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Steve Blair
01-01-2002, 05:38 AM
I'm pretty well convinced. I was fortunate in having had two really great Battalion Commanders in Viet Nam. I know the first would not have and I strongly doubt the second would have made it to LTC any time after the late 1980s. DOPMA and its followers have not done us any favors. Not at all...

We've been in total agreement about this for some time, Ken. The system discourages any initiative or non-conformist thinking.

SWJED
03-20-2006, 02:10 PM
27 March issue of U.S. News and World Report - Hard-Learned Lessons (http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060327/27military.htm) by Julian Barnes.


...After three years of roadside bombs, midnight raids, and sectarian strife, one can safely say that Iraq is not the kind of war for which the National Training Center and the U.S. Army spent decades preparing. In fact, Iraq is the kind of fight that, after Vietnam, the Army hoped to avoid. It is a messy war in an urban landscape against multiple insurgencies, a powder keg of ethnic tensions that the United States still does not completely understand.

It is a war that is forcing the Army to change. Today, combat veterans, military thinkers, and Army historians are beefing up the study of insurgencies. They are emphasizing tone, intelligence, and cultural understanding. They are training designated skeptics to question planned operations. And they are rethinking the way the Army trains and fights...

LESSON #1: Emphasize stability and security

LESSON #2: Study counter-insurgency

LESSON #3: Know the cultural terrain

LESSON #4: Gain trust and confidence

LESSON #5: Improve intelligence analysis

But a short excerpt, click on the link above for the whole story...

SWJED
04-20-2006, 08:30 PM
Interesting COIN discussion going on at the Army.ca (Canada) board - Counter-Insurgency as a 6 Paragraph Parable (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=42347.0).

SWJED
09-01-2006, 03:16 PM
1 September Cato Institute policy analysis - The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency (http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640) by Jeffrey Record.


The U.S. defeat in Vietnam, embarrassing setbacks in Lebanon and Somalia, and continuing political and military difficulties in Afghanistan and especially Iraq underscore the limits of America's hard-won conventional military supremacy. That supremacy has not delivered decisive success against nonstate enemies practicing protracted irregular warfare; on the contrary, America's conventional supremacy and approach to war—especially its paramount reliance on firepower and technology—are often counterproductive.

The problem is rooted in American political and military culture. Americans are frustrated with limited wars, particularly counterinsurgent wars, which are highly political in nature. And Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Expecting that America's conventional military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success, Americans are surprised and politically demoralized when confronted by Vietnam- and Iraq-like quagmires.

The Pentagon's aversion (the Marine Corps excepted) to counterinsurgency is deeply rooted in the American way of warfare. Since the early 1940s, the Army has trained, equipped, and organized for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries, and it has traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies.

Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation.

The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security...

Jedburgh
10-18-2006, 07:19 PM
Presentations from the 10 Oct 06 Panel at the AUSA annual meeting:

Best Practices in COIN (http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06_14/slides/Sepp_AUSA06.pdf)

Successful COIN Practices
• Focus on the population, their needs, and their security
• Emphasis on intelligence
• Secure areas established, expanded
• Insurgents isolated from population (population control)
• Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader)
• Effective, pervasive PSYOP campaigns
• Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents
• Police in lead; military supporting
• Police force expanded, diversified
• Conventional military forces reoriented for COIN
• Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces
• Insurgent sanctuaries deniedThe Evolution of American COIN Doctrine (http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06_14/slides/Crane_AUSA06.pdf)

COIN Paradoxes
• The more you protect your force, the less secure you are
• The more force you use, the less effective you are
• The more successful you are, the less force you can use – and the more risk you must accept
• Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
• The best weapons for COIN do not shoot
• The host nation doing something tolerably is sometimes better than us doing it well
• If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week. If it works in this province, it might not work in the next
• Tactical success guarantees nothing
• Most important decisions are not made by generalsInternational Perspectives on COIN (http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06_14/slides/Riley_AUSA06.pdf)

“Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.”The Lessons of Tal Afar (http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06_14/slides/LTCHickey_AUSA06.pdf)

Change the Environment that Allows Chaos to Exist
• Secure the population - Patrol Bases, R & S
– Perception of security has cascading effects
– Enables civil projects
• ISF Partnership
– Dig to the root problems to improve ISF
• Combined Command & Control
– Develop combined speed & agility
– Focus on developing ISF capabilities
• Restore government
• Relationships matter – Build Trust
– Mutual respect is a combat multiplier
– Be even-handed
• Take personal Ownership of your AO
– People Can Tell When You Care

SWJED
10-18-2006, 08:18 PM
Thanks Jed! Just added these presentations to the SWJ's Counterinsurgency Page (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/counterinsurgency.htm).

SWJED
01-28-2007, 12:13 PM
Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/two-schools-of-classical-count/) - David Kilcullen on the Small Wars Journal Blog.


Discussion of the new Iraq strategy, and General Petraeus’s recent Congressional testimony have raised the somewhat obvious point that the word “counterinsurgency” means very different things to different people. So it may be worth sketching in brief outline the two basic philosophical approaches to counterinsurgency that developed over the 20th century (a period which I have written about elsewhere as "Classical Counterinsurgency"). These two contrasting schools of thought about counterinsurgency might be labeled as “enemy-centric” and “population-centric”...

Please comment on the SWJ Blog as well as here - thanks!

kaur
01-28-2007, 06:30 PM
Dave Kilcullen said:


Both have merit, but the key is to first diagnose the environment, then design a tailor-made approach to counter the insurgency, and - most critically - have a system for generating continuous, real-time feedback from the environment that allows you to know what effect you are having, and adapt as needed.

French General-d'Armee Andre Beaufre wrote in his book "An Introduction to Strategy" in 1965:

"... strategic plan can now be worked out. We are dealing with a porblem of dialectics; for every action proposed, therefore, the possible enemy reactions must be calculated and provisions made to guard against them. His reaction may be international or national, psychological, political, economic or military. Each sucessive action planned, together with the counter to the corresponding enemy reaction, must be built up into a coherent whole, the object being to retain the ability to pursue the plan in spite of the resistance of the enemy. If the plan is good one, there should be no risk of set-backs. The result will be "risk-proof" strategy, the object of which will be to prserve our own liberty of action. Naturally strategy must have a clear picture of the whole chain of events leading up to the final decision - which, be it noted in passing, was not the case with us in France either in 1870 or in 1939 or in Indo-China or in Algeria. It must also be remembered that dialectic struggle between two opponents will be further complicated by the fact that it will be played out on an international stage. Pressure by allies or even neutrals may prove decisive (as at Suez). Germany has lost two wars as a result of failure to grasp this point; she brought England in against her by invasion of Belgium and the United States by the U-boat war. A correct appreciation of the influence of the the international situation upon our own liberty of action is therefore a vital element of strategy ..."

Stratiotes
02-11-2007, 02:48 PM
I am, admitedly, not familiar with General Beaufre's book. But from that snippet he seems to be of the determinist school - if there is enough planning every contingency can be anticipated and the correct formulae applied to guarantee success. Chet Richards' little book, _Certain to Win_ addresses this thinking quite well with regard to business but his comments also apply to warfare. I think it is a rather simplistic view of the world that assumes we can anticipate how irrational human beings will react to everything we do and be able to guarantee success. It ignores the obvious question of what happens when two opponents meet both using that kind of thinking - if both are believing in guaranteed victory because they both believe they have fulfilled the perfect planning paradigm..... It also assumes human commanders of opposing forces are rational enough that one can predict what their reactions will be to every scenario in the "plan" - but by and large, human beings often do not act rationally. In fact, a key to success is very likely acting in a way that appears irrational to your adversary and, as the Boyd crowd likes to say, getting inside the adversary's OODA cycle.

Reid Bessenger
02-28-2007, 12:17 PM
I agree that the deterministic approach limits the depth of understanding and degree of creativity applied. The feature that makes this so is the nonlinear characteristic of human behavior in large groups. The thinking of the Santa Fe Institute toward greater understanding of nonlinear systems theory, and it captures some reasons for the inherent unpredictability of behavior, and the attitudes and perceptions that shape decisions. I think that there is a necessary place for reductionist work in the process of assessing an environment, identifying what is to be done, planning that action, executing that action, and assessing its effect.

Back on point, I read in David Kilcullen's piece a call for developing an approach to counterinsurgency that is appropriate to the environment or situtation in which one is to operate. I agree with that, and see that colliding with a desire to master an approach or small set of discrete approaches in order to provide a general purpose counterinsurgency capability. I'm persuaded that it isn't that simple, but there are methods that guide one to an approach that facilitates learning throughout the effort and provides sufficient flexibility to capitalize on insight gleaned.

120mm
03-07-2007, 01:13 PM
http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2007/02/20/news/news3.txt

A professor of Strategic Studies of the U.S. Naval War College has been selected to become the first holder of the Congressman Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for Counterinsurgency at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim will teach and help develop curricula relevant to counterinsurgency operations, including ensuring that the most relevant counterinsurgency material is included in CGSC courses attended by mid-grade officers. He will also teach electives in the CGSC, and deliver lectures at the School of Command Preparation and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Additionally, he will serve on Master of Military Arts and Science committees and conduct regular faculty development seminars for key CGSC personnel and faculty.

Hashim will develop a counterinsurgency outreach program by actively surveying and participating in "high payoff" counterinsurgency efforts throughout the Joint, interagency, academic and civilian arenas in order to promote institutional change in the U.S. Army. He will also periodically update Missouri Rep. Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, on the chair's activities.

120mm
03-07-2007, 01:14 PM
I'd say 5 1/2 years after the start of a "declared conflict" is about time to start thinking about addressing the problems of COIN at the institutional level.

John T. Fishel
03-07-2007, 02:50 PM
120--

CGSC has at least a fairly good history of teaching COIN and other Small Wars euphemisms. In the 1970s, when the army decided to forget Vietnam and COIN, it reduced curriculum to a mere 1 hour. At that time LTC Don Vought realizing that terrorism was the new hot topic saved all the old stuff under that file so it was available as COIN came back into play in the 80s. Late 70s and 80 - 81 is the period when John Waghelstein was teaching at Leavenworth.
In 92 when I returned as a civilian prof, DJCO had a committee of 7 or so guys devoted to teaching and deveoping curriculum on MOOTW. They included Britishe Lt. Col. Mike Smith who had served in Oman. We also used to have regular lectures by Larry Cable and Amb Dave Passage who had been Charge in El Salvador in 1985.

Tom Odom
03-07-2007, 03:26 PM
At that time LTC Don Vought realizing that terrorism was the new hot topic saved all the old stuff under that file so it was available as COIN came back into play in the 80s.

Don Vought as a civilian sat on my editorial board for LP 14. COL Denny Frasche was CSI Director and he recruited guys to look at UW. LTC Jack Hixson was Research Committee Chief and he let me--with Roger Spiller's support--go forward with the Congo 64 project for LP 14.

Hopefully some of this will hang on when the inevitable refocus on big wars and bigger battalions takes place.

Tom

SWJED
03-07-2007, 03:44 PM
Amb. Dave Passage (now retired) along with LtGen Paul Van Riper are our two senior mentors / grey beards for the Joint Urban Warrior and Expeditionary Warrior programs. Amb. Passage has been a god-send to the programs...

Stan
03-07-2007, 04:08 PM
He is a 30-plus year veteran of the foreign service and had extensive experience with both Latin America and guerrilla insurgencies. I recall he also spent several years as a youth in Colombia and much later as an analyst at the U.S. military assistance command in Vietnam.

I remember mostly reading about his days in Africa with insurgencies and his work as a negotiator during the US's diplomatic efforts in the 1980s securing the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Africa.

120mm
03-08-2007, 11:11 AM
I'm just completing ILE via correspondence course (Pain!!!) and I am underwhelmed by most of the content. There are a few acorns, there, but most of it is just slop.

As I am supposed to become an ILE Instructor here in the next few months, I have suggested that our ILE BN name me as their own COIN chair, and include more relevant information (some of it shamelessly lifted from this web-site) relating to COIN and current ops.

120mm
03-09-2007, 08:03 PM
I just need to get back with you on this. I spoke with the ILE schools director, and he says "We have enough of that stuff in the curriculum the way it is."

So, back to "checking the block" so Majors can do the minimum necessary to make LTC.

Jimbo
03-12-2007, 06:30 PM
That is why the active guys have to go to the residency course now. The people I have met who did the ILE battalion job in the reserves were not always the most up to date. If you really want the PME, you go to the resident course.

sullygoarmy
05-18-2007, 02:26 PM
Jimbo can back me up on this one. The core cirriculum has expanded in the amount of COIN instruction to each student at CGSC (can't comment on the correspondent course...I suspect its lacking). Although not nearly as much as I'd like, it was enough to teach the bare bone basics. During your elective periods, you can sign up for additional COIN/Terrorism classes, which I did. Took a great class on COIN, and two great classes on terrorism...really helped me in broadening my COIN/Terrorism knowledge base. Again, I actively sought out these courses to augment the basic COIN classes taught in the core cirriculum. Hopefully have an experienced guy as the COIN chair will bring out an increase the amount and quality of COIN instruction in CGSC and hopefully, that will spill over to the correspondance stuff as well.

On another note, John, we watched a Larry Cable lecture that he did when he used to come to CGSC...plus his book on Malaya was pretty good as well.

Shek
05-18-2007, 05:26 PM
This is good news. Of all the Iraq books that I've read thus far, I think that Dr. Hashim's is far and away the best. Of course, this is somewhat an apples and oranges comparison since each book has its own focus, but the endnotes on his book are incredible.

Sargent
05-20-2007, 02:47 AM
That is why the active guys have to go to the residency course now. The people I have met who did the ILE battalion job in the reserves were not always the most up to date. If you really want the PME, you go to the resident course.

As I understood it, for the Army the change for CGSC was to give priority to line officers to do the residency course. It was circa 2004 that I had a discussion with an Army O-3 about to be O-4 regarding this shift in the policy. Who knows whether this policy has been enforced given the manpower requirements of OIF/OEF. The Marine Corps has no such requirements -- my husband has been doing the Command and Staff correspondence course while in Fallujah. Also, the Marine Corps has had a reputation, at the War College level, of not necessarily sending people until _after_ they've had BN command. At least one person, whose opinion I trust and whose knowledge of the workings of the Corps is massive, has suggested this can be a problem.

One thing I'd be curious to know is what the stats are on reserve officer attendance at the War Colleges prior to 2001. It seems I run into a fair number of them attending the courses here at Newport, and I don't know whether that's a change (related to the operational requirements for AD officers) or the maintenance of the status quo.

Ski
05-20-2007, 11:32 AM
Actually, the policy is for everyone in the AC to attend the active course. Because of the manpower requirements for the wars, there are a lot of empty seats at ILE and the War College. The Guard and Reserve have started sending more officers to these slots because the AC can't fill them. There were traditionally a few slots for RC personnel in both courses, but again, because of the war there are greater opportunities available.

Sargent
05-22-2007, 06:25 AM
Ok, I've been working on this one since my first tour as a single-by-deployment parent. It's a bit cheeky, but as the old saying goes, many a true word is said in jest. This is the unorthodox view I referenced in the Yingling thread.

Comments and additional "slides" are welcome. Normally I'm opposed to power-point, but in this case, the visuals work -- lot's of good, visceral imagery.


"Babies and Insurgents: Why Raising Children Is Like Fighting a Counter-Insurgency"

Consider:

- Cartoon of parent throttling baby in a circle with a slash through it to illustrate the point that you don't win by physically crushing the baby. Even though you can. And sometimes really, _really_ want to -- sort of. It's that brief moment of insanity, in which we are all mostly lucky for not acting on the idea.

- A Little Rascals picture of one of them kicking an adult. Several shots from Home Alone. Etc. These illustrate the point that they can hurt you to their hearts content. With glorious impugnity.

- A picture of other people smiling over the cute baby. A freedom fighter would kill for this kind of press. Highlights the point that the insurgent is often ahead in the PR campaign, whereas the side with the preponderance of power usually finds itself coming up short on this front. If Van Creveld is correct (On Future War), the obviously stronger side is _always_ going to have a PR problem.

- A visual of a parent holding a crying baby in her arms, Tuesday on the calendar, with one of those thought clouds coming out of her head with another visual of the same set-up, except the baby is happy -- on a calendar in this view it says Monday. What worked yesterday may not work today, and today's victories could be tomorrow's tragedies.

- I can't think of a visual for this one, but it's where you solve one problem and simultaneously create another in its place. If you're a parent, I'm sure you've done this. If you find a route that is not laced with IEDs, it's probably got a few corners with ambushes.

- A corollary to the above -- just walking right into a problem all on your own. Like when you offer something and then can't do it and now you've raised expectations. You just step into the s*&t [FN] all on your own.

- A picture of a parent, done up like a Secret Service agent, doing the throw him/herself in front of the proverbial bullet dive. Even though they drive you crazy, you'd die for your kids. This is the idea that, even when the locals seem to be working against you, you have to be willing to do anything to protect them, so that they don't become insurgents. You have to prove that you have their security and well-being as your priority.

- How to train for the mission: Photo of a Marine PFC/Army Private in full combat gear holding an infant -- if he can keep that thing happy and safe for a month on his own he'll have an idea of what will be needed of him on a deployment to a CI. Scarier, in many respects, than SERE school.


Enjoy.


===================
[FN] I believe that reference to expletives in military history is both necessary, and one of the great bits of fun about the subject -- come on, we talk about some tragic stuff, let us have our moments of levity. I've referred to one of my favorite quotes, from Chosin, where the Marine, after being asked -- by a female reporter, no less -- what the most difficult part of the campaign was, responds, in a morphine induced haze, trying to get 4 inches of [grocery store muzak] out of 6 inches of clothing to urinate. As irreverant as reference to that quote might be, I do find it instructive. Another of my theories is the 4/6ths Principle -- that is, on the battlefield, all you'll ever get is 4/6th of what you need. The art is in making up the deficit. Exemplified by the John Wayne quote, "That's not all I've got, that's what I've got," from Rio Bravo. John Wayne could get away with it because his actual ass was on the line. It's not for the SecDef to say -- it represents his [albeit possibly honest] failure to do his job. The operational commander gets to make this sort of gruff comment that he'll make do with whatever he's given. [Rio Bravo being one of my favorite movies, with a great musical interlude by Martin and Nelson -- here's a link, but don't click on it unless you want to hear the song, because it comes up on its own.]
http://solosong.net/dino/rifle/rifle.html

sullygoarmy
05-22-2007, 02:04 PM
Sargent,
GREAT analogies that I think even our youngest trooper can relate to, especially if he/she is a parent! For your one bullet without a visual (solve on problem and create another in its place), I imagine taking a toy away from one of my kids, put it down and the other takes the same damn toy! Always a problem!

Thanks for sharing your thoughts on the subject. I think you've hit on a relevant, easy to use way of describing how to win/lose in COIN!

120mm
05-22-2007, 02:25 PM
As well as a nearly endless supply of COIN warriors among the women who are raising children. Hell, I bet a bunch of them would volunteer to go to Iraq/Afghanistan just to be able to take a break from the kids.:)

The question is; would we have to pay them to go fight insurgents or would they pay us for the opportunity to do something more restful than raising children?:D

My wife uses a tactic known as "mommy's mad at the world, and it's time to be very, very good." There are certain nation-states that might need this tactic. :eek:

Sargent
05-22-2007, 04:08 PM
Ok, you both made me laugh out loud with your responses.

I forgot another slide, and I don't know quite how/where it fits in. But it's the idea that, caretaking and taking a lot of difficulties aside, the parents also have to be a force for discipline in a child's life. They can't just let the children rule the roost -- ultimately that is only to the child's detriment, as they learn later in life that they aren't the be all end all of everything and that some people don't take kindly to spoiled brats. Maybe it's the "law and order" piece -- that is, as beneficent as you must be in certain respects, you also can't be too indulgent, you have to establish laws that must be followed by all or there will be consequences. Maybe the visual for this is a three picture scenario, first one is the child being told no cookies, second one is the child with the hand in the cookie jar, and third one is the child sitting in a corner on a time out (or, if it's not too offensive, holding his bum because it's just been spanked).

On the "take a bullet slide" I've got a scenario from OIF I'd like to put forward to illustrate and see what folks think about it. A fair bit of the grunt work of the insurgency is being done by regular Iraqi folk who aren't necessarily committed, but who need the money, and who don't want to get on the wrong side of the insurgents. You know, they emplace the IED or trigger it, eg. Or they're one of the prayers and sprayers who work in support of the A-Game guys. Now, let's say you catch the guy. What if, instead of putting them in jail, you offered them something better. You empathize with their situation, and you find out what they'd rather have. What did the guy do before? If he operated a little kabob cart, what if you offer a micro-loan or business grant to open a kabob shop? Maybe they won't all go for it, but some will, probably more than half. Once you get some going for it, I think you'd see a snowball effect. Or perhaps I'm just a bright-eyed optimist.

carl
05-23-2007, 12:40 AM
A fair bit of the grunt work of the insurgency is being done by regular Iraqi folk who aren't necessarily committed, but who need the money, and who don't want to get on the wrong side of the insurgents. You know, they emplace the IED or trigger it, eg. Or they're one of the prayers and sprayers who work in support of the A-Game guys. Now, let's say you catch the guy. What if, instead of putting them in jail, you offered them something better. You empathize with their situation, and you find out what they'd rather have. What did the guy do before? If he operated a little kabob cart, what if you offer a micro-loan or business grant to open a kabob shop? Maybe they won't all go for it, but some will, probably more than half. Once you get some going for it, I think you'd see a snowball effect. Or perhaps I'm just a bright-eyed optimist.

I think it is a good idea. I've read that turning the enemy to fight for your side is one the hallmarks of small wars won.

120mm
05-23-2007, 04:00 AM
In the very beginning of the "insurgency" we had developed an agreement with the locals. Some Fedeyeen strongman had kidnapped some family members, and dropped off a mortar and some rounds. If the farmers didn't fire the mortars on the base, they'd get their relatives back... one piece at a time. So, we allowed the farmers to fire on the "base", as long as the mortar fire impacted in an area that was "safe", our patrols wouldn't kill them.

I don't know what we could've promised the farmers to make them "not shoot" the mortar; as it was, after about 6 months, both the Fedeyeen and "Big Army" caught on to our "agreement" and it was back to being enemies again.

I'm a little disturbed by the Iraqi Populace = Children piece, (White Man's Burden and all that) but I have to say, you found an unexpected and accurate parallel with your unconventional view on COIN.

BTW - Would it be okay to yell at the Iraqis something like "If you guys say one more word, I'm going to turn this war around and go straight back home. And we're never going back!";)

Sargent
05-23-2007, 04:19 AM
In the very beginning of the "insurgency" we had developed an agreement with the locals. Some Fedeyeen strongman had kidnapped some family members, and dropped off a mortar and some rounds. If the farmers didn't fire the mortars on the base, they'd get their relatives back... one piece at a time. So, we allowed the farmers to fire on the "base", as long as the mortar fire impacted in an area that was "safe", our patrols wouldn't kill them.

I don't know what we could've promised the farmers to make them "not shoot" the mortar; as it was, after about 6 months, both the Fedeyeen and "Big Army" caught on to our "agreement" and it was back to being enemies again.

I'm a little disturbed by the Iraqi Populace = Children piece, (White Man's Burden and all that) but I have to say, you found an unexpected and accurate parallel with your unconventional view on COIN.

BTW - Would it be okay to yell at the Iraqis something like "If you guys say one more word, I'm going to turn this war around and go straight back home. And we're never going back!";)

Interesting about the mortars... I don't really know how this all works in reality, it's more of a directional idea (a la Builder and Dewar's idea of "planning" from an article in Parameters back in the 90s).

I totally get your point about the "white man's burden" aspect. I suppose that piece works better when you are fighting an insurgency within your own country. But really, it just goes to the point that law and order are necessary in the process of ending an insurgency/establishing a secure setting. In Iraq, this part might have to be done by the locals.

Sargent
05-23-2007, 04:22 AM
BTW - Would it be okay to yell at the Iraqis something like "If you guys say one more word, I'm going to turn this war around and go straight back home. And we're never going back!";)

Only if you promise not to use an "I'll give you something to cry about!" No kidding, I've actually said that -- and delivered on the promise, once -- to my son. Ooops.

VinceC
05-23-2007, 12:28 PM
"Are we there yet? Are we there yet?":)

What I love about this brilliant analogy is that it is something every human being on the planet can relate to as obvious common sense, because even if childless, we've all been children.

I desperately wish this idea wasn't so deeply enmeshed with the "white man's burden" notion of paternalism/maternalism, because the actual techniques are among the oldest behavior-development tools in the human arsenal.

Perhaps you can get beyond the paternalism/maternalism idea by relating this to group dynamics and social persuasion ... where success also requires repetition, restraint, simplicity of message, and an ability to relentlessly focus on the long-term goal in every day-to-day activity. Everything I need to know about COIN I learned in Kindergarten.

As I read through this, I keep being reminded of Fallujah in the spring of '04, when the four contractors were butchered. My unorthodox view of this is that one of the reasons the U.S. government hires the security contractors and pays them six-figure tax-free salaries is because they are risking their lives with the implicit understanding that, if their bodies were dragged through the streets, the news footage won't show dead American soldiers. In Fallujah, we collectively lost sight of this pragmatic reality and instead declared war on a city. It's as though we became guilty of shaken-baby syndrome.

wm
05-23-2007, 01:03 PM
While I find the analogy to child-rearing compelling, I think you may have focussed on the wrong age group in your analysis.

I believe that we are dealing with something more akin to teenagers rather than younger munchkins. I think an approach like that used by Kevin Kline with his son in the 2001 movie "Life as a House" might be worth investigating.

BTW "Rio Bravo" may be the Duke's best picture, IMHO. I'm particularly partial to the scene where Stumpy's (Walter Brennan's character) complaining about conflicting guidance from Marshall Chance.

Sargent
05-23-2007, 01:26 PM
While I find the analogy to child-rearing compelling, I think you may have focussed on the wrong age group in your analysis.

I believe that we are dealing with something more akin to teenagers rather than younger munchkins. I think an approach like that used by Kevin Kline with his son in the 2001 movie "Life as a House" might be worth investigating.

BTW "Rio Bravo" may be the Duke's best picture, IMHO. I'm particularly partial to the scene where Stumpy's (Walter Brennan's character) complaining about conflicting guidance from Marshall Chance.

The teenagers are more like dedicated AQ -- there's nothing you can do about them!

Seriously, part of the point of using the baby/small child as the object is to make clear the physical/strength disparities -- and how they don't matter. The initial point of comparison that occurred to me was that you are bigger and stronger than the baby, but killing the baby isn't victory, it is most definitely defeat. It is the similar situation to a Counterinsurgency -- you don't win by applying your overwhelming force -- in fact, that's often how you lose. That is, you can't lash out because they've made you insane.

On a separate note, regarding the paternalism piece, I do not mean to suggest that the Counterinsurgent side is the "parent" in the conflict. I mean only to suggest that many of the same ideas that govern parenting also governing the conduct of a counterinsurgency. I want to shake the notion that winning is fighting and killing insurgents and other similar activities.

VinceC
05-23-2007, 01:46 PM
With teenagers (I have experience on both ends here), it's really a test of how well you've done during the pre-teen rearing phase, with the caveat that there are too many variables for you to have had control over the outcome. Plenty of good adults had lousy parents, and vice versa.

The goal is to have given teenagers the behavior tools and experiences for them to have a greater chance of success as they respond to their hard-wired need to drive away from the group that nurtured them and find a new social group of their own. This remarkable evolutionary trait accomplishes two things -- physcially, it minimizes inter-breeding; and socially, it provides a mobility that allows each generation to take a critical look at the received wisdom and knowledge of the larger culture.

Or, as my wife would say, they go insane at age 14 and, sometime around 22, get over it.

It's helpful to understand this social dynamic from a COIN point of view, because our soldiers are teenagers or recent teens who have broken away from their nurturing group and have found a new social group in which to belong. At this age -- 18 to 22 -- humans can be intensely passionate about believing in and defending their newly adopted group and its values. On the other hand, their potential insurgent adversaries are of the same age cohort and believe just as fervently and inflexibly in their chosen values.

wm
05-23-2007, 01:49 PM
Seriously, part of the point of using the baby/small child as the object is to make clear the physical/strength disparities -- and how they don't matter. The initial point of comparison that occurred to me was that you are bigger and stronger than the baby, but killing the baby isn't victory, it is most definitely defeat. It is the similar situation to a Counterinsurgency -- you don't win by applying your overwhelming force -- in fact, that's often how you lose. That is, you can't lash out because they've made you insane.

On a separate note, regarding the paternalism piece, I do not mean to suggest that the Counterinsurgent side is the "parent" in the conflict. I mean only to suggest that many of the same ideas that govern parenting also governing the conduct of a counterinsurgency. I want to shake the notion that winning is fighting and killing insurgents and other similar activities.


My reason for suggesting the teen rather than the younger set is rooted in a view of the whole person. Parents of teens can apply overwhelming force in two different ways--they have the superior mental/rational card
(also known as "age and experience") which they can use to browbeat those teens. They also still have physical power over the teens quite often ("age and cunning will beat youth and brute strength every time")

On a separate, but related, note you seem to have been hoisted on your own pitard here.
While you say you want to shake the notion of winning via violence, your analogy seems largely to focus on just that aspect of the parent-child relationship. Your stated goal leads to another reason for my response focussed on teens: they, at least sometimes, are amenable to reason (while the babies and toddlers in your hypothetical slides are not). Parents just have to figure out what kinds of reasoning works with their teens. This is sort of like a clash between two cultures, which seems to characterize most COIN efforts that are not completely run from inside the affected country by its own forces. BTW, many teens are caught in the same conundrum: trying to figure out how to talk to their parents about their issue, they lack the common ground which causes their all-too-frequently-heard outcries of "Mom (or Dad), you just don't understand." Parents quite often do understand the issue; they just don't share the language (AKA cultural commonalities) to be able to express that understanding.

Sargent
05-23-2007, 02:31 PM
My reason for suggesting the teen rather than the younger set is rooted in a view of the whole person. Parents of teens can apply overwhelming force in two different ways--they have the superior mental/rational card
(also known as "age and experience") which they can use to browbeat those teens. They also still have physical power over the teens quite often ("age and cunning will beat youth and brute strength every time")

On a separate, but related, note you seem to have been hoisted on your own pitard here.
While you say you want to shake the notion of winning via violence, your analogy seems largely to focus on just that aspect of the parent-child relationship. Your stated goal leads to another reason for my response focussed on teens: they, at least sometimes, are amenable to reason (while the babies and toddlers in your hypothetical slides are not). Parents just have to figure out what kinds of reasoning works with their teens. This is sort of like a clash between two cultures, which seems to characterize most COIN efforts that are not completely run from inside the affected country by its own forces. BTW, many teens are caught in the same conundrum: trying to figure out how to talk to their parents about their issue, they lack the common ground which causes their all-too-frequently-heard outcries of "Mom (or Dad), you just don't understand." Parents quite often do understand the issue; they just don't share the language (AKA cultural commonalities) to be able to express that understanding.

I don't disagree with your critique of the idea. But I would submit that we don't even have a good, commonly understood starting point. Consider the "teen" piece as advanced Counterinsurgency, whereas the "baby" piece is remedial. We have such a strong tradition of force=war=winning, and that needs to be broken down in order to begin the process of learning how to do COIN correctly. Alternatively, the "baby" piece might be how to deal with the part of counterinsurgency where there is still quite a bit of violence afoot, and the "teen" piece is how to navigate the point when you've gotten the insurgents to stop fighting (for the most part) and now you have to deal with them politically.

Does that lower my petard?

marct
05-23-2007, 02:58 PM
Hi Sargent,


I don't disagree with your critique of the idea. But I would submit that we don't even have a good, commonly understood starting point. Consider the "teen" piece as advanced Counterinsurgency, whereas the "baby" piece is remedial. We have such a strong tradition of force=war=winning, and that needs to be broken down in order to begin the process of learning how to do COIN correctly. Alternatively, the "baby" piece might be how to deal with the part of counterinsurgency where there is still quite a bit of violence afoot, and the "teen" piece is how to navigate the point when you've gotten the insurgents to stop fighting (for the most part) and now you have to deal with them politically.

Why not combine them and, at the same time, add in some "grand parent" figures as the local sheiks? After all, one of the serious problems with the baby issue is that "White Man's Burden" imagery and that could be corrected with having the local elders in a grandparent role - it also reinforces the idea that it is okay to ask for advice (aka babysitting) and you are a twit if you don't.

Marc

wm
05-23-2007, 03:10 PM
I don't disagree with your critique of the idea. But I would submit that we don't even have a good, commonly understood starting point. Consider the "teen" piece as advanced Counterinsurgency, whereas the "baby" piece is remedial. We have such a strong tradition of force=war=winning, and that needs to be broken down in order to begin the process of learning how to do COIN correctly. Alternatively, the "baby" piece might be how to deal with the part of counterinsurgency where there is still quite a bit of violence afoot, and the "teen" piece is how to navigate the point when you've gotten the insurgents to stop fighting (for the most part) and now you have to deal with them politically.


