COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Ken White]

...so what are we actually doing, because it isn't FID, because the nation doesn't support much of what we're doing. In simple terms it seems we're conducting counter-rebellion or counter-resistance operations against those who oppose our will for their future.Bill, you elsewhere mentioned the idea that SOF should be reinvented every 20 years. I agreed in principle but noted I'd been saying ten years for a long time -- and I've lately come to believe that five years would be even better.

Let me extrapolate that thought a bit. In WW II, all the belligerents formed ad-hoc groupings of not only SOF but 'conventional' forces as well. Most of these worked out rather well, the few that did not were quickly disbanded.

Those organizations were resoundingly disliked by the major forces, partly from jealousy, partly from the semi-valid complaint that they skimmed the cream of personnel but largely from the fact that with respect to both personnel and logistic support, they posed large burdens on the very bureaucratic support structure -- who strongly resented the added burden.

In essence, a bureaucratically inclined structure was forced to produce and support ad-hoc groupings of tactical and operational -- even strategic -- forces rather precisely tailored for missions. That worked and worked well for the most part, some poorly conceived efforts not withstanding. Some point to the Chindits and the Marauders as such failures but I suggest that they were not as effective as they might have been due to then available technology as much as any other failing. We have better -- or the capability to produce better -- tech today. We also arguably have better people and we certainly have the capability to train more effectively (if and when we wish to do so). :(

A problem resulted from those force developments. Many are still here and still doing what they found to be important at their birth. The world has changed significantly and they have not. :rolleyes:

That's a vast over simplification but one can grasp the idea and see permutations that are applicable. Indeed, the point can be made that the US Army as an entity is still stuck in WW II in a good many respects. The point can also be made that current technological advances should allow -- and does, when we want it to do so -- far more rapid fielding of purpose specific equipment. Unfortunately, our stifling bureaucracy and flawed cost avoidance measures do not allow for such adjustment of personnel or of unit structure on a total force basis -- even though with today's computational, logistic and information dissemination ability that should not be a problem...

We currently have fallen into a less than ideal situation where many elements of foreign policy have devolved to the Combatant Commands in the absence of a better National Security Council apparatus, a less assertive DoS and a few other factors. I think that should be changed but there is a plus to that in the near term -- potential military missions within an AOR can be identified early and fairly accurately, more so than is possible at a national level with a worldwide focus (or lack of focus...).

It would thus be possible to finitely tailor and train forces for FID or other missions -- to include assisting in various ways the maintenance of sovereignty and the precluding of gap seeking success -- for the periods envisioned as being required. Stand them up, train, deploy, bring them home, reconstitute into new (lesson learned included) organization and repeat. The Troops can cope with that. Whether the bureaucracy can cope is not really questionable -- that it will absolutely not want to do so is a certainty. :eek:

Nor will the wives and families wish to do so, cope, that is -- but the strong will do so as they have for years. Much of that problem can be ameliorated with sensible policies.

We could do that reinvention of units thing if we wished and it would likely be a significant practical and effectiveness improvement over the current process which relies on mass and not skill or finesse. Always of course with a weather eye for the fog of war...:cool:

[Dayuhan]

Looking at these two comments...


This term, and similar terms such as "The American people" are used all the time and must be conferred to mean a collection of perspectives of varying weight and prevalence across any nation that like anything can be compiled, normalized and averaged.


We need merely be the champion of others being able to sort things out for themselves, and for the idea that government must be responsive to its own populace first.

Would you want government to be responsive to the actual multifaceted populace, with its varied and often incompatible preferences and expectations... or to your hypothetical "normalized and averaged" populace? If we're to be the champion of others, for which of those do we appoint ourselves champion?

Just trying to illustrate the problem of attempting to build policy around a hypothetical "normalized and averaged" construction of popular preference...

[Bob's World]

After a processing a great deal of tremendous insights and inputs from here and elsewhere, an updated snapshot that attempts to avoid some of the unintended implications in the first version, and to clarify some key points as well:

[Dayuhan]

In the first graphic, showing the relative position of populaces, it might be worth pointing out that the ability of government to "reconcile the grievances" depends not only on the adaptability and will to adapt of government, but also on the degree of trust and the extent of the gaps between the various portions of the populace. When the gaps separating those factions are extremely wide and there's a high level of pre-existing hostility there, it gets much much harder for governments to find any viable ground for reconciliation. Inability to reconcile aggrieved multiple factions isn't necessarily evidence that government is unresponsive. It can also mean that the factions have no interest in reconciliation. Spread those black arrow points representing the positions of the various populace factions out close enough to the margins and the zone of stability can become a pretty inaccessible place.

It's not purely up to government to reconcile multiple factions. The factions also have a say, and if they really don't want to reconcile and their demands are far enough apart, governance can become effectively impossible.

I still think your criteria for popular acceptance of government display a high degree of American bias. The ability to provide prosperity and security is often a very compelling factor in popular acceptance, especially when populaces perceive an external threat.

[Bob's World]

Certainly one may have a segment of the populace that feels there is no way to reconcile their primary concerns with the government. As the US government extended out to include regions populated by native americans they certainly could find little common ground with their adoptive governments.

To a lesser degree a similar dynamic is at play closer to you between the Muslim south and Catholic North of the Philippines. But if the government in the north put half as much effort into addressing the critical factors as they do into suppressing the negative effects of ignoring those factors, they would be much farther along the road to a future stability. Compromise is hard, particularly for governments who see that as a challenge to their sovereignty rather than a required component of implementing their sovereignty. One does not "apease" when they address the concerns of their own populace, only when they compromise their own popualce to address the concerns of some foreign government or populace. To compromise wisely at home makes government stronger and enhances their sovereignty abroad.

[M-A Lagrange]

Certainly one may have a segment of the populace that feels there is no way to reconcile their primary concerns with the government. As the US government extended out to include regions populated by native americans they certainly could find little common ground with their adoptive governments.

To a lesser degree a similar dynamic is at play closer to you between the Muslim south and Catholic North of the Philippines. But if the government in the north put half as much effort into addressing the critical factors as they do into suppressing the negative effects of ignoring those factors, they would be much farther along the road to a future stability. Compromise is hard, particularly for governments who see that as a challenge to their sovereignty rather than a required component of implementing their sovereignty. One does not "apease" when they address the concerns of their own populace, only when they compromise their own popualce to address the concerns of some foreign government or populace. To compromise wisely at home makes government stronger and enhances their sovereignty abroad.

Bob,

My only comment would be that you define government as a neutral body above social/ethnical/cultural clivages. But unfortunately, a government is made of people (Human beings to be precise) and reflects the social/ethnical/cultural clivages of a designated country or society. Also, they are accountable to the part of the population who elected them and has to act to please them.
To take an exemple I know better than Philippines, when french government said they wanted to withdraw from Algeria, part of the population that previously was supporting the government turned against it.
This is the real challenge to sovereignty governments are facing in doing compromises.
The real solution lay in preventing insurrection by making sure that domestic policies are including everyone since day 1.
That said, if it happened, there would be no insurgencies anywhere.

[Bob's World]

"That said, if it happened, there would be no insurgencies anywhere."

Perfection is hard to achieve, but yes, in many ways insurgency is a result of choices made by humans in government that adversely affect humans subject to that government. There will always be conflict, but the better governments understand and remain diligent to their role, and the more certain the populace feels in their ability to legally address their grievances (and no, that is not a "Western" concept); the more stable a socieity will be.

How they do that is driven by the culture of the people involved. A key take-away I intend for American audiances is that the appication of American values, forms of government, or perceptions of what right looks like will almost invariably create gaps every bit as large, if not larger, than what already exists. And those external answers will never by perceived as "legitimate."

That is the deal breaker issue in Afghanistan that we treat like a third rail. Everyone know's its there, but no one will touch it. That is why the insurgency grows increasingly worse no matter how hard our efforts are to address various aspects of effectiveness, or to establish better control.

[M-A Lagrange]

"That said, if it happened, there would be no insurgencies anywhere."

Perfection is hard to achieve, but yes, in many ways insurgency is a result of choices made by humans in government that adversely affect humans subject to that government. There will always be conflict, but the better governments understand and remain diligent to their role, and the more certain the populace feels in their ability to legally address their grievances (and no, that is not a "Western" concept); the more stable a socieity will be.

How they do that is driven by the culture of the people involved. A key take-away I intend for American audiances is that the appication of American values, forms of government, or perceptions of what right looks like will almost invariably create gaps every bit as large, if not larger, than what already exists. And those external answers will never by perceived as "legitimate."

That is the deal breaker issue in Afghanistan that we treat like a third rail. Everyone know's its there, but no one will touch it. That is why the insurgency grows increasingly worse no matter how hard our efforts are to address various aspects of effectiveness, or to establish better control.

I tend to believe that you are addressing two different problematics here (Might be wrong).
1) The reaction to a foreign invasion
2) Insurgencies

What triggers a response to a foreign intervention followed by a military invasion and the installation of a "puppet" national government is/are completely different from what triggers an insurgency against a national government.
I was quite stuck when I read Killcullen's accidental insurgency of the amalgam between the situation in Irak/Afghanistan and the one in Thailand.

yes on a military point of iew you can treat both sitations as an insurgency. But political roots are very very different.
What makes it different is not the perception by insurgent but the nature/difference between a national government established since several years and an government establish by/through a foreign power.
Because an invided country is not home, you will never grasp the roots of the problematic (in terms of response to an insurgency). The fact it is not home also explain why it is treated as a third rail.

That said, this does not mean the COIN military and civilo-military response to an insurgency will never work.
Actually, IMHO, in many cases, you may have the feeling that COIN response elaborated by a foreigner would be much more appropriate to response than FID in many "national insurgencies".
What I have difficulties to answer to is what COIN tactics and strategy (ennemy or populace centric or anything else) would be appropriate for an insurgency triggered by a foreign invasion.

[Dayuhan]

Certainly one may have a segment of the populace that feels there is no way to reconcile their primary concerns with the government....


Compromise is hard, particularly for governments who see that as a challenge to their sovereignty rather than a required component of implementing their sovereignty. One does not "apease" when they address the concerns of their own populace, only when they compromise their own popualce to address the concerns of some foreign government or populace.

Again I think you're locking yourself into the "government vs populace" paradigm and disregarding the very significant impact of conflict among segments of the populations... and the degree to which those populace-populace conflicts are not fully controllable by or responsive to government.

I fully agree with the points M-A is making, and would apply a particularly resounding "Amen" to the following:


you define government as a neutral body above social/ethnical/cultural clivages. But unfortunately, a government is made of people (Human beings to be precise) and reflects the social/ethnical/cultural clivages of a designated country or society. Also, they are accountable to the part of the population who elected them and has to act to please them.


What triggers a response to a foreign intervention followed by a military invasion and the installation of a "puppet" national government is/are completely different from what triggers an insurgency against a national government.

[Bob's World]

You seriously want to know what triggers a response following a military invasion?

The invasion triggers it, it is called a resistance insurgency. The violation of Sovereignty is the major criteria from the list

Then you seriously want to know what happens when that invading force installs a puppet regime? That too is a resistance, but now it is violations of Sovereignty, lack of Legitimacy at a minimum, and more likely than not those segments of the populace not collaborating are also feeling some serious Disrespect, Injustice under the law and a major lack of hope in their ability to exercise legal control of their government.

As to "populace on populace" conflicts, that is not insurgency, as insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government. If the kids are just fighting it is just fighting, and probably related to other common factors of greed, anger, etc. Now if one segment of the populace that is outside of good governance is attacking a segment of the populace that is inside of good governance, then that is a part of the insurgency, like the actions of the Rebels against the Tory/loyalists during the American Revolution. Or those of the populace that supports the Taliban against those aspects of the Afghan populace that supports the Northern Alliance.

All of this is in the chart. And in the papers I have published as well.

[Dayuhan]

You seriously want to know what triggers a response following a military invasion?

The invasion triggers it, it is called a resistance insurgency. The violation of Sovereignty is the major criteria from the list

Then you seriously want to know what happens when that invading force installs a puppet regime? That too is a resistance, but now it is violations of Sovereignty, lack of Legitimacy at a minimum, and more likely than not those segments of the populace not collaborating are also feeling some serious Disrespect, Injustice under the law and a major lack of hope in their ability to exercise legal control of their government....

All of this is in the chart.

I confess that at times i envy your certainty. It must be nice to know you have it all worked out and locked down.


As to "populace on populace" conflicts, that is not insurgency, as insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government. If the kids are just fighting it is just fighting, and probably related to other common factors of greed, anger, etc. Now if one segment of the populace that is outside of good governance is attacking a segment of the populace that is inside of good governance, then that is a part of the insurgency, like the actions of the Rebels against the Tory/loyalists during the American Revolution. Or those of the populace that supports the Taliban against those aspects of the Afghan populace that supports the Northern Alliance.


Again you seem to treat "government" as a separate entity apart from these competing populaces, not an entity that is drawn from these populaces and reflects their competitions and prejudices. I'll echo M-A again:


My only comment would be that you define government as a neutral body above social/ethnical/cultural clivages. But unfortunately, a government is made of people (Human beings to be precise) and reflects the social/ethnical/cultural clivages of a designated country or society. Also, they are accountable to the part of the population who elected them and has to act to please them.

Until this reality is reflected on the chart, rather than "government", "populace a", "populace b" and so on in their neat differentiated boxes, the chart is not reflecting reality on the ground.

One problem with trying to represent these things graphically is that we like our pictures to be neat and defined, and the more neat and defined they are the less relation they bear to what's actually going on outside the wire.

[M-A Lagrange]

Bob,

My point is not to argue with you but rather challenge your graph (I will repeat my self but I do agree with most of what you say and come from almost the same starting point).


Then you seriously want to know what happens when that invading force installs a puppet regime? That too is a resistance, but now it is violations of Sovereignty, lack of Legitimacy at a minimum, and more likely than not those segments of the populace not collaborating are also feeling some serious Disrespect, Injustice under the law and a major lack of hope in their ability to exercise legal control of their government.
I fully agree with that.


As to "populace on populace" conflicts, that is not insurgency, as insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government. If the kids are just fighting it is just fighting, and probably related to other common factors of greed, anger, etc.
I partially agree with that. And therefore partially disagree.

What I am saying is:
1) Governments are a mirror of the populations they administrate. Antagonisms as Christian/Muslims which exist in a country are found in the government. In many countries the dominant group will tend to be over represented and have discriminating policies over minorities. This not because they have bad policies or bad governance but because they govern according to the group they represent: the overwhelming majority (think about the Copts in Egypt).
2) Sure an invasion triggers an insurgency. But in many cases, insurgencies come from the previously mentioned governance problematic (inherent to any government) AND the resistance/self-preservation reaction from a minority who will immediately define itself as “different” from the populace and then act as government is a bunch of outsiders/foreigners invading them (In some cases with good reasons).

That’s why I, personally, tend to make a difference between the two. It’s two different problematic with different roots causes but with a similar huge mess trunk.


Taking South Sudan:
Because people inside SPLA did not receive what they expected, they rebelled and created insurgencies. Cause 1: greed.

Because SPLA is ruling South Sudan with disregard to some ethnic groups, they armed themselves and rebelled. Cause 2: bad governance, exclusion.

But before last year, South Sudan was part of Sudan and SPLA was conducting an insurgency because part of the population felt excluded from national representation and South Sudanese, because of cultural differences (Based on ethnicity and religion mainly but not only), felt different from North Sudanese. Cause: legitimacy and sovereignty.

You have here the perfect example of a large mixture of causes leading to the same thing: insurgency.
For a long time what united insurgent was the sovereignty/legitimacy pb. But once they won the war against north, the same sovereignty/legitimacy pb came back in the face of SPLA (the government) within southeners.

Multiple causes with various level of importance for each groups.

What is a challenge to set up a strategy and decide if you need to conduct population centric COIN or enemy centric COIN or Counter Terrorist operations is the necessity to identify:
- Several insurgencies causes (which are sometime related but not always). IMHO, no insurgency has a single root cause.
- Various respond to different causes according to micro context problematic. You cannot treat a situation as one and only problematic.

[SWJ Blog]

22 November COIN Center Webcast (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/22-november-coin-center-webcast)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN is Dead: U.S. Army Must Put Strategy Over Tactics (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-is-dead-us-army-must-put-strategy-over-tactics)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN is Alive: Know When to Use it! (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-is-alive-know-when-to-use-it)

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[Compost]

This item is focused on discussing what COIN is supposed to be, what it is and what is needed to succeed or more accurately to replace COIN. It excludes discussion of morality and acceptable behavioral norms because those are already codified in military and international law.

Some people believe COIN doctrine contains the experiential, synthesized and theoretical knowledge needed to provide a comprehensive guide for successful action in a theatre such as Afghanistan. If that were valid then the actual mix of material – be it military, political, police, social, other – would be of little importance. The vital aspect would simply be that it was agreed upon and usefully employable.

However, employing COIN doctrine and assessing its use as guidance has lead to argument. That is of itself degrading because COIN is currently used as both a strategy and concept of operation intended to promote understanding, agreement and co-ordination down to sub-unit level. Continuing argument about what is useful, tolerable or useless indicates that there have been some quite substantial changes in operational emphasis within for example ISAF. COIN precepts are also routinely subject to posturing and have generated numerous sound-bites.

Names and phrasing can assist memory and with enough time it is possible to devise a clever name or half-meaningful sound bite about anything. But cleverness often contributes more to novelty and ego than to understanding and productive change. ‘Eating soup with a knife’ is cute but conveys little of real use and every infantry trainee learns early how to tackle congealed muck. The ‘three block war’ is an artificial arrangement with neat boundaries when the common situation is a tangle maliciously contrived to occur within the same block.

The associated term ‘strategic corporal’ is a superlative example of excess. Platoon sergeants and company command teams are well able to guide and constrain junior NCOs and junior officers. So the phrase was not meant as a figurative punch to the head of junior officers but was apparently intended to describe a productive and attainable need. As such it is analagous to requirements creep and the assumption that a combat or combat support platform already heavily equipped and tasked to meet tactical needs can be loaded up with further missions and equipment that serve mainly to increase complexity, training, fatique, maintenance, downtime and also procurement and upgrade costs and word count.

Practitioners of COIN are also prone to use keywords such as ‘seamless’ to imply that adherence to its precepts will result in successful operations. But seamless is also an appropriate descriptor for shrink-wrappers, rigid and inflexible castings and shapeless yowie suits. Anything tailor made to fit well has seams as in a swimmer’s wetsuit, or a dress uniform with discrete margins of surplus to enable later adjustment. In real life ‘seamless’ is code for shallow thinking and a weak substitute for coordination to cope with ever-likely seams and other discontinuities.

Capping it off COIN is often presented as an iron fist and velvet glove. A clever duality that must confuse its would-be and co-opted practitioners when minimum force is stressed as a mandatory requirement to win “hearts and minds”. COIN is altogether too clever and adept at confusing those two items also. Regardless of where the heart is at or is going to, conflict is decided when an adversary comes to perceive realistically or otherwise that a desired outcome is not achievable at tolerable cost. The survivor’s heart may be sore but his mind is dominant even if bitter and resentful.

And then there are the counterveiling maxims. Many of them are hard-learned truisms as exemplified by “Presence patrols generate own goals” and “The minimum force response is an effective way of increasing blue force casualties.”

All the above attempts at cleverness are reminiscent of COIN itself. Extrapolating from the specific to derive a general theorem of applicability and doctrine is difficult. And with good reason because circumstances vary in ways that are not always noted and qualified. And the more one reads the more apparent it becomes that COIN concepts are a ragbag of ideas about what has been sometimes useful in the past melded into a supposedly integrated whole. COIN as practised is not an all-encompassing strategy nor a viable conop for an interposing or expeditionary military power or group.

Repeating some points made elsewhere, ‘counter’ is reactive and intrinsicly weak while ‘insurgency’ is an internal uprising which implies a degree of legitimacy. Though COIN might be appropriate to describe operations in one’s own country, it is nonetheless a malapropism when applied to any form of expeditionary conflict.

The sometime alternative name ‘Foreign Internal Defence’ is usefully descriptive and different as it seems to envisage own forces functioning mainly in an advisory role. But that means the term has limited applicability. Also it must anyway have been thought-up by a poorly informed committee because it licenses the news media to make frequent use of phrases such as “fiddling with the populace” and “fiddling while the cities, towns, villages and countryside burn”.

The ineptitudes of COIN and FID from an international community that developed and productively uses things like kevlar, lasers, MASINT and NVGs. A community so technologically advanced should have enough energy and common sense to employ such resources in an effective strategy and associated concept of operation.

The rest of this item is aimed at the terminology, doctrine and conops to succeed clever and sensitive COIN. Why terminology ? Terminology is a useful starting point and aid to understanding. It can also be a means to more accurately inform and to obtain and retain support within one’s own general population and in the target and other countries.

Peacemaking is as elaborated in earlier posts an appropriate name for a doctrine and an over-arching strategy. It quite literally suggests an external power or international group intruding in some region or country to adjudicate between various interests and participants and to sometimes play one off against another. There are surely other names but peacemaking is good enough and it encompasses both a useful objective and a strategy.

As an alternative to seamlessness it is useful to recall the example of bland sounding anti-submarine warfare - the doctrine which harnessed but held apart two conops each with a diametrically opposed purpose and its own distinct resources. One was convoying that aimed to protect and secure shipping primarily by localized suppression, distraction, deterrence of submarines and secondly by the opportunistic destruction of in-area persistent submarines. Two was hunter-killing aimed at wide-area location, pursuit and destruction of every submarine and all supporting resources. There was in practical terms a huge seam between those two conops. The same could apply in peacemaking.

Winning hearts and minds is a natural task for resident forces. So one conop aimed at local security and HUMINT could employ whatever indigenous military and police resources were available for use in contingencies. That conop might be referred to as MAPOPS or MAPCOPS rather than COIN or FID. Advising and mentoring could be done by visiting special forces who are anyway required to have already-trained linguists for use when alternatively engaged in sponsoring guerilla type operations. Any need for additional numbers of security elements would probably require attachment of visiting regular force units, perhaps of battalion size. As supplementary attached forces it could also be useful to form independent companies based on a reinforced company group. Such units would provide a usefully testing environment for majors being considered for command of a battalion.

Wide-area surveillance and stand-off surveillance of local areas is a task for high technology RSTA assets that are likely to be deployed with visiting forces. Those forces are also certain to have ready access to surface and air vehicles that enable fairly rapid concentration of powerful units and subunits for cutoff, persistent pursuit and destruction of whatever is detected. Isolation, mapping and precise targetting are especially difficult in residential areas but tactical sensors and fusion/display aids are steadily becoming more portable, rugged and easy-to-use. NVGs are one example particularly when curfews are not allowed. This wide-area/regional conop for visiting forces might be referred to as WAMOPS or REMOPS.

In some instances these two conops would of course intersect and probably clash with each other. One example would be an area in which MAPCOPS had not gained sufficient intelligence. But such interaction or clashing could be appropriate because thereafter MAPCOPS or WAMOPS might achieve more than it or the other had previously been able to obtain. The alternative is that both would do worse. That could be left for empirical assessment.

That’s enough stirring the pot in this area of social science. It’s easier to consider amenable topics like military technology.

[jmm99]

on this (my emphasis):


from Compost
This item is focused on discussing what COIN is supposed to be, what it is and what is needed to succeed or more accurately to replace COIN. It excludes discussion of morality and acceptable behavioral norms because those are already codified in military and international law.

Law (including military and international law) is an instrument of policy. What we should know as a basic is that military law and international law are far from being monoliths. They vary substatively from country to country, and from group to group.

"COIN" (which I take as primarily an internal effort by a state against a predominately internal opponent) tends to be legal intensive - especially as the military struggle wanes and the political struggle waxes. The applicable laws - for that struggle - grow out of the respectively opposed policies and politics. Those policies and politics are very much shaped by the acceptable behavioral norms of the opposing forces.

Regards

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

More Commentary on COIN is Dead (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-commentary-on-coin-is-dead)

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[Compost]

on this (my emphasis):



Law (including military and international law) is an instrument of policy. What we should know as a basic is that military law and international law are far from being monoliths. They vary substatively from country to country, and from group to group.

"COIN" (which I take as primarily an internal effort by a state against a predominately internal opponent) tends to be legal intensive - especially as the military struggle wanes and the political struggle waxes. The applicable laws - for that struggle - grow out of the respectively opposed policies and politics. Those policies and politics are very much shaped by the acceptable behavioral norms of the opposing forces.

Regards

Mike

Agree that law regardless of how established becomes an instrument of policy. It also functions as a constraint on policy. Also believe that although law and practice iterate, law should not be modified for advantage, convenience or other reason during a particular military contingency or conflict.

However, can see that a military power might of its own volition decide on less vigorous use of for example the military need argument in order to further, but never to foster, some adversarial movement toward an acceptable outcome. It other words be lawful and implacable and give mostly pain until you get a concession or some other useful thing.

[Compost]

It other words be lawful and implacable and give mostly pain until you get a concession or some other useful thing.

sri last sentence should read:


In other words be lawful and implacable and give mostly - but not exclusively - pain until you get a concession or some other useful thing.

[jmm99]

from Compost
Agree that law regardless of how established becomes an instrument of policy. It also functions as a constraint on policy.

They certainly apply in a democracy where more than one power center can be a policy-maker. The US "co-equal" three branches, Executive, Legislative and Judicial, are an example. E.g., the Executive establishes a policy which is executed by "laws" (executive orders). That policy and "laws" also act as constraints on policy-making by subordinates in the Executive branch (e.g., DoD).

They also hold over the other two branches unless they "revolt" (here by a number of constitutional methods). Thus, here, the Executive policy (and its "laws") may be accepted or rejected as constraints (rightly or wrongly) by the other two branches.

But, in an absolute autocracy (in theory), the Autocrat's policy (and its "laws") should operate as constraints on everyone in the state. In fact, that theory doesn't quite hold because multiple subordinate power centers are evidenced in, say, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR (albeit less evident in the USSR until after Stalin died.

A country's "insurgent group" also represents a power center, which obviously does not agree with one or more of that country's governing policies and laws.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

On the insurgent and law, the book
Ya Basta!: 10 Years of the Zapatista Uprising Writings of Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ya-Basta-Zapatista-Subcomandante-Insurgente/dp/1904859135/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322389415&sr=8-1

is interresting as you have a compilation of all the laws promulgated by the zapatist movement in the areas under their control.

It is an interresting illustration of Mike point of law as policy tool.

[Bob's World]

law should not be modified for advantage, convenience or other reason during a particular military contingency or conflict.

In many cases "the rule of law" is the primary source of causation for insurgency; and even more often, when many factors are contributing to discontent and subversion within a populace, it is the state's instinct to ratchet up enforcement of the rule of law to regain control over the populace that pushes an uprising to the next level. Typically to the ultimate detriment of the state and the larger society as a whole.

Laws are important. Justice is essential. One is rooted in rules designed to objectively describe the left and right limits of acceptable behavior, the latter is much more principle-based and rooted in the intangible and innate perceptions of what people instinctively feel.

For me, the greatest example of this "Rule of Law" vs "Justice" debate is in the fundamental essence of the message delivered by Jesus (who was widely feared to be an emerging insurgent leader by Roman and Jewish leadership alike). The rule of law is the foremost tool of a regime to control the populace, and certainly that was the case in Palestine, where the Romans used Jewish officials and Jewish law to control the Jewish people. Jesus message constantly challenged the injustice in how the law's of Moses were being applied. You see how many came to him believing he was their salvation from injustice on Earth, only to be gently redirected to the fact that he had a larger mission and purpose for his message.

The law can be perverted to evil purpose, or is designed for controlling purposes that are no longer necessary or appropriate for an evolving populace. Often it is fixing and changing the laws; rather than more vigorous enforcement of the law, that is the critical step a state can make in reducing popular unrest and quelling a growing insurgency.

One sees this also in the history of English law, which is the root of our American system. The Law was the King's tool for controlling the populace, but increasingly when one could not find justice under the law, and evolving populace demanded greater justice. The King's Chancellors began to hear cases, and evolved to the Courts of Chancery, with a rooting in the principles of Equity (Good Faith and Fair Dealing). Ultimately the two merged into one, bringing justice to the law. The timing of this development and reformation of governance that swept Europe are not coincidental.

Can Muslim's find justice under the law in countries such as Syria or Saudi Arabia today? That is for them to answer, for justice is how one feels, which is not well assessed by outside perspectives. State's also have a biased perspective as the writer and enforcer of the law to not well see the growing injustice under the same. The quest for justice is historically far more powerful than even the most vigorous enforcement of the rule of law to keep suppressed indefinitely.

[jmm99]

for another pointer to evidence that insurgents have laws. Here is a sample (4 pages) of a Marcos article written in 1992, Our Word is Our Weapon (http://faculty.washington.edu/caporaso/courses/203/readings/marcos_our_word_is_our_weapon.pdf), including the role of their women in shaping the Zapatista Laws (at p.3 pdf). See also, this SWC thread, Mullah Omar: Taliban Rules and Regulations (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8675).

Of course, French women use a more direct method in addressing the "rule of law" and "injustice":

http://farm3.staticflickr.com/2406/3542473251_8c9c36c795_z.jpg?zz=1

I'm told that Lagrange's mother was the model for this 1968 graphic, but that might be a canard. :eek:

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

having found the 1968 slogan (stored in one of my old semi-frozen mental file cabinets) to accompany La Beaute (ou La Fille du Pave) as her battle cry:


Soyez realiste, demandez l'impossible = Be realistic, demand the impossible.

That does make it a bit difficult, doesn't it, for governments to meet the demands of insurgent groups who adopt this line of reasoning. The battle line is simply drawn at a revolutionary or separatist point which the government cannot approach.

Of course, the response is that the government should offer some compromises (a bit of a sticky wicket to decide which ones without losing authority, etc); thereby splitting away those insurgents who are satisfied with lesser, but possible reforms.

My obvious and simplistic point is that, in defining "COIN", one must consider what is possible and impossible in regard to each side of the coin, the government and the insurgents. The Beauty and the Beast; but which one is which depends on your vantage point.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

I'm told that Lagrange's mother was the model for this 1968 graphic, but that might be a canard. :eek:

And my father was on the otherside with the police ;)


My obvious and simplistic point is that, in defining "COIN", one must consider what is possible and impossible in regard to each side of the coin, the government and the insurgents. The Beauty and the Beast; but which one is which depends on your vantage point.

The over simplistic view is to discredit insurgents claims. IN many cases, insurgent claims are a complexe combinaison of irrealist demands (as the students of May 68) and legitimate ones.
The biggest difficulty is to identfy what are insurgent legitimate claims and irrealistic onces.
Responding to legitimate claims will leave insurgent with the only option of radicalisation. Actions of the brits in Malaisia is a very good exemple of government responding to insurgent legitimate claims to cut them from their political advantage.
When distance between insurgents claims are only irrealistic or too radical, you end up in a catch 22 situation or the population.
What ever the governement will do to respond to insurgent claims will never meet population demands as insurgents are not responding to a population legitimate demand.
In that perspective subcommandante Marcos legal work is extremely interresting as it is one of the very few modern insurgency designed to respond to a population demand and not impose a governance/powersharing system over a population by an external group that is not the government.
(Am I clear?)

[jmm99]

as opposed to 1968's CRS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compagnies_R%C3%A9publicaines_de_S%C3%A9curit%C3%A 9) and SAC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_d'Action_Civique). ;)

Seriously, my summation was too simplistic because it didn't refer to what "the population" wants. That was not meant to exclude "the population". However, "the population" is not likely to be a monolith - your Malayan example involved three major population groups, Malay, Chinese and Indian - and those groups involved subgroups with different wants. The wants of "the population" are harder to determine than, say, the slogans of the government or the insurgents.

