies) are less a pursuit of goals than an often incoherent backlash against real or perceived threats, with little thought for a desired end state.

I am with Dayuhan on this. Higher command and higher authority does not mean, or even imply, a higher degree of thinking, analysis or rationale. Most governments are run like newspapers and tv news stations. They may start with an editorial bias (strategy) but they end up mostly being run by events. As Harold Macmillan (ex-UK Prime Minister) is reputed to have said when asked what he feared most as Prime Minister: 'Events, dear boy, events'. Events interfere with plans so governments tend to manage events in such a way that they hope it will enable them to get back to their plan :D

The insurgencies we are fighting were not caused by our maintenance of governments in power, they were caused by our (delusional, IMO) idea that we could install governments in places where we removed governments we disliked.

Because (IMHO) we seem to have conflated 'national interests' with 'human rights' and in order to look after our national interests we have to appear (at least) for domestic reasons to be making things better for the people in the places we are fighting - which probably explains why our strategy is so confused!

We also forgot that you have to spend to save, and both Afghanistan and Iraq went to 'economy of force' operations (across all the Lines of Operation) very early, again reinforcing my view that both are regarded as limited wars, with limited (and confused) objectives and very limited means allocated to them.

Dayuhan

07-27-2010, 09:34 PM

Because (IMHO) we seem to have conflated 'national interests' with 'human rights' and in order to look after our national interests we have to appear (at least) for domestic reasons to be making things better for the people in the places we are fighting - which probably explains why our strategy is so confused!

I suspect that you're right... the desire to appear benevolent and beneficial to those we've invaded requred us to install governments that our people and our allies (though not necessarily those being governed) could see as "good". I suspect that this had less to do with national interest than with self-perception, and the interest of parties in power!

slapout9

07-28-2010, 03:59 PM

I was talking about the beginning of the terms ("insurgency" and "counter-insurgency") which some find offensive, used too much as buzzwords, etc.

Regards

Mike

jmm99, Agree!!! when I found that document I new I had caught my man. I felt like I just solved one of the greatest crimes in history. I am a pretty good Cop if do say so myself:D So my job is done.... and now it is time for the Prosecution and Defense to take over. A note on the crime scene...it did not take place at any of the usual war colleges but the Industrial War College...the birthplace of Globalization;)

Bob's World

07-28-2010, 06:36 PM

AQ is conducting UW; so if we really wanted to bundle our operations wisely we would drop narrow tactical constructs such as "Counterterrorism" or inaccurate constructs for describing our foreign interventions, such as "Counterinsurgency."

The most appropriate umbrella for our post-9/11 operations would be one called "Counter Unconventional Warfare." Now, a couple of attempts at similar bundling have been offered, such as "Asymmetric Warfare" and "Irregular Warfare"; but the fact is that most all warfare waged wisely includes aspects that are either or both asymmetric or irregular, so those concepts, while popular, really don't help very much.

UW, however, is a specific operation, and similarly, while not existing in our doctrine currently, to Counter-UW is also a specific operation. Within a CounterUW program one would certainly conduct CT missions, and also do a great deal that would best be described as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), or perhaps Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).

This may seem like more irrelevant namesmanship, but in fact, it is really a logical simplification that allows us to finally break away from the irrelevant namesmanship that we have been engaging in for the past 9 years. To recognize that we are not waging a war against Terrorism; but that rather we are working to disrupt, prevent, contain, etc the efforts of a non-state entity to conduct UW to incite and foment insurgency among Muslim populaces across a wide expanse of the globe. That doing so requires much more than conducting CT against that UW agent, though there is certainly nothing wrong with a smart, tailored family of effective CT. That doing so requires much more that a feel-good COIN program that assumes as a going in position that we are conducting COIN ourselves, and therefore committed to preserving certain governments in power and helping them to defeat the insurgent elements of their own populaces.

By recognizing that I am countering AQ's UW program, I may realize that the best way to secure US national interests in some areas is for us to consider if we might want to usurp AQ as the champion of some oppressed populaces and perhaps take on the UW mission ourselves to best defuse the brewing instability that AQ is targeting. This would best be coupled with a diplomatic approach that gives these governments fair opportunity to heal themselves and evolve to work more effectively with their own populaces and the larger world community, or be prepared to face wrath of their own populace enabled and unleashed. Carrots and sticks work best when one holds one in each hand during the course of the conversation.

There is no such thing as Counter Unconventional Warfare though, and we suffer for that lack of that perspective. UW however, is alive and well, and AQ is a master at that skill. (US UW doctrine is a bit too mired in romantic perspectives of WWII France, and too kinetic as a whole considering the larger success of peaceful subversion over violent insurgency in history, but we can evolve to learn from AQ's successes, and add non-violent approaches as well as we outcompete AQ at their own game), but once we realize we need to Counter UW operations rather than Counter Terrorist tactics or Counter the nationalist insurgencies of others, we will, I believe, finally make the big turn toward a successful approach to this problem.

JMA

07-28-2010, 06:39 PM

The UK has done this. The 'Helmandi Scouts' which has been in the field for at least 2 years. The objection to raising a UK regular unit was (as well as the possible risk of increased PTSD rates) mostly that in a limited war we are only allowed and able to do limited things!

The Helmandi Scouts is a unit of locals? That's not what we (or at least I) are talking about. We are talking about how to best utilise foreign troops who are needed in country while the locals get their act together. Soldiers that can speak the language, understand the culture, know the terrain and climate and thereby negate the advantage the Taliban currently have.

All that said I do believe that instead of forming separate local units in lieu of what I advocate it is of value and often needed to bring in locals into such units as interpreters and trackers and the like. Perhaps over time these units can be indigenised, say over five or more years.

Now if the Brits had started out with this in 2005/6 then there would have been more options on the table.

I have a deep concern over these supposed PTSD rates. PTSD must surely come in degrees, yes? So if it seems to be inevitable than why spread it around the whole army? Why not concentrate it among a smaller group who can be followed up, treated (with X), etc etc. Now why did this PTSD seem to only blossom at current rates after around 1980? In the case of the UK we may be seeing a new angle on the theme of benefit scam. Seems a good angle to me. Do a quick 6 month tour in Helmand, then make sure everyone Knows you wake up in the middle of the night howling like a wolf and you get a disability pension for life with a free doses of X. What % of the claimed PTSD cases are for real?

jmm99

07-28-2010, 07:38 PM

Connections are always interesting; though they may mislead and take one down the primrose path to perdition.

The Industrial War College is formally the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_College_of_the_Armed_Forces), and used to be the Army Industrial College - from the Wiki:

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is a U.S. military educational institution tasked with preparing military officers and civilian government officials for leadership and executive positions in the field of national security. Established in 1924 in the aftermath of America’s mobilization difficulties in World War I, its predecessor, the Army Industrial College, focused on wartime procurement and mobilization procedures. Bernard M. Baruch, who was a prominent Wall Street speculator and Chairman of the War Industries Board, is regarded as one of the founding fathers.
.....
ICAF moved into a newly constructed facility, Eisenhower Hall, in 1960. During the next several years, a period that Baruch termed the Cold War, the character of ICAF changed dramatically. As the United States found itself increasingly involved in Vietnam, ICAF shifted to educating leaders to manage logistical resources in such conflicts, as opposed to focusing on national industrial mobilization.

Now, Bernard Baruch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_M._Baruch) was an interesting figure of my youth (he lived until he was 95 in 1965, when I was 23 :eek:), advisor of presidents from Wilson through Kennedy. Baruch was certainly linked to the Industrial College, and the Industrial College was linked to our 1962 "Counterinsurgency" anthology; but so what - Bernard Baruch did not author the book.

Slap, you've selected one Franklin Lindsay as the author with still-current impact on the subject. So, what do we know about him - actually quite a bit; but you have to go to the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Register of the Franklin Lindsay Papers (http://www.oac.cdlib.org/data/13030/z3/tf3s2002z3/files/tf3s2002z3.pdf), 1943-1994 (10 pages).

From that list of papers, we find Lindsay's brief bio (p.3 pdf):

1916, March 12 Born in Kenton, Ohio

1938 A.B., Stanford University

1938-1939 With Columbia Division, U.S. Steel Corp.

1940-1945 Served in the Army of the United States, to Lieutenant Colonel

1944-1945 With the Office of Strategic Services

1945 Chief, American Military Mission to Yugoslavia

1946 Executive assistant to Bernard Baruch, U.S. Delegation, U.N. Atomic Energy Commission

1947-1948 Consultant, House Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee)

1948-1949 Served as an American representative to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris

1949-1953 With the Central Intelligence Agency

1953-1956 With the Public Affairs Program, Ford Foundation

1954 Consultant, Second Hoover Commission

1956-1961 With McKinsey & Co., Inc.

1961-1962 Executive Vice President, Itek Corp.

1962-1975 President, Itek Corp.

1975- Chairman of the Board, Itek Corp.

In 1946, Lindsay was 30; and running in some pretty high-flying company as Bernard Baruch's Exec Asst. Lindsay's expertise was in the area of economic aid and FID.

Another interesting connection is the first author in the anthology, Walt Rostow (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Whitman_Rostow), DNSA to Kennedy and NSA to Johnson - but, over and above those mere positions, Rostow was the creator of this brand of economic theory:

Rostow was famous especially for writing the book The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto (1960) which became a classic text in several fields of social sciences.
...
Rostow developed the Rostovian take-off model of economic growth, one of the major historical models of economic growth. The model argues that economic modernization occurs in five basic stages of varying length—traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. This became one of the important concepts in the theory of modernization in the social evolutionism.

(from the Wiki) That model justified the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward insurgencies and their "cures".

Rostow was also OSS during WWII.

So, there are some interesting, connected figures in this story.

Cheers

Mike

jmm99

07-28-2010, 08:04 PM

An outline of your doctrine for Counter Unconventional Warfare would seem a very useful thing to post - both for future and historical references.

Can't agree more that AQ is waging Unconventional Warfare against us (some others IIRC say the same). And I have what is perhaps a unique view that Giap waged Unconventional Warfare against us in SVN (using our playbooks). If so, we ought to have waged Counter Unconventional Warfare vs the VC.

I was reading last nite this granddaddy of the vintage "COIN" manuals, 1951 FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Assets/ARSOF%20Reference%20Publications/ARSOF%20Reference%20Publications/Historical/FM%2031-21%2051.pdf), which is certainly based on WWII experiences. So, your comment ("US UW doctrine is a bit too mired in romantic perspectives of WWII France...") was both timely to me and humorous.

RSVP.

Mike

slapout9

07-28-2010, 10:46 PM

.

Slap, you've selected one Franklin Lindsay as the author with still-current impact on the subject.

Mike

No,Sanders and Rostow use the terms counterinsurgency.....Linday uses Unconventional Warfare which can be both Offensive and Defensive. The article pints out how UW was originally the concept for COIN(at least from his point of view),in his further writings he talks about how it can be used offensively (start an Insurgency on purpose).
I have often wondered how much influence (if any he had on Mcuen)Counter-Revolutionary Warfare. Which is one of the most sensible books ever written on the subject IMO.

Dayuhan

07-29-2010, 12:02 AM

By recognizing that I am countering AQ's UW program, I may realize that the best way to secure US national interests in some areas is for us to consider if we might want to usurp AQ as the champion of some oppressed populaces and perhaps take on the UW mission ourselves to best defuse the brewing instability that AQ is targeting. This would best be coupled with a diplomatic approach that gives these governments fair opportunity to heal themselves and evolve to work more effectively with their own populaces and the larger world community, or be prepared to face wrath of their own populace enabled and unleashed. Carrots and sticks work best when one holds one in each hand during the course of the conversation.

Where specifically do you propose to do this, and what's the specific goal or desired end state? Attempting to liberate someone else's populace from what you perceive as oppression sounds to me like an enterprise with abundant potential for unintended consequences, many of which could be less than pleasant.

There is no such thing as Counter Unconventional Warfare though, and we suffer for that lack of that perspective. UW however, is alive and well, and AQ is a master at that skill.

I don't see that AQ is conducting UW against us, though I suppose that would depend on how we define UW. I also don't see that AQ's UW efforts elsewhere have been terribly successful, other than the AQ/Taliban effort to gain control of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. AQ's attempt at UW in Saudi Arabia in the early/mid 90s was an abject failure: the bulk of the populace didn't buy the message and AQ was never able to generate a credible insurgency.

AQ's terrorist attacks on the US effectively derailed any moderate tendencies in the Taliban (you can imagine, for example, how AQ viewed the Taliban's sending a delegation to Texas in 97 to discuss pipeline opportunities) and successfully baited the US into giving AQ an opportunity for a new jihad. I suppose that might be considered successful UW, in that objectives were achieved. It remains to be seen how that will work out for them in the long run.

I don't see that any populace, anywhere can reasonably be said to perceive AQ as their liberator. If there was one, Osama would be cruising down the boulevard in a limo, not hiding in a hole somewhere on the AF/PAK frontier.

jmm99

07-29-2010, 02:06 AM

I wasn't making the argument that Rostow and Lindsay used the same terminology - and wasn't focusing on the differences or not in usage of "counterinsurgency" vice "unconventional warfare".

My proposition, which I believe is accurate, is that Rostow and Franklin were part of a common economic theory and methodology. That theory and methodology also was part of the Industrial College program (including the anthology). The overall program incorporated a worldview going back to Woodrew Wilson and Bernard Baruch - and extending into the Kennedy-Johnson administration. No more than that.

Agreed on McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - BTW: the magic is not in the title; the magic resides (where it exists) in the content.

Cheers

Mike

jmm99

07-29-2010, 02:58 AM

SOW = Special Operations Warfare; UW = Unconventional Warfare.

Here are the doctrinal references supporting the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare, based on Robert Martinage, Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities (http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf) (CSBA 17 Nov 2008), Chapter 1. A Primer on Special Operations Forces, pp.28-30 (pdf).

Martinage sums each area with doctrinal refs. Brief JMM comments re: AQ after the quotes.

The primary concept begins with the DoD definition of "special operations":

The Department of Defense defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”[13] They differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”[14]

13. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 516. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 1-02.

14. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 517.

Since AQ is a near-global pariah, its operations must of necessity occur in "hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments".

More specifically, SOF are currently organized, trained, and equipped to conduct nine core tasks, starting with Civil Affairs (CA).

> Civil Affairs (CA): CA missions create a link between the commander and the local population or government by providing key social and governmental services when the local government cannot; by keeping civilians safely away from combat operations; by establishing programs to build trust between the US military forces and the local population; and by supporting information operations.[15]

15. Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, p. II-2. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 3-57.1

CA- It is well to remember that UBL was primarily a civil affairs officer (engineer) vs the SovComs in Astan.

> Counterproliferation (CP): CP missions are offensive actions to“locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”[16] Counterproliferation includes actions taken to prevent the development or proliferation of WMD.

16. Joint Pub 3-57.1., p. II-10.

CP- AQ, so far mostly unsuccessfully, has a tasked mission to obtain WMD. This is one of two AQ special operations (the other is CT) where their end goal is the reverse of our misson - but still a special operation (albeit, in our eyes, perverted)

> Counterterrorism (CT): CT missions are offensive actions to “prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism.”[17] They include intelligence operations; attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures; hostage rescue; recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations; and non-kinetic activities such as information and psychological operations designed to decrease the influence of terrorist groups and their ideologies.

17. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 131.

CT- Another example of an AQ special operation that is the reverse of our mission.

> Direct Action (DA ): DA missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets of strategic or operational significance, employing specialized military capabilities. Direct action differs from conventional raids by the value of the target, the politically sensitive or hostile nature of the environment, and the need for highly discriminatory applications of force.[18]

18. Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-4. See also Joint Pub 1-02, p. 161.

DA- AQ's direct actions include 9/11.

> Foreign Internal Defense (FID ): FID missions build the capacity of partner nations to provide for their own internal security. SOF’s primary contribution to FID is to organize, train, advise and assist host-nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. It includes SOF support to any programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.[19]

19. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 214 .

FID- AQ does it (not for nations, but for groups) - see UW below.

Here next is a twofer:

> Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting the joint force’s information capabilities.[20]

20. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 261.

> Psychological Operations (PSYO PS): Planned operations to convey selected information to foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to US interests. Typically, this is achieved through the dissemination of information by dedicated PSYOP units.[21]

21. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 44 ; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-11.

IO & PO- AQ does this well.

> Special Reconnaissance (SR): Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures not normally found in conventional forces.[22]

22. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 512; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-6.

SR- AQ also does this.

> Unconventional Warfare (UW): UW operations are conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, including: guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. While unconventional warfare is traditionally considered to be aimed at the destabilization or overthrow of a state, it can also be conducted against non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups. In that application, irregular forces can be controlled by US forces directly in permissive or semi-permissive environments, and indirectly in hostile or politically sensitive areas.[23]

23. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare; and Joint Pub 1-02, p. 572.

UW- Since most everything that AQ does takes place in denied areas, AQ can be said to be waging unconventional warfare covering a larger scope in activities than our UW definition. More to our stricter definition, AQ supports larger groups (insurgencies), smaller groups (e.g., Madrid and London train bombings), and even individuals where the support is indirect and moral only (MAJ Hasan), located in what to AQ is "enemy territory".

That's my best shot (doctrinal and legal) at explaining the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare. I expect that COL Jones can expound, expand and explain his concept in his own terms.

Regards

Mike

PS - to Da Mods. Should this discussion re: the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare, be in a separate thread ? It starts with Bob's World post #63 (interspersed after that with unrelated posts).

slapout9

07-29-2010, 03:25 AM

I wasn't making the argument that Rostow and Lindsay used the same terminology - and wasn't focusing on the differences or not in usage of "counterinsurgency" vice "unconventional warfare".

Mike

jmm99,I was focusing on that, because I think there was a difference of opinion just can't prove it. Lindsay means UW will always involve a 3rd outside party or maybe more, I don't believe the other two necessarily meant that....but like I say that is my opinion.

Your other connections are revealing to say the least but I can't say I was surprised to find a former Wall Street Banker in the bunch.;)

jmm99

07-29-2010, 03:55 AM

but after reading through both of them (Rostow & Lindsay) again, I think they may have been just dealing with different aspects of the same big problem they saw - communist revolutions in developing countries. But, it's fuzzy in places.

What Rostow was very clear about was the centrality to the Kennedy administration of economics in this process. Here is a snip:

1168

This is a remarkable statement when you consider exactly what the US then or now would be biting off by following it to the letter. Ir is akin to a few parts of President Kennedy's inaguration speech.

Ken White has suggested that economics was the key to Kennedy-Johnson involvement in Vietnam. I'd like to see the full presentation of the proposition, which would be consistent with initiation of a lot of wars (done for economic reasons).

Regards

Mike

Ken White

07-29-2010, 04:41 AM

Not ignorance, stupidity. That foolishness still guides too much US Foreign policy. Bob's World has frequently mentioned that the 'cold war' mentality needs to go -- he is for some reason reluctant to acknowledge its origin, perhaps because to many in SF Kennedy is a Saint because he gave 'em the Green Beret. Having been there at the time, I can truthfully say most of us thought it no big deal -- but the showboats sure loved it. :wry:

The cold war mentality does still exist and should be retired but so to does that "America has a responsibility..." charade need to go...

Rostow and others of the Kennedy Admin did a tremendous amount of damage to the US and it has been particularly pernicious and long lasting. Kennedy has a lot to answer for. Almost as much as Johnson.

William F. Owen

07-29-2010, 05:15 AM

Soldiers that can speak the language, understand the culture, know the terrain and climate and thereby negate the advantage the Taliban currently have.
Why? None of those things will actually negate any advantage. All of those things are why you have military intelligence.
What area(size) of ground do you think anyone actually knows "well enough" to negate a military advantage? 100 sq Km? 1,000?

I advocate it is of value and often needed to bring in locals into such units as interpreters and trackers and the like. Perhaps over time these units can be indigenised, say over five or more years.
So indigenous support groups? Far more sensible - as the UK has often historically done. Even in Ulster a lot of good info came from UDR guys who had grown up in the boarder areas.

I have a deep concern over these supposed PTSD rates. PTSD must surely come in degrees, yes?
Why deep concerns? Sure, PTSD comes in degrees. So what? Some folks who have it, don't know it.

So if it seems to be inevitable than why spread it around the whole army? Why not concentrate it among a smaller group who can be followed up, treated (with X), etc etc.
So have an Army and then only use a very small part of it? Why? Any unit that fights in any war or conducts any combat operations will suffer from PTSD casualties. One of the worst cases of PTSD I have ever personally encountered was a former member of RLI.

Now why did this PTSD seem to only blossom at current rates after around 1980? In the case of the UK we may be seeing a new angle on the theme of benefit scam.
I grew up with a whole bunch of men with sever PTSD from WW2. The issue is that it really only became "talked about," in the 1980's. Anyone who had ever spent time in or around the military knew it existed.
Yes a very small percentage of dishonest men might try and commit fraud, but a couple of meetings with a doctor experienced in treating PTSD should uncover that very quickly.

I am by no means an expert, but as explained to me, PTSD is a "wound." Identified and treated the negative effects can be greatly mitigated. Keep "wounding" someone - prolonged and continuous exposure to operations- and you prejudice the chances of their making a full recovery or being "wounded again."
I would also reference the advice from a member of this board, who pointed out that there is a huge difference between actual PTSD and merely the social problems of "re-adjusting" to being "back in the world."

Bob's World

07-29-2010, 10:03 AM

First, I think it is critical not to get mired in debates over ever-morphing definitions that have been applied to a large family of missions and operations generally associated with the condition of insurgency and the employment of Special Operations Forces or irregular/guerrilla forces to shape political outcomes, so I will keep to larger concepts that may overlap or ignore some historic or even current uses of terminology.

(In fact, one would almost wonder if there was an AQ deception campaign designed specifically to create confusion and resultant inaction or inappropriate action going on with our chasing of an elusive answer to how best to describe and thereby shape our response to what we face. They aren't that crafty, but I'm sure a couple of them have taken credit on their OER support forms...)

So, the US was dragged into a "War on Terrorism" after being the target of a series of terrorist attacks. Though not fully satisfying, we set out in response to these attacks with a broad "Counterterrorism" campaign. Tactics met with Tactics.

Over time, we came to realize that such a narrow approach really wasn't appropriate, and as our disruption of Iraq governance and occupation of that long oppressed country was resulting in a wide range of organizations rising up in a mix of separatist, revolutionary, and resistance insurgencies; in addition to AQ riding to the sounds of our guns there and expanding their UW operations to Iraq proper, as well as imploring nationalist insurgent groups they were already engaging with around the Muslim community to send fighters there to further engage the Western governments that are widely perceived as supporting the governments they were in insurgency against back home; we shifted to a more comprehensive approach and called it "Counterinsurgency." (Phew...a whole book in one sentence, sorry)

Insurgency and COIN are much more operations than the tactics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism are, but we co-opted and shaped a new family of COIN doctrine that was (logically) heavily influenced by our experience in Iraq, and also by our continuing challenge of dealing with AQ on a global level. This led to mindsets of a need to sustain the status quo of governance in those countries where AQ was conducting UW operations to motivate and facilitate insurgent movements to challenge the same. In so doing, we morphed to a perspective that successful operations for the US were ones that "defeated" the insurgency, as measured by sustaining the current government. We picked a side. If AQ was for change of governance, we were for the sustaining of governance. This is the slippery slope. Insurgencies do not happen unless the conditions for insurgency exist first. "Ideology" and "Radicalization" do not cause insurgency, they are just tools of insurgent leaders and UW leaders to get things going in the direction they want them to go. We were so focused on the sizzle that we ignored the steak.

So, then seeing ourselves as the COIN force in the foreign insurgencies (both the full blown ones in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines; and the lower level ones like Yemen, Somalia, etc) we came to measure our own success by how well we sustained the current governments. This led to expansion of programs designed to build capacity of forces designed specifically to go after these insurgent forces, and also development programs to attempt to bolster populaces to support the government rather than the insurgency, and was loosely supported with a very Western-centric ideological campaign aimed at these failing governments promoting specific forms of governance used in the West currently ("Democracy") and current values held in the West ("universal values") as cure-alls that these cultures must adopt.

We lost sight of the big picture as we dove deeper into tactical perspectives that we were in turn morphing as we went.

The big picture is that we were attacked and needed to clearly and decisively avenge that attack and punish those who attacked us (CT is very good for this, regime change not so much); and that we had a broad and diverse family of nationalist resistance movements going on in the regions of the world where Islam is the prevalent religion, and not coincidentally, where there are still the greatest degree of residual colonial/western influence and residual effects (borders, forms of government, manning of government, etc) in place being engaged by this same actor, AQ, in a savvy UW campaign to encourage people rise up at home to throw this external burden off. The first pissed us off, the latter threatened to disrupt relationships that we saw as essential to sustaining critical national interests for energy, freedom of movement and security and commerce. Those nations were all too happy to blame their problems with internal security matters on outside influencers as well, resulting in an Intel-driven bundling of distinct nationalist movements under the flag of the AQ UW force and a concerted effort to preserve these threatened governments through a broad program of development, security and governance under a new broad banner of "COIN" that presumed success in the sustainment of the status quo.

Isn't the real goal still revenge against and punishment of AQ; coupled with a reestablishment of stability in regions where critical interests are currently at risk?

COIN sucked us into the role of defeating insurgency and preserving government. That is the role for a government faced with insurgency, not for a government helping another with their insurgency. We got too mired in the problem and lost perspective.

Countering AQ's UW campaign allows us to back up and take a more holistic and yes, Ms Flournoy, "pragmatic" approach. It allows us to:

1. Design and execute a "silent but deadly" CT program at AQ proper (not those who are actually nationalists just wearing AQ T-shirts currently), going after critical nodes of their network around the globe. This is a supporting effort that will not solve the problem (others will replace them in time if the problems that gave rise to them are not addressed), but will send others a clear message, make our own populaces feel better, and disrupt the current UW operations.

2. Drop the COIN mantra. The nations where these subversive movements and insurgencies are growing need to conduct COIN, but our role is to seek a stability that supports our long-term national interests. Picking sides is risky, and these governments need to clearly understand that we are on the side of stability, and not on the side of any particular government. This is also more genuine, as the side we are then clearly on is our own. This facilitates our ability to sit-down with and discuss the challenges to stability with all of the parties involved. Insurgencies happen for a reason, we should be focused on the efforts to get after those reasons, not the efforts to get after those who rise up because of those reasons.

3. Freed from the idea that sustaining the status quo is success, we can look for more creative answers achieving a success defined by stability and national interests. In some places it may well be entirely appropriate to those new ends to supplant AQ as the champion of the people. This does not immediately mean dive into the business of using UW to drive violent insurgency, but to rather take advantage of our position within the law to seek other options to drive change. Not being clearly on the side of the existing government allows more flexibility in seeking options. It also takes away the security blanket that many leaders have clung to to act with impunity toward their own people.

4. Such an approach would allow us to stop demanding that our allies subjugate their own national interests in favor of US national interests. This is an approach that is wearing thin, and the current tact rooted in preserving some questionable governments around the globe is quite naturally creating residual instability in many of the diasporah populaces in these same allied nations. While this is highlighting that some of these allies need to do a better job of COIN at home in ensuring that their entire populace feels included in good governance, current approaches are putting unneccessary pressures on fragile systems. By allowing our allies to engage in manners that THEY see as best promoting stability in pursuit of THEIR national interests we could relieve these pressures and bundle such operations under a comprehensive counterUW campaign

4. Oh, and not least, such an approach would allow us to stop calling Iraq and Afghanistan "wars." Wars come with huge burdens for major powers, and a major change of strategic perspective allows us to drop a term that never should have been applied to begin with. These are merely two of dozens of AORs where we are conducting a wide and diverse program of tailored operations in the pursuit of stability, all under an umbrella of countering the UW campaign of AQ.

Bob's World

07-29-2010, 10:22 AM

As an aside, from wiki on "Pragmatism" (highlights added by me):

"The primacy of practice
The pragmatist proceeds from the basic premise that the human capability of theorizing is integral to intelligent practice. Theory and practice are not separate spheres; rather, theories and distinctions are tools or maps for finding our way in the world. As John Dewey put it, there is no question of theory versus practice but rather of intelligent practice versus uninformed, stupid practice and noted in a conversation with William Pepperell Montague that "[h]is effort had not been to practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice". (Quoted in Eldridge 1998, p. 5) Theory is an abstraction from direct experience and ultimately must return to inform experience in turn. Thus an organism navigating his or her environment is the grounds for pragmatist inquiry."

Our current practice is lacking in a certain intellectual rigor regarding the nature of insurgency in general, as well as the nature of AQ and their operations. A UW lens helps to clarify that nature in a way that the Terrorist lens does not.

Steve the Planner

07-29-2010, 03:15 PM

Bob:

Sounds like you have properly described COIN as one of the many tools in a civilian policeman's tool belt---a radio, Mace, a billy club, a gun, a pad and pencil, etc...