The baby treatment piece is not really remedial. Rather it is part of a graduated response depending on where one is in the insurgency. It goes with Baby insurgencies (I think they used to call them Phase I--those that are just starting and/or have very little popular support). Being too heavy handed with anti-insurgency tactics sways public opinion towards the insurgents. Humor the bad behavior, and we hope it goes away. If it doesn't (as with Baby Dumpling now not only blowing raspberries, but blowing raspberries with a mouth full of food every time s/he's fed), perhaps more coercive measures need to be applied. But, as the Wicked Witch of the West says in The Wizard of Oz ,"These thing have to be done delicately." Graduated responses go along with the various phases of insurgency--I think the current operations in SWA require a more teen-parent-like solution since this is no Phase I Insurrection (and probably never was).
BTW, I think categorizing insurgencies as Phase I, II, II, etc. is a mistake. Insurgencies occupy a continuum going from limited popular support to massive popular support.

Does that lower my pitard?
Petards (my bad for previous uncaught misspelling) usually cannot be unhoisted, just as, more germane to the alleged origin of the phrase, "gas, once passed, cannot be recaptured."

TROUFION
05-23-2007, 06:18 PM
pe·tard
–noun 1. an explosive device formerly used in warfare to blow in a door or gate, form a breach in a wall, etc.
2. a kind of firecracker.
3. (initial capital letter) Also called Flying Dustbin. a British spigot mortar of World War II that fired a 40-pound (18 kg) finned bomb, designed to destroy pillboxes and other concrete obstacles.
—Idiom4. hoist by or with one's own petard, hurt, ruined, or destroyed by the very device or plot one had intended for another.

[Origin: 1590–1600; < MF, equiv. to pet(er) to break wind (deriv. of pet < L péditum a breaking wind, orig. neut. of ptp. of pédere to break wind) + -ard -ard]
Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)
Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2006.
American Heritage Dictionary - Cite This Source pe·tard (pĭ-tärd') Pronunciation Key
n.
A small bell-shaped bomb used to breach a gate or wall.
A loud firecracker.

[French pétard, from Old French, from peter, to break wind, from pet, a breaking of wind, from Latin pēditum, from neuter past participle of pēdere, to break wind; see pezd- in Indo-European roots.]

Word History: The French used pétard, "a loud discharge of intestinal gas," for a kind of infernal engine for blasting through the gates of a city. "To be hoist by one's own petard," a now proverbial phrase apparently originating with Shakespeare's Hamlet (around 1604) not long after the word entered English (around 1598), means "to blow oneself up with one's own bomb, be undone by one's own devices." The French noun pet, "fart," developed regularly from the Latin noun pēditum, from the Indo-European root *pezd-, "fart."

Sargent
05-23-2007, 07:24 PM
Yipes, tough crowd. No more word jokes from me.

Lastdingo
05-24-2007, 01:59 PM
First, I'd like to mention that I doubt very much that it's a good decision to become engaged in a COIN campaign outside of your own nation.
It's usually a hint that you have your troops where they don't belong, probably as unjustified invaders now occupying a foreign country.
A puppet regime asking for your presence and protection is no excuse to me, even not if it's 'democratic'. It lacks sovereignty as long as you're there with your troops.


Anyway, I have some - let's say out-of-the-box - ideas for COIN that try to address common problems in COIN.

A)
Raising indigenous security forces - competent, quick. And to have a credible exit timetable.
My idea for this is to have recruits as 'shadows' of your own enlisted soldiers. For each soldiers there'll be an indigenous recruit who just passed a three-month basic training. He'll learn on the job.
The NCO's observe which shadows are promising enough for NCO jobs and take them as their shadows, recruits from basic training filling the gaps.
After about two years the first indigenous NCOs will be sent to an officer course and become shadows of lieutenants. Senior officers need to be produced somehow else. This would take about three to four years until line companies would have competent shadows. In the fourth year the shadows become the primary units and act independently, the occupying company only as backup. After four years, the occupying company leaves and the shadow company becomes fully operational.
The recruits should (if the country is divided by ethics and/or religion) be at most to one third of local origin, the rest being from different regions - to avoid some problems that are common in inhomogenous country's armies.

If anybody believes that four years isn't enough - compare it to the force buildup of the U.S. in 1941-1945. Three years is already enough if we refrain from over-ambitious requirements.

The language problem could be solved within a year - it's simple for evena dult people to learn about 2000 words of a foreign language in a year and communication by gesture helps a lot. The buddy relationship between soldier and shadow and direct responsibility for the competence of your shadow should encourage quick learning.

The shadow concept has in my opinion several advantages
- clear timeframe
- competence can be observed very well
- atrocities are less likely
- understanding of the civilian society is enhanced
- It's almost impossible that in such a relationship new forces supposedly loyal to the central government are in fact local militias not loyal to the government.



B)
Driving around. How to avoid IED's and other ambushes?
Think about it; what does the IED operator depend on the most? Identification. If he cannot tell which one of the 500 trucks per hour that pass his IED is an enemy, he becomes useless.

My idea is to use trucks acquired locally. A repair show repairs the dynamic components (without changing outer appearance or sound) and includes some more equipment. A driver in uniform but mostly looking like the local truck drivers steers the vehicle, sometimes but not always with another soldier looking the same next to him (let's say his shadow;-) ).
This truck leaves the base with a squad or half squad for patrol or whatever.
After leaving the base, the need to stop some times and set up ambushes to intercept possibly shadowing enemy forces.
If on patrol, they can easily live off these trucks for days before they return to the base, buying additional foot and drinking water from locals (surprisingly and therefore not poisoned).
If they run into a situation that requries reinforcements, they can wait till those reinforcements arrive and remain undetected.
In the famous "A Stryker approaches a compound unheard other than a tracked vehicle and the raid preserves the element of surprise." example, this truck would easily beat any million-$ vehicle. It could even have some armor plating to protect against rifle fire.



C)
Bases...

It's common practice to build a kind of defended fort in an occupied country and to tie up lots of troops with the services and defence of the camp.
At the same time, theorists claim that troops need to be in close contact with the local population and to cooperate, win hearts and minds and so on.
I have a different suggestion that eliminates a lot of the logistical footprint, alienation and other problems ... if it works.

My suggestion is to exploit the hospitality which is usually a very strong cultural element in rural areas - especially un less developed countries. Hospitality is often a matter of family honor.
My scenario is that when a company needs to be based in a small town the captain meets the town's elders together with his translator. He makes promises as well as asks whether they want his protection for the next four years. He wouldn't meddle with local politics but just care about the security situation and assist the local police in fighting common crime.
If they agree, he can ask for their hospitality and whether troops can sleep at night in the houses of the locals. The company could pay the community for this service.
This seems risky, of course. But think about it; hospitality forces the house owner to care for his guest. Any treason would ruin the family's honor in many regions. Treasoning a full company with a hundred dead would invariably lead to the utter destruction of the town, that needs to be clarified through informal channels.
The benefits of such an arrangement would be that community and company are closely tied together - it would be hard if not impossibly for non-local insurgent groups to turn this community into their base. The community would benefit commercially from the occupiers by the direct payment that finances communal personnel and investments and the purchasing power of the soldiers (food, drinks and other goods).

The single most serious problem that I see is the posibility that cultural incompatibility leads to conflits. This includes fraternisation with house owner's daughters. But a problem is just a challenge and without thinking and disciplined soldiers it would be hard to succeed in COIN anyway.



D)
First rule: You're at home when you do COIN. If you're U.S. American and patrol on a street, the children next to you are U.S.Americans of arab or whatever background. Treat them and all other local population as you would treat your own people. If you don't, you may be sent to prison just like you might if you did what you did at home.
You don't bump into the car in front of you with a Hummer to speed up your travel by forcing him to change the lane. You don't stop vehicles at checkpoints with machinegun fire. If you want to search a house, get your permission on paper first and ask first, wait and finally kick the door only if necessary.
You're at an unknown part of your own country and the different language shouldn't irritate you. Simple rule, should be understandable for everyone. Every soldier who's too dumb to learnt his rule quickly will do so in prison for violation of law or at least violation of a standing order.

The purpose is to discipline the soldiers and to minimize civilian unrest about the force. It's also a matter of justness.



==============

I'm waiting for constructive critique.

Van
05-24-2007, 06:25 PM
The 'teen' analogy in COIN: Not a bad analogy; rebelling at everything for rebellion's sake, irrational, driven by hormones rather than conscious thought and reason, seeking affirmation and validation from their peers and the world at large, willing to use destructive methods to satisfy short-sighted desires, seeking causes greater than themselves and thereby falling in on self-serving and manipulitive leaders. And insurgents are pretty difficult people too.

One key piece that reinforces the analogy; shaped by the media. Teens (at least American teens) and insurgents are victims of the mass media. They see self-destructive behavior rewarded with media attention and approval, and they just have to get some of that for themselves. Granted, different media have different motivations. American media are about the profit margin first, last, and always, and sometimes allow personal issues to intrude. Middle Eastern gov't managed media are about stability of the gov't that manages them, so creating issues outside their own borders to draw attention from corruption inside their borders is the order of the day. The end effect is the same - less than mature viewers learn dangerous and destructive lessons from the talking heads. I would wager that the average American 14 yr old and the average insurgent foot soldier (not leader) have similar levels of emotional development. A scary thought.

Re: "White Man's Burden" - there's a big stigma on that phrase, but when you're dealing with populations that won't acknowledge cause and effect, or instantly ascribe "Will of God" as the only cause to all effects, it's hard not to slip toward that role. How do you get a population to accept responsibility for their actions without taking something of a patriariachal or matriarical role?

TROUFION
05-24-2007, 06:32 PM
The idea of the "Q-Truck" , like the old British WWI "Q-Ship" anti-Uboat and 'commerce raider', has merit. As a scout/recon platform, clandestine insertion and extraction vehicle, surveillance vehicle or convoy pointman or sweeper it could work well.

As an idea for large convoys, it is most likely impractical since the point of origion and the size of the convoy would be give aways.

Furhter the locals would be the deciding factor, over time they would probably notice and pass info to the insugents.

-T

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 06:36 PM
The idea of the "Q-Truck" , like the old British WWI "Q-Ship" anti-Uboat and 'commerce raider', has merit. As a scout/recon platform, clandestine insertion and extraction vehicle, surveillance vehicle or convoy pointman or sweeper it could work well.

As an idea for large convoys, it is most likely impractical since the point of origion and the size of the convoy would be give aways.

Furhter the locals would be the deciding factor, over time they would probably notice and pass info to the insugents.

-T
The gun trucks in Vietnam served as Q-Trucks at first, as did the M-113s armed with Vulcan mini-guns, at least in terms of unexpected escorts. In both cases they were quite successful (at least initially) at breaking convoy ambushes.

There were also examples of normal mech units leaving stay-behind patrols (LRRPs or regular grunts), in which case the M-113 was really doing the same task you're talking about.

So there is some history to the technique, although I'm not sure if local vehicles have been used before. Could be a very good spin on an old tactic.

TROUFION
05-24-2007, 06:44 PM
I think also, that LE uses local or clandestine vehicles for surveillance purposes all the time, it wouldn't be that much of a stretch to add this capability to the kit bag of troops in Iraq-Afghanistan for direct action and patrolling.

Steve Blair
05-24-2007, 06:49 PM
This is similar to what was done with both SF A-Teams in the Montagnard regions of SVN and the USMC CAP practices in I Corps. It was very successful (at least in the early days) with SF, and CAP also appears to have been successful (although there are arguments that it only worked in more peaceful areas or those more disposed to the SVN government to begin with).

Lastdingo
05-24-2007, 07:05 PM
Well, I meant the truck idea more for camouflage and less as ambush vs. ambushers as the old WW1 Q-Ship.

I believe it's plain silly to drive around as patrol on predictable routes in easily identified vehicles. It's even more silly to buy expensive armored vehicles that need a lot of gas due to their weight and transport only a few soldiers in them because they still can be crushed by simply larger mines.
In a country with hundred thousands of trucks it should be possible to merge with lots of them and simply drive to where you need to drive by looking unconspicious.
Identification would be much more difficult and likely not timely for IED operation even if every IED operator had and knew photos of every such trucks from the area. Either the effort to keep current info on those trucks is not merited by their small quantity or there are too many to be recognized...

Jedburgh
05-24-2007, 07:08 PM
I think also, that LE uses local or clandestine vehicles for surveillance purposes all the time, it wouldn't be that much of a stretch to add this capability to the kit bag of troops in Iraq-Afghanistan for direct action and patrolling.
Keep in mind that "undercover" vehicles are only good as long as they remain uncompromised. It doesn't matter how well they blend in once the indig recognize those specific vehicles are being used by our troops - that means the threat knows and they are now targeted.

During my time with the Gang Task Force in CA, the local LE (city & county) there had a difficult time comprehending what "compromise" meant. They would conduct surveillance on a subject and then meet up afterwards in the rear parking lot of a shopping mall just a few blocks away - both uniformed and plainclothes LE standing around the vehicles in full view of passing traffic.

At best it meant that those vehicles and officers were now compromised and would no longer be of use in future surveillance in that area. In reality, because of lack of resources (both men and vehicles), it meant that each future surveillance op using any element of that group would have to be planned with the understanding that it may be compromised from the beginning.

In sum, the use of undercover vehicles requires effective mission planning, to include counter-surveillance planning, when used - otherwise they are only effective for a brief period before they become targets like every other vehicle with overt U.S. markings (and those tinted-window SUVs).

Lastdingo
05-24-2007, 07:20 PM
Well, I've seen many trucks in not really industrialized countries looking very "custom" due to decorations, not really fitting spare parts, dirt, different colour spare parts and so on. It should be possible to change the outer appearance by exchanging part and so on. It's a matter of life or death and certainly justifies the effort if it works.
Anyway - an IED operator needs some distance to the IED to be safe from the explosion and safe from the pursuit. That means he'll have some distance between himself and the IED, therefore also difficulties to identify a truck that looks just like some ten thousand other trucks around in time.
That's so much more demanding than identifying a standard brownish 'camouflaged' HMMWV or Stryker or HEMMT as a target ...

Jedburgh
05-24-2007, 07:41 PM
Although there are certainly plenty of IED attacks against vehicles that are simply targets of opportunity, there are also many that are planned to hit specific patrol and convoy routes - and some that target specific vehicles.

In general, it ain't quite so simple as Ahmed emplacing an IED, then sitting and waiting with his finger on the trigger until he sees a US Army vehicle drive by. The bad guys are supported by sophisticated logistics and intel networks, which most definitely supply them with info regarding vehicle movements. This makes mitigation a challenge even for those commanders who aren't so stupid as to fall into predictable patterns.

The use of undercover vehicles implies a certain degree of importance to the mission, and puts them as a higher profile target once they've been identified - that is the inference of my comments in my first post in this thread.

You also have to do the strategic cost-benefit analysis of what the negative domestic public opinion impact if this tactic is given broad application and then fails: we have a number of soldiers killed by IEDs when moving in soft-skinned unarmored local vehicles. Not to mention considering whether or not we are raising the threat level to indig who use similar vehicles - and what the potential impact of an increased kill rate among those people would be.

I see the value of "blending in" by using local autos and hooptie trucks as useful to SOF and intel assets; and only with careful mission planning, as mentioned earlier. I do not see any operational advantage in broadening that use to conventional convoys or patrols.

Sargent
05-25-2007, 02:34 AM
B)Driving around. How to avoid IED's and other ambushes? Think about it; what does the IED operator depend on the most? Identification. If he cannot tell which one of the 500 trucks per hour that pass his IED is an enemy, he becomes useless.

My idea is to use trucks acquired locally. A repair show repairs the dynamic components (without changing outer appearance or sound) and includes some more equipment. A driver in uniform but mostly looking like the local truck drivers steers the vehicle, sometimes but not always with another soldier looking the same next to him (let's say his shadow;-) )....

C)
Bases...

It's common practice to build a kind of defended fort in an occupied country and to tie up lots of troops with the services and defence of the camp.
At the same time, theorists claim that troops need to be in close contact with the local population and to cooperate, win hearts and minds and so on.
I have a different suggestion that eliminates a lot of the logistical footprint, alienation and other problems ... if it works.

My suggestion is to exploit the hospitality which is usually a very strong cultural element in rural areas - especially un less developed countries. Hospitality is often a matter of family honor.
My scenario is that when a company needs to be based in a small town the captain meets the town's elders together with his translator. He makes promises as well as asks whether they want his protection for the next four years. He wouldn't meddle with local politics but just care about the security situation and assist the local police in fighting common crime.
If they agree, he can ask for their hospitality and whether troops can sleep at night in the houses of the locals. The company could pay the community for this service....

D)
First rule: You're at home when you do COIN. If you're U.S. American and patrol on a street, the children next to you are U.S.Americans of arab or whatever background....

Point B. is troubling to me because of the driver/passenger "trying to look like a local" piece. You run the risk of alienating the locals if they start getting targetted. Think about it -- if the insurgent cannot target the forces, they will target the civilians whom the forces are meant to protect. Also, it really wouldn't take long for the insurgents to catch on and devise a way to identify which are the trucks belonging to the military. I also don't know whether you want to be "hiding" from the insurgents -- it doesn't project the sense of authority I think is necessary in a counterinsurgency.

Point C. As the billetting of British troops was one of the causes for the anger leading to the Revolution, I'm not sure how well this will work, especially not for long periods of time. Can you count on hospitality for short periods of time? Sure. It's done now, for periods when forces have to remain in an area, and at least some folks make an effort to be kind and friendly with the hosts. And, in many cases, if the US forces have behaved well, the hosts will return the favor, e.g. making a pot of chai. On the other hand, billetting forces in localities where they can live off of the economy -- thereby injecting a bit of extra cash -- makes sense from a security and relationship building pov. That's why the CAP were placed right in the hamlets. And like the CAPs, you could use the real world skills of the troops (esp. when you use Guard and Reserves, where folks have real world jobs, like electrician and plumber) to strengthen the relationship.

Point D. This one is right on target. No more needs to be said.

tequila
05-25-2007, 07:58 AM
Re: "White Man's Burden" - there's a big stigma on that phrase, but when you're dealing with populations that won't acknowledge cause and effect, or instantly ascribe "Will of God" as the only cause to all effects, it's hard not to slip toward that role. How do you get a population to accept responsibility for their actions without taking something of a patriariachal or matriarical role?
Interesting. I think this idea represents a genuine blockade in any attempt to really wage "empathetic" warfare. If one knows what is better for the population than the population itself --- moreover, that one understands the population and their varied situations so well that this sort of judgment appears valid --- then how can one not treat the natives as "half-devil and half-child (http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/)"?

Sargent
05-25-2007, 10:53 AM
I am concerned that the concern regarding the "White Man's Burden" suggests a too literal interpretation of the "parent" analogy. The point is not to say that forces deployed to COIN should think of themselves as parents. Rather, it is to say that the two endeavors -- parenting and COIN -- present many similar challenges and require a similar skill set to succeed. The comparison is metaphorical, at least in my mind.

marct
05-25-2007, 12:02 PM
I am concerned that the concern regarding the "White Man's Burden" suggests a too literal interpretation of the "parent" analogy. The point is not to say that forces deployed to COIN should think of themselves as parents. Rather, it is to say that the two endeavors -- parenting and COIN -- present many similar challenges and require a similar skill set to succeed. The comparison is metaphorical, at least in my mind.

Good point but, like many metaphors, large numbers of the target audience will assume it is true - with all of their connotations. That was one of the reasons I suggested using images of Sheiks as grandparents - it can modify the White Man's Burden theme while, at the same time, re-inforcing the message that working with the Sheiks is an excellent tactic.

Marc

Sargent
05-25-2007, 12:14 PM
Good point but, like many metaphors, large numbers of the target audience will assume it is true - with all of their connotations. That was one of the reasons I suggested using images of Sheiks as grandparents - it can modify the White Man's Burden theme while, at the same time, re-inforcing the message that working with the Sheiks is an excellent tactic.

Marc

Marc, I think we're getting way ahead of anything my little metaphor is meant to accomplish. I don't have many pretensions that this goes much further than collegial discussion amongst myself and my varied colleagues. I certainly don't think this should ever be used as doctrine, as written. Rather, at most it is to set a frame of reference, give someone an idea of the sort of mindset that COIN requires. It's a way to understand COIN as different from conventional warfare. Nobody thinks that warfare is really _like_ football, but if you want to describe aspects of linear warfare, the football analogy works. (Although, I think rugby is a better analogy, but that's another point.) Even if it were taken "literally" there is perfectly good military language that describes the points without the ma/paternalistic slant.

wm
05-25-2007, 01:02 PM
Interesting. I think this idea represents a genuine blockade in any attempt to really wage "empathetic" warfare. If one knows what is better for the population than the population itself --- moreover, that one understands the population and their varied situations so well that this sort of judgment appears valid --- then how can one not treat the natives as "half-devil and half-child (http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/)"?

Perhaps this reponse really belongs in the empathetic warfare thread, but I tend to agree that the whole idea of a paternalistic approach to solving the problem is a mistake. I further think that an appeal to Kipling is rather mistaken. IMO, a better voice from British South Asian colonial rule, one which points out the problems with a paternalistic approach, is found in George Orwell’s essays from his time in Burma. I heartily suggest reading “Shooting an Elephant” (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/) and “A Hanging” (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/888/)

slapout9
05-25-2007, 01:13 PM
There are a lot of good points in using a family analogy particularly when it has a backdrop of tribal type warfare because family and Kin Folks are heavily involved on both sides. As for methods of attack it is extremely close to stalking and counter-stalking situations because you have that aspect of hidden or secretive enemies that often have extreme freedom of movement because they are hidden or unknown.

VinceC
05-25-2007, 01:22 PM
Nobody thinks that warfare is really _like_ football, but if you want to describe aspects of linear warfare, the football analogy works.

Sports analogies for warfare have had tragic results. They give the impression that the civilians and non-combatants sit on the sidelines and aren't involved. A better analogy might be rugby with hand grenades in a crowded multi-level shopping mall.

Sargent
05-25-2007, 01:27 PM
Perhaps this reponse really belongs in the empathetic warfare thread, but I tend to agree that the whole idea of a paternalistic approach to solving the problem is a mistake. I further think that an appeal to Kipling is rather mistaken. IMO, a better voice from British South Asian colonial rule, one which points out the problems with a paternalistic approach, is found in George Orwell’s essays from his time in Burma. I think the appeal to Kipling is rather mistaken. A better voice from British colonial rule is, IMHO, George Orwell’s essays from his time in Burma. I heartily suggest reading “Shooting an Elephant” (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/) and “A Hanging” (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/888/)

Again, I will say that if these are the criticisms of the idea, then I am not being adequately clear. I do not at all mean to suggest that there ought to be a paternalistic or patronizing slant to this. I don't think that a force fighting a counterinsurgency ought to think of themselves as "parents."

Go back to the first point in the "presentation" -- you can't kill the baby, that's not being a successful parent. It is neither successful in COIN to kill the locals. If a baby is always fawned upon, then in COIN you have to remember that the insurgents and locals will always have better PR. If as a parent you would do anything to protect the baby, then in COIN you have to see your role as protecting the locals, and sometimes even the insurgents.

For example, in a real life case: an IED trigger puller is captured, the jundi are beating the guy, probably going to kill him, and an American Lt. advisor jumps on the prisoner, as if to hit him, and stays there, thus stopping the beating. I doubt the Lt. thought of himself as a parent, but he used an instinct that is common to parents, to protect the "object" despite all the terrible things it may have done in the past. There was no paternalism involved, but the actions were similar.

I suppose it's time to get back to the drawing board to set the idea properly.

marct
05-25-2007, 01:31 PM
Sports analogies for warfare have had tragic results. They give the impression that the civilians and non-combatants sit on the sidelines and aren't involved. A better analogy might be rugby with hand grenades in a crowded multi-level shopping mall.

I love that! You're quite right about the mis-use of analogies and metaphors. They are, however, probably the best communicative devices our species has worked out for a "quick and dirty" type of communication.

Marc

wm
05-25-2007, 01:40 PM
Sports analogies for warfare have had tragic results.

Sports analogies aren't the only producer of tragic results. Misapplication of lessons learned from analogies in general can have tragic results. I submit that far too often the analogical relationship between two things is mistaken for something much more like an identity relationship. That is, instead of saying that "A is sort of like be in certain respects," folks seem to forget that analogies show only similarities and jump to a position that "A is just like B," forgetting the dissimilarities between the two things being compared. Using analogies should be limited to applying them as a heuristic device that may aid in producing better understanding of an otherwise-hard-to-grasp subject.

marct
05-25-2007, 01:45 PM
Really good point WM. When I teach using analogies, which I do a fair bit, I usually try to use two differing analogies and then ask the students how they interpret the results - i.e. what is the intersection set of the analogs. It avoids some of the analog = identity problems while, at the same time, getting the students to think in terms of set-theoretic based topologies.

Marc

wm
05-25-2007, 03:10 PM
Again, I will say that if these are the criticisms of the idea, then I am not being adequately clear. I do not at all mean to suggest that there ought to be a paternalistic or patronizing slant to this. I don't think that a force fighting a counterinsurgency ought to think of themselves as "parents."

Go back to the first point in the "presentation" -- you can't kill the baby, that's not being a successful parent. It is neither successful in COIN to kill the locals. If a baby is always fawned upon, then in COIN you have to remember that the insurgents and locals will always have better PR. If as a parent you would do anything to protect the baby, then in COIN you have to see your role as protecting the locals, and sometimes even the insurgents.

For example, in a real life case: an IED trigger puller is captured, the jundi are beating the guy, probably going to kill him, and an American Lt. advisor jumps on the prisoner, as if to hit him, and stays there, thus stopping the beating. I doubt the Lt. thought of himself as a parent, but he used an instinct that is common to parents, to protect the "object" despite all the terrible things it may have done in the past. There was no paternalism involved, but the actions were similar.

I suppose it's time to get back to the drawing board to set the idea properly.

I thought you were being quite clear in the original presentation. As I hope my more recent posts on this thread point out, I think your point has been misconstrued by misapplication of your analogy. You were making the point, I thought, that a major piece of a successful COIN operation is similar to the protective role that parents play with children. My original counterpoint was that the protection required might be more like a "tough love" approach to the world view of a teenager. That is, we don't need to be overprotective and coddling, as parents tend to be with very young children. Instead we need to teach self-protection in a protected environment (think of the sex ed lectures you got in junior high school--oops, sorry, another analogy).

My point about not being paternalistic, a la Kipling, Cecil Rhodes and the "White Man's Burden" was made to suggest that maybe the wrong lessons were being extrapolated from your original "protective parent" analogy. We ought not be paternalistic in the sense of trying to do others thinking for them. Rather, as I think the Orwell essays point out, we need to become more understanding of the viewpoints of those we are trying to help. Again, the "parenting of teens" view comes out. I don't want to tell my teens how to think. I want to understand how (and what) they think so I can more effectively help them make their own way in the world.

Don't flog yourself for lack of clarity. I thin this thread exemplifies the point about getting better understanding from and about the "target" (and that is a really poor choice of words) population. For another interesting example of multiple interpretations of the same piece of writing, take a look at the "Non Cents" thread under Doctrine & TTPs.

120mm
05-30-2007, 04:39 AM
Ah, yes, the beloved "distinction without a difference". Pole-vaulting over mouse-turds again.

SteveMetz
06-13-2007, 10:34 AM
http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2007/02/20/news/news3.txt

A professor of Strategic Studies of the U.S. Naval War College has been selected to become the first holder of the Congressman Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for Counterinsurgency at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim will teach and help develop curricula relevant to counterinsurgency operations, including ensuring that the most relevant counterinsurgency material is included in CGSC courses attended by mid-grade officers. He will also teach electives in the CGSC, and deliver lectures at the School of Command Preparation and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Additionally, he will serve on Master of Military Arts and Science committees and conduct regular faculty development seminars for key CGSC personnel and faculty.

Hashim will develop a counterinsurgency outreach program by actively surveying and participating in "high payoff" counterinsurgency efforts throughout the Joint, interagency, academic and civilian arenas in order to promote institutional change in the U.S. Army. He will also periodically update Missouri Rep. Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, on the chair's activities.


A bit of news--Ahmed apparently backed out of the position and they've opened it back up.

SteveMetz
06-13-2007, 10:37 AM
120--

CGSC has at least a fairly good history of teaching COIN and other Small Wars euphemisms. In the 1970s, when the army decided to forget Vietnam and COIN, it reduced curriculum to a mere 1 hour. At that time LTC Don Vought realizing that terrorism was the new hot topic saved all the old stuff under that file so it was available as COIN came back into play in the 80s. Late 70s and 80 - 81 is the period when John Waghelstein was teaching at Leavenworth.
In 92 when I returned as a civilian prof, DJCO had a committee of 7 or so guys devoted to teaching and deveoping curriculum on MOOTW. They included Britishe Lt. Col. Mike Smith who had served in Oman. We also used to have regular lectures by Larry Cable and Amb Dave Passage who had been Charge in El Salvador in 1985.


And, as you may know, Peter Leahy, Chief of Army in Australia, was one of the guys who helped us rebuild the LIC/OOTW curriculum in DJCO in the late 80s. After his student year, he stayed on as the Aussia exchange faculty member. Bob Liecht, Terry Grissom, and Roland Dutton were among the drivers of the process.

Larry Cable was a piece of work. You know the story about his demise?

John T. Fishel
06-13-2007, 12:20 PM
Hi Steve--

It's good to see you here. I did not know about the Aussie connection although I was somewhat familiar with Roland's and Bob's roles. Thanks for adding to the context.

I've heard about Cable's demise but I don't recall the details. He did, however, have the best characterization of MOOTW I've ever heard - "Sounds like a cow goig out fo both ends!":p

Cheers

JohnT

SteveMetz
06-13-2007, 01:30 PM
Hi Steve--

It's good to see you here. I did not know about the Aussie connection although I was somewhat familiar with Roland's and Bob's roles. Thanks for adding to the context.

I've heard about Cable's demise but I don't recall the details. He did, however, have the best characterization of MOOTW I've ever heard - "Sounds like a cow goig out fo both ends!":p

Cheers

JohnT


I loved Larry but HATED to follow him as a speaker (which I did at a SOF branch conference once). Despite his werid looks (black-on-black clothing, hair down to his butt), he was absolutely electric on stage. One of my rules for life is "Never follow an animal act, Larry Cable, or Ralph Peters."

But, to make a long story short, Larry claimed he was Marine Force Recon in Vietnam while a teenager, then stayed on as a CIA strike team guy for a number of years. Someone was doing some research and found out that--as well as the undergraduate degree he claimed--was bogus. He left his position at UNC-Wilmington in a cloud of scandal and the last I heard he was living on an ashram in New Mexico or something like that.

Van
06-13-2007, 01:43 PM
I have to echo 120mm's comments from earlier in the thread. I also just completed non-resident ILE and was very disappointed with the course work. Some bits were good, but the nuggets were less than 10% of the many hours of my life thrown away as I ground through that flavorless pap. Hopefully, the new chair will be able to ram more material about "normal" (i.e. small wars) Army operations into the curriculum for non-resident ILE even if it means missing out on some of the endless 'finer points' of the acquisition process.

To be fair, it is hard for the instructors and curriculum writers to get past the students' (accurate) perception that this is a "block" to check. Of course, there are exceptions, but the structure of the Army promotion system, and the culture of the Army today have placed CGSC/ILE in the pile of mandatory training requirements, like suicide awareness and consideration of other training. The students main motivation is not to learn, but to complete an assigned task. To add insult to injury, the big reward for completing resident CGSC/ILE is an extension of the officers obligation.

If CGSC/ILE is mandatory training, it should be designed to convey the material as painlessly as possible, in the minimum time required. If CGSC/ILE is professional military education and professional development, the curriculum should be engaging and challenging, not interminable drudge work designed to build calluses on the intellect. What it appears to be, is both mandatory training and professional military education combining the worst aspects of both while retaining the attractions of neither.

Recommendations:
1- If ILE is supposed to be graduate level work, award an academically recognized graduate certificate. People outside the military have heard of CGSC but not ILE, so an ILE certificate without reference to academic accreditation means nothing.
2- If ILE is supposed to be professional military education, minimize the endless, numbingly detailed discussions of bureaucratic processes, condense them to executive summaries (adequate for most warfighters), and focus on military education. Small Wars scenarios and case studies provide an ideal vehicle.
3- Overhaul the curriculum every year or two, not every ten years and manage the overhaul better (I got caught up in the big curriculum overhaul a couple of years ago and that was just abusive to the students).
4- If ILE is professional military education; exploit it. They've got a brain trust, replace some of the spiritual abuse of bureaucratic trivial pursuit with real world problems to address. A few thousand Majors working individually or in small groups is the ultimate distributed processing machine for attacking emerging problems. Yep, 97 out of 100 of the non-resident answers/recommendations will be rote, doctrinal answers, but those other three will make it all worth while.

SteveMetz
06-13-2007, 01:43 PM
Actually, the policy is for everyone in the AC to attend the active course. Because of the manpower requirements for the wars, there are a lot of empty seats at ILE and the War College. The Guard and Reserve have started sending more officers to these slots because the AC can't fill them. There were traditionally a few slots for RC personnel in both courses, but again, because of the war there are greater opportunities available.

I don't think there are any empty seats at the Army War College. The number of RC slots has remained consistent, at least in the resident course (the non-resident course has always been heavily RC).

Van
06-13-2007, 01:48 PM
P.S. I hope someone is in a position to invite the new CGSC COIN Chair to join SWJ :)

SteveMetz
06-13-2007, 02:57 PM
P.S. I hope someone is in a position to invite the new CGSC COIN Chair to join SWJ :)

They have to hire one first. They've opened the search back up.

