Debate over The Generations of War.

[Cavguy]

Having now dissected EBO (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5128&highlight=effects+based+operations+valid), Maneuver Warfare (MW) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6047&highlight=warfare+fraud), and Boyd (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6103&highlight=boyd), I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.

I first encountered "4GW (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare)" as a term when reading TX Hammes' "The Sling and The Stone" a few years ago, which is an excellent intro into the "flattening" of warfare.

Even then, I was uneasy in the breakdown of the 1/2/3/4th Generation of war, how they were defined, and utilized as a construct.

Looking back, the history dates to 1989 and this article (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm).

At the most simplistic level, I acknowledge 4GW has become a useful 'catch all' for just about any non-conventional, non state based conflict environment. Part of that is that our current (some call 'hybrid (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/are-we-ready-for-hybrid-wars-r/)') wars don't fit easily into traditional descripive boxes, and thus in many casual conversations people often talk about "4GW".

Having now read much more in the field, including this critique (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632), I have come to view the whole "GW" construct with some measure of derision from a theoretical standpoint. It seems really the 2d/3d GW model was developed for the maneuver war theorists to justify the superiority of their theory rather than a rigorously developed time line of warfare. In fact, it kind of falls apart when you take it beyond the PowerPoint deep nature of the theory and start analyzing against history.

Quite simply, 4GW has been going on long before the proponents state (you can find biblical '4GW' conflicts). Also the idea that maneuver warfare is an evolution past attritional (2GW) warfare troubles me more after the above referenced threads.

I am now seeing "4GW" propped up as a term in more than a few papers and articles in leading journals, often as a throwaway. A large part of this is because the community, military, and academics can't decide what to call these asymmetric/hybrid/4GW/COIN/Stability conflicts.

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

* One final note, I sense another argument coming from the MW crew - that it was "justified" despite being a poorly devised construct to bring people to address MW and '4GW'. (the same argument was made about MW as a construct and the sainthood of Boyd) Did the ends justify the means if we accept it as a poor construct?

Let the discussion begin.

[selil]

Having now dissected EBO (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5128&highlight=effects+based+operations+valid), Maneuver Warfare (MW) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6047&highlight=warfare+fraud), and Boyd (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6103&highlight=boyd), I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.


Even though when I wrote this article (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=4362225) I was sure that there was something there (and the literature shows it) I am now thinking "generational" warfare is a misleading term. It isn't that the authors are not discovering different modes of war and applying techniques and tactics to those specific modes, but using generations to discuss them applies a time component that doesn't exist. As you said there are 4th generation conflicts in the biblical age. If it is simply technologies then you might have something, but even then technologies are only analogies/metaphors for other elements.

[Ken White]

Some people live for arcane terms; in some cases, the more arcane the better. Some people want such terminology, some actually need it -- for most it simply becomes a limiting device unless great care is taken.

While some use of terminolgy is necessary for discussion and instructional purposes, attempts to rigorously dictate a lexicon are counterproductive.

War is war, period. Warfare, however, is infinitely and subtly variable and examples of 'multi-generation' warfare throughout history abound -- one adopts limiting terminology at some risk of inducing a mind set or target fixation. In fighting, the only thing in mind should be alertness to what the opponent is doing and development of a counter to that with a goal of preempting him so that you are initiating the action that will remove him as a problem...

[Jedburgh]

See the discussion generated in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2425) early last year in response to the posting of Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf).

[Bill Moore]

Hey, does this mean you don't want to hear my theory on 5th Generation Wafare?

In all seriousness I agree, the terms then to create more confusion than clarity.

In general, there are a few broad categories of war (different doctrines, different equipment, different ways to get to the same objective). I hate all the terms, and still blame Clausewitz for the lack of evolutionary military thought. His writings were superb, but that shouldn't have equated to freezing the study of war in time. Instead we have some half baked ideas now like generational warfare, asymmetrical warfare, etc.

Some broad categories of war are:

Conventional Warfare:

Irregular Warfare/Low Intensity Warfare:

Nuclear Warfare:

Less than war: (Punitive missions such as our air strike on Libya, and our air strikes on Iraq in 98).

With the exception of the "less than war" category, we used all them simultaneously during WWII. We used conventional and irregular simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The bottom line is that anyone will fight the way that is advantageous to them. If you're really silly, you will get together with a much of like minded westerners in Genova and codify war, so everyone will have to fight the way you want them to fight, then assume that is the way that war will be fought. If they do something different, well that can't be war, it says so right here in this convention we signed. That must be that asymmetrical stuff.

[Ron Humphrey]

I would like to say that from the time I first started really looking into the various forms, levels, whatever one wants to call them it always struck me as somewhat odd. They are approached and discussed as totally different types of warfare while for the life of me I can't get out of my head that the real truth is each and every one of these approaches would be more akin to parallel dimensions of one another. Each has its points at which it is successful or at least makes sense but none can really stand on their own as a whole.

Perhaps if they are taken as pieces of the whole and then the linkages between them are established then discussions might actually be able to draw out the key differences be it key differences, strengths, or weaknesses?

