COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

I suppose this is a good time to clarify. COIN – counterinsurgency – is a type of operation. Population-Centric COIN is a strategy. I believe it is because the political end-state (stable, legitimate government) is identical to the operational end-state (stable, legitimate government). The key is legitimacy. It is, by definition, the recognized right to govern. Take that out of COIN and all that is left is tactics and operational concepts.

Here is a question/admonition I received by e-mail followed by my response.

My response:

Disregarding for a moment that our intent in fighting the insurgency may have less to do with supporting the government and more to do with killing the insurgents (think, Pakistan), the ultimate objective should be to have the population accept the government as legitimate. That legitimacy will drain the pool in which the insurgent swims, to use the old Maoist metaphor.

All this could just be an academic exercise, but I believe that if we lose focus on legitimacy we lose.


Gentile is wrong when he claims that nation building equals population centric COIN. That is his primary error … it always has been and always will be. An external party cannot "create" a nation. We can "create" a government. We have done this effectively in the past. We can even “create” a democracy, we did it in Japan after WWII.

I have to disagree that legitimacy must be the goal, because quite simply it simply isn't possible in some cases. However, you can't conduct population centric COIN without it, so what are the options and that is what those of us in the SWJ really need to explore to give our decision makers practical options to protect our interests instead of pursuing pie in the sky idealism.

Post WWII differed so much Iraq and Afghanistan it is almost a completely irrelevant comment. More importantly we had a different defense structure back then that had strategic thinkers and practical planners who actually thought deeply about the post war occupation missions and cultural aspects involved. Leaving the Emperor in place gave the occupation force legitimacy that we never had in our two recent adventures. It is counterfactual, but I can't help but wonder how the Japanese would have responded if we charged the Emperor as a war criminal? In the end we didn't threaten their xenophobic culture, while in Iraq and Afghanistan we turned it upside down. Big difference when it comes to stability or nation building.

To set the record straight I'm not opposed to pursuing democracy over time, but not at the tip of the bayonet. First we need to establish order and recognizable form of governance that conforms to the occupied nation's norms. Next gradually help them build out their government institutions and economy. Then over time through diplomacy begin to nudge them towards democracy, simultaneously one would hope the populace is becoming increasingly educated and aware of the outside world and also spurs their government to behave in ways that is seen as legitimate. We thought we could wave our magic wand in Iraq and replace the Baathists almost overnight. I think we woke up from that dream, but I'm not sure?

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, certainly yes Iraq and Afghanistan are/were both occupations - but that is not a mission with task and purpose, it is simply a fact of our physical status.

It's much more.

Clausewitzians submit to the view that warfare is a continuation of policy and meant to reduce the opposition's ability to resist enough to force an advantageous result of the conflict on them.

An occupation is no such thing. An occupation aims at running the country at least for some time, and whatever armed resistance appears may be long-lasting, but has to be suppressed in order to execute the occupation policies as intended.


'COIN' in a foreign country is about suppression, and there appears usually to be a conflict between the COIN and the purpose and premises of occupation.
An occupation can live with a small degree of suppressed armed resistance as long as critical policies can be carried out in parallel (such as setting up a puppet government with sufficiently loyal and effective security forces). COIN goes farther; it strives not merely to suppress, but to defeat the armed opposition.


I wrote quite the same interpretation half a decade ago (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2009/07/is-germany-at-war-because-of-isaf.html) already:


These {ISAF mission} statements are lacking an important part or a war mission: They do not tell that ISAF's mission was to defeat an enemy or to at least force warring parties to end warfare. ISAF is by official design not meant to win or end the war, but to add security and stability to Afghanistan till the Afghan government takes over.
It was meant to be an Afghanization project from day one (unlike OEF-A).

The clausewitzian understanding that war is about breaking the will of an enemy (if necessary by disarmament or death) is completely missing in ISAF's mission.


The job of ISAF is - as I read it - not to defeat the Taliban or any other group, but to assist the government (forces) and to provide security. It's a kind of policing job.

ISAF is more about buying time than about defeating an enemy.

[carl]

They still don't come close to being as radicalized and violent as the Nazis or the Imperial Japanese Army who killed tens of thousands.

I disagree. They are every bit as murderous as the IJA, the Nazis and Communists who murdered millions and millions. The difference is they don't have the capability to murder millions yet, only thousands. If they could, they would.

This is not a minor point. It has to do with our clearly recognizing the nature of the evil we face, an important thing. The takfiri killers have never shown any hesitation about killing as many as they can when they can. Their only limitations are ones of practicability. If 9-11 isn't proof enough of that the attack on the Yazidis in 2007 is.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Both Fuchs and Bill have points that seem to go back to a problem with definitions.

Fuchs raises the issue of the ISAF mission which says nothing about countering an insurgency. It is support for a government that is in trouble. Bill raises the issue of the occupation. It would seem to me that it might be more appropriate to classify missions by their objective.

Therefore, I am going to classify some operations that ARE NOT COUNTERINSURGENCIES.

Military Government: There are occupations/military governments. This is the post invasion scenario where the victorious military is standing in the power vacuum they just created. De facto, by international law, they are the government and must act accordingly. There is currently no doctrine for this type of operation.

Stability: This is the ISAF mission. Provide the security resources and capabilities to allow the host nation to become stable. This could be after a natural disaster or after a war. But in this case there is a partially functioning government.

Offensive Operations. The first is where our national security interest is not in helping the Host Nation but in fighting the insurgents. This is an “Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend” situation. An example of this might be Vietnam although that was much more an open war. Some might call this a proxy war. But the ultimate objective is not so much stabilizing the Host Nation as it is defeating the insurgent forces.