On some calls, you use on, on some calls, another, and others, none. Sometimes the best weapon is presence, some times its talking, sometimes its throwing the bad guy into the back of the squad car, and in very, very rare instances, it is drawing your weapon.

None of that sounds like WAR.

In the background, though, are specialized actors like DEA, SWAT Teams, FBI anti-terrorist teams, etc... that, to an extent, help to shape the environment by providing specialized tools and tactics for specialized problems not consistent with the routine beat cop's tools.

In another link, Entropy was explaining the ratio of 30,000 Afghan villages to the deployed troops available for "presence" patrolling.

Reminded me of the years I spent in and around the Hof Gap watching Russian radio trucks cruising through East German villages to make sure their TV antennas were pointed East, and not West.

If Talib gunmen are the TV signals invading the local village space, it is pretty hard to believe that a handful of unarmed old guys in a small village are really going to be able to fend off the signal, and the US "radio" truck (the infrequent "presence patrols" wandering through are not adequate to shape or alter the environment.

Sometimes, all the militareze can confuse the reality of the entire problem, when the practical problems are somewhere else.

Funny juxtaposition in this thread of the relationship between personal PTSD, and our national response to 9/11.

Anybody familiar with PTSD knows it is a very real and serious "wound," or injury, and is not just battle related. So, how much did our civilian leadership's response reflect, perhaps, their own personal PTSD in response to 9/11. And this whole "military" response (GWOT) got tangled up in that?

What's the best therapy, and how do we intellectualize the practical problems ?

Bob's World

07-29-2010, 03:53 PM

"None of that sounds like WAR."

America is a nation at peace. Just look outside your window. Yes, our military is certainly in harm's way, and will continue to be so, but describing such engagements as "war" creates unneeded strategic risks for our nation; and approaches that are much less "warlike" on their face may well be more appropriate for promoting long-term success as well.

But first we must be able to step back and reframe the problem. (This is actually what Operational Design is supposed to do for you).

Red Rat

07-29-2010, 07:26 PM

First, I think it is critical not to get mired in debates over ever-morphing definitions that have been applied to a large family of missions and operations generally associated with the condition of insurgency and the employment of Special Operations Forces or irregular/guerrilla forces to shape political outcomes, so I will keep to larger concepts that may overlap or ignore some historic or even current uses of terminology.

(In fact, one would almost wonder if there was an AQ deception campaign designed specifically to create confusion and resultant inaction or inappropriate action going on with our chasing of an elusive answer to how best to describe and thereby shape our response to what we face. They aren't that crafty, but I'm sure a couple of them have taken credit on their OER support forms...)

'debates over ever-morphing definitions' are wont to lead to violent agreements, disagreements and confusion. There could be a whole thread here as we try and come up with common terms and definitions so that we can communicate with each other more accurately. Some disagreements over terminology are a symptom of fundamental differences in philosophy and perception of a problem, most are a symptom of lack of thought and analysis.

So, the US was dragged into a "War on Terrorism" after being the target of a series of terrorist attacks. Though not fully satisfying, we set out in response to these attacks with a broad "Counterterrorism" campaign. Tactics met with Tactics.

Disagree. AQ's strategy was to try and provoke a general conflict between the West and the Umma through an attack that was so provocotive that it would have to be responded to. In responding we would energise and radicalise the Umma. We (the West) responded with a strategy that sought to destroy AQ safe havens (Afghanistan) and then (in invading Iraq) we thought we could install an arc of western liberal democracies in the Middle East (Iraq, then Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran). We would defeat radical Islam by enabling Islamic countries to adopt a western liberal style of Islam. We met strategy with strategy. Both strategies were inherently flawed in that both overestimated the strength of belief in their cause. AQ expected more people to turn against the West more violently, the West expected the Middle East to want to become liberal western democracies. The flaw was brought about because both sides saw their perspective as the 'right' perspective and discounted that there are a number of equally valid perpectives. The AQ analysis was probably more right then ours in that it did provoke the west (more so in the invasion of Iraq then it expected) and it did provoke a rise in jihadist fervour and action - but not as wide as it had hoped for.

Over time, we came to realize that such a narrow approach really wasn't appropriate, and as our disruption of Iraq governance and occupation of that long oppressed country was resulting in a wide range of organizations rising up in a mix of separatist, revolutionary, and resistance insurgencies; in addition to AQ riding to the sounds of our guns there and expanding their UW operations to Iraq proper, as well as imploring nationalist insurgent groups they were already engaging with around the Muslim community to send fighters there to further engage the Western governments that are widely perceived as supporting the governments they were in insurgency against back home; we shifted to a more comprehensive approach and called it "Counterinsurgency." (Phew...a whole book in one sentence, sorry)

Insurgency and COIN are much more operations than the tactics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism are, but we co-opted and shaped a new family of COIN doctrine that was (logically) heavily influenced by our experience in Iraq, and also by our continuing challenge of dealing with AQ on a global level. This led to mindsets of a need to sustain the status quo of governance in those countries where AQ was conducting UW operations to motivate and facilitate insurgent movements to challenge the same. In so doing, we morphed to a perspective that successful operations for the US were ones that "defeated" the insurgency, as measured by sustaining the current government. We picked a side. If AQ was for change of governance, we were for the sustaining of governance. This is the slippery slope. Insurgencies do not happen unless the conditions for insurgency exist first. "Ideology" and "Radicalization" do not cause insurgency, they are just tools of insurgent leaders and UW leaders to get things going in the direction they want them to go. We were so focused on the sizzle that we ignored the steak.

The 'enemy of my enemy is my friend', except sometimes we do not want to get involved in the argument and sometimes the 'enemy of my enemy' is wrong.

So, then seeing ourselves as the COIN force in the foreign insurgencies (both the full blown ones in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines; and the lower level ones like Yemen, Somalia, etc) we came to measure our own success by how well we sustained the current governments. This led to expansion of programs designed to build capacity of forces designed specifically to go after these insurgent forces, and also development programs to attempt to bolster populaces to support the government rather than the insurgency, and was loosely supported with a very Western-centric ideological campaign aimed at these failing governments promoting specific forms of governance used in the West currently ("Democracy") and current values held in the West ("universal values") as cure-alls that these cultures must adopt.

Agree.

We lost sight of the big picture as we dove deeper into tactical perspectives that we were in turn morphing as we went.

I think we fundamentally misappreciated the threat. We tried to whip it up as an existentialist threat to our way of life. In terms of analysing the threat from AQ and co they had Intent, Capability and Opportunity to attack us, but never the capability or opportunity to provide an existential threat.

The big picture is that we were attacked and needed to clearly and decisively avenge that attack and punish those who attacked us (CT is very good for this, regime change not so much); and that we had a broad and diverse family of nationalist resistance movements going on in the regions of the world where Islam is the prevalent religion, and not coincidentally, where there are still the greatest degree of residual colonial/western influence and residual effects (borders, forms of government, manning of government, etc) in place being engaged by this same actor, AQ, in a savvy UW campaign to encourage people rise up at home to throw this external burden off. The first pissed us off, the latter threatened to disrupt relationships that we saw as essential to sustaining critical national interests for energy, freedom of movement and security and commerce. Those nations were all too happy to blame their problems with internal security matters on outside influencers as well, resulting in an Intel-driven bundling of distinct nationalist movements under the flag of the AQ UW force and a concerted effort to preserve these threatened governments through a broad program of development, security and governance under a new broad banner of "COIN" that presumed success in the sustainment of the status quo.

Isn't the real goal still revenge against and punishment of AQ; coupled with a reestablishment of stability in regions where critical interests are currently at risk?

Quite possibly, but it ignores the factor that domestic politics and attitudes play. We also have to be seen to be improving things, preferably in a western liberal vein.

COIN sucked us into the role of defeating insurgency and preserving government. That is the role for a government faced with insurgency, not for a government helping another with their insurgency. We got too mired in the problem and lost perspective.

Countering AQ's UW campaign allows us to back up and take a more holistic and yes, Ms Flournoy, "pragmatic" approach. It allows us to:

1. Design and execute a "silent but deadly" CT program at AQ proper (not those who are actually nationalists just wearing AQ T-shirts currently), going after critical nodes of their network around the globe.

2. Drop the COIN mantra. The nations where these subversive movements and insurgencies are growing need to conduct COIN, but our role is to seek a stability that supports our long-term national interests.

3. Freed from the idea that sustaining the status quo is success, we can look for more creative answers achieving a success defined by stability and national interests.

4. Such an approach would allow us to stop demanding that our allies subjugate their own national interests in favor of US national interests.

5. Oh, and not least, such an approach would allow us to stop calling Iraq and Afghanistan "wars."

Agree to all your 5 points raised. But I suspect that in the times we are living and the need for international consensus these would prove difficult to implement. The nature of conflict reflects the nature of the society waging it and in the western case we now seem to be less hard nosed, more idealistic and the rights of all individuals appear equal, which makes it difficult to carry out your first 4 points if they are seen to be inimicable to individual rights.

Steve the Planner

07-29-2010, 10:00 PM

Rat: Love the term: Misappreciated (Touche!)

Bob: Since November 2009, I was very concerned that we were throwing the wrong tool at the problem.

The problem is the government and its leaders. Corruption, corruption and corruption, as Gen. Petreaus is now focusing on like a laser, are the three main problems.

The weak spot, and what drives the corruption, is a failed and failing civilian strategy and toolkit. Not to discredit the civs in the field enduring a lot to TRY to do something, but the big picture, structure and organization is broken---and must be fixed to get started.

I was very sad to read the following from a recent Christian Science Monitor Report about US AID failures. Didn't we know this a while ago? Why hasn;t it been fixed?

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0728/Afghanistan-war-How-USAID-loses-hearts-and-minds

Steve

Dayuhan

07-29-2010, 10:26 PM

Off to go paddling in a few minutes, so I'll spare the dissertation and focus on one point...

In some places it may well be entirely appropriate to those new ends to supplant AQ as the champion of the people. This does not immediately mean dive into the business of using UW to drive violent insurgency, but to rather take advantage of our position within the law to seek other options to drive change.

Is there a place in the world where AQ is "the champuion of the people"? I don't know of one. Thee are a lot of people in the Muslim world who are absolutely delighted to see AQ fighting the invading infidel someplace far away, but I don't see any particular enthusiasm in most places for an AQ-style power change at home.

I'd also question whether it's realistically possible for the US to don the mantle of popular champion anywhere in the Muslim world. The US is not widely trusted thereabouts, and conspiracy theories are often taken for granted. No matter what we say or do, any US involvement is going to be perceived as an underhanded attempt to seize control. It's not an environment where populaces want us to play an active role.

Criticizing governments in the ME does not win us points with the populace. Even people who despise their own governments will defend them against US criticism: it's not seen as "standing up for the people", it's seen as disrespect for the nation and the culture.

Realistically, what options "within the law" do we have to mess with the domestic policies of other states? Are those waters we really want to be diving into?

For Steve, re this...

The problem is the government and its leaders. Corruption, corruption and corruption, as Gen. Petreaus is now focusing on like a laser, are the three main problems.

The weak spot, and what drives the corruption, is a failed and failing civilian strategy and toolkit. Not to discredit the civs in the field enduring a lot to TRY to do something, but the big picture, structure and organization is broken---and must be fixed to get started.

Again, we're coming up against the limits of our capacity to direct and influence governance in another country. We cannot clone ourselves, nor can we reasonably expect governments we install to simply function as we would like. We cannot "fixx" Afghanistan; we can't govern the place ourselves and any government we install will govern their way, not ours.

JMA

07-30-2010, 10:55 AM

Why deep concerns? Sure, PTSD comes in degrees. So what? Some folks who have it, don't know it.

By degrees I mean whether to the extent of it being debilitating. Minor effects of PTSD can be managed personally, or through the family without the need for any medical care. Then we see the totally debilitating condition which is what my grandfathers generation used to call being "shell shocked". So there we have a 1 and a 10 on the scale. So what about all the 2s to the 9s?

So when I read that 30% of Vietnam veterans suffered from PTSD I ask to what degree.

So if they don't know that they have it do they really have a problem?

So have an Army and then only use a very small part of it? Why? Any unit that fights in any war or conducts any combat operations will suffer from PTSD casualties. One of the worst cases of PTSD I have ever personally encountered was a former member of RLI.

Use only enough of the army who are specialised in that form of warfare to do the job. Leave the mechanised forces out of it to prepare for the next war where their skills will be required.

If this is such a big thing then why not consider raising the equivalent of the French Foreign Legion to do the "dirty work"?

I learn that PTSD can be triggered by one single incident. Who develops it seems to vary from one individual to the next.

The RLI (my regiment) is an interesting case study in this matter.

We understood the build up of combat anxiety which we interpreted as knowing that one would be in combat tomorrow and the next day and the day after that. That creates a fear of the unknown and is probably IMHO more difficult to handle. This opposed to dealing with something that happened in the past. Be it an hour ago, a day ago, a week ago or a month ago.

No doubt some RLI veterans will have some issues. We constantly ask ourselves whether some people had drink and drug problems before they joined the army and whether some had behavioural problems before they joined the army and was there some history of domestic violence before they joined the army. And why is the prevalence of alcoholism not being considered as the rates in the US (http://alcoholism.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=alcoholism&cdn=health&tm=35&f=10&su=p284.9.336.ip_p736.9.336.ip_&tt=2&bt=0&bts=0&zu=http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/Resources/DatabaseResources/QuickFacts/AlcoholDependence/abusdep1.htm) are reported to be around 8-9% for the age group 18-44?

I have seen nothing in the PTSD stats that differentiates between professional soldiers and conscripts and reservists. I believe we need to establish if there is a difference.

Further I would like to see a study follow the 3 Para guys trapped in that Beau Geste fort in Helmand (in 2006/7?) and in constant combat for 50 odd days and see what develops there.

I grew up with a whole bunch of men with sever PTSD from WW2. The issue is that it really only became "talked about," in the 1980's. Anyone who had ever spent time in or around the military knew it existed.
Yes a very small percentage of dishonest men might try and commit fraud, but a couple of meetings with a doctor experienced in treating PTSD should uncover that very quickly.

Existed yes. Shell shocked people were known and sympathised with... but at a rate of 30% of all combatants?

I am by no means an expert, but as explained to me, PTSD is a "wound." Identified and treated the negative effects can be greatly mitigated. Keep "wounding" someone - prolonged and continuous exposure to operations- and you prejudice the chances of their making a full recovery or being "wounded again."

The way to deal with this then is to establish who are most susceptible to PTSD (and alcoholism and anti social behaviour) and screen them out of combat jobs. Then introduce some psychological preparation before these soldiers get into combat situations to allow them to handle the situations they find themselves in psychologically. In other words be professional and be proactive.

I would also reference the advice from a member of this board, who pointed out that there is a huge difference between actual PTSD and merely the social problems of "re-adjusting" to being "back in the world."

Yes I agree... and let the two not be confused.

JMA

07-30-2010, 11:21 AM

Why? None of those things will actually negate any advantage. All of those things are why you have military intelligence.
What area(size) of ground do you think anyone actually knows "well enough" to negate a military advantage? 100 sq Km? 1,000?

So indigenous support groups? Far more sensible - as the UK has often historically done. Even in Ulster a lot of good info came from UDR guys who had grown up in the boarder areas.

Look William you have decided that you are not going to agree so there is little point in continuing this conversation.

If you are dealing with an enemy that has grown up in the area of operations he is in a 1,000 times more advantageous position than a kid out of New York City or London.

As a city boy I can remember back to the school holidays when we visited relations on their farm. Our cousins knew every nook and cranny of their farm. Where to swim, where to find ducks on which dam, where to find and catch a snake, where the wild fruit grew etc etc. This while we "townies" stumbled along in awe. Now whether you or I like it or not that is the situation in Afghanistan. The ISAF "townies" are absolutely lost. But what do we do? We compare ours in-theatre knowledge not with the locals but with other newer units and laugh at their hopeless lack of knowledge while elevating our own even though we are merely proving that in the land of the blind the man with one eye is king (among ISAF forces that is).

Perhaps one should consider the criminal negligence of continuing to pump hopelessly unacclimatised troops into harms way in a far off land of which they have no effective knowledge? I mean there was a Brit battalion that was sent out to Kenya for a month to prepare for Afghanistan? Who makes this kind of weird and bizarre and criminal decision?

I am talking about the best way to utilise foreign troops in Afghanistan where they are needed because the locals don't have it (at present or if they ever will). Yes, no matter how well the troops learn the language there will still a need to be interpreters and interrogators and yes some locals can be fed into the system to slowly build up local content.

Had something like this been introduced around 2006/7 the standard and effectiveness of the British military contribution would have been many times more efficient... but no they just keep feeding raw troops into the fray and wonder why things are not going so well. As the man said, the Brits are slow learners.

Bob's World

07-30-2010, 02:50 PM

On the 28th of June, 1787, then 81 year-old Benjamin Franklin, who had been largely silent for much of the 6 weeks of the Constitutional Convention, gave a short speech to apeal for divine help in sorting out the differences of opinion regarding "Government." One could very easily replace the subject of Government with that of Insurgency and his words would be just as meaningful today as they were then:

"The small progress we have made after 4 or 5 weeks close attendance & continual reasonings with each other - our different sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ayes, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human Understanding.

We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to ancient history for models of Government, and examined the different forms of those Republics which, having been formed with the seeds of their own dissolution, now no longer exist. And we have viewed Modern States all round Europe, but find none of their Constitutions suitable to our circumstances.

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our understanding?"

We too are groping in the dark; but these former insurgents did, in their quest for political wisdom, devine and capture a form of government through much debate and compormise designed to perform the role of deterring insurgency very well. The one issue avoided and unaddressed that stood at the heart of much of the debate would not be resolved until 1865, but otherwise this document has stood the test of time. Smarter guys then us have struggled with larger issues and shared our frustration in the process.

Red Rat

07-30-2010, 03:31 PM

I mean there was a Brit battalion that was sent out to Kenya for a month to prepare for Afghanistan? Who makes this kind of weird and bizarre and criminal decision? Never happened! The training in Kenya might be pertinent to Afghanistan, but it is not what we term 'Mission Specific Training', it is generic field training that all light role battalions are mandated to undertake. We have never sent a unit to Kenya to acclimatise for Afghanistan, no matter how it has been reported! ;)

I am talking about the best way to utilise foreign troops in Afghanistan where they are needed because the locals don't have it (at present or if they ever will). Yes, no matter how well the troops learn the language there will still a need to be interpreters and interrogators and yes some locals can be fed into the system to slowly build up local content.

Surely the best way (bearing in mind that the Karzai Government was not under threat from the Taleban as a serious contender for national power) to use foreign forces would have been to:

Provide training assistance in order to grow capacity quickly
Provide logistical and C2 support to enable effective use of the new capacity (especially tactical and operational mobility and communications)
Use of SF for targeted strikes to keep the Taleban from regrouping and going on the offensive.

Had something like this been introduced around 2006/7 the standard and effectiveness of the British military contribution would have been many times more efficient... but no they just keep feeding raw troops into the fray and wonder why things are not going so well. As the man said, the Brits are slow learners.

I agree in parts; but at what cost? This is a limited war, fought for limited aims with very limited means. Why raise a British regular unit specifically for use in Afghanistan when historically the most effective way to fight the Afghans is to raise a unit of Afghans (South Waziristan Scouts (SWS), Tochi Scouts et al)? The British Army realises that we have got things wrong on campaign continuity and that is being addressed. As part of that it has been decided that the 'across the board costs' of extending unit tour lengths or raising a unit specifically for use in theatre outweigh the tactical advantages that might be accrued - in other words it would be inefficient use of resources.

Personally I think the most efficient use of resources is the Helmandi Scouts or even better the SWS option, but I doubt that the Karzai Government would go along with that. The loan service model as used in Oman is another good model - but there appears not to be any appetite for that - perhaps they wouldn't pay as well as the Omanis! :D

With regards to PTSD all I can currently note is that at no time has the British Army ever exposed frontline units to extended periods of high intensity combat. Even in WW1 and WW2 formations were rotated in and out of the line in order too preserve combat effectiveness. I note too that Secretary Gates is now advocating 9 month tours in Afghanistan for the US Army with longer tour intervals inbetween.

I think having a unit in theatre permanently (perhaps raised specifically for Afghanistan) has advantages and disadvantages. It would have been extremely difficult to do 2006-2008 concurrent with TELIC due to resource constraints. My ire is focused on the slipshod thinking and appalling mismanagement that persisted from when we arrived in 2006 through to relatively recently while operating within the constraints we had been given.

JMA

07-30-2010, 05:38 PM

Never happened! The training in Kenya might be pertinent to Afghanistan, but it is not what we term 'Mission Specific Training', it is generic field training that all light role battalions are mandated to undertake. We have never sent a unit to Kenya to acclimatise for Afghanistan, no matter how it has been reported! ;)

Well if this (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/PeopleInDefence/IrishGuardsCelebrateStPatricksDayInTheKenyanBush.h tm) is incorrectly reported by the MoD itself then its kind of weird logic to take the soldiers away from home for 5 weeks to hold an exercise in Kenya (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/TrainingAndAdventure/3ParaTrainInKenyaAheadOfAfghanDeployment.htm) if the complaint is that troops spend too much time away from home. Another sheer coincidence then?

Surely the best way (bearing in mind that the Karzai Government was not under threat from the Taleban as a serious contender for national power) to use foreign forces would have been to:

Provide training assistance in order to grow capacity quickly
Provide logistical and C2 support to enable effective use of the new capacity (especially tactical and operational mobility and communications)
Use of SF for targeted strikes to keep the Taleban from regrouping and going on the offensive.

There was an immediate need to keep the Karzai regime in power. No time to train up locals had to put foreign soldiers into the country. Now anyone with half a brain would have realised that there was no quick fix in this. By all means run a marine brigade through an area to "mow the grass" but what happens thereafter? The Taliban just pop up once again. So what to do? Keep rotating otherwise good soldiers through an environment for which they are hopelessly out of their depth or give the deployed soldiers the training they need to make an operational difference?

How many SF would be needed for the task you mention? The black army is limited and they have already sucked in a para battalion in support so how far do you go and where does that all end?

I agree in parts; but at what cost? This is a limited war, fought for limited aims with very limited means. Why raise a British regular unit specifically for use in Afghanistan when historically the most effective way to fight the Afghans is to raise a unit of Afghans (South Waziristan Scouts (SWS), Tochi Scouts et al)? The British Army realises that we have got things wrong on campaign continuity and that is being addressed. As part of that it has been decided that the 'across the board costs' of extending unit tour lengths or raising a unit specifically for use in theatre outweigh the tactical advantages that might be accrued - in other words it would be inefficient use of resources.

Personally I think the most efficient use of resources is the Helmandi Scouts or even better the SWS option, but I doubt that the Karzai Government would go along with that. The loan service model as used in Oman is another good model - but there appears not to be any appetite for that - perhaps they wouldn't pay as well as the Omanis! :D

It seems that the Brits can only see to what they have done before (maybe even 100 years ago). What will it take to try something different and new?

The costs would not have been any more than those already incurred. How so? Decide to start with a brigade and apply a compensating reduction across the rest of the army. Simple maths and simple implementation. If it were possible to allocate existing battalions to such a force where they would start with a clean slate and not try to import their own regimental baggage that may be an option (but I fear not).

To takes too long to create local units such as those you mention. And of the loan service model I would suggest (without too much of a slap in the face of the Brits is that rather than officers on such loan service the exercise would be better served by supplying "skill at arms" NCOs in both my option and yours. NCOs (and not officers) would be needed to train locals and quality Brit NCOs would be needed to lead Brit soldiers into battle. Officers are needed but are not the "glue" than makes for an operationally successful unit.

With regards to PTSD all I can currently note is that at no time has the British Army ever exposed frontline units to extended periods of high intensity combat. Even in WW1 and WW2 formations were rotated in and out of the line in order too preserve combat effectiveness. I note too that Secretary Gates is now advocating 9 month tours in Afghanistan for the US Army with longer tour intervals inbetween.

I think having a unit in theatre permanently (perhaps raised specifically for Afghanistan) has advantages and disadvantages. It would have been extremely difficult to do 2006-2008 concurrent with TELIC due to resource constraints. My ire is focused on the slipshod thinking and appalling mismanagement that persisted from when we arrived in 2006 through to relatively recently while operating within the constraints we had been given.

What system of R&R and relief would be needed for troops permanently stationed in Afghanistan do you think? Currently it is a six month tour with two weeks "home" leave around the mid point, I believe? So if the main concern is PTSD surely one should know more about who and why it affects some more than others? Then one can get into the heads of the soldiers to prepare them psychologically to deal with the situations they will likely face or experience. And the disadvantages of raising such units other than that possibility of higher PTSD incidence are?

As to the PTSD issue. If PTSD effects (to a greater or lesser degree) 30% of troops deployed into a combat zone then surely to limit the number so deployed will reduce the overall incidence of PTSD? I must look for PTSD prevalence among Aussie troops exposed to combat. I have a hunch.

davidbfpo

07-30-2010, 07:01 PM

IIRC the Omani Army had, certainly in the Dhofar War awhile ago, a large non-Arab component from Baluchistan, who were mercenaries by tradition and there was historical link as Oman had once held a part of that province. The Scouts raised along the NWFP were nearly all locally recruited.

I doubt that non-Afghan mercenaries would be welcome now in Afghanistan, although I often read that the ANA has a majority of non-Pashtuns.

Interesting though that the UK has raised a Helmandi Scouts unit, although there is little open source information on this.

Fuchs

07-30-2010, 07:20 PM

IIRC the Omani Army had, certainly in the Dhofar War awhile ago, a large non-Arab component from Baluchistan, who were mercenaries by tradition and there was historical link as Oman had once held a part of that province. The Scouts raised along the NWFP were nearly all locally recruited.

I doubt that non-Afghan mercenaries would be welcome now in Afghanistan, although I often read that the ANA has a majority of non-Pashtuns.

Exactly. You could recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirgiz and they would be from an Afghan minority.

I wonder how an all-Gurkha unit with unusual uniforms would resonate in Helmand.

JMA

07-31-2010, 08:03 AM

Exactly. You could recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirgiz and they would be from an Afghan minority.

I wonder how an all-Gurkha unit with unusual uniforms would resonate in Helmand.

Well maybe having Uzbek, Tajik etc troops in a Pashtun area is one small step better than having a Brit but that is not what the Pashtuns want. So if you have to pacify an area do you do it with a dope enhanced ANA contingent or some Brit kids out of Birmingham or Manchester or you can do it properly.

As to the Gurkhas they have been there and would be my choice ahead of the average Brit unit. See here for the latest crisis on a Taliban commander being beheaded to assist with identification (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1296136/As-Gurkha-disciplined-beheading-Taliban-Thank-God-side.html). Brits are about to score an own goal with this again.

JMA

08-03-2010, 01:47 PM

Malaysia? One has to ask, did the military operations of the Brits set conditions for political success; or rather was it the military operations of the communist insurgents who set the conditions for independence and withdrawal of the illegitimate British Colonial government? Even though one group of combatants was defeated, insurgency is about the government and not the bands that rise up to challenge it. One band was defeated under one leader and one line of ideology. That is not the greater insurgency though. Insurgency is the perceptions of the populace as a whole, many who never even consider taking up arms directly, toward their system of governance. The actual resistance will manifest in many forms. To crush any one such manifestation and declare victory is naive at best and delusional.

Yes I agree.

I tend to agree that the majority Malays were kept out of the war through promising them independence once the nasty Chinese communists were defeated (which only partially occurred as the fighting flared up again later).

JMA

08-03-2010, 04:57 PM

And now JMA turns into one of the "New-COIN" boys??

Look I'm getting as frustrated as you about the semantics of "COIN" and "counterinsurgency" and the like. Not sure Afghanistan's situation fits any model we have.

An armed rebellion is a 90% a military problem! = Armed force needs to be countered by armed force. If you don't defeat the men with guns, you loose! - not 20%, but 100%.

I agree that you need to go after the insurgents. That's is what my regiment did and we did it pretty well but that was only part of the story.

Soldiers are not (or at least should not be) the only part of the effort to defeat the insurgents.

Komer wrote (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD748988&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf):
What seems most striking in retrospect about the experience of the British and Malayan governments in containing and ultimately defeating the Communist insurgency in Malaya is the wide rdnge of civil and military programs tied together by unified management into a successful counterinsurgency (C-1) response.

So I don't wish to overplay the military role (important as it may be).

Then there is your Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck who in The Long Long War (http://www.amazon.com/Long-War-Counterinsurgency-Malaya-Vietnam/dp/B0007DVQTE) stated:
For the military their responsibility rests on providing security to the police and attacking guerrilla combatants.