[Cavguy]

Hey, does this mean you don't want to hear my theory on 5th Generation Warfare?



Actually, 5GW has been postulated in an article - the super-empowered individual waging conflict.:eek:

Kinda like the plot of the last "Die Hard" movie or "The Dark Knight".

Now '6 minute abs' er... 6GW ... then you'd be onto something. :cool:

[Cavguy]

See the discussion generated in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2425) early last year in response to the posting of Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf).

Ahhh ... I committed the sin of not looking for old thread. Perused it and found this gem ...



We ignore the fact that Martin van Creveld and Bill Lind, the ideological fathers of the 4GW mafia and seemingly in competion to be known as the grumpiest military historian on the planet, have consistently been more correct than the pack in predicting how military events would unfold over the last 15 years. Wishing that they weren't just dosen't cut it, just as wishing that western forces with massive capability overmatch weren't strategically all at sea in the Middle East. The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

Agree or not with the 4GW construct no one can argue that Armd Divisions, DDGX and F22 Wings, the ultimate evolutionary tools of western warfare, have much utility for the fight we face. Sure we can smash states but we are yet to prove we have the capability or will to build a state. The 4GW argument that it is our inability to conceptualise the issues rather than our military capabilities needs to be considered deeply rather than rejected because its advocates have the personaility of a wire brush.

My major beef isn't the construct so far, it's the linear progression of it - 2/3/4, that I don't buy. I especially don't buy the distinction between 2d and 3d GW. 1GW is also pretty irrelevant. Really all debate is centering around 3d/4th GW, although Bill Lind constantly calls the army a 2GW force.

[zenpundit]

I agree that that seeing "Generations" of warfare in strict linearity is very problematic. IMHO it's better as a simple taxonomy than a chronology.

OTOH, mainstream historians other than those associated with 4GW have also made the argument the the adoption of disciplined formations armed with smoothbore muskets (1GW) constituted a "military revolution" rooted in a particular time and place.

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Revolution-Innovation-Rise-1500-1800/dp/0521479584

[William F. Owen]

I have huge problems with 4GW, and laid them all out before Lind and TX when I met them earlier this year. I basically said that not one area of 4GW withstood scrutiny. TX told me that that does not matter!

It's aim is to get people to think - so just like Manoeuvre Warfare. The facts are irrelevant to the greater aim of getting people to think in a different way, and thus just like EBO.

All of these concepts are aimed at the altering of mindset, seemingly in preference to an approach that goes for empirically based education.

There are also two differing forms of 4GW - Lind and Hammes, do not agree, but exactly where, I am not sure, as I can get past the basic flaws.

[max161]

Here were my thoughts on this subject in 2005.

This article was published in the October 2005 volume of the SWJ Magazine.
Timeless Theories of War in the 21st Century
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v3/maxwell.htm (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v3/maxwell.htm)

Colonel David S. Maxwell, USA

"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War[1]

Warfare must be thoroughly studied. That was as true in the day of Sun Tzu as it is today. Thorough study leads to understanding the nature of war and with that understanding comes the ability to fight a war efficiently and effectively (or sometimes to not have to fight one at all). This will lead to the survival of the nation. Many say that the world is experiencing new threats and new forms of warfare. Fourth Generation Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Insurgency/Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Asymmetric Warfare are some of the terminology being used to describe conflict and war in the 21st Century. To many theorists they describe the way of the future of warfare and the threats and conditions for which the United States military must prepare. Two logical questions arise from thinking about these terms. First, are these conditions and threats really new and different? Second, what do strategists need to know to be able to operate in these supposedly new conditions?

This paper argues that the nature of war has not significantly changed with the arrival of the 21st Century. True, there appear to be new tactics, techniques, and procedures as evidenced by the tragedy of 9-11. The likelihood of direct nation-state to nation-state conflict seems to be declining with the rise of non-state actors such as transnational terrorists and due somewhat to the massive firepower and destructive capabilities available to state supported military forces. However, regardless of the threat and its tactics there remains a fundamental foundation of conflict and this is an enduring immutable truth: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”[2] This applies across the spectrum of conflict from the lowest intensity levels through terrorism and insurgency to large scale conventional war. Clausewitz understood this fundamental principle and this maxim is as true today as it was in the 19th Century.

Furthermore, this paper will not focus on the traditional principles of war as outlined in U.S. joint doctrine.[3] While still relevant in many situations of conventional war and at the tactical and operational level, they are not as useful for leaders today as are the theories set down by the two true great masters of war: Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. In fact, the fundamental thesis of this paper is that the solution to any political-military problem can be found by studying the works of the great masters. Warfare today, as in the centuries past, is a complex form of human interaction that is nearly unpredictable in that there are myriad of factors that can affect the outcome. Because of this there is no prescription that can be followed that will ensure a successful outcome. Simply applying the traditional principles of war, or combinations thereof to every situation is not useful. What is required for successful military operations are leaders that possess coup d’oeil which Clausewitz defined as the “inward eye” and described the concept simply as the “quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”[4] Strategists, whether political or military, must strive to attain this core attribute and the only way it can be attained is through thorough study of the nature of war and the theories of the great masters and with experience. With that foundation, leaders can develop and execute effective strategies to ensure the survival of the nation. Following a brief discussion of the apparent conditions of war in the 21st Century, this paper will examine five enduring principles or concepts from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and demonstrate that they remain timeless and relevant in the 21st Century. These principles form the basis for the development of strategy regardless of the type of conflict that a nation faces. These concepts themselves provide no answers. It is only through intensive and critical study that they can become ingrained into the strategist’s analytical framework so that complex political- military problems can be solved. Again, these principles provide no answers in and of themselves. The solutions are found through study and the development of Clausewitz’ coup d’oiel. Who thinks wins![5]