That leaves ... A pure Counterinsurgency is an attempt to support the host nation in their attempt to defeat the insurgents.

Any thoughts?

[slapout9]

That leaves ... A pure Counterinsurgency is an attempt to support the host nation in their attempt to defeat the insurgents.

Any thoughts?

Which is essentially Counter Guerrilla Warfare? Which is what the experts beleived we would face at the end of WW2 and the beginning of the Cold War/Nuclear Era. Cannot fight and win a Nuke war so go Guerrilla....Yes...No...Maybe?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Which is essentially Counter Guerrilla Warfare? Which is what the experts beleived we would face at the end of WW2 and the beginning of the Cold War/Nuclear Era. Cannot fight and win a Nuke war so go Guerrilla....Yes...No...Maybe?

Perhaps...?

I mostly disagree. There were many efforts by the two superpowers to increase their spheres of influence. Terrorism was the preferred method in Europe, largely because there was no hope of gaining legitimacy for a communist government. In those parts of Europe where communism was imposed, it required a police state and occasional incursion by Russian tanks to keep the population at bay.

In other parts of the world communism had things to offer. Places where there was still a peasant class. South America or Southeast Asia for example.

To call it Counter Guerrilla warfare is to oversimplify an insurgency. There is far more sociology in it than Bing West would admit.

[Bob's World]

I don't think one can debate what COIN is until one first understands what insurgency is. The military tends to see insurgnecy through a military lens, so calls it a form of war, with the defeat of the insurgent and the sustainment of an uncoerced government as the measure of victory. That is one perspective, but it is not a very accurate one.

I think we should begin by re-assessing how we think about a variety of labels we attach to various "threats" that vex us so.

"Insurgency" is best thought of as a condition that comes to exist within some population generating both the energy and the desire to force political change through illegal (and often violent and war-like) upon some system of governance negatively impacting their lives. To be an insurgency this condition must be political in primary purpose, the activities taken must be illegal, and it must be based within a domestic population (internal, illegal, political, & populace-based)

"Insurgent" is one who acts out to operationalize these conditions of insurgency.

"terrorism" is a tactic. An effort to generate fear to coerce some party to do something they otherwise would not, but that the terrorist wants them to do. Governments tend to think of this as only something illegal actors do (much the way many people of color think only white people can be racist). Governments employ terror as a routine tool of statecraft. (and yes, anyone can be racist)

"terrorist" is an actor with any role in the chain of events leading to a deliberate act of terror. It is a thin line between a bin Laden sitting around a rug discussing attacks with his council and the President of the United States reviewing a file of photographs in the Oval Office and directing a drone strike into some sovereign country to execute some person (and those around him) deemed to be a "terrorist." It is a line we should be more careful not to dance too close to.

So what is COIN? We say we counter the insurgency - but typically we largely ignore the insurgnecy and seek to defeat the insurgent and exercise greater control over the population where the insurgency exists. That seems unlikely to be very effective in a durable kind of way. History bears that out.

Actually insurgency is the "counter." It is counter-poor governance. It is counter-illegitimate foreign presence. It is a response to governance perceived as inappropriate to the degree of intolerable, and where no effective legal means exist to effect the desired changes. Typically it is much more to drive some offending system of governance out - not to bring some superior system of governance in.

So COIN is really a counter to a counter. Just realizing that would be a tremendous start to getting to a more effective understanding of what COIN is and how to best go about it. Bottom line is that we need to step back a bit. The insurgent will always be the illegal actor, and the counterinsurgent will always be the legal actor. But right and wrong are other matters entirely, and typically lay divided between the two parties.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bob,

I agree with your overall concept of defining what an insurgency is before you can determine how to “fight” it. I also agree that the military has a tendency to see all problems as ones best solved with an adequate amount of high explosives. But I think that your assessment is limited by a review of insurgencies without comparing them to places where there is not an insurgency.

For example, many places suffer from governments that “negatively impact their lives” as a result of “poor governance.” I would argue that many of the people in the U.S. are suffering from both those conditions. Still, most people in the U.S. are not ready to take up arms, even if we claim revolution as our historical right. The failings of the government must be such that they evoke a powerful emotional response. You probably don’t get that from intermittent electricity or trash removal. Good governance is important, but I don’t believe it is the cause of insurgency (although I have no data to prove it).

Legitimacy, which by definition is the population’s perception of a right to rule, is not necessarily key. Many people could believe that the government is illegitimate and still not take arms up against it. But gaining legitimacy will likely stop the political aspects of the insurgency.

Things I believe contribute to an insurgency can be:
1) a factional society where there is a perception that one faction is unjustly being treated better than another faction (Sunnis are getting more than Kurds).
2) A homogenous society that has experienced a continual growth in economic success leading to greater freedoms and then has that suddenly reversed (the Davis J-Curve), although I am not wed to this idea.
3) A disjoint between the values of the people and the values of the government (Contradicting legitimacy – i.e. the people want a religious leadership and the government is secular and democratic)

This is only a list put together off the top of my head, but this is more in line with what I believe causes an insurgency. It has to be guttural, and there have to be no other mechanism to solve the problem.

So, I would say Bing West is wrong, Insurgency is Sociology.

[slapout9]

So, I would say Bing West is wrong, Insurgency is Sociology.