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in. - "legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population." All those things are for the men in suits - and all of it is political. The military can only set the conditions. No conditions, no suits.
Anyone here an Afghan politician? Silence?
Military force can put in place any policy it wishes. It's politically blind. How military force is applied should reflect the policy being set forth. Legitimacy is nothing to do with success. It's a liberal construct that ignores history. Cutting the hands of kids and stoning women IS LEGITIMATE for about 200 million people on the planet.
"We" the west just wish to force the Afghan people to accept out "our brand" of legitimacy.

There is a delightful term, "concurrent activity" that is what should be taking place right now. Sure there are villages, towns, cities, provinces that are peaceful enough to let the police and other civilian branches operate without continual military protection? Certainly not Helmand but surely somewhere?

What would like to or should force upon the Afghan population is the matter for another debate. I just don't see dragging them kicking and screaming into the 20th century as being the logical extension of policy following 9/11. But we are not even doing that are we? If anything we are making them more resolute in their "old ways".

This 80% political 20% military rubbish is "99%" of the problem. Military force sets military conditions. It sets forth the policy, by denying the opponent the means to set forth his, as in the opponent ceases to use military force. If the politicians cannot work it out, that is NOTHING to do with the efficacy of armed force.

It is the politicians who set the parameters for the military actions who then implement their civil programmes and projects when the areas have been sufficiently pacified by the military.

William F. Owen

08-04-2010, 01:51 PM

Existed yes. Shell shocked people were known and sympathised with... but at a rate of 30% of all combatants?
"Shell Shock" was not PTSD. It was "Battle Shock." The estimates of PTSD for Bomber Command 1943-45 have been estimated to 80% by some who look after the veterans. That is 80% of men have some sort of recurring problem, such as flashbacks or nightmares.

The way to deal with this then is to establish who are most susceptible to PTSD (and alcoholism and anti social behaviour) and screen them out of combat jobs. Then introduce some psychological preparation before these soldiers get into combat situations to allow them to handle the situations they find themselves in psychologically. In other words be professional and be proactive.
Its degrees. You can't do it. Screening out those "thought to be susceptible" may screen out very good soldiers. The best system is to treat it as a wound and treat it when it occurs. You can't screen out those likely to get wounded.

M-A Lagrange

08-04-2010, 02:05 PM

PTSD is a very sensitive matter cause it's wounds but it's also an advantage.
The problematic is not who has PTSD (I do have some behavious that are classified as PTSD due to presence in combat areas) but how each and everyone copes with PTSD.

For some, PTSD are blocking them to go further.
For some PTSD are opening new perception of their environment during stressfull time.

In my personnal experience, PTSD is rather a problem when out side of "dangerous area" for most of those who do have recurent nightmares or sleeping problems or any light PTSD. This does not affect in any ways efficiency in action or decision making.

The problem is rather what to do with individuals heavily affected who are unmanageble even in "peacefull" times.

William F. Owen

08-04-2010, 02:12 PM

Look I'm getting as frustrated as you about the semantics of "COIN" and "counterinsurgency" and the like. Not sure Afghanistan's situation fits any model we have.
Which is why I try not to use the word "Insurgency" and thus not "COIN" either. Both terms miss the point.

Look William you have decided that you are not going to agree so there is little point in continuing this conversation.
Firstly, please feel free to call me Wilf. Everyone else does, and secondly we're not the only ones here.

If you are dealing with an enemy that has grown up in the area of operations he is in a 1,000 times more advantageous position than a kid out of New York City or London.
I think you would agree that the most important thing in combat is the determination and the will to endure and fight - not where you grew up.

This while we "townies" stumbled along in awe. Now whether you or I like it or not that is the situation in Afghanistan.
I grew up in the country. OK, so I knew what badgers sounded like when other recruits were running for cover. They soon learned. Experience is experience and for true expeditionary armies it is normal challenge. Training is training. Good training produces good soldiers. If you want to test real skills, then take men the arctic. That is where experience really counts. When it came to walking the streets of Ulster,the kids who had grown up stealing cars in Liverpool had a better nose for trouble than supposed skilled "woodsmen."

Perhaps one should consider the criminal negligence of continuing to pump hopelessly unacclimatised troops into harms way in a far off land of which they have no effective knowledge? I mean there was a Brit battalion that was sent out to Kenya for a month to prepare for Afghanistan? Who makes this kind of weird and bizarre and criminal decision?
Where would you send them? Where can the UK train overseas that matches A'Stan?

As the man said, the Brits are slow learners.
Another data free opinion. Any man can have opinions. History tramples all over any claim the British Army are slow learners. The issues in A'Stan can't be attributed to guess work about the supposed short coming of the "British Army."

Ken White

08-04-2010, 03:49 PM

The issues in A'Stan can't be attributed to guess work about the supposed short coming of the "British Army."never spake...:wry:

Nor even to British or US politicians, victims of more and shorter comings than their Armed Forces... ;)

JMA

08-04-2010, 07:39 PM

I think you would agree that the most important thing in combat is the determination and the will to endure and fight - not where you grew up.

Yes to a point but like the Brits found in the jungles of Malaya and Burma 60 odd years ago if you are not trained and acclimatised for the environment you will be required to fight in your life expectancy can be pretty short. As short as the Brit military memory it seems.

I grew up in the country. OK, so I knew what badgers sounded like when other recruits were running for cover. They soon learned. Experience is experience and for true expeditionary armies it is normal challenge. Training is training. Good training produces good soldiers. If you want to test real skills, then take men the arctic. That is where experience really counts. When it came to walking the streets of Ulster,the kids who had grown up stealing cars in Liverpool had a better nose for trouble than supposed skilled "woodsmen."

Its horses for courses. Yes it is obvious that street wise London kids would be better equipt to to deal with urban operations. And the farm boy would probably be like a fish out of water in an urban setting.

Now flip the coin. The farmboy will be better equipt to handle operations in a rural environment than a city slicker. Horses for courses.

Where would you send them? Where can the UK train overseas that matches A'Stan?

Why, in Afghanistan of course. Now why haven't the Brits thought of that?

Another data free opinion. Any man can have opinions. History tramples all over any claim the British Army are slow learners. The issues in A'Stan can't be attributed to guess work about the supposed short coming of the "British Army."

History does no such thing. What history shows is that the Brits have the ability to bumble on and learn slowly as they go along. Just like they are doing in Helmand. History repeats itself over and over again.

Ken White

08-04-2010, 08:28 PM

History repeats itself over and over again.I wonder if that's why they call it history... :D

slapout9

08-04-2010, 11:42 PM

Steve the Planner

08-05-2010, 02:36 AM

Slap:

Good hit. I think the COIN court is crumbling faster every day. Algeria was not a success, the objectives were different, and the strategies different.

I was particularly struck by the little nugget about Americans being oblivious in Iraq to real estate ownership and taxation.

In real life, triffles like these are the essence of government, governance and private rights---some of the many little parts not really understood as essential frameworks for COIN tactics.

Reminds me of Wilf's comments about street savvies being good at soldiering. Folks who understand the structure of governments have the same sensibilities about how governments really work---it ain't about projects. It's about rights and benefits.

Steve

Steve the Planner

08-05-2010, 02:55 AM

MAL's comment about PTSD is insightful.

I first became aware of it from a riding stable accident (dog attack). Three days after returning from the hospital, my seven year old was sitting up all night long (wide awake sort-of), with this reptilian stare. Like a zombie.

She spent months in therapy with A PTSD specialist for civilians---car crash victims, etc... who all have the same traumatic path to get through. I see the flashes of it when a big dog barks, etc..., but she MANAGES it. That is not the same as being cured.

Some of the civilian trauma can result from an abuse of government, or anything that undermines the integrity of a person's being and safety.

To push it all on soldiers and war zones is just wrong. PTSD can come from many sources, and anyone witnessing a person in the throws of an acute episode knows it is very real.

I don't think my war zone experience had a negative effect on my life (quite the contrary), but that doesn't mean those experiences could, by some separate trigger, manifest as something very different later.

Funny thing is that before my seven year old's accident, I believed that my aversion to blood and violence in movies was from my prior military experience, but when it happened, I responded automatically with years of training---stop the bleeding, treat for shock, etc... After that, I realized that my training and experience was appropriate to my circumstance in Iraq---so was I acculturated to violence, or did my reptilian brain kick in through some expression of PTSD, but in a positive way?

I'd love a real expert to jump in about the range and circumstances of PTSD, especially from civilian circumstances. Helps to remind that soldiers are, after all, only human..

slapout9

08-05-2010, 03:37 AM

I was particularly struck by the little nugget about Americans being oblivious in Iraq to real estate ownership and taxation.

Steve

Yep, Real Estate ownership and taxation is good Intelligence.

Bob's World

08-05-2010, 10:11 AM

Interesting article in the JUL-AUG 2010 issue of Military Review on why we should STOP using Galula and Algeria as some type of success model for Small Wars. Link to article below.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100831_art006.pdf

First one must free their mind from the widely accepted fiction that the Algerian Insurgency has ever been resolved. Organizations have been suppressed, names have changed, but there has yet to be a root resolution of the problems there and establishment of a form and nature of governance that could realistically be seen as having the country firmly on track in Phase 0 conditions.

That said, Galula must not be read literally, but one must take the many gold nuggets that exist in his work and apply them to the situation they are in, tailored for all the many factors that make every insurgency unique; but focused by the general dynamics that also make every insurgency similar as well. Most COIN practitioners don't appear to understand insurgency well enough to make that distinction.

French COIN is no better or worse than say, British COIN, or US COIN; there are lessons to be drawn from all. For me personally, I'd been working the Philippine mission for a couple of years at SOCPAC when I found my first copy of Galula tucked away in a corner of the Army War College books store. A small little paperback, ridiculously priced at about $35, as if the AWC felt compelled to be able to say they carried it, but really didn't want anybody to actually buy or read it. After a quick scan, I bought it and have no regrets. I don't see it as the end all, be all primer on COIN, but I have yet to read anything else nearly as good. Whoever stole my copy (that I probably loaned around the office too freely) may well agree.

Until our understanding of COIN evolves to the point where practitioners stop talking of COIN "victories", and begin talking about the art of establishing and maintaining general, willing, stability between a populace and its government, we will continue to draw the wrong lessons and either overly praise or criticize works like Galula.

Hell, people think that the current Algerian insurgency is AQ simply because they changed their name to AQ; and that therefore CT is the right mission to apply against them. If they change their name again to Goldman Sachs will we give them a bail out? :eek: We need to get past the surface confusion and simplistic analysis and drill into the real roots of these problems, the problem is that once we get there we don't like what we find out, so we back up and apply some mitigating approach instead.

M-A Lagrange

08-05-2010, 11:54 AM

French COIN is no better or worse than say, British COIN, or US COIN; there are lessons to be drawn from all.

200% agree. Even more on the parallele between Afghanistan and Algeria. The starting points are different: France ruled the place for over 150 years in Algeria, there was a large French native population, French truely believed that Algeria was part of the country...

Actually 3 French colonels who served in Astan just published a book on COIN. According to them, COIN is necessary but not sufficient to bring victory. And I tend to agree with them. Living among the people to conduct a war among the people where you earn legitimacy through protecting them is a starting point. It's not a strategy in itself but rather an approach of how you set the base for kinetic actions against the opponent.

Ref of the book I am talking about:
Hervé de Courrèges, Emmanuel Germain, Nicolas Le Nen, "Principes de contre-insurrection" Editions Economica, 114 pages, 19 euros.
(Unfortunately in French only at this point of time.)

Fuchs

08-05-2010, 01:24 PM

France ruled the place for over 150 years in Algeria, there was a large French native population, French truely believed that Algeria was part of the country...

Actually, no. Few European settlers in Algeria were actually from France. There were many Spanish and Italians.

Dayuhan

08-05-2010, 10:47 PM

First one must free their mind from the widely accepted fiction that the Algerian Insurgency has ever been resolved. Organizations have been suppressed, names have changed, but there has yet to be a root resolution of the problems there and establishment of a form and nature of governance that could realistically be seen as having the country firmly on track in Phase 0 conditions.

Worth noting perhaps, that functioning governments are generally not established. They have to evolve, and they evolve in parallel with the evolution of the nation and the society that they govern. Insurgency is sometimes part of that evolutionary process.

If a "nation" is really not a nation at all, if a society is fractured along ethnic, religious, tribal, or other lines, if its economy remains feudal, if the society is trying to resolve its respect for tradition with its desire for modernity, all of these conflicts will be reflected in government. It is not possible to simply establish a good government and expect it to resolve these conflicts: government is not going to be more coherent and more directed than the society it governs.

As we've seen, any attempt by an outside power to resolve internal conflict by simply establishing good government is doomed to failure. We cannot build a nation. We can try to cultivate a nation, by helping where we can with the evolutionary process and trying to mitigate the adverse impacts of the disorder that comes along with evolution, but there is no way we can simply go in and fix it.

Bob's World

08-05-2010, 11:11 PM

Worth noting perhaps, that functioning governments are generally not established. They have to evolve, and they evolve in parallel with the evolution of the nation and the society that they govern. Insurgency is sometimes part of that evolutionary process.

If a "nation" is really not a nation at all, if a society is fractured along ethnic, religious, tribal, or other lines, if its economy remains feudal, if the society is trying to resolve its respect for tradition with its desire for modernity, all of these conflicts will be reflected in government. It is not possible to simply establish a good government and expect it to resolve these conflicts: government is not going to be more coherent and more directed than the society it governs.

As we've seen, any attempt by an outside power to resolve internal conflict by simply establishing good government is doomed to failure. We cannot build a nation. We can try to cultivate a nation, by helping where we can with the evolutionary process and trying to mitigate the adverse impacts of the disorder that comes along with evolution, but there is no way we can simply go in and fix it.

"Established" simply means that it has matured and devloped so that it functions (ideally) both effectively and is accepted and represents across all segments of society as equally as possible.

I agree that it would be very hard for outsiders to establish such a government; and that it must be by and for the people it is to represent.

Dayuhan

08-06-2010, 02:23 AM

I mentioned outsiders only because the US has made a habit of trying to establish governments lately.

I do think there may be excessive emphasis on the idea of "establishing" as the critical stage in the development of governance. Americans in particular seem to become easily obsessed with structure, though the world around us provides abundant evidence that admirable structures do not necessarily function admirably. For example, on paper the most democratic and modern government structure on the Arabian peninsula belongs to Yemen. It's also the least functional government, far less effective than the medieval autocracies that surround it.

We have to recognize that government isn't simply "established", whether from inside or out. It grows along with the society it purports to govern. What we call "insurgency" is not simply between government and populace, it's also related to internal issues among and within factions of a populace. It's not always reasonable to expect a government to resolve and unify a fractured populace, because government will generally include those same fractures. Growing nations have to work out their issues, and the process isn't always peaceful. Our capacity to influence the process is generally limited, and any attempt to influence it is likely to generate unintended consequences.

JMA

08-08-2010, 08:01 PM

Ken White

08-08-2010, 09:40 PM

...Then in US history there was a guy called John Mosby with his Virginia Cavalry who gave the Union army the run around - much like the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan. Does anyone out there know of Mosby? Has anyone studied him and what he did?LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9223).

There's more. Here, 'Search' is ready when you are (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/search.php?searchid=2743698) and Google is available for the wider world...

Can't speak for now but some years ago he was studied at both the combat arms advanced courses and at the CGSC. He's accorded space in the history of US special operations. We also study Geronimo and Chief Joseph and John Hunt Morgan, all of whom gave the US Army far more pernicious and wider ranging runarounds than did John Singleton Mosby... :D

JMA

08-09-2010, 12:20 AM

Can't speak for now but some years ago he was studied at both the combat arms advanced courses and at the CGSC. He's accorded space in the history of US special operations. We also study Geronimo and Chief Joseph and John Hunt Morgan, all of whom gave the US Army far more pernicious and wider ranging runarounds than did John Singleton Mosby... :D

Ken, who is the we who studies this stuff? Seems not to be the very same people who need to understand this stuff and use the knowledge in Afghanistan.

Ken White

08-09-2010, 05:17 AM

was and is the US Army. Unfortunately, it is a big Army, not everyone studies the same things. Due to that size and 'democratic ideal' and 'fairness' driven personnel policies, those who did study the right things are not always in the right jobs. Thus we're confronted with some really good, well trained and educated people in command occasionally and more often, some less qualified folks whose turn it was to be in charge...

Penalty of a large force and political correctness. :wry:

JMA

08-09-2010, 07:06 AM

Ken White

08-09-2010, 06:55 PM

to an extent but most certainly in the US, that very prevalent syndrome gets fixed only when absolutely necessary.

You've served in two Armies. Each was, man for man, among the world's best at that time. They were that because they had to be. When one has to do something, one puts a lot more effort into it...

Regardless of their worth and merit, those two very young Armies as they then existed are gone, never to return. The US Army has been around for over 200 years, it is an old comfortable Dude of an institution that is concerned with staying alive in a strange and wonderful political arena where there are a lot of other Gladiators questing for survival -- and glory. It plans on being around for another couple of Centuries. The Army thus is cautious and more concerned with survival of the institution than with its competence at this time. That is true in most democratic nations. Goes with the territory and, IMO, that's okay -- the overall life of most citizens is worth the sacrifices in capability those armies have to make.

For us, 'desirable' -- even highly desirable -- or increased effectiveness are not impetus enough to overcome the domestic political aspects. We'll muddle along as we always have, always do, until we have to fix it. Then we will do that temporarily. We will then quickly go back to our navel gazing after the crisis passes. So far, our overall record of doing it in that really inefficient manner is fairly good, surprisingly so. Though the trend is downward -- as should be expected...

The US Army today is mediocre because it doesn't need to be any better. I have seen it -- served in it -- when it was both better and when it was worse. It gets better in wartime and the tougher the war, the better it gets. Easy wars (as today) provide no incentive to get much better. There is no Citizen or Congressional pressure to be incredibly effective (actually, quite the reverse, the bulk of Americans including many in Congress are anti-military to at least some extent). Capability is present to rise to that peak when necessary and most people realize that, so they're content to allow the Army to bumble along. The Army, for its part, truly tries to do better -- but it is captive to political pressures that drive personnel, training and operational policies and to a bureaucracy that is politically derived and supported. There are over 600K DoD Civilian employees, all adults, mostly voters -- so Congress insures they are coddled and catered to. There or over 2M active and reserve service members, add their families and you get almost 4M voters. Congress is more concerned with their votes than with their competence. It's that simple.

Given a need for the hard work and sacrifice of all concerned to get better, quickly, a proven capability to do that has been shown so in the absence of need, no one is terribly interested in an excessive amount of hard work. There are many dedicated people in US uniforms who try to circumvent all that and truly aid in many units doing a good job -- but they move around every three or four years so the overall effect is one of some inconsistency. In terms of US Army units, as Bertrand Russell said of people in general, 20% do 80% of the work... :mad:

The good news is that, aside from that hard working 20%, the Army, too, knows that it can do better when required to do so and it puts a large amount of effort into insuring that remains the case. Too large IMO but they didn't ask me... :wry:

That ability to patch something together in times of real need may or may not remain true. It will for the near term, say 20 to 40 years; after that, hard to say.

Pete

08-09-2010, 07:35 PM

JMA

08-09-2010, 08:38 PM

JMA, being the shameless self-promoter that I am :o , click here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9223) to read the thread I started on John S. Mosby. A collateral relative of mine (mother's maiden name) rode with him in the very last days of the war.

Thanks for that Pete.

Mosby understood how to give a conventional army the run around. As apparently did (according to uncle Ken) Geronimo, Chief Joseph and John Hunt Morgan. So the lesson I suppose is that if you can get inside the head of such men you will understand how to fight them. This will help in the fight against the Taliban.

Steve Blair

08-09-2010, 08:58 PM

Joseph actually fought the Army in more of a stand-up fashion, although his leadership was somewhat mitigated or modified by that of Looking Glass. Geronimo was little more than a bandit (even in the opinion of the Apache at the time). That was one of the things that led to his downfall, as Crook and later Miles never lacked for scouts to lead against him.

Ken White

08-09-2010, 09:01 PM

Ken White

08-09-2010, 09:08 PM

Joseph actually fought the Army in more of a stand-up fashion... Geronimo was little more than a bandit (even in the opinion of the Apache at the time)more bureaucratic opponent a "run around" for much longer than said opponent wished.

That was then and is now the case. Only when confronted with really incompetent enemies did the US Army 'win' quickly in the west. The 'insurgent' generally has an advantage in nimbleness and flexibility -- unless they're flaky... :D

Fortunately, most of our enemies have generally been even more screwed up than were we...:wry:

Pete

08-09-2010, 09:18 PM

One either has it or one does not. Few do. We are capable of selecting those few and placing them in positions of influence. We deliberately choose not to do so.
One has to wonder whether current military personnel policies filter out some promising talent. Before the Civil War while a student at the University of Virginia Mosby, a little skinny guy, shot the town bully in Charlottesville. While in jail he clerked for the prosecutor who sent him there and thereby became a lawyer. Grant had his well-publicized problems with the bottle and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson had such strange interpersonal skills that today people would probably think he was autistic.

Ken White

08-09-2010, 09:51 PM

One has to wonder whether current military personnel policies filter out some promising talent...I'm pretty well convinced. I was fortunate in having had two really great Battalion Commanders in Viet Nam. I know the first would not have and I strongly doubt the second would have made it to LTC any time after the late 1980s. DOPMA and its followers have not done us any favors. Not at all...

Pete

08-09-2010, 10:03 PM

By the way, Jackson and Jonathan Letterman, the Medical Department guy who developed modern casualty evacuation, served together in Florida at the tail-end of the Seminole problems and were close friends. Letterman tried to talk Jackson out of his dispute with his commanding officer there which led to Jackson's resignation from the Army. Jackson later met that old CO on the battlefield and sent him a-runnin'.

Pete

08-11-2010, 04:15 AM

Although during the Civil War a guy with my Mother's maiden name, Utterback, served with Mosby, by that time my branch of the family, Utterback, had moved from Virginia and was then living in Anderson County, Kentucky, and in the vicinity of Franklin, Indiana. The deed for the family farm on the outskirts of Franklin where my Grandfather was born had been signed by Andrew Jackson, "Old Hickory," presumably for our military service during the Affair of 1812.

Well, they ran through the briars and they ran through the brambles
And they ran through the bushes where a rabbit couldn't go.
They ran so fast the hounds couldn't catch 'em
Down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico.

Fuchs

08-11-2010, 08:56 PM

"The waning of the 2005-2010 COIN theory fashion wave" (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/08/waning-of-2005-2010-coin-theory-fashion.html)

JMA

08-11-2010, 09:21 PM

to an extent but most certainly in the US, that very prevalent syndrome gets fixed only when absolutely necessary.

You've served in two Armies. Each was, man for man, among the world's best at that time. They were that because they had to be. When one has to do something, one puts a lot more effort into it...

OK gotcha. Now what I can't get my head around is soldiers going to war in places where there is no real national commitment to a result or where they operate under sever restrictive ROEs. Why do they do this? Doesn't make sense to me.

Regardless of their worth and merit, those two very young Armies as they then existed are gone, never to return. The US Army has been around for over 200 years, it is an old comfortable Dude of an institution that is concerned with staying alive in a strange and wonderful political arena where there are a lot of other Gladiators questing for survival -- and glory. It plans on being around for another couple of Centuries. The Army thus is cautious and more concerned with survival of the institution than with its competence at this time. That is true in most democratic nations. Goes with the territory and, IMO, that's okay -- the overall life of most citizens is worth the sacrifices in capability those armies have to make.

From out hear in the colonies we witnessed the partial awakening of the sleeping giant post 9/11. While you were half awake back then maybe you should have kicked some more ass? Yes the military industrial complex is unstoppable.

For us, 'desirable' -- even highly desirable -- or increased effectiveness are not impetus enough to overcome the domestic political aspects. We'll muddle along as we always have, always do, until we have to fix it. Then we will do that temporarily. We will then quickly go back to our navel gazing after the crisis passes. So far, our overall record of doing it in that really inefficient manner is fairly good, surprisingly so. Though the trend is downward -- as should be expected...

If you have noticed I have not included the US in my discussions on length of tours and rotations as the sheer scale of the US involvement makes it near impossible to stabilise through the formation of permanent units given those numbers. The Brits on the other hand with a deployment of under 10,000 was/is a viable option.

The US Army today is mediocre because it doesn't need to be any better. I have seen it -- served in it -- when it was both better and when it was worse. It gets better in wartime and the tougher the war, the better it gets. Easy wars (as today) provide no incentive to get much better. There is no Citizen or Congressional pressure to be incredibly effective (actually, quite the reverse, the bulk of Americans including many in Congress are anti-military to at least some extent). Capability is present to rise to that peak when necessary and most people realize that, so they're content to allow the Army to bumble along. The Army, for its part, truly tries to do better -- but it is captive to political pressures that drive personnel, training and operational policies and to a bureaucracy that is politically derived and supported. There are over 600K DoD Civilian employees, all adults, mostly voters -- so Congress insures they are coddled and catered to. There or over 2M active and reserve service members, add their families and you get almost 4M voters. Congress is more concerned with their votes than with their competence. It's that simple.

The same sort of situation existed prior to the fall of Rome I believe?

Given a need for the hard work and sacrifice of all concerned to get better, quickly, a proven capability to do that has been shown so in the absence of need, no one is terribly interested in an excessive amount of hard work. There are many dedicated people in US uniforms who try to circumvent all that and truly aid in many units doing a good job -- but they move around every three or four years so the overall effect is one of some inconsistency. In terms of US Army units, as Bertrand Russell said of people in general, 20% do 80% of the work... :mad:

Well if you keep the 20% sharp then you will always have a basis to build on.

The good news is that, aside from that hard working 20%, the Army, too, knows that it can do better when required to do so and it puts a large amount of effort into insuring that remains the case. Too large IMO but they didn't ask me... :wry:

Yes I can understand that for when I take my dog for a run and slip the leash he senses the freedom, takes off and loves it. In a 20 year career how many times would a soldier experience the thrill of being allowed to run free?

That ability to patch something together in times of real need may or may not remain true. It will for the near term, say 20 to 40 years; after that, hard to say.

Yes, I have no crystal ball either.

JMA

08-11-2010, 09:43 PM

However, I can tell you that you will not ever get "inside the head of such men." All those people named as well as Nathan Bedford Forrest and a few others -- including some RSA types -- and my pet, Subotai, had little to no formal military training or education.

"Inside the head" of such people is not reproducible or replicable. One either has it or one does not. Few do. We are capable of selecting those few and placing them in positions of influence. We deliberately choose not to do so.

If you understand the simple fact that the tactic of successful insurgents is to exploit only your weaknesses and never to attack your strengths then you are half way there.

Once you have a force of well trained, well armed and well supported soldiers in the field. You should be able to give them their head to get after the enemy and not hand them a long list of ROE.

With ROEs and lawyers in constant attendance you don't get the best officers and NCOs rising up the structure. To tend to attract bureaucratic "yes-men" which is not what makes for an aggressive and operationally effective army.

You still broadly misunderstand the fight in Afghanistan. It is not that there aren't people who know what to do and how to do it -- it is simply that they are generally not allowed to do those things. There is no pressing need to do much better pushed by the Politicians and those are the people that have forced their services to tread softly and not use a stick. They know they're guilty of that and thus their lack of any real pressure to do better. In short, the problem is not direct incompetence, though that exists in some cases and is due to various factors not least people not suited for the jobs they have due to the inadvertent and unintended inequities of assignments due to the politics of a democratic society...

The real problem there is simply malfeasance induced ineffectiveness due to flawed policies and failed theories.

What I don't get about Afghanistan is why otherwise outstanding soldiers go meekly to the slaughter with one hand tied behind their backs. Maybe the way around all this is to make greater use of private paramilitaries and thereby skirt around the aspects which reduce the efficiency of the US military in the field.

JMA

08-11-2010, 09:49 PM

"The waning of the 2005-2010 COIN theory fashion wave" (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/08/waning-of-2005-2010-coin-theory-fashion.html)

Do you write this stuff Fuchs? I like it. It is only with verbal brutality that those supposedly at the wheel of this out of control vehicle can be woken up. But will it be too late.

I liked the quote:

There's a quote from Churchill:

The Americans will always do the right thing ... after they've exhausted all the alternatives.

This coming from a Brit is like the pot calling the kettle black!

Ken White

08-11-2010, 11:30 PM

It's the American way.
OK gotcha...Why do they do this? Doesn't make sense to me.Of course it make little sense, if any. Politicians are truly an interesting species. Why they send people off on ill advised forays is beyond me...

As for why the Troops go, that's easy. It's what they get paid for, it's why they're in the forces. Most of them if they do not actually like to fight are certainly willing to do so. So why they go is easy. Why they get sent is another question entirely.
The same sort of situation existed prior to the fall of Rome I believe?As well as several other Empires...