[Tom Odom]

Having now dissected EBO (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5128&highlight=effects+based+operations+valid), Maneuver Warfare (MW) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6047&highlight=warfare+fraud), and Boyd (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6103&highlight=boyd), I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.

I first encountered "4GW (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare)" as a term when reading TX Hammes' "The Sling and The Stone" a few years ago, which is an excellent intro into the "flattening" of warfare.

Even then, I was uneasy in the breakdown of the 1/2/3/4th Generation of war, how they were defined, and utilized as a construct.

Looking back, the history dates to 1989 and this article (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm).

At the most simplistic level, I acknowledge 4GW has become a useful 'catch all' for just about any non-conventional, non state based conflict environment. Part of that is that our current (some call 'hybrid (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/are-we-ready-for-hybrid-wars-r/)') wars don't fit easily into traditional descripive boxes, and thus in many casual conversations people often talk about "4GW".

Having now read much more in the field, including this critique (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632), I have come to view the whole "GW" construct with some measure of derision from a theoretical standpoint. It seems really the 2d/3d GW model was developed for the maneuver war theorists to justify the superiority of their theory rather than a rigorously developed time line of warfare. In fact, it kind of falls apart when you take it beyond the PowerPoint deep nature of the theory and start analyzing against history.

Quite simply, 4GW has been going on long before the proponents state (you can find biblical '4GW' conflicts). Also the idea that maneuver warfare is an evolution past attritional (2GW) warfare troubles me more after the above referenced threads.

I am now seeing "4GW" propped up as a term in more than a few papers and articles in leading journals, often as a throwaway. A large part of this is because the community, military, and academics can't decide what to call these asymmetric/hybrid/4GW/COIN/Stability conflicts.

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

* One final note, I sense another argument coming from the MW crew - that it was "justified" despite being a poorly devised construct to bring people to address MW and '4GW'. (the same argument was made about MW as a construct and the sainthood of Boyd) Did the ends justify the means if we accept it as a poor construct?

Let the discussion begin.

Agree 100% and have for years.

Tom

[Bill Moore]

Again, these principles provide no answers in and of themselves. The solutions are found through study and the development of Clausewitz’ coup d’oiel. Who thinks wins![5]

These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value.

The issue of strategy is more than philosophy (which I think we confuse with principles in the case of Sun Tzu), it is the art of providing direction to accomplish objectives. All the Clausewitz and Sun Tzu quotes in the world won't help Officers conceive a strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and other irregular threats.

The so called theories of asymmetrical warafare, 4GW, etc., are an attempt to fill an identified gap in our doctrinal knowledge. They fall way short, but the fact remains there is a gap, and all the answers to today's problems are NOT in the classic texts.

[zenpundit]

It's aim is to get people to think - so just like Manoeuvre Warfare. The facts are irrelevant to the greater aim of getting people to think in a different way, and thus just like EBO.

All of these concepts are aimed at the altering of mindset, seemingly in preference to an approach that goes for empirically based education.

I can't really agree.

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise. I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists? We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

[Entropy]

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?


This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:


* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

[wm]

This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:


* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

Seems to me that both the 30 Years War and the 100 Years War meet all of the criteria above. anyone want to call them 4GW struggles?
Oh wait, I forgot, 4GW only became possible after the Peace of Westphalia introduced the conditions that made 3GW possible.

4GW reminds me of the Ptolemaic geocentric view of the universe. They both require wheels within wheels within wheels to explain the data. I also just love the claim that the 4GW construct is simply a "heuristic" to stimulate discussion. Being exposed to that kind of stimulus makes me want to shout, "Don't taz me bro!"

[TT]

..is interspersed amongst with discussion of Man Warfare, on the 'Boyd and Lind Rebuttal' thread located at

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4534

IIRC, many of the issues raised above are addressed in this in places in this thread.

[ericmwalters]

And I thought I was going to get my thread started on the OODA Loop, but this distracted me. Okay, here goes.

Most of the criticism about 4GW revolves around it's extremely shaky foundations as a theoretical construct, an analytical lens, or any number of uses as tool for understanding military history. Okay, ALL OF THESE CRITICISMS ARE VALID. But the 4GW characterization was never intended for the uses that so many appear to attribute to it.

Look, if this was a serious historical construct, it would not have been published in the Marine Corps Gazette. It would have shown up in a scholarly journal.