But, yes, generally I see true "Rule of Law" as coming from a large majority of the population subject to it - a "constitutional majority" (say, 2/3 -3/4) for major issues. In that respect, I agree with Marcos in what he said about the Zapatista process to develop their laws. Whether what he said was true or false of what was actually done, I don't know.

You also make the point that insurgents, like governments, impose on the population what they believe are the best rules. I suppose Khmer Rouge and Shining Path are examples from the insurgent side. Lots of imposition of law by governments are available. Bob Jones calls that sort of imposition "Rule of Law". I would call it "Rule by Law" - a concept well developed by the Chinese from the Imperial through Communist regimes.

You also make the point that populations are caught in a Catch 22 betwixt the government and the insurgents. You'll get no argument from me on that.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This post from Zenpundit, Do Oligarchies Create Insurgencies? (http://zenpundit.com/?p=4529), deserves citation here as a good framework for discussion - and for distinguishing five basic cases: (1) Foreign Invasion; (2) Totalitarian Dictatorships; (3) Democratic States; (4) Colonial regimes; and (5) Authoritarian dictatorships. Not that all of this has not been discussed here at SWC; but this relatively short blog pulls together many facets.

Those facets depend on the actual legal polices and practices exercised by the state. Above I mentioned "Rule by Law", especially with reference to the Chinese systems - Imperial through Communist, as contrasted to "Rule of Law" (as I use that term).

In a traditional historical presentation, I should start with the "Before the Common Era" School of Chinese Legalism and slog through its ups and down to Mao's study of that and competing schools. If so, most everyone would be asleep - and what's its materiality to present-day issues, anyway ?

Here is a series (by various authors) from the NYT (2005-2007), entitled Rule by Law (http://www.nytimes.com/ref/world/asia/rule_index.html) (index of articles below) which have more life and current materiality than what I could present:


Deep Flaws, and Little Justice, in China's Court System (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/international/asia/21confess.html?ex=1172466000&en=7c4614ffb44d4110&ei=5070) (JOSEPH KAHN; Forced confessions remain endemic in a judicial system that faces pressure to maintain "social stability" at all costs. September 21, 2005).

Dispute Leaves U.S. Executive in Chinese Legal Netherworld (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/01/international/asia/01kidnap.ready.html?ex=1172466000&en=984ae0c547d80cdf&ei=5070) (JOSEPH KAHN; In China, where the legal system rarely backs investors or ordinary citizens against the state, an entrepreneur has become a pawn in a commercial dispute. November 1, 2005).

Desperate Search for Justice: One Man vs. China (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/12/international/asia/12china.html?ex=1172466000&en=d37c020209772ce4&ei=5070) (JIM YARDLEY; A father's quest to free his son poses a question about China: Is it possible for a criminal defendant to get a fair trial? November 12, 2005).

A Judge Tests China's Courts, Making History (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/international/asia/28judge.html?ex=1172466000&en=46052b63026f0e56&ei=5070) (JIM YARDLEY; A ruling on a mundane case about seed prices opened a debate on judicial autonomy in China's political system. November 28, 2005).

Legal Gadfly Bites Hard, and Beijing Slaps Him (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/international/asia/13lawyer.html?ex=1172466000&en=593b540698330719&ei=5070) (JOSEPH KAHN; Gao Zhisheng has become the most prominent in a string of outspoken lawyers facing persecution. December 13, 2005).

Seeking a Public Voice on China's 'Angry River' (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/26/international/asia/26china.html?ex=1172466000&en=a7116b0e169962e3&ei=5070) (JIM YARDLEY; A proposal for a dam project is now unexpectedly presenting the Chinese government with a quandary of its own making: will it abide by its own laws? December 26, 2005).

When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/international/asia/28land.html?ex=1172466000&en=1c4306de9a1f7a30&ei=5070) (JOSEPH KAHN; Courts often refuse to issue any verdict at all - or even acknowledge that some legal complaints exist. December 28, 2005).

In Worker's Death, View of China's Harsh Justice (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/31/international/asia/31china.html?ex=1172466000&en=7a95e41fb486c173&ei=5070) (JIM YARDLEY; There is widespread suspicion, even within the government, that too many innocent people are sentenced to death. December 31, 2005).

Rivals on Legal Tightrope Seek to Expand Freedoms in China (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/world/asia/25china.html?ex=1172466000&en=7a95e41fb486c173&ei=5070) (JOSEPH KAHN; Two advocates of the rule of law differ on whether to work within the system or to seek an end to Communist rule. February 25, 2007).
If you want a quick Wiki view of Chinese Rule by [or of] Law, go here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_law#Rule_of_law), here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law#United_States) and here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_by_law#Asia).

See also, two short pdfs: The Rule by Law in China Today (http://www.hrlf.net/CECC.pdf); and China's Long March to the Rule of Law (http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/2002073483.pdf). From the latter (p.12 pdf):


Rule of law or rule by law?

While there is some evidence that China is in the midst of a transformation to some form of a rule of law, there is at the same time some evidence to support the view that the legal system remains a type of rule by law rather than a form of rule of law. Whereas the core of rule of law is the ability of the law and legal system to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling elite, rule by law refers to an instrumental conception of law in which law is merely a tool to be used as the state sees fit.

Finally, from this year's NYT, A Return to the Cultural Revolution? (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/opinion/21iht-edwei21.html?pagewanted=all) (WEI JINGSHENG; April 20, 2011):


WASHINGTON — On April 3, the Chinese Communist authorities secretly detained the well-known artist Ai Weiwei. Neither his family nor friends were notified of what happened to him, why he was seized or where he was. Like everyone else, they have now learned from the Xinhua News Agency that he is under investigation for “economic crimes.”
...
This episode reveals not only the essence of a system where the individual has no rights, but also the evolution of a new brand of repression: the perverted “rule by law” instead of the “rule of law.” In other words, the application of legal loopholes to violate human rights instead of protect them.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I received a PM re: the post above, including two questions.


Why only cite Chinese examples and links?

Chinese law is the best example I know (others may wish to expand the examples) to illustrate "Rule by Law" - which is how oligarchies survive. The ten Chinese examples from the NYT are not unique to China.

The topic of "Rule by Law" ties it into Zenpundit's more general discussion of oligarchies and insurgencies.

In fact, of his five basic cases [(1) Foreign Invasion; (2) Totalitarian Dictatorships; (3) Democratic States; (4) Colonial regimes; and (5) Authoritarian dictatorships], only Democratic States have close to the theoretical "Rule of Law". Even there, actual practice is not always true to the concept that the law and legal system impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling elite. In the other cases, we deal with one form or the other of "Rule by Law" - which can range from the benign to the malign.

-------------------------


Would it not justify its own thread?

I don't think so. The field of Chinese law will find few specialists here - I'm not (despite a reasonable knowledge) because I've no experience in China and can't read Chinese. So, I think that thread would be a non-starter.

The on-going battle between Rule by Law (even if the rules came from heaven) and Rule of Law (where the rules derive from the people and their practices) is of obvious materiality to "IN" and "COIN". But even Mao was torn between the two different constructs right from the gitgo:

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) (1912):


Laws and regulations are instruments for procuring happiness. If the laws and regulations are good, the happiness of our people will certainly be great. Our people fear only that the laws and regulations will not be promulgated, or that, if promulgated, they will not be effective. It is essential that every effort be devoted to the task of guaranteeing and upholding such laws, never ceasing until the objective of perfection is obtained. The government and the people are mutually dependent and interconnected, so how can there be any reason for distrust? On the other hand, if the laws and regulations are not good, then not only will there be no happiness to speak of, but there will also be a threat of harm, and our people should exert their utmost efforts to obstruct such laws and regulations. Even though you want us to have confidence, why should we have confidence? But how can one explain the fact that Shang Yang encountered the opposition of so large a proportion of the people of Qin?

and, To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (1919):


It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person — the 'emperor'— was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of 'heaven'. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice.

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay. . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved. Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

I think these issues and answers belong directly in a discussion of "IN" and "COIN".

Regards

Mike

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Over the Horizon: Dead or Alive, COIN is not the Culprit (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/over-the-horizon-dead-or-alive-coin-is-not-the-culprit)

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COIN and FID in Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-and-fid-in-colombia)

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Malleable COIN Targeting (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/malleable-coin-targeting)

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US Army COIN Center Webcast (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-army-coin-center-webcast)

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Winning Hearts and Minds During COIN Campaigns (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/winning-hearts-and-minds-during-coin-campaigns)

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[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a "lurker" it is worth reading a hitherto unknown Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic and his paper 'Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma', which appeared in The Washington Quarterly in 2010:http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10julyzambernardi.pdf

So why refer in the title to 'The evolution of modern COIN'? Have we thought here on waging COIN after the exit from Iraq and the expected exit from Afghanistan? It must be a bad day I cannot immediately recall such a discussion!

I know large scale, external COIN interventions are not the only model and there are ample examples of external "small is beautiful" campaigns.

From the opening:
Counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice a counter-insurgent needs to choose two out of three. This is the ‘‘impossible trilemma’’ of counterinsurgency. In economic literature, the impossible trilemma known also as the ‘‘unholy trinity’’ or the ‘‘open-economy trilemma’’ has been used to assert that an economy cannot simultaneously have an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate, and free capital movement.

The impossible trilemma in counterinsurgency is that, in this type of conflict, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents

In pursuing any two of these goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. A state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe, respectively. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents, as U.S. armed forces have started to do in Iraq after the success of the ‘‘surge.’’

Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, as the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have recently begun to do in Afghanistan. As in international economics, where states actually make a trade-off among its economic goals, the argument here highlights that, in counterinsurgency, it is almost impossible to reach all three objectives within a feasible time frame. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them, while putting the third objective on the back burner.

[Fuchs]

I don't see how one could avoid losses ("Force Protection") and eliminate the enemy in a conventional battle either. So COIN would be -judged by his article- an easier mode of warfare. A trilemma instead of a dilemma as 'usual'.

[davidbfpo]

CNA, a think tank within the Beltway, has published a 200 pg. report, so far too lengthy to absorb now and the summary says:
This book seeks to answer two questions: Why is irregular conflict so hard? Can we do it better? The concept of “strategic realities” applies to both questions. Problems arise in the irregular conflict arena that generally do not arise in either conventional conflict or classic development, yet irregular conflict also requires understanding each of those domains—and something more besides. When we undertake responses to an irregular conflict, we do so with organizations that are designed, educated, and trained for other purposes. Jerry-rigged solutions can work and sometimes have, but success usually comes only because of stellar ad hoc efforts, and not because of a focused systemic approach.

There is no shortage of writing on irregular conflict—Afghanistan and Iraq have made certain of that—but the virtue of this book comes from the experience of those writing it and their willingness to tell it as it is, both problems and proposed solutions. The authors look both into problems faced in and by the host nation and at the United States’ approach to irregular conflict in the field and in the bureaucracy. Beyond description, the authors attempt to meld multiple perspectives and propose solutions that those with experience believe could generate more effective results.

Link:http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Irregular_Conflict.pdf

[SWJ Blog]

Mobile Training Teams & COIN Shura: Helping to Minimize Civilian Casualties (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mobile-training-teams-coin-shura-helping-to-minimize-civilian-casualties)

Entry Excerpt:



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

To COIN or Not? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/to-coin-or-not)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

US Army IW Fusion Center Webcast: COIN Challenges in Pakistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-army-iw-fusion-center-webcast-coin-challenges-in-pakistan)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

SOF, COIN, and the Question of Host Nation Viability: An Interview with Dick Couch (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couch)

Entry Excerpt:



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[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note - for Bill M.

On request I'm copying some recent posts from the thread on "Porch shines a torch on COIN to expand the discussion beyond his promising book to discuss whether or not we have confused our COIN doctrine with strategy, and if so what are the risks to our national security if we don't fix this? (Ends).


Professor Douglas Porch, of NPS, has a new book due out at the end of July 'Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War', which is likely to arouse interest, if not controversy.

From the summary:
Douglas Porch's sweeping history of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the three 'providential nations' of France, Britain and the United States, ranging from nineteenth-century colonial conquests to General Petraeus's 'Surge' in Iraq, challenges the contemporary mythologising of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil-military relations.

(Elsewhere)The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability.

Link:http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1373208260&sr=1-1&keywords=douglas+porch and http://www.amazon.co.uk/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1373193058&sr=8-1&keywords=Douglas+Porch

A very partial review by a Guardian journalist, which includes this:
The book came from listening to his students, many of whom are seasoned officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and who repeatedly told him that COIN hadn't a hope of changing the countries for the better. And when he lost two students to "green on blue attacks", he felt an obligation to expose the official doctrine and, in some way, to stop scholarship being militarised.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/07/america-counterinsurgency-threat-home-abroad?CMP=twt_gu

Professor Porch's NPS entry:http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/SIGS/DegreeProg/NSA/Faculty/porch.html

I have read and enjoyed two of his books on French military history.

[Madhu]

http://www.amazon.com/Wrong-Turn-Americas-Embrace-Counterinsurgency/dp/1595588744

Both have books on COIN coming out and I've pre-ordered both (I think I've mentioned that in a previous thread around here. Maybe I won't be so lazy for a change and write up a review or something. I also plan to read what I suppose might be a bit of a rebuttal, the book by Peter Mansoor on the surge.)

Sorta kinda related to the point made on the 'benevolence' of "hearts and minds", a recent review:


“The Imperial lion has roused itself, invoking the Spirit of Clive and of Hastings and Dyer, he roars again,” observed The Daily Tribune in August 1942. Tiring of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress agitating during the war, the British Raj unsheathed the sword. Mass arrests, censorship, and suppression of civil liberties coerced India’s cooperation against the Axis Powers. All pretense of enlightened benevolent rule vanished as Britain showed that its empire, like all others, rested on force.""

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/06/26/imperialism-is-hard-work-great-britain-india-and-the-challenges-of-liberal-empire/

As I said in a note to a friend, the last sentence seems to be the point of the papers by Porch that I've read: that force mattered.

[Bill Moore]

Professor Douglas Porch, of NPS, has a new book due out at the end of July 'Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War', which is likely to arouse interest, if not controversy.

From the summary:

Link:http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1373208260&sr=1-1&keywords=douglas+porch and http://www.amazon.co.uk/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1373193058&sr=8-1&keywords=Douglas+Porch

A very partial review by a Guardian journalist, which includes this:

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/07/america-counterinsurgency-threat-home-abroad?CMP=twt_gu

Professor Porch's NPS entry:http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/SIGS/DegreeProg/NSA/Faculty/porch.html

I have read and enjoyed two of his books on French military history.

David, good catch and the book promises to be provocative. I read several pages on Amazon's website, and this quote is just an example of his diatribe against our current way of war:


COIN as symbolized by FM 3-24 and the ephemeral tactical triumphs of the Petraeus guys in Anbar join a succession of failed organizational concepts that include the Army of Excellence, the Air Land Battle, through the RMA, and now the SOF-led petty war with conventional units in support-we’re all Chindits now! Not only does the special operations tail wag the conventional army dog in this model, it runs the risk of failing catastrophically in the face of a serious challenge, much as the French Army collapsed in 1870.

I'm glad to see a dissenting voice, because it seems everyone in the media, academia, and parts of our military have blindly embraced our COIN doctrine. One lone and vocal dissenter Gian was frequently attacked for just not getting it. Our doctrine is flawed and needs to be challenged, maybe with the COINdistas out of the ranks we can approach with a more critical eye now? My concern is we risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but it is a risk we need to take.

I especially liked the article you provided the link to, but you may want to remind the author that we no longer have five star generals :D.

I didn't see this in the pages provided as re-aheads on Amazon, but apparently Prof Porch makes a supportable argument that democracies that engage in COIN eventually direct those practices against their own populations, thus


Think of mass surveillance, of drones, secret courts, the militarisation of the police, detention without trial.

Hannah Arendt identified "the boomerang effect of imperialism on the homeland" in The Origins of Totalitarianism, but the academic Douglas Porch has used the history of Britain, France and America to demonstrate that all the rhetoric about bringing, respectively, Britishness, liberté and freedom and democracy to the "little brown people who have no lights" is so much nonsense and that these brutal adventures almost never work and degrade the democracies that spawned them in the first place.

His key criticism of Porch's book was that it didn't offer an alternative, and that alone will undermine many of his arguments IMO.

[carl]

I just got finished reading Into the Fire by Meyer and West and it provided a worms eye view of "COIN", or our idea of it in Afghanistan. Basically you drive into a village for an afternoon every couple of weeks and ask what they need, how is security and have you seen any dushmen. They need everything, security is fine and no we haven't seen any but that next village over is suspect. I have no idea what that is about but anybody in his right mind knows that kind of thing can't work. You can't win any war, large or small, being that stupid. Anybody who successfully prosecuted small wars in the past, and there are lots that were successfully prosecuted, would be completely mystified by that, along with force pro, big bases, short tours in theatre, contracting practices and all the other goofy things we do. If you use "COIN" as a synonym for 'stupid', I'll go along with that but not that small war practices don't often work or that these conflicts can't be won.

Where did people get the idea that small wars don't involve fighting? If you actually read what went on in those wars you can't get that idea. West's account of Binh Nghia was ambush patrol after ambush patrol and fight after fight. Galula's account of his time in Algeria stresses the number of ambushes laid and how they never slacked off on the number. The Philippines was fighting and figuring how to get at them, or cutting them off from the people by moving the people. Plenty of application of force. Anybody who didn't figure that wasn't paying attention. Again, if "COIN" means stupid, ok.

That bit about societies being innocent naifs until some small war unleashed the devil within is nonsense. Militarized police, surveillance and all that stuff was happening anyway, in my opinion. To think that mature bureaucracies won't try to grab power is naive. They didn't need some small war to set them along that path. If Ms. Arendt has a different opinion, that is all she has, an opinion. There ain't no way to prove it one way or another.

It always seemed to me that one of Gian's motivations was to rationalize failure of the establishment big military. The argument seemed to be that small wars couldn't be done therefore big military couldn't be blamed for being stupid when they didn't get it right. A support for that is the either/or approach, we can be good at big wars or small, but not both. That is organizational self serving nonsense. You can be good enough at both, if the leadership is good. Gian's argument is sort of a martial manifestation of a modern American cultural trait, it is never my fault.

[Dayuhan]

Where did people get the idea that small wars don't involve fighting? If you actually read what went on in those wars you can't get that idea. West's account of Binh Nghia was ambush patrol after ambush patrol and fight after fight. Galula's account of his time in Algeria stresses the number of ambushes laid and how they never slacked off on the number. The Philippines was fighting and figuring how to get at them, or cutting them off from the people by moving the people. Plenty of application of force.

The Americans still lost in Vietnam, and the French still lost in Algeria. The Philippine conflict was a war of colonial conquest; it belongs to another era and has little or no relevance to today's conflicts.

Would more application of force have "won" in Afghanistan? Maybe, in some places, for a little while. It wouldn't have made the GIRoA any more able to govern, and it wouldn't have made "nation-building" a viable construct.

First step to winning any war, small or large, is a clear, practical, achievable goal. Not sure we ever had one of those in Afghanistan.

[Fuchs]

Judging by Bill Moore's post, this professor is totally in synch with me.

I've been writing about the stupidity of small wars, the neglect of conventional military capability (attention-wise, not necessarily budget-wise) and the risk that population control methods devised to control some foreign people may be used at home.


The forces drawing attention to the current affairs - small wars, stupid anti-piracy patrolling et cetera - are overwhelming, though.

[Madhu]

SWJ interviewed Dr Porch:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-conversation-with-dr-douglas-porch

The interview also mentions a paper by Geoff Demarest that I found very interesting (these have all been discussed around here before, just a reminder).

To clarify, when I said "force mattered" above, I meant that the populations were often brutalized according to other sources than proponents of imperial small wars.

Link to Demarest paper:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_201008310001-MD.xml

[Madhu]

....and the risk that population control methods devised to control some foreign people may be used at home.

Like snooping on home populations in large broad brush swoops? Creepy, all of it.

[Bill Moore]

A lot of the antibodies against COIN and our incredibly lame COIN doctrine is due to the illogic of those who promoted it, which was little more than a thin guise for promoting themselves. People are starting to realize that

"You can't shoot your way to victory, " "you have to win over the population," "we have to build their economy and build schools" are little more than empty rhetoric. Worse it is rhetoric not tied to any strategic end, and lieu of a strategy we confuse our COIN doctrine and its social engineering tactics as strategy. Thus the debate over pursuing a COIN or CT strategy is idiotic since neither are anymore than an assortment of tactics. Finally a paper that puts it all in strategic perspective by Colin Gray. It is only 16 pages, I highly recommend reading it.

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-3/prism17-32_gray.pdf


Concept Failure?
COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory


COIN is neither a concept nor can it be a strategy. Instead, it is simply an acronymic descriptor of a basket of diverse activities intended to counter an insurgency.


COIN debate would benefit if the debaters took a refresher course in the basics of strategy. Many fallacies and inadequate arguments about COIN in Afghanistan, for instance, are avoidable if their proponents were willing to seek and were able to receive help from theory.


There are no such historical phenomena as guerrilla wars. To define a war according to a tactical style is about as foolish as definition according to weaponry. (he listed using tank warfare as an example)


Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself. Because war is a political, and only instrumentally a military, phenomenon, we must be careful lest we ambush ourselves by a conceptual confusion
that inflates COIN to the status of an idea and activity that purportedly has standalone, context-free merit.


To be blunt, the most effective strategy to counter an insurgency may be one that makes little use of COIN tactics. It will depend upon the circumstance (context).


Such winning can be understood to mean that the victorious side largely dictates the terms that it prefers for an armistice and then a peace settlement, and is in a position to police and enforce a postwar order that in the main reflects its values and choices. History tells us that it can be as hard, if not harder, to make peace than it is to make war successfully.


Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.


The principal and driving issues for the United States with respect to counterinsurgency are when to do it and when not, and how to attempt to do it strategically. Policy and strategy choices are literally critical and determinative. IMO this turns the lame argument that COIN is the way of the future, insurgencies have always been present and likely will continue to be for the next few decades, but that hardly means it is in our interest to get engaged anymore than it is to conduct state on state warfare.


Tactical errors or setbacks enforced by a clever enemy should be corrected or offset tactically and need not menace the integrity of policy and strategy. COIN may not be rocket science or quantum theory, but no one has ever argued that it is easy.


If success in COIN requires prior, or at least temporally parallel, success in nationbuilding, it is foredoomed to failure. Nations cannot be built. Most especially they cannot be built by well-meaning but culturally arrogant
foreign social scientists, no matter how well intentioned and methodologically sophisticated. A nation (or community) is best defined
as a people who think of themselves as one. Nations build themselves by and through historical experience. Cultural understanding is always useful and its absence can be a lethal weakness, but some lack of comprehension is
usual in war.


The issue is not whether Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else either needs to be, or should be “improved.” Instead, the issue is whether or not the job is feasible. Even if it would be well worth doing, if it is mission impossible or highly improbable at sustainable cost to us, then it ought not to be attempted. This is Strategy 101.

[Dayuhan]

Finally a paper that puts it all in strategic perspective by Colin Gray. It is only 16 pages, I highly recommend reading it.

I second that recommendation.

That article really deserves a discussion thread of its own, and could serve as an example to many who write on these subjects. The argument and supporting reasoning are impressive, and it is truly refreshing to see someone match intellectual rigor with a presentation that is clear, precise, and completely devoid of the dense and convoluted jargon that has become so fashionable in so many quarters.

Well spotted.

[carl]

The Americans still lost in Vietnam, and the French still lost in Algeria. The Philippine conflict was a war of colonial conquest; it belongs to another era and has little or no relevance to today's conflicts.

Would more application of force have "won" in Afghanistan? Maybe, in some places, for a little while. It wouldn't have made the GIRoA any more able to govern, and it wouldn't have made "nation-building" a viable construct.

First step to winning any war, small or large, is a clear, practical, achievable goal. Not sure we ever had one of those in Afghanistan.

All very interesting, but of course none of it has anything to do with the point made in my paragraph that generated it.

Perhaps you are right that our efforts in the Philippines so long ago are not relevant, but I disagree. I think military history most always has things that are relevant and there are things to be learned, especially small wars. I am probably wrong but this is because small wars seem to be more matters of people than weapons and tech. Steve Blair (I think) has a quote from Fahrenbach about the frontier Army knowing all there was to know about small war fighting. That surely was another era but things learned then are still relevant I think too.

[carl]

Worse it is rhetoric not tied to any strategic end, and lieu of a strategy we confuse our COIN doctrine and its social engineering tactics as strategy.

I haven't read the paper yet but will. In the meantime, people always talk about strategy, but I don't know what they mean in the sense of doing. What, in your view, is a strategy that should be applied to South Asia? What should we do or have done and how? That is a big question but I am not looking for a big answer. But I am sincerely at a loss about actual actions when people talk about strategy.

[Dayuhan]

All very interesting, but of course none of it has anything to do with the point made in my paragraph that generated it.

Perhaps I failed to express the point clearly. Actually two points. First, in the absence of clear, consistent, and achievable goals, "getting it right" on the military level will at best earn transient and localized success. You may win some battles, but you won't win the war. Second, the tactical passivity you decry seems to me largely a consequence of the policy wreckage that I decry. In the absence of clear, consistent, achievable purpose, is it not natural to some extent for those charged with pursuing that purpose to resort to passivity and to focus on protecting their own?

Not that the US military is perfect, but I actually have considerable confidence in their ability to get a job done, provided that the goal is clearly defined and suitable for accomplishment by a military force. If those conditions are absent, we don't need to change the military, we need a better set of goals and we need to choose the right tool for accomplishing the goals.


Perhaps you are right that our efforts in the Philippines so long ago are not relevant, but I disagree. I think military history most always has things that are relevant and there are things to be learned, especially small wars. I am probably wrong but this is because small wars seem to be more matters of people than weapons and tech. Steve Blair (I think) has a quote from Fahrenbach about the frontier Army knowing all there was to know about small war fighting. That surely was another era but things learned then are still relevant I think too.

In the unlikely and unwelcome event that we ever embark on a war of colonial conquest, the lessons of past wars of colonial conquest might be relevant... though I have doubts. Those lessons would point in directions that cannot be pursued today due to domestic and global political constraints, and they would be employed against a rather different class of antagonist. The world does change.


I haven't read the paper yet but will. In the meantime, people always talk about strategy, but I don't know what they mean in the sense of doing. What, in your view, is a strategy that should be applied to South Asia? What should we do or have done and how? That is a big question but I am not looking for a big answer. But I am sincerely at a loss about actual actions when people talk about strategy.

Before you can have a strategy, you need a policy. Policy defines the goals. Strategy defines the broad plan for achieving those goals. Assuring that AQ and similar groups will not be able to find refuge in Afghanistan is a policy goal. The decision to achieve that goal by transforming Afghanistan into a western-style democracy is, IMO, where we went wrong: that goal was not and is not realistically achievable by any means available to us.

[carl]

Perhaps I failed to express the point clearly. Actually two points. First, in the absence of clear, consistent, and achievable goals, "getting it right" on the military level will at best earn transient and localized success. You may win some battles, but you won't win the war. Second, the tactical passivity you decry seems to me largely a consequence of the policy wreckage that I decry. In the absence of clear, consistent, achievable purpose, is it not natural to some extent for those charged with pursuing that purpose to resort to passivity and to focus on protecting their own?

Not that the US military is perfect, but I actually have considerable confidence in their ability to get a job done, provided that the goal is clearly defined and suitable for accomplishment by a military force. If those conditions are absent, we don't need to change the military, we need a better set of goals and we need to choose the right tool for accomplishing the goals.

Nope. Missed the point again.


In the unlikely and unwelcome event that we ever embark on a war of colonial conquest, the lessons of past wars of colonial conquest might be relevant... though I have doubts. Those lessons would point in directions that cannot be pursued today due to domestic and global political constraints, and they would be employed against a rather different class of antagonist. The world does change.

If you insist on every jot and tittle lining up there are no lessons from history. I think there are plenty of lessons even is there are jittles and tots; especially in small wars which to me are more matters of humans than machines. The world may change, humans, not so much.


Before you can have a strategy, you need a policy. Policy defines the goals. Strategy defines the broad plan for achieving those goals. Assuring that AQ and similar groups will not be able to find refuge in Afghanistan is a policy goal. The decision to achieve that goal by transforming Afghanistan into a western-style democracy is, IMO, where we went wrong: that goal was not and is not realistically achievable by any means available to us.

All very interesting again, but not an answer to the question I asked Bill.

[Dayuhan]

Nope. Missed the point again.

I see. What was the point, then?


If you insist on every jot and tittle lining up there are no lessons from history. I think there are plenty of lessons even is there are jittles and tots; especially in small wars which to me are more matters of humans than machines. The world may change, humans, not so much.

If you dismiss historical context as jots and tittles, you're likely to extract lessons that do you more harm than good. I suspect that efforts to apply lessons from 19th century colonial conquest to the problems of 21st century 3rd party intervention would be in deep trouble.

Humans change a good deal. Freedom changes people. In terms of people's ability to effectively prosecute conflict, I can think of few things that change people as much, or as fast, as believing, even knowing, that they can win. Sometimes the genie doesn't go back in the bottle.


All very interesting again, but not an answer to the question I asked Bill.

Just pointing out that you can't have a realistic discussion of strategy in South Asia (or anywhere else) without first agreeing on the policy goals.

[Bill Moore]

I haven't read the paper yet but will. In the meantime, people always talk about strategy, but I don't know what they mean in the sense of doing. What, in your view, is a strategy that should be applied to South Asia? What should we do or have done and how? That is a big question but I am not looking for a big answer. But I am sincerely at a loss about actual actions when people talk about strategy.

Carl,

Getting to this kind of late, so initial response will be short, but I think Colin Gray captured why our efforts are floundering and it because our senior leadership is too focused on an array of tactical activities that we collectively call COIN focused on winning over the population, but that approach is not moving us towards our strategic ends. In fact our current approach IMO is undermining our effort to achieve our ends. This is what happens when we confuse the tactics of countering an insurgency with our strategy aims. What were/are our strategic aims in Afghanistan and the region (since you pointed out S. Asia)? Those would be the ends. How did/do we intend to accomplish them? The ways. What were/are the resources we will employ to achieve the ends? The means. If we agree that strategy consists of the ends, ways, and means we can start here.


The principal and driving issues for the United States with respect to counterinsurgency are when to do it and when not, and how to attempt to do it strategically. Policy and strategy choices are literally critical and determinative.

The above quote is critical to my overall argument. If we pursue unrealistic ends, and/or pursue our ends via a strategy that either won't work, or achieve our ends at an acceptable cost (many factors to consider such as time, money, casualties, and other less tangibles), then we already reached strategic failure (despite our tactical successes), but unfortunately it may take us many years to realize it, and by that time there is a lot of blood and money under the bridge. I'm not making this claim from a position I told you so, like many others I didn't see the mess in Afghanistan coming, but I am critical of two aspects. One we didn't change course when we realized (or should have realized) we got it wrong, and perhaps worse the lessons that the Army is drawing from the past 10 years of fighting is we need more Cow Bell (I think you get my point). This gets at Dayuhan's comment,
Not that the US military is perfect, but I actually have considerable confidence in their ability to get a job done, provided that the goal is clearly defined and suitable for accomplishment by a military force. If those conditions are absent, we don't need to change the military, we need a better set of goals and we need to choose the right tool for accomplishing the goals. In most cases the military is doing superbly at the tactical level, especially SOF. One thing we learned way to slowly that hurt us was not to act like a jerk. It is true that turning the population against us through brutality or rudeness will hurt us at both the strategic and tactical levels (I'm surprised it took us a few years to really learn that, even in some elements of SOF), but it also true in my opinion that simply winning over the population will not achieve our goals which I expand upon below a little. So despite my sometimes excessive criticism of our COIN doctrine, at the tactical level there are many things in it that are valuable that I hope we don't lose, but of course tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat (hopefully that comes across as balanced, I criticize harshly because the COINdista mentality that pervades our force needs some provocative comments to actually get them to think independently and not recite doctrine line by line and confuse it with strategy).