Not to worry, we've been operating like this for 216 years, we're used to it.
Well if you keep the 20% sharp then you will always have a basis to build on.We don't keep 'em all, only about half but we're big enough to obtain adequate slack with that 10%. We're also pretty brutal about firing incompetents in wartime as opposed to the political pressure to keep them in situations short of existential war.
Yes I can understand that for when I take my dog for a run and slip the leash he senses the freedom, takes off and loves it. In a 20 year career how many times would a soldier experience the thrill of being allowed to run free?Depends on the Soldier... ;)
With ROEs...bureaucratic "yes-men" which is not what makes for an aggressive and operationally effective army.Totally true but also absolutely unavoidable in a democracy in peacetime. Democracies do not want, will not tolerate aggressive and operationally effective Armies in peacetime. How they expect a lollygagging Army to suddenly get great if confronted is an interesting sociological question...
What I don't get about Afghanistan is why otherwise outstanding soldiers go meekly to the slaughter with one hand tied behind their backs. Maybe the way around all this is to make greater use of private paramilitaries and thereby skirt around the aspects which reduce the efficiency of the US military in the field.Vast overstatement. The casualty rate in Afghanistan is relatively miniscule (others may differ...). You still misunderstand that operation and the majority of them will agree that one hand is tied but they are confident they can do okay with the remaining hand and a foot or two... :D

It is important to recognize that the US is NOT at war. The same things that adversely affect US military performance in peacetime would also hobble private paramilitaries. So no joy there. It is hard for those not American -- it's hard for most Americans -- to realize how dysfunctional our Congress is unless confronted with a near disaster.

That Churchill quote has always been and is today pretty well accurate. :wry:

jmm99

08-12-2010, 03:34 AM

from JMA
This coming from a Brit is like the pot calling the kettle black!

coming from a halfbreed ?

Winston, after all, was only a Brit from Daddy's side (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lady_Randolph_Churchill) ! ;)

Cheers

Mike

William F. Owen

08-12-2010, 05:02 AM

OK gotcha. Now what I can't get my head around is soldiers going to war in places where there is no real national commitment to a result or where they operate under sever restrictive ROEs. Why do they do this? Doesn't make sense to me.
That IS the exam question!
Fear, honour, interest. Thucydides said it best! Wars are caused by politics and strategy requires a policy and strategy can only be realised in tactics.

jmm99

08-12-2010, 11:31 AM

The exam question ...

from JMA
....where there is no real national commitment to a result or where they operate under sever restrictive ROEs...

I'd suggest that the problem lies in confusion with the concept of "limited war", where that concept is considered to require "limited means" (in military strategy and/or tactics), as opposed to a "limited result" (in the policy end goal which underlies the war).

E.g., we (say the political masters) will conquer only the south 20 miles of the opponent's country - the "limited result". The means used do not have to be limited and may in fact take everything off the table - and use it. An example was Ike's back-channel proposition to the North Koreans, which would I suppose be patently illegal today (according to the ICJ) because it involved the threat to use nuclear weapons.

So, a "limited result" may be logical as a policy; but then all means necessary to that end goal must be employed.

Regards

Mike

JMA

08-12-2010, 01:48 PM

The exam question ...

I'd suggest that the problem lies in confusion with the concept of "limited war", where that concept is considered to require "limited means" (in military strategy and/or tactics), as opposed to a "limited result" (in the policy end goal which underlies the war).

E.g., we (say the political masters) will conquer only the south 20 miles of the opponent's country - the "limited result". The means used do not have to be limited and may in fact take everything off the table - and use it. An example was Ike's back-channel proposition to the North Koreans, which would I suppose be patently illegal today (according to the ICJ) because it involved the threat to use nuclear weapons.

So, a "limited result" may be logical as a policy; but then all means necessary to that end goal must be employed.

Regards

Mike

Mike I believe it is more that a lot of these minor interventions are token efforts. Help out a friendly country in trouble but don't go as far as you did in Vietnam and get sucked in. Then there is an element of political "smoke and mirrors".

For example it seems that the effort was moved to Afghanistan as a means to get out of Iraq without seeming to be "soft" on the guys who caused 9/11. (I have made my point elsewhere that it was enough to bring the Taliban to its knees rather than to take a full step into the quicksand of Afghanistan.)

I'm not sure how I would react if I were still serving and they tried to deploy me into one of these crazy wars.

Mike, tell me more about "Ike's back-channel proposition to the North Koreans" don't know much about that.

I can understand the concept of a limited intervention such as it would have been in Afghanistan if the US had gone home after the Taliban government had collapsed saying to the world "see what happens if you harbour people who attack the USA".

You are correct IMO in saying that a limited objective be given to the military and let them do it best way they can rather than ensure a limited result through restricting the means at the disposal of the military to achieve a result.

jmm99

08-12-2010, 06:12 PM

may be something that cannot be realized solely by resort to military means - or indeed one for which military means are horribly unsuited.

E.g., one end result desired in Vietnam was that the DRV ("North Vietnam") give up its sovereignty claims to South Vietnam. That end result was purely political-diplomatic. That result ultimately could only be realized by diplomatic means - absent the complete destruction of the DRV (which could have been done, leaving aside the consequences that might have flowed from that course of action and the voters' rejection of that COA in 1964).

Thus, limited military means were elected by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in an attempt (a hope ?) to bring the DRV around to our diplomatic position. We wanted the DRV to recognize the right of the GSV to exist, and refrain from infiltration into and subversion of the South. Any resemblences to Iran and Israel are, of course, completely coincidental.

So, we (US) embarked on a gradual escalation in the use of force (a "rachet strategy", if such can be termed a strategy, of McNamara). That war in effect consisted of three wars (in simplified form, three efforts): the effort against the North; the effort against PAVN main force units and their paths from the North to the South; and the effort against the Lao Dong-controlled NLF in the South. The bottom line is that Vietnam was an armed conflict which was long on tactics and short on a coherent strategy.

----------------------------------
Eisenhower and Threatened Nuclear Use in Korea is a subject of historians' spin - not as to the threat, which was made and involved transfer of real nukes; but as to whether the threat caused the North Korean and Chinese to agree to the armistice.

By way of background, possible use of nuclear weapons (and a very destructive and real strategic bombing campaign in the North and parts of the South) pre-dated Eisenhower - see Wiki, U.S. threat of atomic warfare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War#U.S._threat_of_atomic_warfare), and Bruce Cumings' 2005 Why Did Truman Really Fire MacArthur? ... The Obscure History of Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War Provides the Answer (http://hnn.us/articles/9245.html).

The Cumings article has an interesting comment by Curt Lemay (after two paragraphs describing the Korean strategic air campaign), which ties into the discussion above about "limited war":

This was Korea, "the limited war." The views of its architect, Curtis LeMay, serve as its epitaph. After it started, he said: "We slipped a note kind of under the door into the Pentagon and said let us go up there . . . and burn down five of the biggest towns in North Korea -- and they're not very big -- and that ought to stop it. Well, the answer to that was four or five screams -- 'You'll kill a lot of non-combatants' and 'It's too horrible.' Yet over a period of three years or so . . . we burned down every town in North Korea and South Korea, too . . . Now, over a period of three years this is palatable, but to kill a few people to stop this from happening -- a lot of people can't stomach it." (19)

(19) J F Dulles Papers, Curtis LeMay oral history, 28 April 1966.

Keeping the above in mind, we move on to Eisenhower, as to whom there is quite a bit of historians' spin, especially as to his beliefs as to the use or non-use of nukes (in Korea and generally). As is often the case, absolute truth is not part of the available record.

Here are two views, starting with James I. Matray, Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/matray1.htm) (2001):

How Eisenhower managed to achieve an armistice ending the Korean War remains contested terrain. Historians acknowledge that Eisenhower entered office thinking about using expanded conventional bombing and the threat of nuclear attack to force concessions from the Communist side. The armistice agreement came on July 23, after an accelerated bombing campaign in North Korea and bellicose rhetoric about expanding the war. Most scholars, however, reject as myth Eisenhower's claim that Beijing was responding to his threat of an expanded war employing atomic weapons because no documentary evidence has surfaced to support his assertion.[31]

They contend that the Chinese, facing major internal economic problems and wanting peaceful coexistence with the West, already had decided to make peace once Truman left office. And Stalin's death in March only added to China's sense of political vulnerability, causing the Communist delegation to break the logjam at Panmunjom later that month before Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conveyed his vague atomic threat to India's prime minister for delivery to Beijing. Moreover, the nuclear threats of May 1953 were not clearly or forcefully delivered and were not substantively different from those implied threats that the Truman administration made in the fall of 1951, when B-29 bombers carried out atomic bombing test runs over North Korea with large conventional bombs.[32]

31. C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York, 1955),161-62; James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16,1956, 70-80; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY, 1963), 181.

32. William Stueck, The Korean War, pp. 303-307.

So, the threat is acknowledged, but not that the threat caused the Chinese to bend to Ike's will.

And, Beyond brinkmanship: Eisenhower, nuclear war fighting, and Korea, 1953-1968 (http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4737054/Beyond-brinkmanship-Eisenhower-nuclear-war.html) (excerpt available only - snip):

Granted, a few scholars have not hedged their bets regarding Eisenhower and the use of nuclear weapons. (4) However, as suggested above, the overall trend is exculpatory. As a result, a corrective regarding Eisenhower and his reputation is needed. The fact of the matter is that President Eisenhower was much more committed to the necessity, if not the desirability, of nuclear war fighting than most have been willing to accept. This article will illustrate the point by exploring the strong continuity and consistency in Eisenhower's thinking about nuclear war fighting on the Korean peninsula between 1953 and 1960, and in 1968 during the Pueblo Crisis.

Much has been written about the administration's debate in the winter and spring of 1953 about whether to expand the Korean War with nuclear weapons and compel the North Koreans and Chinese to accept an armistice. Most agree that by the time of a critical meeting of the NSC on May 20, 1953, it seemed that serious discussions had already led to some planning, in principle, to expand the war with nuclear weapons in the future if the conflict did not end. (5) In addition, signals of this intention may have been conveyed to Communist leaders by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and others. Because the North Koreans and Chinese agreed to an armistice that June, it cannot be known for sure whether the administration had really agreed to conduct a future campaign of nuclear compellence. An archival "smoking gun" has not been found that would conclusively settle the issue.

To buttress the case that Eisenhower was a seriously committed nuclear war fighter at least on the Korean peninsula, this article will examine the argument from several perspectives. First, the debates within the administration about how to respond to a renewal of the Korean War by the Chinese and North Koreans will be looked at. Then, the discussion about Eisenhower's approval of the introduction of dual-capable nuclear weapons systems into Korea in 1957 will be examined. Finally, President Eisenhower's forceful and affirmative comments about the first use of nuclear weapons in Korea, made after 1953 and throughout his post-presidential years, will be surveyed. Viewed in its entirety, over a period of years, the continuity in Eisenhower's beliefs about the subject becomes clear and striking. The record suggests that Eisenhower assertively promoted the utility of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as will be shown, even during the Pueblo Crisis of 1968, he strongly urged the Johnson administration to consider the use of nuclear weapons.

In this view, Eisenhower and J.F.Dulles made the threat, but also intended to carry it out.

So, analogizing to a game of Chicken, was Ike the total drunk driver, who tapes over his eyes, enters the vehicle and throws away the steering wheel - or was he someone who was play acting all of that ? And how did the Chinese view him ? The answers to the mind game part of all this are not really known.

Regards

Mike

Pete

08-12-2010, 07:06 PM

So, we (US) embarked on a gradual escalation in the use of force (a "rachet strategy", if such can be termed a strategy, of McNamara). That war in effect consisted of three wars (in simplified form, three efforts): the effort against the North; the effort against PAVN main force units and their paths from the North to the South; and the effort against the Lao Dong-controlled NLF in the South. The bottom line is that Vietnam was an armed conflict which was long on tactics and short on a coherent strategy.
As I understand it the reason we sent in combat troops in 1964 was as a short-range expedient to avoid losing, and our ratcheting up of the effort went on from there. I believe it was the spectre of the Chinese coming in the way they had in Korea that prevented us from invading North Vietnam and taking the place over. The so-called neutrality of Laos was our reason for not going in there and cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Fuchs

08-12-2010, 07:53 PM

Do you write this stuff Fuchs? I like it. It is only with verbal brutality that those supposedly at the wheel of this out of control vehicle can be woken up. But will it be too late.

It's my blog.

JMA

08-12-2010, 09:53 PM

So, analogizing to a game of Chicken, was Ike the total drunk driver, who tapes over his eyes, enters the vehicle and throws away the steering wheel - or was he someone who was play acting all of that ? And how did the Chinese view him ? The answers to the mind game part of all this are not really known.

Regards

Mike

Whatever happened it was probably scary enough... as was the Cuban missile crisis. Then in one of the Indo-Pakistan conflicts such threats were exchanged.

So does the world really need a whole bunch of less stable countries to develop nukes?

As I said I believe that there should be no more nuclear armed countries.

Certainly no madman in North Korea nor a mad mullah in Iran should have a button to press... and the West should have the courage make sure that does not happen.

JMA

08-12-2010, 09:54 PM

It's my blog.

Well done, there's good stuff there.

JMA

08-12-2010, 09:55 PM

As I understand it the reason we sent in combat troops in 1964 was as a short-range expedient to avoid losing, and our ratcheting up of the effort went on from there. I believe it was the spectre of the Chinese coming in the way they had in Korea that prevented us from invading North Vietnam and taking the place over. The so-called neutrality of Laos was our reason for not going in there and cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

So what were the strategic errors made?

Pete

08-12-2010, 10:41 PM

jmm99

08-13-2010, 12:14 AM

HT to Bourbon for highlighting this resource, Baptism By Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=11085).

Two estimates (released as part of the June 2010 package) are relevant to the possible use of nukes during the 1953-1954 Eisenhower administration.

8 Apr 1953, SE-41 Special Estimate: Probable Communist Reactions, etc.... (http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/NIEEstimates/1953-04-08.pdf)

1202

8 Mar 1954, SNIE 100-2-54 Special National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Reactions of Communist China, etc..... (http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/NIEEstimates/1954-03-08.pdf)

1203

The materials I cited re: Ike and nukes are 2005 or earlier.

Cheers

Mike

Bob's World

08-13-2010, 09:39 AM

The main strategic error was in not having a strategy, other than the hope that attrition would wear down the NVA and VC. The Harry Summers book On Strategy has a Clausewitzian critique of how the war was fought.

No, our main strategic error was not allowing, and then recognizing the results of the scheduled Vietnam-wide elections of 1956. We overstated the role of ideology in such popular movements then, much as we do today, and took an unsustainable position of supporting the illegitimate government in the South that WE wanted, rather than being willing to work with a much more legitimate government for the entire nation (North and South reunited) that the the majority of the people who actually lived there wanted.

Yes there were many valid reasons we used then to rationalize this decision, just as there are many valid reasons we use today. But it does not matter how "valid" the reasons, one simply cannot overcome the fatal strategic flaw of throwing one's lot in with an illegitimate government. Everything after that was tactics. Vietnam was a pawn on a global chess board, and we got ourself into a position where we had to focus so much on saving that one pawn we forgot it was just a pawn. We lost sight of the big picture, and we lost sight of out national values. These are the real lessons of Vietnam that I think serve us best today as we wrestle with issues like AQ, a "Caliphate", Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

jmm99

08-13-2010, 03:34 PM

which has general relevance to the topic at hand and the current world; and particular relevance to the question of elections, "democracy" and legitimacy:

from BW
No, our main strategic error was not allowing, and then recognizing the results of the scheduled Vietnam-wide elections of 1956.

Let us not argue about whether elections were "scheduled"; what the 1954 Geneva Accords actually "accorded"; and who was bound to be "accorded" by those "accords". Solely for purposes of this discussion, I will accept that Vietnam-wide elections were scheduled for 1956. You get to pick the "scheduled date", unless you actually have found a scheduled date (which, if it exists, would be of great interest to me).

The first thing we have to do (in writing this alternative history) is to see whether we disagree as to the likely results of that hypothetical election. Now, since you are the proponent, I should say that you go first. But, to get this thing moving, I'll give my take.

In 1956, the North's population was at ~ 15M; the South's at ~ 12M. By 1956, Vo Nguyen Giap, but more so Truong Chinh, had pretty much cleaned up the North.

Chinh and Giap had early on collaborated in writing Van de dan cay ("The Peasant Question"), originally published in Hanoi in 1937 and 1938, with the authors using the pseudonyms Qua Ninh and Van Dinh. Chinh (General Secretary of the Lao Dong) was so zealous in the Land Reform Campaign of 1953-1956 (another collaboration with Giap) that he had to be put on the shelf. That campaign was very effective in neutralizing (killing, detaining or converting) "counter-revolutionaries". Sources for my ramblings are from the online docs which can be downloaded from here, Writings by and about Important Communist Leaders (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/commlead.html#giap).

The bottom line (IMO) was that Uncle Ho in a 1956 election would have been assured of the votes in the North that he actually received in the North's elections (where a 90% win would have shown the presence of too many "counter-revolutionaries"). To those Northern votes, we can fairly safely add roughly 1/3 of the votes in the South - the Viet Minh controlled ~ 1/3 of the South's population when the fighting stopped in 1954. So, Ho and the Lao Dong win (nationwide votes: ~ 2/3 Ho; ~ 1/3 Others).

If you agree that would have been the probable result, you can continue with your alternative history of what then would have ensued in the South and for Vietnam as a whole (we know what actually happened in the North); and I suppose you should include what would have happened in Southeast Asia as a region (since that was the real prize, not Indochina). I'm sure you will include the good, the bad and the ugly.

Regards

Mike

Pete

08-13-2010, 04:08 PM

No, our main strategic error was not allowing, and then recognizing the results of the scheduled Vietnam-wide elections of 1956.
Domestic U.S. politics were a major factor in LBJ's decision to send combat battalions to Vietnam; the first to arrive there were Marines to secure the airbase at Da Nang in March 1965. Truman, Eisenhower and JKF had wisely declined to get the U.S. heavily involved in Vietnam, except for aid to the French and later U.S. "advisors" to the South Vietnamese.

However, when it looked as though South Vietnam might fall in 1964-65, LBJ didn't want to be blamed as the president who lost Vietnam -- he and most Democrats remembered that the Republicans had made much hay over "Who lost China" starting in 1947. Hence our initial commitment of combat troops to Vietnam was made to avoid losing, but without having a long-range plan. Then our escallation followed in the hope that attrition of the NVA and VC might reach a tipping point.

It is ironic that in the presidential campaign of 1964 LBJ portrayed himself as the more reasonable of the two candidates -- one of his TV campaign ads showed a little girl followed by a nuclear mushroom cloud, as though that was what would happen were Barry Goldwater to be elected.

Today national policy in Iraq and Afghanistan is in part driven by the desire of Obama and the Democrats to avoid the blame for losing those wars by making premature withdrawals. What we have as a result is this hybrid policy of staying the course but with deadlines for leaving.

Bob's World

08-13-2010, 06:43 PM

which has general relevance to the topic at hand and the current world; and particular relevance to the question of elections, "democracy" and legitimacy:

Let us not argue about whether elections were "scheduled"; what the 1954 Geneva Accords actually "accorded"; and who was bound to be "accorded" by those "accords". Solely for purposes of this discussion, I will accept that Vietnam-wide elections were scheduled for 1956. You get to pick the "scheduled date", unless you actually have found a scheduled date (which, if it exists, would be of great interest to me).

The first thing we have to do (in writing this alternative history) is to see whether we disagree as to the likely results of that hypothetical election. Now, since you are the proponent, I should say that you go first. But, to get this thing moving, I'll give my take.

In 1956, the North's population was at ~ 15M; the South's at ~ 12M. By 1956, Vo Nguyen Giap, but more so Truong Chinh, had pretty much cleaned up the North.

Chinh and Giap had early on collaborated in writing Van de dan cay ("The Peasant Question"), originally published in Hanoi in 1937 and 1938, with the authors using the pseudonyms Qua Ninh and Van Dinh. Chinh (General Secretary of the Lao Dong) was so zealous in the Land Reform Campaign of 1953-1956 (another collaboration with Giap) that he had to be put on the shelf. That campaign was very effective in neutralizing (killing, detaining or converting) "counter-revolutionaries". Sources for my ramblings are from the online docs which can be downloaded from here, Writings by and about Important Communist Leaders (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/commlead.html#giap).

The bottom line (IMO) was that Uncle Ho in a 1956 election would have been assured of the votes in the North that he actually received in the North's elections (where a 90% win would have shown the presence of too many "counter-revolutionaries"). To those Northern votes, we can fairly safely add roughly 1/3 of the votes in the South - the Viet Minh controlled ~ 1/3 of the South's population when the fighting stopped in 1954. So, Ho and the Lao Dong win (nationwide votes: ~ 2/3 Ho; ~ 1/3 Others).

If you agree that would have been the probable result, you can continue with your alternative history of what then would have ensued in the South and for Vietnam as a whole (we know what actually happened in the North); and I suppose you should include what would have happened in Southeast Asia as a region (since that was the real prize, not Indochina). I'm sure you will include the good, the bad and the ugly.

Regards

Mike

MIke,

I may have overstated "scheduled", perhaps a less definitive term is appropriate. I also don't want my point to be that Ho would have won (which it appears he would have), but rather that we are best served strategically in these situations by working with whomever receives (through whatever process they apply) some writ of legitimacy recoginzed by the affected populaces.

By reinforcing what the people want, I am confident that we ultimately work our way into stronger, more mutually benficial relationships than we do when we instead try to force a solution that is wanted by us alone. Such forced solutions are certainly not legitimate to begin with, and not likely to become legitimate anytime soon. As these governments later run afoul of their populaces we then tend rush in to "support our ally," which I believe serves primarily to reinforce the postion of the insurgent challenger.

We tend to seek shortterm gains/solutions that grow into inevitable longterm losses/problems. Better to take a longer view, manipulate outcomes less, and be more open to working with those who we may initially be at odds with politically or ideologically so long as we assess that they represent what their populaces want. Postions that are truly "beyond the pale" are rarely sustainable, and we help to smooth those rough edges off better by working with, rather than working against.

jmm99

08-13-2010, 10:40 PM

and the exact era in which those facts existed. That applies to Vietnam, but also to all other Small Wars we attempt to analyze. We do well to realize that the Lessons Learned are learned from the distinct component parts of each Small War. E.g., Small War 1 might have been in the end a disaster for the incumbant, but may have tucked away a jewel of a program - which just might be the winning difference in Small War 2.

Others may disagree, and this is solely my personal opinion; but I suggest that generalties only provide a starting point for the tough work which is implementation of those generalities. Implementation is made tougher by the nasty habit of armed conflicts to morph over time.

Vietnam 1956 was not Vietnam 1966; and definitely not Vietnam 1976 (at which time, they had a big celebration in Ho Chi Minh City for the US Declaration of Independence, some of whose ringing phrases were included in original DRV Constitution). OK, I lied about the celebration; but inclusion of the phrases is no lie. As the re-education camps opened in the South, the fine phrases became hollow indeed.

Let's go back to 1956 and Vietnam. At that time, we'd find the newly-founded American Friends of Vietnam (http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=1442) (a review by Edwin Moise, whose webpages I cited, of Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975).

These American Friends were organized to support Diem; and they included such rabid right-wing reactionaries as Senators Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Mike Mansfield; Justice William O. Douglas and oft-times Socialist candidate Norman Thomas. The last might be thought a surprise, until one reads the obit of AFV's founder, Joseph A. Buttinger, Nazi Fighter And Vietnam Scholar, Dies at 85 (http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/nyregion/joseph-a-buttinger-nazi-fighter-and-vietnam-scholar-dies-at-85.html), whose opinions (like those of Norman Thomas) also morphed in time (snip from obit):

Working with refugees in Vietnam in the 1950's, he became immersed in the history, culture and politics of that nation. He formed an organization, American Friends of Vietnam, and became a friend and supporter of the ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem. Later, disillusioned with Diem's dictatorial ways, Mr. Buttinger renounced him.

Despite having no formal education beyond the sixth grade, he became a respected historian and analyst of current events in Vietnam. As the United States went to war with Vietnam, his scholarship was in demand. His evolving view was that American policy was historically and morally misguided and doomed to fail.

Of course, that was more Vietnam 1966 than Vietnam 1956.

One of those 1956 members (yup, JFK) delivered remarks at the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon in the Hotel Willard, Washington, D.C., June 1, 1956 (http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-Pres/1956/002PREPRES12SPEECHES_56JUN01.htm).

Let us briefly consider exactly what is "America's Stake in Vietnam":

(1) First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. In the past, our policy-makers have sometimes issued contradictory statements on this point - but the long history of Chinese invasions of Southeast Asia being stopped by Vietnamese warriors should have removed all doubt on this subject.

Moreover, the independence of a Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essential to the economy of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia - and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.

(2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment - it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.

(3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring - we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence - Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest - then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

(4) Fourth and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one - for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of war in Indo-china - a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat to such war is not now altogether removed form the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem. And the key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble.

and to the point of "What Is To Be Done":

But the responsibility of the United States for Vietnam does not conclude, obviously, with a review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs to be done; much more, in fact, than we have been doing up to now. Military alliances in Southeast Asia are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Communism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As Ambassador Chuong has recently said: "People cannot be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their freedom from foreign domination as well ass freedom from misery, oppression, corruption."

I shall not attempt to set forth the details of the type of aid program this nation should offer the Vietnamese - for it is not the details of that program that are as important as the spirit with which it is offered and the objectives it seeks to accomplish. We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution - a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer - far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally controlled. Such a Revolution will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam. We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government. We must assist the inspiring growth of Vietnamese democracy and economy, including the complete integration of those refugees who gave up their homes and their belongings to seek freedom. We must provide military assistance to rebuild the new Vietnamese Army, which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh Armies across the border.

And finally, in the councils of the world, we must never permit any diplomatic action adverse to this, one of the youngest members of the family of nations - and I include in that injunction a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free Vietnam was a party to that agreement - and neither the United States nor Free Vietnam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the Agreement they now seek to enforce.

So, where did the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, "American Friends of Vietnam", drop the ball ?

Regards

Mike

Pete

08-13-2010, 11:26 PM

The invention of nukes screwed up everything. Before they came along military campaigns could be followed through to a satisfactory conclusion, but from 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union the fear of triggering off a world-wide conflict has prevented us from doing things that might upset the applecart.

MacArthur deserved to be relieved of command -- don't get me wrong on that -- but he had a point when he said, "There is no substitute for victory." I was born in 1952 but as far as I know no U.S. president during my lifetime committing troops to combat has ever told the Pentagon: "Win this war in three years or else. Design a plan for winning and tell me what you need. I'll mobilize the country and get the State Department and all of the other parts of the Government on board."

In the absence of that kind of committment we fight these small wars one combat tour at a time with no end in sight, "Mowing the grass" as it were.

Bob's World

08-14-2010, 11:39 AM

Mike,

The key to studying history in order to help with current and future problems is, IMO, not to memorize all of the "facts" (true facts are elusive in history, and as you have pointed out, material facts are even more elusive and rarer still), and not to dwell in "generalities" either; but rather to search for commonalities that are also material to understanding the nature of the problem, and there by shedding insights on why certain approaches to it were either successful or failed in producing desired results.

There is no money in re-fighting Vietnam. There were many great programs applied there, and tremendous efforts by hundreds of thousands of US personnel. Yet it all added up to a loss. Why? Many reasons, of course, but as I look at that war in the context of hundreds of other similar conflicts the most essential material commonality that I draw is this issue of Legitimacy of government as perceived by the relevant populace.

If one backs a leader perceived as legitimate at home (his, not ours), one will likely prevail. If one backs a leader perceived as illegitimate at home, one will likely fail, regardless of how hard or how smart one approaches the problem.

We still confuse "official" government as equating to "legitimate" government; and put far too much emphasis on who's legitimacy WE recognize over that that is recognized by the relevant populace.

jmm99

08-15-2010, 05:48 PM

Hi Bob,

Moving away from that topic, and sticking more to areas of less specific "COIN" contents and discontents, how do Tim Lomperis' constucts of "legitimacy" fit (or not) with your own ideas on "legitimacy".

He has been pushing his ideas on "legitimacy" since the 1980s, with first the issues of Domestic Legitimacy:

1211

and also the related issues with External Legitimacy:

1212

His constructs are most fully developed in his 1996, From People's War to People's Rule (http://www.amazon.com/Peoples-War-Rule-Insurgency-Intervention/dp/0807822736), in the context of case studies of various "insurgencies" (he touches on several dozen, but looks to Vietnam I and II, China, Greece, Philippires-Huk, Malaya, Cambodia and Laos as the key core cases).

You and Lomperis appear to be woofing at the same tree; but you may be finding different commonalities.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World

08-15-2010, 06:01 PM

Mike,

Nice pull. I am not familiar with his work, but I will look at this with interest. Thanks for posting this.

Bob

jmm99

08-15-2010, 07:32 PM

in Vietnam (525 MI Group in Saigon in 1972-73) - see CV (http://www.slu.edu/Documents/arts_sciences/political_science/Lomperisvita.pdf).