Okay, I was pretty much in thick with John Schmitt and Bill Lind at the time the original 4GW article was published and got to know G.I. Wilson and Keith Nightengale much later. So let me provide some context so you can understand the purposes of the original authors, at least from my perspective.

First of all, the "three generations of war" was pretty slick shorthand for charaterizing tactics and command and control. In other words, they were intended as labels. Extremely simplistic labels. But using them, one could describe what one saw on the battlefield. For example, The ROK Marines are a first generation ground force. Tactics of line and column, culture of control, extreme hierarchical command on the Frederickan mold. Discipline enforced by liberal doses of corporal punishment. I say "first generation" and everybody understands--I don't have to describe much more of the basics but can then dive into the details.

Regarding the so-called "linear progression" of the generations, it's true--it's doesn't work. Bruce Gudmudsson calls the development of 2nd and 3rd Generation warfare as "the fork in the road" in his book, On Infantry (Revised Edition). He was doing this pretty early on as I recall him saying this when Bill, Bruce, and I were doing the "Modern War" television show in the Spring of 1994. When "first generation" wasn't working due to the requirement for open order tactics, you saw this split--a focus on firepower at the expense of maneuver and still the rigid culture of order left from the first generation (this is 2nd Gen)...and then what we term as MW (3GW). Lord knows, it's a terrible labeling scheme. Just like the term "maneuver warfare." It was a bumper sticker, and it stuck, showing up in Marine Corps correspondence courses like MCI 7400 WARFIGHING SKILLS PROGRAM.

But I need to emphasize--these generational characterizations were labels applied to descriptions of tactics and C2. It took TX Hammes to flesh them out a great deal in The Sling and Stone and put the historical backdrop behind them and provide an air of historical/analytical basis where none existed before. Should he have done this? I'll let you debate it. We in the field Marine units could have given a rat's *ss. We liked the shorthand labels.

Then came 4GW. It was Bill's label. And the paradox of it was that it didn't describe a tactical or command and control method at all. It described social conditions leading to the value systems of the warriors and explained how traditional operational art and military strategy wasn't going to be sufficient against these people. So why did Bill label it this way? I can only guess--because as soon as you describe 4GW in response to a question, the next question is what are the other three generations. And then you get the short course in the development of MW.

I'm not defending this. It's just how I perceived it at the time.

Now, the caveat. I'm a believer in the concept, although I agree with Echevarria that the term has become too synonymous with the idea of insurgency in general (blame TX Hammes in The Sling and the Stone which changed the original meaning of 4GW) and Iraq in particular (and Lind's "On War' columns in Military.com may have had something to do with that). I still adhere to the original conceptions as outlined in the earlier articles. Hammes' 5GW is more akin to what the original authors envisioned, although they didn't see the potential for "super-empowerment" as we now conceive of it.

But 4GW was still a label to describe a condition. It wasn't intended for the historians. It wasn't created for the defense analysts. It wasn't meant for the academics. It was for the field Marines who needed a shorthand term to describe the Cartels, the Somalia clans, the warring tribes and families, etc. To basically mean that pure military force wasn't going work against these characters. In that sense this bumper sticker label still works, even though the numbering system is misleading and the idea of "generations" just doesn't hold throughout under any serious historical investigation or analysis. Remember, this is the Marine Corps. "It's easy to be hard, and hard to be smart." And the corollary: "I'm not smart, and you can't make me." I'll just leave it at that. I'm not defending it, but I'm explaining it.

So, the bottom line up front for you non-jarhead types: This was never intended for you. Not really. Not originally.

Of course, the proponents--Bill Lind among them--were only too happy to see this particular genie escape the lamp and cause all kinds of debate and rhetorical havoc. And I think it's been a good thing for all the reasons we've seen in other threads about MW. People have to ask questions and defend their points of view...and constantly rethink their assumptions.

This is no doubt a gross summary/oversimplification of nearly twenty years of serious thought and discussion, but I thought I'd open up this particular Pandora's Box since CavGuy started this thread.

[zenpundit]

I'd like to add a few comments to those of Col. Walters.

There's a difference between using correct historical methodology - something I was trained to do - where you seek to explain causation of events and engaging in strategic sudies or some other social science. In history, you do not begin with a conclusion and use that as a prism with which to interpret events or attempt to justify it by gathering evidence that suits the model. Or rather you are not supposed to do that.

Strategic theories, like 4GW or IR theories in Poli Sci or economic models are useful only to the extent that they are explanatory and almost always that means that successful theories will fit a few scenarios very well, fit many adequately or partially and others not at all. Expressing the theory in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms does not change that limitation, it just tells you with greater specifity how well your theory is matching or missing reality.

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ? :)

[Granite_State]

I have huge problems with 4GW, and laid them all out before Lind and TX when I met them earlier this year. I basically said that not one area of 4GW withstood scrutiny. TX told me that that does not matter!

It's aim is to get people to think - so just like Manoeuvre Warfare. The facts are irrelevant to the greater aim of getting people to think in a different way, and thus just like EBO.