Bill Moore
06-13-2007, 04:08 PM
Steve, I heard they unmasked Larry Cable, but then decided that he actually did have a relevant background and education (just not the original bill of goods that he sold), and that he was lecturing again at SWC. He has been published fairly recently also. I was on the receiving end of a couple of his lectures, and his response to a challenge was "I been there, I know, you don't", which told me he didn't know his audience, and his ego was out of control. None the less, I think he made some worthwhile contributions to the community.

John T. Fishel
06-13-2007, 05:10 PM
I looked at the job announcement. It is a remarkable salary for Leavenworth KS - $114 - 136k. Not bad even in DC.:D If they weren't insisting on a US citizen (even though they have the authority to hire a non-citizen) it is a perfect job for Marct. Surely, there is somebody in SWC who is qualified and interested. And Leavenworth is not really out in th boonies - close to KC and KCI.

Jimbo
06-14-2007, 12:18 AM
:)Hashim supposedly went to Iraq to work with GEN Petreaus et al. Van, the resident and non-resident courses are not the same thing, so I would suggets that you not rush to judgement on this. The school is looking for somebody with an established reputation in the field. When I sat in my outbriefing survey, what was clear was that there was a need for a chairperson on the faculty to get the faculty who teach the core COIN block on the same sheet of music, some faculty knew nothing beyond what the teaching notes had on them. The dilemma you will run into at Leavenworth is you are teaching a bunch of folks who might have never read any COIN literature, but they have a lot of expereince. With many of the faculty, the inverse is the norm. Tom Odom, I have lived in SW Louisiana and Leavenworth, I would opt for Leavenworth, you ought to apply!

John T. Fishel
06-14-2007, 01:05 AM
I agree. Tom, you ought to apply. I didn't see a PhD requirement in the job listing.

Dr Jack
06-14-2007, 02:07 AM
I didn't see a PhD requirement in the job listing.

Here are the requirements from the vacancy announcement:


Applicants should have a mastery of counterinsurgency concepts, theories, and studies. Should possess a combination of academic and/or military experiences in education at senior levels. Must possess an earned Ph.D. in a research discipline in the social sciences or the humanities, and have a strong background in counterinsurgency studies. Operational counterinsurgency experience is a plus, but not required. Strong interpersonal and communications skills will be required to interact effectively with the elements of CGSC, CAC and external audiences. Should have a proven record of teaching ability, academic achievement to include publication in the field, good knowledge of national security issues, and active contributions in the on-going discussions on counterinsurgency. The successful candidate must hold or be eligible for a high-level security clearance.

I suspect there will be quite a few applicants... but you never know. I may also throw my hat in the ring, but haven't decided yet. The closing date is 5 July.

Dr Jack
06-14-2007, 02:15 AM
They have also opened up a job announcement for a Culture Chair at CGSC. Here are the requirements for that position from the vacancy announcement:


Applicants should have a mastery of counterinsurgency concepts, theories, and studies. Should possess a combination of academic and/or military experiences in education at senior levels. Must possess an earned Ph.D. in a research discipline in the social sciences or the humanities (cultural anthropology or cultural geography as examples), and have a strong background in cultural studies. Operational cultural analysis experience is a plus, but not required. Strong interpersonal and communications skills will be required to interact effectively with the elements of CGSC, CAC and external audiences. Should have a proven record of teaching ability, academic achievement to include publication in the field, good knowledge of national security issues, and active contributions in the on-going discussions on cultural impacts on military planning and operations. The successful candidate must hold or be eligible for a high-level security clearance.

This job also has a closing date of 5 July.

SteveMetz
06-14-2007, 11:05 AM
Here are the requirements from the vacancy announcement:


Applicants should have a mastery of counterinsurgency concepts, theories, and studies. Should possess a combination of academic and/or military experiences in education at senior levels. Must possess an earned Ph.D. in a research discipline in the social sciences or the humanities, and have a strong background in counterinsurgency studies. Operational counterinsurgency experience is a plus, but not required. Strong interpersonal and communications skills will be required to interact effectively with the elements of CGSC, CAC and external audiences. Should have a proven record of teaching ability, academic achievement to include publication in the field, good knowledge of national security issues, and active contributions in the on-going discussions on counterinsurgency. The successful candidate must hold or be eligible for a high-level security clearance.

I suspect there will be quite a few applicants... but you never know. I may also throw my hat in the ring, but haven't decided yet. The closing date is 5 July.

I'm surprised they can do that. Here at the Army War College, we are told we can make a Ph.D. "desired" for a Title 10 professor position, but not "required." I guess Leavenworth's civilian personnel people interpret the rules differently than the Carlisle ones.

(By the way, I'm recruiting for an Asia security specialist to replace Dr. Andrew Scobell (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=5)who LTG (ret) Chilcoat lured to the Bush School at Texas A&M. Would be happy to provide details if anyone is interested).

John T. Fishel
06-14-2007, 11:36 AM
Dr Jack--

Thanks for clraifying. I was a bit surprised that I didn't see the doctorate requirement. Has its benefits but also its downside since someone like GEN (ret.) Fred Woerner (who was hired by Boston U as a Full Professor and worked there for some 14 years) could not be hired. Looks like it would be right up your alley - nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Steve--

Your personnel people are really screwed up. Leavenworth is not the only place that makes a PhD a requirement - NDU does as well. CPOs really do not understand the Title 10 law and want to treat it like Title 5 light:cool: This can sometimes work to the advantage of the individual or the organization; at other times it works against the interests of one or the other or both. For those who have doubt about the legislative intent of the law, an inquiry to Rep Ike Skelton would surely clarify (might even make some CPO bureaucrats squirm).

Cheers

JohnT

SteveMetz
06-14-2007, 01:18 PM
Dr Jack--

Thanks for clraifying. I was a bit surprised that I didn't see the doctorate requirement. Has its benefits but also its downside since someone like GEN (ret.) Fred Woerner (who was hired by Boston U as a Full Professor and worked there for some 14 years) could not be hired. Looks like it would be right up your alley - nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Steve--

Your personnel people are really screwed up. Leavenworth is not the only place that makes a PhD a requirement - NDU does as well. CPOs really do not understand the Title 10 law and want to treat it like Title 5 light:cool: This can sometimes work to the advantage of the individual or the organization; at other times it works against the interests of one or the other or both. For those who have doubt about the legislative intent of the law, an inquiry to Rep Ike Skelton would surely clarify (might even make some CPO bureaucrats squirm).

Cheers

JohnT


Actually, we kind of like listing it as "desireable" rather than "required." That means if a Fred Woerner comes along, we would at least have the option of hiring him. We normally phrase it "terminal degree" rather than "doctorate" though since our director is retired colonel with a J.D. In practice, all of the civilians in SSI except the director currently have a Ph.D., two of our officers do, and three of our officers are working on one. So we really only have one colonel who is "masters only."

Tom Odom
06-14-2007, 02:29 PM
I agree. Tom, you ought to apply. I didn't see a PhD requirement in the job listing.


I am flattered guys. I have to say that 6 years ago I finally got what I have never had in my life--a permanent home in a place I like (yes, I like Louisiana) and working with people I respect and love for what they do, not who they know. Leavenworth has its attractions and I look back fondly on my time there largely because of the people. But Leavenworth has a concentration of egos akin to the Pentagon and frankly the tax structure compared to Louisiana is oppressive.

I will stay a semi-Cajun.

Tom

John T. Fishel
06-14-2007, 06:29 PM
Steve--

I'm with you on listing things like PhDs as desirable - it does provide "tactical" flexibility. But I don't hold with a CPO telling an academic organization what it can and cannot do in terms of how it lists its academic requirements. I am particularly uncomfortable when a CPO does so with respect to legislation that was designed to give the DOD academic institutions the same hiring flexibility that civilian academic institutions have and to make those academic positions competitive with "elite" civilian universities.:)

Cheers

John

John T. Fishel
06-14-2007, 06:31 PM
Tom--

I understand completely. I wouldn't trade my life here on Rancho la Espada for all the endowed academic chairs in the world (except maybe one here at the U of Oklahoma):D

Cheers

JohnT

SteveMetz
06-14-2007, 09:43 PM
Tom--

I understand completely. I wouldn't trade my life here on Rancho la Espada for all the endowed academic chairs in the world (except maybe one here at the U of Oklahoma):D

Cheers

JohnT

Ironically, Max Manwaring was talking about your "rancho" just minutes before you made this post. Your ears must have been burning.

But on the job listing, we've decided not to fight with CPO on making a Ph.D. desired or required. They never tell us who we have to interview or hire.

Which reminds me, when I was hired at CGSC it was still a Title 5 position. Because of veterans preference, a couple of guys came out ranked higher than me. But the chairman of what was then the Strategy Committee of what was then the Department of Joint and Combined Operations (COL ret Dennis Quinn) wanted me, so he invented a start date for the position that only I could meet, and that disqualified the guys ranked ahead of me. Or so he says! I guess you have to take what Soviet FAOs say with a grain of vodka.

RJO
06-28-2007, 04:12 AM
Greetings, all. Paragraph 1-76 in the new Counterinsurgency field manual discusses the role of narrative (storytelling) in the development and maintenance of insurgencies. "Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions."

Can anyone point me to any publications that have specifically discussed this topic (the role of narratives in insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies)? I am not a specialist in the military literature, so there may well be a famous ten volume treatise on the subject that everyone else already knows -- if so, I'd be glad to be directed to it.

Many thanks.

Bob

SteveMetz
06-28-2007, 09:06 AM
Greetings, all. Paragraph 1-76 in the new Counterinsurgency field manual discusses the role of narrative (storytelling) in the development and maintenance of insurgencies. "Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions."

Can anyone point me to any publications that have specifically discussed this topic (the role of narratives in insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies)? I am not a specialist in the military literature, so there may well be a famous ten volume treatise on the subject that everyone else already knows -- if so, I'd be glad to be directed to it.

Many thanks.

Bob

Well, one example might be that many of the Islam based insurgencies use the story of Mohammed's struggles against the unpious elites of Mecca to explain their own struggle against what they portray as an unpious elite.

kaur
06-28-2007, 11:05 AM
Lawrence Freedman spoke among other things (as new COIN manual) in his "The Transformation of Strategic Affairs" about narratives.

http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/2006-adelphi-papers/ap-379-transformation-of-strategic-affairs

If you need case study about story telling, you should follow Kremlin activities in Russia (and neighbouring countries).


Putin pledged to hand out government grants to authors who will write proper new textbooks. Following his recent pattern, he used the meeting to again lash out at the United States. “Yes, we had terrible pages in Russia’s history,” he said. “Let us recall the events since 1937, and let us not forget that. But in other countries [the U.S.], it has been said, it was more terrible.” Putin suggested that Washington’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan at the end of World War II was worse than Stalin’s political repression and mass murder. Putin also cited the U.S. bombing campaign and use the defoliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam War (official transcript, www.kremlin.ru, June 21).

http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372256

SteveMetz
06-28-2007, 12:20 PM
Greetings, all. Paragraph 1-76 in the new Counterinsurgency field manual discusses the role of narrative (storytelling) in the development and maintenance of insurgencies. "Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions."

Can anyone point me to any publications that have specifically discussed this topic (the role of narratives in insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies)? I am not a specialist in the military literature, so there may well be a famous ten volume treatise on the subject that everyone else already knows -- if so, I'd be glad to be directed to it.

Many thanks.

Bob

One other thought. This is completely useless to you at this point, but I am addressing the issue in some detail in the book I'm writing with Con Crane and Ray Millen (Perdition's Gate: Insurgency in the 21st Century). We're probably looking at a 2008 publication though.

I think some of the best work on the role of "narrative" in conflict has been done by Mike Vlahos. See, for instance, his "Storytelling and Terrorism (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.pdf)."

(Mike is one of the most brilliant people I know. I was rapt listening to him argue with Ed Luttwak--who is also in my "top ten smartest people I know" list--at the Unified Quest seminars last winter).

And, if you want to pursue this, you could pose the question to Conrad Crane who was the lead author for the manual. He'd know the lineage of the idea.

SteveMetz
06-28-2007, 01:13 PM
I was reading this story (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-strategy28jun28,0,2921879.story?coll=la-home-center)from the LA Times:


Iraq strategy geared to U.S. pullout
Expecting a timeline soon, the military shifts main focus to Sunni-led Al Qaeda, a move it says will calm Shiite militias too.
By Julian Barnes
Times Staff Writer

June 28, 2007

BAGHDAD — U.S. commanders plan a summer of stepped-up offensives against Al Qaeda in Iraq as they tailor strategy to their expectation that Congress soon will impose a timeline for drawing down U.S. forces here.

The emphasis on Al Qaeda, described by commanders in interviews here this week, marks a shift in focus from Shiite Muslim militias and death squads in Baghdad. It reflects the belief of some senior officers in Iraq that the militias probably will reduce attacks once it becomes clear that a U.S. pullout is on the horizon. By contrast, they believe Al Qaeda in Iraq could be emboldened by a withdrawal plan and must be confronted before one is in place...



That led me to wonder: Do we need to add a second major criterion when we develop a strategy for counterinsurgency support?

Here's what I mean. Our current strategy relies on effectiveness as the major criterion. We attempt to do what will be effective on the ground. But, perhaps, we need to give equal weight to political feasibility.

We all know that the clock is ticking whenever the United States becomes involved in counterinsurgency support. But it ticks at different rates depending on the nature of the conflict, the extent of American interests in the country facing an insurgency, and a range of domestic political factors.

Our current strategy and doctrine assume a slow ticking clock. Perhaps it would be better if strategy and doctrine explicitly indicated that military operations need to be different when facing a fast ticking clock.

Rob Thornton
06-28-2007, 04:54 PM
I'd say it may go deeper then that. Does the environmental context (I guess I mean GWOT) in which we are practicing COIN differ from historical COIN examples?

The methodology may be very similar, but the context at the political level might be very different - after all how many people thought the Vietnamese would follow us home? After reading some of what is coming out of both the administration, the 08 candidates and the bi-partisan congressional committees -I'm starting to see common ground emerging that might indicate we're getting a sense of how much the world has changed and what that means to our security at home and abroad. We're just so big and bureaucratic with some many divisive interests its taken us this long to start developing a common understanding. You can see it in the think tanks (on both sides, retired civilian and military professionals - even in the search for new terms to build consensus (the Sec State's use of American Realism). Consider the broadening of mind amongst the service cultures toward COIN.


We all know that the clock is ticking whenever the United States becomes involved in counterinsurgency support. But it ticks at different rates depending on the nature of the conflict, the extent of American interests in the country facing an insurgency, and a range of domestic political factors.

What we need is a foreign policy which defines these new challenges (such as globalization in the Info age, the effects of Global Warming, Population growth, Pandemics, etc.) and relates them to domestic impacts. Without that any legislation that is produced will be unguided, and probably either go too far, or not far enough. In order to gain the type of bi-partisan support we require, elected officials must have the means to assume political risk - they must be able to help the citizen understand why success (effectiveness) outside the U.S. in SSTRO means success at home, and vice-versa. Its got to go beyond a catalyst like 9/11 which puts our justification on a failure, or something gradual like gas prices which is felt overtime.

I'm not sure how we do that without demonizing a culture, or providing some type of clear, physical manifestation of an "enemy". When a soldier returns from OIF or OEF or some cruddy place in the world, he intuitively understands what is at stake, and how lucky they are to live in America. They have some sense of the randomness by which children are born into the ####ty places of the world, and they thank God (even if they don't believe) their children were not born there. Unfortunately, over time even the memories of soldiers might be dulled, and through pop culture, and political rhetoric. I guess that speaks to what someone who tries to articulate the threat in "pro-active" way is up against.

So as President the politically feasible depends on how well you can convince the public there is a threat that requires long term sacrifice (at least through 4-8 years), if you can convince the public that the gains (positive, moral things that make you feel good) are worth the sacrifice, and if you can contain that sacrifice to such that its penalties (those events you don't want in your neighborhood) are not more attractive then the sacrifice - extreme examples being - all your kids are killed in war and war is all you know, as opposed to lessened status abroad, less buying power, less security in places which you can choose to divorce yourself from. The public (if you frequent this site face it, your not Joe Public) is generally short-sighted and somewhat fickle because their day to day lives consume them they tolerate government only when it provides for them the things they cannot provide for themselves. There is big difference between the number of people who tune into American Idol vs. C-Span.

:)Ken - I guess I showed my hand - I'm in the Madison Camp. However in about 3 years I'm gonna watch a bunch more American Idol

slapout9
06-28-2007, 05:16 PM
What I don't understand is everyone knows we haven't finished rebuilding New Orleans and yes it will take years, due to the circumstances. But these same people think we can surge an entire country in 6 months and if it doesn't happen that way then something is wrong. :confused:

RJO
06-28-2007, 06:32 PM
Excellent, folks. The Vlahos and Freedman references look perfect.

Many thanks.

RJO

T. Jefferson
06-28-2007, 07:25 PM
Seems to me that clock speed is controlled by public perception of the war effort. If people see the war as badly managed, then the clock will run at a higher frequency. If people see the war is well run and the Administration is selling/explaining it’s policies, then the clock slows down.

Rob Thornton
06-28-2007, 07:34 PM
Slapout,
Off the original thread, but you may be on to a an example of a case study where Humanitarian Aid missions could be examined. You know we do TEWTS inside U.S. cities on MOUT/FIBUA but I've never heard of one that did it on Hamanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief. I mean, what a case study to consider IA friction, Logistics, security, infrastructure, Bio-Hazzards, etc. Its also one where we know quite a bit about what went wrong, when it went wrong, why it went worng, hard numbers on people, etc.

Even though it was Katrina that was the immediate catalyst for New Orleans we could use it to consider issues such as the combined effects global warming and mass population migration in the context of a myriad of "what ifs" such as natural disasters to refugee flow.

Rob

Dominique R. Poirier
06-28-2007, 10:16 PM
Greetings, all. Paragraph 1-76 in the new Counterinsurgency field manual discusses the role of narrative (storytelling) in the development and maintenance of insurgencies. "Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions."

Can anyone point me to any publications that have specifically discussed this topic (the role of narratives in insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies)? I am not a specialist in the military literature, so there may well be a famous ten volume treatise on the subject that everyone else already knows -- if so, I'd be glad to be directed to it.

Many thanks.

Bob

Bob,
Maybe I can help you and bring my own contribution to this exchange. In case where you are starting from scraps about the purpose and role of narrative, then I begin in introducing you to some fundamentals.

Imagine yourself as the CEO of a car maker, for a while. You want to sell a new car you designed and your plant shall begin to mass manufacture it in a few months. So, with the help of your advertising agency you start working on ideas to sell this new model. But your problem it is not very different of the others your main competitors manufacture. The reason stems from the fact that your marketing department aimed at a pool of customers likely to spend $25,000 to 29,000 for a Sedan and no more; and so your engineers couldn’t do miracles with that. All you expect from that future model is just to get a market share in this category and in this range of prices. But is this what you are going to tell to your customers?

Better not!

For, your customer would say that you are just attempting to fool them and that’s all. Is it likely that things turn to be otherwise?

No.

So, you have to tell yout customers something else if you want to convince them to buy your car, and not those of your competitors. The survival of your company depends of that. Business’ business is business, said Milton Friedman. Isn’t that so?

At some point you get the idea, at last.

You know that all your competitors import most of their parts from East Asia whereas you don’t because, for some reason of your own, you were unwilling to cut jobs and close plants.
On the basis of this fact you decide to change the name of your future car for “America;” a daring and bold decision.
Thereupon, your Marketing Manager tells you that it’s good idea, though not new, but that it will be a challenge nonetheless to goes on with that because if American people are sensible to that argument many of them hold that East Asian made cars are strong, enduring, and cheaper than American made cars.
So, to make such a strategy a successful one you’ll have to make your advertising campaign so compelling that it must take precedence over selfish considerations. You think that it is possible since Harley Davidson did it beyond all expectations in motorbike industry. Why not you?

The add your advertising agency brilliantly made shows the model America moving on a road mixed with video sequences featuring good looking American workers welding coach parts, assembling engines, putting a shiny air filter cover on which is stamped in a calligraphic style the name “America”. At some point we may distinguish a wavering American flag mixed with another sequence showing a huge crowd of enthusiast and smiling employees posing on the parking lot facing the headquarters of your company. The rich sound of the Chicago Philharmonic Orchestra is covered by a deep male voice entertaining the listener about the legendary American know-how and the spirit of constant innovation your company expresses in all domains, and so on and on.

Ten years latter.

You are alone in your office remembering your bygone angst, the first days on the road of the America, the huge and enthusiast media coverage, the broadcasted angry protestations of one your main challengers.
Sales timidly started the first year, before it literally skyrocketed from May on during the second year. It was a success you even didn’t dream of. You were just in need to introduce a new model on the market; and you made your company an American symbol. Around the world countless people wear tee-shirts marked with your company’s name. You published your autobiography last year and it is a best seller.
Good marketing and good for the image of the company! Your are a symbol of American entrepreneurship and patriotism. Though things happened accidentally you yielded at some point to the conclusion that it couldn't be that accidental. Today you truly believe what you said ten years ago and you are proud of your company the same way your loyal and patriot customers are to own a car it produces.


Well, I put an end to my fiction here.

That’s narrative. That’s why it is done for, and it works in politics and religion almost exactly as it works in business.

No matter how aware we may be of the deceptiveness of narrative, we all need it at some point. For, the world around us would seem gray, sad and cynical; purposeless, in sum.
Carl Yung is right when he stresses the importance of religion in our mind and for our mental balance. Personally, I prefer calling it a “need to believe in something that is not necessarily rational.” We need landmarks; especially in our complex world of today. Lenine said in jest that “religion is the opium of the people” but he missed to acknowledge that political ideology alike.
No matter how skeptic and disillusioned we may be; we all are looking for a narrative when we don’t have one already. Nothing in this world is done without it, from mere cheese to clothes, to sodas, to elections, to war.

Now, while talking about “counter narrative,” you don’t need to have much imagination to find what might retort the challengers of this hypothetic car builder. Possibly, they would attempt to fuel discontent among employees in its plants through bribery and manipulation of the labor unions. Possibly they would buy a lot of advertising space to some publication in order to influence their opinion and get them criticizing the performances of the America. Possibly they would manage to find a NGO willing to go to court because the company that builds the America infringed rules of respect toward the American flag, etc. In sum, they would attempt to damage the image and reputation of the company.

In order to afford the subject of narrative in politics and religion per se, I find as practical as purposeful to take a look at a comment relating to religion and insurgency I recently wrote on another blog; I name The Captain’s Journal. In this comment, I explain the purpose and role of narrative in mass movements and insurgency. Since it is my description of the role of narrative, it goes without saying that any critics expressed by the enlightened Council members of the SWJ are welcome.


You can find the integral version of this text (numbered #11), as taken in its context, at the following link:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/05/13/religion-and-insurgency-a-response-to-dave-kilcullen/

Another of my comments, numbered #16, I wrote on this same webpage continues on narrative.

MaxL
06-29-2007, 02:12 AM
Rob,

I think I may have said something like this already, but I think hard-nosed honesty is the key to winning long-term public support for operations. For one thing, it means the public will be less likely to hold unrealistic expectations. For another, it means the public is more likely to believe what you tell them after the campaign is under way.

I think it shouldn't be too difficult to gain liberal and conservative support this way. Especially if appeals to moral duty are made early and often--couched in religious terms, perhaps. Mind, those terms should be to the effect of 'Jesus told us to help the poor and downtrodden even at great expense' not 'Crusade!'.

The corollary being that if it proves impossible to gain support for an action without spinning the bejesus out of it, you don't proceed to spin, spin, spin, and undertake the course of action. Otherwise you'll end up where we are now or, even worse, where we were in 1969.

The problem with this idea is that I'm unaware of any examples of our political leadership being open and honest about the objectives and difficulties of a military action while trying to gain support for it. So it probably isn't realistic to hope for.

Mark O'Neill
06-29-2007, 12:17 PM
Rob,

Mind, those terms should be to the effect of 'Jesus told us to help the poor and downtrodden even at great expense'

I wonder what the large number of non-christian Americans would think about this as a justification for national policy or strategic planning? You wouldn't last 10 seconds in Australia trying it.

Thankfully, I have never seen anyone successfully argue a conops in our Army or security policy establishment on the basis that "Jesus would want me to do it". Our mob tend to be a bit secular and stick to the more mundane, rather than the divine... you know, good old fashion simple things like sound military strategic planning principles.

SteveMetz
06-29-2007, 12:31 PM
I wonder what the large number of non-christian Americans would think about this as a justification for national policy or strategic planning? You wouldn't last 10 seconds in Australia trying it.

Thankfully, I have never seen anyone successfully argue a conops in our Army or security policy establishment on the basis that "Jesus would want me to do it". Our mob tend to be a bit secular and stick to the more mundane, rather than the divine... you know, good old fashion simple things like sound military strategic planning principles.


Excellent point, Mark, that illustrates what I think is THE key dilemma of the "war of ideas" against Islamic extremism: our enemies are offering their followers eternal bliss and we're offering satellite television. But if we cannot compete in a LTG Boykinesque religious-ideological war because we are multi-faith/multi-cultural nations.

It's really depressing, but the only long term solution I can see is radical action to wean overselves off of petroleum, disengagement from the Islamic world, and treating people from that region like we treated Soviets during the Cold War, i.e. with no expectation of unfettered rights. We haven't reached the point of taking such admittedly adverse steps yet, but I think we're one WMD terrorism incident away from doing so.

But, I hope everyone is having (or had, for those of you on the other side of the date line) a happy Friday!

Mark O'Neill
06-29-2007, 12:36 PM
But, I hope everyone is having (or had, for those of you on the other side of the date line) a happy Friday!

Is there such a thing as a bad friday? After all, it is not Monday!

Will have good saturday too if the Wallabies put away the All Blacks in the Bledisloe Cup test match in Melbourne tomorrow night. :)

Of course, if we lose...:(

Sorry, getting way off thread.

Rob Thornton
06-29-2007, 04:13 PM
Clauswitz made a good point when he proposed that the longer a war continues the greater role chance plays (paraphrased).

War expectations have allot to do with this.

Until you can get the public to accept that chance is going to play an increasing role in long term conflicts where political solutions weigh heavily, its going to be a hard sell. That is not to say it can't be done, just that politicians must articulate the threat as so it is self evident. That does not mean they should mis-represent the threat, to do that is to erode trust, once trust is gone its not easily recovered. In today's info age, there are many wiki-ists who will go out of their way to find the truth.

RJO
06-30-2007, 02:47 AM
Many thanks for the thoughtful commentary, Dominique.

MaxL
07-01-2007, 11:45 PM
I wonder what the large number of non-christian Americans would think about this as a justification for national policy or strategic planning? You wouldn't last 10 seconds in Australia trying it.

Thankfully, I have never seen anyone successfully argue a conops in our Army or security policy establishment on the basis that "Jesus would want me to do it". Our mob tend to be a bit secular and stick to the more mundane, rather than the divine... you know, good old fashion simple things like sound military strategic planning principles.

Fair enough. To clarify, I was discussing garnering public support for a policy, and operating on the assumption that combining a moral argument with 'sound military strategic planning principles' would be a way to do that. In hindsight the Jesus thing was a bit much.

Essentially, I was trying to say what Rob said, much more concisely than I managed, in his most recent post in this thread.

kaur
07-05-2007, 10:27 AM
Here is part of the Freedman's book, that describes narratives.

http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=4184174

RJO
07-05-2007, 06:04 PM
Many thanks, kaur. I will read that with interest. I've done some work in the past on narrative in the sciences, and am trying to see how that work might fit in with the issues discussed here.

Bob

VinceC
07-05-2007, 06:58 PM
One thing to think about: We are comfortable with the role of narrative in Western civilization -- it embodies the idea of starting at a beginning and taking actions that cause reactions, until you reach a logical outcome. This includes the concept, deeply rooted in our culture, of overall strategic progress toward better conditions of existence, despite short-term setbacks and complications. We live in a cause-and-effect culture.

Communicating with other cultures might require different techniques and strategies. For example, the Jewish and Christian Bibles are organized with a strong narrative dimension. The Quran is organized by chapter lengths, starting with the longest chaperter first. It does contain sub-narratives, but its overriding element is that the Quran was not created but is the truthful word of G-d that has always existed, and which was revealed -- first at once, then in comprehensible portions -- to the Prophet (peace be upon him).

If you consider some of the most enduring art of the Muslim world ... calligraphy, architecture, weaving and carpets ... these are not narrative works but are based instead on elegance, harmony, and intricate presentation.

Brian Gellman
07-11-2007, 10:39 AM
Many COIN theorists discuss how the guerilla or insurgent has time on their side, and that often they only need to survive to win. However, in Iraq, time (or lack there of) has always been a concern of key leaders of the Iraqi insurgency. There have been many incidents where insurgent leaders demanded an insurgent "surge" such as during elections and other milestone events. The insurgents do not want to just sit around and wait for the government to collapse, they feel pressure to increase instability before the government does have an effective counter-insurgent force, and before the people truly grow tired of insurgent presence. This is what I believe happened in al Anbar (specifically Ar Ramadhi). The Iraqi people just got tired of the AQ types, joined up and kicked them out. AQI moved elsewhere. Eventually AQI will be forced out of that province as well. It is a matter of time. But how long?

I posit that time is not solely in favor of the insurgent, as much COIN study suggests, and the counterinsurgent can use time to his advantage after proper analysis. Everyone is worried about time. Everyone wants to see change. A counter argument might be that the insurgent, a soccer fan, may see a stalemate against a stronger opponent, similar to a tie, as a victory. But eventually people want to see real gains and real wins. Just as we ask how much time the US has before our strategic CoG, the will of the American people, is broken, we should give serious thought and discussion to just how long AQI and other Iraqi insurgents have until their popular support recedes due to a lack of any tangible gains.

Recommendations for analysis:

1. Determine an estimate of how long insurgent organizations can sustain the fight. How long will the population tolerate them, how long will their local and foreign support last in a particular region? We can use these estimates to help determine time frames for troop levels and goals for security force training. We can focus efforts where we feel insurgents have the least amount of time remaining.

2. What are the “deal breakers” with the population that might end passive or active support for the insurgents? What events might influence foreign entities to cut ties to the insurgents? We can use “deal breaker” events to decrease the time insurgents have left before losing popular support. (Many of the deal breakers would be actions taken by the insurgent, however, if we know what they are, when they happen we can be better prepared to exploit them).

3. Perhaps we should demand a timetable for AQI's withdrawal. When they refuse to give one as we have refused, it may have an effect on their local support, just as our refusal to submit a time table affects our support. We have to stop thinking of the insurgent guerilla as this mythical entity that cannot be beaten and use their own strategies against them.

SteveMetz
07-11-2007, 11:03 AM
Many COIN theorists discuss how the guerilla or insurgent has time on their side, and that often they only need to survive to win. However, in Iraq, time (or lack there of) has always been a concern of key leaders of the Iraqi insurgency. There have been many incidents where insurgent leaders demanded an insurgent "surge" such as during elections and other milestone events. The insurgents do not want to just sit around and wait for the government to collapse, they feel pressure to increase instability before the government does have an effective counter-insurgent force, and before the people truly grow tired of insurgent presence. This is what I believe happened in al Anbar (specifically Ar Ramadhi). The Iraqi people just got tired of the AQ types, joined up and kicked them out. AQI moved elsewhere. Eventually AQI will be forced out of that province as well. It is a matter of time. But how long?

I posit that time is not solely in favor of the insurgent, as much COIN study suggests, and the counterinsurgent can use time to his advantage after proper analysis. Everyone is worried about time. Everyone wants to see change. A counter argument might be that the insurgent, a soccer fan, may see a stalemate against a stronger opponent, similar to a tie, as a victory. But eventually people want to see real gains and real wins. Just as we ask how much time the US has before our strategic CoG, the will of the American people, is broken, we should give serious thought and discussion to just how long AQI and other Iraqi insurgents have until their popular support recedes due to a lack of any tangible gains.

Recommendations for analysis:

1. Determine an estimate of how long insurgent organizations can sustain the fight. How long will the population tolerate them, how long will their local and foreign support last in a particular region? We can use these estimates to help determine time frames for troop levels and goals for security force training. We can focus efforts where we feel insurgents have the least amount of time remaining.

2. What are the “deal breakers” with the population that might end passive or active support for the insurgents? What events might influence foreign entities to cut ties to the insurgents? We can use “deal breaker” events to decrease the time insurgents have left before losing popular support. (Many of the deal breakers would be actions taken by the insurgent, however, if we know what they are, when they happen we can be better prepared to exploit them).

3. Perhaps we should demand a timetable for AQI's withdrawal. When they refuse to give one as we have refused, it may have an effect on their local support, just as our refusal to submit a time table affects our support. We have to stop thinking of the insurgent guerilla as this mythical entity that cannot be beaten and use their own strategies against them.

I'd agree with you that it makes no sense to draw the general conclusion that time is on the side of insurgents. There are many historical instances of the opposite--an insurgency often catches a government by surprise and poorly prepared for it. Sometimes, if governments avoid early defeat, they learn and adjust. Since government nearly always have access to more resources than an insurgency, if they can learn, adjust, and sustain their morale, the balance often shifts in their favor.

I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist. Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict. (One would assume that insurgents and an indigenous government both have an equal stake in a conflict).