Denying safe haven in Afghanistan was one of the stated ends (I believe our primary end after the initial combat operations to kill the core of AQ), and our proposed strategic approach for achieving that was installing a centralized and democratic government, and getting the population to support it. That approach may reform a country, but in itself wouldn't deny safe haven, but we ignored that fact. We also ignored the fact we can't transform a country like Afghanistan at an acceptable cost. I don't know we decided to do this based on neocon hubris (the end of history outlook), perception that it was an inherent responsibility (you break it you fix it), but we clearly didn't understand the culture and history which would have indicated this approach wouldn't work without a significant investment in resources and implementing severe population control measures that we can't do by law and custom. This policy end (transforming the nation) and our strategic approach to do so was probably fatal to our ability to achieve our policy end of denying safe haven. It required building a nation from a state composed of tribes with a long history of intertribal warfare. In recent decades the Taliban was the only force that was able to impose some limited degree of stability through tactics we would never employ.

I'm not prepared to argue in detail alternative approaches to achieving our policy end, but will quickly summarize some potential courses of action (that surely are not less realistic than the ones we're pursuing now). In all courses of action I think we started off right with SOF and air power to conduct aggressive combat operations against AQ and their friends (but leaving the door open for their friends to become our friends). Continue pressure on the Taliban/ruling party, and negotiate a settlement with them from a position of power under the table so they can save face and all sides can declare victory except AQ. They agree to deny AQ safe haven in turn for the U.S. not interfering with them. It may be unpleasant to allow these thugs back in power (assuming they regained control, we could have continued covert support to the Northern Alliance), but we live in a tough world.

Another option is no deal, we hit AQ and their friends hard, to include pursuing AQ into Pakistan while we had the global political support to do so shortly after 9/11. That would be a punitive raiding expedition for a couple of months, and then we leave with the promise of returning (based on our recent action we demonstrated we have the means to execute our will, so it wouldn't be hollow threat) if AQ returns. We turn it over to whoever and let them work it out (yes it will be bloody, but not unlike our 10 plus years in country, or the 10 years prior to our raiding expedition). We have every right to conduct a punitive expedition, it didn't need to turn into a humanitarian one. I suspect there are multiple other options that could have been explored related to options with Pakistan, India, Iran and even China at the beginning based on realpolitik opportunities for all concerned that would have got to denying safe haven much more effectively than we have done.

Instead we decided we wanted to install a democratic and central government (which is actually undemocratic in Afghanistan). Not surprisingly the government is opposed by different insurgent groups and our presence is opposed by resistance groups. Our misdiagnosis of the situation led us to naively assume that if we win over the population with economic incentives that insurgents will be defeated and peace will fall upon us and AQ will be denied a safe haven because people have jobs and the kiddies are going to school. Of course the Afghans aren't fighting for our vision of Pleasantville, but for wide range of deep seated hatreds between groups we just can't seem to apprehend. We spent billions trying this approach, and after it failed we assumed we still had the right strategic approach to achieve our end, and decided we needed more cowbell so we surged and spent billions more. Now it seems our leadership realized our current approach failed, but unfortunately the answer isn't adjusting our strategy, but simply leaving. Apparently we never seriously considered actually changing our strategy because we confused our COIN doctrine with the strategy and failed to realize it was the wrong doctrine for this conflict to achieve our end, but we were blinded by the hype that many authors made a good living promoting. This is where the danger of confusing tactics with strategy becomes readily apparent.


The issue is not whether Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else either needs to be, or should be “improved.” Instead, the issue is whether or not the job is feasible. Even if it would be well worth doing, if it is mission impossible or highly improbable at sustainable cost to us, then it ought not to be attempted. This is Strategy 101.


Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.

[Bill Moore]

Seriously, if our goal was to deny safe haven, and stabilize Pakistan (a related regional goal) because they're a nuclear weapons state, our ways and means certainly worked contrary to our ends. Killing AQ's core was/is certainly in our interest and should have been pursued even more aggressively. Instead we were distracted by COINdista platitudes that were completely disconnected from our strategic ends. Somewhere along the line the platitudes became the ways even if they were disconnected from our ends. We quit learning/adapting somewhere along the way, and now we have a non-coherent arrangement of tactical efforts working towards no collective end. In some cases our PRTs become the supported effort which gave the insurgents, terrorists, and criminals a great opportunity to make money and freedom of movement, because we forgot we still had to fight. Instead we confused an illogical platitude "we can't shoot our way to victory" with focus on the population, when it should mean that war is more than warfare.

A lack of coherent strategy equated to a VSO program that undermines the our effort to develop a viable central state. A corrupt central state that undermines our efforts to win over the population, and neither have much to do with denying AQ safe haven long term. Our massive nation building efforts floods money into both Pakistan and Afghanistan. That money reinforces corrupt politicians which undermines the nation building, which is irrelevant to begin with. However, that money is diverted to our adversaries empowering them to continue fighting why we are trying to win over the population. Finally we announce our desire to reach a political settlement from a position of weakness, because we announced we're finished and pulling out. We should have had the political settlement as our end to begin with a strategy to get to it. Not strive for it after we are tired. The list goes on and on. It all comes down to having disjointed ends, ways, and means. If we spent more time on developing realistic ends and viable ways (a realistic strategic approach to those ends) we would probably be in a different place now. Our military adapts quickly to the tactical situation if you remove the micromanagers. If those micromanaging were more focused on strategy than tactics maybe we would be somewhere else today?

Coming from a Special Forces background I know this sounds self-serving, but there were a number of options for SOF and especially SF, the intelligence community, and law enforcement to maintain steady pressure on AQ at an acceptable cost, well below the stage lights, that would have ultimately been more effective. You can counter hindsight is 20/20, but we should use that hindsight to help shape future decisions. We need our General Purpose Forces to be combat ready for whatever threat emerges on the scene, and quit confusing our fixation with irregular warfare as we it now as the way of the future. The world is trending towards to some state on state conflicts, transforming our Army into a giant PRT will not ensure our security


Such winning can be understood to mean that the victorious side largely dictates the terms that it prefers for an armistice and then a peace settlement, and is in a position to police and enforce a postwar order that in the main reflects its values and choices. History tells us that it can be as hard, if not harder, to make peace than it is to make war successfully.

[Newguy]

Moderator's Note - for Bill M.

On request I'm copying some recent posts from the thread on "Porch shines a torch on COIN to expand the discussion beyond his promising book to discuss whether or not we have confused our COIN doctrine with strategy, and if so what are the risks to our national security if we don't fix this? (Ends).


Professor Douglas Porch, of NPS, has a new book due out at the end of July 'Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War', which is likely to arouse interest, if not controversy.

From the summary:

Link:http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1373208260&sr=1-1&keywords=douglas+porch and http://www.amazon.co.uk/Counterinsurgency-Exposing-Myths-New-Way/dp/1107699843/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1373193058&sr=8-1&keywords=Douglas+Porch

A very partial review by a Guardian journalist, which includes this:

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/07/america-counterinsurgency-threat-home-abroad?CMP=twt_gu

Professor Porch's NPS entry:http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/SIGS/DegreeProg/NSA/Faculty/porch.html

I have read and enjoyed two of his books on French military history.


Came back to check and see if anyone answered by thread on the new draft FM. Saw this, and I thought it was interesting. The new draft of FM 3-24 says it clearly isn't a strategy. It states:


Counterinsurgency is neither a concept nor a strategy. It is simply a descriptor of a range of diverse activities intended to counter an insurgency. The U.S. can use a range of activities to aid a host nation in defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these activities with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses the enable those ways.

It makes this statement in the very beginning of the new draft, in the first chapter titled, "Understanding the Strategic Context".

[jmm99]

Gian P. Gentile, A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA510427) (2009):


But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from the new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy.

Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of COIN principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the media, emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians. The result is a strategy of tactics and principles.

Conclusion

Instead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN classic texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history of the British Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is in this period that if they did nothing else right the British Army and government did understand the value of strategy. They understood the essence of linking means to ends. In other words, they did not see military operations as ends in themselves but instead as a means to achieve policy objectives. And they realized that there were costs that had to be paid.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

JMM99, thanks for posting a very relevant article.

Newguy, agreed, but there is doctrine and there is practice and often they don't meet in the middle. You can do a quick Google search for COIN strategy and find an indefinite number of articles where "experts" are quoted discussing COIN strategy. This unfortunately has influenced the strategic thinking (or lack of) for a generation of junior officers, policy makers, and politicians. Some are capable of seeing through the BS, but others recommend remaking our military to support our global COIN strategy which may be borderline suicidal for the security of our nation.

I have opinions on the topic, but none are locked in stone, but I do hope to be provocative as a forcing function to generate ideas on the topic. For the most part we have to live the results of our COIN efforts over the past decade, what is most important now is the lessons we draw from these engagements. That is why I want to explore it in more detail with the SWJ community.

IMO I think we lost the bubble in Afghanistan when we thought we could achieve our strategic of defeating AQ by denying safe haven in Afghanistan. Then we took it a step further and our strategic approach to denying safe haven was COIN. Other options were readily dismissed, and we saw the rise of the COINdista and their influence on policy and strategy. I think an argument can be made the COIN effort failed, but even if did work it was the wrong strategic approach to defeat AQ. Should we really remake our Army a COIN force? I found this comment in line with my thinking:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/05/what_max_boot_missed_a_response_about_the_future_s hape_of_the_us_military


No matter how good our tactics, cultural training, language ability, etc., we will never get out of the dilemma that the harder we try, the worse it gets. More money for AID and development = more corruption. More troops = accidental guerrillas and al Qaeda in Iraq type organizations. Joe Meyers and UBL call it defensive jihad, but whatever. Our very presence delegitimizes the government we are trying to prop up. It's a failed model and one that Galula said was the worst of all possible worlds.


The most important factors for success against irregulars -- partner nation governance and the local military's will -- are out of our hands. Those two issues are not discussed by people who want to rearrange the military and create all kinds of nonsense. If eliminating safe havens and supporting stable governments is our policy, then what kind of military deployments maximize the host nation's ability to create legitimacy and find their will to win? I argue that Max's concepts minimize them.

The following is somewhat in line with Gian's argument, and something we all need to be aware of is how the super star mentality has biased our perception on the issue. We couldn't focus on the issue of strategy, because the debate too often came down to whether or not you were pro or anti GEN Petraeus, which added an unhealthy level of emotion to the debate.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/13/general-david-petraeus-flaw-surge-afghanistan


In an age in which military officers are practically above public reproach – glorified and exalted by politicians and the media – the repeated failures of our military leaders consistently escape analysis and inquiry. This can have serious national security implications. As Joshua Rovner, associate professor of strategy and policy, US Naval War College, said to me in an email conversation, this lack of scrutiny has had grave consequences:

"[W]e have misunderstood our recent history in Iraq and Afghanistan; we have created new myths about strategy that will persist for many years despite their manifest flaws; and we may make bad decisions about intervening in other civil wars based on these myths."

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were more than just bad strategy; they reflected poor military tactics and generalship. Self-interested and incomplete interpretations of what happened in Iraq led to predictably disastrous results in Afghanistan.

Back to my focus, what lessons do we draw from the past decade of warfare (some would argue warfare without strategy)?

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/coins-failure-afghanistan-7409?page=1


COIN’s greatest tragedy was that it gave policy makers—who were facing difficult choices in Iraq and Afghanistan—the illusion that “victory” (or some sort of political resolution) was possible; that military power applied in a specific manner against an insurgency can lead to specific political outcomes.

Henry Kissinger once wrote that “each generation is permitted only one effort of abstraction; it can attempt only one interpretation and a single experiment, for it is its own subject. This is the challenge of history and its tragedy.” Five years ago, COIN seemed like the right strategy. The empirical results on this experiment are now in, and they are not looking good.

[slapout9]

I watched this whole lecture last night, it is an hour and 15 minutes. The link below is a Short preview of the lecture from the Naval Academy in Annapolis and the Professor Aaron O' Connel is a Lt. Col. in the USMC reserve. It covers the history of Small Wars and how it has shaped present COIN doctrine and does work or not! Excellent lecture and very eye opening at times compared the regular hop la about COIN theory in general.

http://www.c-span.org/History/Events/Lectures-in-History-US-Marines-in-the-Banana-Wars/10737440212-1/

[jmm99]

1. HT and thanks to Slap for the USNA lecture. After looking at the preview, I tried Cspan3 - and lo, the lecture was being live streamed. The complete lecture is here (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Banan). Since I was looking at snips from the Small Wars Manual to prepare this post, the lecture was helpful in providing different views on my topic.

2. What follows is very much an opinion piece; first by me and then by the authors of the SWM (snips attached). Its main parts are A. Counterinsurgency, B. Expeditionary Operations, C. Counterterrorism, and D. 1940 Small Wars Manual. Here (at SWC), I usually write about politics, policies and rules (often involving legal concepts) - suggesting an inclination toward "COINistanism". My primary interest, however, evidenced by what I mostly read at home, favors "Large Wars" ("conventional warfare"). It would be nice if we could go back to 1904 and Oppenheim's clear dichotomy between "Peace" and "War"; but WWI, WWII and the Nuclear Age put paid to that distinction. We are left with a very mixed bag.

A. Counterinsurgency

I look on the Civil War-Civil Rights "Era" as being the USG's only major experience in "pure" conterinsurgency - military and political action by the USG against US citizen insurgents within the confines of the not-so-united states. When that "Era" ended is not clear: 1876, 1896, 1954, 2008, or several weeks ago (when USG direct election supervision in several Southern States was curtailed).

I'm not convinced that the Indian Wars were USG "counterinsurgency" operations; rather they were a series of Wars of Conquest, as to which the Laws of War applied. That was held by the most reasoned Federal judicial decision after Wounded Knee. BTW: it also was a very politically motivated decision. Whether specific Laws of War were properly applied is another issue.

The Philippines War (aka Insurrection) was another War of Conquest - distinct from the Indian Wars in that American expansion was seen as temporary. The USG had no intention of colonizing the Philippines with hordes of US settlers, much less of receiving a host of "little brown brethren" as US citizens.

Thus, I'd put the Indian Wars and the Philippines War into the class of Expeditionary Operations; specifically, where the US was an invasive belligerent.

B. Expeditionary Operations

I catch these in a net - broad and not definitionally rigorous. They deal with force projection (and sometimes non-force projection) by the USG in foreign countries. I believe the examples provide enough definitional input for conversational purposes.

1. As a Adverse Belligerent

The Indian Wars, the Philippines War, and WWII (Germany, Japan, Italy) provide examples where the USG entered the armed conflicts as an adverse belligerent to the foreign nations. The post-acute armed conflict result was occupation - permanent in the case of the Indians; temporary for greater or less periods for the other cases. All are examples of "nation building".

An adverse belligerent has other courses of action. One is simply a "punitive expedition" to achieve a more immediate end goal - e.g., kill the existing foreign government and simply leave.

2. As a Co-Belligerent

Examples are Korea and Vietnam (1965 on); Iraq (once an Iraqi government was in office); and Afghanistan (arguably from the gitgo). In all these cases, the foreign governments (our co-belligerents) had both internal and external enemies - whose agitprop pitches boiled down to "US imperialists and running dog puppets".

3. As an Advisor

Force projection may be minimal (El Salvador) or maximal (Vietnam through 1964); in present terms, FID or SFA.

C. Counterterrorism

USG actions against transnational violent non-state actors - a nebulous concept as stated; e.g., the enemy must be defined as a group and its members identified as armed combatants or not. Unclear situations are the rule, not the exception. For example, is the USG operating (via drones and direct actions) as a co-belligerent with the Yemen government against its insurgents, as a belligerent against AQAP (as part of AQ) as part of a transnational armed conflict with AQ, or both.

D. 1940 Small Wars Manual

Attached to this post are the first four pages from Section I (" GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS"). They describe the broad scope of "Small Wars", from non-forceful actions (advice genuinely requested) up to but not including wars with major powers. In a nutshell:


The assistance rendered in the affairs of another state may vary from a peaceful act such as the assignment of an administrative assistant, which is certainly nonmilitary and not placed under the classification of small wars, to the establishment of a complete military government supported by an active combat force. Between these extremes may be found an infinite number of forms of friendly assistance or intervention which it is almost impossible to classify under a limited number of individual types of operations.

and:


Most of the small wars of the United States have resulted from the obligation of the Government under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and have been undertaken to suppress lawlessness or insurrection, Punitive expeditions may be resorted to in some instances, but campaigns of conquest are contrary to the policy of the Government of the United States. It is the duty of our statesmen to define a policy relative to international relationships and provide the military and naval establishments with the means to carry it into execution. With this basis, the military and naval authorities may act intelligently in the preparation of their war plans in close cooperation with the statesman. There is mutual dependence and responsibility which calls for the highest, qualities of statesmanship and military leadership. The initiative devolves upon the statesmen.

cont.

[jmm99]

Only 4 attachments are allowed per page. Here are the first two pages of the SWM's Section II ("STRATEGY"). In a nutshell:


The military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations. In the latter case, war is undertaken only as a last resort after all diplomatic means of adjusting differences have failed and the military commander's objective ordinarily becomes the enemy’s armed forces.

and:


In small wars, either diplomacy has not been exhausted or the party that opposes the settlement of the political question cannot be reached diplomatically. Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign.

These are just some highlights from a 492 page book.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Not sure if COIN is stragety but I disagree with the flipant tone and much of the content of Gray's article:


(for example, war allegedly changing its nature;
or human behavior suddenly, post–Cold War,
reflecting the benign consequences of a normative
revolution that denies repression as an
effective domestic policy option, and suchlike
attractive fantasies)

That is not an "atractive fantasy", that is a political reality. The current post-cold war world actively engaging in tirals at the Hague for political leaders who commit war crimes. Yes, currently those are only the leaders of weak countries, but it is a change.

It is a change in the political landscape that began in Britain about 400 years ago and spread to Holand and the United States and to France. Ultimately, the Western way of democratic poitics is being imposed on the rest of the world weather they like it or not. The reality remains that using "repression as an effective domestic [or military] polcy" is the fantasy.

War has not changed but politics has. War is only now catching up. COIN is a manifestation of that reality, however you decide to classify it.

[Fuchs]

That is not an "atractive fantasy", that is a political reality. The current post-cold war world actively engaging in tirals at the Hague for political leaders who commit war crimes. Yes, currently those are only the leaders of weak countries, but it is a change.

No, losing a war or power has always been risky if you had made enough enemies.


It is a change in the political landscape that began in Britain about 400 years ago and spread to Holand and the United States and to France. Ultimately, the Western way of democratic poitics is being imposed on the rest of the world weather they like it or not.

The anglophone world always points at the British and Americans in regard to democracy traditions, but there have been independent, citizens-ruled cities in much of Europe since the early middle ages, and others before.


The focus on democracy as indicator is probably very ill-advised. Acemoglu/Robinson were probably right in pointing rather at the difference between patriarchal political systems (where the own supporters are rewarded with what the government extracts from the political losers) and programmatic politics (driven by ideology, technocracy, theocracy etc).

I think programmatic politics are probably even on a withdrawal in the West since ~1980, while our democracies still maintain a shiny surface.

Plenty "democratic" governments overseas have adopted the fashionable shiny surface of elections and on-paper division of power, but still follow patriarchal politics. Some European countries don't even maintain the shine (Hungary, Belarus) while others moved towards or maintained what Acemoglu/Robinson call "extractive" policies and the accompanying patriarchal politics (UK, Italy).

[SWJ Blog]

Thinking and Writing About COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thinking-and-writing-about-coin)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thinking-and-writing-about-coin) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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[TheCurmudgeon]

No, losing a war or power has always been risky if you had made enough enemies.

Perhaps, but that does not mean that you can use genocide to stay in power. You could a hundred years ago. The Boer wars are proof that it works. I doubt you could do that again today.


The anglophone world always points at the British and Americans in regard to democracy traditions, but there have been independent, citizens-ruled cities in much of Europe since the early middle ages, and others before.

Fine, it started with Martin Luther and Grotius. Makes no difference in the end. There has been a shift away from duties to a central figure (king, pope, whatever) to rights of the individual citizen. Once the individual becomes supreme there is a shift in the political system from monarchy or theocracy to democracy. Yes, there were republics throughout Europe, particularly in Italy, but they were not democracies. Who was involved in political decisions was a matter of family and wealth.



The focus on democracy as indicator is probably very ill-advised. Acemoglu/Robinson were probably right in pointing rather at the difference between patriarchal political systems (where the own supporters are rewarded with what the government extracts from the political losers) and programmatic politics (driven by ideology, technocracy, theocracy etc).


Perhaps, but I still see our recent concern with population-centric warfare as a result of a shift in thinking away from the key leaders to whom the population owes a duty to the individual members of society who WE believe hold the real political power. It is not the world that has changed ... or war ... it is the way we think about where political power emanates has changed.

What tends to tick me off is the plethora of military historians who want to fight this reality tooth and nail fearing their irrelevance.

Don't take any of this as defending COIN as laid out in the FM 5-34. While I agree with the general idea that, to fight an insurgency you must remove the support for the insurgents that exists within the population as well as their motivation to fight, I think the 5-34 is too westernized; too limited. We need to look at WHY people fight if we really want to defeat/coopt the insurgency.

[Madhu]

Perhaps, but I still see our recent concern with population-centric warfare as a result of a shift in thinking away from the key leaders to whom the population owes a duty to the individual members of society who WE believe hold the real political power. It is not the world that has changed ... or war ... it is the way we think about where political power emanates has changed.

I think our recent concern with population-centric warfare is deeply confused on this point. We want to increase the legitimacy of a government by improving governance and have used, in part, examples from imperial small wars (the perfect example of retaining a status-quo running against a certain tide of history, people didn't want to be colonized and providing better services wasn't going to change anything in the end.) So, what aspect of power are we really strengthening or thinking about? Chicken and egg, the population versus the representatives.

So critics of pop-COIN (and you say this too in a different way) are basically saying, "you are assuming you know why people fight in every situation. They are unhappy that their current government doesn't do X, Y or Z so we will do it or teach them to do it.")

PS: The other assumption is that the majority of people are "noncommitted" and need to be wooed, so to speak. And of course, there is the old argument about how and when to provide security while doing the governance improving.

What troubles me is that the military seems to sometimes confuse describing historical trends with "how to think about doctrine." But I'm an outsider and often get things wrong on the first go. Small Wars! COIN! 4GW! Non-State Actors! Conventional War vs the New Way of Doing War! AirSea Battle! The buzziness of selling an idea often obscures the idea.

[TheCurmudgeon]

So critics of pop-COIN (and you say this too in a different way) are basically saying, "you are assuming you know why people fight in every situation. They are unhappy that their current government doesn't do X, Y or Z so we will do it or teach them to do it.")

Actually, I kind of see the opposite. The critics of COIN are saying "It is irrelevant why people fight. Destroy their ability to fight and you win!" That is true to a point, but it does not address the problem, it only suppresses the ability (or urge) of the aggrieved population to attempt to address the problem.

Of course, if you kill off the entire aggrieved population or put them in reeducation camps and your problem is solved. At least that is what I see as being floated by Gray as the solution. Yeah, it works, but you are probably not going to get any western politician to publically buy off on it. Even targeted killings are lossing their luster.

The US had a civil war. The North won. Before, during, and after each side had their own idea of why the war was fought. Even now, most Northerners will say it was to free the slaves, an act that did not occur until well after the war had started. For the last century Americans, particularly Southerners, have not put that war behind them. I am not sure simply winning solves much for either the victor of the vanquished. I believe that reality is part of human nature.

For most warfighters, what happens after the war is really not their concern. Winning is everything. That is not a bad attitude but it is an incomplete strategy.



What troubles me is that the military seems to sometimes confuse describing historical trends with "how to think about doctrine." But I'm an outsider and often get things wrong on the first go. Small Wars! COIN! 4GW! Non-State Actors! Conventional War vs the New Way of Doing War! AirSea Battle! The buzziness of selling an idea often obscures the idea.

To be honest, I am with you on this. We use too many buzzwords to say basically the same thing. I am not sure how to solve THAT problem.

[SWJ Blog]

MCoE Playing Role in COIN Doctrine Revision (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcoe-playing-role-in-coin-doctrine-revision)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

Gen. Amos on Reinventing the Marines, Owning Sequester and Why COIN Is More Relevant Than Ever (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gen-amos-on-reinventing-the-marines-owning-sequester-and-why-coin-is-more-relevant-than-ever)

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The Other Side of the COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-other-side-of-the-coin-0)

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[jmm99]

from Dayuhan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=147623&postcount=10)
That article really deserves a discussion thread of its own, and could serve as an example to many who write on these subjects. The argument and supporting reasoning are impressive, and it is truly refreshing to see someone match intellectual rigor with a presentation that is clear, precise, and completely devoid of the dense and convoluted jargon that has become so fashionable in so many quarters.

The article is Colin Gray's Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory (working link to pdf (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&ved=0CFEQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2 FFiles%2FISN%2F143974%2Fichaptersection_singledocu ment%2Fc6bba3eb-b1c0-4305-84b9-85fbb0d1570a%2Fen%2FChapter%2B2.pdf&ei=jehJUpvfMMbuyAHk44CoAw&usg=AFQjCNFMAN7gqlsUEQEDgjxiDq2S75eu9g&sig2=kxuugYNZoTc9_VhWrqBMWA)); the following original link doesn't work for me:

http://www.ndu.edu/press/concept-failure.html

What I've done below is to pick off his key statements (as I see what is key) and put them into a framework for discussion - of whatever statement anybody wants to talk about. I'm not the local help desk on this topic and want to be the listener.

I see two major areas. The first one has a very important general statement (one sentence), with three subtopics (the headings and one comment are mine; the rest are Gray's words):


1. Formal education in strategy is not an adequate substitute for experience or talent and aptitude, but it should help.


Subtopic 1 - Philip Crowl's Strategic Questions

What is it all about?

What are the political stakes, and how much do they matter to us?

So what?

What will be the strategic effect of the sundry characters of behavior that we choose to conduct?

Is the strategy selected tailored well enough to meet our political objectives?

What are the probable limits of our (military) power as a basket of complementary agencies to influence and endeavor to control the enemy’s will?

How could the enemy strive to thwart us?

What are our alternative courses of action/inaction?

What are their prospective costs and benefits?

How robust is our home front?

Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and honestly upon the strategic education that history can provide?

What have we overlooked?


Subtopic 2 - Principles of Warfare
...

My second list is designed to complement the longstanding wisdom in the Principles of War (mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, and simplicity)—which actually are principles of warfare—with some “new,” though hardly novel, principles that are more fit for their purpose.

[JMM's Principles of Warfare: e.g, the classical, as slightly reformulated; MOOSEMUSS: momentum (mass x velocity; replacing mass), objective, offensive, security (including the "defensive"), economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, and simplicity].


Subtopic 3 - Principles of War

War is a political act conducted for political reasons.

There is more to war than warfare.

There is more to strategy than military strategy.

War is about peace, and sometimes vice versa.

Style in warfighting has political consequences.

War is caused, shaped, and driven by its contexts.

War is a contest of political wills.

“War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale”: take the enemy into account.

War is a cultural undertaking.

War requires the ability to adapt to failure and to cope well enough with the consequences of chaos, friction, and the unintended consequences of actions.

The second major area is COIN. I find some statements clear and some muddy.


2. The merit in COIN cannot sensibly be posed as a general question.

3. In COIN, all war and its warfare are about politics no more or less than in strategic behavior applied to other missions.

4. It is not sensible to categorize wars according to the believed predominant combat style of one of the belligerents.

5. Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself.

6. Insurgents can lose the warfare, but still win the war. In contrast, if the political incumbents lose the warfare, they lose the war.

7. Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.

8. COIN requires tactical competence, but it is hugely subordinate to politics, policy, and strategy.

9. If success in COIN requires prior, or at least temporally parallel, success in nationbuilding, it is foredoomed to failure.

This is a request for other peoples' viewpoints - this thread has had 2435 views as of this post.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

Not sure what happened to the original link I provided, but this one is working:

http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/ci%20prism17-32_gray.pdf

Which statements did you find to be muddy?

[jmm99]

Now we have two good links to a good article. :)

The muddy statements are all in the COIN section - they're bolded in the following:


2. The merit in COIN cannot sensibly be posed as a general question. p.6 pdf

3. In COIN, all war and its warfare are about politics no more or less than in strategic behavior applied to other missions. p.7 pdf

4. It is not sensible to categorize wars according to the believed predominant combat style of one of the belligerents.

5. Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself. p.9 pdf

6. Insurgents can lose the warfare, but still win the war. In contrast, if the political incumbents lose the warfare, they lose the war.

7. Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.

8. COIN requires tactical competence, but it is hugely subordinate to politics, policy, and strategy.

9. If success in COIN requires prior, or at least temporally parallel, success in nationbuilding, it is foredoomed to failure.

The unbolded statements are understood by me; I don't get the three bolded items; or perhaps, my mind doesn't buy them as stated.

Regards

Mike

[wm]

Mike,

I'll try to shed light on the three unclear statements, at least as far as I understand them. But, I am not Gray, so my understanding is not going to be his.

Anyway, I think the underlying point is that each insurgency is likely sui generis. Identifying insurgencies is somewhat like ordering a multicourse meal from a menu. One diner doesn't order an appetizer or a dessert, another orders two apps and no dessert, a third chooses an entree with a salad while a fourth chooses a soup to go with the entree. When you consider the number of sald dressings, soups, appetizers, entrees, and sides, the number of possible combinations becomes rather amazing. It probably exceeds the number of possible combinations that come from drawing playing cards from a standard deck: 52! (factorial), which is something like 8X10 to the 67th power. For context,

Scientists have estimated that the number of atoms in the Milky Way Galaxy is only 1 x 10 to the 65th power. The number of possible combinations of cards in an ordinary 52 card deck is nearly a thousand times greater than the number of atoms in the Milky Way Galaxy!
If the possible combinations are that huge, each insurgency to date has been unique and the insurgencies of the future will continue to be so for a long time. We deceive ourselves into thinking that counter insurgencies are relatively simple affairs when we try to lump the issues into broader categories in order to simplify our ability to discuss/comprehend them. But to simplify is to falsify.

So,

The merit in COIN cannot sensibly be posed as a general question. p.6 pdfbecause the merit of each opportunity to conduct COIN must be judged on the insurgency being considered for counter operations.

And,

5. Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself. p.9 pdf because counter insurgency must be indexed to each insurgency which is being countered. Lessons learned an Malay apply to only those insurgencies that mimic Malaya in all relevant respects, which, I think means they must occur in another Malaya that is basically the same as the original Malaya--maybe the color of the wildlife is not treally relelvant and could be different. Regardless of the promise of big data analysis, one must be able to collect and tag correctly all the relevant data first. Deciding which data are relevant is the hard part.