His latest writings are from 2004 and 2005. They dealt primarily with valid and invalid comparisons of Iraq and Vietnam ("commonalities" and "differences"); and less so with his "legitimacy" constructs.

Aid and Comfort to Our Enemies (http://www.viet-myths.net/Session16T.htm)

Iraq: The Vietnam War We Cannot Afford to Lose (http://www.viet-myths.net/lomperis_Iraq_VN.pdf)

To a Baghdad Victory Via Saigon (http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/7/6/pages40769/p40769-1.php)

The last article is in a nutty page by page format (unformatted text at top; picture below; I couldn't find a normal pdf or html page); but it does deal with "legitimacy" (e.g., p.9):

As the first president of an independent South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, at first, seemed to represent a legitimate Vietnamese nationalist leader. He had many American admirers in a Friends of Vietnam organization, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson called him “the George Washington of Asia.” But he grew autocratic and isolated, and was overthrown in a coup in November 1963. After some stability was achieved in 1965 by a military regime under General Nguyen Van Thieu, nationally elected delegates drew up a constitution in 1966. Presidential Elections were held in 1967 that put Theiu into the presidency democratically. Elections were held for the National Assembly, as were a second round of presidential elections in 1971 (even though all challengers to President Thieu had backed out by the actual balloting). Even though Allan Goodman has laid out several ways in which something of a civil society along democratic lines was emerging in local village politics and in constituent services provided by National Assembly legislators, [21] these politics did not go the full distance in nation building. The communists, and even political neutralists, were shut out of all these elections. The failure to incorporate the communists into the political process precluded the type of competitive politics that would have fostered the growth of real national political parties that would have engendered some checks and balances to a political system that left President Thieu with too many autocratic powers.

[21] Allan E. Goodman, “Conflict and Accommodation Within Legislative Elites in South Vietnam, Pacific Affairs 44, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 211-228

I agree with most of that, except for the concept of communist inclusion. That strikes me as pure Pollyanna given the history of North Vietnam. Of course, since they ended up with the South anyway, why not have brought them into the government before that. :rolleyes:

The more salient point to the quoted passage (IMO) is that "legitimacy" has a tendency to morph with events and with how leaders morph.

Lomperis is hard to peg re: the political spectrum - a bit eclectic and revisionist at times, perhaps ?

Anyway, he has some definite and long-winded ideas on "legitimacy".

Regards

Mike

slapout9

08-15-2010, 08:28 PM

jmm99

08-16-2010, 12:40 AM

as presented by Tim Lomperis, since there is no explicit third party in his diagram.

However, Slap, your instincts are correct and Karpman's Drama Triangle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karpman_drama_triangle) certainly looks applicable to an insurgency - incumbant (Victim), insurgent (Persecutor) and intervenor (Rescuer):

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/DramTri.png/774px-DramTri.png

and the intervenor in an insugency certainly has some of the problems faced by a Rescuer in a domestic relations situation, for example.

This may well be another good catch on your part where concepts well known to LE and the justice system can be helpful in "COIN". Perhaps, COL Jones as a former prosecutor agrees ?

On a related note, does anyone reading this know Tim Lomperis; and who could ask him to join the discussion ? IMHO: he would be a good addition to SWC.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World

08-16-2010, 01:57 AM

Question is who do you cast in the role of "victim" and who in the role of "persecutor"?

Governments faced with insurgency, or the US faced with broader ME terrorism, tend to cast themselves in the role of victim. Blame is heaped upon the insurgent, upon his ideology, upon those who "radicalize" him, etc.

I would argue that in true insurgency the victim is the populace. That it is governments that fail the people, and not the people who fail the government. Not that the entire populace will act out in insurgency, they won't. But those who do act out have a much broader base of support than the counterinsurgent is typically willing to admit.

As to the models, without reading his work yet, it appears to me that he is blending what I call "officialness" with what I see as "legitimacy" under an umbrella of what he calls simply Legitimacy. My take is that no outside party can bestow legitimacy. The best an outsider can do is recognize officialness. Legitimacy comes from the governed. It is a recognition of the right of those who govern to do so. No amount of outside recognition can overcome a perception of illegitimacy from the governed populace.

Just my first perception as I try to decode his charts. I need to read his words to see where he is truly going with this.

jmm99

08-16-2010, 02:49 AM

multiple Karpman's Drama Triangles, particularly where you have more than one intervenor (Rescuer).

1. Viewpoint slanted toward incumbant (Victim; e.g., GVN), as seen by its intervenor (Rescuer; e.g., US) against the insurgent (Persecutor; e.g., Viet Cong & its Rescuer, the DRV).

2. Viewpoint slanted toward insurgent (Victim; e.g., Viet Cong), as seen by its intervenor (Rescuer; e.g., DRV) against the incumbant (Persecutor; e.g., GVN & its Rescuer, the US).

3. Viewpoint slanted toward civilian population (Victim), as seen by its intervenors (Rescuers; e.g., ICRC, NGOs, etc.) against both the incumbant and insurgent (both Persecutors & also their Rescuers).

Keep in mind that Karpman's Drama Triangle is a transactional analysis game where the avowed motives are not the real motives, apparent "good guys" rapidly shift to "bad guys", etc.

Bob, probably the book is your best bet to understand Lomperis (the articles online only give some taste); although I've been slogging at his theories on and off for the last two years without becoming a convert. But then, I'm not a convert to your "legitimacy" theories either. Well, we can agree to disagree.

Cheers

Mike

slapout9

08-16-2010, 03:23 AM

Keep in mind that Karpman's Drama Triangle is a transactional analysis game where the avowed motives are not the real motives, apparent "good guys" rapidly shift to "bad guys", etc.

Yep, makes it all the more applicable IMO.

M-A Lagrange

08-16-2010, 06:42 AM

I tend to be like Mike: not agreeing 100% with the transactional theory but it does help to determine how you are perceived.

Basically, the problem is that it is not just what you are but also how you want the others to perceive you and how each position allows you to influence others. The victim does enjoy the victimisation and basically is calling to the persecutor to persecute her and the rescuer to save her. It is a position of power and not a real state of distress.
The victim will act in order to be harassed and then be saved. So rather than the population, I would place the host nation government in the role of the victim.
The insurgents could feet in, like during liberation wars of the 70th, but in the case of Afghanistan it does not translate the reality of their actions and propaganda.

The persecutor will then be either the loyalist external forces (ISAF and US) or the insurgents (Taliban), depending on what would allow the victim to enjoy her position. In fact in that diagram, when applied to politic, the most powerful position is the victim one. That’s mainly why it is not really satisfactory to analyse a situation.

The second position of power is the rescuer. The rescuer is the one who enjoys external recognition and takes direct advantage of his acts. But the rescuer needs a victim to justify his role. That is why, IMO, the rescuer cannot be the host nation government.
As example, the NGO will always try to place themselves as rescuer but also victim. Rescuer because they save the world, Victim because they are not armed and therefore exposed or by endorsing the role of population voice.
Applied to insurgency, you can come with the insurgents as rescuer or the loyalist external force. Actually, the legitimacy battle will basically be on who is the rescuer as both agree that protecting the population is their aim.

The persecutor is a quite passive position. Basically both victim and rescuer cannot exist without him. And he cannot exist without them while the victim and the rescuer can always justify their existence by the designation/creation of a persecutor. He is not the bad guy but the tool of the victim to be rescued and the tool of the rescuer to legitimate his position.
Groups like LRA, or the lightening path in Peru, tried to reverse that hierarchy through atrocities on the civilian population. The idea is that if the victim does fear the persecutor enough, he will become the rescuer by stopping his persecutions. The victim cannot therefore enjoy her position of being aggressed to be rescued but will enjoy her position of victim by being protected from being rescued by the persecutor. (Do not know if that is clear). Basically more the victim calls for rescue more she is persecuted and less she calls for rescue and less she is persecuted. It is the base of ruling by terror.
But I do not see that case being applicable to Afghanistan.

What is important to understand is that this is a dynamic diagram in which each position is dependant of the existence/creation of the others. And that no one is a passive actor, especially the victim.

Dayuhan

08-16-2010, 09:56 AM

Question is who do you cast in the role of "victim" and who in the role of "persecutor"?... I would argue that in true insurgency the victim is the populace.

I'd be curious to know what constitutes "true insurgency".

I agree that the populace is generally the victim. Often, though, the Government, the insurgent, and outside intervenors are all proclaiming themselves saviours - and generally pursuing their own interests - while acting as persecutors.

I'm not convinced that it's possible to generate a really universal theory of insurgency.... the differences between cases are too dramatic. In many ways trying to come up with a theoretical framework obstructs understanding, as it tends to create assumptions that may not be appropriate to any specific insurgency. Each needs to be examined and understood on its own terms.

(he touches on several dozen, but looks to Vietnam I and II, China, Greece, Philippires-Huk, Malaya, Cambodia and Laos as the key core cases).

I should look at that. I confess that I get extremely cranky when people treat the Huk insurgency as a separate phenomenon, rather than a subset of the continuing insurgency later fought (and still being fought) as the New People's Army. The Huk insurgency was not, realistically, defeated: it was suppressed for a while and subsequently re-emerged under a new name.

Bob's World

08-16-2010, 10:17 AM

I too recognize that every insurgency is unique. These differences are indeed dramatic. Equally dramatic, and far more helpful for drawing lessons that help to prevent or cure these unique events, are the similarities.

I see no downside to looking for universal factors when the COIN community has already developed universal solutions. How many times must I listen to some senior leader parrot "Development-Governance-Security"? Not to be argumentative but within those three broad lanes lies the cause of insurgency as well as the cure, so how and where then must one apply their energy for the desired effect? Too often we do as much harm as good, and often the good is as much the result of good luck as it is good planning. We can do better. We must do better.

Study of the human terrain, etc are all efforts to smarten up this engagement, but even if I understand the human terrain like a native, and I know the insurgent as well as he knows himself, I still am apt to F the whole thing up if I don't really understand what causes insurgency in the first place.

The afore mentioned "victim mentality" of governments faced with insurgency; and a COIN doctrine that presumes success in the preservation of the current government combine to steer engagement away from where it really needs to be within these broad lanes for a positive effect and tends to drive it toward engagement that is either ineffective or counterproductive. Thus why most COIN efforts are such long, drawn-out affairs.

When the intervening force sees itself also as the COIN force it exacerbates all of the above.

M-A Lagrange

08-16-2010, 10:44 AM

The afore mentioned "victim mentality" of governments faced with insurgency; and a COIN doctrine that presumes success in the preservation of the current government combine to steer engagement away from where it really needs to be within these broad lanes for a positive effect and tends to drive it toward engagement that is either ineffective or counterproductive. Thus why most COIN efforts are such long, drawn-out affairs.

Bob,

I believe also that in the case of Afghanistan, the fact that the government is differenciated from the external powers plays a great role in its capacity to play the victime.
More you want to give him its independance more you face the possibility that they will play the victim of an insurgency which is not the result of their faults but the result of the presence of an occupying power.
Unlike situation as Algeria this gives even more room for the host government to enjoy and abuse of the victim position.

If you add the fact that you place your self in the confortable place of the rescuer (by calling yourself the COIN force) this tend to exacerbate the possibilities for the host government to abuse of his even more confortable position of victim. Just because criticising victims makes of you quite automatically a persecutor... (Which is not always the case.)

In cases like Algeria, the combat to be the persecutor or the recuser between the 2 armed parties is much easier to identify and the population is "automatically" the victim. In Afghanistan, you find yourself with a middle man (the host government) who can claim to play the role of the population. in fine the victim/population has no voice in that game.

Dayuhan

08-16-2010, 10:54 AM

even if I understand the human terrain like a native, and I know the insurgent as well as he knows himself, I still am apt to F the whole thing up if I don't really understand what causes insurgency in the first place.

True enough... but if we try to reach conclusions about what causes "insurgency", generically, there is always a temptation to impose those conclusions on a specific insurgency where they may not fit. Similarities are not universalities, and when people become invested in certain generic conclusions they are often very reluctant to set them aside, even when understanding demands it. This can be a dangerous thing.

jmm99

08-16-2010, 04:39 PM

from Dayuhan
I should look at that. I confess that I get extremely cranky when people treat the Huk insurgency as a separate phenomenon, rather than a subset of the continuing insurgency later fought (and still being fought) as the New People's Army. The Huk insurgency was not, realistically, defeated: it was suppressed for a while and subsequently re-emerged under a new name.

You'd have to read the book and then give your opinion on how well Lomperis covered the situation. He goes back in time well before the Huks and also briefly covers NPA.

You have the viewpoint of someone who is neither government nor insurgent; and therefore closer to an NGO. Nothing wrong with that considering where you live; I'd probably do the same under the same circumstances - I don't have a big trust of governments or mining companies.

Regards

Mike

M-A Lagrange

08-16-2010, 04:54 PM

You have the viewpoint of someone who is neither government nor insurgent; and therefore closer to an NGO.

Hello Mike,

What do you call an NGO point of view?
I had several colleagues who would admite without any problem that they are closer to insurgents than any occupying power what ever insurgents may do. Just a question of principle.
Also, I know a lot of NGO which are closer to their funding master than you can imagine.

In Goma, NGO were crying for the FARDC to go and kill some insurgents (CNNDP, FDLR, LRA). But where also begging for MONUC to protect them. In terms of advocacy, they were all on the FARDC back and very little critic on the insurgents (CNDP or FDLR).

And when I tried to use the transactional sheme to criticise the NGO positions, former NGO staff students and prof in Paris were just shocked that I could even imagine that "rescuer" may not be just a good guy but actually depended on victims to exist.

Colonialement

M-A

Tom Odom

08-16-2010, 05:07 PM

And when I tried to use the transactional sheme to criticise the NGO positions, former NGO staff students and prof in Paris were just shocked that I could even imagine that "rescuer" may not be just a good guy but actually depended on victims to exist.

M-A

I applaud the fact that you even brought that point to light in front such an obviously pure-of-heart audience. Goma in my day was perhaps one of the most startling example of that phenomenon, albeit one in which the UNHCR was especially culpable.

I chuckled at the thought of asking the FARDC to "rescue" the NGOs by killing insurgents. I never could see the FAZ as willing to go after anyone who might actually be armed.

Tom

Tom

M-A Lagrange

08-16-2010, 06:24 PM

I chuckled at the thought of asking the FARDC to "rescue" the NGOs by killing insurgents. I never could see the FAZ as willing to go after anyone who might actually be armed.

Well FARDC have slightly changed from FAZ (But not so much, I reassure you). But the most interresting point is that NGO were putting themselfs as the victims (they did have objective reasons for that) and were pushing the adgenda of the NGO being the victims rather than pushing the adgenda of the population being the victim.
The idea was to push MONUC to have a more active role into supporting FARDC in conducting the operation. (And a more robust Chap 7 mandate).
This happened after some UK based NGO did not managed to have France and the Belgium sending troops to conduct a Artemis like operation in Goma.
Which was also the Kabila adgenda. (Not that they did not try, even the congolese catholic church went on a tour in europ to pleade the cause of the silent genocide of Bantu by the Nilotic...:eek:)

I believe that it illustrate quite beautifully how from persecutor/rescuer (Kabila/NGO) you can try to picture yourself as the "Victim" calling for a third part to come and rescue you.

jmm99

08-16-2010, 06:41 PM

was a generalized reference to the NGO that is "neutral" and aimed at fixing or lessening the humanitarian problems of the population without regard for whether the individuals are incumbants, insurgents or neutrals.

I realize that is a stereotype; and that there is considerable disagreement about what NGOs are and what they should do. In any given situation (whether it has reached the armed conflict stage or not - as defined by GCs), there can be a lot of Karpman Drama Triangles. Some of them will shift and some will not.

Colonialement - Vive les Marsouins et les Bigors (http://www.troupesdemarine.org/traditions/tradis/tradis1.htm) !

Mike

Tom Odom

08-16-2010, 06:54 PM

was a generalized reference to the NGO that is "neutral" and aimed at fixing or lessening the humanitarian problems of the population without regard for whether the individuals are incumbants, insurgents or neutrals.

Mike

I would say that is a fair description of what many (if not most) NGOs would have the greater audience accept. My expereince and perhaps M-A's suggest that the reality is all too often quite different. The entrance of an NGO regardless of definition, goals, or stated purpose changes the local conditions. Smaller NGOs mean lesser impacts. Massive responses can unhinge the local and even strategic balance in the area. That was the case in Goma in 1994 on into 1996. You could also make the case that NGOs with video cameras have true strategic effect; look at Audrey Hepburn in 1992 in Somalia. Finally I would state that fundamentally we must understand that at its heart an NGO is a business seeking work.

Best
Tom

slapout9

08-16-2010, 07:07 PM

Welcome back Tom, been wondering what happened to you and Stan?

M-A Lagrange

08-16-2010, 07:12 PM

Mike

Finally I would state that fundamentally we must understand that at its heart an NGO is a business seeking work.

Without entering in the debate of NGO being spies,disguised governemental actors and funding mechanism for insurgents... I concure with Tom.
But also, NGO have changed from purely "charity"/saving life oriented action to a fully political adgenda which is not as neutral as it first appears.

On that point, I would recommand to read the work of Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclos: Aide humanitaire, aide a la guerre.
But I believe that it is not translated yet in english.

M-A

davidbfpo

08-16-2010, 07:36 PM

This appeared on an email and appears to be an amalgam of thoughts, one author appears on SWJ regularly. Sub-titled:
America's internecine counter-insurgency debate is now making some progress, though not on a single predefined path.

Big compliment paid to Steve Metz:
Army War College professor Steven Metz’s 2007 monograph Rethinking Insurgency is a seminal—if under-referenced—work in the emerging understanding of insurgency. Metz helped move the field away from its 50s-60s roots in countering broadly “Maoist” Vietcong-style movements, incorporating a wider template of data on conflicts over the last thirty years, Metz particularly focused his research on the emerging blurring of crime and war. His eye was not on the Algeria of the 1950s but more fractured and chaotic places like Mexico, Somalia, and Afghanistan. The complex blurring of greed, grievance, and criminal insurgency promises greater challenge for aspiring counterinsurgents on tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Concludes with:
The narrow focus of the COIN debate in America will eventually end, but as long as irregulars defy state authority, police and military forces will employ a variety of means—some new, others stretching back thousands of years in origin—to combat them.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/john-p-sullivan-adam-elkus/strategy-and-insurgency-evolution-in-thinking?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=201210&utm_campaign=On-Demand_2010-08-16%2013:27

jmm99

08-16-2010, 08:19 PM

Unless Stan was left out in the bush somewhere, might we see his cranium raised here also. If so, you can keep me on the right path and he can lead me astray off of it. :D

Regards

Mike

Steve Blair

08-16-2010, 08:27 PM

Finally I would state that fundamentally we must understand that at its heart an NGO is a business seeking work.

Best
Tom

Quite true, Tom. I'd also add that in many cases the NGO is a business with an agenda (aside from 'simple' profit) seeking work. In some cases that agenda might be helping those in need, but that isn't always the case. And in some cases the agenda puts the NGO at odds with many in the region, including those they may be trying to 'help.'

Pete

08-16-2010, 09:40 PM

Best
Tom
Who was that Masked Man?

Tom Odom

08-16-2010, 11:56 PM

Who was that Masked Man?

That would be, me, Pete :D

Hi to all. Been catching up and at 33% strength it is tough getting back on track. Making progress but it is the proverbial 2 steps forward one step back.

Stan is still out there being Stan. He peeks in to see what is happening.

Again hello all and best regards,

Tom

Pete

08-17-2010, 12:04 AM

How'd your new artillery-sized pistol work out?

Dayuhan

08-17-2010, 12:58 AM

You'd have to read the book and then give your opinion on how well Lomperis covered the situation. He goes back in time well before the Huks and also briefly covers NPA.

Yes, I'd have to read it, though the chances of finding a copy in my corner of the world are remote. The classification of the Huk Rebellion as a "win" - and the consequent veneration of Edward Lansdale - has become so common that I admit to anticipating it, and getting cranky before being provoked. Guess we all have our hot buttons.

You have the viewpoint of someone who is neither government nor insurgent; and therefore closer to an NGO.

Less NGO, I'd say, than member of the populace, albeit one with the option of leaving. A remote option - we'd have to have a full scale war on before the wifelet would consider an exit - but more than most have. As discussed above, and NGO is involved and has an agenda; like most of the populace I'm not involved and have no agenda beyond wanting those with agendas to shoot each other elsewhere. Still, a different viewpoint when it's going on around you.

Tom Odom

08-17-2010, 12:32 PM

How'd your new artillery-sized pistol work out?

It is fine. Shoots like a dream. Long slide really tames 10mm and gives a very nice sighting plane. I found iron sights to be faster than an ACOG (Trijicon RMR) and much more natural to me as I kept wanting to sight along the barrel with the ACOG versus looking through the sight. I may tap a deer with it this fall.

Tom

SteveMetz

10-29-2010, 02:47 PM

Here's an idea I'm playing with as I continue to work on the "reconceptualizing insurgency" manuscript I've been struggling with for the past couple of months.

Internal conflicts involving a strategy of insurgency often arise in nations where there are poorly integrated peripheral regions. Governance in these places is a form of internal colonialism, with the core--often simply the capital--having a parasitic relationship with the periphery. The national government is seen as an outsider in the periphery. Develop programs are seldom enough to overcome this.

History suggests that the most effective method for forging a nation is involvement in successful interstate war. (This is what Mike Vlahos calls "sacred wars.") It took the Civil War and the world wars to truly make the United States a nation. The same happened in many other places such as Britain, France, and Russia.

In other words, states which have been involved in successful interstate wars are much less likely to have major internal, sectional conflicts, whether ones that take the form of insurgency or conventional civil war. (Failed external wars also do not serve the "forging" function, e.g. Iraq and Pakistan).

But, and here's the rub, the current international system constrains major interstate wars, thus preventing nations from undergoing the "forging" process that lowers their chances of facing major internal conflict.

There also seems to be a couple of other factors at play. First, the external war has to be big--"sacred" in Vlahos' term. India's wars with China and Pakistan, for instance, didn't work. Second, the "forging" effect of external war declines over time. E.g. post-Soviet Russia.

slapout9

10-29-2010, 03:02 PM

The "forging process" that is an interesting concept. I would say that requires leadership or as CvC says a Moral Center of Gravity.

Joske

10-29-2010, 04:18 PM

So if i get this right, your general idea is that insurgencies occur primarily in countries where certain groups do not consider themselves as part of the nation as a group, the lack of a feeling of shared identity troughout the nation, the fact that the people that rise up (insurgents) do not consider themselves part of the nation they are officialy part of. And that thanks to the lack of major wars between countries, which serves as a sort of bonding experience that shapes the nation as an identity, the chance that insurgencies occur increases.

This would be a valid conclusion if you would leave other potential causes of rebellion out of consideration, causes such as poverty, repression (political, cultural...etc),corruption...etc.So lack of a shared national identity would be a good addition to that list, but taking mismanagement by a governement and replacing it with lack of a national identity is everything but a valid conclusion.

Secondly, the use of war as a nation forger can just as well lead to a polarisation of the country and the creation of a sort of blind nationalism where the feeling of frustration towards the inept governement is simply replaced by feelings of hate towards a third party, and the persecution of anyone that criticizes the regime in any way by linking him to the hated enemy. A bit like the perpetual war in the novel "1984".

In the end the lack of a national identity can be a factor in rebellion, but arguing for the "forging" of national identities to prevent rebellions feels more like indoctrinating a group of people so that they will overlook the core issues that would eventually cause them to rise up, instead of actually adressing them.

mic

10-29-2010, 05:03 PM

If I read you correctly, you are using the history of states such as Britain, France, Russia, and United States, as examples of the nation forging process and that it may be applicable in the 20th and 21st century. (if this is not the case then feel free to shoot me down).

One idea to consider is to separate the nation forging process as it existed pre-20th century and afterwards.

WWI was a watershed in many respects and one of the main ones is in relation to nation forging in that before WWI there was general agreement among the larger powers in nation building (and indeed expansion or colinisation) by “right of conquest”. Following WWI, the general agreement was for self determination. The principle of self-determination can then be seen as a driver for nation forging via decolonisation and as a way to roll-back some of the "nation building/expansion" of previous centuries.

If you accept this "right of conquest"/"self-determination" watershed then countries such as Britain, France, Russia, and United States may not be good examples of how states can be forged today.

Global Scout

10-29-2010, 07:22 PM

This would be a valid conclusion if you would leave other potential causes of rebellion out of consideration, causes such as poverty, repression (political, cultural...etc),corruption...etc.So lack of a shared national identity would be a good addition to that list, but taking mismanagement by a governement and replacing it with lack of a national identity is everything but a valid conclusion.

where has poverty ever been the cause for rebellion?

Graycap

10-29-2010, 07:31 PM

Not only a succesfull interstate wars but a peace able to cast a strong legitimacy over the "winner" government.

In Italy the succesfull WWI was followed by the fascist insurrrection and coup. One of the reasons? The italian fiasco in Versailles.

In my opinion the impact of an external conflict is all about the strenght of the government at the end. Even a a victory could be a disaster.

For what about the current international system I recall Colin Gray saying: give war a chance!

slapout9

10-29-2010, 07:53 PM

where has poverty ever been the cause for rebellion?

America,The Civil Rights Movement.

Bob's World

10-29-2010, 08:24 PM

wasn't there a recent movie along these lines...Invictus?

There is something to the bonding effects of common challenge, but I would argue that it does not have to be war. It could be over coming a major financial crisis perhaps, such as the bonding we see in Americans who experienced the Great Depression. Or perhaps a sporting event such as the World Cup.

Such events are important, but I would put them in a supporting role, rather than as a decisive one.

Dayuhan

10-29-2010, 10:57 PM

Interesting idea. I'm not sure that actual war is required: I suspect that, for example, South Korea and Taiwan have derived a significant internal cohesion dividend from the presence of an immediate and proximate threat of war.

On the non-state side, AQ would stand out as an example of a violent non-state actor that draws its support and sustenance from conflict, specifically foreign intervention in Muslim lands.

Global Scout

10-30-2010, 03:21 AM

In other words, states which have been involved in successful interstate wars are much less likely to have major internal, sectional conflicts, whether ones that take the form of insurgency or conventional civil war. (Failed external wars also do not serve the "forging" function, e.g. Iraq and Pakistan).

I think there are a lot of variables that need to considered, clearly the U.S. and the U.K. were victorious in WWII, but can the same be said about France, the Philippines, China, Burma, Italy, etc.? Countries that were occupied developed resistance groups (during the WWII era most countries developed communist and non-communist resistance groups), which actually led to greater instability after they were victorious in ousting their conquerors. The Afghan resistance victory over the Soviets didn't result in a stable nation with a national identity, and clearly Iraq and Afghanistan won't be stable after we leave them.

Japan and Germany were defeated, yet remained relatively stable after WWII?

I think you'll have to explain away so many exceptions that the hypothesis will lose meaning.

Posted by Slapout,

America,The Civil Rights Movement. j

Incorrect, it wasn't a rebellion and it wasn't due to poverty.

slapout9

10-30-2010, 03:59 AM

Posted by Slapout,

j

Incorrect, it wasn't a rebellion and it wasn't due to poverty.

Clip from "The Poor Peoples Campign"...the march to the Washington Monument.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBkVLlZdAG4

Black Panter Party 10 Point plan.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPP0hiLuxdQ&p=55D6264643BE92EA&playnext=1&index=33

Violent Resistance by Stockley Carmichael
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGisMOY6M4c&feature=related

History of The Black Panther Party.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJYIFyd9FL4&feature=related

Joske

10-30-2010, 09:32 AM

where has poverty ever been the cause for rebellion?

The troubles in northern Ireland, the rise of socialism (potentialy also anarchism) during the industrial revolution period, peasant rebellions during the French revolution, The russian revolution, the tambov rebellion, MEND in nigeria,...etc

Off course it is important to note that poverty almost always isnt the only cause for rebellion, and other causes are generally also present.

Bob's World

10-30-2010, 12:20 PM

guys, not to take Steve's thread off track, but on this poverty issue what has to do is look past the poverty to what the populace perceives is the cause of the poverty.

In the American Civil rights movement it is very true that in large the African American populace was poor. It is also very true that they believed (rightfully) that they were denied opportunities to escape poverty that were granted to others as a matter of status. It is not poverty that causes rebellion, there are many politically satisfied populaces that live in poverty. It is the perception that your poverty is a result of government enforced inequity that drives populaces to rebellion.