If Insurgency is Sociology then would agree with Galula that COIN is "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward"

[Bob's World]

If Insurgency is Sociology then would agree with Galula that COIN is "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward"

Never forget that Galula grew up and lived as a Frenchman in foreign colonies. His mission then was to sustain French control and to get resistance and revolution to manageable levels. He said the insurgency was always against the puppet regime, not against France. We share his blind bias of our own goodness, but we do not share his mission.

We need to figure out what OUR mission is, and then derive approaches to do that.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Never forget that Galula grew up and lived as a Frenchman in foreign colonies. His mission then was to sustain French control and to get resistance and revolution to manageable levels. He said the insurgency was always against the puppet regime, not against France. We share his blind bias of our own goodness, but we do not share his mission.

We need to figure out what OUR mission is, and then derive approaches to do that.

Bob's right, our mission and Galula's are not the same. And no, I don't believe that you have to build or rebuild anything from the ground up. But unless you identify the key driving factors of an insurgency FROM THE INSURGENT'S POINT OF VIEW, not ours, then the you cannot hope to effectively counter it.

Interstate war is fundamentally different from intrastate war. Intrastate war is a serious collapse of social institutions. Hence my belief that we have more to learn about the nature and causes of insurgencies from sociology than we do from the history of all the interstate wars.

[Bob's World]

Bob's right, our mission and Galula's are not the same. And no, I don't believe that you have to build or rebuild anything from the ground up. But unless you identify the key driving factors of an insurgency FROM THE INSURGENT'S POINT OF VIEW, not ours, then the you cannot hope to effectively counter it.

Interstate war is fundamentally different from intrastate war. Intrastate war is a serious collapse of social institutions. Hence my belief that we have more to learn about the nature and causes of insurgencies from sociology than we do from the history of all the interstate wars.

Well, I'd say you need to understand from the aggrieved population's point of view, not the insurgent. After all, one needs to resolve the insurgency, not just defeat the insurgent de jour. Also, not buying the collapse of institutions, more often the bias of those running those institutions to favor some populations and exclude or oppress others.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Well, I'd say you need to understand from the aggrieved population's point of view, not the insurgent. After all, one needs to resolve the insurgency, not just defeat the insurgent de jour.

I agree, a pourly worded sentence on my part.


Also, not buying the collapse of institutions, more often the bias of those running those institutions to favor some populations and exclude or oppress others.

I would argue that by favoring some of the population or excluding or oppressing others, the institution has collapsed. It is a rather complex argument and not of great value here. I don't believe it would add any clarity (as someone else around here noted, any fool can make things more complicated...), so I will simply agree there is more to it than a failure of the insitution to provide to the entire society what it was designed to provide. I will try not to be so obtuse.

... that's two for Bob, zero for the Curmudgeon.:p

[slapout9]

Insurgencies dont really sound to sociable to me(bad joke). Almost sounds like seperate but equal is a viable option? I know that is a PC incorrect question but building walls sometimes works. I think that was part of the COIN plan for the Irish problem. I do believe that Race, Religion and Language are the new flashpoints in the world.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Insurgencies dont really sound to sociable to me(bad joke). Almost sounds like seperate but equal is a viable option? I know that is a PC incorrect question but building walls sometimes works. I think that was part of the COIN plan for the Irish problem. I do believe that Race, Religion and Language are the new flashpoints in the world.

I don't believe that Race, Religion or Language (as associated with National Identity and ethnicity) are "New" flashpoints. They have been the factor that distinguished "us" from "them" since the beginning of recorded history. In common parlance, this is known as "factionalism."

What I believe what has changed is the push for democracy and elections. Combining open competition for power in in a factionalized society creates the conditions for instability and ultimately, insurgency.

This is from a paper called "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/documents/PITF/PITFglobal.pdf)"


The real surprise came from the predictive power associated with the addition of a single element of this scheme. By distinguishing partial democracies according to the presence or absence of factionalism in political participation, we found we could substantially improve the fit of our models. As measured by Polity, factionalism occurs when political competition is dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas. Factionalism typically occurs in new democracies, where party systems are weak and political participation is more likely to flow through networks rootedin traditional identities or other parochial interests, but it can emerge in established democracies as well. Factionalism is also the most common form of participation in autocracies that do not repress political competition, either by design or incapacity. Recent examples include Bolivia and Ecuador, where the mobilization of indigenous movements has produced stand-offs over the appropriate uses of mineral wealth; Venezuela, where polarization along class lines has produced mass protest and a failed coup in recent years; and Bangladesh, where personalist rivalries have dominated national politics since a return to democracy in 1991.

The link between factionalism and instability may sound unsurprising, so much so that one might wonder whether factionalism itself is simply part and parcel of the instability that ensues. Our analysis suggests that it is not. Only about half of countries coded with factionalism develop instability in our data; thus knowing a country is factional in its political competition still gives you no better than a 50-50 guess about its stability status two years hence. It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office (executive recruitment scores 6-8 on the 8-point scale) that extremely high vulnerability to instability results, and even then, factionalism does not inevitably lead to instability.1

And while I disagree with the authors' reliance on "institutional" factors as the key to stability in a democracy, their concluding paragraph makes clear that there are unitended consequences to democracy promotion:


The key elements of stable democracy are to combine fully open access to political office with fully institutionalized and functional political competition. It is these conditions, not elections as such, and certainly not a mythic and utopian notion of “democracy,” that should guide policymakers seeking greater stability in the world. Where these conditions obtain, even amidst seemingly inhospitable conditions for stability or democracy, as in sub-Saharan Africa, the relative odds of ethnic wars, revolutions, and genocides have been dramatically lower. Where these conditions are absent, even if conditions of economic development and trade seem favorable, the relative odds of near-term instability, especially for factionalized partial democratic regimes, loom exceedingly large.