In terms of Iraq specifically, though, I'm not sure I agree with your analysis. You are approaching it from a rational decisionmaking perspective, assuming that various participants are weighing costs and benefits. But many analysts have pointed out that conflicts like insurgencies often reach the point of irrationality--where participants make decisions based on something other than a cold analysis of costs and benefits. Americans have a particularly hard time understanding this, particularly when primal identities (ethnicity, sect, confessionalism, tribe) and cultural elements like the obligation for revenge and a hyperdeveloped sense of personal honor are involved.

To take a specific example, why would "foreign entities" end their support to "jihadists" in Iraq? Much of that support, at least that we know of, is unofficial (Iran may be the exception). How could we, for instance, pressure the Saudis to stop the flow of money from their citizens to Iraq (assuming they could do so) when those providing the funds see it as "defending Islam"?

I'm not sure what effect giving AQI a withdrawal ultimatum would have. AQ has long said they are involved in a hundred year struggle. They know that support involvement in Iraq is eroding quickly in the United States. I can't imagine how we could convince them that if they don't withdraw, we will make things worse for them.

tequila
07-11-2007, 11:14 AM
A problem with your thesis. You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership.

This goes even more for the groups that Malcolm Nance and others have identified as the main force of the Sunni insurgency - the native nationalist groups, whether originally spun off from the Ba'athist security forces, the army and RG/SRG formations, the Saddam Fedayeen, etc. as well as native Iraqi jihadist groups that have sprung up since, i.e. the Islamic Army in Iraq and its allies in the Reform and Jihad Front.

Basically, most of the insurgents are Iraqi Sunnis who live in Iraq. They have that basic advantage over Americans, who will one day go home. The issue has passed on from whether the Americans will leave (they will) to when will they leave, and who will hold what kind of power after they are gone.

A simple reading of insurgent rhetoric shows that Iraqi Sunni insurgents have not yet let go of some basic conceptions (1) they are the founders and the guardians of modern Iraqi nationalism (2) Iraq is occupied by both Americans and Persian "Safawis" - i.e. religious Shias are not really Iraqis but rather Iranians, a trued-and-true bias played on by Saddam from the old days (3) a truly free Iraq is one that is free from both American and Persian dominance - i.e. one that is run by Sunni Iraqis.

Lack of military progress is largely moot. As Sunnis feel more besieged, they will not turn on the insurgency which they see as the only legitimate defense against Shia supremacy. Insurgents may turn on each other to protect their own standing and place in the community, as in Anbar, but that is not a guarantee that they will not turn their guns on the Americans or the Iraqi government once the greater threat of AQI or other Sunni insurgents has passed.

Brian Gellman
07-11-2007, 12:02 PM
Steve and tequila,

Thanks for the very quick and well thought out replies. Here is a quick response, I hope to have more time later.

"I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist."

Ok, I agree with this statement, however, time is relative and it has different meanings to different people. Even the most dedicated protagonist can be forced to act prematurely and overcommit themselves if they feel time is not on their side.

I should add another recommended analysis: What is the insurgent's perception of time? Does the insurgent believe that time is on their side, and why does the insurgent believe that? How can we exploit this perception in order to force the insurgent to change their strategy (or at the very least, their tactics)?

"Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict."

Agreed, and this leads to the "outsider" counterinsurgent's perception of time, or lack there of. This is also important to the perception of the insurgent and probably one of the primary reasons why an insurgent might choose a prolonged strategy and trade space for time.

"You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership."

AQI itself is a foreign element, as are its ideas. And to the majority of the population, they are not welcome ideas. Some suggest that if the US left Iraq, that AQ could not survive in Iraq. If true, this suggests that many see AQI as simply a means to an end, one that is merely a convenient relationship intended to be discarded when no longer needed. If this is true, or even if only the perception exists, that would mean that AQI and their native Iraqi followers must have some sense of an end of their time in Iraq.

The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).

tequila
07-11-2007, 12:23 PM
The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).

Hi Brian,

Just FYI, I greatly enjoyed your posts at Intel Dump and it is good to see you posting here, assuming you are the same guy of course.

W/regards to AQI, hasn't its declaration of the ISI already made any departure plans moot in that it has given its own declaration to stay permanently? The backlash can already be seen in Anbar province and with the formation of the RJF. However, this has not ended in AQI's liquidation since, I would argue, the main drivers of AQI's continued support in the extremist Sunni community still exist --- the presence of the Americans and (most importantly) increasing violence between Sunni and Shia.

SteveMetz
07-11-2007, 12:27 PM
Steve and tequila,

Thanks for the very quick and well thought out replies. Here is a quick response, I hope to have more time later.

"I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist."

Ok, I agree with this statement, however, time is relative and it has different meanings to different people. Even the most dedicated protagonist can be forced to act prematurely and overcommit themselves if they feel time is not on their side.

I should add another recommended analysis: What is the insurgent's perception of time? Does the insurgent believe that time is on their side, and why does the insurgent believe that? How can we exploit this perception in order to force the insurgent to change their strategy (or at the very least, their tactics)?

"Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict."

Agreed, and this leads to the "outsider" counterinsurgent's perception of time, or lack there of. This is also important to the perception of the insurgent and probably one of the primary reasons why an insurgent might choose a prolonged strategy and trade space for time.

"You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership."

AQI itself is a foreign element, as are its ideas. And to the majority of the population, they are not welcome ideas. Some suggest that if the US left Iraq, that AQ could not survive in Iraq. If true, this suggests that many see AQI as simply a means to an end, one that is merely a convenient relationship intended to be discarded when no longer needed. If this is true, or even if only the perception exists, that would mean that AQI and their native Iraqi followers must have some sense of an end of their time in Iraq.

The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).


In my Rethinking Insurgency (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790) monograph, I argued that many insurgencies persist for reasons other than the dream of strategic success. They become a way of life for the insurgents. Insurgent leaders and footsoldiers realize that if the conflict ends, so does their access to resources, their prestige, their very psychological raison d'etre. If true, this means that simply altering the strategic equation may not be enough to end the conflict.


I agree with you that AQ is largely a foreign element. But, as tequila pointed out, it is also true that it has put down roots in Iraqi society. There now are Iraqis who fully subscribe to the AQ ideology. That suggests that even if all the foreign fighters left tomorrow. there would still be an AQI of some type.

Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

Abu Buckwheat
07-11-2007, 12:33 PM
A problem with your thesis. You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership.

You are absolutely right that the Sunnis will not turn on the insurgency but as I wrote in my entry, they won't turn on them specifically because they are Iraqi and not foreigners.

I have lived in Iraq for quite a while and I believe that for all of AQI’s efforts to assist their Iraqi brothers they are still considered a foreign force by the community (both Sunni and non-Sunni). The Iraqi insurgents under arms who follow their Salafist philosophy may number in the low hundreds as opposed to the Iraqi rejectionist religious extremists or the neo-Baathist nationalists. They see themselves as the true Iraqi resistance. This is why the Islamic State of Iraq suffered so much and why the

The efforts of AQI are just complimentary to the entire "eject the occupiers" mission of the entire Sunni Resistance. They operate a specific mission with specific goals that just happen to be complimentary to the over all mission of each group, including stoking sectarian violence. What happens there after the occupation is entirely up to each groups' own long-term strategy but I doubt there will be grateful Iraqis willing to give AQI a mini-Afghanistan in the Sunni Triangle. They will be sidelined. Their real threat comes from their ability to keep professionalizing and acquiring weapons. What I was saying was that AQI's ultimate goal and end state for Iraq is not what the other two wings of the insurgency desire. I illustrated the singularity of the short-term strategy with the clear differences of the long term in this chart from The Terrorist of Iraq:

http://i7.photobucket.com/albums/y271/buckwheatz/035-InsurgentStrategy-small.jpg

I do not fear for an AQI run or influenced community because extremely few are Salafist Takfiris. What I fear is that the status quo will remain after we withdraw. Tequila also wrote:


Lack of military progress is largely moot. As Sunnis feel more besieged, they will not turn on the insurgency which they see as the only legitimate defense against Shia supremacy. Insurgents may turn on each other to protect their own standing and place in the community, as in Anbar, but that is not a guarantee that they will not turn their guns on the Americans or the Iraqi government once the greater threat of AQI or other Sunni insurgents has passed.

Classic and to the point. AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

Tom Odom
07-11-2007, 12:35 PM
Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

Such a far cry from the "bring it on" in 2004. Agree, Steve. But you are proving your own post as below:


But many analysts have pointed out that conflicts like insurgencies often reach the point of irrationality--where participants make decisions based on something other than a cold analysis of costs and benefits.


Tom

tequila
07-11-2007, 01:09 PM
AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

A great point. Also they provide a certain deniability to Sunni groups who realize that one day they may have to negotiate with Shias and Kurds. They can always say, "No, it wasn't us setting off all those car bombs in markets, it was those awful sectarian takfiris from the ISI."

For example (http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrArticle=50001&NrIssue=2&NrSection=1):


A front of Iraqi armed groups, which declared opposition to the foreign presence in Iraq, denounced on Monday the suicide bombing attack that targeted a market in Tuz Khurmato district in northern Iraq.

The Jihad and Reform front, including six major Iraqi armed groups, said in a statement on the internet that "the front denounces the bombing attack in Tuz Khurmato area where hundreds were killed and injured."

"While we denounce these attacks, we call upon all Jihadist groups to refer to the Holy Quran and the Prophetic tradition in acts concerning the people's souls, wealth and honor," the statement added.

Brian Gellman
07-12-2007, 01:22 AM
"Insurgent leaders and footsoldiers realize that if the conflict ends, so does their access to resources, their prestige, their very psychological raison d'etre. If true, this means that simply altering the strategic equation may not be enough to end the conflict."

Steve, I will take some time this weekend to read your article, I find the statement above very interesting and can easily believe it based on my experience. Again, thanks for your responses, as a relatively new student of COIN, I truly appreciate and respect your time.

In my understanding of COIN, you can target three things:

1. The insurgent themselves
2. The population who supports the insurgent (thus indirectly attacking the insurgent by destroying its logistical base).
3. Target the cause of the insurgency, the ideas that feed it.

In my experiences in Iraq I constantly found myself focusing on #1, hunt down an insurgent, one after another. I never saw any real positive effects in this strategy because we did not address #2 and #3 which set the conditions for the replenishment of insurgents we removed. There is no doubt that the insurgents will not change their minds, that many times the insurgents enjoy their status and want to prolong the fight for multiple reasons such as you suggest. Due to political realities, #3, removing the cause of the insurgency, US withdrawal, may not be a viable option, therefore I am biased towards option #2.

My post is suggesting a strategy that focuses on #2. We find the ties that bind the insurgents to the population, the "deal breakers", effectively poisoning the see in which they swim. This is why I suggest an approach that is not focused on the insurgent, whoever the insurgent is, with an desired endstate of getting the insurgent to change his mind or die. I want to find the "deal breakers" between the insurgent and their support base, and exploit it.

I believe there are always deal breakers in every relationship. If AQI planted roots in Iraq, what do the Iraqi people get out of it? Surely they don't accept the philosophy simply on its merit, there must be an arrangement.

Even foreign support of the insurgency has deal breakers. Once such deal breaker may be secrecy of support. Another may be how the money is used. I suggest that these are very important questions that can be answered and not simply discounted.

Brian Gellman
07-12-2007, 02:23 AM
Tequila, yep, that is me, same guy. Glad you enjoyed the post, Phil let's me play from time to time. Good to see a familiar face.


However, this has not ended in AQI's liquidation since, I would argue, the main drivers of AQI's continued support in the extremist Sunni community still exist ---the presence of the Americans and (most importantly) increasing violence between Sunni and Shia.

Question: I am confused about this statement. Are you arguing that Sunni and Shia violence increasing is good or bad for AQI and their continued presence in Iraq?

I would argue that sectarian violence, which is primarily blamed on AQI (whether they did it or not), is one of the "deal breakers" for the average Sunni Iraqi who simply wants to resist occupation, not kill their fellow Iraqis for being apostates. I believe it is the indiscriminate sectarian attacks that separate the average AQI guy from their local support. It is because of AQI tactics such as sectarian attacks on Iraqis that I believe time does not favor AQI, they (and their ideas) are foreigners that will one day wear out their welcome. The question is when and how can we catalyze it?

Brian Gellman
07-12-2007, 02:32 AM
AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

Abu B, what might be the "deal breaker" that would convince Iraqis to put that tool down? How do we separate the link between the people and AQI? Is US withdrawal the answer? Sounds like basic economics, if there is a need (remove the occupiers), it will be filled (AQI). If the need disappears, will AQI be out of a job and force to move on?

Dr Jack
07-12-2007, 03:05 AM
I agree with you that AQ is largely a foreign element. But, as tequila pointed out, it is also true that it has put down roots in Iraqi society. There now are Iraqis who fully subscribe to the AQ ideology. That suggests that even if all the foreign fighters left tomorrow. there would still be an AQI of some type.

Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

This reminds me of the baseball expression "play for a tie at home, play for a win on the road." If the struggle in Iraq is between AQI and the US, then the US is the team on the road... and President Bush wants to play for a win -- but AQI know it still has the bottom of the 9th in their "100 year struggle," so a tie works for now.

Abu Buckwheat
07-12-2007, 03:30 AM
Abu B, what might be the "deal breaker" that would convince Iraqis to put that tool down? How do we separate the link between the people and AQI? Is US withdrawal the answer? Sounds like basic economics, if there is a need (remove the occupiers), it will be filled (AQI). If the need disappears, will AQI be out of a job and force to move on?

I think the answer is rather rudimentary ... Petraeus and Kilcullen are focusing on the community, but again that community has its own insurgents they support because they are family and friends. They will make some inroads but then they will have to face the big questions. What about our children's comfort and safety (not from AQI but from the Shiites and a lack of electricity?)

To break the deal with AQI there would have to be a monumental shift in the political and economic recovery in Iraq. I mean Marshall plan sized in its scope and intent. The country is massively broken and until the basics of electricity and jobs are restored, there won't be security. The contracting methods we have used (American only equipment, US Company's as lead partners, politcal sole source, cost plus contracts for shoddy work) have guaranteed there would never be a reconstruction. We need to open it up to the world and expect to pay a heavy price.

We have to go back to square one on reconstruction. I have a blog entry I'll post later this week that talks about how much in concessions the US & GoI will have to make, and it is substantial, but the entire American effort has been based on the stick. Micro-reconstruction programs such as those in Anbar can make a minor local difference and only as long as the money goes to the Sheiks but a massive Iraq-wide reconsituction, using Middle East companies from Saudi and Syria (Yeah, I said it!) with Iraqi-only subcontractors, building new electrical plants, free distribution of Diesel for generators and militarization of the oil industry. To be honest the UN is far more skilled at this kind of massive people management than we ever will be and they should be brought in to bring back the displaced people and refugees and document them.

Start simple ... initiate a new National boimetric ID card program with RFID embedded. It should start with all police and soldiers... some have been checked but we need to sort them out gang-style and let them know there is a permanent trackable system that can identify them down to the retina. Since they love a good conspiracy and believe the TV show "24" is a CIA documentary, that will actually scare quite a few of them. Then make a simple rule ... no new ID, no movement throughout the coutry. Period.

Let the UN administer a natonal registration in exchange for food, air conditioners and diesel oil. We have got to get people registered under a more modern system and know exactly whom we are dealing with.

The insurgency has to be bought. Nothing less will do. If that means setting honey-pots for Sunni politicians and enriching them, then it has to be done on a scale that far exceeds what they get from oil smuggling ... once the insurgents have a choice between money, commerce or fighting and no air conditioning for their kids, they will seek more concessions.

I have met some of the Sunni insurgents and their extremist supporters in other ME countries... if I could put it in a word what they want it would be Money... closely followed by electricity for air conditioning. If those conditions are met then AQI would only have to hit one of their electrical plants to break the deal. Its really that simple.

Abu Buckwheat
07-12-2007, 03:32 AM
This reminds me of the baseball expression "play for a tie at home, play for a win on the road." If the struggle in Iraq is between AQI and the US, then the US is the team on the road... and President Bush wants to play for a win -- but AQI know it still has the bottom of the 9th in their "100 year struggle," so a tie works for now.

Good Analogy. I put it this way ... "You Stay, We Win ... You leave, We Win."

marct
07-12-2007, 12:12 PM
Hi Brian,


In my understanding of COIN, you can target three things:

1. The insurgent themselves
2. The population who supports the insurgent (thus indirectly attacking the insurgent by destroying its logistical base).
3. Target the cause of the insurgency, the ideas that feed it.

I really think that you should split your third point into three separate ones:

Target the physical, environmental and infrastructural causes of the insurgency. As an example, consider how the Thais broke their northern rebellion by building a highway into te northern provinces.
Target the social and political causes of the insurgency. An example would be the land tenure reformation in Bolivia that led to Guevera being beaten and betrayed.
Target the ideological and symbolic causes of the insurgency. This is the hardest one, but a good example comes out of Al Anbar right now.In actuality, all three are interlinked quite heavily, as Abu Buckwheat alludes to when he says


Micro-reconstruction programs such as those in Anbar can make a minor local difference and only as long as the money goes to the Sheiks but a massive Iraq-wide reconsituction, using Middle East companies from Saudi and Syria (Yeah, I said it!) with Iraqi-only subcontractors, building new electrical plants, free distribution of Diesel for generators and militarization of the oil industry.

One of the points I really liked about this post was that it just highlights so many of the things that the US did wrong in the attempts at reconstruction. If a Marshall Plan sized operation had been planned at the beginning, it could have worked, but the current version is, in many ways, an insult to much of the Muslim world. In effect, it's saying, "listen kids, we know you are incompetent so we'll do it and you'd better thank us for doing it. Be nice children and say we are great." No wonder that it isn't hard to wave the "occupiers" flag and get recruits!:wry:

Basically, as far as reconstruction is concerned, there are really only two options - overwhelming force with a damn good understanding of cultural engineering (vide post WW II Germany and Japan), or co-operative reconstruction (what Abu Buckwheat is proposing).

Marc

Abu Buckwheat
07-13-2007, 04:30 AM
I think that if I were Reconstruction Czar and I were told to do one thing I would bring in modular powerplants, like they did in California after the backout, and smack about 30 of them down all over SOUTHERN Iraq, make the locals guard it with their lives and promise 24 hour electricity ... any intrurruptions are the fault of the insurgents. I was in Basrah for the electrity riots in 2003 and its all about not making their kids sleep on the roof at night in summer.

Once the south is comfortable I would propose doing the exact same thing in Anbar/SAD/and Nineveh province, etc ... however they would have to give us the heads of local AQI in exchange for a powerplant. Once they see people in Najaf and Samawah and, heaven forbid, even Zubayr ... they'll be ready to trade for anything.

Armchairguy
08-15-2007, 02:11 AM
I think the family analogy is useful because it paints the other guys as humans for a start. Without that it's too easy to look at them as things. No hearts and minds to win there. Learning names and some of the details about locals lives would be useful, if possible. I like the microloan idea. I think that would be a good one to leave in local commanders hands. Give them an amount of discretionary funds to loan or give out. This would need some thinking to not look like someone just trying to buy good will. perhaps the local commanders after being in an area for a time could help fund projects that the community most needs.

Rob Thornton
09-05-2007, 11:42 PM
This is something I've been trying to work through for about a month since I got back from the Overland Campaign staff ride. There I finally thought I understood, by virtue of physically having gone over it, where Operational Art, Campaign Design, and the Operational Level fit in the relationship between the Tactical and Strategic levels of war.

I understood that tactical engagements could be a means to achieve an operational advantage, and the goal of that advantage is to translate it into a strategic gain - say against an operational or strategic center of gravity, then you could win the war. It also struck me as important that you could win tactically, but lose on the operational and strategic level - and conversely, you could lose tactically (at least relatively), but win on the operational and strategic level by taking away and retaining the initiative at the Operational Level.

Since then the question of Operational Art in COIN has continually bothered me as I look and consider what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan.

You can see that there are many different types of Lines of Operation - doctrinally some of these are logical lines of operation - going on in Iraq. There are Diplomatic, Economic, Informational, Military, Financial, Intelligence & Legal LOOs. Some seem to be having better success then others within the PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Intelligence & Infrastructure framework then others - but how do you tie all this together in a COIN campaign plan to achieve a strategic objective?

It seems to me MNF-I is on to something. At first it did not register to me what I thought was the significance of Kilcullen saying they were "hardwiring the social environment" to prevent AIF from getting back in once they were separated. I also did not infer a connection between that (rightly or wrongly) and the "tribal revolt" against the AQ in Iraq, and the thought of enlisting sheiks toward achieving a secure environment in areas where ISF and the central government have little authority.

I feel like these are elements of "Operational Design" to achieve a broader strategy of securing the population so that some political progress can be made, but its not exactly the same thing as Grant continually stealing the move on Lee and extending him from Richmond to Petersburg while cutting his LOCs to the South and exhausting his means & will - its different.

I think this is a good question to consider - given the discussion on likely threats, and the debate on military force structure and adaptability here on the Council.

Thanks, Rob

Smitten Eagle
09-06-2007, 01:33 AM
In reading Tom Rick's Fiasco, he made the analogy that when dealing with "human terrain", that individual opinion is the tactical level, and that mass public opinion would be analogous to strategic level. Operational level would thus be "opinion-makers", being NGOs, Loya Jirgas, Anbar Salvation Councils, Imams, mosques, etc...

Seems pretty reasonable to me. Some weaknesses of this would be the role of the media (is it an opinion-maker or merely a guage--and if it's a maker, how operational or strategic is it in scope?) Also, many NGOs are intimately connected with foreign publics outside the realm of the tactical/operational fight. Lastly, this construct seems to not take into account the human terrain of the home front, which is certainly important in the long war.

But apart from those criticisms, Ricks seems to be on to something.

slapout9
09-06-2007, 02:40 AM
Hi Rob, you must be psychic! I have been thinking about it and wanted to say a few things but have bitten my tongue. I haven't been to Iraq nor have I fought a counterinsurgency (except gangs and the like) so I don't like saying here is what you guys should do. But some of the things that have been posted here and similar threads makes me wonder didn't somebody see this coming or wasn't this obvious?? So you want my thoughts here or in a PM?

Rob Thornton
09-06-2007, 11:21 AM
Steve , and everyone else:)
Please post your thoughts on the thread so we can collaborate and draft off of each others thoughts - I for one really benefit from the different perspectives (and the occasional tangent/rabbit hole) we get from coming at problems/questions as groups

I'd also offer up to those interested - if your not sharp on the vernacular and feel like you need something clarified to better understand this (or any topic) feel free to write it down or PM somebody on the site you think might be able to help - your thoughts are valuable.
Best regards, Rob

slapout9
09-06-2007, 11:52 AM
Hi Rob, Random thoughts. Lets start with how the Mafia would take over Iraq. Most people believe the Mafia works like they see on TV and the movies and there is sometimes some truth in this but here is an "Operational Design" of how they really do it.

Say you want to take over neighborhood X. You and your thug buddies first go and case the Hood and decide on the pressure points to go after first. Lets say Bakeries and there are 4 in your AO. Do you round them all up and threaten to kill them....no. Thatsa no gooda recipe:wry:. You go see each owner and tell them you guys are not making enough money. Starting Monday the price of bread is going to go up 25 cents and out of that I want 5cents you keep the rest. Once a week I am going to send a guy around to pick up my share.

Right now you stand a good chance of gaining the hearts and minds of those folks right then. But say you get 3 bakery owners and 1 guy once to hold out.
So you go pay him a special visit. You are going to make him an offer he can't refuse. You ask him how much to buy his business. He says he doesn't want to sell. You respond with you will pay him what his business is worth now or you can pay him what it is worth after it is burned to the ground.

You keep doing this with all the other businesses in your AO and pretty soon you will own the neighborhood and whats more everyone will like you and support you. You have in effect hard wired the government out of the area! Have I lost everyone or do you want to hear more?

Stan
09-06-2007, 12:46 PM
It seems to me MNF-I is on to something. At first it did not register to me what I thought was the significance of Kilcullen saying they were "hardwiring the social environment" to prevent AIF from getting back in once they were separated. I also did not infer a connection between that (rightly or wrongly) and the "tribal revolt" against the AQ in Iraq, and the thought of enlisting sheiks toward achieving a secure environment in areas where ISF and the central government have little authority.

Hey Rob,
Using Slapout's recent post (which I actually understand having lived in Estonia for 12 years), once we've hardwired ourselves into the social environment, what is it exactly that keeps the AIF from coming back and offering (if you will) the very same ? Our physical presence may no longer be sufficient, or may no longer be next year. If I wanted back in per se, I'd simply wait for the US departure and subsequently go back to business as usual (with far less resistance than before).

Having observed 'tribes' for years in Sub-Sahara, I learned that the 'chiefs' don't always have the last say for long. Would an enlisted sheik last long if his community was silently against his decisions and receiving cash from say AQ ?

Are promises of Democracy, Peace and Serenity adequate to win ? They had that before (or naively believed they did). The Africans used to tell me, "I can't eat it or sell it. So why do I need it, and why are you offering it to me?"

Thanks for an interesting post !
Regards, Stan

Steve Blair
09-06-2007, 12:58 PM
Rob,

Many of my thoughts and examples tie back to the Indian Wars (one of my main areas of expertise and perhaps the longest COIN effort ever undertaken by the US Army...though the term didn't exist then).

In that particular situation, the operational COG was really the tribes themselves. I don't mean the Sioux per se, for example, but the various bands and factions within what the whites considered the Sioux. In the Southwest it centered on a variety of sub-groups and tribes within wider families, but the effect was still the same. If you could "turn" segments or factions of the tribes, you stood a good chance of coming out ahead.

Crook gained a great deal of fame for using Apache scouts, but he wasn't unique in this effort. Carleton used Indian auxiliaries during his campaigns in Arizona, and the North brothers fielded a battalion of Pawnee in Kansas and other central plains states. And Crook's efforts weren't always successful (he misread the Sioux and couldn't recruit scouts there). But most commanders who were successful on the frontier came to recognize (at least intuitively) that the tribes were key. Mackenzie understood, for example, that tribes depended on mobility and targeted their pony herds when he attacked villages. As a result, he generally killed far few hostiles than other commanders but his engagements were often decisive.

A bit of a ramble, but I'd say that tribes (or other social networks) make up a good chunk of the operational level in COIN. NGOs work a great deal with social networks, making them key to any operational design for COIN. Same goes for civic action projects (when balanced against the local networks/human terrain). Crook and other officers (Mackenzie, Carleton in his own way, Grierson, and others) also recognized this and fought many battles (mostly losing, sadly) with the Washington bureaucracy to get needed programs to reservations.

I'll add more things as they come to me with this. It's an interesting subject to be sure, and one of growing importance.

Hippasus
09-06-2007, 01:20 PM
I think we should remember that the current levels of war were birthed in the Napoleonic wars and matured in the WWI and II. They are, then, tuned to wars of attrition and manuever. This is not a bad thing - since we were fighting wars of attrition and manuever, it only makes sense to develop thought models specifically suited to them. In "war among the people," as Rupert Smith calls what we're fighting today (Trinquier named it "modern war," to give a more dangerous example), we are still struggling to develop thought models specifically tuned to how we're fighitng.
It is natural to simply take what we have (strategic, operation, and tactical levels) and try to make them fit - to consider them a universal tool for all warfare. I'm not sure that has served well in Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, or Lebanon to name just a few examples. I think the 4GW crowd may have something when they present Boyd's conception of the "moral, mental, and physical" levels of war. I don't think levels is a good description, however - it is to linear and simplistic. "Dimensions" of war may be more appropriate. It is easy to imagine existing on only one "level" of something (a building, a ship), but very difficult to imagine anything existing in just one dimension. Our world experience is that we exist in four physical dimesions simultaneously(3 of space, one of time). In "modern war," I believe we must accept that, instead of a battle or even a series of operations being "tactical" or "operational" in and of themselves, that ALL our actions, from a fire fight on Haifa street to a GEN Petraeus's speech next week exist simultaneously in the "physical, mental, and moral" dimensions of war.
So what? To bring in Slapout's excellent example, that means when we craft campaigns, whether it's to take over a neighborhood in Chicago or to bring security and stability to Iraq, understanding the how our actions interplay with the existing situation within the dimensions of war is more effective that attempting to tie tactical actions together to support operational and strategic aims. I love the bakery example - the Gangsters don't start by busting heads (primarily in the physical dimension, but weak in the moral and mental). They start by being strong in the moral dimension - appealing to the baker's greed. The Gangsters did not need to create this greed - the bakers wouldn't be in business to begin with if they didn't want to make money. The Gansters are taking advantage or what already exists and then using it for their own profit.
Our success in Anbar, I think, is similar. Reading Kilcullin's description of what happened in Anbar, it was not that we "enlisted the sheiks toward achieving a secure environment in areas where ISF and the central government have little authority" as Rob writes, but that we saw, understood, and took actions to profit from a situation where the shieks in Anbar already had power and AQ had alientated themselves through thier actions (attempted intermarriage). This understanding of human systems and their potential within the moral, mental, and physical dimensions of conflict is at the heart of quality campaign planning. Sorry for the long post....

Tom Odom
09-06-2007, 01:39 PM
Hi Rob, Random thoughts. Lets start with how the Mafia would take over Iraq. Most people believe the Mafia works like they see on TV and the movies and there is sometimes some truth in this but here is an "Operational Design" of how they really do it.

Say you want to take over neighborhood X. You and your thug buddies first go and case the Hood and decide on the pressure points to go after first. Lets say Bakeries and there are 4 in your AO. Do you round them all up and threaten to kill them....no. Thatsa no gooda recipe:wry:. You go see each owner and tell them you guys are not making enough money. Starting Monday the price of bread is going to go up 25 cents and out of that I want 5cents you keep the rest. Once a week I am going to send a guy around to pick up my share.

Right now you stand a good chance of gaining the hearts and minds of those folks right then. But say you get 3 bakery owners and 1 guy once to hold out.
So you go pay him a special visit. You are going to make him an offer he can't refuse. You ask him how much to buy his business. He says he doesn't want to sell. You respond with you will pay him what his business is worth now or you can pay him what it is worth after it is burned to the ground.

You keep doing this with all the other businesses in your AO and pretty soon you will own the neighborhood and whats more everyone will like you and support you. You have in effect hard wired the government out of the area! Have I lost everyone or do you want to hear more?

Slap

What you are describing is essentially tribal in that it lays out the extra-legal/non-governmental-- legitimate in the eyes of the locals --use of force. I use legitimate because that is the "hardwiring" which is occurring. Here is where I see flaws in what Dave Kilcullen says on this subject; as a foreign power we cannot hardwire the tribal society of Iraq's Sunnis. to assume that tactical shifts now with uson tne ground are long term is delusional.

Consider the issue of women and women's rights; four years ago we made sweeping declarations about emncipating women--the Vice President's daughter was put in charge of the State Department effort to affect those changes. Now we using the dispute between the Sunni chiefs and the AQ over who gets to marry the Sunnii women as a larger context for cooperation. Should we assume then that the chiefs now believe in women's rights? I don't think so and I doubt anyone in MNF-I does either. But I do ot see what is happening right now as a longer term commitment to stability or a permanent rejection of AQ values.

Tribal politics are defined in raw power--just like your mafia example. They cannot accept stasis for any length of time because that power is zero-sum--if you are not gaining, you are losing. States, nations, emporers, kings, prime ministers, and presidents whether really democratic or nominally so all came into being as a social and poltical evolution that is in no way "hard-wired". England took centuries to evolve into the UK; Iraq as an Arab entity versus an extension of the Ottoman Empire or the earlier Ummayid orAbbasid Dynastyies is somewhere along that path. I believe we are still seeing the equivalent of Angles, Saxons, and Normans in Iraq. It is happening in the 21st century and they have cell-phones and satellite television; it is still tribal in nature.

Best

Tom

selil
09-06-2007, 02:04 PM
It seems like a lot of people have defined counter-insurgency doctrine at different levels of war. I’ve been trying to construct a VENN diagram showing elements of low intensity conflict for a project and came up with some things that COIN is not:

COIN is not all out total war.
COIN is not a war of attrition.
COIN is not a resource war.
COIN is not about geography.
COIN is not rehabilitation by force.

I know some will disagree because of course COIN is a little of the above but it isn’t the stated goal. If we plow through the middle of a city with tanks and level it via large kinetic weapons COIN is a discussion for the after the preliminary action and not a primary objective. As to attrition there are elements but rather than fighting a war on the move expending resources until the adversary has no resources in COIN we look at replenishing particular resources and removing others. Geography in COIN is determined on the aspects it presents. COIN and MOUT in Iraq are inextricably linked and the geography is peoples front rooms and courtyards. Regime change is outside the realm of COIN too. The forceful resignation of foreign dignitary by 500lb bomb is not COIN. Rehabilitation of political affiliation is a large Army Task.

Similarly COIN does have some things that it might be. It has linkages to different levels of warfare. COIN appears to have tenuous and in some cases hardened fundamental interests in different levels of warfare.

COIN is a pre-conflict or total war agent of diplomacy.

It would seem that the use of COIN techniques could be used prior to escalated hostilities as a method of reducing the scope of conflict. I see this as the advisory capacity when supporting a government. In this capacity it seems that the ground operator may call upon assets in the military arsenal to persuade others through “bomb” to consider new and innovative methods of participation in local politics. As such COIN operators have a relationship to other war fighters as a selective target designator.