3. In COIN, all war and its warfare are about politics no more or less than in strategic behavior applied to other missions. p.7 pdf
I cannot really help with this one. It seems to me to be inconsistent with everything else about the individuality of each COIN opportunity unless he is saying you must make a strategic assessment about whether engaging war/warfare as a COIN technique, just like you would make a strategic assessment about using war/warfare as a means to some an end in some other political context (securing trade for example). If that is what is operative, then the point is that war/warfare may not be part of the means used to achieve the end of countering some insurgencies. In other words, when a probability calculus is done on the likelihood of various types of actions achieving the desired end, war/warfare may fare very poorly as an effective/efficient method/means in countering any given instance of insurgency.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Not sure this is exclusive to COIN, but I would like to throw out some thoughts on this comment:


In COIN, all war and its warfare are about politics no more or less than in strategic behavior applied to other missions

In that section is the addtional comment:


It is fallacy to believe that counterinsurgency is activity of a species different from interstate war in regard to its nature. Both interstate war and (counter) insurgent warfare are owned by politics. There are some important differences between interstate and intrastate war, but degree of political meaning is not among the distinctions.

So here is my question based on a hypothetical built on the totally historically accurate movie Braveheart . The noble Scots have been downtrodden by the evil number 6 - sorry, wrong show - King Henry. After his wife is murdered Mel enters the English FOB and kill a number of English Soldiers in revenge. The suppressed anger spreads and retribution is taken across the land. At this point there is nothing political going on. It is simply revenge on a very personal level. So is this not war? if not, what is it?

Now, clearly it morphs into a separatist movement that has political aspirations. But the source of the conflict is not political. So how do you make a statement like all war is owned by politics. In my opinion, this is the fallacy that we have to come to grips with.

[Bob's World]

I think the main thing in thinking about COIN is to not get too intellectually boxed in by the historic writings of current and former governmental officials who have dealt with some form of insurgnecy in some place or time; to not get trapped by what particular governmental organizations (the military, for example) do; and certainly not by the doctrine of a current era.

To understand what COIN is, the first step is to understand what insurgency is.

At the end of the day, in the purest form, insurgency is any type of activity that includes the following four components (and if any are missing it is something other than insurgency):

1. It must be internal. It has to come from a population that is directly affected by the system of govenrance that is being challenged.

2. It must be populace based. There must be an agrieved, identifiable, segment of the population behind those who are actively acting out.

3. It must be illegal. When and where effective legal means exist to express discontent with, and to drive change of, governance, insurgency is rare.

4. It must be political in primary purpose. Insurgency is ilegal politics, typically from a segment of the population denied full and effective participation in legal politics. If the primary purpose is profit, as in drug cartels that grow so powerful as to challege governance, it is not insurgency and requires a profit-focused cure rather than a political one.

Violence is merely a tactical choice. Likewise, Ideology is a tactical choice. Like most fires put off smoke and heat, most insurgencies adopt some ideology that is counter to the challeged regime and adopt violent tactics. But attacking smoke and heat is the slowest way to put out fire. Attacking ideology and violence is the slowest way to put out an insurgency.

So is COIN a "strategy"? No, it is simply what a government must do when faced with an insurgency. There are many ways to approach COIN, some that are effective in the short-term, some in the long-term, and some hardly at all. God knows the airwaves and libraries are filled with opinions on the best tactics for COIN.

Sadly, little of values exists on insurgency.

We always put the cart in front of the horse, and then wonder why we aren't getting anywhere.

[Bob's World]

Now, as to COIN. I think the number 1 fix US doctrine needs is the simple recognition that COIN is a domestic operation!!!

If one is attending a wedding, one better have a clear understanding as to if one is the Best Man or the Groom. They are both working the same wedding, but no good will come from a confusion of roles and responsibilities. That is why we have different names for each activity. We have the same thing for COIN, the "best man" is doing FID, and only the host nation/groom is doing COIN.

For many this seems a minor nuance. Well, minor nuance is typically the margin of success in dealing with insurgency. But in fact, this is not minor at all. If both are doing COIN, and the external party is far more capable, brings far more capacity, etc, it is only a matter of times until critical roles of legitimacy and sovereignty become inverted. Once that happens, no amount of good tactics are apt to overcome the strategic imposibility one has framed. We did this to ourselves in Vietnam. We did this to ourselves in Iraq, and we are doing this to ourselves in Afghanistan.

And as far as our doctrine community is concerned, this is still a lesson unnoticed, unlearned, and unaddressed. Instead we debate what from of tactics are most likely to lose the least. I think the sentiments captured by the great bard Johnny Cash address this best: "Now when I hear that whistle blowing, I hang my head and cry..."

At some point we need to hear the whistle and actually fix our doctrine.

[TheCurmudgeon]

To understand what COIN is, the first step is to understand what insurgency is. ... We always put the cart in front of the horse, and then wonder why we aren't getting anywhere.



Although I don't think it changes your criteria I do think that it matters whether the insurgency is for something or against something.

Activities by a population who are strictly against something (like Assad in Syria) may be an incoherent mass that is much more difficult to deal with than a group with an ideological goal (like the IRA).

Not sure where this fits in, just feel that it matters.

Personally I think that the overemphasis on the “political” aspects of war creates a false impression that there is always a coherent enemy – some element out there with a clear political goal. I don’t think that comports with reality.

[Bob's World]

The IRA were against British occupation.

Help me think of a single significant case where what was ideologically being promoted during the struggle did not come well after the actual situation being struggled against. I can't think of any. History frames many in that context, but that is spin and perspective, not reality. I'm open, but at a loss to name one.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Syria comes to mind as does Egypt, but I guess this is the case in a lot of rebellions and revolutions. I will use the American Revoution 1775–1783. To say that the Colonists were of one mindset when the first shots were fired at Concord would be a bit of a stretch. Many Colonists felt they were being dragged into a fight they did not want by those hot heads in Boston. Some may have wanted representation in Parliament while others wanted independence but they all knew that they did not want things the way they were. Concord was April 1775, the final agreement on independence was not until July 1776.

This is different than an ideological revolution like Mao or Lenon that, from its onset, has a clear political alternative in mind.

I guess to be fair, every war is against something, but not every one starts out for a specific something else.

[Bob's World]

No population is ever "of one mind."

Do you seriously think ideology created revolution against the governance of George, Mubarak, or Assad? There are no facts to support such a proposition. Ideology is a critical requirement for binding individuals to a cause, but is not causation. people are not brainwashed, they are simply fed up and ready to act.

Most insurgent leaders are like Mao, they "saw a parade and jumped in front."

[TheCurmudgeon]

No population is ever "of one mind."

Do you seriously think ideology created revolution against the governance of George, Mubarak, or Assad? There are no facts to support such a proposition. Ideology is a critical requirement for binding individuals to a cause, but is not causation. people are not brainwashed, they are simply fed up and ready to act..

No, I don't think ideology is the source of most revolts or revolutions. I think the motivation behind these acts are usually much more guttural like revenge or survival, in which case there is no realistic political component. That is my point.



Most insurgent leaders are like Mao, they "saw a parade and jumped in front."

Perhaps, but once there is a leader of a parade there is someone to negotiate with (and or eliminate). Tough to negotiate a political settlement with a mob. Also tough to negotiate a settlement with a group that does not really know what they want, only what they don't want.

Once things coalesce around a leader and/or an ideology then things start to look a lot more like a state v. state political war. Until that happens, an internal fight has some characteristics that are not found in more traditional wars. More violent, more intense, more personal. I will have to find the references later to back this statement, but I have seen it in more than one source. From this perspective I think it is worth looking at these conflicts as being apolitical (unless you see man as a political animal, in which case saying a war is political is the same as saying war is conducted by humans).

[Bob's World]

Ahhh, ok. As I understand your position it brings up the same concern I have with the Rand study. Focus is too much on the insurgent, and not the insurgency.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Sorry, much of what I write seems to only make sense to me:eek:

Insurgency is conflict, as one commentator put it, on a "primordial" level. It is not the same as a clean, interstate conflict. It is not interstate war. Any attempt to claim it is the same is to miss the entire point of what is occurring.

The people who engage in this conflict are pushed passed the point of obeying the laws of the country they live in. They are not Soldiers given orders to fight a foreign enemy or outside threat. They have been pushed to the breaking point. What happens when they break is different than what happens when a Soldier goes to war.

I don't understand why people don't see that.

[Bob's World]

I know I occupy a lonely space, but I am OK with that.

Personally, I think we think about insurgency most clearly when we think of it as a condition that comes to exist within some (or several) population groups under any particular system of governance. When these conditions exist, they may lay dormant for years. Often it is some event, or some leader, or some ideology, or some combination of these things that empowers an organization to emerge from such a population to actually act out illegally to challenge said system of governance and seek to coerce it to change in a way intended to address the drivers of said conditions of insurgency.

Seen in such a light, the conditions of insurgency are not something a state (or system of governance) can negotiate with, or that they can defeat. These conditions are something they must understand and address.

Once an insurgent organization emerges, the cat is out of the proverbial bag. At this point said system of governance typically plays the victim and calls out the military to defeat the offending insurgent. All this accomplishes is to simply press the conditions of insurgency back into a dormant state, but nothing to resolve those conditions. In fact, the efforts to defeat the insurgent typically make the underlying insurgency worse.

This is why our COIN doctrine is so dangerously flawed. It is not designed to resolve insurgency at all, but merely to drive it, or bribe it, or develop it, etc into dormancy. Then we claim victory, and the civil system of governance that created these conditions to begin with goes on about its way unreformed, unaware, unapologetic and unable to see how they created this mess in the first place.

Insurgents must be dealt with, they are criminals. But sometimes they are right, and often they are righteous, but always they are illegal.

We in the United States have become so paranoid and fearful of AQ and their UW efforts to tap into these conditions of insurgency across the greater Middle East that we have adopted a CT/COIN strategy that is very expensive and very counter productive to the ends we seek. We merge UW actors with foreign fighters with insurgents and treat all as targets. This does not work. It does not bring stability to the lands we bring these operations to, and it does not reduce the threat of terrorism to the US. In fact, it does the opposite.

We are hard broke at the strategic level. We attack symptoms. We help our partners and allies attack symptoms. By attacking symptoms as if they were the problem, we make the actual problem worse.

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello,

If I tend to agree with Bob and Curmudgeon, I think that we are discussing here something very specific under the term insurgency.
From the researches I conducted in DRC, where you have countless insurgents or armed groups, I came to the conclusion that you also have to differentiate insurgency from insurgents. Let me explain

In DRC, insurgency are no more a produce of a disagreement between the State and a group of population. Rather, I witnessed insurgency as a strategic tool to gain access to power. The basic discontent between part of the population and the government described by Bob are there, in theory, but reality is much pragmatic. In fact, many politicians, who are MP or senators, use armed groups (I prefer the term rather than insurgent) to basically conduct political campaign and force government to pay them for peace.
If during the early hours of DRC independence there was real insurgencies with all the complex political claims (At the time communist against capitalist or Moscow against Washington), nowadays, this is no more the case. Part of the issue comes from the COIN/conflict settlement strategy used to end the 1998-2002 RCD and MLC insurgencies that was based on rewarding insurgents.
This was followed by the creation of countless armed groups with former insurgents not happy with the peace benefits they got from the big deal made between the State and the insurgencies leaders. Basically, what ever the deal or political settlement is offered to them, it is less beneficial than the benefits they get from being an insurgent group (black market, smuggling...). Also, to get benefits politicians pretend to have an armed group support. The armed group does not have to exist, all what is needed is to be introduce into the circles of power as an armed group delegate.

I know, this is different from the AQ affiliated insurgencies. What I would like to flag here is not the rational behind the insurgencies (real or fake) but rather the responsibility of the COIN strategy used (rewarding insurgents to buy peace).
A counter example from the same area (Uganda, the Rwenzururu mvt) shows that conceding political gains to insurgents can bring an end to the insurgency only if it is limited (Creation and recognition of the main claims, in this particular case the creation of the Rwenzururu kingdom) AND this does not ensure that all insurgents will stop their operations (Another armed group was formed, in that case the Nalu and then the ADF-Nalu). You even end up with, as in DRC, residual insurgencies that can be transformed into a normative use of violence for political gain (MPs negotiate their posts in government on the base they will not activate or will negotiate with armed groups).

In the end, my point is that you may have to differentiate between the insurgency and the insurgents motives. The root causes of the insurgency can be address without impact on the insurgents groups. And that is where I can see a loo-pol in the COIN strategy. COIN is necessary to address the core roots and griefs of an insurgency but COIN is may be not sufficient to address the core motivation of the insurgents.
(I hope I make sense :D)

[TheCurmudgeon]

M-A,

I understand the distinction you are making but I would like to ask a question. Are these groups, with their political leaders, only insurgents because there is a government imposed over the top of them? Let me ask this another way, if there was no central government would the dynamics you are describing exist naturally? Do these groups become criminals only because we define them that way?

I hope that makes sense.

[jmm99]

as portrayed by Suger, Abbot Suger: Life of King Louis the Fat (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/suger-louisthefat.asp); and specifically, LOUIS LE GROS ET LES CHÂTELAINS DE L'ÎLE-DE-FRANCE (http://www.mediterranee-antique.info/Auteurs/Fichiers/JKL/Lavisse/Histoire_France/T22/T22_25.htm#_edn1).

Sometimes allied to the king; sometimes revolting against the king; sometimes fighting amongst themselves; these castle-keepers always had their private armies available. They weren't really insurgents either, but definitely greedy politicians.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

One of the most deadly flaws in our CT/COIN approach to the events of 9/11 is to not recognize the two levels of conditions of insurgency that the many national, regional and transnational groups are relying upon and emerging from.

As the Arab Spring clearly attests, many population groups around the greater middle east (around the world as well, but I'll restrict this to the Sunni Muslim populations targeted by AQ as this is about our post 9/11 activities) have deep grievances with the systems of governance that affect their lives. Some of these systems are formal and national. Some are informal and more regional. Some are formal and international. Some are informal and international. Some grievances are real, some are largely perceived. The key in studying and thinking about these populations and what conditions of insurgency might exist is that the perspective of anyone or any group other than the actual population in question is moot. We need to deal with that reality. So do many of the governments we support around the region. We also need to deal with the fact that while effective government and the provision of governmental services are nice, they will not buy a government out of trouble when that same government is offending some population in more fundamental ways.

So, for the US to appreciate is that there are many pockets of nationalist or regional (in places like Yemen, Somalia or the Maghreb where borders mean little and populations straddle multiple systems of governance) revolutionary insurgency. So simply helping those governments build security force capacity in an effort to sustain the status quo makes a certain tactical logic, particularly in the context of how we have framed AQ and the degree of colonial bias still infused into our doctrine. But all this can do is help suppress the current set of actors emerging from these populations, while at the same time enabling said systems of governance to continue on with the family of sins that brought them to this place to begin with. It also serves to validate a one of three primary points in AQ’s UW sales pitch: "You can't win at home (get your own government to listen to you and evolve) until you break the support of these powerful external players, such as the US, to those regimes." In fact, it is our very support that contributes the most to making those governments "apostate."

For AQ each of these pockets of revolutionary insurgency energy is a playground for their larger UW campaign. What our Intel community has broken out into several different branches of AQ (AQAP, AQIM, etc, etc) are more accurately simply separate theaters of operation for AQs larger UW campaign to change the overall governance of the region. To call these separate segments of AQ and to include the local revolutionary actors under the AQ umbrella for ease of CT targeting is a strategic disaster of the highest order. It may "mow the grass," but it also "poisons the soil" at the same time.

What is this poison soil? Well, that gets to larger perspective. We can all appreciate how a resistance insurgency to a physical occupation occurs. The many famous resistance movements across Europe to German occupation during WWII are recent examples. The resistance to US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan are more recent examples. But does it require a physical occupation for conditions of resistance insurgency to grow?? I don't think so. I think what we have are broad conditions of resistance insurgency to an occupation by policy, if you will, of the US-led efforts and programs put in place over the post-WWII era to contain the Soviets and to lend stability to energy markets and critical lines of communication. These are the conditions of insurgency that AQ relies upon to recruit individuals for acts of transnational terrorism. When we simply help defeat revolutionary insurgents, and when we bundle revolutionary insurgents accepting help from AQs UW teams as also being AQ and conduct CT against them, we make these conditions of insurgency and this source of causation worse.

We need to reframe the problem. We need to separate, not conflate diverse actors. We need to put a much finer point on our CT efforts, and we need to recognize that security force capacity is only a mitigating effort in dealing with revolutionary insurgency, but is in no way a cure.

To do this will be far less expensive that efforts of the past 12 years. It will be far less offensive to people everywhere (to include our "war weary" population at home), and will bring US foreign policy back much closer into line with how we see ourselves (rather than what we have become). Oh yeah. And it will also be far more productive at the strategic level. We need to stop promoting generals and admirals for great tactical success in the face of strategic failure. Flag officers are supposed to be strategic leaders; we need to hold them to a strategic standard.

[Bill Moore]

Now we have two good links to a good article. :)

The muddy statements are all in the COIN section - they're bolded in the following:


The unbolded statements are understood by me; I don't get the three bolded items; or perhaps, my mind doesn't buy them as stated.

Regards

Mike

Mike, my first cut at the items in bold. I actually appreciate you prompting me to go back to the article and think about further. Bill

2. The merit in COIN cannot sensibly be posed as a general question. p.6 pdf

This makes perfect sense to me, although my interpretation of Collin’s intent may be off the mark. He emphasized that "our" decision to intervene is always a political decision first, and of course that is tied to policy ends. He wrote, “
Whether or not it is sensible for an outside polity to intervene in other polities’ insurgencies is a question that can only be posed in the particular.” Bottom line whether or not the U.S. should intervene in another nation’s insurgency is not a general question. It isn’t as clear as it could be, but he points at the strategic context, and that not all insurgencies are the same in that respect. If we first focus on the strategic context we should be able to come to a resolution on the appropriate tactics and doctrine for that particular engagement. (bold is my highlight)

We clearly don’t do that now, we have a generic doctrine that is not tailored to the situation (even if the doctrine plainly states it should be). Instead we respond with actions tied to buzz phrases such as good governance, winning hearts and minds, providing jobs, targeting insurgent leadership, protecting the populace, developing their security forces, etc., which in turn translate into metrics we monitor and report on that make it appear we’re winning until we lose. Understanding the policy goals and strategic context first, and then determine the tactics. This approach is so easy to grasp because it is so logical, yet so hard to do.

He makes other great points in this section, but to address them now would distract from the question at hand.

3. In COIN, all war and its warfare are about politics no more or less than in strategic behavior applied to other missions. p.7 pdf

The statement is oddly written, and no doubt some of our members will disagree with his points to varying degrees (myself included), but overall I concur with his arguments and feel appropriately scolded :-).

He points to the conceptual confusion in our COIN discussions between two principle poles of COIN theorists. The first pole believes the political factors (and I’ll add economic since we tend to blend the two) related to legitimacy are more essential than the military ones in countering an insurgency, while the second pole believes insurgency is primarily a military challenge which includes protecting the population. He points out both poles are correct unless they’re taken to their extremes where one disregards the other. The means and methods in COIN will vary case to case, with varying degree of military effort dependent upon the situation, but the take away is all war and warfare is political (to include state on state war, terrorism, insurgency, etc.), so to claim that COIN is more political than other forms of conflict is illogical.

I like his final comment in this section,
“Conceptual creativity that sees the light of day in wars that allegedly are irregular, hybrid, complex, difficult, fourth generation, and the rest of the products of fertile imaginations must not be permitted to obscure the simple and usable verities that war is war and it is always about politics. Theoretical elaboration of the claimed structure of allegedly different kinds of wars is usually an example of conceptual construction on sand.”

My only disagreement is that this fails to capture how insurgents superbly integrate their militant operations to principally achieve political effect instead of win battles. This doesn’t counter anything Collin said, but our military leaders often seem to miss this point after 10 years of being involved in insurgencies.

5. Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself. p.9 pdf

Collin writes, “
It is highly misleading to write about COIN as if it were a technique, a basket of operational and tactical ways and means, utterly divorced from specific historical political circumstances. There is and can be no “right way” to do COIN,”

He advises us not to conflate COIN to a point where it has standalone, context free merit, which in my view we have already done with all the cottage industries and Think Tanks that have emerged since 9/11 focused on COIN, which was just recently reinforced with yet another RAND study on COIN that is largely focused on tactics.

He adds that we shouldn’t restrict ourselves to our current COIN playbook (doctrine?), and instead, we should “
draw upon the full range of our strategic understanding and of historical experience far beyond our own.” The questions we should ask are whether we should intervene? and if so how? and to what end? This is much larger than a basket full of tactics and best practices. I think this essentially captures the point that COIN is not subject that has integrity my itself, instead it must be viewed in a larger strategic context.

Don't know if I just muddied the waters more or helped the mud settle.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill M.

What is the political component of a humanitarian intervention? Or is humanitarian intervention not war?

Not scolding, just trying to wrap my head around this. If, in Syria, we send in troops to create safe zones, but not to tip the scales of the conflict towards the rebels, what is our political aim and who is it against?

[Bill Moore]

Bill M.

What is the political component of a humanitarian intervention? Or is humanitarian intervention not war?

Not scolding, just trying to wrap my head around this. If, in Syria, we send in troops to create safe zones, but not to tip the scales of the conflict towards the rebels, what is our political aim and who is it against?

Humanitarian interventions are tied to political goals/policy, more so when military forces are employed to conduct them, or quite simply we wouldn't be intervening as a nation. There were underlying political objectives for Haiti and Somalia, as there are for Syria and the region.

I'm not showing my cards on what I believe is right for our response to Syria, but simply providing some of the political policy objectives I have seen or heard reported in the media that can be tied specifically to supporting the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, but note our strategy is much larger than intervening strictly for humanitarian purposes, so it is not possible to develop a military strategy based simply on the humanitarian crisis without considering the larger context involving Assad, Iran, Russia, Turkey, Al-Qaeda, economic system disruption, weapons of mass destruction (the main issue at the moment), Hezbollah, etc.

Possible political objectives related to the humanitarian aspect:

- Encouraging a desired international order where man-made humanitarian disasters are no longer acceptable.

- Maintaining global U.S. leadership of the international order.

- Maintain an acceptable degree of stability by containing the conflict to the extent possible.

- Weaken Al-Qaeda's messaging and attempt to exploit the situation in surrounding countries.

- Politically compelled domestically to intervene based on our nation's belief (this would be the case if Sen McCain could gain traction).

- Maintain influence with a potential follow on government in Syria.

I don't know what all the reasons are, but it is imperative for those developing the supporting military strategy to understand the overall political/strategic context and not simply respond with a doctrinal approach as some of our COINdistas would do if we were responding to an insurgency.

[jmm99]

I'll read through the three sections more carefully to see if I can more out of Gray than I did.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't know what all the reasons are, but it is imperative for those developing the supporting military strategy to understand the overall political/strategic context and not simply respond with a doctrinal approach as some of our COINdistas would do if we were responding to an insurgency.

Bill,

I don't disagree with your statement. For Soldiers of Western powers, places where the idea of the state and what is political is less fuzzy, or just more compartmentalized, I agree. But to say that all war is political is to westernize war. It commits the same sin that we do when we attempt to build nations in our own image - it does not take into account that other people in other cultures may not see things the same as we do.

In the introduction to "The Changing Character of War (http://www.amazon.com/The-Changing-Character-War-Strachan/dp/0199596735)" Strachan and Scheipers discuss an attempt to define war:


So, the seminar series at the beginning of calendar year 2004, the first term of the programme’s existence, was designed to address the big question of what is war … After a series of talks by subject specialists both in the areas where the programme lacked research expertise as well as areas in which it possessed it, we agreed on five criteria. First, war involves the use of force, although there can be a state of war in which active hostilities are suspended, and some would argue that the threat of the use of war (as in the Cold War) constitutes war. Fighting is what defines war, a point made by Clausewitz, and echoed in this book by Barkawi and Brighton. Second, war rests on contention. If one party attacks another, the other must respond for war to occur, or else what follows will be murder, massacre, or occupation. This reaction means that possibly the most important feature of war is reciprocity: part of the problem with much operational thought in the 1990’s was that it had forgotten that the enemy has a vote and that his response might be ‘asymmetrical’ or even unpredictable. Third, war assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting: scale matters, and skirmishers and border clashes are not necessarily war. Fourth, those who fight do not do so in a private capacity, and fifth, and consequently, war is fought for some aim beyond fighting itself. Both of the last two criteria tend normatively to be associated with states and their policies, but they do not have to be defined in these ways, and wars have been pursued – for example, by Germany and Japan in 1945, beyond the point at which they seem to be able to deliver worthwhile results. emphasis added.

We define war to be political. It is not necessarily a definitional component of war and it may not be the way our enemy sees it.

For purposes of examining the motives behine war I defined it as "deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal." The motivation need not be "political".

Of course your other option is to torture the definition of what is political. If I fight a holy war is that political. Were the Crusades political? War is a social act, yes. But political? Only in our western minds.

Why does it matter? Because when we define war this way we tend to homogenize our enemy and impart onto them our motivational scheme without seeing the conflict from thier perspective. We sterilize the act of war, turning it into a political fight rather than an emotional response to the acts of another. We make war logical. I think this is one of the primary mistakes of COIN. Because if war is political, then we can pacify the population by providing what we feel a political entity ought to provide. We can “govern” our way out of a fight. I think this is one of the major mistakes of COIN – and one that we perpetuate as long as we assume the enemy sees war the same way we do.

[jmm99]

under this definition:


"deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal." The motivation need not be "political".

Lt. Fuzzstick is the obnoxious commander of a platoon of border police. Lt. Ruffstuff commands a platoon of border police on the other side of the border. The two platoons (and their commanders) have been exchanging trash talk for months. Lt. Ruffstuff (after getting together with his platoon to explore all COAs) decides to send a section of his platoon to neutralize an outpost of Lt. Fuzzstick's command. That mission is executed as planned.

I'd suggest that:

1. The Fuzzstick-Ruffstuff event meets the definition of "war" as proposed in the quote.

2. Strachan probably would find this "border skermish" not to be "war", although his five "rules" do not explicitly explain why this is so.

3. The Fuzzstick-Ruffstuff incident might well fall into the category of a limited "armed conflict", with application of some "in war" rules.

4. Definitions in this area (e.g., "group") can't be precise; and matters have to be addressed on a case by case basis.

Finally, I'm frugal (cheap) and I'd look to the FREE ICRC materials on "war" (Hague) and "armed conflict" (Geneva), which have more clout, rather than to Strachan at $80 - but to each their own :).

As to politics, group politics beget group policy, which begets "war" (aka "armed conflict" in most instances). "War" has two general components: political action and military action. Nothing is "Western" or "Eastern" about that. China is a good example of positing a broad swath of "political warfare".

One might formulate something of a continuum (roughly based on the degree of violence sustained by, and the size of, the groups involved) reflecting the balance between political action and military action. For example, in an all-out nuclear war, political action would seem immaterial. In the early stages of an insurgency, the incumbant should be looking more at political action than military action. State to state conventional warfare would be in between.

I still have to go back to Gray.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Jmm,

When I refer to Western I am more referring to the post Westphalian "state" that we like to pretend exists worldwide, and that we have drawn lines all across the globe to divide the world up into political "states".

So, if war is political, what do we call it when pre-political hunter-gatherer tribes engage in organized violence - a rugby match? The reason we call it political is because that is how we see the world.

I think it also allows us to step back from the violence. We are not murdering human beings, we are executing policy. It is clean and guiltless. Cold and logical. Yet, you have to enlist "the passion of the people" if you want to execute a war. I think we go to great lengths to create logical models of "rational actors" that we then try unsuccessfully to overlay on a world that is emotional and irrational.

Let me offer another view on the matter, one that takes us very far afield into the evolution of the human brain. When you look at the hunter-gatherer wars, ... err ... I mean "rugby matches", you see that one of the major purposes of these fights is to steal women from another group. The addition of women to one's group means more children and hence, the survival of the group. Moving forward a few thousand years, one of the questions that is often raised in modern wars is "why is rape so often associated with war?" Could it be that even though we have become more "civilized", when we engage in the primordial act of war we trigger associations that were created through hundreds of thousands of years of evolution?

OK, that was a wild theory, but it brings us back to the point that war is not the creation of politics nor must it be political. War existed long before we had politics. Now you will find some theorists, like Douglas Fry (http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-War-Human-Potential-Peace/dp/019538461X) who will argue that war only came into being after humans became horticulturalists and stopped hunting and gatherering. Others (http://www.amazon.com/Demonic-Males-Origins-Human-Violence/dp/0395877431/ref=pd_sim_b_1) dispute that, citing the fact that all members of the ape family engage in similar acts of murderous organized violence. Either way, war (http://www.ted.com/talks/steven_pinker_on_the_myth_of_violence.html)existed long before any realistic form of organized politics. We are attempting to retrofit war with a modern reason for its existence and make ourselves feel better about it in the process.

[Steve Blair]

I think part of that goes back to how you define politics. There's going to be nation-state politics, but there's also social and tribal/group politics that predate all that. Any hunter-gatherer society is going to have its own variation of politics (be it a social need to avenge kin losses, jockeying for position within the group, or something else), and denying that is dangerous.

One of the things that played into many of our Indian conflicts was the Anglos' almost total lack of understanding of tribal politics. We expected to see "chiefs" that corresponded to our own leaders and never grasped the depth of tribal politics. The Kiowa, for one example, were almost addicted to tribal politics, with various factions vying for power at any given point in time. Their raiding could be (at any time) a response to tribal losses, an attempt to show (or save) face within the various factions, or the attempt by a younger leader to move up in a culture that valued raiding success and rewarded it with political leverage. The Navajo were similar.

We blunder when we don't understand local politics, no matter where they're found or where they center.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

I don't disagree with your statement. For Soldiers of Western powers, places where the idea of the state and what is political is less fuzzy, or just more compartmentalized, I agree. But to say that all war is political is to westernize war. It commits the same sin that we do when we attempt to build nations in our own image - it does not take into account that other people in other cultures may not see things the same as we do.

In the introduction to "The Changing Character of War (http://www.amazon.com/The-Changing-Character-War-Strachan/dp/0199596735)" Strachan and Scheipers discuss an attempt to define war:

emphasis added.

We define war to be political. It is not necessarily a definitional component of war and it may not be the way our enemy sees it.

For purposes of examining the motives behine war I defined it as "deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal." The motivation need not be "political".

Of course your other option is to torture the definition of what is political. If I fight a holy war is that political. Were the Crusades political? War is a social act, yes. But political? Only in our western minds.

Why does it matter? Because when we define war this way we tend to homogenize our enemy and impart onto them our motivational scheme without seeing the conflict from thier perspective. We sterilize the act of war, turning it into a political fight rather than an emotional response to the acts of another. We make war logical. I think this is one of the primary mistakes of COIN. Because if war is political, then we can pacify the population by providing what we feel a political entity ought to provide. We can “govern” our way out of a fight. I think this is one of the major mistakes of COIN – and one that we perpetuate as long as we assume the enemy sees war the same way we do.

These are great points, and no doubt we view war and warfare through a Western lens and that implies a high degree of bias (whether we're aware of it or not). Mike provided a legal definition, but in most of the non-Western world people have little use for our legal definitions.

I'm of the opinion that once we define something as complex and varied as war and warfare in order to scope it, we created a false paradigm that will not only bias our perception of events, but result in inappropriate strategies based more on our definitions than what is really happening. Of course that is a minority opinion in military circles where doctrinal knowledge is considered supreme, and you can't have doctrine (the way we write it) without defining the undefinable.