[carl]

Never forget that Galula grew up and lived as a Frenchman in foreign colonies. His mission then was to sustain French control and to get resistance and revolution to manageable levels. He said the insurgency was always against the puppet regime, not against France. We share his blind bias of our own goodness, but we do not share his mission.

We need to figure out what OUR mission is, and then derive approaches to do that.

Mr. Galula was born in Tunisia of Jewish parents and all his ancestors were North African I believe. So that to my mind puts him in a somewhat different category than that connoted by the phrase "a Frenchman in foreign colonies."

I read also that he got most of his ideas from his time in China observing war between the Reds and Chiang's forces. That conflict was hugely different from the fights the French were involved in so I think his ideas and observations are not so parochial.

Also a lot of people who know what they are about think there is much of value in what he wrote, for us and anybody else.

[Bob's World]

Mr. Galula was born in Tunisia of Jewish parents and all his ancestors were North African I believe. So that to my mind puts him in a somewhat different category than that connoted by the phrase "a Frenchman in foreign colonies."

I read also that he got most of his ideas from his time in China observing war between the Reds and Chiang's forces. That conflict was hugely different from the fights the French were involved in so I think his ideas and observations are not so parochial.

Also a lot of people who know what they are about think there is much of value in what he wrote, for us and anybody else.

I am a huge fan of Galula myself - but my facts are straight and my point of understanding the context of his experience and the difference of his missions are critical ones.

[slapout9]

Mr. Galula was born in Tunisia of Jewish parents and all his ancestors were North African I believe. So that to my mind puts him in a somewhat different category than that connoted by the phrase "a Frenchman in foreign colonies."

I read also that he got most of his ideas from his time in China observing war between the Reds and Chiang's forces. That conflict was hugely different from the fights the French were involved in so I think his ideas and observations are not so parochial.

Also a lot of people who know what they are about think there is much of value in what he wrote, for us and anybody else.

carl,
Just my opinion but I think the problem with Galula(which is generally an outstanindg theory for normal revolutions) in the most "recent" application was a far more Radicalized Muslim Element then when he first used his theory. The present Radical Muslims are not subject to any form of rational political control. The Islamic leadership has to step in with the power of Allah and tell these creeps that this is not what Islam is all about. Until that happens we should just let them meet the Christian Marines and all become martyrs.

[slapout9]

I don't believe that Race, Religion or Language (as associated with National Identity and ethnicity) are "New" flashpoints. They have been the factor that distinguished "us" from "them" since the beginning of recorded history. In common parlance, this is known as "factionalism."

What I believe what has changed is the push for democracy and elections. Combining open competition for power in in a factionalized society creates the conditions for instability and ultimately, insurgency.

This is from a paper called "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/documents/PITF/PITFglobal.pdf)"

Interesting stuff but.......IMHO the Strategic Question is why do people join gangs? And the answer is..... for protection and prosperity. Take away those two reason and the system will collapse. That is why the Bloods and The Crips are still here. We cannot provide protection and we cannot provide prosperity. But we sure can do it for the 1%. Is there a lesson to learn there?

So likeI keep saying Jeremy Bentham was a smart guy, just do the greatest good for the greatest number and things will generally be OK. In America that is a good job with rising incomes and then people can create their own Social Justice without causing everyone else problems. I suspect that could be an achievable Military/State department supported objective for COIN.


Sorry for the ramble but I do that stuff sometimes:D

[Fuchs]

Interesting stuff but.......IMHO the Strategic Question is why do people join gangs? And the answer is..... for protection and prosperity.

Not quite. They only provide the hope for prosperity to most members - and many gangs are even unable to do this.

Gangs also emulate the kind of hunter-gatherer clans that we used to be and that are still hardcoded into our brain.

[carl]

I am a huge fan of Galula myself - but my facts are straight and my point of understanding the context of his experience and the difference of his missions are critical ones.

Perhaps. But perhaps you are making too much of Mr. Galula's background limiting his ability to discern the essentials of small war.

Figure it this way. Mr. Clauswitz is held in very high regard by many people who are in a good position to know. Many of those people are Americans who are residents of what is principally a maritime power, one of the greatest in history. Clauswitz could be looked at as having been very limited by his experience. He barely mentioned navies and command of the sea and had no experience at all in with ships and sea fighting as far as I know. Yet he is of great value to many Americans, residents of a maritime power.

So I think Mr. Galula's limitations of experience didn't affect the value of his work to us.

[slapout9]

Perhaps. But perhaps you are making too much of Mr. Galula's background limiting his ability to discern the essentials of small war.

Figure it this way. Mr. Clauswitz is held in very high regard by many people who are in a good position to know. Many of those people are Americans who are residents of what is principally a maritime power, one of the greatest in history. Clauswitz could be looked at as having been very limited by his experience. He barely mentioned navies and command of the sea and had no experience at all in with ships and sea fighting as far as I know. Yet he is of great value to many Americans, residents of a maritime power.

So I think Mr. Galula's limitations of experience didn't affect the value of his work to us.

That's right carl. IMO his book on COIN theory is a more practical book than most field manuals. His limitations were minimal and had as much to do with the time period his ideas were being used in as anything else. I also have some doubts about just how much effort was really behind trying to implement his proposed "step"plan and adapting it to the actual current situation on the ground.