COIN is an on-going conflict agent of change.

In traditional maneuver warfare sea/air/land COIN seems to have a relationship during conflict as a method of mitigating risk to the war fighter. In a time of restrictive rules of engagement it may be that the COIN role is to insure that the population not become tactical targets of opportunity. If the populace is perceived to take up arms then they no longer have any protections under the most restrictive ROE. If they do not take up arms and can be kept off the collateral damage statistic sheet their relevant gripes will be few. Since wars of annihilation are likely not in the current operational calendar COIN has a substantial role and vested interest in being a participant in any traditional maneuver warfare.

COIN is the janitor for the school of hard knocks.

All kidding aside no conflict can be waged with an expectation of no unintended consequences. When force of arms interact with the population those without political will be emboldened to action in absence of corollary forces of self-interest. The role of COIN post traditional military conflict is to create trust where none exists, fix/repair/explain the excesses of maneuver warfare, create alliances, create impediments to insurgency and failing all of that utilize the assets of the larger military arsenal to vanquish those who would not relinquish armed conflict.

I don’t claim any of the previous as singularly my ideas. I have read long and hard on the topic but build my own ideas on the backs of better scholars and writers. I have come to some conclusions though that may be troubling and yet ancillary to the discussion at hand.

COIN can be fought in the boardroom and by advertising agencies.

The ability to bring foreign investment to the table through non-governmental organization (NGO) is boon to the COIN operator. With the advent of hyper-media and worldwide media networks the advertising and primarily corporate interests take on new and substantial roles in COIN. It is only a wonder until we have COIN being tested between corporations as stateless actors in conflict. The ability to shape a message for a populace and have that message added to the common media and intellectual discussion within normal media consumption can not be overstated as a goal.

COIN can be fought at the bank.

In seems that money truly is the root of all evil and the salve for the bruised conscience. The ability to flow or stop money and funding seems to be hugely important. Yet at the operator level few will give a COIN operator the resources to affect that outcome. Unlike the traditional military maneuver answer “bomb it” the COIN operator can say “buy it”. In the hands of the COIN operator dollars can me lives can be objectives are met.

It seems that COIN has a direct relationship to different methods of war, and perhaps levels of war, but that relationship is found truly in my opinion in the scope and time-table of war. COIN as a mission changes depending on the level and scope of the conflict and the currency of the larger military mission. Perhaps there are phases that are readily understood by others, but from my perspective they would be fairly vague and subject to numerous feedbacks as the scope and challenges change.

Steve Blair
09-06-2007, 02:07 PM
Tom,

That also tends to be where many of the efforts on the Frontier failed: they were trying to turn the tribes into something they were not at the time (pastoral farmers...though many had been before the introduction of the horse). The efforts that showed the most promise took advantage of existing social structures (stock raising in some examples), but were often over-ruled by the "hardwired" set that wanted to turn all Indians into God-fearing farmers.

Successful commanders at the operational stage on the Frontier tried to make things work within the framework of the tribes they understood. I think that's one of the reasons Crook failed so miserably in Montana and Wyoming: he didn't grasp the scale of what he faced.

To go back to the point about levels of war...I think the real problem has come not from the levels or stages themselves but from a misunderstanding about how they work and inter-relate. Part of the Western, and especially American, mindset seems to be a desire to neatly package or label things...warfare included. This leads to a compartment mindset and fixation on one level or the other without necessarily having a clear grasp of how they relate or shift from one to the other. Calling them dimensions won't really change that, and Boyd's ideas just substitute one set of stratifications for another for those who can't grasp the fluid nature of conflict. Moral and mental relate in much the same way tactical and operational are related...each impacts the other and each requires elements of a different approach or focus. "A rose by any other name" as it were....:)

slapout9
09-06-2007, 02:13 PM
Tom, agree completely that the Mafia is tibal they also used to be known as "The Family" interestingly their down fall came as a result of their ventures into drugs!! but thats another chat:wry:

The key point about the Mafia is their strategy is essentially economic based. They don't care what you believe just don't make waves....make money for everybody and we can all get along. A rising tide lifts all boats so to speak. But it is essentially a control or containment strategy not a domination strategy where we will dictate what kind of Guvment;) you have.

You might be right about Killcullen because it is not sustainable for the long term. I think we are essentailly buying their loyalty and when the money stops they will stop.

So what do you do? Couple of thoughts.

1-The people are NOT the miltary objective they are the POLITICAL objective. The MILITARY objective should be to "seize and control terrain" that has political value, Oil,Electricity,Water,Etc. When you do this you will be using the military to create conditions that will allow for a politcal settlement to be reached and enforced. And it should be tied to our interests not the form of guvment they have.

2-Historic example. We have treated the Amercian Indian far worse then any ethnic minority in the history of our country. We lied and cheated and broke just about every treaty we ever made with them. Until finally some body in the Guvment came up with the idea of giving them an economic advatange and just turn them loose. At least in the south anyway. The casinos, cigarettes (no federal tax) have performed a miracle and it is all under Indian control and they take care of the tribe. The Hard Rock Hotel that Anna Nicole Smith was found at is "Injun Country" that is part of their resort reservation.

3-If we try and use this in Iraq where economic advantage is tied to the tribes you will have a long term funding mechanism which maybe???will lead to stablization.

Tom Odom
09-06-2007, 02:21 PM
Sam, from a class I gave last Friday


What does winning hearts and minds mean?

Winning the population:
Is NOT a love story
Is NOT a popularity contest

So what are we trying to win?

Winning the population:
Is about legitimacy and acceptance of that legitimacy
Is relative in that we seek to make the population see the HN government as more legitimate than the insurgent

What’s love got to do with it? Tina Turner Answer: Not a damn, thing!

COIN is Armed Politics

Tom Odom
09-06-2007, 02:34 PM
Tom,

To go back to the point about levels of war...I think the real problem has come not from the levels or stages themselves but from a misunderstanding about how they work and inter-relate. Part of the Western, and especially American, mindset seems to be a desire to neatly package or label things...warfare included. This leads to a compartment mindset and fixation on one level or the other without necessarily having a clear grasp of how they relate or shift from one to the other. Calling them dimensions won't really change that, and Boyd's ideas just substitute one set of stratifications for another for those who can't grasp the fluid nature of conflict. Moral and mental relate in much the same way tactical and operational are related...each impacts the other and each requires elements of a different approach or focus. "A rose by any other name" as it were....:)

Steve, I agree with you for sure in this one. Dave was working the issue of strategic compression and I believe that concept trully applies in its most relevant form when discussing COIN. The fact that COIN is a small unit leader's war best fought within strict framework of ROE and other guidelines to achieve the objectives stated in a campaign plan makes separation of the tactical, operational, and strategic somewhat artificial and antiquated.

Best

Tom

Steve Blair
09-06-2007, 02:44 PM
Steve, I agree with you for sure in this one. Dave was working the issue of strategic compression and I believe that concept trully applies in its most relevant form when discussing COIN. The fact that COIN is a small unit leader's war best fought within strict framework of ROE and other guidelines to achieve the objectives stated in a campaign plan makes separation of the tactical, operational, and strategic somewhat artificial and antiquated.

Best

Tom

Agreed 100%+, and it's always been that way. I can dig up any number of examples from my own "pet" period of one officer or sergeant's simple (to him) action having major consequences for policy (both local and national). Even back before the Internet this phenomenon existed...what the web has done is amplified and accelerated it.

But I don't want to drift too far away from Rob's original question....the operational level/framework/COG type stuff.

selil
09-06-2007, 02:53 PM
Sam, from a class I gave last Friday


Dang I wish I could get classes like that.

So, I'm having an interesting discussion. Is COIN in Asymmetric warfare completely, slightly inside, or outside of Asymmetric warfare. I though it was a slam dunk and COIN was wholly inside the concepts of Asymmetric warfare. Then I got asked to define "Asymmetric Warfare". ugh. Well I found as many definitions as there are authors. Well now I'm not so sure about the relationships.

John T. Fishel
09-06-2007, 02:54 PM
Guys--

You have produced a stimulating set of posts - thanks Rob for starting it. Let me drop back to the notion of levels of war for a few comments:

1. Not so very long ago, the US military saw only 2 levels of war - strategic and tactical. Some "visionaries" and/or historians kept mucking things up by pointing out that there was an intermediate level that, in the West, was often called Grand Tactics. The Soviets wrote a lot about that intemediate level and called it the operational level and we later adopted that name.

2. By the time I was teaching full time at Leavenworth (1992) we were teaching from a vertical Venn diagram that showed an overlap between the strategic and operational and the operational and tactical. We also had developed some terminology to address the overlaps - one was the Theater Strategic level. CTAC kept trying to oversimplify and equate levels of war with formations: thus, the operational level ran from the unified command down to the corps. (My boss in SWORD, COL Bob Herrick, related levels of war and troop formations by saying that the operational level could be defined in terms of a troop formation that could conduct operations relatively independently over time. That might be a regiment, brigade, division, corps, etc. In El Salvador by that approach, the operational level of war conducted by the ESAF was by Brigade, Military Detachment, and Immediate Reaction Bn formations - COL level commands.)

3. For me, the levels of war remains a useful concept in the conduct of COIN. I see a US national strategic level of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the National Security apparatus is trying to define objectives, appropriate COA, and provide the resources to achieve those objectives. I see the HN as trying to do the same thing with a key issue being the lack of congruence between US and HN objectives. At the Theater Strategic level in Iraq, the issue is how GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker implement a strategy to achieve US objectives - some of which they have to define on the ground. My reading of Kilcullen is that the Anbar Awakening provided an opportunity to develop a new set of COA to achieve both military and political objectives. It also raised new issues at both the strategic and operational levels for the Iraqi government - problems, challenges, and opportunities.

I'm running out of gas, so I'll stop here. So much for my 2 cents!:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

Tom Odom
09-06-2007, 03:17 PM
Dang I wish I could get classes like that.

So, I'm having an interesting discussion. Is COIN in Asymmetric warfare completely, slightly inside, or outside of Asymmetric warfare. I though it was a slam dunk and COIN was wholly inside the concepts of Asymmetric warfare. Then I got asked to define "Asymmetric Warfare". ugh. Well I found as many definitions as there are authors. Well now I'm not so sure about the relationships.


Sam,

I personally consider the entire construct of assymetric (mispelling is deliberate :D) an artificial creation in that it says a clever enemy fights your weaknesses not your strengths. Only dead enemies match strengths and then not for long. I admit this gets back into the 4GW argument etc but wise warriors have always sought out the soft spots to slip in the blade.

In any case, if one adheres to AW models, then AW could apply to COIN or irregular warfare as well as conventional warfare if logically applied. For instance, 1986 Airland Battle was an AW application of conventional warfare against Soviet operational and tactical art.



John T on


By the time I was teaching full time at Leavenworth (1992) we were teaching from a vertical Venn diagram that showed an overlap between the strategic and operational and the operational and tactical. We also had developed some terminology to address the overlaps - one was the Theater Strategic level. CTAC kept trying to oversimplify and equate levels of war with formations: thus, the operational level ran from the unified command down to the corps. (My boss in SWORD, COL Bob Herrick, related levels of war and troop formations by saying that the operational level could be defined in terms of a troop formation that could conduct operations relatively independently over time. That might be a regiment, brigade, division, corps, etc. In El Salvador by that approach, the operational level of war conducted by the ESAF was by Brigade, Military Detachment, and Immediate Reaction Bn formations - COL level commands.)

That was going on when I was on the faculty 85-87 and again as a student 88-89--tactical was division and operational was corps. Strategic was higher but less defined. All of this was of course applied in support of Airland Battle--affectionately referred to as Airland Babble--on the plains of Europe. It had virtually no relevance when applied to contingency operations or the very real irregular wars ongoing in Central America at that time.

Best

Tom

Steve Blair
09-06-2007, 03:27 PM
Sam,

I personally consider the entire construct of assymetric (mispelling is deliberate :D) an artificial creation in that it says a clever enemy fights your weaknesses not your strengths. Only dead enemies match strengths and then not for long. I admit this gets back into the 4GW argument etc but wise warriors have always sought out the soft spots to slip in the blade.

Yet again we agree. I think it's another manifestation of the American/Western urge to label and thus compartmentalize the obvious...thereby making it somehow "special."

PhilR
09-06-2007, 04:05 PM
I find the levels of war discussion very useful as theory with which to analyze past operations to acheive some focus and clarity of understanding.

The task of operational design and campaign planning, however, is one of synthesis. I find it disconcerting how much time I've spent in planning teams trying to come up with strategic COGs, operational COGs, and tactical COGs. Is MNF-I at the operational level or strategic level? I'm not sure and I don't think it matters. He has a higher headquaters to please, objectives, resources, terrain (human and other wise), allies, and enemies. Not all of these are clear, and some of them change as the campaign moves along. The focus must be on the inter-relationship of these factors specific to the situation--how to solve the problem at hand.

My personal lens on the strategic-operational-tactical is that it is less useful to view them as levels and more useful to look at them as almost diferetn functions. Strategic is the setting of broad goals and the allocation of resources. Tactical is the specific uses of those resources. Operational is the "logic" to include method, intermediate obectives, etc. that links the tactical actions into a coherent whole in order to acheive the strategic objectives. Understanding that tactical actions, if uncontrolled, tend to follow an internal logic, the operational art can consist of "disciplining" the tactical actions into the correct direction to reach the objective.

In COIN, the "tactical actions" are occurring on political, social, economic and military (security) lines. The operational art is not the arrow on the ground, but the blending of these actions so that they are mutually reinforcing and are actually leading to the objective (and not a dead end). Security without an understanding of the social and political dynamics may be just a temporary absence of violence that leads nowhere. Conversely, the correct aplication of economic solutions, quick enough, may overcome the this.

For all of the back and forth about the new COIN FM/MCWP, the most dangerous thing is if we think its all we have to read (and if we assume that it covers all COIN). Its a good beginning. The addition of a discussion on strategic-operational-tactical would be useful, if done with the thought of conducting critical analysis of past campaigns, not to provide a framework for future design.

Van
09-06-2007, 04:14 PM
I've been faulted for asserting that 'asymetric' is the buzz word to make people feel like stuff Sun Tzu talked about is something new. Part of the problem may be that Western militaries have, for a few centuries, either fought symetric (XXth century conventional conflicts, or the Napoleonic wars for example) conflicts, fought with a radical degree of overmatch (Brithish Colonial forces frequently), or did not recognize asymetry in a timely fashion (the Boer War as seen from London, or Viet Nam as seen from LBJ's office).

Asymetry aided by modern media, comms technology, and the internet (overlapping but not redundant things), degrades the utility of using the old nomenclature of 'tactical, operational, strategic' as the lines get very blurry, but does not eliminate the usefulness of these concepts. These ideas are a convenient starting place, like telling elementary school students that there are only three states of matter, or that geometry is what you can do with a compass and a straight edge (take it up with a physicist or a mathmatician, the origami based geometry is really neat stuff, but I'm a liberal arts major and can't articulate it well). Like the now famous quote from an SF guy in Iraq "COIN is the graduate level of war".

Slightly flippant, but in COIN as in screw-ups, it is hard to tell which are little things and which are big things, and things that seem little can turn out to be really big (and contrawise). Taking time to drink tea with a sheik seems like a little thing to most folks, especially when you only discuss the weather and your kids'/grandkids' soccer games. But in the long run, this can accomplish operational or strategic level objectives (gaining local legitimacy/support, etc). And strategic level weapons systems are providing tactical fires (B-52...).

Gosh I miss the Cold War. It was so much simpler.

wm
09-06-2007, 05:25 PM
Once upon a time, we had a perfectly good English word, “act.” We had another perfectly good English word that was its contrary, “react.” Somehow or other, folks in the military needed a stronger counterpoint to being reactive. Hence, we wound up with “proactive.” I submit that the adoption of “asymmetric” is a similar construct. We used to plan for and fight wars in a relatively linear fashion. Our rear areas were safe for our folks, with the exception of the occasional H & I fire and “strategic” airstrike. The same was true for our opponents. However, the run up country into Iraq quickly broke that paradigm. We quickly became more like the US Cavalry portrayed in John Wayne movies, with our supply trains attacked by the enemy while still deep in our rear areas. Of course, the reality is that such activity was jut as common in many other wars. (Things like Grierson’s Cavalry Raid during the Civil War come to mind.). While our form of war had ceased to be linear, “non-linear” just does not quite capture the attention. So a more catchy adjective was called for—“asymmetric,” that’s the ticket! Of course, asymmetry also conveys the notion that one side in the struggle is much bigger and/or can bring much more force/combat power to bear than the other side can. So we have a turn of phrase that allows users to bend the English language to their will as they see fit.
(Remember what Humpty Dumpty said to poor Alice—It’s a question of which is to be the master (`When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.' `The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many different things.' `The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master - - that's all.'—Full link here (http://www.literature.org/authors/carroll-lewis/through-the-looking-glass/chapter-06.html))

On the relationship of strategy, operations/operational art, and tactics, I suggest a mapping of these terms to the hierarchal taxonomy of an armed conflict. We have wars, which are made up of campaigns, which are made up of battles. Strategy maps to what we do to win the war, operational art is focused on winning a campaign, and good tactics bring victory in battles. We can of course have bigger and smaller variations of each—wars, campaigns, and battles. Nonetheless, a battle are usually focuses on direct engagements of one’s opponents in a particular geographic location in a restricted timeframe, a campaign strings together efforts to achieve a particular outcome in a geographic region over a more extended timeframe, and wars are the continuation of politics, which, as we all know, covers the gamut of human experience.

Ken White
09-06-2007, 05:27 PM
Or something like that...

The COIN battle IS the Operational level.

I read Rob's initial post yesterday and I started thinking, always painful -- so I had some extra Bourbon to assuage the pain and then some more so I could think like a General. Massaged the whole process in my sleep last night, read all the foregoing this morning and decided that my initial reaction was correct.

Are we trying, as Americans always do, to needlessly complicate something? :wry:

Simply put, the strategy sends us to a country or countries. If an insurgency of any type (and there are many, no two will be alike) develops, the Operational level is the COIN effort.

The TTP involved in resolving that Operational task are many, varied and a number of the efforts described by many in this thread all roll into that.

We've played in a number of insurgencies since 1946; the four largest in terms of troop commitment were Korea in early 1951, 1st MarDiv, 5th RCT and three South Korean Divisions; DomRep in 1965; Viet Nam 1962-72 and the current operation (note term) in Iraq. All were quite different in every aspect.

The first two were virtually conventional operations against an irregular force (NKA left behinds in one and dissident Military types egged on by Cubans in the other), the last two were characterized by an abysmal failure to understand what was going to happen and to proceed to fight a land war in Europe in SEA or SWA. Neither was a good plan...

The Army that went into both theaters was euro-centric; as, he leered, is the Operational art :rolleyes:. Yet, in both cases there was adequate warning of what was faced and it was ignored by the Army's power structure. In fairness, Iraq was hobbled by abysmal intelligence preparation (due to many and long standing politically induced problems) but it still took 18 months to realize we'd screwed the pooch. That it took another 18 months to turn things around is progress over Viet Nam where it took a total of seven years to do that but it still is too long. I submit a part of that length of time was due to efforts to over intellectualize the need and solutions. IOW, we needlessly complicated it -- and I know the domestic and in-theater political aspects also contributed to that delay. :(

The attitude of the local populace in all four major efforts I cited varied a bit. The first two had locals that just really wanted to be left alone and who just tried to stay out of the lines of fire. The second was mostly characterized by the same thing with the addition of random terror to force assistance to the insurgents by the populace, the current one sees that to a far greater degree. Contrary to many theorists, that ain't 4G, 5G or 9G warfare; it's Third Century warfare practiced in a digital age, no more.

Viet Nam did have an advantage that Iraq did not. The first US units in Viet Nam had been training for CI work and knew what to do -- regrettably, they were told to go on search and destroy missions instead. Complaints about this were ignored. In Iraq on the other hand, the Army was hobbled by 30 years of short sighted ignorance of CI and a proscription from on high to not even talk about it, much less train for it.

Our failures to date are simply not realizing that an insurgency was a planned effort by Saddam; in inadvertently being an accelerant to that Insurgency due to lack of training; in too slowly reacting and changing to meet that challenge; and most importantly at both the Operational level (the COIN effort in Iraq) and the strategic level (the goals, policies and plans of the USG in the greater ME and the world) not appreciating or properly implementing to this day effective counters to the opponents media operations plans and efforts.

We have a bad tendency to place templates on things (rarely works, others don't play by our rules * ); attempt to sound highly professional (we are and we don't need excessive adherence to buzzwords to prove it -- even as we try to dazzle the non-serving Academics and Congroids); be too prescriptive in assigning missions and methods thus stifling initiative and innovation ( * again); not quickly ascertaining where the COG is (in the current case, worldwide public opinion has to be a contender...) and, importantly, consistently failing to apply KISS...

Tom Odom
09-06-2007, 05:30 PM
For all of the back and forth about the new COIN FM/MCWP, the most dangerous thing is if we think its all we have to read (and if we assume that it covers all COIN). Its a good beginning. The addition of a discussion on strategic-operational-tactical would be useful, if done with the thought of conducting critical analysis of past campaigns, not to provide a framework for future design.

Phil,

Amen. I love Dave Kilcullen's 28 articles as a framework and have used it extensively on here after a couple of council members bounced their thoughts against it. I taught a class to a young separate batttalion staff last week on COIN and they had FM 3-24 and Kilcullen as a pre-class reading assignments. But I told them that neither the FM nor Dave K's work obviated their responsibility to think, evaluate, and create.

Your point on COGs and levels of war is also well taken. Too many planners do not see planning as synthesis--they see it as purely process and that usually means a checklist. The checklist says identify COGs so we do so, regardless of applicability. A parallel was IPB and identfying NAIs and TAIs--used to see so many that they covered the entire area--safer that way it seemed when in reality having too many was like having none.

best

Tom

TT
09-06-2007, 08:48 PM
Very interesting, and very intriguing, discussion. Your discussion has sparked two questions - though I should in the spirit of full disclosure note that I am one those who seriously struggled, and probably failed, to understand ‘Operational Level for Dummies’ :confused:, opting instead to accept 'It depends' as an answer I could live with.

Steve Blair:

In that particular situation, the operational COG was really the tribes themselves. I don't mean the Sioux per se, for example, but the various bands and factions within what the whites considered the Sioux. In the Southwest it centered on a variety of sub-groups and tribes within wider families, but the effect was still the same. If you could "turn" segments or factions of the tribes, you stood a good chance of coming out ahead.


Steve’s example seems to lean away from what seems to be a general view that in COIN the COG is the ‘population’, by which is meant, by and large, the protection of the population and, in some cases at any rate, the providing for the needs of the population. But over the past 6-8 months I have come to wonder whether this is really the case, whether instead this is the ‘aim’ of COIN efforts rather than the COG. If one perceives the population as the ‘aim’, then it seems to me that COG should be the social (and cultural?) environment of the population (their primal loyalties, interconnections, religion, world view/culture, etc and so on). To accomplish ‘turning segments or factions of tribes’ seems, to me, to suggest that what is being influenced to achieve the desired result is the social-cultural system of the Sioux or the tribes that comprise the Sioux. Much of the discussion here and elsewhere also seems to point to their social system being the COG.

Of course, the corollary of this that has to be asked is, does such a change in how we think is the COG make a difference? I suspect it would, but honestly do not konw. I can only suggest/guess that this would mean that everything that is said, every little thing that is done (cups of tea with a sheikh), is part of an IO campaign aimed at influencing the social environment of the population. This is, of course, the general tenor of discussion regarding what should and/or can be done in COIN of a lot of discussion on these boards and elsewhere as well.


My second question stems from the fact that what is being discussed here is ‘our’ levels of war. But what are ‘their’, our opponents, levels of war? If their perception of the levels of war differs from ours, does it matter?

And perhaps to complicate this a bit, does it matter that it is very probable that al Qaeda’s, as in OBL et al, perception of the levels of war is different from that of their many affiliates, such as al Qaeda in Iraq?

Rob Thornton
09-06-2007, 10:08 PM
Hey TT,


My second question stems from the fact that what is being discussed here is ‘our’ levels of war. But what are ‘their’, our opponents, levels of war? If their perception of the levels of war differs from ours, does it matter?

Interesting question!

I'm starting to think there might be question or at least part of a question for Marc.:D - Maybe it gets to perceptions of time, space and scope by opponents. Maybe there be something in there about action/reaction/counter-action - is that specific to a particular culture, or is that more of a universal learning function?

I think it may be useful in trying to understand what your enemy is trying to do to you, but I'm not sure it prevents you from framing the depth of your own activities. I think it also could shed some light on applicability of other lenses/cognitive framing - like CoGs and Lines of Operation,etc. Another council member PM'd me about applicability and utility of doctrine, tenets and principals to COIN. My initial thoughts were that I believed in general they were broad enough to accommodate a great deal of conditions and that it depended on how they are interpreted by people.

We define/express the utility of things and their adequacy - when something lacks utility, ceases to be useful - we adapt what exists, innovate out of the original, or invent something new to get us where we need to go - we're pretty good at that - we should hold doctrine, tenets and principles to be descriptive vs. prescriptive - whatever tools get you there:D

I'm still thinking about what everybody else wrote - I did not expect so much so fast - most of you guys said you'd post on Saturday:D - never look a gift horse in the mouth though (BTW there is an Arabic parallel to that expression, although I don't remember how it went). I do want to go ahead and say thanks for your interest and your brain cells, although it looks like we can still get some mileage out of this one.

Best Regards, Rob

Rob Thornton
09-06-2007, 10:47 PM
From John T:


3. For me, the levels of war remains a useful concept in the conduct of COIN. I see a US national strategic level of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the National Security apparatus is trying to define objectives, appropriate COA, and provide the resources to achieve those objectives. I see the HN as trying to do the same thing with a key issue being the lack of congruence between US and HN objectives. At the Theater Strategic level in Iraq, the issue is how GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker implement a strategy to achieve US objectives - some of which they have to define on the ground. My reading of Kilcullen is that the Anbar Awakening provided an opportunity to develop a new set of COA to achieve both military and political objectives. It also raised new issues at both the strategic and operational levels for the Iraqi government - problems, challenges, and opportunities.


From Tom:


That was going on when I was on the faculty 85-87 and again as a student 88-89--tactical was division and operational was corps. Strategic was higher but less defined. All of this was of course applied in support of Airland Battle--affectionately referred to as Airland Babble--on the plains of Europe. It had virtually no relevance when applied to contingency operations or the very real irregular wars ongoing in Central America at that time.

I do think you need some kind of medium for translating policy goals into strategy and also for relating success and failures on the ground into the pursuit of those policies. When we are committing blood and treasure toward a purpose there needs to be linkage. I do think it could be a mistake to limit the association of a level of war to an echelon - that one seems to firmly relate to large, conventional force on force actions. In irregular wars the catalyst for a operational or strategic action/effect/objective could be a HN force with an advisory team conducting their own independent operations, or a UW action by a large guerrilla force led by an ODA (or ODA like unit), just to provide a couple of alternatives.

I find it useful to think of strategy of the application of means and ways by the assigned uniformed proponent (I guess you could use COCOM/Unified CMD or a JTF or a sub-Unified CMD - MNF-I is closest to the latter, but not designated as so in fact - probably a reason for that though) to achieve a policy end.

Another way to consider "operational" might be an element with sufficient means that it can conduct a series of actions/coordinate and execute different LOOs in terms of scope, time, and depth to achieve an advantage toward realizing the strategy.

I mentioned before that I stole and adapted something I'd picked up from DR Mike Matheny on tactics - but I'm going to expand it a bit "the thinking human application of technology, resources & procedures on the battlefield to achieve a purpose"

The other thing I stole was the there is a greater importance of technology at the tactical level then at the operational and strategic. This is very much the realm of the physical. Even though a unit might be "tactical" in the sense its task and purpose, or its size and composition - it may very well be simultaneously facilitating operational LOOs.

These are not doctrinal definitions of the levels of war, but as John said, I think they are still useful in considering how you link things, plan, allocate resources, assess the situation, adjust course, exploit success, report to higher, etc. This is not Grant and Lee, yet in a philosophical sense it is. Well my head hurts now - so I'll take Ken's advice and pour myself a Maker's Mark!

Best regards, Rob

slapout9
09-06-2007, 11:21 PM
From John T:




In irregular wars the catalyst for a operational or strategic action/effect/objective could be a HN force with an advisory team conducting their own independent operations, or a UW action by a large guerrilla force led by an ODA (or ODA like unit), just to provide a couple of alternatives.


Best regards, Rob


Two points:
1-action/effect/objective is the greatest error of how EBO is taught as opposed to how it was supposed to be taught. The process is this ACTION/TARGET/EFFECT/OBJECTIVE. Our enemy is not doing 4GW no matter how much the authors claim. Is what they are doing is EBO and they understand TARGETING like nobody else. If you understand targeting the ways and means become almost infinite, but if you try to effect the wrong target it doesn't matter how well or precise it is, it will not work for you.

2-Effects are ALWAYS tied to a target. If you can not explain why effecting this target will help you achieve your ultimate objective you have no business striking it in the first place because you don't know what you are doing.

Rob Thornton
09-07-2007, 12:18 AM
Slapout,
It brings up a good point. I know you are passionate about EBO. One of the reasons I grouped the three together was to provide a menu depending on how a planner might design a campaign. Not everybody looking at the thread may know this - but EBO (Effects Based Operations) are Joint planning doctrine, but not Army planning doctrine (however you will find it referenced in some FMs) - but if you are an Army 3 star HQs acting as a Joint HQs then you use Joint doctrine - unless you have a good reason not to. There are also some Army units using EBO and EBO hybrids in theater - one thing I believe EBO does do well is lend itself to looking at a systems environment (PMESII) in pursuit of Logical Lines of Operations - what I'm not crazy about is establishing causal relationships.

I think there is some differences in the way services view systems theory - which is partly why Joint doctrine is so hard to get published - services argue over terms and definitions because it defines the way they see life.


If you understand targeting the ways and means become almost infinite, but if you try to effect the wrong target it doesn't matter how well or precise it is, it will not work for you.

Slapout - if you would, expand on that a bit - I think its important.


Effects are ALWAYS tied to a target. If you can not explain why effecting this target will help you achieve your ultimate objective you have no business striking it in the first place because you don't know what you are doing.

I think you could also say that it is tied to unintended consequences which create new problems vs. solving problems.

However, I also think there are always going to be some unintended consequences when we're talking about people and social organizations even if its the right target. Some of these could lead to new opportunities, some will be adverse.

How fast you can identify and exploit, mitigate/neutralize and rectify those consequences in a social environment is tied to how much they influence other LLOOs - ex. the relationship between clean water, sewage, electricity and health and their bearing on local government credibility to how much a piece of insurgent propaganda resonates.

Best Regards, Rob

marct
09-07-2007, 01:51 AM
My second question stems from the fact that what is being discussed here is ‘our’ levels of war. But what are ‘their’, our opponents, levels of war? If their perception of the levels of war differs from ours, does it matter?

Interesting question!

I'm starting to think there might be question or at least part of a question for Marc.:D - Maybe it gets to perceptions of time, space and scope by opponents. Maybe there be something in there about action / reaction /counter-action - is that specific to a particular culture, or is that more of a universal learning function?

I've been following the discussion but, in a fit of unusual reticence, I've been keeping quite :cool:. Well, as the newly coined "old saying" goes "it takes two to tango and if I'm in 3/4 and your in 7/12, we ain't gonna get the prize!".

Certainly our opponents perceptions are important! Just think about all the fuss and bother with having to fight someone who isn't a state! I mean, really, the gall of some of these people! <said with a very phony British accent>.

On a more serious note, cultural categories of space, time and scope are quite mutable. In some ways they actually depend on how the language is constructed. For example, our western fixation on causality is based, in part, on the noun - verb structures we use. If this was compared with some of the Amerind languages, we see totally different forms. Edward Sapir's Language, Culture and Personality deals with some of these issues. As a note, the very terms that are being used in this current thread relate to early 19th century physics (e.g. Centre of Gravity), and this has a pretty serious impact on how "levels" are conceived.

So, I'm going to turn it around and ask people what are the words and phrases that AQ uses to describe their perceptions of "conflctual reality"? Once we have those, then we can start to analyze how they construct their levels.

Ken White
09-07-2007, 02:19 AM
My Farsi has deteriorated to beyond rusty but I do recall there were a number of Persian military operational terms that had no good English equivalent and vice versa.

The Iraniha were competent if not great soldiers in the western mode (the conscript bulk did not help) and the USAF MAAG guys always told me the the IIAF had better CEPs on ground attack missions than the TAC norms. They were quite enamored of Liddel Hart and the indirect approach. Many in the MAAG saw that as a desire to avoid harsh combat; some of us saw it for what it was. Smart.

Interestingly, some of their Officers used to (semi) jokingly say we, the US Army, were "too Prussian."

slapout9
09-07-2007, 02:34 AM
Hi Rob. I didn't know you put that together actions/effects/objectives. Because that is exactly how it appears in the new AF Doctrine Manual on operations, which is really confusing. The AF targeting manual makes a lot more since in explaining the process as it should be.