All of these concepts are aimed at the altering of mindset, seemingly in preference to an approach that goes for empirically based education.


Be curious where Lind stood, in contrast, if you had the chance to talk to him about it.

[Cavguy]

I'd like to add a few comments to those of Col. Walters.


There's a difference between using correct historical methodology - something I was trained to do - where you seek to explain causation of events and engaging in strategic sudies or some other social science. In history, you do not begin with a conclusion and use that as a prism with which to interpret events or attempt to justify it by gathering evidence that suits the model. Or rather you are not supposed to do that.

Strategic theories, like 4GW or IR theories in Poli Sci or economic models are useful only to the extent that they are explanatory and almost always that means that successful theories will fit a few scenarios very well, fit many adequately or partially and others not at all. Expressing the theory in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms does not change that limitation, it just tells you with greater specifity how well your theory is matching or missing reality.

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ? :)

Zen, I don't see how it's a "challenge", because you can't use 4GW to predict anything, only describe and environment. I'm confused. How is 4GW or whatever construct I use "predictive"? It's a descriptor of a condition, not a theory.

That theory, at its root, exists to support the notion that "maneuver warfare" (3GW) is automatically superior to "attritional warfare" (2GW) in most every situation. Note I used quotes. And 4GW exists to make people think this is something "new" rather than old. In other words - the whole construct simply exists to reinforce a dogmatic notion that (as the creators define it) 2GW<3GW<4GW. Which means you have to accept that there even is a "attrition" school and a "maneuver" school - which is also a fraud. This is as dogmatic as the "2GW" construct the authors were trying to get the USMC out of. Having had some success in the USMC, their followers are now applying it beyond where it should be, IMO.

My beef with 4GW is that I don't think it's in all forms superior to 3GW and 2GW, and I don't necessarily think in all cases 3GW is "superior". I feel even bankrupt making these arguments because I don't agree with the premise of the construct in the first place.

I've seen Eric argue in every thread that it was a strawman to shake off complacency. Well that strawman is still around, and wreaking some bad history and knowledge among the less-thinking. What bothers me, at its core the GW construct exists only to advance the theories and ego of its authors, which they view as "necessary" even while acknowledging its bankruptcy. What happens when their bankrupt construct is carried too far? That is my concern.

Why the need to break down warfare in such a way against time?

[Bill Moore]

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

I must admit this post seems a little out in left field. As Cavguy stated, 4GW is not a theory, so how would you use it in a predictive manner?

I can see using it in some measure to describe the irregulars overall strategy, or if they don't have one, you can still capture the impact of their actions and the challenges their methods pose to States, but predict, in as predict the outcome?

There are a few models that attempt to be predictive, such as the SWORD model, which according to its advocates has been accurate in the vast majority cases.

Let us how you plan to use it in a predictive manner, and you may get a few of us to join in on this one, although openly publishing suspected pro's and con's of two belligerent's strategies while they're fighting could very well shape the outcome if they browse this site. To keep it objective it would have to be done via e-mails to the referee.

[William F. Owen]

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise.

Bill Lind makes so many points it's hard to keep track, but I submit that he is always trying to alter peoples ideas and opinions.


I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.
Concur. We now have more nation states, not fewer, and the vast majority of conflict is concerned about who lives where and with what systems of government.


Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists?
There is no evidence of what you suggest. My position is, that this is the area that holds the most promise for progressing military thought - and the one that most (not all) the "new concepts of war" folks seem to ignore.


We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

Above my pay grade. I don't get or even pretend to understand US Foreign Policy. - what is more, none of my business so I can't comment.

[William F. Owen]

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ? :)

Very happy to participate, except I agree with a lot of the 4GW positions, and CAVGUY has got it right, with his reservations about the idea. My "beef" with 4GW is the overall concept, not the detail of its parts. I have the same beef with MW.

4GW is a bag of ideas, some of which are useful, but that to assume relationships between them, is not. WM's list is instructive

One of my "Rules" for modern operations is DO NOT KILL CIVILIANS. If you simply aim for that, then a lot/some of the 4GW constructs evaporate as a concern. Why doesn't 4GW just say that?

BUT - if you are fighting for your national survival, who cares how many of the other guys civilians die and your people are always more important that the enemies people.

[max161]

These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value. These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value.

The issue of strategy is more than philosophy (which I think we confuse with principles in the case of Sun Tzu), it is the art of providing direction to accomplish objectives. All the Clausewitz and Sun Tzu quotes in the world won't help Officers conceive a strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and other irregular threats.

The so called theories of asymmetrical warafare, 4GW, etc., are an attempt to fill an identified gap in our doctrinal knowledge. They fall way short, but the fact remains there is a gap, and all the answers to today's problems are NOT in the classic texts. .

Actually Bill, I think you have described the problem perfectly. All most people do is look at the quotes and do not study the theory. As we talk about 4GW and asymmetric warfare and all the other buzzwords we are using today to try to describe the nature of warfare, we can find explanations for all of it in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz take study, not just regurgitating famous quotes and misapplying like, for example, the paradoxical trinity. Clausewitz did not only say the trinity was the people, the military, and the government like we so often hear (or as Summers said in his book On Strategy).