[Compost]

I suppose this is a good time to clarify. COIN – counterinsurgency – is a type of operation. Population-Centric COIN is a strategy. I believe it is because the political end-state (stable, legitimate government) is identical to the operational end-state (stable, legitimate government). The key is legitimacy. It is, by definition, the recognized right to govern. Take that out of COIN and all that is left is tactics and operational concepts.

US Army and USMC doctrine in para 1-4 of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated May 2014 starts with a short sentence: “ Counter-insurgency is not a substitute for strategy. ”

So now you want to split hairs and insist “ POP-centric COIN is a strategy “. But that doesn’t run fast enough to bypass history or escape common sense. The operational end-state of a completely successful strategy must be virtually identical to the sought-after political end-state. But that will not invariably - or frequently if ever - be “ stable, legitimate government “. It could be any form of junta, regime or government that can obtain the enthusiastic, reluctant or coerced acceptance of a sufficiently large proportion of the local, regional and/or international communities. That is real world legitimacy.

POP-centric COIN is not a strategy. Nor is evangelism.

[BrentWilliams]

US Army and USMC doctrine in para 1-4 of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated May 2014 starts with a short sentence: “ Counter-insurgency is not a substitute for strategy. ”

So now you want to split hairs and insist “ POP-centric COIN is a strategy “. But that doesn’t run fast enough to bypass history or escape common sense. The operational end-state of a completely successful strategy must be virtually identical to the sought-after political end-state. But that will not invariably - or frequently if ever - be “ stable, legitimate government “. It could be any form of junta, regime or government that can obtain the enthusiastic, reluctant or coerced acceptance of a sufficiently large proportion of the local, regional and/or international communities. That is real world legitimacy.

POP-centric COIN is not a strategy. Nor is evangelism.

I would note that the enemy centrist versus population centrist debate that was in the 2006 version is not in the 2014 version. Moreover, the FM directly says the population is not necessarily the center of gravity (see 7-21)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Compost,

Actually I think the manual makes my point well. The whole quote is:


Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S. can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)

My emphasis.

Moving on to Para 1-10:


1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to counter an insurgency is a question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a
range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces securing the population or performing offensive operations, in a counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information on how counterinsurgents may organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and
should not be the only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See JP 3-24, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more information on counterinsurgency policy tools.)

A military counterinsurgency effort it not a substitute for a complete strategy to reach the strategic goal. How much effort, and of what type, will depend on the unique strategic goal. We might care more about defeating the insurgents than helping the government because our interest are against the insurgents.

However, if you want a stable government that is supported by the people (or the people are at least not so pissed off that they will support an insurgency), then the goal is the population.


1-27. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is true however the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and the government for that society. A population’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society perceives as a legitimate authority. Both the insurgency and the host nation attempt to control the population by some mixture of consent and coercion. Insurgents use all available tools, including political (diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal or ideological beliefs), and social, military, and economic tools to overthrow or undermine an existing authority. Likewise, the host nation will use all available tools to maintain acceptance of its authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be a generally accepted social order. Control of a population, however, may not be the end state desired by an insurgent. A criminal enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its criminal activities or insurgents could seek political power in order to impose an ideological (or religious) system on an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, if the affected government wants to end the insurgency, it should use all instruments of its national power to prove its legitimacy, to defeat the insurgency, and to reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging.

Now, to be far, I am a bit of an evangelist when it comes to the idea of legitimacy. The problem I tend to run into is that most people assume that when I say something like legitimacy or rule of law I am talking about democracy. Nope. Legitimacy is in the eyes of the people. A tribal leader of the local Mullah may be who the people see as the legitimate leader.

Now, that does not square well with those of the liberal mindset that liberty is the same as equality. In reality that notion is the result of changes in the society having to do with prosperity and security. Equality is a "luxury" that is affordable by wealthy, stable societies. Inequality is a reality that is required to survive in less fortunate places.

I have also noted in several places that electoral democracy is a really bad idea in a factional society. A factional society is one where there are several different groups each with their own ideas about who is the legitimate leader (usually based on association with their ethnic group or religion). It creates instability. So, yes, I an evangelical against pushing for democratic elections too fast, ... a mistake we commonly make based on the assumption that liberty means equality.

I can rant more, but I won't. I have not finished the whole FM, but I think it has some good points. I also think that it probably grants Commander's too much leeway and not enough control or direction. But that is necessary. In the right hands it works. In the wrong, it leads to disaster.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is an interesting view. The Trailer for the new "Call of Duty:Advanced Warfare" Video Game. Kevin Spacey makes a great world dictator. But he has a lot to say about America's attempts at creating democracies around the world.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFu5qXMuaJU

A view that will now be part of the younger generations understanding of the world, since they won't read the news but will play the video game.

[slapout9]

Here is an interesting view. The Trailer for the new "Call of Duty:Advanced Warfare" Video Game. Kevin Spacey makes a great world dictator. But he has a lot to say about America's attempts at creating democracies around the world.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFu5qXMuaJU

A view that will now be part of the younger generations understanding of the world, since they won't read the news but will play the video game.

Curmudgy,
1-This view is already part of the younger generation and has been for some time. This video shows one of the strongest attractions of gangs but college boys and politicians just don't like simple answers because then they would actually have to do something that would show clear accountability. Clear,simple and accountable is not something Politicians like.

2-We are NOT a democracy! We are a Constitutional Republic that uses a limited Democratic process (elections). The whole point of having a Republic (rule of Law not rule by mass influence) was to prevent such things from happening as the video depicts. The more we push democracy the more the country will continue to fail.