To expand on targeting I will say it how Col. Warden says it. After you have mapped the system with the 5 rings template to include any fractal analysis, "Decide on what targets to effect and stay at that level until you can't stand it." Jumping to the how to do it level will lead you into the trap of just acting on targets just to be doing it. Like the expression you can win every battle (actions for the sake of actions) and still loose the war(inability to choose the right targets that will lead you to success.

As I have said before, the all time EBO was 9-11. They understood the targets to hit and when that is known the means to do it will almost come to you simply by using what is already available in your current environment.


Warden's concept of EBO planning is extremely close to the Army Artillery concept of D3A. The concept of CARVER has a lot of similarities to the 5 rings analysis from the standpoint of it concentrates on high value targets COG's but yet still takes into account adverse effects. The E stands for Effect on populace which could be positive or negative. He (Warden doesn't believe in a single COG, all systems have multiple COG's) The final multiple target set of CARVER is very close to the 5 rings analysis in this respect as it relates to selecting COG's.

I would agree with you about varying definitions of systems theory between the services, it is that way in the civilian world too.

wm
09-07-2007, 03:16 AM
Certainly our opponents perceptions are important! Just think about all the fuss and bother with having to fight someone who isn't a state! I mean, really, the gall of some of these people! <said with a very phony British accent>.

On a more serious note, cultural categories of space, time and scope are quite mutable. In some ways they actually depend on how the language is constructed. For example, our western fixation on causality is based, in part, on the noun - verb structures we use. If this was compared with some of the Amerind languages, we see totally different forms. Edward Sapir's Language, Culture and Personality deals with some of these issues. As a note, the very terms that are being used in this current thread relate to early 19th century physics (e.g. Centre of Gravity), and this has a pretty serious impact on how "levels" are conceived.

So, I'm going to turn it around and ask people what are the words and phrases that AQ uses to describe their perceptions of "conflctual reality"? Once we have those, then we can start to analyze how they construct their levels.
MarcT,

I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to pre-empt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anyhting more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal teminology.

Now I am going to change horses here. Your post inclines me to believe that you have fallen under the spell of folks like Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault (the structuralist/post structuralist, not the physicist). I am thinking you place the cart before the horse in your last paragraph. I submit that we can only know the meanings attached to the words and phrases used by our opponents to describe their "levels of war" in a complex that also includes the theoretical constructs the words and phrases convey. First, we must determine whether they even operationalize a notion of "levels of war." Just because we do, I would not want to suppose that this is a universal practice in war theorizing.

I also have some issues with your point about etymology. While it may well be the case that COG originally derives from Newtonian physics, it has long since taken on new meanings divorced from that original context. The following is an example of what I mean. In the 80's, the U.S Army offered an effective writing course. One point made in the course was using vocabulary correctly. The purist vocabulary gurus pointed out that military writers habitually misused 'viable.' Its definition, coming from biology, is "able to sustain life;" yet military writers and speakers talk about viable plans and viable options among other things. The community of speakers here, not being biologists, knew pretty much what they really meant when they used 'viable' and that most often was 'workable,' 'practicable,' or something synonymous.

I revert to my earlier post with the quotation from C. L. Dodgson, AKA Lewis Carroll. He was an Oxford don, holding a chair in mathematics at Christchurch, a mathematician and logician who recognized the problems with which language is fraught, especially when one tries to formailze natural language into logical argument in symbolic form. He put versions of many of those problems, humorously, into the mouths of his characters in his Alice stories.
In your last post, you seem to have taken the opposite pole to Humpty Dumpty, allowing the words to determine what and how we think, while our ovoid friend chooses to make the words bend to his conceptualization of the world.
I am proposing that there is something like a Hegelian middle ground here. We reach an understanding of other view points by successive approximations in a dialectic exchange with those who hold that point of view different from our own. The initial foot in the door (or camel's nose in the tent) is indexed to those things which we have in common because we are all human beings. An interesting exmple of this is found in the Star Wars Next Generation episode "Darmok," summarized here (http://memory-alpha.org/en/wiki/Darmok_(episode)#Summary). For dry philosophical alternatives, I suggest a look at the literture in the philosophy of language on the problems of radical translation, radical interpretation, and the indeterminacy of translation (W.V.O Quine and Donald Davidson as prime sources).

Rob Thornton
09-07-2007, 12:28 PM
Hey guys,


wm:

[QUOTE]I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to preempt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anything more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal terminology.

To be honest I'm not sure either :D- but it just "felt" related, and so sparked an interest. I like it when we have several different (but related to a degree) thoughts going on in a single thread. It allows me to get to places I might not if we remained too focused on the original statement/problem/inquiry. We've had threads that seemed to radically depart from where they started, but when viewed as a whole when the thread was exhausted, offered a more complete set of possibilities.

In the case of this departure - I guess it fits (albeit loosely) with the concept of multiple LLOOs, and maybe the ideas of Red Teaming, how and why we make decisions and their consequences. Sometimes I also need a square put in front of me before I stop looking for circles. Our departure into the EBO discussion is also useful I think because its helping shape context - and clarify content for a diverse group.


I also have some issues with your point about etymology. While it may well be the case that COG originally derives from Newtonian physics, it has long since taken on new meanings divorced from that original context. The following is an example of what I mean. In the 80's, the U.S Army offered an effective writing course. One point made in the course was using vocabulary correctly. The purist vocabulary gurus pointed out that military writers habitually misused 'viable.' Its definition, coming from biology, is "able to sustain life;" yet military writers and speakers talk about viable plans and viable options among other things. The community of speakers here, not being biologists, knew pretty much what they really meant when they used 'viable' and that most often was 'workable,' 'practicable,' or something synonymous.

I was thinking about that yesterday, but was not sure how to say it well. When a term enters new usage by a different audience and takes on different values - does that make it any less viable (no pun intended)? Some of this gets to the original question about defining and relating the levels of war in COIN.



I revert to my earlier post with the quotation from C. L. Dodgson, AKA Lewis Carroll. He was an Oxford don, holding a chair in mathematics at Christchurch, a mathematician and logician who recognized the problems with which language is fraught, especially when one tries to formailze natural language into logical argument in symbolic form. He put versions of many of those problems, humorously, into the mouths of his characters in his Alice stories.
In your last post, you seem to have taken the opposite pole to Humpty Dumpty, allowing the words to determine what and how we think, while our ovoid friend chooses to make the words bend to his conceptualization of the world.

A fantastic point - I spent a good part of last night and this morning watching the C-Span coverage of House and Senate testimony (yes I know it appears I have no life, but I'm here at Belvoir and the family is in PA:() from GEN (R) Jones and his group on the progress of ISF. I also have a serious interest in this particular topic.

Some members of Congress asked questions to obtain information to weigh in their decisions, some (Ds & Rs) proposed an observation in the form of a question which could not be responded to.

They were reasonably good at looking earnest as to cause me to wonder if they were doing it on purpose, or is that just how they define a question. In some cases I felt that the common language required to articulate the question or answer was just not there - possibly because the preceding questions and answers set the perception for the subsequent ones. I think this is important when we are considering various LLOOs and Physical LOOs in a campaign plan, or in the broader strategy - how much of what you ask next depends on what was asked last? How much influence does the limitations of expressions bind our cognitive abilities?

from wm,


I am proposing that there is something like a Hegelian middle ground here. We reach an understanding of other view points by successive approximations in a dialectic exchange with those who hold that point of view different from our own. The initial foot in the door (or camel's nose in the tent) is indexed to those things which we have in common because we are all human beings.

I quoted that just because it should precede every serious discussion that seeks an answer:)

Best regards, Rob

Tom Odom
09-07-2007, 12:48 PM
Warden's concept of EBO planning is extremely close to the Army Artillery concept of D3A. The concept of CARVER has a lot of similarities to the 5 rings analysis from the standpoint of it concentrates on high value targets COG's but yet still takes into account adverse effects. The E stands for Effect on populace which could be positive or negative. He (Warden doesn't believe in a single COG, all systems have multiple COG's) The final multiple target set of CARVER is very close to the 5 rings analysis in this respect as it relates to selecting COG's.

I would agree with you about varying definitions of systems theory between the services, it is that way in the civilian world too.

Indeed it is and we have worked targeting, EBO, EBP, Full spectrum planning here at JRTC for the past 6 years as have units in both theaters. Some have used CARVER; most use PEMSII as a framework. On COGs in general, when we worked COGs in the 80s we were looking for the long pole in the tent--that node or vulnerability that would collapse an enemy's capabilities. That in itself was nothing new--we did the same in WWII. But this was all discussed in terms of operational art and in the hopes of getting away from the attritional position warfare of the Active Defense. Now when we talk COGs we are not really talkng COGs in that single critical node sense--we are talking vulnerabilities but it is muti-layered approach and yes, effects are very much part of it.

Best

Tom

marct
09-07-2007, 12:50 PM
Hi WM,

Always funto gte into philosophy debates with you :D.


I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to pre-empt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anyhting more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal teminology.

That's actually a really good question, and I'll try to answer it. My first observation would be that unless we are planning on the annihilation of an opposing group, they will be around for a while so we will be dealing with them long after any open conflict ends. My second observation would be that while Rob couched the question in terms of military doctrine, I believe he was actually trying to get more at how cultural groups perceive a conflict space. My third observation is that how a group perceives a conflict space will, inevitably, condition how they act within that space.

I think a really good example of this comes out of the way that the new CMC technologies have been perceived by AQ - they are a major part of their battlespace as it were. Your latter point about levels is, IMO, quite justified - I would actually prefer to describe it in terms of overlapping topologies, but I'll get to that latter. Anyway, I would suggest that the AQ "strategy" is centered in a "conflict space" that is radically different from that of the Western militaries.


Now I am going to change horses here. Your post inclines me to believe that you have fallen under the spell of folks like Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault (the structuralist/post structuralist, not the physicist).

I hope you're smiling when you say that :cool:. It was to avoid that attribution that I purposefully referenced Sapir.


I am thinking you place the cart before the horse in your last paragraph. I submit that we can only know the meanings attached to the words and phrases used by our opponents to describe their "levels of war" in a complex that also includes the theoretical constructs the words and phrases convey. First, we must determine whether they even operationalize a notion of "levels of war." Just because we do, I would not want to suppose that this is a universal practice in war theorizing.

I would certainly agree with your caution here, and that is why I would prefer to conceive of it along the lines of intersecting and overlapping topologies rather than the more limited concept of "levels". But how are we going to find out how they conceive of conflict without analyzing how they a) talk about it and b) operationalize that talk?

I certainly agree that the meaning of terms is contained within a semantic matrix, but that matrix, by its very nature, also serves to condition their operations and, as such, is worth examining.


I also have some issues with your point about etymology. While it may well be the case that COG originally derives from Newtonian physics, it has long since taken on new meanings divorced from that original context. The following is an example of what I mean. In the 80's, the U.S Army offered an effective writing course. One point made in the course was using vocabulary correctly. The purist vocabulary gurus pointed out that military writers habitually misused 'viable.' Its definition, coming from biology, is "able to sustain life;" yet military writers and speakers talk about viable plans and viable options among other things. The community of speakers here, not being biologists, knew pretty much what they really meant when they used 'viable' and that most often was 'workable,' 'practicable,' or something synonymous.

Sure, word shift or semantic drift or whatever you want to call it is one of the crucial limits of any form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapir-Whorf_hypothesis). Still and all, there appears to be a fair amount of support for a weak form of it.


I revert to my earlier post with the quotation from C. L. Dodgson, AKA Lewis Carroll. He was an Oxford don, holding a chair in mathematics at Christchurch, a mathematician and logician who recognized the problems with which language is fraught, especially when one tries to formailze natural language into logical argument in symbolic form. He put versions of many of those problems, humorously, into the mouths of his characters in his Alice stories.

You could also point to the dismal failures of the Vienna School in their attempts to create a scientific language.


In your last post, you seem to have taken the opposite pole to Humpty Dumpty, allowing the words to determine what and how we think, while our ovoid friend chooses to make the words bend to his conceptualization of the world.

Nope; I tend to hold with a weak form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. At present, that takes the form of words have a limiting effect on perceptions and thought as a result of their connotations and neuronal associations. Where it becomes stronger is when we try to communicate a thought or perception.


I am proposing that there is something like a Hegelian middle ground here. We reach an understanding of other view points by successive approximations in a dialectic exchange with those who hold that point of view different from our own. The initial foot in the door (or camel's nose in the tent) is indexed to those things which we have in common because we are all human beings. An interesting exmple of this is found in the Star Wars Next Generation episode "Darmok," summarized here (http://memory-alpha.org/en/wiki/Darmok_%28episode%29#Summary). For dry philosophical alternatives, I suggest a look at the literture in the philosophy of language on the problems of radical translation, radical interpretation, and the indeterminacy of translation (W.V.O Quine and Donald Davidson as prime sources).

That's one of my favorite episodes ("Trek", not "Wars" ;)). I also agree that biological commonalities form the basis for communications (NB that "communications" is different from "thought" - a crucial point that is often not addressed in the debates in this area). While I am not enamoured of Hegel, the dialectical approach is certainly one of the bases of understanding although I believe there are others.

Marc

wm
09-07-2007, 02:17 PM
MarcT-- always glad to do a little sophistical sparring.

My first observation would be that unless we are planning on the annihilation of an opposing group, they will be around for a while so we will be dealing with them long after any open conflict ends. My second observation would be that while Rob couched the question in terms of military doctrine, I believe he was actually trying to get more at how cultural groups perceive a conflict space. My third observation is that how a group perceives a conflict space will, inevitably, condition how they act within that space.
Thanks for the clarifications of intent.


I hope you're smiling when you say that :cool:. It was to avoid that attribution that I purposefully referenced Sapir. Of course I was smiling. I hoped you'd have seen the intended humor when I categorized Foucault both as a Structuralist and as a Post-structuralist. I think that most of what we say ought not to be placed in a specific box--to abstract in this manner is to falsify and misrepresent.


I would certainly agree with your caution here, and that is why I would prefer to conceive of it along the lines of intersecting and overlapping topologies rather than the more limited concept of "levels". This is where I want you to explain more about your concept of topologies, please.


You could also point to the dismal failures of the Vienna School in their attempts to create a scientific language. I suspect this applies equally to almost any other "school" seeking to standardize the domain of discourse that they view as unique to their area of investigation, sort of like establishing the equivalent of what cosmological physicists do with their grand unified theories (GUTs). Wittgenstein is particularly apropos here I think--we need to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle rather than cork it up inside.


That's one of my favorite episodes ("Trek", not "Wars" ;)). I also agree that biological commonalities form the basis for communications (NB that "communications" is different from "thought" - a crucial point that is often not addressed in the debates in this area). While I am not enamoured of Hegel, the dialectical approach is certainly one of the bases of understanding although I believe there are others.
Thanks for catching my mistake re STNG and SW. It was well past my normal bed time. I was also looking at a miniature pod racer as I was typing that. Regarding Hegel, I tend to agree if you are speaking about the form of his presentation rather than the contents. (Maybe that just goes with writing/speaking in German. :D Kant, Goethe, Heidegger, and even the Brothers Grimm are as opaque as Hegel IMHO.)

marct
09-07-2007, 02:45 PM
Hi WM,


This is where I want you to explain more about your concept of topologies, please.

This is rather tricky for me to do, in part since I'm in the process of reformulating it, so apologies if it's not up to snuff. I first started using the idea via Husserl, Schutz and Luckmann with some Korzybski added in. basically, in my first version it was an attempt to abstract phenomenological concepts into a form that was amenable to manipulation and analysis.

By about 1998 or so, I started to tie it in much more closely with cognitive neuropsychology, since it was beginning to look like cognitive neural networks were "fuzzy" in nature. Since then, I've been working on the concept, on and off, and keeping track of the CN literature waiting for some really hard data to show up. This, the hard data, really started appearing a last year and i seems to support the idea that neural networks use a fuzzy set typology to classify incoming sensory impressions.

This use of fuzzy vs crisp membership really does, to my mid, fit in very nicely with the phenomenological position - at least in its social theoretic form (e.g. The Structures of the Life World, V. 1 & 2 Schutz and Luckman), which brings us back to some type of cultural influence during childhood on the formation of language and concepts. Again, in the weak form of the S-W hypothesis, not the strong one.

So, back to typologies: they are, for me at least, the simplest way to "see" the various relationships (I'm a very visual thinker).


Regarding Hegel, I tend to agree if you are speaking about the form of his presentation rather than the contents. (Maybe that just goes with writing/speaking in German. :D Kant, Goethe, Heidegger, and even the Brothers Grimm are as opaque as Hegel IMHO.)

Sounds like linguistic determinism to me :eek: (LOLOLOL). Isn't there some famous quote about German being the only language where love poetry sounds like an argument?

Marc

John T. Fishel
09-07-2007, 03:01 PM
Clausewitz defined Center of Gravity as "the hub of all power and movement on which all else depends." One of the problems caused by that definition was that many believed it meant that there could only be a single COG. It was a great debate. But you could find places in the 8 books where Clausewitz suggested that there could be more than one COG. The other issue related to COGs was the common view that they represented targets. In fact, the COGs were the source of the enemy's strength. Of course, they could be vulnerable to direct attack as were the pony herds attacked by Mackenzie but often they would only be vulnerable to indirect attack. The point is that the objective was to neutralize the source of the enemy's strength - the COG.

From my perspective, there are typically one or more COGs at each level of war. So, the pony herds were the operational level COG for particular tribes. Detroying the pony herds made it difficult to impossible for those tribes to both conduct war and maintain their nomadic way of life. But what were the strategic COGs? Did that depend on the objective? In this current war, what are the American strategic COGs? I see one as what I would call regime legitimacy based around the war policy of the Bush administration. If the enemy objective is to drive us out of Iraq and Afghanistan then neutrailizing regime legitimacy will likely achieve that. But if the objective goes beyond the two local conflicts and seeks to achieve a greater caliphate encompassing the entire globe, then the US strategic COG becomes what I call system legitimacy and goes beyond simply neutralizing the current war policies. There is, of course, nothing to prevent the enemy form attacking both COGs independently, sequentially, or simultaneously, directly and/or indirectly.

On that happy note:eek:

Cheers

JohnT

goesh
09-07-2007, 03:20 PM
We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.

slapout9
09-07-2007, 03:32 PM
goesh....You go boy!!! Tell it like is...put some MOJO in the fight. Somebody say Amen...:wry:

Steve Blair
09-07-2007, 03:48 PM
We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.

For those of us who study the Indian Wars, this is nothing new. I could also mention the case of Isa Tai of the Comanche, who goaded his people into a conflict that they ultimately lost. Most good Frontier commanders were quite aware of this aspect of the fight, although how they used it varied from commander to commander.

You're quite correct that current concepts ignore this aspect of the conflict. One of the reasons (I think) that current efforts do not use God in the Western sense is that it's not always our primary motivation, and to use it in such a way plays right into IO efforts to paint all people in the West as "crusaders." I'm a firm believer in the spiritual side of conflict, but the "American Way" as spiritual center just doesn't play out well outside the US. This was a central component to most efforts in Latin America in the 1920s, though, and also played a major role in the Philippines and other involvements. But that smacks of empire-building these days.

What can take its place? That may be a good subject for another thread...

wm
09-07-2007, 03:51 PM
We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.
A spiritual leader may not need to appeal to matters religious. I submit that Hitler was as much a shamanic spiritual leader as Sitting Bull. What I think Goesh is on to is what the French spent a lot of time describing as the moral aspect of combat. It is also what we hear described as charismatic leadership and explains why names like Chesty Puller made it on to some folks Great Generals lists on this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2783).

marct
09-07-2007, 04:02 PM
Hi Folks,


A spiritual leader may not need to appeal to matters religious. I submit that Hitler was as much a shamanic spiritual leader as Sitting Bull. What I think Goesh is on to is what the French spent a lot of time describing as the moral aspect of combat.

I would certainly agree with the comment on Hitler - that really comes through in watching old clips of the Nurenburg rallies. I'm not sure Goesh is talking about the "moral" aspect, although that is probably part of it (Goesh? Expansion please?). We've had a couple of threads on the more "aplied" aspects of spirituality - in particular, and my favorite, was the Magical Realism (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1745) thread, and I still stand by my suggestion of creating the US Magi Corps for just his type of fight :cool:.

Marc

Steve Blair
09-07-2007, 04:17 PM
We may have gotten away from this in a mainstream sense because we've become such an industrial/mechanical society and lost touch with that side of our cultural identity/focus. As the focus has shifted away from units (as in the regimental system that's been discussed before) and moved more to weapons systems/communities I think the military has lost an appreciation for how important the moral side of the fight is (although the Marines seem more in touch with this...perhaps because of their own "combat spirituality" as it were).

Hitler was an absolutely brilliant shamanic leader and clearly understood the value of totems. He had another astute witch doctor (Goebbles) to package the product for him, and a sub-chief who took the totems to extremes (Himmler and his Nordic visions).

Mattis by all accounts is a stunning motivator combined with strong combat leadership skills and intelligence. We have others who can convey the message as well. The question still remains: what message do we convey? I'd submit that (as has often been the case in past American expeditionary efforts) we don't really know what our message is. Is it God? Freedom? Oil profits? New markets for Microsoft? Cheap real estate for Disney Middle East/Jasmine's Kingdom?

slapout9
09-07-2007, 04:26 PM
It's what used to be called "The Spirit of The Bayonet" I don't know if they teach that anymore.

wm
09-07-2007, 04:54 PM
MarcT,


I would certainly agree with the comment on Hitler - that really comes through in watching old clips of the Nurenburg rallies. I'm not sure Goesh is talking about the "moral" aspect, although that is probably part of it (Goesh? Expansion please?). We've had a couple of threads on the more "aplied" aspects of spirituality - in particular, and my favorite, was the Magical Realism (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1745) thread, and I still stand by my suggestion of creating the US Magi Corps for just his type of fight :cool:.

Marc

The moral aspect I mean is best found in the writings of duPicq. It has little to do with ethical rectitude and everything to do with attitude, belief in oneself, and spirituality. I think Slapout has it right with his description of it as "the spirit of the bayonet." Back in the day, my drill sergeant used to call out, "What is the spirit of the bayonet?" We would respond as loudly and toughly as we could "To kill!" He would then respond, "And who are we?" To which we would reply, "The killers!" (I think VOLAR killed that mode of training and thinking though. :()

tequila
09-07-2007, 05:07 PM
I'll testify that the spirit is alive and well at MCRD Parris Island. My platoon didn't call it that, but our senior, a combat veteran of OIF I, gave us all many a lecture about the desire and willingness of Marines to kill the enemy --- specifically that Marines were men who could "take joy in carving the heart out of a mother####er with your right hand, and hold that man's child safe in his left." SOI was more of the same, emphasizing the former and not much on the latter.

I wouldn't worry overmuch about the warrior spirit of our infantry.

TT
09-08-2007, 03:50 PM
John T. Fishel:

From my perspective, there are typically one or more COGs at each level of war. So, the pony herds were the operational level COG for particular tribes. Detroying the pony herds made it difficult to impossible for those tribes to both conduct war and maintain their nomadic way of life.


Thank you, John, for the elaboration and for the important point that there is not necessarily one COG in a particular level of war. It is helpful.

I understand the point that the destruction of the pony herds – to stay with this example – had the consequence of impacting the tribes mobility. In part my question was spurred by the impact, as you have noted, on the tribes nomadic way of life, which would in part provide a frame for their social-cultural (and even political) terrain. But I was thinking somewhere in the back of my mind of the role of horses in the social –cultural life of any one nomadic tribe (largely the plains tribes) as well between tribes. If my memory of reading I did way back in antiquity serves me right, horses were a sign of ‘wealth’ and ‘prestige’ within a tribe and between tribes.

But primarily in the back of my mind was how some tribes were split off from the Sioux, while other tribes, who were not part of the Sioux nation were co-opted. I do not know that much of the Indian wars (does the Lone Ranger count?), but this to me implied taking advantage of or influencing aspects of the social-cultural and even political contexts of each tribe and that the of social-cultural- political inter connections amongst various tribes and/or tribal groups. And you can throw in shamans and mysticism and religion into this mix as well ;)

That there may be, and perhaps should be, more than COG covers this. Leaving aside the issue of whether the socio-cultural environment should be a COG, would I be correct in thinking that when there are multiple COGs that there ‘may’ be [or 'should be'?] different priorities attached to them (a case perhaps of minor COGs and major COGs)? I raise this understanding that in some cases several COGs may have different implications that combine to achieve one or more desired consequences.

Best

TT

slapout9
09-08-2007, 03:57 PM
I posted this link awhile back but here it is again.
The Sioux Campaign of 1876: The Horse as The Center of Gravity of the Sioux Indians.




http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=73&CISOBOX=1&REC=1

TT
09-08-2007, 04:02 PM
Rob:

I'm starting to think there might be question or at least part of a question for Marc. - Maybe it gets to perceptions of time, space and scope by opponents. Maybe there be something in there about action/reaction/counter-action - is that specific to a particular culture, or is that more of a universal learning function?

I think it may be useful in trying to understand what your enemy is trying to do to you, but I'm not sure it prevents you from framing the depth of your own activities. I think it also could shed some light on applicability of other lenses/cognitive framing - like CoGs and Lines of Operation,etc. Another council member PM'd me about applicability and utility of doctrine, tenets and principals to COIN. My initial thoughts were that I believed in general they were broad enough to accommodate a great deal of conditions and that it depended on how they are interpreted by people.

Wm wrote:

I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to pre-empt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anyhting more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal teminology.

wm, I fully take your point that if our approach is working, then whether there is a difference is of no great consequence. Though I agree with Rob that understanding how they conceive their levels of war and the how and why the levels interconnect would be critical to disrupting sucessfullly their plans.

But what I was really thinking about is – and yes, I should have elaborated! :( - what if our approaches are not succeeding, or are not nearly as successful as is required to be successful against them? I am thinking here, say, of a success at ‘disrupting’ the enemy at what we perceive as the operational level ends up not having the impact that we think it should, because our disruption was on what the enemy perceives as the tactical level.

Behind this lies a number of thoughts. One is that that it appears that AQI (and other insurgent groups) through the ‘propaganda of the deed’ are in effect leveraging the tactical straight into a strategic effect (ie affecting how we think about what is going on, chances of success, etc and so on). It is almost as if they are skipping a level – though their IO campaign may be seen as their operational level. Allied to this was another issue that was at the back of my mind which is that,if we accept Ken White’s point that ‘the COIN battle is the operational level’, for al Qaeda as in UBL et al Iraq very likely is a tactical level fight (I am simplifying, of course, by leaving out the complexities created by the multitude of different insurgent groups in Iraq).

AQ/UBL claim that their aim is to create, or recreate, the caliphate. To me this means that their strategic level goal has to be to control the Islamic holy land (effectively Saudi Arabia – the strategic level COG?). If this analysis is accepted – and please do correct me if I am not – this in turn might suggest that, given where he and his core followers are located, that the operational level COG would be to control (or completely destabilize?) Pakistan because of the potential benefits (probably the nukes, maybe an army?) that would contribute to their way of thinking to achieving control of Saudi (or would Pakistan be a second strategic level COG?). And pretty much everything else – Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorist attacks in N. Africa, Europe, etc - essentially are tactical level actions. (Marc’s point about perceptions of time is likely relevant here, but best that I leave that aside lest I irredeemably dig myself into a very deep hole. :wry:)

I guess in part what I am getting at here is the possibility that if the coalition succeed in Iraq, that this would only be tactical set back from UBL et al’s point view, while a loss of Iraq and whatever the consequences of that could have adverse operational and strategic level consequences for us beyond Iraq per se.


Time to go watch the Three Lions take on the Israelites….it may be a case of maneuver warfare vs methodical battle/attrition.

TT

slapout9
09-08-2007, 04:05 PM
I am also posting this one called: Plans That Survive First Contact.

I was under the impression that COG's and decisive points were used all the time in WW2 but according to this paper they were NEVER used at all.
Also the term Objective had a different meaning, it was used to describe the defeat mechanism?? Wow what a concept.

Tom Odom you may find this interesting.
Rob Thornton I told you about this in a PM awhile back don't know if you ever got a chance to read it.


http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=491&CISOBOX=1&REC=1

Steve Blair
09-08-2007, 04:09 PM
I have never bought into the concept that there is only "one COG to rule them all"; rather I feel that there are many (and EBO may be a "scientific" variation on this) acting in concert. Some are more important than others, but that importance can shift over time and/or if the objectives of the parties involved change.

To go back to the pony herd COG...there was another factor at play as well (more of a social COG). Within most tribes (although in this case I'm using the Comanche and Kiowa) there was a "blood for blood" social element at work. In other words, if warriors were killed during a raid, their male kinsmen had a social duty to avenge that loss. This social drive was one of the factors behind the 1874 Red River War. Astute commanders (like Mackenzie) grasped the fact that by striking a logistic COG (or two...the pony herd and the physical wealth represented by the village) he could achieve the goal of his campaign without triggering the vengeance factor. When he attacked the combined Comanche/Kiowa encampment at Palo Duro Canyon there were only 3-4 reported Indian casualties (Mackenzie also only counted bodies left behind...he didn't do estimates), but he captured and destroyed the village and the 1,200 or so ponies in the combined herd.

This same approach didn't work with tribes like the Apache, who didn't depend on horses in the same way, but commanders found other ways to attack their COGs. Grierson, for example, hit on water as a main COG and scattered patrols at each dependable water hole along an Apache escape route. This proved successful in that it forced them to battle and the Apache were not capable of replacing losses in any real way (something they had in common with most tribes).

Again, in each case there were a number of COGs in play (supply, mobility, reinforcements, social considerations) and each was targeted based on the commander's assessment. Mackenzie seems to have grasped quickly the social aspect of most tribes, as he usually targeted things other than the warriors of a tribe he tried to bring to battle. Sheridan hit on mobility as a COG early on when he started pushing winter campaigns in 1867-68. The Army could move (with difficulty) in the winter; the tribes could not. Miles carried this to its logical conclusion in 1876-77 against the Sioux using infantry (which had more mobility during winter than cavalry due to its lack of horses and correspondingly lighter logistical tail).

With the social COG aspect, some commanders understood that there were factional lines between the tribes and within the tribes themselves. Most tribes contained what came to be called "peace" and "war" factions, and astute commanders tried to isolate the latter from the former. But most also failed to understand the weak nature of tribal leadership, so they missed a vital COG (or at least a factor that would greatly hinder what diplomacy they tried).

Lots going on in this thread, but I've always felt that multiple COGs were the norm and that they could be found in many areas (including those not traditionally looked for...like social networks). Maybe that's my Indian Wars specialization coming through, but you also saw it in Vietnam. We just never picked up on it there....

Ken White
09-08-2007, 05:14 PM
I have never bought into the concept that there is only "one COG to rule them all"; rather I feel that there are many (and EBO may be a "scientific" variation on this) acting in concert. Some are more important than others, but that importance can shift over time and/or if the objectives of the parties involved change.
. . .
. . .
. . .

... Maybe that's my Indian Wars specialization coming through, but you also saw it in Vietnam. We just never picked up on it there....

I totally agree with your premise but disagree with the final sentence. In Viet Nam, WE picked up on it early on and at Division / Brigade level generally practiced it (Commander dependent). Some of the Field Forces also did from time to time (again Commander dependent). The problem was that ComMACV/USARV largely did not allow it to be implemented on a command wide basis because of a different command philosophy on what the war entailed -- until a New Commander who picked up on it and practiced it took charge on 10 Jun 68.

In COIN efforts, the nation and the effort become the Operational level of war. If COIN is not understood, then the operational effort will be misdirected at the wrong COG -- or even non-existing but falsely presumed COG. There will almost always be multiple COG and they will constantly shift (COIN or conventional -- or IO...). That's why bureaucracies don't do well at war fighting while intuitive commanders with fairly well trained troops win...

We were a bureaucracy in WW II yet we still did pretty well because we were generally willing to put the right folks in charge and leave them alone. Most of our errors (Schmidt?) were due to a failure to identify what was important and put form over function. COG existed and even if we didn't use the term or the process, the good guys identified what was stupid (Gavin's comment on Schmidt, Urquhart's on bridges, Halsey's on Peleliu) and what needed to be done -- after they learned by a few mistakes; just as did Miles and Crook.

As did Abrams in Viet Nam after the Harkins / Westmoreland land war in Europe Operational effort had proven disastrous for seven years. Abrams and Co. focused on mostly the correct COGs and methodically went after them.

Steve Blair
09-08-2007, 05:59 PM
With VN, I use the statement in direct reference to MACV under Westy and his staff. I know it was picked up on at lower levels (with varying degrees of success), but at the end of the day it was a higher headquarters push that was needed. Abrams got it...his predecessors didn't.

Rob Thornton
09-08-2007, 06:29 PM
Placed a new thread here dealing with COIN LOG requirements. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3858) Best Regards, Rob

Ken White
09-08-2007, 06:58 PM
With VN, I use the statement in direct reference to MACV under Westy and his staff. I know it was picked up on at lower levels (with varying degrees of success), but at the end of the day it was a higher headquarters push that was needed. Abrams got it...his predecessors didn't.

"We." Thus I missed the direct reference. My apologies.

I'd also state that the "varying degrees of success" were specifically related to the knowledge of the commander on the ground and his willingness to do what was right instead of what his boss or his bosses boss thought was the politically astute thing to do.

As you say it was indeed higher headquarters comprehension and vision that was needed and lacking in the pre-1968 days.

TT
09-08-2007, 07:43 PM
Slapout9 – Thanks for link, the paper looks interesting!