Instead of trying to define war and warfare, I think we need to define political. I found an answer I like (admittedly it fits my bias), but it may bastardize the term as you understand it.


http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_does_political_mean


Political means involving or characteristic of politics or parties or politicians, of or relating to your views about social relationships involving authority or power, of or relating to the profession of governing. Political refers to relationships of interest within a community, whether that community is large or small.

This expands it well beyond the Westphalian definition of states down to the community level and discusses authority and power, which most conflicts are about (I believe). This would address the political agenda of the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, the various thug groups in West Africa, the intertribal warfare in Afghanistan, and to some extent even major level cartels. A lot of the politics is based on ethnic issues, what religious group should control the area, who should primarily benefit from economic exploitation, etc. These policy objectives will shape the militant strategy as part of the overall strategy, and in some cases there will only be a militant strategy to achieve their political end. We have to understand their political end and strategy and how it conflicts with ours to effectively develop a strategy that achieves our ends.

[Bill Moore]

I think part of that goes back to how you define politics. There's going to be nation-state politics, but there's also social and tribal/group politics that predate all that. Any hunter-gatherer society is going to have its own variation of politics (be it a social need to avenge kin losses, jockeying for position within the group, or something else), and denying that is dangerous.

One of the things that played into many of our Indian conflicts was the Anglos' almost total lack of understanding of tribal politics. We expected to see "chiefs" that corresponded to our own leaders and never grasped the depth of tribal politics. The Kiowa, for one example, were almost addicted to tribal politics, with various factions vying for power at any given point in time. Their raiding could be (at any time) a response to tribal losses, an attempt to show (or save) face within the various factions, or the attempt by a younger leader to move up in a culture that valued raiding success and rewarded it with political leverage. The Navajo were similar.

We blunder when we don't understand local politics, no matter where they're found or where they center.

We were typing at the same time apparently, so I needlessly duplicated your answer. I'm in line with your reasoning as you can see.

[Steve Blair]

We were typing at the same time apparently, so I needlessly duplicated your answer. I'm in line with your reasoning as you can see.

No worries. It's good to have multiple examples.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think part of that goes back to how you define politics. There's going to be nation-state politics, but there's also social and tribal/group politics that predate all that. Any hunter-gatherer society is going to have its own variation of politics (be it a social need to avenge kin losses, jockeying for position within the group, or something else), and denying that is dangerous.

I would concur. Aristotle desribed man as a political animal which others interpreted as a social animal. Perhaps the two are truely indistinguishable on a very basic level. Still, moving forward to the present, the way we use the term political especially in regards to war and policy creates a false impression that I feel is dangerous. This false impression is that 1) there must be a poitical basis or reason(including a political body and a policy objective) for a war (or insurgency) to start, and 2) there is a political solution to the conflict. I am not sure that this is always true, unless you are willing to stretch the definition of politics to include all things social.

[jmm99]

Your response to my message simply ignores what I said - and rattles on about things I didn't say. Your choice, as we all have. My choice is simply not to respond to your message's rubbish.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm of the opinion that once we define something as complex and varied as war and warfare in order to scope it, we created a false paradigm that will not only bias our perception of events, but result in inappropriate strategies based more on our definitions than what is really happening. Of course that is a minority opinion in military circles where doctrinal knowledge is considered supreme, and you can't have doctrine (the way we write it) without defining the undefinable.


Hmmmm, so is COIN actually the Graduate level of Warfare :p


These policy objectives will shape the militant strategy as part of the overall strategy, and in some cases there will only be a militant strategy to achieve their political end. We have to understand their political end and strategy and how it conflicts with ours to effectively develop a strategy that achieves our ends.

Here is the key. To wrap ourselves up in defintions is to defeat ourselves. To understand the enemy and what it is they want is, in my mind, the first step in developing a strategy to end the conflict (although, not necessarily "win" the "war".)

[Steve Blair]

I would concur. Aristotle desribed man as a political animal which others interpreted as a social animal. Perhaps the two are truely indistinguishable on a very basic level. Still, moving forward to the present, the way we use the term political especially in regards to war and policy creates a false impression that I feel is dangerous. This false impression is that 1) there must be a poitical basis or reason(including a political body and a policy objective) for a war (or insurgency) to start, and 2) there is a political solution to the conflict. I am not sure that this is always true, unless you are willing to stretch the definition of politics to include all things social.

Perhaps, but I think you're doing the discussion a disservice by using the Westphalian "state" (your quotes) argument to try to box politics into a modern construction. Politics are social interactions at the root anyhow, as much of politics relates to trying to gain some sort of social status or protection (or to secure same for your clan/family/group). By chaining the concept of politics to a state construct you're really limiting the ability to grasp the whole picture and make mistakes like the whole "chief" thing I mentioned in an earlier post far more likely. Maybe we should go back to the older "socio-political" construct, since (after all) politics are created by social institutions and social methods.

Drawing back to the Indian Wars example, there was a political reason for the Kiowa starting their campaign of aggressive raiding in Texas in 1874...but it was driven by social considerations. One of the main leaders within the peace faction of the tribe had a relative who was killed during a raid. His social obligation to avenge that loss led him to start raiding, which shifted the political balance within the tribe from the "peace" faction to the "war" faction. That's a simplified explanation, but it serves to illustrate the point. Combine that with the fear and uncertainty generated by a government census taken earlier that year (an activity that went against some Kiowa social taboos and created social and political pressure on the various leaders within the tribe's structure) and the whole situation exploded.

Within the tribal political situation the whole thing makes sense, but viewed from outside it did not. Now I may be missing your point, but I think at the end of it that group dynamics are politics, and that our loss of understanding of that (if we ever actually had that understanding) is causing all sorts of havoc. Personally, I blame talk TV...:D

[TheCurmudgeon]

Your response to my message simply ignores what I said - and rattles on about things I didn't say. Your choice, as we all have. My choice is simply not to respond to your message's rubbish.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

My apologies.

I thought you were on the right track. I thought you were still playing with the continuum idea. I did not realize you were looking for a response until I read this message.

If you are asking me if the conflict between Lt. Fuzzstick and Lt. Ruffstuff is war, then I would say yes. From this you could extrapolate that if Fuzzstick and Ruffstuff were the heads of two rival street gangs and they engaged in the same type of activity it would still be war. I realize that by using that definition I move beyond what most people would see as war - it cannot be war because they do not represent the "government" in the area - gangs are not political entities - but when I start to pull things apart I keep coming back to the same components in the my definition. The reasons people engage in deadly violence does not really seem to make a lot of difference.

Now, using Bill Moore’s definition that “[p]olitical refers to relationships of interest within a community, whether that community is large or small”, then the interests of a gang over turf could meet that definition. It all gets very fuzzy around the edges. This is why I tried to strip away the modern accouterments and look at conflict from as primitive an aspect as possible (my”rubbish” as you so eloquently describe it.) When we start to layer too many additional criteria over the top of these concepts I think we box ourselves into solutions that may not solve anything.

But all that is secondary. I am sorry. I did not mean to offend.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Perhaps, but I think you're doing the discussion a disservice by using the Westphalian "state" (your quotes) argument to try to box politics into a modern construction. Politics are social interactions at the root anyhow, as much of politics relates to trying to gain some sort of social status or protection (or to secure same for your clan/family/group). By chaining the concept of politics to a state construct you're really limiting the ability to grasp the whole picture and make mistakes like the whole "chief" thing I mentioned in an earlier post far more likely. Maybe we should go back to the older "socio-political" construct, since (after all) politics are created by social institutions and social methods.

Drawing back to the Indian Wars example, there was a political reason for the Kiowa starting their campaign of aggressive raiding in Texas in 1874...but it was driven by social considerations. One of the main leaders within the peace faction of the tribe had a relative who was killed during a raid. His social obligation to avenge that loss led him to start raiding, which shifted the political balance within the tribe from the "peace" faction to the "war" faction. That's a simplified explanation, but it serves to illustrate the point. Combine that with the fear and uncertainty generated by a government census taken earlier that year (an activity that went against some Kiowa social taboos and created social and political pressure on the various leaders within the tribe's structure) and the whole situation exploded.

Within the tribal political situation the whole thing makes sense, but viewed from outside it did not. Now I may be missing your point, but I think at the end of it that group dynamics are politics, and that our loss of understanding of that (if we ever actually had that understanding) is causing all sorts of havoc. Personally, I blame talk TV...:D

I agree that we would be better off using the idea of socio-political influence rather than just political. You provide a good example of why this is.

Based on your example I would ask which was the more powerful motivator, 1) personal revenge, 2) social duty, or 3) doing what was required to maintain his position as chief? Is it even possible to separate the three in this type of tribal setting? What would have happened if he chose not to act – would the tribe have acted without him? Was his personal decision to act really a decision at all? (these are rhetorical)

As you point out is it essential to understand the events from the tribe’s perspective. It may allow one to be more creative in designing strategies or solutions. I don’t know. But I am curious.

[Bob's World]

Definitions are like doctrine. Necessary evils that both guide and restrict our thinking and actions in equal parts.

For me, insurgency is more about governance than politics. A fine point perhaps, but as others have pointed out it is often informal systems of governance that are at the root of the problems feeding the growth of conditions of insurgency in some population.

[Steve Blair]

I agree that we would be better off to work off using the idea of socio-political influence rather than just political. You provide a good example of why this is.

Based on your example I would ask which was the more powerful motivator, 1) personal revenge, 2) social duty, or 3) doing what was required to maintain his position as chief? Is it even possible to separate the three in this type of tribal setting? What would have happened if he chose not to act – would the tribe have acted without him? Was his personal decision to act really a decision at all?

As you point out is it essential to understand the events from the tribe’s perspective. It may allow one to be more creative in designing strategies or solutions. I don’t know. But I am curious.

The first issue is the concept of "chief." The position in the sense you're using it is an Anglo construction that didn't exist within the Kiowa. Theirs was a political society based more on blocs of power and influence. One bloc might gain ascendency for a time based on events, only to lose that authority later. It's worth nothing that some of the leaders Anglos called "chiefs" shifted from the "war" to "peace" factions and back again depending on need.

During the Red River War only a part of the Kiowa people "went to war." Another faction, who gravitated around the remaining leaders of the "peace" faction, sat out the conflict. This wasn't unusual in the Plains tribes, actually. In the case of the leader I used as an example, available evidence suggests that his main motivator was social duty and cultural pressure. In a society where status was often earned by raiding exploits, if he failed to act he became "less of a man" in some senses. That would cause him to slip in the eyes of other warriors, and possibly be scorned by younger men who were anxious for opportunities to earn their own raiding honors.

Another example of this kind of tension can be found in the Nez Perce. Although Joseph is usually held up to be the "chief" of the tribe, Looking Glass was the primary force behind their flight and the main military leader. Joseph was more of a political leader and couldn't resist the pressure applied by Looking Glass and those of his faction. The Modocs are another example, and perhaps an even more tragic one. The leader hung as the main "chief" (called Captain Jack by Anglos) was in fact the primary driver behind that tribe's "peace faction," and the warrior who could be considered most responsible (from the Anglo point of view) for the conflict changed sides partway through and was spared. In both cases the role of the individual, as well as their actual ability to act within social constraints, was limited and poorly-understood by the Anglos (both then and now).

The handful of consistently successful commanders on the Frontier seem to have understood this social system (although in some cases how they arrived at that understanding is unclear). Mackenzie seemed to have grasped the revenge pressure within the tribes, and his campaigns usually targeted property and not warriors (arguably James Carlton made the same connection in the 1860s, although "Kit" Carson was one of his regimental commanders and might have served as something of a cultural tutor). Crook seems to have grasped some of this when dealing with Apaches, but he failed badly on the Northern Plains.

[jmm99]

is what my analysis came down to:


4. Definitions in this area (e.g., "group") can't be precise; and matters have to be addressed on a case by case basis.

The "Fuzzstick-Rufftough" event is a conflation of a number of "border incident" case studies which CLAMO and the ICRC have put together over the past two decades, with which everyone is probably familiar. The bottom line is that "war" and "armed conflicts" are a sticky wicket militarily, as well as legally.

I wouldn't necessarily "extrapolate that if Fuzzstick and Ruffstuff were the heads of two rival street gangs and they engaged in the same type of activity it would still be war." Note that I understand your definition and its application #1, but that there are at least two more viewpoints to consider #2 & #3:


1. The Fuzzstick-Ruffstuff event meets the definition of "war" as proposed in the quote.

2. Strachan probably would find this "border skermish" not to be "war", although his five "rules" do not explicitly explain why this is so.

3. The Fuzzstick-Ruffstuff incident might well fall into the category of a limited "armed conflict", with application of some "in war" rules.

On the other hand, I wouldn't exclude inclusion of urban gangs within a "war" or "armed conflict" paradigm based on the particular case. Again, all of us are familiar with the work done by Max Manwaring and John Sullivan.

As to the "political", my views correspond much more to those of Bill Moore and Steve Blair; though I have to correct Bill on one point:


Mike provided a legal definition, but in most of the non-Western world people have little use for our legal definitions.

I believe Bill is talking about this definition I quoted (#53):


"deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal." The motivation need not be "political".

but which comes from this prior post from TheCurmudgeon (#52):


For purposes of examining the motives behind war I defined it as "deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, whose actions are morally sanctioned by that group, against a discrete and identifiable other group with a specific objective or goal." The motivation need not be "political".

All of this is kind of funny to me; but in any event no one was putting a legal definition on the table. :)

As to hunter-gatherers, one has a wealth of seriously conflicting works to choose from. That is an area of biology in which I have an interest. Maybe I'll start a thread someday if and when I open up some very old mental file cabinets.

In the meantime, you all can watch and enjoy these; and tell me whether incidents of "war" are shown:

Gang of Chimps Attack and Kill a Lone Chimp (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPznMbNcfO8)

Chimp Patrol (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Z33WiXGiWo)

Violent chimpanzee attack - Planet Earth - BBC wildlife (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7XuXi3mqYM)

Chimps vs red colobus monkeys - BBC wildlife (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bLhv-aQ5YY)

Baboons vs chimpanzees - BBC wildlife (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERwZwaOUyjs)

Chimpanzee attacks in Florida (Documentary) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RU9P_tMShs)

BBC Natural World - Chimps of the Lost Gorge (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6yZj3YAiYI)

And our next installment will be chimp insurgency strategies by someone other than me. :D

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

As to hunter-gatherers, one has a wealth of seriously conflicting works to choose from. That is an area of biology in which I have an interest. Maybe I'll start a thread someday if and when I open up some very old mental file cabinets.

Just some snippage from that post, but I think it's also risky to lump "hunter-gatherers" into a single group like that. If you were to look at Vietnam, and the Montagnard population in particular, you find some fairly wide variations between the tribes regarding social practices and even their warlike propensities...yet they're all considered either "hunter-gatherer" or practitioners of slash-and-burn agriculture. Even a comparison of two more traditional Plains tribes (Kiowa and Comanche) turn up some differences in warlike outlook (some of the clans/bands within the Comanche structure alone had distinct variations in terms of their propensity to raid or make war).

We ignore the social/cultural landscape at our peril...and I'm not talking that nifty pie-charted landscape beloved by social scientists. Bob may be correct in stating that insurgency rises from governance, but governance rises from the social-political swamp that holds groups.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Just some snippage from that post, but I think it's also risky to lump "hunter-gatherers" into a single group like that. If you were to look at Vietnam, and the Montagnard population in particular, you find some fairly wide variations between the tribes regarding social practices and even their warlike propensities...yet they're all considered either "hunter-gatherer" or practitioners of slash-and-burn agriculture. Even a comparison of two more traditional Plains tribes (Kiowa and Comanche) turn up some differences in warlike outlook (some of the clans/bands within the Comanche structure alone had distinct variations in terms of their propensity to raid or make war).

We ignore the social/cultural landscape at our peril...and I'm not talking that nifty pie-charted landscape beloved by social scientists. Bob may be correct in stating that insurgency rises from governance, but governance rises from the social-political swamp that holds groups.

I don't think any of the groups in Vietnam would be considered hunter-gatherers. The number of groups around today are very limited. There are a number of horticulturalists, or slash-and-burn groups as you refer to them, but they have a different dynamic.

[jmm99]

No, I didn't; and in fact I stated the works in that field are "seriously conflicting" - and again, I do things on a case by case basis.

If you have an argument about hunter-gatherers, take it up with The Curmudgeon who raised the topic in post #54:


So, if war is political, what do we call it when pre-political hunter-gatherer tribes engage in organized violence - a rugby match? The reason we call it political is because that is how we see the world.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

No, I didn't; and in fact I stated the works in that field are "seriously conflicting" - and again, I do things on a case by case basis.

If you have an argument about hunter-gatherers, take it up with The Curmudgeon who raised the topic in post #54:



Regards

Mike

I know you didn't, but you conveniently used the term close to my posting string. Didn't mean to imply that you were doing any lumping.

[jmm99]

I'm filing this post since TheCurmudgeon mentioned my continuum idea, which was expressed in a prior post, in my words (post #53):


One might formulate something of a continuum (roughly based on the degree of violence sustained by, and the size of, the groups involved) reflecting the balance between political action and military action. For example, in an all-out nuclear war, political action would seem immaterial. In the early stages of an insurgency, the incumbant should be looking more at political action than military action. State to state conventional warfare would be in between.

This is a hypothesis (that means it is untested and is offered as something to be researched), expressed in a number of posts in the thread, Applying Clausewitz to Insurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6743): We have a civil-military continuum (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=67453&postcount=44); Co-belligerency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89339&postcount=165); Transition Zone (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89365&postcount=177); and Transition Zone - Continuum (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89367&postcount=179).

In graphic form, it looks like this; but there's a lot of text explaining it in the four posts, which I'm not going to regurgitate:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=997&d=1261157939

Takio was the only one who was interested enough in the hypothesis to ask if he could use it ("yes"). I don't know whether he did anything with it on a professional level.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Mike, question on the continuum.

In the section marked Military Struggle you indicate that it is controlled by the Law of War. This would indicate a level of control by each of the two combatants (or parties if this were a non-military struggle). Is there a point on your continuum where that level of control breaks down, where chaos reigns, or is that outside the sphere of this chart?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I know you didn't, but you conveniently used the term close to my posting string. Didn't mean to imply that you were doing any lumping.

Hunter-gatherer was used by me. I don't like the term but it is one that most people understand (to a point). I prefer Family-Level Foragers as used by Earle and Johnson in "The Evolution of Human Societies (http://www.amazon.com/Evolution-Human-Sociality-Stephen-Sanderson/dp/0847695352)". These are relatively small groups (about one-hundred) who consist of a small cluster of related families. They have no real political structure. The IKung are probably the most famous of such groups but the American Shoshone would qualify when first encountered by Europeans. People who study war in these groups tend to point to the Yanomamo and Napoleon Chagnon (http://www.amazon.com/Noble-Savages-Dangerous-Yanomamo-Anthropologists/dp/0684855100/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1380843798&sr=1-1&keywords=noble+savages+chagnon) but much of his work has been called into question. The allegations were that he staged many of the incidents of combat that he filmed.

In any case these groups are generally considered egalitarian, but they are not quite at that level.


In egalitarian societies such as the !Kung's, group activities unfold, plans are made, and decisions are arrived at - all apparently without clear focus of authority or influence. Closer examination, however, reveals that patterns of leadership do exist. When a water hole is mentioned, a group living near there is ofter referred to by the !Kung by a single man's or woman's name: for example, Bon!a's camp at Xangwa or Kxarun!a's camp at Bate. These individuals are often older people who have lived there the longest or who have married into the owner group, and who have some personal qualities worthy of note as a speaker, and arguer, a ritual specialist, or a hunter. In group discussions these people may peak out more than others, may be differed to by others, and one gets the feeling that their opinion holds a bit more weight than the options of other discussants. Whatever their skill, !kung leaders have no formal authority. They can only persuade, but never enforce their will upon others The Evolution of Human Societies, p.80.

I term these groups "pre-political" because they have no formal authority or even institutionalized influence. Their age and their accomplishments are all they can draw on to influence the minds of other members who are free to agree or disagree. There is no alpha male or alpha female. Clearly, however, they are not "pre-social" and they have a group dynamic that holds them together.

As the groups get larger and they start to have possessions like herds or they become tied to the land as with agrarian cultures the dynamics change. Big Men who control resources start to become the central figures although age still matters. THe control over resources is where I tend to draw the line between pre and post political entities. But that is just me. :D

Technically speaking the Indians of the Pacific Northwest are considered hunter-gatherers, gathering fish. But they do this in settlements of several hundred to several thousand and their leaders control the resources of the group. So while their lifestyle qualifies them as hunter-gatherers (and they are considered complex hunter-gatherers) they are beyond the level of the family-level foragers and clearly have a political structure.

[jmm99]

If you haven't done so, slog through the four posts dealing with my "continuum hypothesis" - which should tell you what it is and what it isn't. Your precise question:


In the section marked Military Struggle you indicate that it is controlled by the Law of War. This would indicate a level of control by each of the two combatants (or parties if this were a non-military struggle). Is there a point on your continuum where that level of control breaks down, where chaos reigns, or is that outside the sphere of this chart?

Your first two sentences are not within my hypothesis. Please note that this is a simple Euclidian, two-dimentional chart of straight lines. The development of the chart can be followed in the four posts. There are three material inputs by Bill Moore cited in the posts.

BTW: in reality, the lines would be non-linear (even in a two-dimensional presentation). In this simple sketch, I'm charting the amount of violence (not exactly defined; it's some sort of power relationship) vs. the relative spectrum (again not defined by formula) from Utopian Peace to Absolute War. Those are the x-y axes. One could add a z-axis (for "control" or whatnot) and the graph would become three-dimensional.

In the real world, we live in a non-Euclidian space-time continuum, where non-space-time variables would have to appear as added dimensions. E.g., an 8-dimension graph would be needed for violence, peace-war spectrum, control axes for A and B groups + the space-time continuum. Moreover, each case is unique. I claim no general rule from which solutions for wars (armed conflicts) can be deduced.

Now back to the simple chart. The Military Struggle is not "controlled" by the Laws of War. The Laws of War "apply" because the Military Struggle exists. The Rule of Law "applies" because the Political Struggle exists. The Transition Zone exists where the Military Struggle and Political Struggle are so intertwined that choice between the Laws of War and the Rule of Law is not clear.

Polarbear1605 and I would select the Laws of War in most cases in the Transition Zone because of an a priori "argument" - in our opinion, it protects our troops better. The "international community" would go the other way in many cases, again by their own a priori argument(s).

As to the underlying premise (not shown in the chart, but explained in the four posts), it's another hypothesis:


Group A: its politics > its policy > its Political Struggle and its Military Struggle actions;

interacting with

Group B: its politics > its policy > its Political Struggle and its Military Struggle actions;

"effect" (I'd not say "control", since other factors can also have material "effects") the level of violence and the peace-war spectrum.

This is based on Saint Carl, who did not recognize any material effect of law on war and warfare. "Law" doesn't control anything in the chart, except itself; and is in any event an a priori choice. So, you could eliminate "Rule of Law" and "Laws of War" from the chart and insert two different non-legal doctrines.

This "continuum hypothesis" may have some usefulness as an illustrative tool. Of course, it can be misread or overread. That's true of any chart. Once, I used the standard CLAMO three-ring intersection chart (military considerations, political considerational, legal considerations) to explain what goes into ROEs; and someone commented that he didn't really understand the "targeting system" I had presented - and he thought it needed work. :D

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

Technically speaking the Indians of the Pacific Northwest are considered hunter-gatherers, gathering fish. But they do this in settlements of several hundred to several thousand and their leaders control the resources of the group. So while their lifestyle qualifies them as hunter-gatherers (and they are considered complex hunter-gatherers) they are beyond the level of the family-level foragers and clearly have a political structure.
You might check out some of Leslie White’s stuff (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/aa.1943.45.3.02a00010/full). He concentrates on the ratio of energy input to energy output rather than worrying a typology to death.

[ganulv]

I term these groups "pre-political" because they have no formal authority or even institutionalized influence. Their age and their accomplishments are all they can draw on to influence the minds of other members who are free to agree or disagree. There is no alpha male or alpha female. Clearly, however, they are not "pre-social" and they have a group dynamic that holds them together.

As the groups get larger and they start to have possessions like herds or they become tied to the land as with agrarian cultures the dynamics change. Big Men who control resources start to become the central figures although age still matters. THe control over resources is where I tend to draw the line between pre and post political entities. But that is just me. :D
Here is a link (https://db.tt/uXedz4ut) to the skeleton of a presentation I gave a few years back that touches on social evolution theory, should you be interested.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Mike,

In your graph in the left bottom corner is a condition that indicates that there is a level of violence but armed military action is not yet started. What do you see occurring in that space? Is this simply protests and political rhetoric or could an un-coalesced insurgency be included in that period.

[Steve Blair]

As the groups get larger and they start to have possessions like herds or they become tied to the land as with agrarian cultures the dynamics change. Big Men who control resources start to become the central figures although age still matters. THe control over resources is where I tend to draw the line between pre and post political entities. But that is just me. :D

Except that it's not all about control of resources. I can point to at least two individuals who had considerable authority within their respective Native American tribes who controlled little or nothing in terms of physical resources (in fact both seemed to go out of their way to avoid controlling resources). My point in bringing that up dovetails to a degree with ganulv's comment about beating typologies to death. It's more important to understand how a particular society or group works than know what broad classification it might fit into (IMO, anyhow).

[Steve Blair]

Mike,

In your graph in the left bottom corner is a condition that indicates that there is a level of violence but armed military action is not yet started. What do you see occurring in that space? Is this simply protests and political rhetoric or could an un-coalesced insurgency be included in that period.

It could also represent the "fundraising" phase (as put forward by Carlos Marighella). He contended that insurgent groups (urban guerrillas in his language) needed to raise operational funds by robbing banks, kidnappings, and other activities calculated to generate operational funds.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Except that it's not all about control of resources. I can point to at least two individuals who had considerable authority within their respective Native American tribes who controlled little or nothing in terms of physical resources (in fact both seemed to go out of their way to avoid controlling resources). My point in bringing that up dovetails to a degree with ganulv's comment about beating typologies to death. It's more important to understand how a particular society or group works than know what broad classification it might fit into (IMO, anyhow).

As Bob's World has already noted, and I have to agree with, definitions and typologies both illuminate and constrain.

Perhaps Platonic or Weberian” Ideal Types” would be a better way to categorize politics – it can have certain characteristics in greater or lesser degree. Perhaps it is a useless concept – going back to my quasi-tautology that saying that war is political is like saying that war is conducted by humans.

Speaking of Weber, the influence described in the !Kung example I equate to charisma, which I would assume you could agree could be a description of what your two leaders wielded (instead of control over resources). I think that level of natural influence is different than institutional influence that I would equate with politics. Perhaps politics is more than influence, it is authority which infers control. I don’t know.

In the end though, you are correct. However you describe or define it, understanding why your enemy is acting as they are, their dynamics of influence, authority, and/or control within that society, provides you the ability to tailor your response.

[Steve Blair]

As Bob's World has already noted, and I have to agree with, definitions and typologies both illuminate and confine.

Perhaps Platonic or Weberian” Ideal Types” would be a better way to categorize politics – it can have certain characteristics in greater or lesser degree. Perhaps it is a useless concept – going back to my quasi-tautology that saying that war is political is like saying that war is conducted by humans.

Speaking of Weber, the influence described in the !Kung example I equate to charisma, which I would assume you could agree could be a description of what your two leaders wielded (instead of control over resources). I think that level of natural influence is different than institutional influence that I would equate with control. Perhaps politics is more than influence, it is authority AND control. I don’t know.

One leader (Roman Nose) certainly had that charisma, but the other (Crazy Horse) didn't seem to...or didn't use his in the same way. Both exerted influence over younger warriors through their conduct in combat but didn't necessarily have any wider influence (Roman Nose did, but again Crazy Horse seemed to avoid it and had a mixed reputation within the wider Sioux nation).

I would say that politics at any level (but especially at the group/social level and context) is certainly about influence, authority (of some sort) AND control. How they intersect, and the tensions arising from those intersections, may be one of the causes of external conflict you're looking for.

[ganulv]

As the groups get larger and they start to have possessions like herds or they become tied to the land as with agrarian cultures the dynamics change. Big Men who control resources start to become the central figures although age still matters.

When you’re talking about the Big Man you’re talking about New Guinea and concepts derived from ethnography of that region. Paul Roscoe (http://www2.umaine.edu/anthropology/Roscoe.html) has done good critical (as in “attentive” and “informed”) work there.

[TheCurmudgeon]

When you’re talking about the Big Man you’re talking about New Guinea and concepts derived from ethnography of that region. Paul Roscoe (http://www2.umaine.edu/anthropology/Roscoe.html) has done good critical (as in “attentive” and “informed”) work there.

I do like the definition he uses in "Before Elites: The Political Capacities of Big Men (http://www2.umaine.edu/anthropology/PDFs/Roscoe2012BeyondElites.pdf)"


First, the Big Man is foremost a manager,
an organizational entrepreneur, and only secondarily
a transactor of material goods. Second, under
the uncircumscribed conditions that obtained in New
Guinea, he does not become ethnographically visible
until crude population densities rise above 30/sq km
or so. The maximum crude densities under which he
is known to have operated were around 110 people/
sq km, at which point elements of de facto ascription
may be apparent in his rise to prominence. Given the
uncircumscribed status of most European prehistoric
environments, Big Man systems are thus plausible
analogical candidates for political society wherever
similar demographic regimes prevailed in the Neolithic
and metal ages.
Third, I have attempted to estimate the capacity
of Big-Man communities to mobilize collective
labour for certain types of political task. In contrast
to Sahlins’s assertion that a contradiction existed
between the Big Man and his followers, major collective
projects such as material distributions, performances
of singing and dancing, and monument
building involved them in a symbiotic relationship
based on their common interests in communicating
fighting capacity to other individuals and groups. It
is a graphic instance of Kienlin’s suggestion (this volume)
that there are subtle forms of power that build
up from “below”, often with a much stronger impact
on the individual’s life than “political” authority.

He is not a chief – he has no ability to order compliance. He did not gain his “title” by right of birth and he cannot pass it one to his children. He is a self-made leader who has a following that he "influences" but has no "authority" to control beyond what he can offer in exchange for loyalty. He is what I would term a “proto-politician” if I were to dive back into the dangerous waters of defining terms.

[jmm99]

than I did. :)


In your graph in the left bottom corner is a condition that indicates that there is a level of violence but armed military action is not yet started. What do you see occurring in that space? Is this simply protests and political rhetoric or could an un-coalesced insurgency be included in that period.


It could also represent the "fundraising" phase (as put forward by Carlos Marighella). He contended that insurgent groups (urban guerrillas in his language) needed to raise operational funds by robbing banks, kidnappings, and other activities calculated to generate operational funds.

All of the above are plausible as interactions between groups or a state and a group. As also are interactions between states short of war (aka armed conflict).

Let me tell you what my ideas were on the y and x axes - and they were much simpler (simplistic) than what you two are suggesting.

First as to the y axis of violence and destruction, we've had Lanchester models ("Lanchester's Laws (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lanchester's_laws)") for a long time. E.g., Taylor, Lanchester Models of Warfare, volumes I & II. Operations Research Society of America (1983), which may be hanging around online as pdfs. And, Hugh Everett (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Everett_III)'s 1959 WSEG study on the "The Distribution and Effects of Fallout in Large Nuclear-Weapon Campaigns". That was a major factor behind the Kennedy-McNamara flexible approach to war (http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/viii/32073.htm). The point is that the interactions of states, state & group and groups leading to violence-destruction have been modeled through the stages of insugency, and into conventional war and nuclear war.