What Clausewitz really said was that:

"...war is a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects concerns mainly the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope of which he play of tcourage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone."

I think that explanation of war cuts across the spectrum from insurgency to Major combat operations and is still relevant today.

But Bill, you are correct. Only looking at select quotes from the great masters does not bring understanding of war either historically or in today's world. It takes thorough study and that is what Clausewitz was trying to foster among his students and readers.

And lastly, Bill, as I argued in my paper, the answers are NOT found in the classic texts. They are found by studying them. Everyone wants to loko to a book to find the silver bullet or the holy grail. But there are no answers that can be pulled of books -0 not in FM 3-24, not in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, not in the Sling and the Stone, not in the Pentagon's New Map and not in On War or the Art of War. You have to read and study and figure out the answers for the situation in which you find yourself. The answers are inside us but the study of the classics and an understanding of the nature of war (from insurgency to major combat operations) is what it takes to develop strategy and practice operational art.

[Ski]

I'm up for a wargaming scenario with a 4GW lens. Will be enjoyable, especially if Herr Oberst Walters and Zen are on my side...:)

[Ski]

There is a trend here with Lind's work within the field of military theory.

The guy is brilliant, but he comes up with poor naming conventions for his theories. It happened with MW and now 4GW. I understand why he named them this, but only after hours of sitting down with him and eating copius amounts of food. That's the rub.

I disagree with Cavguy to an extent - I think 4GW can be used as a framework for prediction, and it starts with recogizing that the nation-state is failing. Just because there are more nations in the world doesn't mean anything if they are weak, illigitimate and broken.

I spoke to a Naval Academy history class in 06 about 4GW and Afghanistan as I had just returned from that Mecca of Central Asia culture. When doing some research for my brief, I found the Foreign Policy "Failed State" index. I then started scanning it, and looked at the countries we had troop committments to, and it reinforced my beliefs on 4GW.

Now I'm at CGSC, and we get to read theorists like Kaplan and Huntington, who describe a world very similar to what Lind and Co. wrote in 1989, 1994 and for the last 7 years. They have acceptable frameworks - even though Lind is quoted by Huntington, and Van Creveld (who wrote The Transformation of War in 91) is quoted throughout Kaplan's work.

To me, there is great overlap with 4GW. The 1989 article is the base for an intellectual discussion drawing in people such as Col Hammes (4/5GW), Frank Hoffman (Hybrid War), Kalev Sepp (Mosiac War), Echeverra (4GW doesn't exist), Barnett (Agrees with Lind but hates him because of hit piece Lind wrote), and many others trying to describe a condition/framework of warfare that is beyond simple counterinsurgency.

And on we go.

[wm]

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ? :)

I'd be more than happy to play but I suspect that the predictive power of 4GW theory (if it has any, which I doubt for the same kinds of reasons given by CavGuy and Bill Moore) is not where Zenpundit proposes the contest. I submit that it may lie in assessing where and how the next outbreak of violence will occur, not in deciding how it will end up.
Do the 4GW advocates want to take on this challenge instead?

BTW, I note that Zen proposed a one against many effort--the "traditionalists" nominate a prognosticator "champion" to be subjected to a riposte from a 4GW "Red Team"--certainly sounds like a traditional (dare I say attrition-based warfare) approach--use mass to ensure you trounce your opponent. :D

[slapout9]

SBW Slapout Based Warfare has 3 principles.
1-use people as soldiers that don't look like soldiers.
2-use things as weapons that don't look like weapons.
3-use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefileds.
Try that out on 4GW and so who can predict who:D

[William F. Owen]

There is a trend here with Lind's work within the field of military theory.

The guy is brilliant, but he comes up with poor naming conventions for his theories. It happened with MW and now 4GW. I understand why he named them this, but only after hours of sitting down with him and eating copius amounts of food. That's the rub.


Yep! It's a trend, and not a useful one. I'm very much less interested in the names, than I am the confusion they generate. He could have chosen to call them "X1A" and "Camel Theory." Names don't matter unless they have meaning! :)

MW and 4GW take a collection of ideas and observations and throw them into the same bucket. These do not generate something greater than the sum of the parts - thus peoples confusion and dissatisfaction - and a lot of the assertions that form the core of the ideas and not as valid as some believe.

For 4GW, I always as which observations are true, and which are not? Do the answers usefully progress my understanding?

[wm]

[C]all them "X1A" and "Camel Theory." Names don't matter unless they have meaning! :)

MW and 4GW take a collection of ideas and observations and throw them into the same bucket. These do not generate something greater than the sum of the parts - thus peoples confusion and dissatisfaction - and a lot of the assertions that form the core of the ideas and not as valid as some believe.

For 4GW, I always as which observations are true, and which are not? Do the answers usefully progress my understanding?

Names do matter as long as the meaning they take is held constant or agreed upon by those using the names (I think Wilf has argued for this in other threads). And the failure to do this is part of my beef with 4GW guys. Depending on who does the writing, differnt pieces of chum are taken from the bucket that Wilf describes above and are then presented as 4GW.