3-All that a side......some pretty cool soldier outfits and equipment. When is this coming into inventory?:)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Curmudgy,
1-This view is already part of the younger generation and has been for some time. This video shows one of the strongest attractions of gangs but college boys and politicians just don't like simple answers because then they would actually have to do something that would show clear accountability. Clear,simple and accountable is not something Politicians like.

2-We are NOT a democracy! We are a Constitutional Republic that uses a limited Democratic process (elections). The whole point of having a Republic (rule of Law not rule by mass influence) was to prevent such things from happening as the video depicts. The more we push democracy the more the country will continue to fail.

3-All that a side......some pretty cool soldier outfits and equipment. When is this coming into inventory?:)

First, number 3. The game is set in 2054, so I am guessing it will be a while before you see any of that stuff ... other than on your TV when you play the game. I tried playing the "Army" game. In it you went through basic training. I couldn’t get through the obstacle course, so I am guessing I will die every time in this game too. Still, looks like fun.

Interestingly, your 1 and 2 conflict, showing the weakness of our “republic”. We certainly were a republic when founded. Direct elections were limited to the House with the Senate and the President elected by members of the House and others elected for their ability to make decisions for us. Those days are long gone (except for the remnants of the Electoral College). Today we are a representative democracy. Politicians are more worried about poll numbers (and political contributions) and public opinion than they are about leading. This may have been a republic, but I feel that the label really no longer really applies.

That said, I don’t believe that the important difference lies in the distinction between a democracy and a republic. Our system of government is founded on the principle that the individual is more important than the state. Communist democratic republics were founded on the principle that the state is more important than the individual. Terms like republic and democracy are largely meaningless. What matters and the foundational principles.

[slapout9]

That said, I don’t believe that the important difference lies in the distinction between a democracy and a republic. Our system of government is founded on the principle that the individual is more important than the state. Communist democratic republics were founded on the principle that the state is more important than the individual. Terms like republic and democracy are largely meaningless. What matters and the foundational principles.

It matters Curmudgy,

I pledge allegiance to a Republic not a Democracy.

We used to be about being an individual and about creating strong individuals but democracies are about creating victim/special interests groups that can form voting blocks and and as a reward they get more or special rights. As you mentiond once the so called "in" and "out" groups and then getting them to fight each other instead forming one group called citizens with the same rights for all under one law.

[slapout9]

Red Skelton expalins The Pledge Of Allgeince and also why it makes a differance!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZBTyTWOZCM

[TheCurmudgeon]

It matters Curmudgy,

I pledge allegiance to a Republic not a Democracy.

We used to be about being an individual and about creating strong individuals but democracies are about creating victim/special interests groups that can form voting blocks and and as a reward they get more or special rights. As you mentiond once the so called "in" and "out" groups and then getting them to fight each other instead forming one group called citizens with the same rights for all under one law.

I am not sure I would agree ..., no, I pretty much disagree with your assessment of the distinction between a democracy and a republic. I would also argue that the use of the two terms is so ubiquitous as to make them meaningless. For example, North Korea is the “Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” In most cases a country is a combination of the two, it is a representative democracy – the population votes (democracy) to select their representatives (republic).

The only pure democracy I ever lived in was when I lived in Lebanon, NH. Once a year we had a town meeting in the school gymnasium and everyone from the town that was eligible to vote came to the meeting. All items were discussed and debated, and all the people directly voted on every item. Everywhere else that claims to be a democracy, some form of representative system is used. It is considered a democracy because the representatives are elected rather than appointed.

This is an interesting area, and if you are so inclined you should start a thread over it.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think this thread has run its course. While I will probably find other issues with the new FM 3-24, the distinction between the strategic objective of political legitimacy and the other operational objectives (Centers of Gravity like external support for the insurgents/cross-border sanctuaries) is fairly clear early on.
Operational considerations …

1-13. An operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 3-0). The commander may use direct or indirect approaches to counter threats. Commanders may find their operational approach is mainly direct, indirect, or a mixture of both. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the center of gravity while avoiding the enemy strength. Commanders may use a single direct or indirect approach or, more likely, may employ a combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. Additionally, the emphasis on or combination of approaches may have to evolve as the security situation and insurgent networks evolve. The commander’s intent and the approach(es) the commander selects will drive the methods used by counterinsurgents. These methods may be direct or indirect. Approaches and methods must be nested and clearly linked, since they often involve support from diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts by non-military forces. (See chapter 9 for more information on direct methods and chapter 10 for more information on indirect methods. See JP 5-0 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.)

Versus strategic considerations …


STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

1-77. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, several strategic principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-78 through 1-92 are relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to be exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.

LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE

1-78. Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to countering an insurgency. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a perceived condition by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people. (See paragraphs 1-27 through 1-33 for more information on legitimacy and control.)

I don’t believe there is much more to be said. While I personally don’t believe it matters if the government is effective (as in, it provides adequate services) as long as it is seen by enough of the population as legitimate. But that is a different issue.:p

[slapout9]

I am not sure I would agree ..., no, I pretty much disagree with your assessment of the distinction between a democracy and a republic. I would also argue that the use of the two terms is so ubiquitous as to make them meaningless. For example, North Korea is the “Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” In most cases a country is a combination of the two, it is a representative democracy – the population votes (democracy) to select their representatives (republic).

The only pure democracy I ever lived in was when I lived in Lebanon, NH. Once a year we had a town meeting in the school gymnasium and everyone from the town that was eligible to vote came to the meeting. All items were discussed and debated, and all the people directly voted on every item. Everywhere else that claims to be a democracy, some form of representative system is used. It is considered a democracy because the representatives are elected rather than appointed.