Fixing such inequities is a long, slow road, and America is still not out of the woods on this one. More than Vietnam, it was Johnson's pressing for civil rights reforms that cost him the political stature and influence to run for a final term. He does not get the credit he should for the self-sacrifice and moral courage to push through three landmark civil rights bills that prevented the full eruption of violent insurgency that was building. Most of us don't appreciate how bad the racial insurgent tension was in the 60s, but Johnson saved the nation. The Civil Rights Act, the follow-on Voters rights act (as AAs were still denied access at the polls through outrageous literacy tests, and if a segment of the populace can't help pick leaders, they won't recognize their legitimacy over them), and then the final nail in Johnson's political coffin, the Fair Housing Act. This is COIN done right. It's too bad he could not escape the paradigm of Idealistic containment of the idea of communism to see that he was denying for the people of Vietnam the very rights he was throwing his career under the bus on for the rights of Americans. One of histories great ironies, IMO.

slapout9

10-30-2010, 03:05 PM

Internal conflicts involving a strategy of insurgency often arise in nations where there are poorly integrated peripheral regions. Governance in these places is a form of internal colonialism, with the core--often simply the capital--having a parasitic relationship with the periphery. The national government is seen as an outsider in the periphery. Develop programs are seldom enough to overcome this.

Hi Bob, I don't think the Civil Rights movement detracts from the thread at all. The South was seen very much as a poorly integrated peripheral region, until the Interstate Highway system came along. Also the Civil Rights movement was very much a Marxist driven movement. Most people just don't study Marx, kinda like Clausewitz but say they do. President Johnson did a lot but so did Eisenhower (more so then people realize)and Kennedy. And it was very much a rebellion against specif policies that turned into an armed revolution (straight up Marx). But most Americans have the attention span of about 15 minutes and Real American History is largely a Stealth subject IMO.

Global Scout

10-30-2010, 05:48 PM

Appreciate Bob's assist, numerous studies have indicated that poverty does not cause rebellions, that is simply one of the many rallying lines employed by those rebelling. Leaders count, because they create and exploit perceptions. Rebellion leaders to be successful in mobilizing enough of the masses, just as political candidates, have to adjust their message and focus issues based on the audience.

When we look at issues of national unity I think we're remiss if we don't look at the effects of mass media. A major war in itself will not unify a nation if there is no way of getting a unifying message (perception management) out to the masses. Both radio and T.V. (even print) have played key roles is promoting ideas that create a sense of identity. Furthermore television has had the effect of creating a national language (it lessened the impact of dialects and accents) over time. Years ago I read an interesting case study on the impact of T.V. on Italy, where prior to the the wide spread use of T.V. there were several dialects of Italian spoken and it is was very difficult for Italians to communicate with other Italians from different parts of the country. I would think it would be difficult to create a national unity without a national language.

Taking it one step further, what is the effect now of mass media (especially with the internet and satellite T.V./radio) on globalism? I think we're seeing more unity (there are of course outliers still) globally in the way of global values such as human rights, expectations of economic opportunity, etc. due to information leveling the playing field. I think this may reverse the impact that media had on building national identies and encourage people to identify with global special interest groups instead such as environmental issues, religious identity, ethic identity (Tibetian, Tamil, etc.), woman's rights, etc.

Rough thoughts that I think are worth considering.

slapout9

10-30-2010, 06:27 PM

Appreciate Bob's assist, numerous studies have indicated that poverty does not cause rebellions, that is simply one of the many rallying lines employed by those rebelling.

I have no doubt that there are such studies funded by rich special interests groups, much of the original Ecology movement was funded by Oil corporations because it supports the use of their products as opposed to switching to Nuclear Energy which was originally Eisenhower's plan. If you had grown up in the south as I did during that time you would not need a study to tell you that poverty (although not the main effort) was one of the primary drivers. One of the most common slogans and signs was the expression "No full time work for part time pay." Black people were paid half or less what a white person would be paid for the same job. This was part of the reason behind President Kennedy's push for a federal minimum wage law. Part of Bob's World way to truly counter an insurgency before it gets to bad.

I agree with your assessment about communications and again in our own country that was the idea behind the Public Broadcasting System(The President of the USA would have been able to literally flip a button and address the country in times of crisis) which is anything but Public now, most sponsorship is by private corporations not tax dollars as is commonly thought.

The NASA program linked the country together and helped produce our National Identity as a leader in technology. At the same time there was another program called NAWAPA which was going to do the same thing for the continental United States, but it was canceled. The current China Infrastructure building program would be an equivalent idea, which is why they are being seen as such a formidable future world leader.

Global Scout

10-30-2010, 09:33 PM

I agree with your assessment about communications and again in our own country that was the idea behind the Public Broadcasting System(The President of the USA would have been able to literally flip a button and address the country in times of crisis) which is anything but Public now, most sponsorship is by private corporations not tax dollars as is commonly thought.

We'll agree on the danger that major corporations present, and large media companies like Fox, CNN, CBS do more to shape public opinion and identity than the White House. I like that the idea that the man on the street can challenge government leaders (keeping them honest), but suspect the objectives of the corporations have little to do with keeping them honest, but instead keeping them in line with what's good for the corporation.

We'll just agree to disagree about poverty, but if everyone in the South was dirt poor then it wouldn't have been an issue. The issue wasn't poverty (IMO), but rather unequal treatment. A black person doing the same job as a white person gets half pay isn't about poverty, but about identity and discrimination.

The NASA program linked the country together and helped produce our National Identity as a leader in technology. At the same time there was another program called NAWAPA which was going to do the same thing for the continental United States, but it was canceled. The current China Infrastructure building program would be an equivalent idea, which is why they are being seen as such a formidable future world leader.

China is an interesting case study, they have a centralized government, and they were on the side of the winners during WWII, but immediately afterwards the communists and nationalists went at it full bore again. WWII didn't forge a national identity for China. Even with China's rapid economic growth and centralized policies they have a considerable internal stability problem with the Uyghers, Tibetians, and an emerging liberal class. India is another example of a nation (in name only) undergoing rapid economic development with a splintered society. So much hype over the Ghandi peace revolution that in fact accomplished very little, and India today is much worse than the American South ever was during the pre Civil Rights movement with their discrimination policies and the growing gap between the haves and have nots. With the exception of Brazil (which I know very little about) all the BRIC countries face enormous challenges. Russia is another example of a winning nation during WWII, and in reality they did more to defeat Nazi Germany than any other nation. While it did help forge a national identity, but that didn't equate into love for their government. It was suspected if Hitler wasn't so stupid and he sent the German army into Russia to liberate them from their communist suppressors they would have welcomed German's Army. Somethings we'll never really know the answer to, but it fun to ponder them. The only reason they didn't have a major insurgency in Russia after WWII was due to effective suppression campaigns directed against dissenters and suspected dissenters.

I personally don't think we're going to find a cookie cutter answer for insurgencies around the world.

slapout9

10-30-2010, 09:52 PM

We'll just agree to disagree about poverty, but if everyone in the South was dirt poor then it wouldn't have been an issue. The issue wasn't poverty (IMO), but rather unequal treatment. A black person doing the same job as a white person gets half pay isn't about poverty, but about identity and discrimination.

I actually agree with that. The term Civil Rights implies it is to correct Civil Wrongs meaning many or multiple. Poverty alone did not cause it, it was the combination of "multiple unequal" situations that finally kicked it off.

Know there is no cookie cutter approach, especially what works or may work in industrialized/western style countries may be completely wrong in other parts of the world.

I think national identity is often better achieved through the peaceful accomplishments of counties as opposed to what they do in war time.

SteveMetz

10-31-2010, 11:17 PM

This would be a valid conclusion if you would leave other potential causes of rebellion out of consideration, causes such as poverty, repression (political, cultural...etc),corruption...etc.

Thing is, the vast majority of nations which have poverty, repression, corruption, etc. never experience internal conflict using a strategy of insurgency. I think Westerners coming from the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment attribute those factors and conclude that not following liberal practices causes discontent and potentially insurgency. I'm just more and more convinced that we use that conceptualization less because it accurately reflects reality than because of our own mindset.

But what I was really getting at is that nations which have been forged by war are more resilient than those which have not.

Global Scout

11-01-2010, 12:36 AM

I agree with the first part of your assessment that poverty is not the leading cause for insurgencies, that is simply a figment of liberal imagination. In some cases it may argued that poverty equates to stability that is another thread.

I'm still not convinced that war forges a national identity that makes a nation resistant to insurgency. Both Japan and Germany lost major wars and yet they remained resistant to insurgencies. Most of Northern Europe on the good side of the wall remained resistant to insurgencies. Most of Canada (minus a few French separatists) remained resistant to insurgency. The UK didn't remain resistant, nor did any country in Southern Europe. S. Africa was forged by war (a war of liberation, then subsequent wars in Africa), but it wasn't resistant to insurgencies. Bangladesh was forged by war with W Pakistan, but it suffers from numerous insurgent groups. Thailand has a strong national identity (not forged by war), but it still suffers from insurgencies.

Are you only referring to Western countries? What qualifies as a good war that forges a nation and makes it resistant to insurgency?

jmm99

11-01-2010, 04:18 PM

"External War as a Pall[i]ative Against Insurgency" (that is, explicitly took on an international armed conflict as a cure, or part of the cure, for a domestic armed conflict) ?

Regards

Mike

tequila

11-01-2010, 05:22 PM

I think Steve is thinking more along the lines of Charles Tilly's state-making rather than nation-making. Check out Coercion, Capital, and Europaen States AD 990-1992 (http://www.amazon.com/Coercion-Capital-European-States-Discontinuity/dp/1557863687/ref=pd_sim_b_1), which puts war-making capacity at the center of state formation in Western Europe during the early modern period. Examples like Japan and Germany don't fit in the post WWII era because they already had strong states which came about through consolidation in preparation for modern war.

jmm99

11-01-2010, 06:12 PM

except as they express themselves in words.

So, back to the title: External War as a Palliative Against Insurgency. Put quite simply, I'm the Power That Be in Xistan. I have a domestic insurgency. I decide to embark on an external war to "palliate" the insurgency.

Has this happened (where the choice is explicit as I have stated) and was the palliation successful ? Simple answer: nation-state, time period, reference.

--------------------------

Looking up the word "palliative", the medical definition (http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/palliative) is less than a "cure":

Relieving or soothing the symptoms of a disease or disorder without effecting a cure

Regards

Mike

mic

11-01-2010, 07:21 PM

Argentina, Falklands War 1982, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/malvinas.htm, unsuccessful

The actual motivation for Argentina's April 1982 invasion was a more immediate threat to General Leopoldo Galtieri’s ruling military junta: internal instability in Argentina threatened to topple his dictatorship. Galtieri needed a uniting diversion, an outside conflict to distract the public and maintain domestic control.

jmm99

11-01-2010, 07:50 PM

that is what I was asking for.

Galtieri (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopoldo_Galtieri) bet wrong on the result of the armed conflict (he lost it and was removed from power in the end anyway, but the armed conflict bought him time). Which doesn't detract from the theory which Steve Metz qualified as requiring a successful external war.

Any others ?

Regards

Mike

CSC2005

12-10-2010, 04:03 PM

I am putting together a "Intel in COIN" class. I have found a whole host of great info on the site. Thanks to all who have posted. I am looking to insert a few one-minute film clips in my class that demonstrate the main points of COIN intel. Any thoughts or ideas. Which movies and which scences. I do not have time to show all of "Battle of Algiers" at this time. Thanks-

-Quantico

slapout9

12-10-2010, 05:24 PM

CSC2005

12-11-2010, 03:12 PM

Any movie will do. The class is for a LE group.

slapout9

12-11-2010, 03:51 PM

Any movie will do. The class is for a LE group.

Send me a plane ticket....I'll teach some good stuff:D:D

selil

12-11-2010, 05:43 PM

Any movie will do. The class is for a LE group.

My law enforcement/forensics students produced a GREAT set of videos, and we were looking at creating more. I'd suggest the same thing. Reverse the process. Make your students make the videos. If you've got the time. We made about 40 videos this semester. All ten minutes or so long.

slapout9

12-11-2010, 06:04 PM

My law enforcement/forensics students produced a GREAT set of videos, and we were looking at creating more. I'd suggest the same thing. Reverse the process. Make your students make the videos. If you've got the time. We made about 40 videos this semester. All ten minutes or so long.

Good idea Sam, here is an example and there are actually some very good techniques in here, each one about a minute long.

Ask a spy series from the TV show Burn Notice.
http://www.usanetwork.com/series/burnnotice/video/spytips/

slapout9

12-11-2010, 06:21 PM

You should get a copy of this CD. This whole CD is about Intelligence and collecting it in the WOT/GWOT/COIN/CRIME/MEAN GUYS WITH GUNS or whatever we are calling it these days.

http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/series/cia-confidential/4200/Overview#tab-Videos/06840_00

bourbon

12-11-2010, 06:31 PM

The film The Dancer Upstairs comes to mind, but it is more CT than COIN; some good intel scenes, iirc. Tropa De Elite (The Elite Squad) and The Untouchables come to mind with regard to criminal insurgencies. I will try to think of some specific scenes in them.

I have always liked this scene (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRXNNqNfQBs) in Men in Black, but never knew what to do with it.

IntelTrooper

12-12-2010, 04:15 AM

The scene in Star Wars: ANH where the alien tells the stormtroopers where Luke & company are going. :)

The scene in Green Zone where the guy is trying to tell the Americans about the meeting of all the high-ranking Iraqis and they scuff him up.

IntelTrooper

12-12-2010, 04:54 AM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1c4VEuts70U

Colors has a good scene summing it up, in my opinion.

Starbuck

12-13-2010, 02:09 PM

IntelTrooper

12-13-2010, 04:27 PM

What about the conversation between Lawrence and Feisal in Feisal's tent towards the beginning of LAwrence of Arabia?

There's also a clip where (Either Archibald Murray or Allenby?) tells Lawrence to "find out what sort of a man [Feisal] is". Another good clip.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSvik9WPigE
"I cannot fiddle, but I can make a great state from a little city."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2qA_csGH9co&feature=related
"The English have a great hunger for desolate places."

SWJ Blog

12-15-2010, 12:40 AM

Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/thinking-critically-about-coin/)

Entry Excerpt:

Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War
An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile
by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf)

I’ve carefully read your commentary concerning David Galula’s work on counterinsurgency and its applicability for today’s COIN campaigns and you seem to identify a special kind of lesson or warning than the ones that influenced the development of FM 3-24: “its tactical brilliance was divorced from a strategic purpose. So don’t repeat the same mistake. After all, France lost Algeria”. So, why do you think that by embracing Galula’s tactical brilliance, we tend to lose sight of the art of strategy?

That has been the whole problem with the COIN narrative that developed at least in US Army circles since the end of the Vietnam War. It was, and is, premised on the idea that the Vietnam War could have been won by better counterinsurgency tactics and operations. This is the basic nugget of an idea that had a snowball effect; in the 1980s with Andrew Krepinevich’ The Army and Vietnam, then in the 1990s with John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, and more currently many of the writings of Colonel Robert Cassidy and others.

The idea of a better war through improved counterinsurgency tactics has come to define causation in the Iraq war too. Recent books like Tom Ricks’s duo of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq and Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq offers the notion of a bumbling, fumbling conventional army that is doing counterinsurgency incorrectly, but because a better and enlightened general comes onto the scene combined with a few innovative new officers at the lower levels who figure out how to do counterinsurgency by the classic rule and voila the operational Army is reinvented and starts doing the things differently. And it is because the Army does things differently on the ground that it produces a transformed situation, as the narrative states. It’s the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy.

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf)

Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

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CSC2005

12-15-2010, 06:46 PM

Guys

Thanks for the ideas. They are great. I have already pulled a couple of them into my class. thanks

Art

SWJ Blog

12-23-2010, 12:00 PM

Tossing the Afghan COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/tossing-the-afghan-coin/)

Entry Excerpt:

Tossing the Afghan COIN (http://www.thenation.com/article/157154/tossing-afghan-coin) by Michael A. Cohen at The Nation. BLUF: "...what should really be taken away from the US military's experience over the past ten years is not that the United States understands how to fight and win population-centric counterinsurgencies but that counterinsurgencies are as violent and inconclusive as any other conflicts, and that the United States should avoid such wars at all costs."

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SWJ Blog

12-23-2010, 12:14 PM

U.S. Army COIN Center SITREP (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/us-army-coin-center-sitrep/)

Entry Excerpt:

Here's the latest U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center SITREP (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/coincenterdec2010sitrep.pdf). From the Director's Comments: This SITREP highlights current initiatives in the Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare Communities of Interest to help keep you apprised of some important ongoing activities. It has been a dynamic time at the Combined Arms Center since the last COIN SITREP -- the COIN Center has been involved in several organizational changes -- creation of Mission Command Center of Excellence and the Army Irregular Warfare (IW) Fusion Cell -- intended to harmonize efforts across Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, and security force assistance communities; several extended trips to Afghanistan; and assumption of the mission to deliver COIN Seminars to deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) beginning in May, 2011.

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SWJ Blog

12-28-2010, 11:00 PM

U.S. COIN Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/us-coin-operations-in-anbar-an/)

Entry Excerpt:

Innovation,Transformation, and War: U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and
Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0804773092?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0804773092) (Stanford University Press) by Dr. James A. Russell (http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/faculty/russell.html) is now on the streets and available for purchase.

From Amazon's product description: Within a year of President George W. Bush announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, dozens of attacks by insurgents had claimed hundreds of civilian and military lives. Through 2004 and 2005, accounts from returning veterans presaged an unfolding strategic debacle—potentially made worse by U.S. tactics being focused on extending conventionally oriented military operations rather than on adapting to the insurgency.

By 2007, however, a sea change had taken place, and some U.S. units were integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect. In the main, the government and the media cited three factors for having turned the tide on the battlefield: the promulgation of a new joint counterinsurgency doctrine, the "surge" in troop numbers, and the appointment of General David Petraeus as senior military commander.

James Russell, however, contends that local security had already improved greatly in Anbar and Ninewah between 2005 and 2007 thanks to the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders—evidenced most notably in the turning of tribal leaders against Al Qaeda. In Innovation, Transformation, and War, he goes behind the headlines to reveal—through extensive field research and face-to-face interviews with military and civilian personnel of all ranks—how a group of Army and Marine Corps units successfully innovated in an unprecedented way: from the bottom up as well as from the top down. In the process they transformed themselves from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations into ones with a unique array of capabilities for a full spectrum of combat operations. As well as telling an inspiring story, this book will be an invaluable reference for anyone tasked with driving innovation in any kind of complex organization.

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SWJ Blog

12-31-2010, 06:30 PM

PI: COIN, CT Operations Fruitful in 2010 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/pi-coin-ct-operations-fruitful/)

Entry Excerpt:

Philippine Military: Counterinsurgency, Terrorism Operations Fruitful in 2010 (http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/295839/counter-insurgency-terrorism-operations-fruitful-2010-philippine-military) - Xinhua via The Manila Bulletin. BLUF: "The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) said Friday it had further reduced the strength of leftist and terrorist groups in the country in 2010, owing to its " successful operations" throughout the country."

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SWJ Blog

01-12-2011, 10:30 PM

Will China have to master third-party COIN? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/will-china-have-to-master-thir/)

Entry Excerpt:

In the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly (http://www.twq.com/currentissue/index.cfm), Ely Ratner, an Associate Political Scientist at RAND, asserts that one of the consequences of China’s rapid rise in global influence will be increasingly complicated and difficult security challenges for the Chinese state. Ratner believes that most Western analysts who study China’s future influence on global security have failed to take these challenges into account.

Ratner contends that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has made a thorough study of the lessons learned from the experiences of other rising powers in history. He claims that China’s foreign policy is attempting to avoid the errors made by these powers. However, Ratner asserts that China’s expanding commercial and political connections throughout the world, an unavoidable consequence of China’s need for raw materials and export markets, will lead to clashes with states and non-state actors that will acquire grievances against China’s decisions, methods, and actions. In addition, China’s eagerness to transact with authoritarian regimes otherwise shunned by the West may lead to surprisingly large “blowback” directed against Beijing.

It is highly likely that China will find itself using the same tools – covert action, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, proxy wars, third-party counterinsurgency, etc. – that other past global powers have used to defend their interests in quasi-colonial situations. Ratner recommends that U.S. policymakers take this estimate of China’s future security difficulties into account when formulating their own strategies, to including cooperation with China when security interests with the United States overlap.

Click here (http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Ratner.pdf)to read this interesting paper.

Nothing follows.

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SWJ Blog

01-15-2011, 12:41 PM

COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/coin-manpower-ratios-debunking/)

Entry Excerpt:

COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges
by Joshua Thiel

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/647-thiel.pdf)

“Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency” (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army’s Handbook on Counter Insurgency, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/647-thiel.pdf)

Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict.

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SWJ Blog

01-16-2011, 04:41 PM

The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/the-new-physics-key-to-strengt/)

Entry Excerpt:

The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN
by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/649-chickering.pdf)

In a series of short reflections, Tom Ricks neatly summarizes major themes in current thinking on how to strengthen COIN. Sharing a trait that is evident in most current theoreticians, he omits serious discussion about how to recruit the populace of countries threatened by insurgencies to play an active role in COIN. This failure has several dimensions. I want, in this short essay, to address one of the most interesting of them, which relates to the importance of basic principles in physics to counterinsurgency warfare. I will focus, especially, on the difference between the “old” (Newtonian) physics and the “new” physics of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/649-chickering.pdf)

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

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SWJ Blog

01-29-2011, 01:40 PM

Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/counterinsurgency-conference-a/)

Entry Excerpt:

Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2011/01/26/counterinsurgency-conference-and-coin-qualification-standards.aspx) by Colonel Daniel Roper, U.S. Army COIN Center.

Conference: “To foster dialogue between ISAF members over tactical lessons from Afghanistan, particularly at the company level”—that was the purpose of a conference held at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London last December. The conference, organized by the British Army’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Centre, the US Army COIN Center, the USMC Irregular Warfare Center, and the ISAF COIN Advisory and Assistance Team, drew civilian and military academics and practitioners from Afghanistan, Belgium, the Netherlands, the US, and the UK. Speakers included the former commander of Regional Command-South; the US Army Command and General Staff College COIN Chair; a US Army brigade commander, the director of ISAF CAAT, the director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and an official from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. You can download the conference report here (http://usacac.army.mil/blog/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/coin.Documents/US-Army-COIN-Ctr_2C00_-London-COIN-Conf-Report_2C00_-DEC-2010.pdf).

COIN Qualification Standards: The COIN Qualification Standards are nine tasks and fifty-two sub-tasks submitted by Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), and approved by Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert M. Gates (see here (http://usacac.army.mil/blog/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/coin.Documents/100827_2D00_NUI_2D00_COIN-TASK-MEMO.PDF)).

RFI: "We would like to hear your thoughts on the COIN Qualification Standards and how they might help your unit prepare for deployment."

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SWJ Blog

02-10-2011, 06:15 AM

Is COIN Dead? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/is-coin-dead/)

Entry Excerpt:

Mark Safranski, aka Zenpundit, asks "is counterinsurgency dead? (http://zenpundit.com/?p=3733)".

"By that, I mean contemporary, mid-2000’s ”pop-centric” COIN theory as expressed in FM 3-24 - is it de facto dead as USG policy or is COIN theory formally evolved to officially embrace strong elements of CT, targeted assassinations, FID, “open-source counterinsurgency” and even bare-knuckled conventional warfare tactics?"What say you?

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SWJ Blog

02-28-2011, 01:21 PM

Gates On COIN: What Was Really Said? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/gates-on-coin-what-was-really/)

Entry Excerpt:

The problem with the coverage of this speech is that it combines hedges and qualifying preambles from disparate parts of the address and paints a picture of a Secretary of Defense disenchanted with counterinsurgency, and repentant about ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too much attention is given to the shaping of the arguments rather than their intended thrust. A closer read of the address reveals a very different, and very important message, one that is unfortunately struggling to get out.

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SWJ Blog

03-05-2011, 03:00 PM

COIN in Mexico? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/coin-in-mexico/)

Entry Excerpt:

COIN in Mexico? A Response to Robert Culp's Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/656-culp.pdf)
by Patrick Corcoran

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/691-corcoran.pdf)

It has grown fashionable in recent years to argue that the solution to Mexico’s public security difficulties lies in treating organized crime within the context of counterinsurgency theory. Many have made this argument, one of the most recent being Robert Culp here at Small Wars Journal. This is an unfortunate misreading of the security problems that are plaguing Mexico. While COIN theory offers a handful of sensible ideas, as an overarching philosophical guide, it is an imperfect fit for Mexico.

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/691-corcoran.pdf)

Patrick Corcoran is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies. He lived in northern Mexico from 2005 to 2010 and blogs daily about Mexican security and politics at Gancho (http://ganchoblog.blogspot.com/).

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SWJ Blog

03-11-2011, 03:30 PM

Seeing the Other Side of the COIN: A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/seeing-the-other-side-of-the-c/)

Entry Excerpt:

Seeing the Other Side of the COIN:
A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan
by Metin Turcan

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/701-turcan.pdf)

Though the international visibility of Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (TRMEs) such as rural Afghanistan has dramatically increased for almost nine years with the efforts of Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan, TRMEs have rarely been studied from Counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective. Although there has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan and the prospective policies of the international community to resolve the current insurgency, unfortunately, we are still unable to see the other side of the COIN at the tactical level, or view on the ground.

The utmost aim of this article is to attack many “dogmas” currently exist in the COIN literature, and challenges traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature. It also aims to lay out a different perspective regarding the COIN efforts in rural areas at the tactical level, a rarely studied level from COIN perspective. This is, therefore, not an article of problem solver. It may be regarded, instead, as an article of problem setting at the tactical level and concerning Afghanistan in general. It claims that the current situation in rural Afghanistan do not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature, and the current literature is, thus, far behind from figuring out what the real problem is.

Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul.
If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain.
If you have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.
-Sa’adi Shirazi (13th century Islamic poet)

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/701-turcan.pdf)

Metin Turcan is an ex-military officer who participated in many joint operations in southeastern Turkey (1999,2004,2006,2008), Iraq (1999,2003,2005) and fulfilled liaison and training missions in Kazakhstan(2004), Kyrgyzstan(2004), and Afghanistan(2005) before resigning. Currently, he is a PhD candidate at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

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SWJ Blog

03-11-2011, 04:00 PM

The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/the-fallacy-of-coin-one-office/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
by Scott Dempsey

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/702-dempsey.pdf)

General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he continues to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban's heartland -- and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or lost. COIN doctrine argues that with the right combination of security, governance, and development, there will be transformational impact that can marginalize insurgents’ control over local populations. Combined with multiple external factors mostly beyond our ability to influence, COIN was indeed part of the transformational improvement in Iraq – and provided sufficient stability for American troops to withdraw in favor of Iraqi government forces. The Afghanistan surge seeks to create similar results– which would ultimately create conditions for transfer of authority and responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces. A key component to GEN Petraeus’s COIN talking points cites the Nawa District of restive Helmand Province as a "proof of concept" for counterinsurgency dogma, and that the "Nawa model" is durable. However, during my year in Helmand Province, including nine months as the U.S. development lead in Nawa District, I saw a variety of factors that led to Nawa's success – none of which pass this test. Furthermore, to secure even the most basic degree of Afghan government-led stability will require a seemingly endless commitment to continue to fight and finance this effort.

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/702-dempsey.pdf)

Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 - August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.

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SWJ Blog

03-21-2011, 11:52 PM

Training for COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/training-for-coin/)

Entry Excerpt:

Training for Counterinsurgency Center (http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/coin/default.aspx) by Dr. Rich Kiper, Booz-Allen-Hamilton analyst, US Army COIN Center

In a previous post, the COIN Center explained the nine COIN training tasks and fifty-two subtasks approved by Secretary of Defense Gates. The latest COIN Center blog on the subject explains how the Army is developing a strategy to ensure that all deploying units receive instruction and training on the approved standards. Gates has stated clearly the importance of mastering those standards: “Units and individuals (both military and civilian) preparing to serve in Afghanistan must understand COIN and routinely assess the effectiveness of these standards in actual operational conditions.”Continue reading “Training for Counterinsurgency (http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/coin/default.aspx)”.

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SWJ Blog

04-05-2011, 07:50 PM

COIN Center Web Cast 15 April (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/coin-center-web-cast-15-april/)

Entry Excerpt:

The US Army COIN Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) is pleased to host Dr. Sarah Sewall (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/sarah-sewall) for an online web cast on 15 April 2011 at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU). The subject of the web cast is civilian casualties and their mission effect. Dr. Sewall teaches international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/), where she also directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights. Dr. Sewall is the founder and faculty director of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/index.php) (MARO) Project and is currently leading a study on civilian casualties with the United States Military.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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SWJ Blog

04-08-2011, 10:00 AM

COIN Center Webcasts on 14 April (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/coin-center-web-casts/)

Entry Excerpt:

The US Army COIN Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) is pleased to host Dr. Mark Moyar (http://www.markmoyar.com/) who will conduct two webcasts on key COIN topics: "Leadership in COIN" and "Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide." Both briefs are on Thursday, 14 April.