Before someone flames, please note that I use the word "chum" based on Eric Walters' claim that the whole 4GW/MW construct was a way of baiting Marine to break out of their "business as usual" lethargy and think about how they plan and fight battles/war.

[Ken White]

...Before someone flames, please note that I use the word "chum" based on Eric Walters' claim that the whole 4GW/MW construct was a way of baiting Marine to break out of their "business as usual" lethargy and think about how they plan and fight battles/war.would comment on how successful -- or not -- that effort to change planning and fighting has been?

[ericmwalters]

Question from Ken is how successful the 4GW concept has been in changing planning and fighting. Very good question and cuts to the heart of a problem the concept so far is dodging.

If you buy into the idea of the state losing its monopoly on organized violence (a return to conditions that existed prior to 1648, according to 4GW wisdom)--regardless of whether you term this phenomenon 4GW or not--what does this mean for standing professional militaries maintained by the nation state? 4GW does a great job at stating emerging social conditions and reasons behind this trend, as well as effects on organized violence which confounds traditional nation-state reponses. But this begs the question of how relevant nation-state standing professional militaries are in coping with 4GW opponents. Even FMFM 1A in its current draft provides little way forward beyond some of the usual COIN imperatives.

So what we've got is a label and an explanation that serves as a warning to those who would seek to apply nation-state military force with the expectation that this is the key to victory. Do the Marines "get" this? Yes. Did we get it before 4GW? Possibly I could make that argument, but the benefits of 4GW are really the terminology/labels/shorthand.

Has it changed planning and warfighting? Jury is out on that. We see the problem now. We just don't know what to do about it, how we fit in, how we are relevant. We're all over the map on that.

As an interesting case study, just look at Marine operations and tactics in Al Anbar. Prior to the so-called "Awakening" in 2006, Al Anbar was the Wild West and we were fighting a patchwork of insurgencies, bandits, violent opportunists, terrorists (and Al Quaida was only one of several), etc. A lot of these folks could have (and were) understood as 4GW-style opponents. We labeled them, but we didn't know how to solve the problem ourselves. Fortunately, Al Quaida overstepped itself and some of the Sheiks realized they had better get their act together before the province disintegrated further. Interestingly, the tribal approach would seem to contradict/counteract the extension of Baghdad's centralized authority. The U.S. military in Al Anbar made local accommodations to get the tactical security situation under control. These were deals made in the political, informational, and economic front just as much (and often more) than in the military realm. Was this a good thing? Well, the Marines point to the lowering of violence in the past couple of years. But one does have an Arsenio Hall moment when some of the Anbaris ask, "When the war with Baghdad comes, whose side will you be on?" Hmmmmm.....

The above illustrates primarily a 4GW problem--and I'm not talking about the Hammes definition, but the Lind/Schmitt/Wilson/Nightengale one. This is a problem I don't think we've got a real answer for. One that my friends in the State Department would say we can't possibly be expected to have an answer for. Ouch. Marines like General Tony Zinni well understand it and articulate it.

Bottom line: 4GW "theory" in the USMC provides a usable diagnosis...but unlike 3GW/MW, there is no prescription!

[slapout9]

If you buy into the idea of the state losing its monopoly on organized violence (a return to conditions that existed prior to 1648, according to 4GW wisdom)--regardless of whether you term this phenomenon 4GW or not--what does this mean for standing professional militaries maintained by the nation state? 4GW does a great job at stating emerging social conditions and reasons behind this trend, as well as effects on organized violence which confounds traditional nation-state reponses. But this begs the question of how relevant nation-state standing professional militaries are in coping with 4GW opponents. Even FMFM 1A in its current draft provides little way forward beyond some of the usual COIN imperatives.


Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy:D

[wm]

Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy:D

Slap,
If this the answer, then I think we end up with things that look more like the Earps vs. the Clantons at the OK Corral in Tombstone in 1881 or the Ranchers vs. Store Owners in the 1878 Lincoln County War.

Eric's point that Anbar was like the Wild West is, I think, worth exploring more fully. It supports your LE view and seems more useful than applying the 4GW model IMO. Viewing our involvement as more like that of the French in Mexico in the 1860s might be fruitful. I just hope we have gotten past the possibility of an event like Capt Danjou at Camerone. I suspect that we have in Iraq. I'm not so sure about Afghanistan.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Max161,
And lastly, Bill, as I argued in my paper, the answers are NOT found in the classic texts. They are found by studying them. Everyone wants to look to a book to find the silver bullet or the holy grail. But there are no answers that can be pulled of books -0 not in FM 3-24, not in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, not in the Sling and the Stone, not in the Pentagon's New Map and not in On War or the Art of War. You have to read and study and figure out the answers for the situation in which you find yourself. The answers are inside us but the study of the classics and an understanding of the nature of war (from insurgency to major combat operations) is what it takes to develop strategy and practice operational art.