This is an interesting area, and if you are so inclined you should start a thread over it.

Might just do that:)

[slapout9]

I think this thread has run its course. While I will probably find other issues with the new FM 3-24, the distinction between the strategic objective of political legitimacy and the other operational objectives (Centers of Gravity like external support for the insurgents/cross-border sanctuaries) is fairly clear early on.
Operational considerations …


Versus strategic considerations …



I don’t believe there is much more to be said. While I personally don’t believe it matters if the government is effective (as in, it provides adequate services) as long as it is seen by enough of the population as legitimate. But that is a different issue.:p

I believe that is the main Political Objective, the desired Political End state but I don't think that is the Strategic Military Objective. The Military Objective needs to be the Motive of the Insurgency.

When I first came to SEC I was very conscious of how close COIN is to LE and I originally pushed the primary method of COG analysis of Motive, Means/Method and Opportunity. Traditional Military methods are just not going to work IMO. I now see that both the Army and Joint Publications on COIN included this concept for analyzing an insurgency, although one (the JP) appears to place it on a higher level of importance than the Army manual.

Which goes back to the concept of Linkage. Until the motive for the Insurgency is dealt with, establishing any kind a of legitimate government is just folly IMO. Which is why the main mission for the military should be to deal with motive of the insurgency and once that is done the political objective (winning the peace) of legitimacy can be done.

[Currahee23]

Just downloaded your thesis. I'm on a two week break from school right now, will see how much I can get through.

Congratulations, by the way!

[SWJ Blog]

Revisiting COIN Strategies in Vietnam (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/revisiting-coin-strategies-in-vietnam)

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[SWJ Blog]

Digging Our Own Grave? The Results of CT, COIN and Regime Change (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/digging-our-own-grave-the-results-of-ct-coin-and-regime-change)

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[SWJ Blog]

Don’t Hold Colombia Up as a COIN Model to Emulate (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/don%E2%80%99t-hold-colombia-up-as-a-coin-model-to-emulate)

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[SWJ Blog]

Is COIN No Longer Relevant? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/is-coin-no-longer-relevant)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN Is a Proven Failure (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-is-a-proven-failure)

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[Jedburgh]

Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation: Economics in Counterinsurgency Operations (http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IAS-004-March15.pdf)

Absence of a common operating framework, vague and conflicting guidance, and a lack of an integrated and cohesive effort among U.S. government agencies in the employment of economics in COIN operations is apparent. While clearly uncomfortable with COIN campaigns as an institution, the U.S. military and the U.S. government as a whole must remain prepared for future operations of a similar nature. A failure to develop a sound strategy for the employment of economics would inevitably lead to a repeat of the same ad hoc methods and structures used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worse, the same inefficiencies, waste, and abuse would likely be repeated as well, an issue clearly exacerbated by the immense fiscal pressures presently facing the U.S. military and the nation as a whole. This paper seeks to identify the fundamental cornerstones of sound economic strategy in previous COIN operations in the hope of contributing to a more unified and efficient effort in the future.

[SWJ Blog]

No, COIN is Not a Proven Failure (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/no-coin-is-not-a-proven-failure)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN & the Capitalists: Private Sector Development and the Endgame in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-the-capitalists-private-sector-development-and-the-endgame-in-afghanistan)

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[SWJ Blog]

CNAS: Don’t Forget COIN, Because COIN Threat’s Getting Worse (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cnas-don%E2%80%99t-forget-coin-because-coin-threat%E2%80%99s-getting-worse)

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[SWJ Blog]

Rethinking Western COIN: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflicts (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rethinking-western-coin-lessons-from-post-colonial-conflicts)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN Logistics: Let’s Do Camels (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-logistics-let%E2%80%99s-do-camels)

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN Scorecard Update (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin-scorecard-update)

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[SWJ Blog]

On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-winning-hearts-and-minds-key-conditions-for-population-centric-coin)

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[SWJ Blog]

Event: Lessons for Africa from Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/event-lessons-for-africa-from-colombia%E2%80%99s-counter-insurgency-experience)

The events two hour podcast is now available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY2T_kKHF2o&feature=youtu.be

[davidbfpo]

COIN or counter-insurgency features in many threads and this article is worthy of a new thread. The author Dr Geraint Hughes, UK Staff College, mainly covers Anglo-US practices, but refers to others and asks many questions about our assumptions.

Hat tip to the blog Defence-in-Depth again.

He concludes:
As Clausewitz put it, ‘[everything] is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult’. It would be highly dangerous for governments and their armed forces to be seduced into the logic of ‘clear, hold, build’, and to assume that they can fight a ‘pure’ and binary (government v insurgents) campaign that does not account for the possibility of proxy warfare, internecine conflicts involving multiple actors, state failure, and the potential for either escalation or metastasised violence across borders. Indeed, the characteristics of current conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere suggest that the terminological distinctions between COIN, PSO, ‘stabilisation’, and ‘major combat operations’ are potentially becoming increasingly less relevant.Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2016/03/07/uncertain-coinage/

[SWJ Blog]

No COIN Left In Afghanistan – Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking About (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/no-coin-left-in-afghanistan-%E2%80%93-or-the-elephant-in-the-room-that-no-one-is-talking-about)

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[SWJ Blog]

Guard Should Specialize In COIN: War College Study (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/guard-should-specialize-in-coin-war-college-study)

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[SWJ Blog]

How COIN Theory Explains Organizational Change (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how-coin-theory-explains-organizational-change)

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[SWJ Blog]

The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-coin-conundrum-the-future-of-counterinsurgency-and-us-land-power)

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[SWJ Blog]

Where Are the Women? The Unfortunate Omission in the Army’s COIN Doctrine (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/where-are-the-women-the-unfortunate-omission-in-the-army%E2%80%99s-coin-doctrine)

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[davidbfpo]

Nine threads merged in, a few were one post with high views.