Dr. Moyar joined Orbis Operations (http://www.orbisops.com/) as Director of Research in July 2010 after serving as a professor at the Marine Corps University (http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/default.aspx). He travels to Afghanistan regularly to undertake research and consulting for the ISAF (http://www.isaf.nato.int/) COIN Advisory/Assistance Team and USCENTCOM (http://www.centcom.mil/). Dr. Moyar is the author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0300152760?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0300152760).

"Leadership in COIN" is 0900-1000 CDT (1000 EDT, 1500 ZULU), 14 April.

"Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide" is 1030-1130 CDT (1130 EDT, 1630 ZULU), 14 April.

As a reminder, don't forget Dr. Sarah Sewall's webcast presentation (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/coin-center-web-cast-15-april/) on Friday, 15 April, 1000-1100 CDT.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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SWJ Blog

04-18-2011, 01:21 PM

U.S. Army COIN Center Webcast 22 April (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/us-army-coin-center-webcast-22/)

Entry Excerpt:

The U.S. Army COIN Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) will be hosting Mr. Haider Mullick, a fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University (http://jsoupublic.socom.mil/) and the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (http://www.ispu.org/). He will present a webcast presentation entitled "Counterinsurgency Challenges in Pakistan and Effects on ISAF-Afghanistan."

Mr. Mullick advises and consults with U.S. government organizations on security, diplomacy, governance and development issues in South Asia. From 2009-2010, he conducted research for General David H. Petraeuson Pakistan’s national security policy. Mullick is also the President and Chief Executive Officer of Red Teaming Associates (http://www.redteamingassociates.com/). He is the author of Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies.

His brief will be 0900-1100 CDT (1000-1200 EDT, 1500 ZULU), Friday, 22 April 2011.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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SWJ Blog

04-28-2011, 05:00 PM

ISW / MCA COIN Event on 2 May (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/isw-mca-coin-event-on-2-may/)

Entry Excerpt:

Field Report: The Fight to Secure Helmand Province (http://fieldreportmajgenmills.eventbrite.com/); United States Navy Memorial, Washington, D.C., 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm, 2 May 2011. Sponsored by the Institute for the Study of War (http://www.understandingwar.org/) and the Marine Corps Association (http://www.mca-marines.org/).

ISW and MCA cordially invite you to a conversation with Major General Richard Mills (https://slsp.manpower.usmc.mil/gosa/biographies/rptBiography.asp?PERSON_ID=10&PERSON_TYPE=General), the Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/external/imef-fwd/index.jsp) and ISW’s President, Dr. Kimberly Kagan (http://www.understandingwar.org/user/kkagan). During their discussion, Major General Mills and Dr. Kagan will discuss counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, and the recent successes and future challenges in the coalition’s fight to secure southern Afghanistan.

More information and event registration may be found here (http://fieldreportmajgenmills.eventbrite.com/).

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SWJ Blog

05-01-2011, 09:30 PM

SWJ Coin (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/swj-coin/)

Entry Excerpt:

No, not COIN as in Counterinsurgency, though we do that to. Coin as in challenge coin -- you know, those little things the Army has been flinging around for many years and the Marine Corps eventually glommed onto as well, and now they're everywhere. Well, they're finally here now, too.

For your donation of $50, we'll send you a freshly minted SWJ Challenge Coin as a thank you gift. Wield it with the vigor and flair appropriate to its magnificence. For those interested in such details, these are 1 3/4" coins, the perfect size, not too tiny and not too big. Just like most wars.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/coin1.jpg https://www.paypalobjects.com/WEBSCR-640-20110401-1/en_US/i/scr/pixel.gif For multiple coins, contact us (office@smallwarsjournal.com?subject=Multiple Coins).

If you don't want a coin as a premium, you can still:

https://www.paypalobjects.com/WEBSCR-640-20110401-1/en_US/i/scr/pixel.gif

Prior donors please note, now that we've finally got these, we'll be rummaging through our records of past donors and contacting those of you that are coin-qualifying from prior support to see if you'd like one. You are of course always welcome to donate again, but we remember and appreciate what you've already done. We'll be in touch soon.

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SWJ Blog

05-06-2011, 01:10 AM

FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/fm-324-coin-manual-critique/)

Entry Excerpt:

A Civilian’s Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual…In 5-6 Pages
by Braden Civins

Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/749-civins.pdf)

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as “transcendent” and has “become the defining characteristic of the…new way of war.” This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.

Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/749-civins.pdf)

Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs.

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SWJ Blog

05-09-2011, 09:31 PM

COIN Stars (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/coin-stars/)

Entry Excerpt:

Maura O'Connor has the COIN Stars (http://www.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/coin_stars.php?page=all) at Columbia Journalism Review. BLUF: "Counterinsurgency bloggers help set the Afghanistan agenda and ten COIN blogs to read." Coming soon to the History Channel, right after Pawn Stars and American Pickers.

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SWJ Blog

05-26-2011, 02:40 AM

COIN and ISR Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/coin-and-isr-operations/)

Entry Excerpt:

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2011-05-COIN.pdf).

Cover Memorandum Excerpt:

Based on its investigation the Task Force arrived at the following observations:

- DoD lacks a common understanding of COIN
- DoD has assumed responsibility for COIN ISR by default
- DoD ISR is narrowly interpreted to mean technical intelligence collection by airborne platforms
- ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COIN does not exist
- The U.S. Government is not investing adequately in the development of social
and behavioral science information that is critically important to COIN
- ISR support for COIN is currently being overshadowed by counterterrorism and force protection requirements
- Increasing the focus of ISR for COIN on incipient insurgencies would provide more whole of government options and reduce the need for major commitment of military forces
- New S&T solutions must address the crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communications caused by the deluge of sensor data
- New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve our understanding of COIN environments

The report provides the rationale for the Task Force’s findings and recommendations, responds to five specific tasks, and notes substantial policy guidance on aspects of COIN and ISR as well as numerous and inconsistent definitions of key terms associated with the study.

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SWJ Blog

06-01-2011, 01:10 PM

COIN Center Webcast, Winning Insurgent War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/coin-center-webcast-winning-in/)

Entry Excerpt:

US Army Counterinsurgency Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) Webcast - Winning Insurgent War on Thursday:

The US Army COIN Center is hosting Dr. Geoff Demarest (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=62) of the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/) and author of the recently published book, Winning Insurgent War. He will be discussing important aspects of defeating insurgents including the legitimate use of violence in winning. His brief is tomorrow, Thursday, 2 June 2011, at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU).

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online (https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb) at and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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SWJED

06-08-2011, 08:54 PM

All,

I’ll be joining, in July, an effort by the U.S Army that is conducting a study to determine lessons learned and best practices in support of coalition counterinsurgency infrastructure development and capacity-building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study is also intended to provide recommendations for engineer use during campaigns in an “irregular warfare” environment based on both past lessons and likely evolutions in future security environments.

This project will be my first post-Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JFCOM organization that was disestablished) job (excepting what I do at Small Wars Journal) and really need to get a good start going in and would appreciate those with the expertise and experience concerning the issues in paragraph 1 contacting me at ddilegge (at) smallwarsjournal.com. The team will be conducting interviews in support of this project.

Thanks much,

Dave Dilegge

SWJED

06-08-2011, 09:05 PM

As a saved round, I'd like to hear from "anyone" with the experience / expertise mentioned - not just military and not just U.S. Thanks again.

davidbfpo

06-08-2011, 09:34 PM

PM en route and good luck. Don't forget to pack a shovel.

SWJ Blog

06-17-2011, 08:21 PM

COIN Center Webcast (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/coin-center-webcast/)

Entry Excerpt:

The US Army Counterinsurgency Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) is pleased to host Dr. Sebastian Gorka (http://www.ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?secID=460&pageID=119&type=section), Assistant Professor of Irregular Warfare at National Defense University (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ndu.edu%2F&ei=ebH7TeucGtSo0AHZmMnSAw&usg=AFQjCNHOJv-Z9-HXq7A31lLKKwS1ssQaCA). Dr. Gorkais is also an Associate Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Default.aspx). He is a graduate of the University of London and Corvinus University, Budapest.

Dr. Gorka and Dr. David Kilcullen (http://www.caerusassociates.com/Caerus_Associates/-_files/Company%20Snapshot.pdf) recently co-authored an article for Joint Force Quarterly (http://www.ndu.edu/press/jointForceQuarterly.html) entitled An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency (http://www.ndu.edu/press/COIN-and-Counterinsurgency.html). In that piece they wrote that "COIN, in the American mode, is but one small reflection of the much older, even ancient, practice of countering insurgents, or irregular enemies." They propose a theory of war based on who is using violence against us; an "Actor-Centric" theory of war.

Dr.Gorka’s brief is Wednesday, 29 June 2011 at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU). Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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Johannes U

06-20-2011, 08:59 PM

Hello SWJ community.

I've just started my to to plan my PhD in political science/international relations. Since the topic will be the differences between COIN, CT and FID, with a case study of (guess what) Afghanistan, I have the follwing questions for the community:

At what level are COIN, CT and FID mainly situated (politics, strategy, military strategy, operational)?
Are COIN, CT and FID doctrinally on the same level?
Other than the ususal suspects (3-22, 3-24, 3-26, both JP and FM), what doctrines, manuals (not only US) deal with the above mentioned stratgies?

And now for the most important questions for a future PhD :D:
What literature (other than of course SWJ ;)) can you recommend concerning COIN, but especially CT and FID.

Greetings from Austria

OfTheTroops

06-20-2011, 09:26 PM

Why astan instead of iraq ? You're study would be more complete

Bob's World

06-20-2011, 10:12 PM

You are a brave man, and will earn your PhD.

Begin with good definitions, and that will likely mean laying out the various nuances of differing opinions and positions between organizations and over time. Once you have captured, analyzed and discussed that, put a stake in the ground and define and defend how you will differentiate between the three.

In the purest sense, we have never conducted COIN in Afghanistan (or Iraq). We went in conducting UW, then shifted to a major in CT with a minor in FID. After a couple of years of that we elevated Karzai in a kangaroo election and promoted the production of a centralized form of government under the current constitution that left the Taliban government in exile no option but to wage revolutionary insurgency to regain some degree of influence in their homeland. At that point our FID effort grew in response to the growing revolutionary insurgency, which in turn promoted a growth of resistance insurgency to our growing presence and activities. A vicious circle.

Now, we call that "COIN." SF guys will tell you that is a bastardized use of the term, but the conventional community likes it, and it matches with the use from the colonial intervention TTPs and lessons learned that we derived FM3-24 from. Capturing this debate/divergence between SF and the conventional Army (and the SF community's focus on CT that allowed it to happen) is also worth exploring.

Anyway, like I said up front, you will earn your PhD if you can sort this out.

Bob

MikeF

06-20-2011, 10:41 PM

A couple of quick notes-

1. Concur with Bob on good definitions. I’ve sat with a lot of operational regular Army and SF units discussing terms. COIN, CT, and FID can mean anything to anyone.

2. Instead of CT, you may want to use the term manhunting. You’ll find a vast amount of literature on it in the academic search engines.

3. As far as what Bob describes as “bastardization,” instead of labels, you may want to analyze force size and mission tasks. There is a big difference between ten advisers training an Afghan unit in a safe area (FOB) and a 150 man American infantry company clearing, occupying a village and attempting to control it with a handful of Afghan soldiers along for “partnering.”

4. Look past the military to see what other agencies are doing to promote the rule of law, governance, economics, judicial force, etc…

Good luck

Mike

Old Eagle

06-21-2011, 02:07 AM

OK. I teach at the graduate level, so I am a little more anal than some in the forum. Other professors may chime in with other views. I have also been a practitioner, mainly at the strategic level, so I have some practical insights, too.

1. Are you writing in German or English? This is a BFD because there are nuances in both languages that often get lost in translation.

2. Are you writing about doctrine or strategy, or what? You can't throw the various terms around loosely.

3. There are synergistic forces among the three topics you are studying. Beware of those who say, "if this, then not that", because in most cases, COIN, CT and FID are all parts of the same whole.

Danke. Mir geht's gut -- wie es immer den Guten geht.

Johannes U

06-21-2011, 11:22 PM

... but since I had a long day shooting at the range (and it's now past midnight) and tomorrow will also be a long day - more questions, answers and remarks tomorrow.

Just one question:
I read the attached chart in the way, that COIN, FID and CT are in the JP-hierarchy on the same level below Ops.

Am I right in this thinking (and I know that they are not easily distinguished in reality).

Dayuhan

06-22-2011, 03:46 AM

Not to confuse things any more, but it seems to me that what we're dealing with in Afghanistan, and what we've been dealing with in Iraq, may not be any of these things.

The great COIN-vs-FID debate often seems to overlook the reality that both our COIN doctrine and our FID doctrine are generally built around the assumption that the US is deploying forces to assist the threatened government of a friendly state facing an internal threat. These assumptions are of limited applicability in a case where we have invaded another state to remove a government and install a new one.

I'd suggest that what we're doing in Afghanistan is not COIN nor FID not CT, though it involves elements of all. It's still regime change. Regime change logically has 3 broad stages:

- Remove old government (generally pretty easy)
- Install a new government (generally pretty difficult)
- Shelter and support that new government until it is actually able to govern on its own... until it becomes an actual government, rather than a puppet extension of our presence.

That 3rd stage is very difficult indeed, and that's where we're still mired in Afghanistan, and to some extent in Iraq.

Far too much of our discourse seems to treat the GIRoA as if it was a pre-existing entity, an actual friendly government that we are assisting, rather than as a US creation and an extension of our presence. Far too often we assume that insurgency is a reaction to the way the GIRoA governs (or doesn't), without considering the lively possibility that it's primarily driven by our presence, and that the "government" we protect is just one of many facets of that presence that's generating resistance.

I wouldn't presume to suggest changes in doctrine, which I know little or nothing about, but I'd suggest that much of our problem in Iraq and Afghanistan derives from fundamental assumptions about regime change, most notably the grotesque underestimation of the challenges involved in "installing" a government that can actually govern. Imposing practices and assumptions derived from experience in assisting pre-existing governments on a regime change situation is, I suspect, an inherently flawed approach. Stage 3 regime change may incorporate elements of FID and COIN, but it is fundamentally a different situation.

SWJ Blog

06-23-2011, 05:40 PM

This Week at War: End of the COIN Era? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/this-week-at-war-end-of-the-co/)

Entry Excerpt:

Obama's Afghan withdrawal speech may mark the end of the U.S. counterinsurgency experiment.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) By tossing the COIN to Afghanistan, Obama can now aim at Pakistan

2) Are the Pentagon's plans about to become obsolete?

By tossing the COIN to Afghanistan, Obama can now aim at Pakistan

President Barack Obama's prime-time speech (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan) on his plan for withdrawing from Afghanistan left no doubt that he intends to run for reelection as the leader who ended two painful wars. Most notable was his intention to extract 10,000 soldiers this year and 23,000 more by next summer, before the height of Afghanistan's traditional summer fighting season. For some analysts, this would seem to be a large military risk, taken for purely domestic political benefit.

Obama may have concluded that conventional U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan no longer provide much leverage over the military or political situation there. Obama realizes that the Taliban have established safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan where they can wait as long as they need to. With those safe havens, he likely realizes that the coalition cannot obtain sufficient advantage over the Taliban to achieve a favorable negotiated settlement. Nor can anyone be sure how permanent the apparent progress in stabilizing southern Afghanistan really is.

The real permanent leverage over the Taliban comes in two forms. The first is Afghanistan's security forces, both the government's and local militias, which will presumably operate long after coalition soldiers have left the field. A favorable outcome ultimately rests not with U.S. combat patrols but with the long-term effectiveness of Afghan security forces, something which remains very much in doubt. For those officers responsible for U.S. military doctrine, Obama's speech would seem to bring to a close another unhappy encounter with counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. But true COIN -- winning over the population through security and better governance -- is not done by an outside intervening power like the United States, but by the host country itself. Although Afghanistan provides particularly poor raw material for U.S. COIN doctrine, U.S. military planners still need to solve the COIN puzzle for future contingencies, at a much lower cost than the United States paid in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Click below to read more ...

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Johannes U

06-24-2011, 07:15 AM

To answer your questions:

@ old eagle:

I will write in English (better language for this topic in my opinion)
Doctrine or strategy - good question, but since both are linked, I will write about both

@bob:

Thanks for the flowers, but especially thanks for the advice.
OK, so this whole COIN - CT - FID thing is a mess of intermingling concepts, but what is the overall goal - nationbuilding?
To state the question more clearly: if what the US+Allied forces are doing in Afghanistan (and probably in Iraq) is COIN+CT+FID, under what heading do those missions fall?

@ MikeF:

Will follow your advice, especially 4

@ All:

I plan to not only write about the case of Afghanistan, but probably also Iraq, maybe even Somalia 1991ff
One of the questions I want to answer is whether/how the US strategy concerning COIN/CT/FID changed over the times in different missions
Another question I want to answer is, how the different strategies effected the ROEs in different ways
And last (for now) I want to also differentiate between insurgents and terrorists. I do believe that they have a lot of common ground and that you can differentiate between them only to a certain degree (Hizbollah for example)

Steve the Planner

06-24-2011, 07:04 PM

Johannes:

Echoing Troop's comment, I believe you will find much more consistent and credible source information and analytical resources on Iraq that will be highly appropriate to your field of study.

Particularly, you can now begin to contrast efforts with results, and with the depth of background that is readily identifiable through newly published works by the likes of Gareth Stansfield (Exeter), and (if he is back to academia) Wilfried Buchta (Frieburg? or through his published Crisis Group work).

Similar works are emerging from US sources, and, as time goes rapidly by, from Iraqi sources that will allow you to paint the entire picture, and fully test and defend a thesis.

Just my two cents, but I believe you will find, as other commenters have noted, that Afghanistan is a bag containing many different, and as yet unknown, things which will result in a very difficult time unscrambling in order to then begin your thesis. Why make two jobs when only one is required?

Old Eagle

06-24-2011, 08:54 PM

Start by reading as many general works on the subject as you can. Get familiar with the issues. Settle on definitions you will use, as they vary widely.

Then develop a thesis that is focused and narrow in scope. This is perhaps the most difficult task. If your paper is going to be a couple of hundred pages, you can be sloppier than if it's shorter. (Still not recommended.)

Then read the high-end sources and see where the evidence leads. Do not cherry pick. Do not lap up everything that is available. Rather, read critically and carefully analyze the information available.

Keep the forum informed of your progress and we will try to assist.

Johannes U

06-25-2011, 08:27 PM

Old eagle, you sure are right about the difficulty of developing a sound and narrow thesis.
Since my tutor "only" allows me to write around 300 pages:confused:, I sure will have to find/develop a narrow thesis.

The main problem I have so far is how I view those different terms from a theoretical background.
Are they (military) strategy, doctrine/concepts, policy ...
I know that sounds a bit confusing, but that's where I stand right now.
I do know that the questions in my last post were probably a bit widely phrased and I will try to narrow down further.

But maybe you can answer my basic question:
If you view the terms from a military viewpoint (and I further on don't want to exclude the civil side), what is the common denominator for all of them?

Concerning literature:
For now I have the different JPs, I have the National Security Strategy 2010, the latest QDR ...
Concerning books, I have Mansoors "Baghdad at sunrise" and I have ordered Kilcullens "Accidental guerilla".
I have access to all the Military Review, JFQ and parameters articles.

Is there anything I forgot?
I'm also thinking about Galula.

Thanks for the advice.

Johannes U

06-30-2011, 07:40 PM

... or as the saying goes.
I just met with my tutor and we defined my PhD thesis in a more exact way:
"Counterinsurgency vs Counterterrorism - an analysis of the difference by comparing applied measures and ROEs as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan"

I want to compare how the different levels of leadership/command (mainly strategic to operational level) apply different kinetic and non-kinetic measures and how the ROEs change.

As the coincidence goes - the US just released the new national CT strategy.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
Let's see how usefull it will be for me.´

If you have any suggestions for further research/literature, just call ...:D

Let's see how this will work out - I'm really looking forward

Greetings from Austria (no, we don't have kangaroos) :p

SWJ Blog

07-13-2011, 02:50 PM

COIN and FM 3-24 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/coin-and-fm-324/)

Entry Excerpt:

Be Honest: Who Actually Read FM 3-24? (http://wingsoveriraq.com/2011/07/09/be-honest-who-actually-read-fm-3-24/) by Starbuck at Wings over Iraq. BLUF: "At a US Army Combat Training Center, an informal poll of Observer-Controllers, many of whom had just returned from counterinsurgency conflicts and had advised units of counterinsurgency tactics, only twenty percent admitted to reading FM 3-24. Perhaps the problem with counterinsurgency lies with us, not with the doctrine?"

Starbuck is Wrong by Carl Prine (http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/07/12/starbuck-is-wrong/) at Line of Departure. BLUF: "Starbuck is wrong. And in his drive to keep getting it wrong, he’s trying to rewrite FM 3–24, the military’s chief doctrinal publication on counterinsurgency. But that just makes him more wrong. He’s wrong about me. He’s wrong about what I believe. He’s wrong about the literature that informs FM 3–24. He’s wrong about what the manual says and he’s wrong about what it left out. He’s wrong about historiography. He’s wrong about how a caste of top officers and diplomats came to understand “strategy” in the wake of the occupation of Iraq."

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SWJ Blog

07-15-2011, 12:04 AM

COIN Monthly Webcast 21 July 2011 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/coin-monthly-webcast-21-july-2/)

Entry Excerpt:

The US Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/) is pleased to host Lieutenant Colonel Adrian T. Bogart III on 21 July for our monthly webcast. LTC Bogart will be discussing command and control as well as the coordination of joint, interagency, irregular and multi-national forces during COIN operations.

Entitled “Counterinsurgency Mission Command” the brief will discuss the "how to" of the day-to-day management of multiple forces and organizations conducting combined COIN operations. The brief includes a review of the mechanics of executing a unity of effort for various commands and organizations involved in combating an insurgency and the key organizational and procedural constructs for the day to day management of the campaign.

His online briefing is scheduled for Thursday, 21 July 2011 at 10:00 CDT (1100 EDT, 15:00 ZULU).

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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SWJ Blog

07-22-2011, 05:51 AM

The Interpreter COIN Discussion (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/the-interpreter-coin-discussio/)

Entry Excerpt:

Two interesting pieces at The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy):

Doubts about Leahy's Afghanistan Plan (http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/07/21/Doubts-about-General-Leahys-Afghanistan-proposal.aspx) by Dr. Milton Osborne

...in every counter-insurgency campaign of which I am aware, the goal of overcoming insurgents through programs that emphasise civic as well as military action can only be contemplated when both the non-military personnel who are carrying out that action and their clients can be protected.
It seems evident to me that such a situation does not exist in Afghanistan, and is not likely to be achieved in any foreseeable future, whatever brave statements are made to the contrary. Our Undeserved COIN Reputation (http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/07/22/It-is-extraordinary-what-you-dont-know.aspx) by Major General (Ret) Jim Molan

... I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step. Security does not have to be perfect. But political, social and economic progress will not occur while the local population has the insurgent or terrorist tearing their collective throat out... Both authors were writing in response to Time Running Out to Fix Strategy for Afghanistan (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/commentary/time-running-out-to-fix-strategy-for-afghanistan/story-e6frgd0x-1226097103120) by Peter Leahy in The Australian.

... The West has mistaken killing terrorists and counter-insurgency warfare for nation building. All three are needed but at different times and different degrees. It is clear the only way to deal with many of today's terrorists is to strengthen our defences and kill those who maintain their murderous intent. We can conduct raids on them in their lairs with drones as in Pakistan and raw air power as in Libya. But these actions are also likely to destabilise the countries we attack and generate more terrorists then we kill. So counter-insurgency and nation building will still be needed...

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SWJ Blog

07-22-2011, 01:03 PM

Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/evolving-the-coin-field-manual/)

Entry Excerpt:

Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform
by Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, and Michael Few

Download the Full Article: Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/820-prineburkefew.pdf)

Nearly a decade removed from 9/11, United States military forces remain entrenched in small wars around the globe. For the foreseeable future, the United States Government (USG) will continue to intervene in varying scale and scope in order to promote democracy and capitalism abroad. While many made efforts to describe small wars and methods of coping with them, our field manuals have not kept up with the wealth of knowledge and wisdom learned on the ground.

In order to prepare for the future, we must first understand where we have been moving beyond individual articles of best practices and lessons learned. The intent of this essay is to provide the critique in order to promote an evolution in our thinking. The purpose is to better prepare those who will follow in our footsteps. Finally, we believe that this reform is a duty required from those who directly observed the costs of today’s small wars.

Download the Full Article: Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/820-prineburkefew.pdf)

Carl Prine is a former enlisted Marine and Army infantryman who served in Iraq. Currently, he serves as a reporter at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and blogs on national security affairs for Military.com (http://www.lineofdeparture.com/).

Captain (P) Crispin Burke is an active duty aviator who commanded in Iraq. Currently, he is the unmanned aviation observer controller at the Combined Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, and he blogs on national security affairs at Wings over Iraq (http://wingsoveriraq.com/).

Major James Michael Few is an active duty armor officer who served multiple tours to Iraq in various command and staff positions. Currently, he serves as the editor for Small Wars Journal.

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SWJ Blog

07-24-2011, 03:01 PM

The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/the-iraqi-coin-narrative-revis/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant
by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/821-manea.pdf)

How would you see today the rationale behind the 2007 Bagdad surge? To act as a buffer between the Iraqi sectarian, ethnic pressures and ontological (group extinction) fears? To protect a Sunni population that could not be protected by the formal Iraqi security forces (either because of weakness or because the Sunnis didn’t trust them) and setting the stage for the next level-a rational political space?

Protecting the population is important. But the sad fact is that by early 2007 in Baghdad, the Sunni groups had been pushed back to small enough enclaves that it was fairly easy to protect them, save in Southern Baghdad, where the cleansing continued well into the fall of 2007. The continued cleansing in South Baghdad made me skeptical that things were working until very late in 2007, despite the obvious reduction in violence elsewhere in the city as of late summer.
So yes, protecting the population is important. But I don’t think that we could have done much to protect them in mid-2006. The civil war had to burn itself out—the Sunnis had to realize that they had lost and the Shi’a had to realize that we had won—before a settlement could be reached.

I do think that the presence of additional U.S. troops in the urban areas tamped down the end of the civil war faster than it might otherwise have happened. U.S. forces worked with the local trend to accelerate it, and did not impose a totally foreign agenda. Had we started the “surge” plan in Sadr City, for example, I think the outcome might have been much less favorable. I have come to a more tempered view of what military forces are able to accomplish, as I tried to lay out in my Washington Post piece on the “three wars” in Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/821-manea.pdf)

Douglas A. Ollivant is a Senior National Security Fellow with the New America Foundation. He most recently spent one year as the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to the Commander, Regional Command-East at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, returning to Washington this spring. He served in Iraq as the Chief of Plans for MultiNational Division Baghdad in 2006-2007 and he led the planning team that designed the Baghdad Security Plan, the main effort of what later became known as the "Surge." An expanded view of his thoughts is presented in Countering the New Orthodoxy-Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

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Compost

08-15-2011, 03:07 PM

... or as the saying goes.
I just met with my tutor and we defined my PhD thesis in a more exact way:
"Counterinsurgency vs Counterterrorism - an analysis of the difference by comparing applied measures and ROEs as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan"

An underlying point of this item is that it is very Wylie - as Saito will probably agree – to avoid being moved onto ground preferred by an opponent. But currently such movement often occurs due to thoughtless re-use of ‘politically correct’ terms that are routinely introduced by people who may think of and refer to themselves as intellectuals and SNAGs, or more correctly SNAPs.

Of course such individuals may be clever - though not necessarily in an intellectual sense – and they are better described as sensitive new age propagandists rather than sensitive new age people. The problem is that such use of terminology often sticks because it is not identified and combated. The proliferation of ‘Counterinsurgency’ manuals is a prime example.

Common sense or access to a dictionary/thesaurus can make allegiance or viewpoint easy to identify. For example war games as opposed to defex or tacex. Due to blurring and also dependent upon context, terms such as guerrilla, insurgent, partisan, patriot may seem preferable to nihilist, rebel, revolutionary, terrorist, zealot or the more neutral adversary, enemy or opponent.

However, much of what passes as ‘insurgency’ can be more appropriately described as ‘pseudo-revolutionary warfare (PRW)’ because it has been fostered or even contrived by external interests as a direct or proxy means by which to exert influence, or to distract and degrade an opponent. As a fairly recent and major example one can look at the PRW campaigns waged on most continents by the USA and the former-USSR.

My take on ‘counterinsurgency/COIN’ is that it is a malapropism. Also that its use is on the one hand clever and on the other foolish. Firstly, the term COIN is weak because it is reactive. Secondly, COIN implies that an opponent is indigenous and that his interests may therefore be home-grown. If the purpose is to clarify rather than obscure, then there are better terms for legitimate use by the military.

One such term is peacemaking ops which is strongly objective. Another is secops (or if that seems liable to mispronunciation then securitops) as a term by which to describe police activities directed against terrorism. And there are others which could be generally preferable to the malapropisms that are in widespread current use.