The x axis is more problematic mathematically. It's based on Clausewitz's theory of state-state interactions in ratcheting up their means and wills to go from limited war to absolute war. You also could throw in some Andre Beaufre ("Peace" no longer makes a quantum leap to "War" - it's a spectrum); and Mao and Giap (the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle); and Bill Moore for the Transition Zone (although all errors in expressing it are mine). I don't know of any models based on a Clausewitzian continuum of Means and Wills; but there certainly could be one or more out there.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=997&d=1261157939

In summary, the x axis is a continuum of the Means and Wills created by the interactions of A and B. The y axis is the Effect caused by the interactions of A and B in "pushing" the button on the x axis and applying their Means and Wills from that point.

The genesis for the chart travels back to my watching Dr Zhivago one night, where the commisar says:


Understand this: as the military struggle draws to a close, the political struggle intensifies. In the hour of victory, the military will have served its purpose - and all men will be judged POLITICALLY - regardless of their military record! Meanwhile, there are still White units in this area ...

and, before that, a Dow poster showing a Bull and Bear wrestling. All very Claustewitzian. :D

In mucking about the Web today, I came on this abstract, Spatial Lanchester models (http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v210y2011i3p706-715.html) (2011):


Lanchester equations have been widely used to model combat for many years, nevertheless, one of their most important limitations has been their failure to model the spatial dimension of the problems. Despite the fact that some efforts have been made in order to overcome this drawback, mainly through the use of Reaction-Diffusion equations, there is not yet a consistently clear theoretical framework linking Lanchester equations with these physical systems, apart from similarity. In this paper, a spatial modeling of Lanchester equations is conceptualized on the basis of explicit movement dynamics and balance of forces, ensuring stability and theoretical consistency with the original model. This formulation allows a better understanding and interpretation of the problem, thus improving the current treatment, modeling and comprehension of warfare applications. Finally, as a numerical illustration, a new spatial model of responsive movement is developed, confirming that location influences the results of modeling attrition conflict between two opposite forces.

and an interesting abstract on social animals, Lanchester's attrition models and fights among social animals (http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/beheco/v14y2003i5p719-723.html) (2003):


Lanchester's models of attrition during warfare have served as the basis for several predictions about conflicts between groups of animals. These models and their extensions describe rates of mortality during battles as functions of the number and fighting abilities of individuals in each group, allowing analysis of the determinants of group strength and of the cumulative numbers of casualties. We propose modifications to Lanchester's models to improve their applicability to social animals. In particular, we suggest that the per-capita mortality rate of a group is a decreasing function of the fighting abilities of its members, that the mortality rate is an increasing function of the number of individuals in both groups, and that there will often be diminishing returns for increasing numerical advantage. Models incorporating these assumptions predict that the ability of social animals to win fights depends less on group size and more on individual prowess than under Lanchester's original models. We discuss how data on casualties can be used to distinguish among alternative attrition models.

That's all folks.

Regards

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Did CT Kill COIN?: Perspectives on the Special Forces Raids (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/did-ct-kill-coin-perspectives-on-the-special-forces-raids)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Karl Eikenberry has an article in Foreign Affairs 'The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other Side of the COIN ', which is on limited open access:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan

Hat tip to a tweet from Peter Neumann @ ICSR, Kings College; his tweet:
Eikenberrys angry, axe-grinding denunciation of COIN will no doubt become mandatory reading for trainee officers soon

As a former ISAF commander (2005-07) and later Ambassador in Kabul (2009-2011) he cites Galula, US military doctrine and practice, the US$ cost and a man called Karzai:
Karzai disagreed intellectually, politically, and viscerally with the key pillars of the COIN campaign.

Near the start:
The COIN-surge plan for Afghanistan rested on three crucial assumptions: that the COIN goal of protecting the population was clear and attainable and would prove decisive, that higher levels of foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan government’s capacity and legitimacy, and that a COIN approach by the United States would be consistent with the political-military approach preferred by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, all three assumptions were spectacularly incorrect, which, in turn, made the counterinsurgency campaign increasingly incoherent and difficult to prosecute. In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan.

Elsewhere there are some very direct comments, on 'Protect the Population' for example:
The typical 21-year-old marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?

Finally he concludes:
In sum, the essential task is deciding how to do less with less. It has been said that in Afghanistan, as in Southeast Asia 40 years earlier, the United States, with the best of intentions, unwittingly tried to achieve revolutionary aims through semicolonial means. This is perhaps an overly harsh judgment. And yet the unquestioning use of counterinsurgency doctrine, unless bounded politically, will always take the country in just such a direction. Before the next proposed COIN toss, therefore, Americans should insist on a rigorous and transparent debate about its ends and its means.

[SWJ Blog]

Tuppence for your COIN Thoughts (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/tuppence-for-your-coin-thoughts)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN Doctrine Under Fire (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-doctrine-under-fire)

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[Mark O'Neill]

Attached is the link to my recently awarded PhD Thesis .
Best regards,
Mark
http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:11717/SOURCE01

[davidbfpo]

Well done Mark and there's no way I can read this before Xmas. However I welcome you using these examples for your work:
Evidence supporting the case for adoption of the proposed framework by second-party counterinsurgents is from the analysis of three comparative case studies. These are the South African campaign in South West Africa (Namibia now), the British campaign in Dhofar (Oman) and the 2003 Iraq War ‘surge’ of 2007-2008.

(Later) Rather, the structure is deliberately one of a problem-solving investigation. It seeks to answer the simpler question ‘is there a better way?’

[Mark O'Neill]

I hope you enjoy the read,
Best,
Mark

[JMA]

Look forward to studying this. Happy too that McCuen’s contribution to counterinsurgency warfare has been finally recognized.



Attached is the link to my recently awarded PhD Thesis .
Best regards,
Mark
http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:11717/SOURCE01

[jmm99]

Congratulations on becoming Dr. Red Hand. :):D

I read through up to chapter 3; and after moving the snow in my driveway, I expect I'll tackle the next two chapters.

The title is simply excellent in setting the basic theme requiring distinction between second-party counterinsurgency and first-party counterinsurgency. That's somewhat along the lines of Bob Jones (I'm paraphrasing): If the flag on the courthouse you're protecting ain't yours, you ain't doing counterinsurgency; you're doing something else.

Like Mark Adams (JMA), I appreciated repeated references to Michigan-native John McCuen's work; but, just as much, I appreciated repeated references to Andre Beaufre's concepts - and an integrated discussion of both (I did a little reading ahead; pp.164-165, pdf pp. 178-179):


Notwithstanding evidence of broad acceptance and understanding of contemporary Western counterinsurgency thought, the views of two theorists in particular - Beaufre and John McCuen – are instrumental in explaining and understanding much of the South African approach to counterinsurgency in South West Africa. Examination of the impact of Beaufre’s work on higher South African strategy is complete, but his ideas were also highly influential at the operational and tactical level within the SADF. This occurred not only through the expected ‘trickle down’ effect from higher strategic guidance, but also because of advocacy by several senior officers who were impressed by his work. In 1968, C.A. ‘Pop’ Fraser (later a Lieutenant General and Chief of the South African Army) returned from a posting as the military attaché in France, where he was exposed to Beaufre and his work. Fraser and another SADF officer, Deon Fourie, subsequently wrote a local strategic analysis that incorporated Beaufrian concepts and was influential in teaching done at the SADF staff college.

McCuen’s book, The Art of Counter-revolutionary War was also studied at the South African staff college and it too became highly regarded – a former senior SADF officer stating in an interview that ‘I never came across a better book on the subject’. A key message that the South Africans derived from McCuen was that: ‘The aim of counterrevolutionary warfare was to deny the insurgents the capability to get and maintain the support of the general population through force’. This aphorism melded with the idea they had gained from Beaufre about force in the ‘dialectic battle of wills’ to incorporate the deliberate and calculated use of force as a key tenet of the South African approach to counterinsurgency.

There was also considerable alignment between Beaufre and McCuen regarding the coordination and integration of all the functions and functional elements of the state (the bureaucracy) into a coherent counterinsurgency response. Yet while both theorists were clearly influential, a note of caution informs the extent such influence extended into the practical aspects [of] the counterinsurgency fight. As Seegers explains: ‘As time went by, however, Beaufre’s indirect strategy and McCuen’s guidelines would be quoted repeatedly. Yet very little COIN practice originated in theory. Rhodesian improvisation was too valuable. Theory would follow it’.

(footnotes omitted in snip above; emphasis added).

Pretty good stuff from an Ulster sept man. ;)

Regards

Mike

[Mark O'Neill]

Thanks Mike, and Mark
Mark

[SWJ Blog]

COIN Book Launch and Panel Discussion (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-book-launch-and-panel-discussion)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

Front Row Seat: Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/front-row-seat-watching-coin-fail-in-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



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[JMA]

Time to revisit this matter I suggest.

Would welcome a discussion of the thesis.

[jmm99]

Is Mark O'Neill interested in joining in the discussion ?

Regards

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Next COIN Manual Tries to Take Commanders Beyond Iraq, Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/next-coin-manual-tries-to-take-commanders-beyond-iraq-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

U.S. Military Learns COIN Lesson (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-military-learns-coin-lesson)

Entry Excerpt:



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[SWJ Blog]

Joint COIN Pub Ignores Reality (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/joint-coin-pub-ignores-reality)

Entry Excerpt:



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[TheCurmudgeon]

This is a bit of a preemptive strike, as I have not been privy to the new 5-34, but this phrase originally tossed around by COL Gentile that COIN is not Strategy has gotten me to wondering. The more I think about it, the more I think it is wrong. In Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN was the ONLY connection we had to the political strategic objective of a free, democratic country. No other doctrine contained anything about democracy or democratic legitimacy. And while I agree that the doctrine is flawed, that connection is not the flaw.

So I ask the question, if the strategic objective is a free, stable, democratic state, what other strategy do we have other than the population-centric government building that is found in COIN?

Simply killing insurgents does not get you any closer. In fact killing insurgents has little to do with the strategic goal. As the doctrine still notes, to stop an insurgency you must address the root causes.

Perhaps I am confusing strategy with strategic objective. I would think the two would be nested. I will wait to see how the statement is phrased in the new doctrine, but I am curious what other action the military can take that would bring the US any closer to its strategic objective.

[David Ucko]

If I may, the point about COIN not being strategy is that nothing in FM 3-24 (or, I suspect, its follow-on) resembles a strategy: not the principles, not the considerations, the guidance or the theory. You can have a counterinsurgency strategy: this would be a strategy based on the premises of counterinsurgency theory but wedded to the particular context at hand (and that is the hard part, of course). The problem in Afghanistan, I submit, is that a lack of strategy clarity led to various counterinsurgency principles and slogans becoming elevated to a strategy in their own right, and pursued without any real prioritisation or sequencing. I tend to quote Eliot Cohen in these discussions: 'strategy, 'he writes, ‘is the art of choice that binds means with objectives. It is the highest level of thinking about war, and it involves priorities (we will devote resources here, even if that means starving operations there), sequencing (we will do this first, then that) and a theory of victory (we will succeed for the following reasons)’. Plainly, a field manual cannot resolve these difficulties and attendant trade-offs.

[TheCurmudgeon]

If I may, the point about COIN not being strategy is that nothing in FM 3-24 (or, I suspect, its follow-on) resembles a strategy: not the principles, not the considerations, the guidance or the theory. You can have a counterinsurgency strategy: this would be a strategy based on the premises of counterinsurgency theory but wedded to the particular context at hand (and that is the hard part, of course). The problem in Afghanistan, I submit, is that a lack of strategy clarity led to various counterinsurgency principles and slogans becoming elevated to a strategy in their own right, and pursued without any real prioritisation or sequencing. I tend to quote Eliot Cohen in these discussions: 'strategy, 'he writes, ‘is the art of choice that binds means with objectives. It is the highest level of thinking about war, and it involves priorities (we will devote resources here, even if that means starving operations there), sequencing (we will do this first, then that) and a theory of victory (we will succeed for the following reasons)’. Plainly, a field manual cannot resolve these difficulties and attendant trade-offs.

Ok, then if the strategic objective is a democratic Afghanistan, what should have been our means and objectives?

Or was the problem not the doctrine but how it was prioritized and sequenced?

Given the parameters Cohen lays out, would any doctrine ever be strategy?

[carl]

The problem with using our experiences and actions in Afghanistan to derive lessons or conclusions about much of anything is that everything is/was severely distorted by the lack of strategic clarity Mr. Ucko spoke of. We never did figure out who the most important enemy was, the Pak Army/ISI, so consequently we never did anything about them. It is almost as if the Royal Navy was trying to judge after losing the war which was better, independent sailings or convoy without ever having acknowledged that the U-boats were Kreigsmarine and Germany was using them to war with.

If you refuse to recognize and confront an actual enemy nothing will work.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The problem with using our experiences and actions in Afghanistan to derive lessons or conclusions about much of anything is that everything is/was severely distorted by the lack of strategic clarity Mr. Ucko spoke of. We never did figure out who the most important enemy was, the Pak Army/ISI, so consequently we never did anything about them. It is almost as if the Royal Navy was trying to judge after losing the war which was better, independent sailings or convoy without ever having acknowledged that the U-boats were Kreigsmarine and Germany was using them to war with.

If you refuse to recognize and confront an actual enemy nothing will work.

Identifying the enemy is a targeting issue. It is not strategy.

I agree that failing to address the Pak Army/ISI support proved problematic. But I would argue that, had you invaded Pakistan it would not have have changed the dynamics. You would just be fighting to maintain control in two countries. It would not have provided a strategic solution. It would have created a larger battlespace and spread your limited resources. It would bring you no closer to your objective.

Which brings up the other question that COIN dances around, what happens when you have chosen a strategic objective that is not achievable?

[carl]

Identifying the enemy is a targeting issue. It is not strategy.

I agree that failing to address the Pak Army/ISI support proved problematic. But I would argue that, had you invaded Pakistan it would not have have changed the dynamics. You would just be fighting to maintain control in two countries. It would not have provided a strategic solution. It would have created a larger battlespace and spread your limited resources. It would bring you no closer to your objective.

Which brings up the other question that COIN dances around, what happens when you have chosen a strategic objective that is not achievable?

That is why I don't like using the word 'strategy'. People tend to start arguing whether this or that is actually strategy or something else. The question is what do we want and what do we have to do to get it? Recognition of the Pak Army/ISI as the enemy should flow from that. It never did. I am perfectly serious when I use the Battle of the Atlantic analogy. The magnitude of our failure is that great, greater even. It is as if there were Kreigsmarine liaison officers working with Western Approaches Command because Dudley Pound was buddies with Doenitz.

In order to effectively contest the Pak Army/ISI there was never any need to invade Pakistan, which is one reason I almost always say Pak Army/ISI and not Pakistan. There were many things that could have been done, things like not giving them any aid of any kind, not providing any technical or spare parts support for equipment, publicizing from the start that we knew what they were up to, attacking the finances of the Army/ISI and the generals etc. There were other things to ranging up to the ultimate, reducing our use of or even abandoning the use of the Karachi supply line. All of these things would have hit the Army/ISI and the feudal elites with whom they are allied. The goal was not Pakistan per se, the goal was the actions of the Pak Army/ISI. But we never did any of that in a serious way because we wouldn't see who the enemy was.

You're right. What if you try to do something that can't be done? We tried to beat Taliban & Co in Afghanistan without dealing with the support and sanctuary provided them by the Pak Army/ISI. About the only thing to be learned from that is not to be so blindingly stupid in the future. But that brings us to the question of why we were/are so blindingly stupid and why for so long? I've never seen that question answered anywhere.

[Bob's World]

Yes, we declared we were implenting a "COIN Strategy" - but what we called COIN, really was not; and what we called strategy, really was not either.

Like so many of the things that have driven us mad with frustration over the past 12 years, we place labels on things to suit our own sensibilites more than to accurately understand and label them for what they actually are; then we work dilligently to achieve success in the context of what we have declared something to be, rather than what it actually is.

If this was a land navigation exercise we plotted the point we wanted to get to far outside of the training area; we plotted a course based upon the way we we wanted to go, rather than the way that was most logical given the terrain, vegetation and other obstacles, then we picked up a rock and declared it to be a compass and moved out at a high rate of speed in the wrong direction.

We then assess how well we progressed in the ensuing journey to measure our "success"; and have captured our troubles during that journey as our "lessons learned" to guide doctrinal re-writes to ensure we have a better journey next time.

What we really need to do is step back and re-think how we understand and have framed the entire problem from the outset; and also gain a better sense of what we actually need to accomplish and how to best do so. But instead we ignore all of that and debate vigorously the relative merits of our fundamentally doomed journey. Most senior leaders seem quite happy with that. As to those below those seniors, to paraphrase a 3-star general leading a conference I had to attend a couple years ago, "and if the boss is happy, I am ecstatic!"

[carl]

What we really need to do is step back and re-think how we understand and have framed the entire problem from the outset; and also gain a better sense of what we actually need to accomplish and how to best do so. But instead we ignore all of that and debate vigorously the relative merits of our fundamentally doomed journey. Most senior leaders seem quite happy with that. As to those below those seniors, to paraphrase a 3-star general leading a conference I had to attend a couple years ago, "and if the boss is happy, I am ecstatic!"

Just so, especially well illustrated by your last two sentences. But that leads us to the point Lind was driving at and the one well articulated by Muth in Command Culture, the professional US military may not be capable of honestly looking and acknowledging what is seen. Will it ever be unless there are some great changes in the command culture? I am skeptical the needed change can be made short of a defeat in a really big war and that scares me.

With this in mind as a civilian out of any and all loops it will be interesting to see what happens to Gen. McMaster in the future. Will he move up further? Will he be able to make changes? Will he go over to the dark side? Will the dark side try to destroy him? I say this because from my perspective the beast tried to make him go away once because it seemed to fear him and it almost took an act of Congress to keep him around.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yes, we declared we were implenting a "COIN Strategy" - but what we called COIN, really was not; and what we called strategy, really was not either.

Like so many of the things that have driven us mad with frustration over the past 12 years, we place labels on things to suit our own sensibilites more than to accurately understand and label them for what they actually are; then we work dilligently to achieve success in the context of what we have declared something to be, rather than what it actually is.

If this was a land navigation exercise we plotted the point we wanted to get to far outside of the training area; we plotted a course based upon the way we we wanted to go, rather than the way that was most logical given the terrain, vegetation and other obstacles, then we picked up a rock and declared it to be a compass and moved out at a high rate of speed in the wrong direction.

We then assess how well we progressed in the ensuing journey to measure our "success"; and have captured our troubles during that journey as our "lessons learned" to guide doctrinal re-writes to ensure we have a better journey next time.

What we really need to do is step back and re-think how we understand and have framed the entire problem from the outset; and also gain a better sense of what we actually need to accomplish and how to best do so. But instead we ignore all of that and debate vigorously the relative merits of our fundamentally doomed journey. Most senior leaders seem quite happy with that. As to those below those seniors, to paraphrase a 3-star general leading a conference I had to attend a couple years ago, "and if the boss is happy, I am ecstatic!"

I agree with you, I am just frustrated with how we are re-thinking the problem. It is as if, using your analogy, in the AAR the trainer told us that the mistake was made was picking up the wrong rock to use as a compass – it gets us no closer to a solution.

Actually, I would take it one step further. We are given a land navigation problem where one of the points does not exist and we are told we failed to reach that point because we were using the wrong rock as a compass and holding our map with our left hand when we should have been holding it with our right hand.

I was thinking about the Ukraine. Assuming Putin used military and paramilitary forces to enter into Eastern Ukraine, create a separatist movement, take control of key infrastructure, gain limited credibility with the ethnic minority, and then hold an election that grants them legitimacy, are they not implementing a pop-centric insurgency strategy with political legitimacy of the population as the ultimate goal? And if that was his strategy, would not the counter to that strategy be to degrade the separatists’ claims of legitimacy and gain the backing of the population for the government in Kiev? Isn’t that pop-centric COIN used as strategy to defeat the separatists?

[slapout9]

Identifying the enemy is a targeting issue. It is not strategy.



This is one thing that just drive me nuts. IMO It is the very essence of Strategy! People cause crimes and wars and you must decide which person or group of persons you are going to apply energy against. Its is the very essance of Policy and Generalship....which is probabaly why we keep loosing:(


Your statement reminds me of that saying ready,fire,Aim!

[Bill Moore]

Slapout, every time we used targeting as a strategy we ultimately failed. Targeting is nothing more and nothing less and nothing more than one of several contributing ways to achieve our strategic end. If we simply conduct targeting without doing so in a strategic context we end up with Vietnam, OIF, OEF-A, etc. That doesn't mean it isn't important, but sure has heck isn't the essence of strategy.

[Compost]

This is a bit of a preemptive strike, as I have not been privy to the new 5-34, but this phrase originally tossed around by COL Gentile that COIN is not Strategy has gotten me to wondering. The more I think about it, the more I think it is wrong. In Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN was the ONLY connection we had to the political strategic objective of a free, democratic country. No other doctrine contained anything about democracy or democratic legitimacy. And while I agree that the doctrine is flawed, that connection is not the flaw.

Seem to remember that you argued along this line - without success - in a long-past post on another thread. Here's an opposing opinion.

Strategy is a purposeful, clearly established and agreed plan to achieve an overall objective and any auxiliary components of that objective. Part and parcel of a strategy is a means or methodology to distinguish between success and failure, and in some instances between partial success and partial failure.

COIN is just a concept of operation. It may be present within a strategy as the sole or as one of several conops. To try and employ a conop as a strategy is to avoidably risk falling disastrously short of the objective/objectives.

If you want an example just look back into recent history.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Seem to remember that you argued along this line - without success - in a long-past post on another thread. Here's an opposing opinion. I rarely give up that easy, but am always looking for opposing opinions.


Strategy is a purposeful, clearly established and agreed plan to achieve an overall objective and any auxiliary components of that objective. Then explain to me that the strategy is if the political objective is a "free, democratic, and stable Iraq"?


COIN is just a concept of operation. It may be present within a strategy as the sole or as one of several conops. To try and employ a conop as a strategy is to avoidably risk falling disastrously short of the objective/objectives. seizing Berlin and forcing the surrender of the Nazi's was a concept of the operation too. Not seeing a point here.


If you want an example just look back into recent history. I don't see anything in recent history that provides examples of COIN not being strategy.

This is what I see in recent history: http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/

The failure to achieve a political objective does not change the nature of the operation, and the nature of the operation was not the cause of the failure, in Iraq or Afghanistan. It was a total lack of any concept of human nature and political psychology.

[slapout9]

Slapout, every time we used targeting as a strategy we ultimately failed. Targeting is nothing more and nothing less and nothing more than one of several contributing ways to achieve our strategic end. If we simply conduct targeting without doing so in a strategic context we end up with Vietnam, OIF, OEF-A, etc. That doesn't mean it isn't important, but sure has heck isn't the essence of strategy.

I disagree Bill. In fact I have come to the conclusion that the more we look at Targeting as something different and not an integral part of Strategy the more we get into trouble. In fact I now belive Targeting Beats Strategy! Just look at 911. A single air strike, against a single Target group and it the USA forever and largely the changes are not good!

No, we need to rethink the whole entire concept of Strategy because we have missed something and our enemies no that.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I disagree Bill. In fact I have come to the conclusion that the more we look at Targeting as something different and not an integral part of Strategy the more we get into trouble. In fact I now belive Targeting Beats Strategy! Just look at 911. A single air strike, against a single Target group and it the USA forever and largely the changes are not good!

No, we need to rethink the whole entire concept of Strategy because we have missed something and our enemies no that.

Your going to have to give me some proof. I have seen nothing that indicates that targeted killings work as a strategy. http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf

[slapout9]

Your going to have to give me some proof. I have seen nothing that indicates that targeted killings work as a strategy. http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf

1-I am the "Attack The System" guy and I always have been. I have never said just killing a few leaders and everything will be fine ( I believe Wilf is a supporter of this idea) in fact I have rather consistently pointed out that just shooting a few leaders and not attacking their supporting infrastructure and processes will not work!

2-As for Proof. Read "Killing Pablo" by Mark Bowden (page 92 if I remember correctly) is almost perfect example of a 5 rings attack on a criminal/terrorist organization.

3-I did support the Killing of Ben Ladin as soon as possible for the psychological boost needed for our side.

[slapout9]

Curmudgy,

Show me proof of something we (USA) did that was anywhere near as effective in generating the ''Desired Effect" as the attack on 911.

Like I say,we are missing something!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Curmudgy,

Show me proof of something we (USA) did that was anywhere near as effective in generating the ''Desired Effect" as the attack on 911.

Like I say,we are missing something!

Bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ended the war and kept all later major world conflicts to a manageable size.

Besides, 9/11 was not a strategic victory. The US did not convert and join the Caliphate. It had a psychological impression, but it was not a strategic victory.

[carl]

I feared this would happen. People are starting to argue about whether it is strategy or conops or psychological impressions.

[Bill Moore]

Curmudgy,

Show me proof of something we (USA) did that was anywhere near as effective in generating the ''Desired Effect" as the attack on 911.

Like I say,we are missing something!

I didn't say we shouldn't target, as you pointed out targeting is critical to achieving our strategic objectives, but only if it is done within a strategic context. Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attack on the WTC and the Pentagon was within their strategic context and it worked in that they finally drew us into Afghanistan with the intent of dragging us into a long, unwinnable conflict that weaken our economy.

Killing Pablo was a successful intelligence, military, and law enforcement operation and like many I'm glad he's dead, but in a way it undermines your argument. If it was part of the so called war on drugs strategy, then an argument can be made that targeting the cartels failed, because the cocaine output from Columbia actually increased after Pablo's death (and became more decentralized). Killing UBL needed to be done, but Al-Qaeda-ism is alive and well and spreading.

We fail because of our doctrinal approach to the war that is heavily weighted towards using the center the gravity planning concept (which the 5 rings is part of). It was designed to work against industrial nation-states, but it even failed there to include Japan and Germany. Ultimately we had to break the will of both the Germans and Japanese and there was no specific target or set of targets that would accomplish that. The atomic bomb was more about technology and strategy than targeting, it convinced some of the Japanese that we now had the capacity to completely wipe them out and that resistance was futile. It certainly didn't convince all the Japanese that was the case and their surrender was predetermined, but was partly the result of chance on how other factors played out within Japan. Anytime we attempt to get overly deterministic we tend to get it wrong.

Read Grant Martin's latest article on the Blog, it doesn't take away anything from the phenomenal targeting capacity JSOC built to find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze, but it became more a process that was disconnect from strategy and I think you have a hard time arguing we were successful in Iraq when you look at it today. If you don't think we haven't been aggressively targeting terrorist networks and their support networks you're disconnected from the fight. Just demonstrates that targeting outside a strategic context is little more than tactics, and as Sun Tzu wrote tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-zero-dark-six-sigma-learning-organization-black-belt

A comment in response to the article:
The CIA analyst stated she supported the JSOC targeting process initially but after a certain point the intel being collected and used for follow-on missions became simply a reason to do more missions with little or no thought given to the follow-on missions---it seemed to her to be all about numbers---she then left Iraq and the CIA.

Targeting is part of strategy, it isn't the strategy itself. I personally think we didn't kill enough insurgents in Afghanistan and our economic development focus did more to serve the Taliban and its allies than our objectives, so I'm certainly not advocating against targeting, but like everything else we need to understand the reason why we're doing it and move beyond the myth of a decisive target.

[Bill Moore]

This is a bit of a preemptive strike, as I have not been privy to the new 5-34, but this phrase originally tossed around by COL Gentile that COIN is not Strategy has gotten me to wondering. The more I think about it, the more I think it is wrong. In Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN was the ONLY connection we had to the political strategic objective of a free, democratic country. No other doctrine contained anything about democracy or democratic legitimacy. And while I agree that the doctrine is flawed, that connection is not the flaw.

So I ask the question, if the strategic objective is a free, stable, democratic state, what other strategy do we have other than the population-centric government building that is found in COIN?

Simply killing insurgents does not get you any closer. In fact killing insurgents has little to do with the strategic goal. As the doctrine still notes, to stop an insurgency you must address the root causes.

Perhaps I am confusing strategy with strategic objective. I would think the two would be nested. I will wait to see how the statement is phrased in the new doctrine, but I am curious what other action the military can take that would bring the US any closer to its strategic objective.

We had this discussion earlier and I'm thinking along the lines of this post.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=147622&postcount=9

Key excerpts:

COIN is neither a concept nor can it be a strategy. Instead, it is simply an acronymic descriptor of a basket of diverse activities intended to counter an insurgency.

Quote:
COIN debate would benefit if the debaters took a refresher course in the basics of strategy. Many fallacies and inadequate arguments about COIN in Afghanistan, for instance, are avoidable if their proponents were willing to seek and were able to receive help from theory.

Quote:
There are no such historical phenomena as guerrilla wars. To define a war according to a tactical style is about as foolish as definition according to weaponry.

(he listed using tank warfare as an example)


Quote:
Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself. Because war is a political, and only instrumentally a military, phenomenon, we must be careful lest we ambush ourselves by a conceptual confusion
that inflates COIN to the status of an idea and activity that purportedly has standalone, context-free merit.

Quote:
To be blunt, the most effective strategy to counter an insurgency may be one that makes little use of COIN tactics. It will depend upon the circumstance (context).

Quote:
Such winning can be understood to mean that the victorious side largely dictates the terms that it prefers for an armistice and then a peace settlement, and is in a position to police and enforce a postwar order that in the main reflects its values and choices. History tells us that it can be as hard, if not harder, to make peace than it is to make war successfully.

Quote:
Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.

Quote:
The principal and driving issues for the United States with respect to counterinsurgency are when to do it and when not, and how to attempt to do it strategically. Policy and strategy choices are literally critical and determinative.

IMO this turns the lame argument that COIN is the way of the future, insurgencies have always been present and likely will continue to be for the next few decades, but that hardly means it is in our interest to get engaged anymore than it is to conduct state on state warfare.


Quote:
Tactical errors or setbacks enforced by a clever enemy should be corrected or offset tactically and need not menace the integrity of policy and strategy. COIN may not be rocket science or quantum theory, but no one has ever argued that it is easy.

Quote:
If success in COIN requires prior, or at least temporally parallel, success in nationbuilding, it is foredoomed to failure. Nations cannot be built. Most especially they cannot be built by well-meaning but culturally arrogant
foreign social scientists, no matter how well intentioned and methodologically sophisticated. A nation (or community) is best defined
as a people who think of themselves as one. Nations build themselves by and through historical experience. Cultural understanding is always useful and its absence can be a lethal weakness, but some lack of comprehension is
usual in war.

Quote:
The issue is not whether Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else either needs to be, or should be “improved.” Instead, the issue is whether or not the job is feasible. Even if it would be well worth doing, if it is mission impossible or highly improbable at sustainable cost to us, then it ought not to be attempted. This is Strategy 101.

[carl]

I didn't say we shouldn't target, as you pointed out targeting is critical to achieving our strategic objectives, but only if it is done within a strategic context. Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attack on the WTC and the Pentagon was within their strategic context and it worked in that they finally drew us into Afghanistan with the intent of dragging us into a long, unwinnable conflict that weaken our economy.

I think you are giving them rather too much credit. I think they just wanted to kill a bunch of people in a spectacular way and did so. They have made noises I believe about how they will exhaust the West but 9-11 was just a chance to kill grabbed.

Unwinnable? Hardly. Using that word implies there was no way no man could have done it. Nonsense. We never bothered to fight the main enemy. If you don't do that you won't win. It was a failure by a group of men, us, that could have done differently but we didn't. We failed. We. It could have been done.