There are over a hundred threads, in various arenas which have COIN in their title so searching is needed still.

[davidbfpo]

Citing David Betz @ Kings War Studies acclaim for this new book:
Insurgencies win by out-governing the status quo power and the primary thrust of their strategy is nearly always the provision of alternative justice to populations hungry for better law. Frank Ledwidge’s brilliant book plugs the gap in the literature commendably. It is indispensable reading.The publishers, Hurst & Co (London) intro says:
This indispensable book explains how courts are now part of the broader battlefield, deployed by both insurgents and state forces in a world convulsed by unconventional warfare.

In most societies, courts are where the rubber of government meets the road of the people. If a state cannot settle disputes and enforce its decisions, to all intents and purposes it is no longer in charge. This is why successful rebels put courts and justice at the top of their agendas. Rebel Law explores this key weapon in the arsenal of insurgent groups, from the IRA’s ‘Republican Tribunals’ of the 1920s to Islamic State’s ‘Caliphate of Law’, via the ALN in Algeria of the ‘50s and 60s and the Afghan Taliban of recent years.

Frank Ledwidge delineates the battle in such ungoverned spaces between counterinsurgents seeking to retain the initiative and the insurgent courts undermining them. Contrasting colonial judicial strategy with the chaos of stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he offers compelling lessons for today’s conflicts.Link:http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=a3800e1d3d40b72dd38ebbd1a&id=303caa7e00&e=80d42c7c0a

The author has an interesting bio indicated here:http://www.port.ac.uk/strategy-enterprise-and-innovation/staff/dr-frank-ledwidge.html

[davidbfpo]

This was a 2012 conference, held in Austin, Texas, with Kings College London, University of Queensland and the hosts The Robert Strauss Center. There is a list of articles by the speakers and on a quick check the links do work. Some names are familiar, others not and SWJ does appear.:)
There is a strong British emphasis, so a couple of Northern Ireland articles will appear on that thread.
Link:https://reassessingcounterinsurgency.wordpress.com/articles/

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary cum book review of Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Front-Patron-Client-Relationships-Counterinsurgency/dp/1316621804/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1502968475&sr=8-1) (Cambridge University Press, 2017):
The King’s College London professor takes direct aim at FM 3-24, and the West’s thinking on counterinsurgency, specifically its naiveté that the patron and client will share common political goals if the patron is doling out large sums of cash to the client.
(Later) Ladwig shines a bright light on some of the deficiencies in counterinsurgency literature and the United States’ naiveté about its relationship with its clients. His goal is to improve the West’s performance in future counterinsurgency battles.Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/hope-and-hype-advising-foreign-forces-in-the-middle-of-a-counterinsurgency-campaign/

[SWJ Blog]

British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/british-counterinsurgency-returning-discriminate-coercion-to-coin)

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[davidbfpo]

A scathing critique, entitled '‘Savior General’ Petraeus Gave Us the Wrong Bible;The fatal flaw in his vaunted counterinsurgency strategy' by an academic William Smith in The American Conservative.

It ends with:
Unfortunately, for those who have backed U.S. military interventions, setting aside issues of history and culture is a part of the great appeal of the manual. Supporters tend to think in terms of abstract secular ideals, not concrete cultural obstacles. Understanding the yawning differences in culture between the U.S. and, for example, a Middle Eastern country, should give great pause to planners contemplating the invasion of a foreign nation. But it is precisely this pause and reflection that our military planners and policymakers have been lacking.Link:http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/savior-general-petraeus-gave-us-the-wrong-bible/

[SWJ Blog]

Understanding the “IN” in COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/understanding-the-%E2%80%9Cin%E2%80%9D-in-coin)

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[davidbfpo]

Post 1059 refers to a book published in 2017, namely Walter Ladwig's 'The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counter Insurgency', I have just discovered a podcast when he spoke @ Kings War Studies (1hrs starts at 3 mins). It is worth listening to and is summarised:
Why has it been so difficult for the United States to effectively assist countries like Iraq and Afghanistan in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? That's the question Walter Ladwig asks in his new book, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press 2017), which analyzes the often-fraught political relationship between the U.S. government and a local regime it is attempting to advise and support in its conflict against terrorist and insurgent groups. Although a patron and its client are often presumed to be partners in such an endeavour, in this study of American interventions in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador during the Cold War, Ladwig details the stark differences of preferences and priorities that can exist between them. This often means the U.S. must give as much attention to modifying the behavior of its local partner as it does to countering the insurgents.
In conversation with Deborah Haynes, defense correspondent for The Times, he discussed the challenges of intervening in internal conflicts and how the United States can best exert influence over a government it is supporting in counterinsurgency to change their policies.Link:https://www.facebook.com/WarStudies/videos/1484732894914595/

He is political scientist, not a historian and his website is:http://www.walterladwig.com/

The book has several 5* reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Front-Patron-Client-Relationships-Insurgency-ebook/dp/B0716F3SSB/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519327988&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Forgotten+Front%3A+Patron-Client+Relationships+in+Counter+Insurgency