There is also a corollary. It can be difficult when considering foreign policy and military activities abroad to distinguish altruistic PKOPS from opportunistic PRW.

Bob's World

08-15-2011, 04:03 PM

... or as the saying goes.
I just met with my tutor and we defined my PhD thesis in a more exact way:
"Counterinsurgency vs Counterterrorism - an analysis of the difference by comparing applied measures and ROEs as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan"

I want to compare how the different levels of leadership/command (mainly strategic to operational level) apply different kinetic and non-kinetic measures and how the ROEs change.

As the coincidence goes - the US just released the new national CT strategy.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
Let's see how usefull it will be for me.´

If you have any suggestions for further research/literature, just call ...:D

Let's see how this will work out - I'm really looking forward

Greetings from Austria (no, we don't have kangaroos) :p

When I hear "COIN vs CT" in general it sets my teeth on edge; for certainly that dichotomy of choices is no way to look at a foreign intervention and hope to attain a comprehensive, successful scheme of engagement.

However, that IS how we approached Iraq and Afghanistan, so to drill into how those terms were defined during the course of those operations, what types of operations were conducted under those banners; what types of effects were achieved, etc is indeed something worth laying open for inspection.

jmm99

08-15-2011, 04:19 PM

When you get to it, I'd be interested in the ROE comparison - and which ROE constructs are included for discussion.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo

08-15-2011, 10:30 PM

Maybe useful for SWC students:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/08/phds-dummies.html

Very USA-based, maybe thee are clues though!

SWJ Blog

08-18-2011, 10:13 PM

25 August COIN Center Webcast (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/25-august-coin-center-webcast)

Entry Excerpt:

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08-23-2011, 01:00 PM

The Real Challenge in Afghanistan: Toward a Quantum COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-real-challenge-in-afghanistan-toward-a-quantum-coin)

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08-26-2011, 02:32 PM

White Paper on COIN Instruction (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/white-paper-on-coin-instruction)

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08-26-2011, 02:32 PM

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08-27-2011, 12:26 PM

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09-01-2011, 08:21 PM

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09-03-2011, 10:13 PM

PI COIN / FID Fight Over? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/pi-coin-fid-fight-over)

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09-10-2011, 10:12 PM

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10-05-2011, 12:31 PM

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10-05-2011, 03:11 PM

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10-25-2011, 09:01 PM

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10-27-2011, 01:01 AM

COIN Monthly Webcast Invitation 3 Nov 2011 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-monthly-webcast-invitation-3-nov-2011)

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11-02-2011, 11:30 PM

COIN is Dead. Long Live COIN? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-is-dead-long-live-coin)

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Bob's World

11-04-2011, 03:55 PM

Getting COIN and FID roles right is in synch with principles of Sovereignty as it helps to prevent the intervening power from drifting into roles belonging to host populace and government. Efforts to secure sovereignty for one must also respect sovereignty of others.

The “Bob Jones Flag Pole Test”: Go to the national capital building of whatever country you are in, look at the top of the tallest flag pole and identify that flag. If it is your nation's flag, you are conducting COIN. If it is the flag of some other nation, then your mission is FID.

Somewhere along the line we lost sight of this simple test, and have been tredding fairly heavily upon the sovereignty of others in the pursuit of a broad definition of what we feel we must do to exercise our sovereign duties (protect the populace) to our own people back home. I don't think we ever flew our flag as the primary sovereign standard over Iraq or Afghanistan, and that was for very good reason. We must learn that we cannot recognize sovereignty with one hand while we abuse it with the other, and still nurture and maintain our good influence and credibility as a nation.

Dayuhan

11-04-2011, 10:56 PM

The “Bob Jones Flag Pole Test”: Go to the national capital building of whatever country you are in, look at the top of the tallest flag pole and identify that flag. If it is your nation's flag, you are conducting COIN. If it is the flag of some other nation, then your mission is FID.

In general I agree. Our post-regime change excursions are a bit different, though.

We take it on ourselves to remove a regime. We "install" a new regime. We call them a government. We dress them up as a government: they sit in the chair, wear the t-shirt. We put their flag highest on the pole. That doesn't fool anyone, though, except sometimes ourselves. Everyone else - "government", population, insurgent - knows that the fight is actually about us, our invasion, our occupation, our pretense that the puppet is actually a government.

In these cases, the flagpole test wouldn't define "FID" until the "government" actually governs and is locally recognized as a government, not as an extension of our presences.

I think a great deal of our trouble in Iraq and Afghanistan comes from efforts to apply lessons learned from "FID that we pretend is COIN" to "regime change that we pretend is COIN.

Aside: if we want to define COIN, might be best to start by defining insurgency.

Bob's World

11-05-2011, 10:57 AM

I feel your pain on these operations, and believe that we should avoid these at all costs, but when we do convince ourselves that this is necessary we still apply the flagpole test.

Our little fictions of sovereignty only serve to confuse ourselves. Someday we will learn that "king making" is a bit of colonialism that is as obsolete as the rest of that package, and that any process we apply in an effort to create a "legitimate" government to replace the one that we just took out can never truly be legitimate in the eyes of the populace it is supposed to serve.

But if we do take this dangerous path, the best way to traverse it is by being honest with ourselves from the very outset and defining our role as FID and operating within constraints set for us by that fledgling government that is struggling for both legitimacy and effectiveness. Of the two, legitimacy in the eyes of the populace is by far the most important, and FID facilitates that role, while COIN destroys it.

Consider the highly controversial night raids in Afghanistan. These are a gross violation of the cultural perceptions of sovereignty and human dignity of the people of Afghanistan (and frankly, every other country on the planet, but particularly so in Afghanistan where there is little governance and a man's duty in his home and Pashtunwali are so fundamental). This is de facto sovereignty, and we violate it nightly. These operations are also a gross violation of what the government of Afghanistan has clearly stated on numerous occasions. This is de jure sovereignty, and we violate this as well.

Now, under a COIN construct we can rationalize that WE have a duty to defeat the insurgency, and that the ends justify the means, and that we really don't have to honor the sensibilities of the populace nor the directives of the government. We say the government is sovereign with our words, but we declare even more loudly with our actions that even we, the creator of this government, have no recognition or respect for their sovereignty. There is no way to establish a legitimate regime with this mindset.

Under FID we would respect the culture of the people as well as the demands of the government. We would have worked out a process of making a finding of probable cause before some Afghan official, who would in turn offer a warrant that would narrowly define what it is we were authorized to search for or who we were authorized to arrest. We would have Afghan partners in the lead on the operation itself. Now, this would greatly reduce the effectiveness of these operations in terms of the measures of performance that we love so much. The total number of raids would go way down, the total number of suspects captured, killed, questioned and released, etc would all go down. BUT the EFFECT of these operations would change from a major negative into a potential positive that reinforces every night that GIROA is the master of their own country and that they can indeed enforce their most primal duty as a sovereign government: "protect the populace."

For those who think in terms of warfare and cannot see any sound reason for the distinction between COIN and FID, I ask that you consider this issue in the context of sovereignty instead. COIN is a domestic operation by a sovereign to bring stability to his own people. FID is a foreign operation to help a sovereign maintain or establish stability executed in a manner that reinforces his sovereignty.

As to defining insurgency? My cut on this is what I follow when I think, speak or write on this topic. The DoD definition is a dangerously over militarized perspective that creates far more problems than it helps avoid.

Insurgency, IMO, is best viewed as "an illegal political challenge to government, rising from a base of support within some significant and distinct segment, or segments, of the populace; and employing any mix of violent and non-violent tactics."

Infanteer

11-05-2011, 02:55 PM

Agree with both of the previous posts; my government and military will take a vastly different approach if it is dealing with unruly locals in Somewhere, Canada than if it is deploying military forces to support the government of Afghanistan to deal with unruly locals in Somewhere, Kandahar.

As well, BW's definition seems fit for the task. The key part to me is that "insurgency" is a political phenomenon where the military aspect (involving formed groups working at policy through other means) may or may not be present to any degree.

I disagree with the trend lately to put "Counter-Insurgency" on a sliding scale of a spectrum of conflict between Major Combat and Peace Support. First, it comes off as putting every sort of irregular conflict or small war into the catagory of insurgency; those two terms are not the same.

Second, counter-insurgency is a response by a government against the whole spectrum of challenges posed by an insurgent movement. By framing what may be simply counter-guerrilla operations as "COIN", regardless of the context, we seem to create rabbit holes for military forces to go down, frittering forces and effort away on things like development, tracking economic trends or acting as a local employment center.

Bill Moore

11-05-2011, 05:48 PM

In general I agree with Bob's flag pole test, but the situations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were different. It didn't really matter if we for purposes of show raised Iraq's or Afghanistan's national above ours, during the early years we were an occuppying power and the resistance was largely directed against us, so during that transition period we were in fact doing something that was similiar to COIN, since we were the government that was directly being attacked. Most seem to agree that our approach to both of these cases was deeply flawed, so hopefully these are abberations or outliers.

However, the same situation did apply in Germany and would have applied in Japan if there was resistance to our occupation. I agree it is not COIN, and COIN doctrine is inappropriate for these situations (would add our COIN doctrine for the most part is inappropriate for COIN), and we need an occupation doctrine. Once we transition effectively to a new national government the nature of the mission changes, but we tried to transition too quick (once again political correctness influenced policy in a way that did more harm than good) and the results are quite visible, so draw your own conclusions. Haste makes waste.

Compost

11-11-2011, 02:25 AM

Quote from Wikipedia.

Foreign internal defense (FID) is a term used by a number of Western militaries, including the United States, France and the United Kingdom, to describe an approach to combating actual or threatened insurgency in a foreign state called the Host Nation (HN). The term counter-insurgency is more commonly used worldwide than FID. FID involves military deployment of counter-insurgency specialists. According to the US doctrinal manual, Joint Publication 3-07.1: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), those specialists preferably do not themselves fight the insurgents. [ref] Doctrine calls for a close working relationship between the HN government and military with outside military, diplomatic, economic, and other specialists. The most successful FID actions prevent actual violence, although that is rarely possible. When combat is needed, it is best done by HN personnel with appropriate external support, the external support preferably being in a noncombat support and training role alone. [ref]

[ref] US DoD (2004-04-30). Joint Publication 3-07.1: Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

An out-of-country flag tied to FID is a better site. But FID is oriented to a client nation or regime, and is still overshadowed by the lumpen edifice of COIN.

Both the US FM 3-07.3: Peace Operations and British JWP 3-50: The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations seem devoted to peace keeping. Neither they nor the other generally available manuals are suitable for expansion into something preferable to COIN and FID. My vote was and is for ‘peace-making operations’ because that is pro-active and usefully includes a cordial objective. But it is also generic and implies bureaucratic development of a large quantity of rigorously specified doctrine.

It would be interesting to see more general discussion on the development and dissemination of a yet-to-be named doctrine for (deep breath) military activities to defeat or otherwise overcome irregular interests employing armed force in out-of-country regions. Especially interesting would be the situations and boundaries needed to hold that doctrine within manageable bounds.

Bob's World

11-11-2011, 12:02 PM

This is an important point, so I will elaborate a bit.

First, Compost, I absolutely am not suggesting that we need to go fly our flag over the capitals of other countries in order to allow us to implement our outdated COIN doctrine; what I am saying is that unless we actually intend to make some foreign land our own, it is NEVER appropriate to execute COIN overseas. COIN is a domestic operation, it is the actions of government day in and day out to stay in synch with the will of their nation's populace. COIN is also the in extremes actions of a government when it has failed to stay in synch and must act out violently, often even in war-like manner and employ the nation's military against the insurgent elements of the nation's populace to re-stabilize the situation sufficiently to allow government to make the long overdue adjustments that led the nation to that troubled place.

What Bill describes is the rationalization process we applied. Yes, we took out the legitimate governments of Iraq and Afghanistan in the pursuit of solutions that we believed would better meet our own national interests. We determined that the defense of our own sovereignty was so hard pressed that it demanded and justified such extreme breaches of the sovereignty of others. Will history judge our assessment to be flawed? Probably, but that is for history to determine and for other threads to debate.

My point is that just because our actions, or the actions of others, have destroyed the government of some foreign land that we occupy it does not make us "the government" of that nation, we are still merely the agents of the government of the nation we came from. Sure, we may find ourselves executing the roles and duties of that nation's government, but that does not make us that nation's government. We act based upon an authority granted by the nation we came from, not one granted from the populace of the nation we are in. WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT. In saying that we are conducting the domestic mission of COIN rather than the foreign mission of FID we begin down the slippery slope of inappropriate behavior that all such interventions inevitably take.

As a FID force we are always subordinate to the sovereignty of the nation we are in. Sovereignty does not come from some government, but rather it comes from the collective will of the populace and is merely executed by the government as an agent of the populace. This is as true in an absolute monarchy or dictatorship as it is in a liberal democracy (and bloody floors of history are littered with the heads of such leaders who have forgotten where their power truly comes from).

This may seem like a fine point to some, a semantic debate, such as SFA vs FID; etc. It is not semantics, this is fundamental to the essence of the nature of the operation and the context within which it will be designed and implemented. FID constrains the behavior, rights and duties of the intervening actor.

If there is no government there to tell us what those limits are then we need to be disciplined enough to set them for ourselves, and then publish them to the world so that others can quickly point out to us when we have crossed them.

I know it is easier to operate without constraints. I spent four years working the OEF-Philippines mission within such constraints while our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan did whatever the hell the damn well pleased. I have severed in Afghanistan to see firsthand the difference, both in action and effect. This is important, and the presence or absence of some governmental agent to represent the affected populace is not the deciding factor that should guide our actions.

Bill Moore

11-11-2011, 06:59 PM

Posted by Bob's World,

We act based upon an authority granted by the nation we came from, not one granted from the populace of the nation we are in.

O.K., well said and I buy that, so what are we actually doing, because it isn't FID, because the nation doesn't support much of what we're doing. In simple terms it seems we're conducting counter-rebellion or counter-resistance operations against those who oppose our will for their future. I definitely wouldn't advocate developing doctrine for that since it runs against the grain our morals (or should). I'll stick with occupation doctrine, and the legal requirements for an occupying force are defined by international law. If we assumed those roles earlier and stayed out of the internal political transformation role we may be in a different place today. Our views that are not that far apart.

Bob's World

11-11-2011, 07:44 PM

Oh I know we see things very similarly, to paraphrase, "we are divided by a common doctrine."

Compost

11-12-2011, 12:00 AM

This is an important point, so I will elaborate a bit.

First, Compost, I absolutely am not suggesting that we need to go fly our flag over the capitals of other countries in order to allow us to implement our outdated COIN doctrine; what I am saying is that unless we actually intend to make some foreign land our own, it is NEVER appropriate to execute COIN overseas.

Bob, you have gone way off my track. The meaning of “An out-of-country flag tied to FID” seemed clear to me: the flag of a euphemistically named ‘host nation’ raised above a FID effort conducted by the US or other. Also have commented several times that COIN is a malapropism, and more vitally a flawed conop.

Your response then proceeded to “Yes, we took out the legitimate governments of Iraq and Afghanistan in the pursuit of solutions that we believed would better meet our own national interests.” After that the argument veered back into FID with “As a FID force we are always subordinate to the sovereignty of the nation we are in.” It then proceeded into a concerned discussion of sovereignty, constraints, collective will with value-laden statements such as “long overdue adjustments that led the nation to that troubled place.”

It general it was odd, strangely disconnected and different from your previous posts which I have found lucid and usually interesting.

Now back to my intended track. There has been a lot of military confusion in both Iraq and Afghanistan. That confusion was mainly caused by poor operational planning and lack of appropriate doctrine to displace COIN (back to the practitioner’s own country where it belongs). The result has been that many units in Iraq and Afghanistan seemingly came to rely on trial and error learning-on the-job iteration. Also that mis-guided insistence on COIN precepts meant that contrary lessons learned were not put on the feedback loop into doctrine but instead departed with a unit until its next posting back into the theatre.

What would be useful to reduce future confusion is discussion and development of an alternate doctrine, or doctrines dependent upon the objective. The methodology of interstate doctrine has to proceed from application/intervention to an acceptable end-state. FID which endorses one side is from my viewpoint rarely suitable. However, the end-state must include a viable political entity of some kind; possibly an authoritarian, socialist or plutocratic regime rather than full-fledged democratic state. Possibly two or more such states as in balkanization.

Peace-making is a good candidate because it admits coercion in the multiple sense of openly acknowledging its use, and employing it in one form or another against all local participants. Peace-making also promotes the use of patronage and other rewards to local individuals, groups and interests who make concessions or are to some extent compliant.

There are other candidate doctrines. Occupation followed by picking a batch of sometime or would-be politicians is one. Perhaps that is what is really meant by FID. If not then an early need would be a euphemistic name that suggests repair of a failed state. It would be interesting to read discussion of the pros and cons of that and other candidates.

Bob's World

11-12-2011, 12:18 PM

Compost,

Perhaps we are talking past each other, what I hear you saying is that is we could just develop the right doctrine and strategy, then we could do these interventions more effectively.

What I am saying is that no amount of tactical or doctrinal manipulation will make much difference so long as we cling to the same outdated and inappropriate strategic perspectives and context. We replace generals, we shift tactics, and we dig the hole deeper. This in not to say that it is impossible to go out and help others, what it is to say that it is impossible to go out in the name of helping others while our true focus is on controlling and shaping events to best help ourselves. Current COIN doctrine enables such flawed strategic context. By in large, the tactics within our COIN doctrine all have merit, it is in the critical area of context and nuance that they fall apart in terms of providing enduring effectiveness.

Changing FM 3-24 from a COIN manual to a FID manual is merely one step, but it would be a powerful one.

Most of the friction in the Middle East is rooted in populaces that have been evolving over the past 100 years, and that in recent decades no longer have the threat of godless Soviet occupation as a "greater evil" to balance Western manipulations against combined with a tremendous increase in access and amount of information about the world around them. The populaces are moving forward, while the governments are doing their damnedest to sustain the status quo. As those gaps widen between the will of the populace and what they expect of governance, and the policies and actions of the government, it creates an exploitable condition. The people in general feel increasingly that the government is out of touch and that they have no legal means available to the to regain/gain control over the government to address this concern. If the conditions/perceptions are significant enough and no legal options are available the people will seek illegal courses of action (violent, non-violent, or some mix).

The US cannot "fix" this through military intervention. The US cannot "fix" this through development and aid. The US cannot "fix" this by demanding governments adopt US values and forms of governance (which would create an even larger gap between the government and the people than already exists). Our best course is to get our messaging straight in regards to our support for the people of the region, and to privately engage governments in regards to these "sovereignty gaps." The proverbial mountain (populace) will not come to Mohammed (the government), so Mohammed must go to the mountain. By making small accommodations tailored to their respective populaces the governments of the region create far more stability than any amount of increased security or bribes or development could ever hope to produce.

US interventions are always about us and our concerns, and then either seek to preserve the status quo or impose some radical westernized change; and that is a recipe for disaster.

Bob's World

11-12-2011, 12:35 PM

I find when I talk about political tensions within a nation of the type that lead to insurgency with civilians who work in other aspects of governance, they often have a hard time grasping the context. Too many years of military leaders talking of insurgency as "war" when what we are talking about is often definitely not war contributes to the ineffectiveness of talking in terms of insurgency. This is an effort I am working on to describe this dynamic in the context of "Sovereignty."

Any comment or feedback is most welcome and very helpful.

Compost

11-12-2011, 10:22 PM

Compost,

Perhaps we are talking past each other, what I hear you saying is that is we could just develop the right doctrine and strategy, then we could do these interventions more effectively.

Yes we have been 'talking' past each other. Posts 38 and 39 are worth reading. It is easy to agree that when a "people in general feel increasingly that the government is out of touch" an appropriate response could be to provide diplomatic or other support to further some change.

My interest is elsewhere: the subset in which a state is being disrupted by an internal minority using armed force, and operating with or without external support.

Dayuhan

11-12-2011, 10:38 PM

Any comment or feedback is most welcome and very helpful.

1. The term "sovereignty" has traditionally been used to describe a nation's relationship with and degree of independence from other nations. Applying it to a totally different concept is likely to cause confusion and obstruct discussion. Not that there's anything wrong with the idea you're expressing, but other terminology might make it easier to work with.

2. The idea of "the collective populace" seems dangerous to me... once we posit it we tend to look for it, or even to assume it exists, even if it doesn't.

3. "Populaces are evolving at an accelerated rate in the current ecosystem" needs empirical support. It's a long way from being self-evident. It's probably true in some places and certainly less so in others, but I don't think it's something we want to assume as given.

PS... maybe it would be useful to describe this with the word "legitimacy", rather than "sovereignty"?

AmericanPride

11-12-2011, 11:11 PM

Bob,

I think you have the cart before the horse. You state that "sovereignty" is a "social contract between every populace and their government." You state that "sovereignty" is then "perceived" by the population and that what follows is an mandate for the government to implement the population's will. Social contract theory is a Western construction and is not universally applicable, if we assume it to be theoretically suitable in the first place. Your chart assumes a universal desire for democratization, that democracy is a universal concept singularly defined, and that the population at large has anything whatsoever to do with the formation and practice of government. To turn your theory right-side up, I think you only have to switch the two sentences in the green "Sovereignty" box, and restate the "fundamental duty" of the government to say that it is to preserve the power of represented interests. Thus, conflict does not emerge between the government and the people, but between the incompatible interests of those subject to the power of the government.

Bob's World

11-13-2011, 11:49 AM

Dayuhan and American Pride, thank you both, good comments that help both to improve the concept that I am working to develop, and to better communicate it as well.

First, on the issue of "Sovereignty" as a whole, yes, we mostly consider it in terms of rights and duties between states,(and that too is largely defined in terms of western concepts that we associate with the treaties of Westphalia coming out of the wars of Reformation that finally broke the hold over western Europe exercised by the Holy Roman Empire through the Catholic church; and then refined, defined, and exported around the world in the age of discovery and subsequent colonization of much of the globe. This too has a De jure (how defined and woven within much of international law) and De facto (what any state can actually enforce - clearly even the US has no ability to secure its borders, a principle tenet of sovereignty).

What I attempt to explore here is the dynamics internal to each state; with de jure being the form of government and the policies and actions of a state to exercise its sovereign duties under that nation's laws; and de facto being how the populace as a whole feels about that official approach, and what they perceive more appropriate forms, policies and approaches would be.

Now, I completely agree with Dayuhan that there is no single voice or mindset for "the populace." This term, and similar terms such as "The American people" are used all the time and must be conferred to mean a collection of perspectives of varying weight and prevalence across any nation that like anything can be compiled, normalized and averaged. We try to measure these things with specific metrics, but I don't like such approaches that attempt to objectify certain criteria, as there is the risk that one picks the wrong criteria and draws a dangerously flawed conclusion. While at the same time I do believe that there are certain critical "bands" of perceptions that are them most important to certain phenomena. This is why I narrowed down to "legitimacy" "respect" "justice" and "hope" for my insurgency model. I would caution against picking any handful of criteria to measure, stack, track and plot as gospel for any of those, as the tendency becomes to mistake precision for accuracy. I believe it is better to take a more instinctive approach, to consider the totality and to trust one's (or collective) instincts to observe and assess once the right criteria are identified. Great military commanders do this instinctively, they ignore the smoke, blood, chaos and noise, and hone in on critical factors which they assess in their heads and make decisions upon. Great civil leaders do this as well. Great business leaders, etc.

Sometimes these lists are captured, such as Jomini's efforts to identify and distill the "principles of war" as a list of such criteria that Napoleon would mentally assess and balance. While many discount Jomini's efforts I have always found them to be profoundly helpful at all levels of military operation when applied as broad categories to mentally assess and always attempt to maximize. From an age when "Strategy" was really "tactics", Jomini's work is, IMO, a timeless tactical guide.

So, on this Sovereignty chart, while yes, I do believe that over time all cultures are generally trending to more liberal forms of government, where it is more widely believed that sovereignty comes from the people rather than from god, and that it is best exercised in a form that allows that same populace some degree of control and is not all vested in a single man who is above that control; I also recognize that such evolutions take time and can go in either direction depending on a vast range of factors, culture, events, etc unique to every state/nation/whatever.

This is not intended to be a "model", nor to project that populaces always move to more liberal perceptions, or that governments always cling to more conservative designs. But rather to create an image that helps to visualize the key points in the lower right box.

That when government and populace diverge in how they believe their nation should exercise its sovereignty, there grows a gap that is ripe for exploitation.

That the populace is where it is, and that it is the duty of government to move to them, and to stay in synch, not the duty of the people to toe some line the government draws for them.

and that external solutions will always lack legitimacy so will always be suspect (next chart), but that they too often also call for changes of governance based upon the de jure or de facto beliefs of that external power rather than the de facto beliefs of the affected populace, so are every bit, and typically more so, flawed than what exists now.

Examples abound across the Middle East where populaces have evolved to be out of line with current systems of government. Those governments must evolve, but if they adopted the US values and form of democracy the US cries for it would create gaps far more massive than what exist now and lead to even greater instability and violence due to governments being both illegitimate AND out of synch in terms of sovereign concepts.

Sometimes it is neither a move to the left or right, but both. I believe the Saudi populace wants a government that is in many ways even more conservative in terms of being closer to the teachings of Islam, and less corrupted by wealth and Western influences; while at the same time they want some degree of greater control/voice, such as a judiciary that is not controlled by the king. The Saudi royals in effect straddle the populace, and will fall in the gap if they do not listen and respond. In Syria I suspect it is more a populace moving toward more liberal models and a government clinging to a more conservative one. Each situation is unique, but all call for the government to listen, assess, and respond to their own populace (not foreign presidents) and to move to be closer to what the people want wherever that might fall on the spectrum of options.

We want other to be like us, but we focus on form over function. We need merely be the champion of others being able to sort things out for themselves, and for the idea that government must be responsive to its own populace first.

Dayuhan

11-13-2011, 11:47 PM

First, on the issue of "Sovereignty" as a whole, yes, we mostly consider it in terms of rights and duties between states....

What I attempt to explore here is the dynamics internal to each state; with de jure being the form of government and the policies and actions of a state to exercise its sovereign duties under that nation's laws

I see where you're going with it. My objection to the term "sovereignty" is purely semantic, but I don't think it's irrelevant at all. Because that word has an accepted and extended usage, its use automatically puts the reader in a certain frame of mind conditioned by that convention. Trying to redirect the conversation from that point to where you're going may lose some people completely or obstruct understanding in others. I just think that choosing terminology with fewer pre-existing associations would make it easier to communicate what you're getting at.

and de facto being how the populace as a whole feels about that official approach, and what they perceive more appropriate forms, policies and approaches would be.

Again, "populace as a whole" is a loaded and dangerous concept. Populaces and their beliefs/desires rarely break down into a neat continuum with a clear balance point. More often they cluster at points along that continuum, in factions with distinctly conflicting beliefs and desires. This is especially true when we're involved or contemplating involvement, because we don't do that until those internal conflicts are becoming very pronounced.

We have to accept that our understanding of these internal dynamics is always imperfect, and that our pre-existing beliefs will always intrude on our evaluation of such situations. Basing action on our imperfect assessment of what "the populace" of another country thinks or wants is skating on very thin ice indeed.

This term, and similar terms such as "The American people" are used all the time and must be conferred to mean a collection of perspectives of varying weight and prevalence across any nation that like anything can be compiled, normalized and averaged.

Disagree strongly, as in rend the garments and clutch the hair. I don't think there is anything we could do that would be worse than trying to normalize and average. Of course we need to try and understand the complex interplay of factions and frictions, what groups want, where their support lies, where they are or are not willing to compromise, etc, ad infinitum. We have to recognize that this understanding will always be incomplete, but we still pursue it. Attempts to normalize and average do not enhance understanding, they obstruct it, especially when political differentiation is on sectarian, ethnic, or similar lines. If we normalize and average we address policy to a hypothetical construct, and we're likely to end up antagonizing everybody in the picture.

This is why I narrowed down to "legitimacy" "respect" "justice" and "hope" for my insurgency model.

I think that selection reveals a quintessentially American bias. As I've noted before, several key factors are omitted, notably economic prosperity and fear of change.

I believe the Saudi populace wants a government that is in many ways even more conservative in terms of being closer to the teachings of Islam, and less corrupted by wealth and Western influences; while at the same time they want some degree of greater control/voice, such as a judiciary that is not controlled by the king.

Is that a "normalized and averaged" belief?

I'd be hesitant to say what "the Saudi populace" - or any other populace - wants, though I'd go to the extent of saying that the Saudi populace wants us to stay the %$#@ out of their business.

We need merely be the champion of others being able to sort things out for themselves, and for the idea that government must be responsive to its own populace first.

Why do we need to be anybody's champion, especially when the people in question haven't asked us to take that role? Seems like a fairly presumptuous mantle for anyone to assume.