[Bill Moore]

I think you are giving them rather too much credit. I think they just wanted to kill a bunch of people in a spectacular way and did so. They have made noises I believe about how they will exhaust the West but 9-11 was just a chance to kill grabbed.

Unwinnable? Hardly. Using that word implies there was no way no man could have done it. Nonsense. We never bothered to fight the main enemy. If you don't do that you won't win. It was a failure by a group of men, us, that could have done differently but we didn't. We failed. We. It could have been done.

Carl, Al Qaeda's strategic comments are well known by those who study them (they're not classified), and unlike us they did have a strategy. Killing a lot of people had a purpose.

Unwinnable? The way we're fighting "pop centric" is a no win pipe dream.

[carl]

Carl, Al Qaeda's strategic comments are well known by those who study them (they're not classified), and unlike us they did have a strategy. Killing a lot of people had a purpose.

Unwinnable? The way we're fighting "pop centric" is a no win pipe dream.

Their comments are known. But the way you phrased it it was if they planned on our reaction to 9-11 being what it was. I don't think they are that smart. They killed a lot of people because they like to and anything else was a bonus.

Nothing, repeat, nothing will work if you refuse to recognize and take action against the prime enemy. We never did that. In fact we supported financially the prime enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. Pop centric, enemy centric, CT or whatever is useless unless you identify and contest the prime enemy.

[TheCurmudgeon]

We had this discussion earlier and I'm thinking along the lines of this post.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=147622&postcount=9

Thanks Bill, all I could find was Gentile's piece, I knew there was a better article out there that made the argument.

I will review this before I read the new 3-24. I doubt it will change my mind.

I do believe that the military never understood or implemented pop-centric COIN. I certainly believe that, even if applied properly, it would not have changed the outcome in either Iraq or Afghanistan.


It was not possible to create a “free, democratic, and stable Iraq.” This was well-known almost from the onset and certainly not in the timeframe America was willing to spend supporting this venture. The process of democratization has been studied for some time. Some of the requisites for democracy — economic wealth distributed across the society, political participation, urbanization, and literacy — were identified by Seymour Lipset as early as 1959. Since that time, additional factors have been identified and the originals refined. Based on these well-known factors, it was clear in 2004 that Iraq was not prepared for democracy. As one professor put it:

Iraq lacks any of the preconditions academics generally accept as being necessary for democratization to succeed. It has no middle class to speak of independent from the state; oil revenues, the life-line of any Iraqi regime, are notorious for their ability to centralize rather than democratize power; the country has no tradition of limited or responsible government; national identity is weak in the face of rival religious or ethnic loyalties; regional neighbors will do what they can to undermine whatever democratizing movements exist; and the democrats themselves lack a figure such as Nelson Mandela or Kim Dae Jung who could give them leadership.

Iraq was possibly the worst place on the planet to attempt to create a democracy. One researcher, taking into account the conditions in Iraq at the time of the invasion, estimated the odds of success at 1,725 to 1. In addition to these social factors, a significant portion of the population of Iraq embraced a tribal value system that was antithetical to democratic legitimacy. The values necessary to embrace power sharing and individual rights were largely absent. Values can change, but that takes time. Given enough time it might have been possible to help the Iraqis build a democratic Iraq. How much time? Twenty years at a minimum for successful democratic consolidation. With all the issues Iraq had to deal with, the researcher estimated it would take 50 years to create a free, democratic and stable government. Even Larry Diamond, one of the more ardent supporters of the Bush administration’s attempt to democratize Iraq, had come to the conclusion in late 2004 that due to the conditions in Iraq and the lack of resources committed to the occupation democracy in Iraq would be a long term project.

Even worse, what the military was able to accomplish, a partial democracy, is the most volatile and least predictable form of government known. When all the factors that can be associated with political instability are ranked, being a partial democracy is number one. Certainly elections in Iraq were a triumph of democracy, but elections alone don’t create democracy. Iraqis have voted in large numbers in the past and will certainly do so again in the near future, but as Professor Bruce E Moon observes “… history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor the results of those elections.” This is particularly true when factionalism — a political system dominated by ethnic or parochial groups that regularly compete for influence — is present. Factionalism tends to limit an interest in power-sharing. You might think that factionalism in any system would be divisive, but it is not necessarily destabilizing. As Professor Jack A. Goldstone and his associates noted in their research on political instability “It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office … that extremely high vulnerability to instability results …”

By holding elections and attempting to create a democratic system in an ethnic and religiously factionalized society, we were creating the very instability we were seeking to suppress. But this was inherent in the mission, and since we had no doctrine on creating or consolidating a democracy, we integrated those tasks into our counterinsurgency and stability doctrine almost ensuring a self-defeating situation.http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militarys-kobayashi-maru/

But that has little to do with the basic argument. Gray admits as much. But his attack was not that Pop-centric COIN was not "a" strategy, only that it was the "wrong" strategy. If you read your last two quotes you will see that was where Gray was headed.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Nothing, repeat, nothing will work if you refuse to recognize and take action against the prime enemy. We never did that. In fact we supported financially the prime enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. Pop centric, enemy centric, CT or whatever is useless unless you identify and contest the prime enemy.

OK, who was the prime enemy in Iraq?

[carl]

OK, who was the prime enemy in Iraq?

Iraq? I was speaking of Afghanistan and have been, if I remember correctly, throughout this entire series of posts.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Iraq? I was speaking of Afghanistan and have been, if I remember correctly, throughout this entire series of posts.

Agreed, but you infer that targeting is strategy, and that the failure in targeting in Afghanistan was the cause of our failure.

It would then follow that our failure in Iraq was a lack of targeting. Who should we have been targeting in Iraq?

Or do you concede that targeting was not the cause of our failure to create a democratic Afghanistan?

[TheCurmudgeon]

If PSmith is right, this entire venture may have been for naught ... but any intellectual exercise examining the nature of our successes and our failures is never an exercise for naught.

[Bill Moore]

Their comments are known. But the way you phrased it it was if they planned on our reaction to 9-11 being what it was. I don't think they are that smart. They killed a lot of people because they like to and anything else was a bonus.

Nothing, repeat, nothing will work if you refuse to recognize and take action against the prime enemy. We never did that. In fact we supported financially the prime enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. Pop centric, enemy centric, CT or whatever is useless unless you identify and contest the prime enemy.

Carl

You interpreted my intent correctly. Al-Qaeda leadership is not amoral, and doesn't engage in killing just for the sake of killing. To state that they do is about as simplistic as it gets, and is it is type of American arrogance that regarding our adversaries that puts us at a disadvantage. If we fail to recognize their strategy we risk actually supporting it, which in fact we have none. Their strategy is both sophisticated and complex, and they understand us better than we understand them or ourselves.

Do they recruit a bunch of foot soldiers that are little more than psychopath killers? Of course, some are so bad AQ rejects them. That doesn't mean they don't have a strategy. The Management f Savagery is worth reading, as are a number of UBL and other senior AQ leader statements.

We'll lose in Afghanistan because our objective of a stable democratic government that respects human rights isn't achievable within the next decade (on top of the last one) with or without military force no matter how much killing we do or even if we go into Pakistan and deny that safe haven. The problem we should have been focused on is Al-Qaeda, instead we focused on a condition (Islamic culture) that we can't nor necessarily should change.

[Bill Moore]

TheCurmudgeon


But that has little to do with the basic argument. Gray admits as much. But his attack was not that Pop-centric COIN was not "a" strategy, only that it was the "wrong" strategy. If you read your last two quotes you will see that was where Gray was headed.

I think the relevant quotes actually paint a somewhat different picture.


There are no such historical phenomena as guerrilla wars. To define a war according to a tactical style is about as foolish as definition according to weaponry.

Tank warfare, lawfare, terrorism, insurgency, unconventional warfare, info warfare, and many others fall under this advise. All are viable operational concepts, but none are strategies. This is why most of us tend to hate the label "global war on terror" because it implies we're doing little than countering a tactic. That description isn't about a war or warfare, it is void any strategic guidance or insight other than attempting to avoid another attack on the homeland by conducting countering operations globally which we can do for another 100 years and still watch AQism expand globally. Our adversaries are adapting and becoming more dangerous, while we advocate for doing more of the same even though all indications clearly point what we're doing is not effective. Why?


To be blunt, the most effective strategy to counter an insurgency may be one that makes little use of COIN tactics. It will depend upon the circumstance (context).


Population-centric COIN will not succeed if the politics are weak, but neither is it likely to succeed if the insurgents can retreat to repair, rally, and recover in a cross-border sanctuary.

Population-centric COIN tactics have and will continue to fail in both Iraq and Afghanistan for the reasons pointed out in the quote above and others. That doesn't mean they won't work in other circumstances, but it worries me when we default to: well we have an insurgency so we have to do counterinsurgency (do we?) and it must be pop-centric COIN regardless of how bad the government, the safe haven the insurgents enjoy, or the internal sociopolitical divides in the country (the true underlying drivers) that we can't change.


The principal and driving issues for the United States with respect to counterinsurgency are when to do it and when not, and how to attempt to do it strategically. Policy and strategy choices are literally critical and determinative.

Emphasis is mine, I think we lost in Iraq and Afghanistan before we started due to policy decisions that never changed even when most realized they were unreasonable. If the policy was to militarily cripple Al-Qaeda and we were allowed to go into Pakistan we probably could have done that, but it would have been a temporary and potentially pyrrhic victory. A punitive military operation to hammer AQ in Afghanistan of limited duration to demonstrate U.S. resolve and deter other countries from hosting AQSL (like Sudan learned) may have had some value for both hurting AQ and appeasing the home front after 9/11. That would have to be following up with more FID, unilateral Special Operations, and other activities meant to dismantle AQ without derailing our overall national defense strategy and standing in the world. Conducting two major occupation operations where we attempting to transform cultures was certainly bold, but ultimately I think it has put us in a worse position. Hard for me to agree with Rumsfeld on much, but I do agree with him comment there were known unknowns. What worries me is that once we determined our assumptions were not valid we continued with the same plan.

IMO this turns the lame argument that COIN is the way of the future, insurgencies have always been present and likely will continue to be for the next few decades, but that hardly means it is in our interest to get engaged anymore than it is to conduct state on state warfare.


Quote:
Tactical errors or setbacks enforced by a clever enemy should be corrected or offset tactically and need not menace the integrity of policy and strategy. COIN may not be rocket science or quantum theory, but no one has ever argued that it is easy.

Quote:
If success in COIN requires prior, or at least temporally parallel, success in nationbuilding, it is foredoomed to failure. Nations cannot be built. Most especially they cannot be built by well-meaning but culturally arrogant
foreign social scientists, no matter how well intentioned and methodologically sophisticated. A nation (or community) is best defined
as a people who think of themselves as one. Nations build themselves by and through historical experience. Cultural understanding is always useful and its absence can be a lethal weakness, but some lack of comprehension is
usual in war.

Quote:
The issue is not whether Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else either needs to be, or should be “improved.” Instead, the issue is whether or not the job is feasible. Even if it would be well worth doing, if it is mission impossible or highly improbable at sustainable cost to us, then it ought not to be attempted. This is Strategy 101.

[slapout9]

Bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ended the war and kept all later major world conflicts to a manageable size.

Besides, 9/11 was not a strategic victory. The US did not convert and join the Caliphate. It had a psychological impression, but it was not a strategic victory.

I didn't make myself clear I asking for examples after 911. Hiroshima and Nagaski come from the days when we new what we were doing and why.

As for your second point I don't think you can make that statement since the war is not over and we do have a President who told the director of NASA that his most important mission was to make Muslims feel good about themselves. We are in deep trouble.

[slapout9]

I will just do this.

Bill,
1-Killing Pablo was not about the war on drugs per say other than he happened to be a drug dealer. It quickly moved to a destroy him and his organization problem which is why the DEA was able to get Intelligence and the Military involved. Also why they didn't really care about the cocaine increase since that was not the primary mission.

2-Hiroshima and Nagasaki were definitely targeted there is a McNamara documentary done recently that goes into some detail about that. I was surprised that he admitted he was more concerned about efficiency and it was Curtis LeMay who was more concerned about being effective.

3-I read Grants piece and liked it very much. Colonel Warden would have given Grant a gold star for finally what he has been saying for the last 10 years. You should read "The Way of The Knife" the story about the CIA involvement from the beginning to the end. On one page they make the comment that the meaning of "Targeting" was being transformed from a person, group or government that you want to collect Intel on or one you want to influence at a high (Strategic) level to list of people you want to kill.

I am trying to get permission to post a review Colonel Warden did in afterward to the book he wrote. It is a recap of the whole war situation since it began and how we have failed to essentially understand Strategy and the difference between Strategic measures vs. Tactical measures. link to the book I mentioned http://www.amazon.com/The-Way-Knife-Secret-Earth/dp/1594204802

[Compost]

Then explain to me that the strategy is if the political objective is a "free, democratic, and stable Iraq"?
A strategy to accomplish that would have to cover Iraq and parts of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and also the various “ Kurdistans “. That task is way too big and difficult for me.


seizing Berlin and forcing the surrender of the Nazi's was a concept of the operation too. Not seeing a point here.

Seizing Berlin and forcing the surrender of the Nazi's was a strategy aimed at speeding up the disruption and unconditional surrender of Germany. The plan was to cordon off Berlin to prevent support and escape, and to then suppress military and civil resistance. The conop for the latter was to employ composite infantry-engineer-armour forces - plus artillery fire away from prospective avenues of advance - to sequentially and in parallel overwhelm bite-sized segments of the city.


I don't see anything in recent history that provides examples of COIN not being strategy.Then it seems you haven’t seen much at all.

[TheCurmudgeon]

First, let me say thanks to everyone for engaging in the discussion. It has helped me clarify my thoughts and realize that this discussion needs to be narrowed before it can be useful. There is also a lot of baggage regarding Iraq and Afghanistan that has to be separated out before it can be useful.

What I am starting to realize is that the military has little to offer in strategic Pop-centric COIN.

Just to be clear, my definition of pop-centric insurgency or counterinsurgency is a battle over political legitimacy. All other interests support this fight.

The JP-1 lists two types of military strategy. The first is the traditional form, destroy the enemy's physical ability to fight. This is where targeting comes in. The second is to destroy the enemy's will to fight. The only tool either of these strategies has to offer is coercion. Coercion is the opposite of legitimacy. It would follow that coercion cannot create legitimacy. So I may have run into a wall.

[carl]

Agreed, but you infer that targeting is strategy, and that the failure in targeting in Afghanistan was the cause of our failure.

It would then follow that our failure in Iraq was a lack of targeting. Who should we have been targeting in Iraq?

Or do you concede that targeting was not the cause of our failure to create a democratic Afghanistan?

I don't do targeting and strategy. I leave that to others as well as arguing whether it is FID or CT or whatever. I stick to what should we do or not do in a given place and time. So near as I can figure I didn't infer targeting was strategy. To me targeting is making sure I hit the right one on the range.

I will concede there are a lot of different ways to fail. We seem to explore most all of them. In Afghanistan we decided to try our hand at not fighting or contesting the real enemy. In Iraq we decided to get into a fairly big fight and see how it went if the President didn't pay attention to what was going on...twice. The first time Mr. Bush finally woke up and took charge near the end of his second term and things went fairly well for awhile. Then he left office and Mr. Obama tried his hand at not paying attention and here we and Iraq be.

[slapout9]

"So I ask the question, if the strategic objective is a free, stable, democratic state, what other strategy do we have other than the population-centric government building that is found in COIN?"


I'll try to better explain why I am big on Targeting at the Strategic level.

(The part in Highlights)
First that is not a Strategic Objective it is a Political Objective. The Military job is to find the correct Targets that will create a linked Effect so the Political Objective can be achieved.

*So lets look at free. That implies there is some force or forces that is causing the Target country to not to be free.

*Second stable. That implies that there is some force or forces that are causing instability.

*Third there is either some corrupt process or a lack of some democratic process for the Target country.

From there you MUST identify these Targets in order to complete your mission. So based upon this COIN has little or nothing to do with accomplishing the original Iraq mission. But Strategic level Targeting does and we did not do that very well at all. So we have fallen into the COIN psychosis-analysis conundrum.

[TheCurmudgeon]

"So I ask the question, if the strategic objective is a free, stable, democratic state, what other strategy do we have other than the population-centric government building that is found in COIN?"


I'll try to better explain why I am big on Targeting at the Strategic level.

(The part in Highlights)
First that is not a Strategic Objective it is a Political Objective. The Military job is to find the correct Targets that will create a linked Effect so the Political Objective can be achieved.

*So lets look at free. That implies there is some force or forces that is causing the Target country to not to be free.

*Second stable. That implies that there is some force or forces that are causing instability.

*Third there is either some corrupt process or a lack of some democratic process for the Target country.

From there you MUST identify these Targets in order to complete your mission. So based upon this COIN has little or nothing to do with accomplishing the original Iraq mission. But Strategic level Targeting does and we did not do that very well at all. So we have fallen into the COIN psychosis-analysis conundrum.

I'm not leaving, just clarifying my thoughts.

First, I would disagree that there should be any difference between the political strategic goals and the military strategic goals in the long run. Now, the military strategic goals may only be able to set the conditions for the political goals, but they should not be separate from them least they take on a life of their own. From the things I have read this risk is identified in the new FM; the potential that one, both, or all parties may wish that the insurgency continue because they have more to gain through continued fighting than through an effective peace. The political goals should always act as a limit on the military goals.

I don't disagree that identifying the impediments to the political goals are important. But the question becomes how to deal with the impediment. Destruction may not yield the effect we desire. In the fight for legitimacy, I think that there is not a powerful positive correlation between destructive targeting and political legitimacy.

This is the old "Utility of Force" argument, I know. I think it is a tad more complex then that simple statement that is found in the COIN paradoxes. The real question is WHY the connection fails to yield the desired effect. Is it because the destruction is via a third party (occupying force) that it fails to connect with legitimacy? Is it because it is an intrastate fight rather than an interstate fight - does that change the dynamics of the target population's perceptions of the actions? Or is it simply that coercion never produces legitimacy. Legitimacy grants the power to use violence, but violence never produces legitimacy. I don't think that last statement is correct, but I am leaning that way.

Anyway, still thinking about it.:confused:

[TheCurmudgeon]

Slap,

The question you raise about targeting in general and bin Laden in particular, brings up another interesting dynamic. The targeting and destruction of enemy combatants may be neutral or even detrimental to the political goals in theater, but they could have a huge political impact back home. Bin Laden would be a great example if we were not trying to kill him from the start. But his death had little or no effect in Afghanistan or Iraq, but a huge effect back home.

Are there cases where the destruction of a target is detrimental to the mission in theater but carried out anyway because of the positive political effect back home? Does this connection reduce the legitimacy of our activities in the country having the insurgency ("the Americans aren't here to help us, only to kill others").

Sorry for thinking out loud.:o

BTW, the obvious counter to this, that targets are not destroyed in theater because of the negative political consequence they had back home, was one of the problems in Vietnam.

I think this is a thread you need to start Slap - Targeting and strategic objectives - do they conflict in theater and at home and what to do about it

[TheCurmudgeon]

TheCurmudgeon

Population-centric COIN tactics have and will continue to fail in both Iraq and Afghanistan for the reasons pointed out in the quote above and others. That doesn't mean they won't work in other circumstances, but it worries me when we default to: well we have an insurgency so we have to do counterinsurgency (do we?) and it must be pop-centric COIN regardless of how bad the government, the safe haven the insurgents enjoy, or the internal sociopolitical divides in the country (the true underlying drivers) that we can't change.

Bill, I agree. The trick now is to identify those circumstances where it might work. I have researched the political end at least as far as it applies to democracy. I do believe the key to a successful pop-centric insurgency or counterinsurgency strategy is legitimacy. I think Putin's actions in the Ukraine prove that point. A popular vote may have a more long term effect than tanks crossing the boarder.

In circumstances where pop-centric is not the route to go, I have few thoughts. But I do believe that pop-centric need not be based on legitimacy derived through elections. It could be just as well to install a new leader who is seen as politically legitimate to the population but is not democratic. Mullah Al Sustaini might have been such a person in Iraq had we not been so dead set on democracy.




Emphasis is mine, I think we lost in Iraq and Afghanistan before we started due to policy decisions that never changed even when most realized they were unreasonable. If the policy was to militarily cripple Al-Qaeda and we were allowed to go into Pakistan we probably could have done that, but it would have been a temporary and potentially pyrrhic victory. A punitive military operation to hammer AQ in Afghanistan of limited duration to demonstrate U.S. resolve and deter other countries from hosting AQSL (like Sudan learned) may have had some value for both hurting AQ and appeasing the home front after 9/11. That would have to be following up with more FID, unilateral Special Operations, and other activities meant to dismantle AQ without derailing our overall national defense strategy and standing in the world. Conducting two major occupation operations where we attempting to transform cultures was certainly bold, but ultimately I think it has put us in a worse position. Hard for me to agree with Rumsfeld on much, but I do agree with him comment there were known unknowns. What worries me is that once we determined our assumptions were not valid we continued with the same plan.

IMO this turns the lame argument that COIN is the way of the future, insurgencies have always been present and likely will continue to be for the next few decades, but that hardly means it is in our interest to get engaged anymore than it is to conduct state on state warfare.


The argument that COIN is the way of the future is deeply flawed, but there is something to the idea that domestic politics have changed the acceptable military options. We can no longer use genocide as a war tactic as in the Boar Wars or even in the American West. That said, coercion alone begins to loose its appeal. But that is another argument.

[Bob's World]

What we persist in calling COIN is actually FID; and while not recognizing that causes us troubles; it is our persistence in creating fundamentally illegitimate systems of government and attempting to protect and preserve the same that is killing us.

Our COIN doctrine validates what we want to do; but it does not warn us that our want is not acceptable, suitable, or feasible. Doctrine should be smarter than that.

[Bill Moore]

What we persist in calling COIN is actually FID; and while not recognizing that causes us troubles; it is our persistence in creating fundamentally illegitimate systems of government and attempting to protect and preserve the same that is killing us.

Our COIN doctrine validates what we want to do; but it does not warn us that our want is not acceptable, suitable, or feasible. Doctrine should be smarter than that.

This isn't completely accurate, if we overthrew an existing government and occupied that nation-state we are in fact and by law the defacto military government. If insurgents challenge us then we're conducting COIN. We rapidly sought to put in place so called legitimate governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but that had little to do with legitimacy in the eyes of that country and much more to do with legitimacy with our coalition partners.

One could argue at that point we were conducting pseudo-FID or quasi-FID in support of that government who didn't exactly invite us to help them out, but that seems like a play on words. In most places such as Yemen, Philippines, Kenya, Uganda, Columbia we're conducting FID.

I think we're beginning to place too much emphasis on legitimacy since most governments are perceived as illegitimate by segments of their population to include ours. We need to focus on what is in our national interest, and understand legitimacy from the optic of whether it will be a supporting or opposing factor for our proposed courses of action. For example, if we included legitimacy as a factor in our course of action analysis for OIF we may have determined that our bold plan didn't have a snow ball's chance of hell in surviving. However, we cannot impose legitimacy and there are times when we may have to go to war to protect our interests and find ourselves in a similar situation again, so it is important we learn the right lessons from the previous decade of social-political engineering, I mean war.

[Bill Moore]

The Curmudgeon


Bill, I agree. The trick now is to identify those circumstances where it might work. I have researched the political end at least as far as it applies to democracy. I do believe the key to a successful pop-centric insurgency or counterinsurgency strategy is legitimacy. I think Putin's actions in the Ukraine prove that point. A popular vote may have a more long term effect than tanks crossing the boarder.

If you're saying we must impose democracy to achieve legitimacy I disagree with what I have seen and learned to date. In the Ukraine Russia didn't upset the apple cart too much, they pretty much replaced the existing government with their people, but the form of government is roughly the same so there is enough stability to hold a vote. That wasn't true in either Iraq or Afghanistan where managed to erase the existing forms of government (not governance), thus opened Pandora's box creating a situation where democracy wouldn't work. You can't transition from complete chaos into a credible democracy, the institutions to facilitate that don't exist, so as we all know context matters. I do agree that Putin's action in Ukraine will be significantly boosted if the popular vote is perceived to go his way. Whether this was just happenstance or the result of deliberate planning the Russians are taking advantage of a strategic opportunity.


In circumstances where pop-centric is not the route to go, I have few thoughts. But I do believe that pop-centric need not be based on legitimacy derived through elections. It could be just as well to install a new leader who is seen as politically legitimate to the population but is not democratic. Mullah Al Sustaini might have been such a person in Iraq had we not been so dead set on democracy.

Exactly, but he wouldn't be supported by all Iraqis (no one would), and we would be uncomfortable with that.


The argument that COIN is the way of the future is deeply flawed, but there is something to the idea that domestic politics have changed the acceptable military options. We can no longer use genocide as a war tactic as in the Boar Wars or even in the American West. That said, coercion alone begins to loose its appeal. But that is another argument.

It is important we understand ourselves as well as we understand the adversary. I think many of our plans would have worked under a different government, but not under the U.S. government. If we're going to have to depend on coercion population control is critical, but it also runs against our character to do so and it is unlikely we will have the political will to do so effectively. That limits our options, but instead of picking the wrong option (pop-centric) we should have scoped our objectives to something that was achievable. Too many times we look for enduring solutions when they don't exist, which is why we need to recognize some of the underlying drivers of conflict are not going away so at best we manage/contain it to some extent.

[TheCurmudgeon]

What we persist in calling COIN is actually FID; and while not recognizing that causes us troubles; it is our persistence in creating fundamentally illegitimate systems of government and attempting to protect and preserve the same that is killing us.

Our COIN doctrine validates what we want to do; but it does not warn us that our want is not acceptable, suitable, or feasible. Doctrine should be smarter than that.

You are right. But how do we do that? How do we warn our civilian masters that there plan is untenable?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Before I close for tonight I want to make one important observation. SWJ had degenerated. Those of us who want to maintain a modicum of intellectual integrity need to take the time to post here.

For those of you who have thanks. For those of you who hanen't, I will address you later. :mad:

[carl]

Carl

You interpreted my intent correctly. Al-Qaeda leadership is not amoral, and doesn't engage in killing just for the sake of killing. To state that they do is about as simplistic as it gets, and is it is type of American arrogance that regarding our adversaries that puts us at a disadvantage. If we fail to recognize their strategy we risk actually supporting it, which in fact we have none. Their strategy is both sophisticated and complex, and they understand us better than we understand them or ourselves.

Do they recruit a bunch of foot soldiers that are little more than psychopath killers? Of course, some are so bad AQ rejects them. That doesn't mean they don't have a strategy. The Management f Savagery is worth reading, as are a number of UBL and other senior AQ leader statements.

If you intended to say AQ pulled off 9-11 because they knew it would result in a thoroughly mishandled 13 year effort in Afghanistan then you are just wrong. Nobody is that smart and nobody could believe we could be as stupid as we have been.

They may indeed have a strategy but it is anything but complex and sophisticated At least as far as terror attacks on the West go, AQ and all its affiliates seem to have a very simple strategy, stage theatrical attacks to kill as many people as possible when they can and hope for the best. There is nothing beyond that if only for the simple reason they aren't too well organized on an international scale.

Notice I said "kill as many people". If they were truly interested in hitting us economically there are a lot, a lot of ways to do that. Given what I've read about the training you guys get you know all about them. But AQ and their affiliates don't go in for that. They go in for killing, as many and as spectacularly as possible.

So I think they do indeed kill because that is what they like to do. In any event they seem quite enthusiastic about taking innocent life.


We'll lose in Afghanistan because our objective of a stable democratic government that respects human rights isn't achievable within the next decade (on top of the last one) with or without military force no matter how much killing we do or even if we go into Pakistan and deny that safe haven. The problem we should have been focused on is Al-Qaeda, instead we focused on a condition (Islamic culture) that we can't nor necessarily should change.

If we fail in Afghanistan it will be mostly because we refuse to recognize and contest the primary enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. Historians will puzzle over that one for generations.

Why is it that every time I say something about doing something about the Pak Army/ISI people immediately think invading the place? There is no need for that because our objective was/is the actions of the Pak Army/ISI. That can be done quite efficaciously sans any kind of invasion. We could at least start by stop giving them money to kill us with. Pakistan is a sanctuary because of the actions of the Pak Army/ISI. The Pak Army/ISI provides support, training, direction and funds to Taliban & Co. They are and have been waging UW upon us and the Afghans. The Pak Army/ISI is the enemy and one that can be quite effectively opposed without setting a booted foot in the country. We never did it.

There is a civil war of sorts going on within Islam right now and there probably isn't a whole lot we will be able to do directly to affect the result. We will be darned interested in the results though because if the 'convert or die' boys win things will be unpleasant. So regardless of what we can do about that we had better oppose with violence if needed those who would do violence to us.

[carl]

If you're saying we must impose democracy to achieve legitimacy I disagree with what I have seen and learned to date. In the Ukraine Russia didn't upset the apple cart too much, they pretty much replaced the existing government with their people, but the form of government is roughly the same so there is enough stability to hold a vote. That wasn't true in either Iraq or Afghanistan where managed to erase the existing forms of government (not governance), thus opened Pandora's box creating a situation where democracy wouldn't work. You can't transition from complete chaos into a credible democracy, the institutions to facilitate that don't exist, so as we all know context matters. I do agree that Putin's action in Ukraine will be significantly boosted if the popular vote is perceived to go his way. Whether this was just happenstance or the result of deliberate planning the Russians are taking advantage of a strategic opportunity.

I must know. Do you really think any vote taken when Putin's special warriors are all over the place is going to go any way but the way Putin directs?

[carl]

We can no longer use genocide as a war tactic as in the Boar Wars or even in the American West.

This is a bit of a pet peeve of mine, the casual abuse of the word genocide. It always sounds good but is almost never justified. In my mind genocide is the Holocaust or Rwanda, the intentional full on slaughter of people simply because they belong to a specific group. In general that didn't happen in the American West nor the middle west nor the east, and the bulk of the Indian fighting America has seen was in the east, only the end game was in the west. It may have come close sometimes, I am not familiar with all the wars but when it came close it was the aftermath of a...war.

In the Boer War it wasn't the intentional killing of the Boer's as in there's a group of them, kill them all. IIRC, it was the result of very badly handled logistics and neglect of people who were in concentration camps. That is criminal negligence but it isn't genocide.

[Bill Moore]

I must know. Do you really think any vote taken when Putin's special warriors are all over the place is going to go any way but the way Putin directs?

Which is why I wrote perceived.

[Bill Moore]

"If you intended to say AQ pulled off 9-11 because they knew it would result in a thoroughly mishandled 13 year effort in Afghanistan then you are just wrong. Nobody is that smart and nobody could believe we could be as stupid."

Carl,

They saw how we reacted to a few casualties in Somalia and they believed they defeated the USSR who they believed were stronger than us. They certainly believed they could defeat us there by undermining our political will and weakening our economy. They attacked the USES COLE and our embassies in East Africa for the same reason but we didn't take the bait so they upped there game. They believe if they defeat us they'll be free to win the caliphate. They were actually surprised at how well we fought initially but you know the rest of the story. AQ won't win strategically either but that doesn't excuse our lack of understanding.

[JMA]

Before you criticise others for not contributing to this thread you need to take it on the chin that to open a discussion where a doctrine is considered to be a strategy is merely a waste of time.

Go back a few years and see that there were very few people around here who challenged the then conventional wisdom on how the war was being/should have been fought in Afghanistan. I note now that as the failure in Afghanistan is self evident more people are crawling out from under stones to join the anti-COIN bandwagon.