Steve,

Thank you very much for elaborating on the Sioux example. What you describe is generally what I was thinking towards. What knowledge I have on Native American culture and the Indians wars was gleaned some thirty odd years ago from some limited readings, one or two anthro classes and some conversations with members of the Blackfoot located in Alberta. So the details are kind of fuzzy these days.

It is interesting that a number of Army commanders figured out many of the social as well the other ones you mention, such as logistics and mobility. Stemming from the discussion on ‘the Concept of Adaptation’ thread with respect to rehabilitating past commanders to serve as new hero-warrior icons for COIN - (around about here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3478&page=3) an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

And, no, I am not really expecting an answer to this last, just musing in print. But I expect there are a fair number of interesting, and potentially very valuable, papers to be written on this subject.

Ken White
09-08-2007, 08:14 PM
Slapout9 – Thanks for link, the paper looks interesting!

...an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

. . .


I did not know Eddy (Slapouts good link Div Cdr) and do not know Petreaus but I've briefed and just talked to Abrams and Westmoreland. Both the latter two were courtly, did not shoot messengers and were smart. The difference was that Abrams listened and asked pertinent questions then listened to the answers. As an aside, Westmoreland had an awesome memory for names and faces and used that to good effect, Abrams did not have that people skill but he did have an awesome recall of events and circumsatnces.

My impression is that Eddy did and Petreaus does the same thing Abrams did. Listen...

Steve Blair
09-09-2007, 02:04 AM
an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

And, no, I am not really expecting an answer to this last, just musing in print. But I expect there are a fair number of interesting, and potentially very valuable, papers to be written on this subject.

Thanks in part to Rob's suggestion I'm starting to work up a possible article about the ability of commanders to adapt (or not adapt) when moving from the Civil War to the Indian Wars. It is, indeed, a very interesting question and one that hasn't really been looked at in any detail (or at least with this sort of specific intent).

Dr Jack
09-09-2007, 03:05 AM
Clausewitz defined Center of Gravity as "the hub of all power and movement on which all else depends." One of the problems caused by that definition was that many believed it meant that there could only be a single COG. It was a great debate. But you could find places in the 8 books where Clausewitz suggested that there could be more than one COG. The other issue related to COGs was the common view that they represented targets. In fact, the COGs were the source of the enemy's strength.

I've entered into this discussion a bit late, but here is what we currently teach at Leavenworth:


Joint doctrine describes centers of gravity (COGs) as “agents or sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance—what Clausewitz called ‘the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.’”

The intent is that the definition of COG is not just the "hub," but the source of strength...


From a planning perspective, determining the COG should be to discern where the real power is and where a knockout blow can take the enemy out, or at least bring the enemy to a culminating point where he ceases to be effective. At the strategic level this is almost always the population that is resolved to win or the leader who is leading out ahead of the population with firm resolve and dedication. This distinction of the leader vice the population begs the “chicken-egg” argument with a big gray area, but it is still useful to analyze and determine from a planning perspective which of the two is the strategic COG.

There is always a lot of disagreement about using either a leader or the population; this is just the starting point we use to help start the discussion and to get our arms around the concept.


At the operational level the COG is almost invariably specific military or insurgent forces. Because the operational level of war is more fluid and subject to changes, the COG at the operational level is more likely to change over time.

The biggest discussions center around the Operational COG; in a COIN situation or fighting a compartmented enemy such as AQ (with different components doing planning, recruiting, funding, etc., without knowledge of the other components) this is particularly problemmatic. That's life.


The COG at the operational level is, of course, theater-specific and should represent an entity that can be attacked either directly or indirectly. It is preferable, from a planning framework, that there only be one COG, but this is not always the ground truth—there may be more than one. This is especially true in a campaign that has multiple logical lines of operation such as humanitarian operations, offensive operations, and other stability operations that are ongoing simultaneously.

Many don't think you can have more than one COG, but I don't agree... particularly at the operational level and when conducting full spectrum ops.


There will no doubt be wide variance between planners on determining the COG at the strategic and operational levels. This should not be cause for concern. The debate and discussion that lead to identifying the COGs help focus the staff and commanders on the all-important task of identifying and understanding the problem. The discussion will help to identify the sources of power and assist in identifying how to address these sources.

This is the key; all of the discussion doesn't get you to the point of agreement -- it's to the point of understanding the adversary and the environment by considering the constuct of COG.

More at this link (including how lines of operation are used) -- and this document will be updated in the next couple of months:

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=377&filename=378.pdf

slapout9
09-09-2007, 04:14 AM
Here is an article with a very different view by Dr. Milan Vego. You can not name a COG (focus of effort) until you name an Objective and the COG will always be found in the Objective. If you have multiple Objectives you will have multiple COG's. If your Objective changes your COG will have to change. Also points out on how the error in translation has led to many misconceptions about what a COG is. Very good article in my opinion and certainly makes the concept a lot clearer, at least in his opinion.

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/Publications/Campaigning_Journal_Spring_2006.pdf

wm
09-09-2007, 01:06 PM
Here is an article with a very different view by Dr. Milan Vego. You can not name a COG (focus of effort) until you name an Objective and the COG will always be found in the Objective. If you have multiple Objectives you will have multiple COG's. If your Objective changes your COG will have to change. Also points out on how the error in translation has led to many misconceptions about what a COG is. Very good article in my opinion and certainly makes the concept a lot clearer, at least in his opinion.

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/Publications/Campaigning_Journal_Spring_2006.pdf

I like Vego's description. I have always considered a COG as the point where you get the most bang for your buck. This needs more refienment however, because different operations seek different sorts of bang. For example, if you want to keep the Comanches from going out on raids (the bang, AKA, objective or mission) then perhaps the most cost effective way to do so is to eliminate their mounts. Other options include killing them all off, fencing them in and mounting a 24-hour guard, etc. But which is most effective and efficient, which produces the best payout for the least investment?

I still don't understand the need to overintellectualize this stuff. It goes back to the concept of METT-TC, IMHO.

I concur that a COG is only defineable after an objective or mission is determined. As an alternative way to understand this, one that allows for multipler COGs, view a military operation as a causal chain of events. Every link in that causal chain is potentially a COG, depending on what the commander chooses (or is directed) to target. Remember the old causal chain: "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse, the rider was lost. For want of a rider, the battle was lost." If it were that simple, then the COG in this case would be that nail of your opponent's. But, the shoe, the horse, or the rider could also be COGs, depending on ETT-TC in METT-TC. (I presume that M was "win the battle.")

If you wish to take MarcT's point about COGs being derived from Newtonian physics, then look at gravitaional forces in our solar system. Each planet has its own center of gravity. They interact with the other bodies in the solar system as well to produce additional centers of gravity. If I remember my high school physics correctly, the universal law of gravitation talks about the force of attraction between two objects being based on the product of their masses divided by the square of their distance apart. So, in this case, we have at least three items that we can focus on to disrupt a force of gravity--each, I suppose, could be considered a center of gravity.

slapout9
09-09-2007, 01:45 PM
Posted by wm:
I still don't understand the need to overintellectualize this stuff. It goes back to the concept of METT-TC, IMHO.

Do I ever agree with that statement.
METT-TC is Strategy to me as opposed to the Ends, Ways, and Means used now.:wry:

Ken White
09-09-2007, 05:50 PM
a bad tendency to try to build templates and matrices and over complicate things to enhance our 'professionalism.' We are professional (no quotes) and need to avoid clouding something as complicated as fighting a war with any more confusing ideas.

Studying war in a vacuum is neat and good ideas and words can abound -- and should, seriously. However, that study and verbosity must be reduced for implementation. At the implmentation point, it needs to be simple. Period.

Much of this is, I think, an effort to produce voluminous guides and easy to follow (though they aren't) steps to allow anyone and everyone to be a great captain. Not going to happen. Some have it and some don't and all the aids in the world will be of small benefit to those who don't.

PhilR
09-09-2007, 06:05 PM
The COG discussion is always fascinating and enlightening... and it is endless. It is a good technique to drive discussion in planning teams and staffs as to what is important, what should we focus on, what makes the enemy tick, etc. At the end of the day, however, what is necessary is for the commander to describe what he thinks the COG(s) is, why he thinks it is a COG, what does it mean to him that its a COG, and what he thinks we should do about it.
Doctrine goes along way to get us (collectively) on the same sheet of music with the COG concept, but it is apparrent from all of the discussions, books and articles, that there is a fairly wide divergence of opinion on COGs. This is all well and good for discussion and learning, but for application, the commander needs to ensure that everyone has his same understanding, or else the resulting logic of the plan can be lost on his subordinates. Of course, this requires the commander to be an active thinker and not just bless off of a slide put in front of him. in most cases where that happens, I see that the commander doesn't really consider the COG (that is presented) as a critical piece. After the course of action is approved, it can sometimes be hard to go back and demonstrate how it is really getting after the COGs defined early in the planning.

Ken White
09-09-2007, 06:53 PM
above. I think PhilR summed it up nicely.

We've all watched an amazing number of folks try to follow complex plans and orders with bad effects...

The academic discussions on strategy, operations, tactics and methods absolutely need to occur in the Universities, the Think Tanks and above all in the service Schools. It should also take place with our Allies and even with non-Allies -- we are terrible about the "not invented here" syndrome (both inter and intra) -- and the results debated endlessly with one thought in mind; to produce sensible, easily followed doctrine (while always bearing in mind that Halsey's dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." [emphasis added / kw] is important). ;)

The results then need to be synthesized and simplified into simple doctrine. I submit that is much more of an intellectual challenge than merely establishing ever more complex methodologies with only limited applicability simply due to their complexity. We effectively won WW II with Field Manuals that would fit in a pocket. I'm not advocating regression; rather smarter progress.

We should also ban Power Point... :D

TT
09-09-2007, 10:24 PM
PhilR
The COG discussion is always fascinating and enlightening... and it is endless.

Agreed. Definitely fascinating and enlightening. Many thanks!


Ken White
It should also take place with our Allies and even with non-Allies

I have the good fortune to interact with officers of many different Allied nations on a fairly regular basis. Once upon a time I had thought that COGs was pretty much straightforward but how different nationalities and different officers perceive COGs left me believing that it really is dependent on a range of factors, including national experience and training, organizational culture and so on.


Ken White;
I did not know Eddy (Slapouts good link Div Cdr) and do not know Petreaus but I've briefed and just talked to Abrams and Westmoreland. Both the latter two were courtly, did not shoot messengers and were smart. The difference was that Abrams listened and asked pertinent questions then listened to the answers. As an aside, Westmoreland had an awesome memory for names and faces and used that to good effect, Abrams did not have that people skill but he did have an awesome recall of events and circumsatnces.

My impression is that Eddy did and Petreaus does the same thing Abrams did. Listen...


Thank you for this, Ken, as it is an interesting insight on how different individual officers behave. The willingness to to listen, ask pertinent questions,and then listen, is one I had not considered before but now that you have pointed it out it seems intuitively to be an important character and command trait.


Steve Blair
Thanks in part to Rob's suggestion I'm starting to work up a possible article about the ability of commanders to adapt (or not adapt) when moving from the Civil War to the Indian Wars. It is, indeed, a very interesting question and one that hasn't really been looked at in any detail (or at least with this sort of specific intent).


This would be an interesting and valuable study, and I would love to read it. If you are interested in an academic perspective, I would be more than happy to read and comment on a draft when you have finished.

Ken White
09-09-2007, 11:16 PM
angle, in addition to listening ability (really listening), a suggestion if I may. You might consider another intangible imponderable...

A lot of people in positions of power have really big egos. Understandable and not all bad; as someone once pointed out, "You wouldn't want your kids going to war under a guy with an inferiority complex, would you?"

Good question. I suggest the answer is no -- but (as they say)...

I have met a number of senior folks who had adequate egos but who were surprisingly lacking in simple self confidence. They mostly covered or hid this well but seemed to continually question themselves while reacting strongly and frequently adversely to a question from anyone else. They also tended to be excessively concerned with unimportant minutia. Thus, I think we sometimes do send our kids to war under a guy with an inferiority complex of sorts.

For a good Commander, I believe a blend of ego, self confidence, willingness to listen and plain old strength of character as well as an intuitive sense of combat have to meld. I've been lucky to know and serve under a number of folks who had that blend; I've also known and served under a perhaps larger number who did not but just, usually, got by -- generally at some unnecessary cost to the unit involved.

Armchairguy
09-10-2007, 05:15 AM
but what Ken said about consulting allies had a real ring to it. Does anyone in a really methodical way ask the former insurgents what types of messages. media, and ways of turning them from the insurgency would have worked with them? Seems they would have a more culturally astute eye for stuff that would or would not be worth doing. I was thinking along the lines of fairly widespread questionairres or polls. Just seems there is a ready made focus group with a relatively close demographic.

Steve Blair
09-10-2007, 01:11 PM
angle, in addition to listening ability (really listening), a suggestion if I may. You might consider another intangible imponderable...

A lot of people in positions of power have really big egos. Understandable and not all bad; as someone once pointed out, "You wouldn't want your kids going to war under a guy with an inferiority complex, would you?"

Good question. I suggest the answer is no -- but (as they say)...

I have met a number of senior folks who had adequate egos but who were surprisingly lacking in simple self confidence. They mostly covered or hid this well but seemed to continually question themselves while reacting strongly and frequently adversely to a question from anyone else. They also tended to be excessively concerned with unimportant minutia. Thus, I think we sometimes do send our kids to war under a guy with an inferiority complex of sorts.

For a good Commander, I believe a blend of ego, self confidence, willingness to listen and plain old strength of character as well as an intuitive sense of combat have to meld. I've been lucky to know and serve under a number of folks who had that blend; I've also known and served under a perhaps larger number who did not but just, usually, got by -- generally at some unnecessary cost to the unit involved.

Ken,

The group I'm dealing with (Indian Wars officers with CW service) certainly had egos...in plenty.;) That is something I was going to factor in...ego combined with an ability to learn and set the ego aside when the time came to assimilate new experiences and ideas. One of my factors, actually, is the ability of the officer to lay aside old CW ego battles and get on with the new job. Some of them could, some could not, and others were a middle ground of sorts.

John T. Fishel
09-10-2007, 01:26 PM
The ends, ways, means approach to strategy is not, and cannot be, the whole story. It depends on, as well as drives, a METT-TC analysis. That analysis, usually takes place at the operational and tactical levels but there is no reason it cannot or should not take place at the strategic. Still, strategy is usually defined as the relation of ends to means (or vice versa) [through ways]. In other words, strategy must answer the questions: What do I want to accomplish? How do I expect to do so? And, what resources do I need?

Listening, really listening, I agree, is the key to successful leadership. In the end, I also agree that the commander's understanding to the enemy COG(s) and friendly COG(s) must be adopted by all in the chain but the commander must listen first to other views before he puts his stamp on it.

Steve, your proposed article on adaptation from the CW to the IW raises the question I have ponered here and elsewhere: Why do we always seem to have to relearn the lessons os Small Wars? I will look forward to reading the article and await it with anticipation.:D

Cheers

JohnT

Steve Blair
09-10-2007, 01:28 PM
Steve, your proposed article on adaptation from the CW to the IW raises the question I have ponered here and elsewhere: Why do we always seem to have to relearn the lessons os Small Wars? I will look forward to reading the article and await it with anticipation.:D

Cheers

JohnT

This has always interested/baffled me as well, and is one of the things that pushed me in this research direction.

TT
09-10-2007, 07:33 PM
Thank you very much for your additional insight. You are right that the characteristics you raise are intangibles, and that means that they are very easy for an academic such as myself to overlook. So I do appreciate and value your insights.

Best

TT

Rob Thornton
09-10-2007, 07:46 PM
I got a PM asking me about my thoughts I put up front. I thought it might help - the PM went to relevancy of operational thinking:

From my response,

The operational level is really about projecting a series of operations, lines of operation and/or logical lines of operation toward an objective that provides a distinct enough advantage as to have strategic consequence. So I think a political line of operation that might start with local reconciliation, but ended in large scale, national reconciliation by easing pressures might be a good example (or it could be the other way around - depends on how you pursue it). FID or the ongoing advisory effort and the operational steps needed to realize that might be another good example of a logical line of operation toward enabling partner capacity. A series of security operations beginning in Baghdad and spreading outward (the ink blot) might be a physical LOO in the context of COIN operations - hope that helps.

These are not meant to say that these LOOs have succeeded or failed (I'm just using them as examples), but that operational thinking is "a way" to apply resources in time and space toward seizing the initiative from an enemy, with the goal of making strategic progress. The question might be asked, if you don't think in operational terms how to do this - what method do you use to keep from just flailing about - meaning managing and synchronizing resources so that they can be sustained over time. The same question might be used for COG analysis in terms of its apllicability - but I think members have already hit that one well - its a process that allows you to consider relationships between strengths and weaknesses, then apply resources to their best ends.

Ken makes a point that I've been cogitating on since he posted it about the extension of the operational environment. I think its wisely stated, and something we should include in the context of all wars where public will is accessible.

Thanks, Rob

Rob Thornton
09-10-2007, 08:26 PM
Steve - I think its going to be a very good article, and I really look forward to it - considering the bearing of leadership on organizational adaptation is I believe the most influential factor - plenty of armies have had a technological advantage and went into a fight thinking they would not fail, only to have suffered catastrophic defeats at the hands of Armies better led.

Where successful, those armies (the ones better supplied and more technologically advanced) have overtime adapted their tactics, operational thinking and strategy to meet the needs of the COE - but it was the emergent of dynamic leadership which supplied the rationale for change. That leadership seems to come most often from the conditions which required the change.

Its going to be a very timely and relevant article - but no pressure:D

Best Regards, Rob

slapout9
09-11-2007, 02:45 AM
Here is a link to an article published June 1973 Military Review on a Theory of Strategy. This was before the Ends,Ways and Means definition appeared.

Not only that but it is by a Navy guy:eek:

From the paper.
Strategy is defined as the comprehensive direction of power to establish control over areas and situations to achieve objectives. Strategy is essentially concerned with control for a given effect. The essences of Strategy is control.
The Strategic concept is simply a verbal statement resulting from the analysis of:
1-what to control?
2-the nature of the control.
3-the degree of control necessary.
4-when control is to be initiated.
5-the duration of control and the general method or scheme to be used.
Without clearly and precisely analyzing these elements,it is impossible to establish any rational kind of control which could reasonably succeed in bringing about the desired effects.

http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/txts/VOL53/00000006/art10.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=TSPTTRPWGFXP&CQ_QH=124913&CQDC=9&CQ_PDF_HIGHLIGHT=YES&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=1

Alex Alderson
10-07-2007, 08:12 PM
Forgive me asking what may be an obvious question, but aren't our definitions of COIN a touch dated? If identifying the nature of the problem is a fundamental (paraphrasing K v C) is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy? Presumably if insurgency is a strategy (see Steve's Learning from Iraq and Rethinking Insurgency), then to counter it requires a strategy? Lots of definitions tell us where the military might start but not how a political solution to a political problem might finish. The answer might be obvious but not from doctrine or most of the mainstream works.

Rob Thornton
10-07-2007, 08:46 PM
Alex,
Check out the slides presented by DR. Dave Kilcullen on the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/coin-seminar-dr-david-kilculle/). They'll provide you some food for thought - they are a good stand alone set - as much as slides can be.

This is a very broad brush to discuss your question-

With regards to insurgency as a strategy - really defining the best ways with regard to available means toward defined ends. Defining the use of Insurgency as a strategy is to describe a way of overcoming limited means (relatively speaking) towards the end of establishing some other form of government, ruling body, or possibly even toward the absence of one in which to achieve broader ends for a group or other state.

In DR. Kilcullen's piece he plays on Counter-Insurgency and puts forward Counter War - the question that builds your COIN strategy is how do you counter the conditions which encourage war and violence as an alternative form of political redress? This is where the various elements of national power figure into the strategy as required ways and means to achieve that end.

In a very simplistic sense (until you try doing it in an environment full of they type of fog, friction and chance that allowed an insurgency to take hold), a strategy of counter-insurgency is one in which diplomatic, economic, informational and military means of power are employed in ways that counter the conditions which led to and perpetuate the insurgency.

Within the more general COIN strategy there is a great deal of latitude for how to employ those elements of power, and toward their individual limitations. Just because you know you must conduct a COIN campaign doesn't mean you'll get it right - much of what occurs is going to be shaped by subjective nature of the insurgency and the environment which gave birth to it. The priority given to objectives and weight given to logical lines of operation across the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Intelligence) must be defined with regard to the insurgency. In Iraq it may vary some by region.

There are no cookie cutter solutions with regard to insurgencies - just as there are no cookie cutter societies or problems that occur in those societies. I hope I've not mis-characterized Steve's work - he's done some good thinking and its helped me consider the problems of Insurgency and its opposite number.

Best Regards, Rob

skiguy
10-07-2007, 10:30 PM
I found this explanation good too.
Understanding Current Operations in Iraq By Dave Kilcullen (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/print/understanding-current-operatio/)

max161
10-07-2007, 11:55 PM
Forgive me asking what may be an obvious question, but aren't our definitions of COIN a touch dated? If identifying the nature of the problem is a fundamental (paraphrasing K v C) is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy? Presumably if insurgency is a strategy (see Steve's Learning from Iraq and Rethinking Insurgency), then to counter it requires a strategy? Lots of definitions tell us where the military might start but not how a political solution to a political problem might finish. The answer might be obvious but not from doctrine or most of the mainstream works.

Forgive the drive by: One thing that I think we need to consider is that (in my very humble opinion) the US cannot "win" a COIN fight unless the the insurgency is directly threatening the overthrow of the US. The US cannot "win" in the Afghanistan, Iraq, (or in the Philippines where I am just departing from). Only the Afghans can win in Afghanistan, only the Iraqis can win in Iraq, and only the Filipinos can win in the Philippines. I think that we are trying so hard to "win" and win hearts and minds for the US that we undercut the necessary legitimacy of the indigenous government and security forces. We cannot win these fights ourselves, we can only help the indigenous governments and security forces to win. As we consider COIN strategies I think we need to think about who is really capable of winning.

Now to answer your question here are some excerpts from various definitions of insurgency. These are dated (from a paper I wrote in 1995 and Larry Cable has been discredited academicly but he still provides some useful concepts so these are pre-1995 definitions from Joint pubs and FMs).


1. Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Definition)

a. It is an armed expression of internal and organic (regardless of external support) political disaffiliation. May be offensive (revolutionary war) or defensive (separatist or autonomous movements). (Dr. Larry Cable)

b. A protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy (FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations)

c. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources (FM 31-20)

(1) Revolutionary insurgencies seek to overthrow existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

(2) Other insurgencies seek to:

• Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
• Establish autonomous national territory within the borders of a state
• Cause a withdrawal of an occupying power
• Extract political concessions that are unobtainable through less violent means

5. Some additional notes on insurgency for consideration.

a. Consider that there are generally four “elements” that may be involved in the insurgency:

(1) The insurgent

(2) The population

(3) The counter-insurgent (the existing government or occupying power)

(4) The peace enforcer or peace keeper (external nation or forces)

b. Key to understanding insurgency is that it is a political problem first and foremost which has implications for the military. However, an insurgency will ultimately be successful if the underlying political and socio-economic causes are not addressed,

c. The insurgent, the counter-insurgent, and the peace keeper/enforcer have only two fundamental tools to work with to accomplish their goals:

(1) The enhancement of popular perceptions of legitimacy.

(2) The credible capability to coerce

d. Success or failure is determined by each sides understanding, application, and the mixture of these tools (which is determined by the political leadership NOT the military leadership)

e. Remember that no armed political disturbances begin without significant lead times.

f. When is the US military committed to counter-insurgency? Usually during the guerilla warfare or, at worst, the war of movement phase. Guess what? The war is already lost especially if a thorough Phase I has been conducted. It is generally too late for the established government to initiate the political reforms necessary to defeat the insurgency. Therefore, the US military ends up conducting a military operation to counter a political problem which just adds strength to the perceived legitimacy of the insurgency. The signs of a latent insurgency are too often overlooked and unrecognized.

g. Some fundamental considerations needed for the mindset of dealing with insurgencies.

(1) Encourage improvisation by subordinates (can lead to valuable tactics and techniques; i.e., SF CIDG program in Vietnam or the USMC Combined or Civic Action Platoons (CAP in Vietnam).

(2) Orient on the “human terrain”. Think in terms of cultural historical, and psychological terms.

(3) The killing (military operation) is clearly subordinate to the psychological and political.

(4) Replace “shoot, move, and communicate: with “presence patience and persistence.” Someday, if you are successful, the mission will disappear, like a river flowing into a swamp. (Dr. Larry Cable)

You may consider these dated but I think they are still useful in understanding the types and nature of insurgencies.

V/R

Dave

Rank amateur
10-08-2007, 01:32 AM
The one issue I've never seen addressed - though I'm sure someone here has addressed it some where - is defining the circumstances under which COIN can be successful and under which it can't.

max161
10-08-2007, 02:33 AM
The one issue I've never seen addressed - though I'm sure someone here has addressed it some where - is defining the circumstances under which COIN can be successful and under which it can't.

An excellent new book analyzing insurgency and COIN is Jeffrey Record's Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. I strongly reocmmend it.

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 09:16 AM
An excellent new book analyzing insurgency and COIN is Jeffrey Record's Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. I strongly reocmmend it.

The problem is that it deals almost exclusively with an outside power undertaking insurgency in a strange culture. My own belief is that the current administration , for some reason, forgot that's a very bad idea. Future administrations are likely to remember.

Incidentally I came across an interesting New York Times op ed from December 2001 while doing research for my book. The title is "Iraq Shouldn't Be the Next Stop in the War on Terror." Coming as the campaign in Afghanistan was nearing a conclusion, it was intended as a warning for those who wanted to set their sights on Iraq, arguing that there are other targets much more important to destroying transnational terrorism.

The author's name was L. Paul Bremer.

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 09:18 AM
Forgive the drive by: One thing that I think we need to consider is that (in my very humble opinion) the US cannot "win" a COIN fight unless the the insurgency is directly threatening the overthrow of the US. The US cannot "win" in the Afghanistan, Iraq, (or in the Philippines where I am just departing from). Only the Afghans can win in Afghanistan, only the Iraqis can win in Iraq, and only the Filipinos can win in the Philippines. I think that we are trying so hard to "win" and win hearts and minds for the US that we undercut the necessary legitimacy of the indigenous government and security forces. We cannot win these fights ourselves, we can only help the indigenous governments and security forces to win. As we consider COIN strategies I think we need to think about who is really capable of winning.

Now to answer your question here are some excerpts from various definitions of insurgency. These are dated (from a paper I wrote in 1995 and Larry Cable has been discredited academicly but he still provides some useful concepts so these are pre-1995 definitions from Joint pubs and FMs).


1. Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Definition)

a. It is an armed expression of internal and organic (regardless of external support) political disaffiliation. May be offensive (revolutionary war) or defensive (separatist or autonomous movements). (Dr. Larry Cable)

b. A protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy (FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations)

c. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources (FM 31-20)

(1) Revolutionary insurgencies seek to overthrow existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

(2) Other insurgencies seek to:

• Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
• Establish autonomous national territory within the borders of a state
• Cause a withdrawal of an occupying power
• Extract political concessions that are unobtainable through less violent means

5. Some additional notes on insurgency for consideration.

a. Consider that there are generally four “elements” that may be involved in the insurgency:

(1) The insurgent

(2) The population

(3) The counter-insurgent (the existing government or occupying power)

(4) The peace enforcer or peace keeper (external nation or forces)

b. Key to understanding insurgency is that it is a political problem first and foremost which has implications for the military. However, an insurgency will ultimately be successful if the underlying political and socio-economic causes are not addressed,

c. The insurgent, the counter-insurgent, and the peace keeper/enforcer have only two fundamental tools to work with to accomplish their goals:

(1) The enhancement of popular perceptions of legitimacy.

(2) The credible capability to coerce

d. Success or failure is determined by each sides understanding, application, and the mixture of these tools (which is determined by the political leadership NOT the military leadership)

e. Remember that no armed political disturbances begin without significant lead times.

f. When is the US military committed to counter-insurgency? Usually during the guerilla warfare or, at worst, the war of movement phase. Guess what? The war is already lost especially if a thorough Phase I has been conducted. It is generally too late for the established government to initiate the political reforms necessary to defeat the insurgency. Therefore, the US military ends up conducting a military operation to counter a political problem which just adds strength to the perceived legitimacy of the insurgency. The signs of a latent insurgency are too often overlooked and unrecognized.

g. Some fundamental considerations needed for the mindset of dealing with insurgencies.

(1) Encourage improvisation by subordinates (can lead to valuable tactics and techniques; i.e., SF CIDG program in Vietnam or the USMC Combined or Civic Action Platoons (CAP in Vietnam).

(2) Orient on the “human terrain”. Think in terms of cultural historical, and psychological terms.

(3) The killing (military operation) is clearly subordinate to the psychological and political.

(4) Replace “shoot, move, and communicate: with “presence patience and persistence.” Someday, if you are successful, the mission will disappear, like a river flowing into a swamp. (Dr. Larry Cable)

You may consider these dated but I think they are still useful in understanding the types and nature of insurgencies.

V/R

Dave

As I've mentioned before, I think that Joint definition is badly, badly flawed and I'm hoping it gets changed.

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 09:19 AM
is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy?

He did lots of drugs when he was young.

Steve Blair
10-08-2007, 01:44 PM
Perhaps it's because in its classic sense an insurgency IS a strategy. It is a campaign (or series of campaigns...or linked operations) aimed at accomplishing a specific goal or goals and has both a military and political component. What causes confusion, IMO, is that the term "insurgency" is used to cover a variety of situations and individuals...many of whom do not properly belong within that term's framework.

Rank amateur
10-08-2007, 01:48 PM
Future administrations are likely to remember.


I wish I shared your optimistic view of human nature. (Maybe I didn't do enough drugs when I was younger.;))

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 02:03 PM
I wish I shared your optimistic view of human nature. (Maybe I didn't do enough drugs when I was younger.;))

Well, we did remember Vietnam for 30 years. I really think it was a complex combination of conditions that got us where we are in Iraq, and that they're unlikely to be replicated:

1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection
2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq
3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months
4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological
5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"
6) we had drawn inappropriate military lessons from the past decade (speed and precision=victory)

To tell you the truth, I'll go to my grave kicking myself in the keester over this. In 2003, a number of my colleagues and I were convinced this was going to be a disaster but, for reasons I won't go into, we were prevented from published frank, critical assessments. I know it wouldn't have mattered, but I feel I was an intellectual coward.

In case anyone is intersted, I've attached the draft chapter of my book that I finished last week. It's not really counterinsurgency, but the roots of the Bush strategy. The next chapter will be on the decision to intervene in Iraq and the conventional campaign; the one after that the counterinsurgency.

Tom Odom
10-08-2007, 02:13 PM
To tell you the truth, I'll go to my grave kicking myself in the keester over this. In 2003, a number of my colleagues and I were convinced this was going to be a disaster but, for reasons I won't go into, we were prevented from published frank, critical assessments. I know it wouldn't have mattered, but I feel I was an intellectual coward.

Steve,

Even raising it took a certain amount of guts; I echoed your concerns and indeed they echoed concerns heeded in 1991. You do what you can, when you can.

And even when you are in position of responsible authority, your warnings even if 100% accurate will not necessarily have any effect, much less the effects you seek. Rwanda in 1995-1996 taught me that.

When a senior official can go before Congress and declare that there are no ethnic divisions in Iraq like the Balkans and that such a war will pay for itself, then that official and the adminstration he represented, and the Congress that accepted that testimony without serious challenge are the ones who need their keesters kicked.

Best

Tom

jcustis
10-08-2007, 02:20 PM
1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection
2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq
3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months
4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological
5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"
6) we had drawn inappropriate military lessons from the past decade (speed and precision=victory)

An excellent and appropriate analysis Steve.

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 02:22 PM
An excellent and appropriate analysis Steve.

Thanks. Give me four years to mull something over and occasionally I'll get it right (marriage excepted)

tequila
10-08-2007, 02:32 PM
Some quibbles:


1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection

I think the issue here was more that we did not know enough about the insurgency to tell who they were. I remember the old saw back in 2004-2005 was not AQ, but rather that they were all dead-ender Ba'athists, and they would dry up and blow away once Uday/Qusay died and Saddam was caught.



2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq

Not sure exactly what the international community was supposed to do about the insurgency, or that the Administration would have welcomed any assistance forthcoming. Control was the most important thing to this Admin. The treatment of de Mello before the UN bombing showed just how seriously the CPA and Bremer took the UN - that is, not at all.


3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months

After the election, our strategy did not appreciably change or improve.


4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological They weren't this way already? And did Rumsfeld really add to the poisonous disconnect between Bremer and Sanchez?


5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"

Really, is the ES experience valid or applicable at all? Did Big Army draw anything from here, or was this "win" seen as something interior to the SF community?

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 02:56 PM
Some quibbles:



I think the issue here was more that we did not know enough about the insurgency to tell who they were. I remember the old saw back in 2004-2005 was not AQ, but rather that they were all dead-ender Ba'athists, and they would dry up and blow away once Uday/Qusay died and Saddam was caught.



Not sure exactly what the international community was supposed to do about the insurgency, or that the Administration would have welcomed any assistance forthcoming. Control was the most important thing to this Admin. The treatment of de Mello before the UN bombing showed just how seriously the CPA and Bremer took the UN - that is, not at all.



After the election, our strategy did not appreciably change or improve.

They weren't this way already? And did Rumsfeld really add to the poisonous disconnect between Bremer and Sanchez?



Really, is the ES experience valid or applicable at all? Did Big Army draw anything from here, or was this "win" seen as something interior to the SF community?

I don't know how to make text boxes within a quote, so:

1. I meant if not for the smells-like-AQ dimension of the conflict, we could have disengaged or downgraded our involvement long ago. We've gotten where we are because the administration has to seem "tough on terrorists."

2. There's lots that could have been done:

--Turkey could have played initially, allowing a more rapid stabilization of the Sunni Triangle by the 4th
--Europe, India, etc could have seen peacekeeping troops when there still was peace to be kept
--The Gulf States could have provided reconstruction assistance
--The whole world, but especially the EU, could have helped with strategic communications

3. By the time of the election, we were committed to massive involvement. I'm suggesting that if not for the election, it would have been easier to have begun disengagement earlier. Or, conversely, to have sustained U.S. political control until the Iraqis were truly able to manage it. I believe we had two viable options: throw the keys to Chalabi in the summer of 2003 and beat feet; or run the place for a decade. By splitting the difference, we got the worst of both.

4. I wasn't clear. By civil military relations, I meant Rumsfeld's relationship with senior military, not the Bremer Sanchez thing. If the COCOM commander and all of the JCS had said, "Yea, Shinseki is probably right," things might have been different. I think some day H.R. McMaster Jr will write Dereliction of Duty II

5. I was suggesting that El Salvador allowed policymakers to draw the conclusion that we could successfully undertake counterinsurgency. No one stood up and screamed "that's an inapplicable lesson." One of the great ironies in that in 2004, a lot of people in DoD were looking at Algeria for lessons about how to conduct a counterinsurgency in an Arab country. No one was asking, "And how did that turn out for them?" Basically we figured that with the development of AirLand battle, we could derive operational lessons from the Germans without replicating their strategic blunders, so we could do the same with the French and counterinsurgency. This is kind of like a college coach cribbing a Charlie Weis game plan.

Tom Odom
10-08-2007, 03:15 PM
One of the great ironies in that in 2004, a lot of people in DoD were looking at Algeria for lessons about how to conduct a counterinsurgency in an Arab country. No one was asking, "And how did that turn out for them?"

I remember that well. Rumsfeld held a limited showing of the film in the Pentagon and as I recall invited the press to sit in, which struck me as really bizarre given the FLN wins.

I put out two history lessons on the Alerian War, one of which highlighted the paradox of Trinquier's methods succeeding tactically and failing strategically, which the film The Battle of Algiers offered as its central message.

Tom

tequila
10-08-2007, 03:21 PM
1. I meant if not for the smells-like-AQ dimension of the conflict, we could have disengaged or downgraded our involvement long ago. We've gotten where we are because the administration has to seem "tough on terrorists."


Agree the with the tough-guy rhetoric, but I think the insurgency had quickened and become so obviously a military challenge by 2004 that withdrawal would have been mooted regardless of an election or not.


2. There's lots that could have been done:

--Turkey could have played initially, allowing a more rapid stabilization of the Sunni Triangle by the 4th
--Europe, India, etc could have seen peacekeeping troops when there still was peace to be kept
--The Gulf States could have provided reconstruction assistance
--The whole world, but especially the EU, could have helped with strategic communications

That the 4th ID could have snuffed the insurgency is pretty implausible. 12,000 additional troopers would not have made much of a difference given the capital itself was not secured despite the flood of coalition troops there, much less the countryside or arms depots. They would have been 12,000 additional troops mostly concerned with securing themselves while surrounded by policy confusion as the national infrastructure was looted and burned.

No Indian or EU troops would have been committed without some degree of operational control. This was anathema to the Administration.

Likewise "strategic communications" - how would this have stopped the growth of the insurgency? The primary dynamics of this were domestic Iraqi concerns, not international in scope.

The amount of reconstruction assistance was not material to success or failure. Additional Gulf money would not have helped given the way money was being blown or stolen in 2003-2004 --- it would have disappeared in much the same way.


3. By the time of the election, we were committed to massive involvement. I'm suggesting that if not for the election, it would have been easier to have begun disengagement earlier. Or, conversely, to have sustained U.S. political control until the Iraqis were truly able to manage it. I believe we had two viable options: throw the keys to Chalabi in the summer of 2003 and beat feet; or run the place for a decade. By splitting the difference, we got the worst of both.

Again, I feel that the insurgency had ballooned to the point in 2004 that withdrawal would have been withdrawal under fire - politically impossible for any President. Throwing Chalabi the keys was recognized quite early as not even close to viable. He would have been dead or co-opted very shortly thereafter with no indigenous base of support. Sustained U.S. political control under the CPA was attempted by Bremer with his caucus plan, where elections would have been held with only CPA-approved candidates. This was mooted by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - to go against him at that time risked bringing the religious Shi'i against the occupation.

Steve, you are much closer to Beltway types - was El Salvador really bandied about as a reason why we could succeed in Iraq? I don't recall reading any real comparisons in the op-ed or thinktank literature at the time, except for some somewhat specious "voting under fire" comparisons with the Iraqi elections in 2005.

Rex Brynen
10-08-2007, 06:42 PM
Let me weigh in on this part, not with any fundamental difference, but perhaps a slightly different weighting:


This was, of course, code for the Palestinian conflict which, as much as any single issue, motivated Islamic militants and their supporters. But the Bush administration faced an absolute Gordian knot in Palestine. Resolution seemed to require compromise by both the Palestinians and Israel. But compromise on the part of Israel would be a concession to terrorism and send the terrible message that it worked.

I think it has to be remembered that the Bush Administration came to office regarding the Palestinian issue as tar-baby of the Clinton Administration, an issue that was impossible to solve and more (political) trouble that it was worth. To this should be added the view that Arafat (until his death) was no possible partner, and that Barak had been too generous (a view held by some senior Administration officials). Finally, PM Sharon had a clear view of a rather different approach--that of managing the conflict and consolidating Israel's strategic position, rather than seeking a resolution.

The net result was that, even post-9/11, the issue wasn't seriously addressed. When it was--in Bush's June 2002 Rose Garden speech--it was to (inappropriately) place all of the focus on the need for Palestinian leadership and "reform," not the core political issues. The Roadmap was only ever produced and released by the Quartet due to British pressure, with the Brits seeing it as important that the West be seen to be doing something on the Palestinian issue while they were intervening in Iraq (and even then, it was a mish-mash of poorly designed interim steps, bound to fail from the outset). It was also largely derailed by Gaza disengagement, and subsequent events.

As for your conclusion, I absolutely agree:


Unable to resolve these shortcomings in its policy, the administration responded with sophistry.

SteveMetz
10-08-2007, 07:02 PM
Agree the with the tough-guy rhetoric, but I think the insurgency had quickened and become so obviously a military challenge by 2004 that withdrawal would have been mooted regardless of an election or not.



That the 4th ID could have snuffed the insurgency is pretty implausible. 12,000 additional troopers would not have made much of a difference given the capital itself was not secured despite the flood of coalition troops there, much less the countryside or arms depots. They would have been 12,000 additional troops mostly concerned with securing themselves while surrounded by policy confusion as the national infrastructure was looted and burned.

No Indian or EU troops would have been committed without some degree of operational control. This was anathema to the Administration.

Likewise "strategic communications" - how would this have stopped the growth of the insurgency? The primary dynamics of this were domestic Iraqi concerns, not international in scope.

The amount of reconstruction assistance was not material to success or failure. Additional Gulf money would not have helped given the way money was being blown or stolen in 2003-2004 --- it would have disappeared in much the same way.



Again, I feel that the insurgency had ballooned to the point in 2004 that withdrawal would have been withdrawal under fire - politically impossible for any President. Throwing Chalabi the keys was recognized quite early as not even close to viable. He would have been dead or co-opted very shortly thereafter with no indigenous base of support. Sustained U.S. political control under the CPA was attempted by Bremer with his caucus plan, where elections would have been held with only CPA-approved candidates. This was mooted by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - to go against him at that time risked bringing the religious Shi'i against the occupation.

Steve, you are much closer to Beltway types - was El Salvador really bandied about as a reason why we could succeed in Iraq? I don't recall reading any real comparisons in the op-ed or thinktank literature at the time, except for some somewhat specious "voting under fire" comparisons with the Iraqi elections in 2005.

I was being metaphorical with the "throw the keys to Chalabi." I simply meant cobbling together some sort of Iraqi government and leaving. Sure it would have fallen apart. But Hussein would be gone and we wouldn't have been involved.

And I meant a serious period of U.S. rule and tutelage. Thing is, that would have required several hundred thousand troops. We were in mortal fear of the "Shia uprising" because we wouldn't have been able to deal with it with 120K troops. In other words, it wasn't that would couldn't have dealt with it, but that we weren't willing to pay the price to deal with it.

And I didn't mean that the El Salvador precedent was direct (although there were a few people contending that we needed to use the same method). I just meant that the success of El Salvador muted the impact of Vietnam. That caused us to not consider whether Iraq is more like Vietnam than it is like El Salvador.

And while a huge amount of reconstruction assistance was stolen, some got to where it needed to go. Even if 90% of the additional was stolen, there still would have been more getting to where it needed to go than there was.

On the strategic communications, I was thinking of two things:

--the refusal of Islamic governments to help delegitmize the insurgency contributed to the flow of money and foreign volunteers
--the opposition to the American role by many nations helped the insurgents believe that we would leave sooner rather than later, and thus all they had to do was wait us out.

Rank amateur
10-09-2007, 11:39 PM
I really think it was a complex combination of conditions that got us where we are in Iraq, and that they're unlikely to be replicated:

I look at it from a human nature point of view. People who think they're doing God's work will always attempt to overpower their opponents. A good spin doctor can sell anything: especially to his base, at least for a while and it doesn't take long to start a war.

I really think everyone in the administration believed they would kick Saddam's ass in a couple of weeks and there would be parades in the streets just like the Gulf War. (So no one would ever ask about WMD etc.)

Every war in history has happened because one side, and often both sides, believed they'd quickly kick the other's ass. It'll happen again. The more successful our military is, the less attention people will pay attention to why it was successful and the more they will forget about why we failed: especially if the Raptor is involved in future victory. The "technology changes everything" paradigm will rule again.


The problem is that it deals almost exclusively with an outside power undertaking insurgency in a strange culture. My own belief is that the current administration , for some reason, forgot that's a very bad idea.

Wouldn't it make sense to reinforce that it's a bad idea? It seems to me like a good time for a Powell doctrine Version 2.0: especially since many here seem to know exactly what they didn't like about version 1.0.

Ken White
10-10-2007, 01:09 AM
Some of us just knew it wouldn't work. Moore's law applies to 'Doctrine' nowadays.

Still, there's merit in your suggestion. What would be your ideal Powell Doctrine Version 2.0?

SteveMetz
10-10-2007, 09:47 AM
Some of us just knew it wouldn't work. Moore's law applies to 'Doctrine' nowadays.

Still, there's merit in your suggestion. What would be your ideal Powell Doctrine Version 2.0?

I know you didn't address that to me, but have you read Skip Bacevich's books? I'm more and more falling into that school which is sort of neo-Powellite.

Ken White
10-10-2007, 03:02 PM
I know you didn't address that to me, but have you read Skip Bacevich's books? I'm more and more falling into that school which is sort of neo-Powellite.

While I disagree on details, most of the disagreement is little more than a slew of minor quibbles. I agree with the thrust.

I have seriously believed we were on the wrong strategic approach for well over 40 years -- and every time I thought we'd done the dumbest thing in the world, we pulled another one... :o

The which has also led us into some not too smart equipment buys which in turn pushed the strategy which then caused not too smart equipment buys which led to...

Friend of mine went to the War College back in the early 80s. After he completed, he mentioned to me that the theory there was that we needed a base lodgment in the ME, the only place we did not have one at the time. He and I had a lot of great arguments over the desirability of that and my objections thereto. :)

I disagree with Bacevich on Iraq but only due to the fact that, right or wrong, we're there. I wouldn't have done it that way but it wasn't my call; we're there and unlike Bacevich I'm pretty sure it'll work out okay. Not great by a long shot -- but okay. There is no win in any COIN op in this age but an acceptable outcome can be achieved.

wm
10-10-2007, 05:00 PM
I remember that well. Rumsfeld held a limited showing of the film in the Pentagon and as I recall invited the press to sit in, which struck me as really bizarre given the FLN wins.

I put out two history lessons on the Alerian War, one of which highlighted the paradox of Trinquier's methods succeeding tactically and failing strategically, which the film The Battle of Algiers offered as its central message.

Tom

Funny that--actually your use of bizarre is probably even more appropriate.

I used to show this film to my college sophomores as part of a Just War block of instruction. They got the point quite well. Prior to showing this movie, most of them thought that the good guys can do whatever they want in war because their cause justifies it. Afterwards, they came to see that the desired end does not authorize just any old means of attaining it.

tequila
10-10-2007, 06:19 PM
I was being metaphorical with the "throw the keys to Chalabi." I simply meant cobbling together some sort of Iraqi government and leaving. Sure it would have fallen apart. But Hussein would be gone and we wouldn't have been involved.

Isn't this a bit utopian? Do you think that politically the Bush Admin could have simply stood by and watched resurgent Ba'athists or Iranian proxies overthrow our puppet government?


And I meant a serious period of U.S. rule and tutelage. Thing is, that would have required several hundred thousand troops. We were in mortal fear of the "Shia uprising" because we wouldn't have been able to deal with it with 120K troops. In other words, it wasn't that would couldn't have dealt with it, but that we weren't willing to pay the price to deal with it.

I agree with you here. A more massive footprint would have helped enormously here.


And while a huge amount of reconstruction assistance was stolen, some got to where it needed to go. Even if 90% of the additional was stolen, there still would have been more getting to where it needed to go than there was.

Enough to make a real difference?


On the strategic communications, I was thinking of two things:

--the refusal of Islamic governments to help delegitmize the insurgency contributed to the flow of money and foreign volunteers
--the opposition to the American role by many nations helped the insurgents believe that we would leave sooner rather than later, and thus all they had to do was wait us out.

Do you think that "Islamic" governments (are you thinking Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc.) can really delegitimize anyone, especially given their own unpopularity amongst Islamic radicals (those most susceptible to assist or fund Iraqi insurgents)? Witness the rapid 180-degree turn that most of these governments had to pull in the recent Lebanon War, where most of the Arab governments backed Israel against Hizbullah but had to reconsider once they realized just how unpopular such a move was.

As for the latter, I think this is impossible to assess given how poorly we understand insurgent motivation, especially in the 2003-2005 timeframe. I do not believe that this meme had any traction as far as insurgent propaganda during that period.

SteveMetz
02-06-2008, 06:03 PM
Panel (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/media/)

SWJED
02-06-2008, 09:03 PM
Interesting Q&A on COIN doctrine, emerging concepts and "the debate". Linked from SWJ here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/us-army-coin-panel-video/).

Hacksaw
02-06-2008, 10:58 PM
As good as any COIN "state of the union" summary I've seen/heard to date. I'm using it to help my boss prep for a conference. Steve, I think your point in the wrap-up regarding knowing your partners was the most important perspective of the session. Sometimes the pol. correctness bug keeps us from speaking plainly.

Gian P Gentile
02-07-2008, 12:37 PM
I appreciate the point that Steve made about the potential of the American Army becoming so focused on Coin that we end up in the next fight or operation trying to "re-fight" the last war; and the last war being the one we are fighting now in Iraq.

I disagreed with Con's binary explanation of the theoretical premise to Coin operations as being either "enemy centric" or "population centric." He then built on this point by talking about a conference he went to a while back where there were a bunch of western European thinkers on the subject and they said something like well we just cant do, or go back to, the "enemy centric" approach because post-modern civilizations cant operate that way. The problem with FM 3-24 is that its only theoretical construct is the "population centric" approach and this theoretical construct has actually and in practice become a immutable principle that can not be challenged. I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected. Once we have these two rules dominating our thinking it in effect determines our strategic, operational and tactical approach to any irregular fight that presents itself to us. In short we have become dogmatic and our answer on the ground then means to commit large number of troops, establish cops, etc. in order to “protect the people.” This may be the correct course of action in certain cases, but not always. This was one of the main points that MG Dunlap was making in his article (http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/121007dunlap.pdf) that the SWJ ran a few weeks ago.

wm
02-07-2008, 04:11 PM
Gian,

I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected. Once we have these two rules dominating our thinking it in effect determines our strategic, operational and tactical approach to any irregular fight that presents itself to us. In short we have become dogmatic and our answer on the ground then means to commit large number of troops, establish cops, etc. in order to “protect the people.” (Emphasis Added)

I am not convinced that by making the population the center of gravity we must infer that the people must be protected. Instead, I think making the population the center of gravity entails respecting the wishes and desires of the population. I suspect that there are principles or courses of action other than protection that we might derive from making the population the center of gravity. It might also be the case that there is a list of things that the population wants with differing levels of intensity for each. It might well be the case, for instance, that the people want protection much less than they want something else --like jobs, a working sewer system, or a consistently available power grid.

TROUFION
02-07-2008, 04:29 PM
The question to ask is: why are the people the focus for COIN Ops?

The people are the focus because they provide (in Maoist lingo) the ocean for the insugent to swim in. Protecting the people from the insurgents is not necessarily the only way to achieve the end state of stability. Basically you want to seperate the insurgents from the general population. You want to remove the people as a source of intel, sustenance, and support. There are many ways to achieve this and they do not all require protecting the people.

CR6
02-07-2008, 05:24 PM
I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.

I think that's a huge point Sir. CGSC stressed treating each operation as unique, being mindful that just because the enemy's (and your own) CoG was one thing the last time, doesn't mean that it hasn't changed. Additionally, isolated instances may arise in which it is possible for more than one CoG to exist (although the school recomended isolating the CoG to one thing as often as possible). The population as CoG model does focus thinking in one specific direction before mission analysis even occurs, which in turn limits thinking creatively about problems. To me this indicates a lack of continuity between 3-0 and 3-24.

Hacksaw
02-07-2008, 08:46 PM
Gian, my brother, I know its difficult to generate much discussion without throwing a little fuel on the fire, but you extrapolate the "dictum" a little too far...

I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.

It is more accurate to say that the people must be separated from the influence of the insurgent. That can take many forms and are not limited (quite the opposite in fact) by placing the people as a COIN COG. COIN operations at their core are (should be) designed to defeat an insurgent's efforts to sway the people's opinion that their vision is the preferred option to reforming the current sitting government. It is the people's trust and confidence, and maybe that is what is missing in the current version, that must be earned, swayed, etc

I acknowledge your concern that a default setting may develop that trust & confidence equals secure the people (probably justified), but I think you sell CDRs and their slaves (planners) a tad short:D.

I do think we can (and have in the case of Iraq) do much worse than establishing a relatively secure environment while simultaneously building HN capability & capacity to provide individuals with an acceptable degree of security and freedom from the capricious (sic) application of violence. Without doing so there is no chance to earn trust & confidence.

Now Mr Crane's comment about the conference and people always being the center regardless of the spectrum. That is probably either language translation barriers or a lack of precision. We live in an era in which we have to keep in mind the IO content of all operations, but that is a far cry from People as the COG of all operations. If neither of the above applies, then that is just drivelling, I don't think he was espousing that as his position, but if it was then the previous statement applies.

Live Well and Row

Hacksaw
02-07-2008, 08:48 PM
:)

Gian P Gentile
02-08-2008, 12:49 PM
Gian, my brother, I know its difficult to generate much discussion without throwing a little fuel on the fire, but you extrapolate the "dictum" a little too far...

I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.

It is more accurate to say that the people must be separated from the influence of the insurgent. That can take many forms and are not limited (quite the opposite in fact) by placing the people as a COIN COG. COIN operations at their core are (should be) designed to defeat an insurgent's efforts to sway the people's opinion that their vision is the preferred option to reforming the current sitting government. It is the people's trust and confidence, and maybe that is what is missing in the current version, that must be earned, swayed, etc

I acknowledge your concern that a default setting may develop that trust & confidence equals secure the people (probably justified), but I think you sell CDRs and their slaves (planners) a tad short:D.

I do think we can (and have in the case of Iraq) do much worse than establishing a relatively secure environment while simultaneously building HN capability & capacity to provide individuals with an acceptable degree of security and freedom from the capricious (sic) application of violence. Without doing so there is no chance to earn trust & confidence.

Now Mr Crane's comment about the conference and people always being the center regardless of the spectrum. That is probably either language translation barriers or a lack of precision. We live in an era in which we have to keep in mind the IO content of all operations, but that is a far cry from People as the COG of all operations. If neither of the above applies, then that is just drivelling, I don't think he was espousing that as his position, but if it was then the previous statement applies.

Live Well and Row

Good to hear from you Hack, old friend:

I am not making these arguments just for the sake of doing so, or as you state to throw "fuel on the fire." I do make these arguments not to be argumentative but because I believe them to be true and to get at a serious problem in our army today.

Here is an example of theory turned to principle, then turned in practice to immutable law:

FM 3-24 states:
The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success [in Coin]. To think that FM 3-24 is not exclusively premised on the "population centric" theory of Counterinsurgency operations is not to understand FM 3-24 in scope and purpose. In short FM 3-24 reads like Galula and not Callwell.

In the current issue of Military Review there is an essay (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/CossEngJanFeb08.pdf) by a former Brigade Commander in Afghanistan on his outfit's experience there in 2006 practicing FM 3-24 by the book. The article is articulate and important for its insights from a former brigade commander practicing Coin in Afghanistan. However, at the beginning of the essay this brigade commander notes that


the population is the center of gravity in ANY insurgency. [caps mine]

Lastly, before I left command i participated in a senior command "warfighter" training exercise that was based on a contemporary Iraq scenario. A few days into the exercise the senior commander changed the purpose statement on all unit missions from the highest level of command down to the lowest to read as purpose:


protect the people

So we can talk about flexibility and adaptability but those qualities by and large in our army are constrained by a FM 3-24 box that we have put ourselves into. Consider the fact that newspaper reports have it that AEI is putting together a "Surge 2" plan for Afghanistan. I speculate that it will be premised on an increase in troop strength, the method of clear, hold, build, and has as its center of gravity the "people" and the imperative to "protect them."

always good to be in touch with you; just like old times.

gian

slapout9
02-08-2008, 02:00 PM
Very interesting thread here. According to the Slapout Based Warfare theory the COG is the GROUND. The ground connects and links and provides life and support to everything and everybody. Whoever can seize and control terrain that has the most political value (life support) is going to win in the long run.

Eden
02-08-2008, 05:44 PM
As always when the center of gravity comes up in a discussion, people rapidly begin to talk past each other. To paraphrase Carl - I'm ashamed to admit that I don't have my copy of On War close to hand - the center of gravity is that thing (piece of geography, fortress, unit, weapon system...or 'the people') which serves as the 'hub of all power and movement on which everything depends." It is not a 'source of strength', and dear Carl insisted that for an enemy to possess a CoG, it must operate as a single entity. I would submit that there are cases where 'the people' - and who are these people anyway? - do not fill this role in counterinsurgency.

For all you Clausewitz haters out there, you can look at it another way. In the earliest phases of a counterinsurgency, the insurgents may have no claim on the people. In that case, the people can, by definition, hardly serve as the insurgents CoG no matter how you define it. In other phases, the counterinsurgent may face a people completely supportive of the insurgents. In that case, they hardly need to be 'protected'.

By the way, I have to hold my nose everytime I write 'the people'. It is a sloppy term that obscures more than it clarifies.

Ken White
02-08-2008, 06:59 PM
We do tend to get wrapped around terminology axles and we sure hop on the latest fad... :wry:

Causing us to frequently get too busy counting alligators. :D

Your points are well taken and they don't even address the fact that those 'people' are more than amorphous, they're unbelievably diverse and may not want what you or I would want were we in their shoes...

slapout9
02-08-2008, 11:44 PM
Jedburgh posted a link to this paper about rethinking the COG concept and how maybe it is time to get rid of it except foe general historical study. Short paper and thought provoking.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB805.pdf

SWJED
02-10-2008, 01:08 AM
Operational Effectiveness and Strategic Success in Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/operational-effectiveness-and/) by Dr. Steven Metz at SWJ Blog.


When I was a young professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College I joined a small committee responsible for strategy instruction. This was all new to me: I had to learn before I could teach. One of the ideas that most impressed me then—and continues to today—is a simple, elegant, yet powerful way of thinking about strategy: it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Feasibility means that there must be adequate resources to implement the strategy. Acceptability means that the "stakeholders" of the strategy have to buy in. Suitability means that the strategy had to have a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. This was the most important of all. A feasible and acceptable strategy was worthless if it did not offer a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. Reading Major General Dunlap's essay on counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/02/collateral-damage-and-counteri.php) reminded me of this. His recommendations are feasible and acceptable but short on suitability...

Ken White
02-10-2008, 02:10 AM
You do good work.

Cliff
02-10-2008, 03:39 AM
I'm new to posting here, so forgive me if my formatting is lacking. I'll also lead with the disclaimer that I am approaching this from an academic standpoint, as I haven't been in the AOR in a while and won't be for a while due to my current job - so I am definitely an armchair quarterback.

While I agree with your arguments, I think that there are some valid points in Maj Gen Dunlap's article.

The essence of the article is that airpower has contributions to make that can enhance the effectiveness of COIN operations - IE that the effects of airpower are what matter and not the means. In this light, his argument is essentially a strategic one - airpower can have positive effects at a tactical and operational level while supporting the overall strategy. In other words, the same effects a ground unit could have on insurgents can be had by well placed use of airpower, with less cost collateral-damage wise. This enhances the strategic effect of the airpower, assuming that keeping the population happy with us/the HN government is a part of our strategy.

While I agree that this strategic linkage could be made better, it doesn't change the fact that it exists. After nearly a year of lurking on the SWJ boards just reading, it seems to me that there is a very large bias against airpower in general and the USAF in particular. While this is understandable (clearly the AF is focused on the Big Wars and is not able to focus on Small Wars to the same level as the USA/USMC) I think that the point MG Dunlap is getting at is exactly right - people need to not look at who/what is providing the effects, but at the tactical/operational/strategic effects of the forces themselves.

Now before I lead you to think that I am advocating using aircraft with targeting pods and strikes from above to win a small war, let me clarify. I believe that the point Maj Gen Dunlap is making is that better integration is necessary. The soldier on the ground is clearly better able than a Predator or F-16 at 15,000' to tell the friendlies from the enemy (although almost all USAF platforms have the technical, if not ROE/doctrinal ability to gather their own intel/targeting data through organic means). But isn't it better if the grunt on the ground has a ROVER and can see the "eye in the sky" perspective? Or even better, has a persistent overhead view (Predator on station for hours at a time), can see who comes and goes from a given area, and then make decisions based on this? In addition, the use of airpower need not involve folks dying. The ability of air to have a psychological effect in a non-kinetic way does seem to have been lost - early in OIF and definitely in OEF it seemed that low passes in full grunt with flares were used extensively. I haven't heard much about that sort of thing lately (doesn't mean it doesn't occur) but the psychological effect of helplessness one gets when attacked with relative impunity by air should be considered (I've read several places that being shelled is much more terrifying but it seems that that would have severe unintended collateral damage consequences). Finally, if things do go south good comms and especially ROVER, laser designator, or datalink help can mean quick, accurate, and relatively low collateral damage fire support from above.

My point, to wit, is that the true STRATEGIC impact of airpower in COIN is when it is used operationally/tactically in a seamless manner with the rest of the joint force. There have been several prominent examples of our forces failing to do this - Anaconda being a good one. Airpower cannot win the COIN war on its own - that is true. But it can help save many lives on the ground as a partner. I agree with what you have said about dispersion, though better intel from the ground and persistence in the air can help combat that. And I strongly agree about the commitment to the supported HN - I think perhaps that in light of lack of support at home, sometimes airpower may be forced to be used as a substitute, though.

We haven't talked much about the Cyber implications of all this, and neither did MG Dunlap. It seems to me that in a society like Iraq's seems to be, where rumor travels fast, that our efforts in the cyber/informational domain have a ways to go.

Finally, let me say that my opinion is that the real role of the USAF in particular in small wars is to make sure that small wars are the only ones we fight in. Our brothers and sisters in the USMC and Army are of necessity focusing on the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, which entails some risk (reference last week's leak of the assessment of risk by the JCS). Our biggest job in the AF is to support them while decreasing that risk by maintaining the ability (along with the USN) to overwhelm any conventional attack by the air.

I fully expect that this post will generate a lot of controversy, so I suppose that it is good that it is my first. :D Like I said at the start, I do think that the ground forces are definitely the primary vehicle for winning in the COIN environment. I do think that the AF has some capabilities that could be integrated into the joint fight, and are sometimes overlooked due to not understanding the capabilities involved.

I look forward to your thoughts on this - thanks! -Cliff

Jedburgh
02-11-2008, 10:35 PM
RAND, 11 Feb 08: War By Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf)

In early 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked RAND’s National Defense Research Institute to conduct a comprehensive study of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), with a view toward how the United States should improve its capabilities for such conflicts in the 21st century. This is the capstone report of that study, drawing from a dozen RAND research papers on specific cases, issues, and aspects of insurgency and COIN. The study included an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II to learn why and how insurgencies begin, grow, and are resolved. It also analyzed the current challenge of what is becoming known as global insurgency, exemplified by the global jihadist movement, as well as lessons about both insurgency and COIN from a number of cases, including Iraq and Afghanistan.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the current policy context for this study. To be clear, however, the study is concerned with deficiencies in U.S. capabilities revealed in those conflicts, not with how to end them satisfactorily. Most new investments to improve U.S. COIN capabilities would not yield capabilities of immediate use. That said, to the extent that the findings can help the United States tackle the problems it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan, this would be a bonus. Regardless of how Iraq and Afghanistan turn out in the short term, the United States and its international partners will not have seen the last of this sort of challenge, and they must become better prepared than they have been for today’s insurgencies.....As noted, numerous other products of this study are or soon will be in the public domain. These include:

Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG595.1.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 1

Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.3.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 2

Heads We Win—The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP168.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 1

Subversion and Insurgency (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP172.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 2

Understanding Proto-Insurgencies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3

Money in the Bank—Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP-185.pdf): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 4

Rethinking Counterinsurgency—A British Perspective: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 5

Note: Most of the above are linked elsewhere on the board. I've reposted them all in one location because they support the final, and I figured many of you would find it useful to have them all together. Paper 5 has not been published yet; I will plug the link in here as soon as it becomes available.

Paul Smyth
03-17-2008, 01:01 PM
I am also new to this site, but here goes...

Personally, I find that views expressed on the utility of Air Power are invariably weakened by the subjective position of the person expressing them (so I'd better be careful!). Although most do not acknowledge it, I believe airmen are in one of two schools of thought: the 'Primacy of Air Power' camp ('Air Power rules 'ra ra ra'') or the 'Air Power has its Optimum Effect in a Joint Context' group. Consequently, when observations are made about the use or usefulness of Air Power today they often 'degenerate' into arguments between those from the former school and those who are outside the air community, while those from the latter school say very little, rarely arguing with anyone.

The debate about Air Power's role in COIN is therefore part of a larger discussiion which does not facilitate an objective analysis of its utility in Small Wars. However, one point seems clear (to me anyway), that regardless of which camp is correct, Air Power has been under-utilized and probably mis-used on the current COIN campaigns. Given the enduring nature of both the endeavours in Iraq and Afghanistan, this sub-optimal situation cannot be allowed to continue so the debate must move beyond distracting expressions of the relative value of Air, Sea and Land Power to one that ensures each Component fulfils its full potential.

slapout9
03-17-2008, 08:50 PM
Although most do not acknowledge it, I believe airmen are in one of two schools of thought: the 'Primacy of Air Power' camp ('Air Power rules 'ra ra ra'') or the 'Air Power has its Optimum Effect in a Joint Context' group. Consequently, when observations are made about the use or usefulness of Air Power today they often 'degenerate' into arguments between those from the former school and those who are outside the air community, while those from the latter school say very little, rarely arguing with anyone.



Hi Paul, that is very well put based on my experience. The Joint Ops folks just don't talk about options that much...despite the fact that they some very good ideas.

William F. Owen
04-12-2008, 07:02 AM
http://www.jcpa.org/text/Amidror-perspectives-2.pdf

a.) I have taken to liberty of linking the document in this location, as it was originally linked in the ME forum. In my opinion it has far wider implications. I think it is necessary, in order to create rational discussion to de-link from the context in which it was originally posted.

b.) That being said, it is a document produced by an IDF General. Thus it exhibits the unique qualities and perspectives, of the IDF experience. It is hard/impossible to find to a more challenging environment, with higher stakes. It also reflects the IDF need to get rid of "imported theories of warfare," which have led them so badly astray.

c.) The problem I have with this document is that, while 99% of what it suggests is good common sense and a logical reversion to simple, proven and effective methods, the "sales icing" adds elements which can probably only confuse. Even though the writer defines "Asymmetric" in a useful way, there is simply no need to include the word or a discussion of it. In fact this strongly indicates that the document was written for the consumption of a US audience.

d.) Personally, I find this a simple, useful and very worthwhile document. It is in the same vein as Ron Tira's work, and reflects the need to go back to basics.