Personally I don't want to read what they say now... I want to read what they said then.



Before I close for tonight I want to make one important observation. SWJ had degenerated. Those of us who want to maintain a modicum of intellectual integrity need to take the time to post here.

For those of you who have thanks. For those of you who hanen't, I will address you later. :mad:

[TheCurmudgeon]

Before you criticise others for not contributing to this thread you need to take it on the chin that to open a discussion where a doctrine is considered to be a strategy is merely a waste of time.

Go back a few years and see that there were very few people around here who challenged the then conventional wisdom on how the war was being/should have been fought in Afghanistan. I note now that as the failure in Afghanistan is self evident more people are crawling out from under stones to join the anti-COIN bandwagon.

Personally I don't want to read what they say now... I want to read what they said then.

I remember those days. There were more voices then. Now there are a few of us left. Even I am not here all the time. But there were some that used to contribute more often. Some have gone out and created their own sites. World Political Review for example. But those sites are generally one way. What I have always liked about this site is that you could put your thoughts out there and be attacked by those with other ideas.

The one that was ticking me off at the time I wrote that was COL Cassidy. He wrote a nice piece for the Journal but never came back to look at the comments after. I may not do it, but I at least try to address all the comments addressed to me. Sometimes it is just to say that we will have to agree to disagree, but I try.

You are right that this is an old topic, but the new manual will bring up old questions, and we have a greater hindsight and more information to draw from. We can't fix the past, we can try to address the future. That is why I am not looking at just Iraq or Afghanistan, but at the theory as a whole.

Sorry if my personal pet peeve seemed like I was being rude. Not my intent.

[SWJ Blog]

5 Questions with Dave Dilegge on Small Wars and COIN Cocktails (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/5-questions-with-dave-dilegge-on-small-wars-and-coin-cocktails)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/5-questions-with-dave-dilegge-on-small-wars-and-coin-cocktails) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[TheCurmudgeon]

This is a bit of a pet peeve of mine, the casual abuse of the word genocide. It always sounds good but is almost never justified. In my mind genocide is the Holocaust or Rwanda, the intentional full on slaughter of people simply because they belong to a specific group. In general that didn't happen in the American West nor the middle west nor the east, and the bulk of the Indian fighting America has seen was in the east, only the end game was in the west. It may have come close sometimes, I am not familiar with all the wars but when it came close it was the aftermath of a...war.

In the Boer War it wasn't the intentional killing of the Boer's as in there's a group of them, kill them all. IIRC, it was the result of very badly handled logistics and neglect of people who were in concentration camps. That is criminal negligence but it isn't genocide.

Carl,

You don't need to kill hundreds of people to commit genocide.


The word 'genocide' was coined by Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), a Jewish Polish lawyer, following the Nazi destruction of the Jews of Europe. He used a combination of Greek and Latin words: geno (race or tribe) and cide (killing). Lemkin was describing "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."

On December 9, 1948, in the shadow of the Holocaust, and due in large part to Lemkin’s efforts, the United Nations approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This convention establishes "genocide” as an international crime, which signatory nations “undertake to prevent and punish.” It says:

genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
http://efchr.mcgill.ca/WhatIsGenocide_en.php?menu=2

It is the intent to destroy, in whole or part, any group that you can separate out from the whole based on an identifying characteristic. It does not even require death. When we "assimilated" the American Indians into our society effectively destroying theirs, arguably, that was genocide.

Of course, when we took the children away and taught them how to be American's there was no crime of genocide, so it was all good.

[TheCurmudgeon]

What we persist in calling COIN is actually FID; and while not recognizing that causes us troubles; it is our persistence in creating fundamentally illegitimate systems of government and attempting to protect and preserve the same that is killing us.

Our COIN doctrine validates what we want to do; but it does not warn us that our want is not acceptable, suitable, or feasible. Doctrine should be smarter than that.

I have pretty much come to the same conclusion. The question remains as to if there are places where things MIGHT work.

I am thinking now more in line with stability operations, trying to stablize a situation and not let an insurgency start in the first place. I think that is one of our conceptual errors, we think of Iraq and Afghanistan as insurgencies, but they did not start out that way. It was a failure of our stability ops that resulted in an insurgency.

[Fuchs]

Which "FID (http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/fid)" and why don't you simply call it "occupation"?

[BrentWilliams]

This is a bit of a preemptive strike, as I have not been privy to the new 5-34, but this phrase originally tossed around by COL Gentile that COIN is not Strategy has gotten me to wondering. The more I think about it, the more I think it is wrong. In Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN was the ONLY connection we had to the political strategic objective of a free, democratic country. No other doctrine contained anything about democracy or democratic legitimacy. And while I agree that the doctrine is flawed, that connection is not the flaw.

So I ask the question, if the strategic objective is a free, stable, democratic state, what other strategy do we have other than the population-centric government building that is found in COIN?

Simply killing insurgents does not get you any closer. In fact killing insurgents has little to do with the strategic goal. As the doctrine still notes, to stop an insurgency you must address the root causes.

Perhaps I am confusing strategy with strategic objective. I would think the two would be nested. I will wait to see how the statement is phrased in the new doctrine, but I am curious what other action the military can take that would bring the US any closer to its strategic objective.

If this is a response to the upcoming FM 3-24, you might as well have what it actually says. I put in a few of the relavent paragraphs.


1-4. Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S. can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)

1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nation by not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. For example, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S. is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A host nation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a force into the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commitment to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves.




1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to counter an insurgency is a question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces securing the population or performing offensive operations, in a counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information on how counterinsurgents may organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and should not be the only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See JP 3-24, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more information on counterinsurgency policy tools.)

1-11. Effective counterinsurgency operations require an understanding of the military profession. The tasks counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization of these tasks in time and space that is unique. For example, geographic combatant commanders employ theater strategy to align and shape efforts, resources, and tasks to support strategic goals and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their region. In support of this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, building partner capacity and force posture, and preparing for contingencies and other tasks those are not unique to counterinsurgency operations. For example, a unit can perform security cooperation tasks in support or not in support of countering an insurgency. (See FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation tasks.) Those units that carry out security cooperation tasks to support a counterinsurgency should understand security cooperation and the tasks they are performing and teaching. Moreover, they should understand how these tasks are used in defeating an insurgency. Soldiers and Marines must start from a foundation of professional knowledge and competence to have a framework for understanding and aiding a host nation in defeating an insurgency. Whether a unit is directly performing the tasks to defeat an insurgency or indirectly supporting a host nation, this manual provides a doctrinal framework for counterinsurgency operations. However, to be effective, Soldiers and Marines must be professionally competent. This is the foundation in understanding another nation’s or group’s actions to defeat an insurgency and in providing aid to that nation or group. (See ADRP 1 for more information on professional competence.)

1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the security needs of the U.S and states or groups the U.S. supports. Different capabilities provide different choices that offer different costs and risks. U.S. strategy is defined by how it combines these capabilities (the ways), resources them (the means), and its willingness to accept risk in attaining its policy goals Commanders inform political leaders about the prospects for victory and the different costs and risks of various options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks against their importance to U.S. national interests. Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates operational approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk. The joint force provides a range of capabilities that it integrates into the overall strategy. For example, in a functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of security cooperation tools. Moreover, other tools fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action and counter threat financing, that the U.S. can integrate into the mix of ways that it will use to defeat or contain an insurgency. The U.S. government integrates the various instruments of national power to create a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part. (For a further discussion on strategy, see MCDP 1-1.) (See table 1-1.)

1-13. An operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 3-0). The commander may use direct or indirect approaches to counter threats. Commanders may find their operational approach is mainly direct, indirect, or a mixture of both. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the center of gravity while avoiding the enemy strength. Commanders may use a single direct or indirect approach or, more likely, may employ a combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. Additionally, the emphasis on or combination of approaches may have to evolve as the security situation and insurgent networks evolve. The commander’s intent and the approach(es) the commander selects will drive the methods used by counterinsurgents. These methods may be direct or indirect. Approaches and methods must be nested and clearly linked, since they often involve support from diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts by non-military forces. (See chapter 9 for more information on direct methods and chapter 10 for more information on indirect methods. See JP 5-0 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.)

[TheCurmudgeon]

If this is a response to the upcoming FM 3-24, you might as well have what it actually says. I put in a few of the relavent paragraphs.

Thank you very much!!!

... a quick question, does the manual discuss supporting an insurgency?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Which "FID (http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/fid)" and why don't you simply call it "occupation"?

Because it won't always be an "occupation". I would think that would be one of the lesser possibilities. Hypothetically speaking, if we were to support the Ukrainians in their fight against the insurgents by providing training or other technical support, then it would not be an occupation.

[BrentWilliams]

Thank you very much!!!

... a quick question, does the manual discuss supporting an insurgency?

Yes. In chapter 1, in a section titled "LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS" it states:


1-18. Insurgencies could also be part of large scale combat or fueled by a regional or global adversary. In a protracted large scale operation, an insurgency often develops in controlled areas with populations sympathetic to the enemy. As such, planning for prevention of an insurgency and integrating stability operations into a prolonged operation is essential. If an insurgency develops, it will require resources to defeat the insurgents. This will reduce the resources available to defeat the enemy in large-scale combat. In addition, an adversary can fuel an insurgency in a host nation to undermine U.S. interests. In this case, the insurgency is part of an adversary’s overall strategy and policy. (See FM 3-05, chapter 2, for more information on unconventional warfare. It provides a U.S. perspective on enabling an insurgency.)

While it doesn't discuss how the United States would fuel an insurgency (a topic covered in FM 3-05), it does cover the importance of external aid to an insurgency. For example, Chapter 4 provides eight dynamics for an insurgency, one of them being external support.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yes. In chapter 1, in a section titled "LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS" it states:



While it doesn't discuss how the United States would fuel an insurgency (a topic covered in FM 3-05), it does cover the importance of external aid to an insurgency. For example, Chapter 4 provides eight dynamics for an insurgency, one of them being external support.

Unfortunately, not a document approved for unlimited release.:D

Thanks again!

[TheCurmudgeon]

1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the security needs of the U.S and states or groups the U.S. supports. Different capabilities provide different choices that offer different costs and risks. U.S. strategy is defined by how it combines these capabilities (the ways), resources them (the means), and its willingness to accept risk in attaining its policy goals Commanders inform political leaders about the prospects for victory and the different costs and risks of various options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks against their importance to U.S. national interests. Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates operational approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk. The joint force provides a range of capabilities that it integrates into the overall strategy. For example, in a functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of security cooperation tools. Moreover, other tools fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action and counter threat financing, that the U.S. can integrate into the mix of ways that it will use to defeat or contain an insurgency. The U.S. government integrates the various instruments of national power to create a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part.

The highlighted section sets up an interesting dynamic between the political leadership and the military leadership. Am I to infer from the italicized section that it is the military leader that advises the political leader on the odds of political victory? I ask because the use of the word "victory" as opposed to "operational success."

[BrentWilliams]

The highlighted section sets up an interesting dynamic between the political leadership and the military leadership. Am I to infer from the italicized section that it is the military leader that advises the political leader on the odds of political victory? I ask because the use of the word "victory" as opposed to "operational success."

Does the United States acheive its policy goal? Thats how I would define victory, not operational success.

[carl]

Carl,

They saw how we reacted to a few casualties in Somalia and they believed they defeated the USSR who they believed were stronger than us. They certainly believed they could defeat us there by undermining our political will and weakening our economy. They attacked the USES COLE and our embassies in East Africa for the same reason but we didn't take the bait so they upped there game. They believe if they defeat us they'll be free to win the caliphate. They were actually surprised at how well we fought initially but you know the rest of the story. AQ won't win strategically either but that doesn't excuse our lack of understanding.

Their actual actions seem to reflect a rudimentary strategy exactly as I described, set bombs off to kill as many people as spectacularly as you can and hope for the best. If they upped their game it was because somebody had a bright idea and the opportunity presented itself. It was not as if they were students of LBJ gradualism and had been holding back until they needed to increase the pressure. They did what they could when they could as they have since, but it always involved killing people in a theatrical way. They have never gone after the economy as such even though it is an easy target as demonstrated by the attack by parties unknown on our grid last year. They like blood. They like to kill.

[Dayuhan]

They did what they could when they could as they have since, but it always involved killing people in a theatrical way. They have never gone after the economy as such even though it is an easy target as demonstrated by the attack by parties unknown on our grid last year. They like blood. They like to kill.

I don't honestly see how you can study the history of AQ and not conclude that 9/11 was intended to provoke American incursions into Muslim lands, restoring to the movement the raison d'etre that it lost with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Does the United States acheive its policy goal? Thats how I would define victory, not operational success.

Agreed, but the language makes it sound like the military Commander is the one making that determination. I would think that the military Commander could determine whether the military operational objectives could be met. State, the Intelligence community, and others, would determine whether their components were achievable, and with all that data the political leader makes the final call.

Could just be the way the verbiage is laid out, but it sounds like the military is the final word. I would think that is backwards.

Still, until the rest is published I may be assuming too much based on a single sentence or two.

[carl]

I don't honestly see how you can study the history of AQ and not conclude that 9/11 was intended to provoke American incursions into Muslim lands, restoring to the movement the raison d'etre that it lost with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

You mean like the US military presence in Saudi Arabia from 1991 to 2003 and current bases in Kuwait and Quatar?

[Bill Moore]

You mean like the US military presence in Saudi Arabia from 1991 to 2003 and current bases in Kuwait and Quatar?

Carl, your arguments are overly simplistic and while I understand not wanting to give credit to our adversaries, to pretend or deny they don't have a strategy and seek to understand it puts us at a disadvantage. I'll see what references I can find, but in the meantime recommend reading the Looming Tower for some background.

Those that attacked us on 9/11 were well educated and obviously highly dedicated to their cause. Like us they don't mindlessly spend resources on operation that isn't tied to a strategic end, and that attack obviously wouldn't defeat us, so it was part of larger construct. They didn't do it just to kill innocent people (though they obviously did kill many innocent people), but for a larger aim which was to provoke into a fight they think they can win in the long run.

You bring up a fair point about why aren't they attacking economic targets directly? I can only speculate, but so far our response has been measured, they may assume correctly if they start targeting economic targets we'll take the gloves off. Just a thought.

[JMA]

I don't honestly see how you can study the history of AQ and not conclude that 9/11 was intended to provoke American incursions into Muslim lands, restoring to the movement the raison d'etre that it lost with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Please explain how you arrive at that conclusion.

[Bill Moore]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/blood-in-shallow-waters

Blood in Shallow Waters


“All that we have mentioned has made it easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written Al-Qaida, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than some benefits for their private companies.” (O. Bin Laden, 2004)


This paper focuses on the facet of Al Qaeda’s stratagem very plainly laid out by Osama bin Laden above, further explicating Al-Qaeda’s plan to cripple the U.S. through a series of proxy wars: an integral – and currently the most pertinent – component of its aggregate strategy.

Carl, the author of this paper may agree with you, since according to his research there is little evidence AQ initially conducted the attacks to sucker us into invading Afghanistan, but afterwards this became a primary element of their strategy. The next article written by a former CIA member seems to claim it was their strategy all along.


Like most of Al-Qaeda’s public communications, this account of their strategy came after the operation and its effects. This ex-ante account of grand strategy may indeed have been a creative effort of Al-Qaeda leadership and media personnel designed to give the organization an appearance of having a more robust and impressive strategic design than they had. Given the history of Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations and operations by both Al-Qaeda affiliates and U.S. and other western military and security services throughout the last 12 years it would be foolish to believe that Al-Qaeda doesn’t consider, if not aim for, a response by the U.S. and other western forces through military means.


Al-Qaeda’s plan of bait and snare via franchising disparate guerrilla forces accomplishes seven objectives. First, Al-Qaeda is able to gain reaction by U.S. leadership resulting in a military response and a new guerrilla conflict. Second, the military response puts U.S. boots on the ground in even more Muslim lands lending even greater credit to the argument that the U.S. is engaged in a crusade to occupy and exploit Muslims and Muslim lands throughout the world. Third, Al-Qaeda’s image of the vanguard of Muslim resistance to the imperialist U.S., a Robin Hood of the Muslim world, is reinforced by the primacy the U.S. assigns to it. Fourth, Al-Qaeda is able to frame the conflict as being fard ‘ayn (individual duty) to defend Muslim lands from an invading force, thus flooding their ranks with new recruits. Fifth, increasing international opposition to U.S. military action often proves detrimental to U.S. political efforts. Sixth, domestic support for the U.S. government will be further diminished as troops and money are allocated to conflicts that are largely perceived to be ‘none of our business’, divisions which are exacerbated by Al-Qaeda’s media prowess. Seventh, the U.S. military is further strained and weakened by these new battlefronts. Each of these objectives is further developed below.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2007/05/terrorism-riedel

Al Qaeda Strikes Back

By: Bruce Riedel



Bin Laden's goals remain the same, as does his basic strategy. He seeks to, as he puts it, "provoke and bait" the United States into "bleeding wars" throughout the Islamic world; he wants to bankrupt the country much as he helped bankrupt, he claims, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The demoralized "far enemy" would then go home, allowing al Qaeda to focus on destroying its "near enemies," Israel and the "corrupt" regimes of Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. occupation of Iraq helped move his plan along, and bin Laden has worked hard to turn it into a trap for Washington. Now he may be scheming to extend his strategy by exploiting or even triggering a war between the United States and Iran.

Decisively defeating al Qaeda will be more difficult now than it would have been a few years ago. But it can still be done, if Washington and its partners implement a comprehensive strategy over several years, one focused on both attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions that allow them to thrive. Otherwise, it will only be a matter of time before al Qaeda strikes the U.S. homeland again.

[Bob's World]

Which "FID (http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/fid)" and why don't you simply call it "occupation"?

Fuchs and Bill Moore both raise factually accurate points, but I believe that sometimes we focus on the wrong facts and allow them to lead us logically into intractable situations.

Fuchs, certainly yes Iraq and Afghanistan are/were both occupations - but that is not a mission with task and purpose, it is simply a fact of our physical status.

And Bill, yes absolutely we blew out the existing sovereign and created power vacuums in both cases. There was no "host" government - but equally we had no intent to stay and submit those lands and the people who lived upon them to our sovereign control. I believe that second fact trumps the first. "Begin as you intend to finish.". It is about mind-set, perspective and priorities. This in turn shapes perceptions of the legitimacy of our own actions and the legitimacy of whatever host system of governance might ultimately emerge.

Based on our intent and purpose from the very start, from the moment President Bush declared "mission accomplished" in Iraq we were no longer fighting a short brutal war, but were beginning the long, even more brutal peace. That is FID, even if there is little to no host governance left to support. Perhaps we shouldn't have tossed out Gen Zinni's plan that left much of the Iraqi military intact to serve that role. Regardless, the nature of the game does not change because we chose to deal ourselves bad cards.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Decisively defeating al Qaeda will be more difficult now than it would have been a few years ago. But it can still be done, if Washington and its partners implement a comprehensive strategy over several years, one focused on both attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions that allow them to thrive. Otherwise, it will only be a matter of time before al Qaeda strikes the U.S. homeland again.

Bill, isn't this what we are doing in Afghanistan?

1. Killing leadership ... which only accomplishes the next rank moving up.

2. Changing conditions by trying to create responsible, representative government.

3. Attacking their ideas ... by offering an alternative via changing conditions.

It would seem that we are working an old fashion exhaustion campaign.

Perhaps we need to work more on number 3 by not responding with large military actions and treating the group as criminals instead of granting them the status of combatant via our responses to their actions.

Lastly, I really hate comments like "if you don't do this it is only a matter of time till AQ strikes again." AQ may strike again and it will have absolutely nothing to do with not implementing this plan, but it serves as a logical (though not causal) connection "proving" the author right. .... Hmmmmm .... If you don't listen to my ideas about doctrine there will be hurricanes in the Atlantic and Typhoons in the Pacific, mark my words!


But this is off topic.

[carl]

Carl,

You don't need to kill hundreds of people to commit genocide.

http://efchr.mcgill.ca/WhatIsGenocide_en.php?menu=2

It is the intent to destroy, in whole or part, any group that you can separate out from the whole based on an identifying characteristic. It does not even require death. When we "assimilated" the American Indians into our society effectively destroying theirs, arguably, that was genocide.

Of course, when we took the children away and taught them how to be American's there was no crime of genocide, so it was all good.

Your response illustrates my point exactly. The word as it is used popularly, or had been anyway, was associated with truly monstrous crimes that had few equals in history, the Holocaust being the prime example. It has expanded to include just about anything that somebody disapproves of. People use it now mainly show how very much they disapprove of something, the intent of which is to really put their moral superiority on display. "I don't just disapprove of it, I judge it genocide which makes me a really sensitive and fine person." That kind of thing.

That's fine I guess. Words and meanings change in language but in this case it tends to minimize the events that the word should be confined to. Instead of a description of something so big and bad as to almost defy comprehension, the word is being used to establish the moral superiority of people who use when describing something they disapprove of.

It's a shame I think but language goes where it goes.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Your response illustrates my point exactly. The word as it is used popularly, or had been anyway, was associated with truly monstrous crimes that had few equals in history, the Holocaust being the prime example. It has expanded to include just about anything that somebody disapproves of. People use it now mainly show how very much they disapprove of something, the intent of which is to really put their moral superiority on display. "I don't just disapprove of it, I judge it genocide which makes me a really sensitive and fine person." That kind of thing.

That's fine I guess. Words and meanings change in language but in this case it tends to minimize the events that the word should be confined to. Instead of a description of something so big and bad as to almost defy comprehension, the word is being used to establish the moral superiority of people who use when describing something they disapprove of.

It's a shame I think but language goes where it goes.

You are correct, meanings change over time. But in this case I was referring to the crime that can be committed by people or states acting in their sovereign capacity. The US will bend the rules, but I don't see them overtly breaking them. That will limit the range of options and remove ideas like mass relocation (without a good justification) or mass re-education of children.

How far we would go to turn a blind eye to the actions of our host nation is hard to say.

[carl]

Carl, your arguments are overly simplistic and while I understand not wanting to give credit to our adversaries, to pretend or deny they don't have a strategy and seek to understand it puts us at a disadvantage. I'll see what references I can find, but in the meantime recommend reading the Looming Tower for some background.

Those that attacked us on 9/11 were well educated and obviously highly dedicated to their cause. Like us they don't mindlessly spend resources on operation that isn't tied to a strategic end, and that attack obviously wouldn't defeat us, so it was part of larger construct. They didn't do it just to kill innocent people (though they obviously did kill many innocent people), but for a larger aim which was to provoke into a fight they think they can win in the long run.

You bring up a fair point about why aren't they attacking economic targets directly? I can only speculate, but so far our response has been measured, they may assume correctly if they start targeting economic targets we'll take the gloves off. Just a thought.

They do indeed have a strategy, it just isn't a sophisticated and complex. It's rudimentary. Kill people in a theatrical fashion and hope for the best. I said that I think twice above.

They didn't spend resources on something with no end. It was in accordance with their strategy, kill a lot of people in a theatrical way and hope for the best.

The 'kill' part is integral to all this. If OBL had issued a fatwa saying 'Boycott Pepsi and monkey wrench oil refineries' it wouldn't have had the same effect. That doesn't motivate young men, the key target audience. You want to motivate them, you say 'Kill'. They like that.

I think you are missing the obvious when you wonder why they don't hit economic targets. They aren't green beanies. They are takfiri killers. They want to kill because it makes them feel good to smack it to the kufars.

[carl]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/blood-in-shallow-waters

Blood in Shallow Waters


Carl, the author of this paper may agree with you, since according to his research there is little evidence AQ initially conducted the attacks to sucker us into invading Afghanistan, but afterwards this became a primary element of their strategy. The next article written by a former CIA member seems to claim it was their strategy all along.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2007/05/terrorism-riedel

Al Qaeda Strikes Back

By: Bruce Riedel

AQ talks and talks and writes and writes but as far as doing against the the West in the West, it is blow some people up in a spectacular way and hope for the best.

Because that is simple doesn't mean it won't work. But it is simple.

[carl]

You are correct, meanings change over time. But in this case I was referring to the crime that can be committed by people or states acting in their sovereign capacity. The US will bend the rules, but I don't see them overtly breaking them. That will limit the range of options and remove ideas like mass relocation (without a good justification) or mass re-education of children.

How far we would go to turn a blind eye to the actions of our host nation is hard to say.

The children had better be reeducated if you want an occupation of pacification or whatever to work. If the Israelis were to tomorrow occupy all of Gaza and turn it into Israel they would have to tinker with the curriculums of all the schools a bit.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The children had better be reeducated if you want an occupation of pacification or whatever to work. If the Israelis were to tomorrow occupy all of Gaza and turn it into Israel they would have to tinker with the curriculums of all the schools a bit.

An accurate observation, but possibly an illegal act:confused:

[slapout9]

If COIN isn't Strategy then what is it? Link to a PDF download of noted military commentator Edward Luttwak who believes that COIN is nothing but Military Malpractice. Article appeared in Harper's Magazine in 2007.

http://www.ifri.org/files/politique_etrangere/luttwak.pdf

[TheCurmudgeon]

I suppose this is a good time to clarify. COIN – counterinsurgency – is a type of operation. Population-Centric COIN is a strategy. I believe it is because the political end-state (stable, legitimate government) is identical to the operational end-state (stable, legitimate government). The key is legitimacy. It is, by definition, the recognized right to govern. Take that out of COIN and all that is left is tactics and operational concepts.

Here is a question/admonition I received by e-mail followed by my response.


I am surprised by this thread at SWJ. It's as if the past several years are erased away. The critique is that the insurgency should be put down first, then nation building or democratization may take place.


I already posted--years ago--Col Gentile's suggestion for the manual, that there be various options besides pop-COIN in the manual: "In general terms I would deconstruct the manual as it is now and break the singular link that it has with a certain theory of state building (known as population centric COIN). Once broken up I would then rewrite the doctrine from the ground up with three general parts: 1) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered on post-conflict reconstruction; 2) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered around military action to attack insurgent sources of military power (sometimes referred to as counter-terror or CT), but not linked to an endstate of a rebuilt or newly built nation state; 3) would be a counterinsurgency approach -- perhaps call it COIN light -- that would focus largely on Special Forces with some limited conventional army support conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID)."

I don't get that thread. We have been over this a thousand times.


My response:


First I totally (ok partially) disagree. I would even go so far as to say that there is only one effective strategy in an intra-state conflict. That is to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population.



Gentile is wrong when he claims that nation building equals population centric COIN. That is his primary error … it always has been and always will be. An external party cannot "create" a nation. We can "create" a government. We have done this effectively in the past. We can even “create” a democracy, we did it in Japan after WWII.



A Nation is largely a matter of identity. Theoretically nation building is possible. I could argue that Stalin did it in parts of the Soviet Union, including parts of the Ukraine. A fact that is now creating instability.



An insurgency is always a fight for the right to govern. The right to govern is granted by the population via legitimacy. You can govern through coercion, either naked threat or via bribery. But this will always require constant pressure on the population until you gain legitimacy.



If we don’t recognize this basic fact then we will be drawn into counterinsurgencies we cannot hope to win. Our history demonstrates this.


Disregarding for a moment that our intent in fighting the insurgency may have less to do with supporting the government and more to do with killing the insurgents (think, Pakistan), the ultimate objective should be to have the population accept the government as legitimate. That legitimacy will drain the pool in which the insurgent swims, to use the old Maoist metaphor.

All this could just be an academic exercise, but I believe that if we lose focus on legitimacy we lose.

[carl]

An accurate observation, but possibly an illegal act:confused:

Thompson said you must always do things in accordance with the law, but the law can be changed. In my little hypothetical, the Israelis would change the law.

[Bill Moore]

They do indeed have a strategy, it just isn't a sophisticated and complex. It's rudimentary. Kill people in a theatrical fashion and hope for the best. I said that I think twice above.

They didn't spend resources on something with no end. It was in accordance with their strategy, kill a lot of people in a theatrical way and hope for the best.

The 'kill' part is integral to all this. If OBL had issued a fatwa saying 'Boycott Pepsi and monkey wrench oil refineries' it wouldn't have had the same effect. That doesn't motivate young men, the key target audience. You want to motivate them, you say 'Kill'. They like that.

I think you are missing the obvious when you wonder why they don't hit economic targets. They aren't green beanies. They are takfiri killers. They want to kill because it makes them feel good to smack it to the kufars.

Terrorism is theater and you don't create theater by throwing wooden shoes in into a factory's machinery. When you say hope for the best, I guess we all do that to varying degrees. We build a school, we conduct a raid, we stand up a local government and we hope for the best. If it doesn't work then we should adjust our approach. I'm not confident we do this.

I think Al-Qaeda was hoping we invade in Afghanistan, and when the USS Cole and East Africa Embassy attacks didn't work they went back to the drawing board. That's my hypothesis. They are absolutely killers and they do so with a passion that only hate can generate. They still don't come close to being as radicalized and violent as the Nazis or the Imperial Japanese Army who killed tens of thousands. President Bush was right that evil exists in this world that must be dealt with. I don't debate that, I debate our approach/strategy for dealing with it.

[Bill Moore]

Bill, isn't this what we are doing in Afghanistan?

1. Killing leadership ... which only accomplishes the next rank moving up.

2. Changing conditions by trying to create responsible, representative government.

3. Attacking their ideas ... by offering an alternative via changing conditions.

It would seem that we are working an old fashion exhaustion campaign.

Perhaps we need to work more on number 3 by not responding with large military actions and treating the group as criminals instead of granting them the status of combatant via our responses to their actions.

Lastly, I really hate comments like "if you don't do this it is only a matter of time till AQ strikes again." AQ may strike again and it will have absolutely nothing to do with not implementing this plan, but it serves as a logical (though not causal) connection "proving" the author right. .... Hmmmmm .... If you don't listen to my ideas about doctrine there will be hurricanes in the Atlantic and Typhoons in the Pacific, mark my words!


But this is off topic.

I don't agree with his recommendations, it is the same ole standard line of we have to change conditions, and by definition we can't change conditions. I also agree with your off topic point. :D

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs and Bill Moore both raise factually accurate points, but I believe that sometimes we focus on the wrong facts and allow them to lead us logically into intractable situations.

Fuchs, certainly yes Iraq and Afghanistan are/were both occupations - but that is not a mission with task and purpose, it is simply a fact of our physical status.

And Bill, yes absolutely we blew out the existing sovereign and created power vacuums in both cases. There was no "host" government - but equally we had no intent to stay and submit those lands and the people who lived upon them to our sovereign control. I believe that second fact trumps the first. "Begin as you intend to finish.". It is about mind-set, perspective and priorities. This in turn shapes perceptions of the legitimacy of our own actions and the legitimacy of whatever host system of governance might ultimately emerge.

Based on our intent and purpose from the very start, from the moment President Bush declared "mission accomplished" in Iraq we were no longer fighting a short brutal war, but were beginning the long, even more brutal peace. That is FID, even if there is little to no host governance left to support. Perhaps we shouldn't have tossed out Gen Zinni's plan that left much of the Iraqi military intact to serve that role. Regardless, the nature of the game does not change because we chose to deal ourselves bad cards.

I can't agree that we weren't an occupying force just because our long term intent was to hand both Iraq and Afghanistan back over to their citizens. I also don't imply anything negative by being an occupying force, it is often a necessity in war, and it comes with legal responsibilities we largely ignored by pretending we weren't an occupying power. It is FID when the supported nation invites us to assist them, in reality we stood up a government and their security forces to assist us. If we go into Iraq it will be FID this time. A mind set doesn't change physical reality.