Very well put and I'm in 95% agreement, 100% agreement if you are also implying that the nature of war (and perhaps more accurately conflict or armed competition in some cases) has evolved based on a number of variables ranging from globalism, international laws, technology, individual/small group empowerment with information/weapons of mass effect, etc. Many of the concepts addressed by various 4GW idealists have merit, but their writings should be vigorously debated to determine what is germaine to the so-what of it all. The so-what is what we we need to change doctrinally, force structure wise, over all government approach, ROE, etc. If it 4GW doesn't drive some change in our approach to fighting (or fighting without fighting), then its authors have failed. That doesn't mean they're entirely wrong, just that their writings were unconvincing. Eric and Ken did a good job of addressing this below. As for Slapout's approach, I have a closet full of man jami's.

[ericmwalters]

Hey Slap--I'm also won over by your SBW model. A lot. You also wrote:


Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy.

As an aside, it's worthwhile to relate a quick tale about how a couple Marine sergeants were able to execute a tactical strike that has disproportionately successful operational and strategic level success--this from MCDP 1-2, Campaigning:


For example, consider the killing of Haitian guerilla leader Charlemagne Peralte by two Marine non-commissioned officers in 1919. During this period, U.S. Marines were involved in the occupation of Haiti. Peralte had raised a rebel force of as many as 5,000 in the northern part of the country. From February through October, Marine forces pursued the rebels, known as a ‘cacos,’ fighting 131 engagements but were unable to suppress the rebel activity. So, disguised as cacos, Sgt Herman Hanneken (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_H._Hanneken)and Cpl. William Button infiltrated Peralte’s camp, where Hanneken shot and killed the caco leader. The rebellion in the north subsided. In this case, a special operation consisting of two Marines accomplished what 7 months of combat could not.

Hanneken retired from the Marine Corps as a Brigadier General.

Sure, that worked then. We proved ourselves relevant in such situations. But given today's threats in today's contexts, this is much more difficult to pull off. Even had we killed Aideed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Farrah_Aidid) in Somalia back in UNOSOM II (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNOSOM_II)days, would that have solved the problems with his Habr Gidr clan? No, it would have been even far worse than it was, "Blackhawk Down" notwithstanding, as a blood debt would have been incurred that surviving clan males would have been obligated to settle.

[slapout9]

Eric, that is true, single leader types ending revolutions are rare. But relative to MW my point is a unifrom creates a surface that can be seen. An insurgent creates a gap by looking like everyone else so he has unrestricted maneuver among the population.:eek:

Bill Moore, dosen't surprise me at all about your and your man jamis;)

Eric, read Killing Pablo also by Mark Bowden to overcome the Somila problem.

Of course SBW beats em all. I have to put some more non understandable stuff in it for it to be considered a Grand Theory, it's to simple right now:D all the way up to half a page:D

Sgt. Herman Hanneken of course he was great he was a Sergeant first.

[shloky]

Names do matter as long as the meaning they take is held constant or agreed upon by those using the names (I think Wilf has argued for this in other threads). And the failure to do this is part of my beef with 4GW guys.

Nah.


Depending on who does the writing, differnt pieces of chum are taken from the bucket that Wilf describes above and are then presented as 4GW.


Nature of the 4GW beast. You want as many concurrent loops as possible, generating as much insight as possible.

Were we to all line up under a 4GW banner (which, arguably, we do, once a year) it would be a very varied group of people that simply share some common intellectual grounding:

To me, there is great overlap with 4GW. The 1989 article is the base for an intellectual discussion drawing in people such as Col Hammes (4/5GW), Frank Hoffman (Hybrid War), Kalev Sepp (Mosiac War), Echeverra (4GW doesn't exist), Barnett (Agrees with Lind but hates him because of hit piece Lind wrote), and many others trying to describe a condition/framework of warfare that is beyond simple counterinsurgency.

And on we go.

That's right, and its OK. Which is why:


Many of the concepts addressed by various 4GW idealists have merit, but their writings should be vigorously debated to determine what is germaine to the so-what of it all. The so-what is what we we need to change doctrinally, force structure wise, over all government approach, ROE, etc. If it 4GW doesn't drive some change in our approach to fighting (or fighting without fighting), then its authors have failed. That doesn't mean they're entirely wrong, just that their writings were unconvincing. Eric and Ken did a good job of addressing this below.

[ericmwalters]

My particular take on 4GW is that it is social--and as such is more of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) than most of the "Military Technical Revolution" (MTR) stuff -- to use a Soviet phrase -- I typically have seen in the old "Transformation" days.

To quote Trotsky, the essence is 4GW for America is this: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you." The best illustration is Flight 93 on 9/11. Classes of society who were kept away from war, not intended to fight war, nevertheless were "liberated" by the circumstances into organized violence--in this instance, against the terrorists who seized the plan. The struggle for the jet--both in the seizure of it by the terrorists and the retaking of it by the passengers--show all the signs of 4GW and, coincidentally enough, SBW (Slapout-Based Warfare). And where was the law enforcement community? Where was the federal government's military in this? Citizens improvised effective organized violence using every day objects. I think we're going to see a lot more of this in the future...in many other realms of human activity where violence can be mounted.

Whither the U.S. military in such circumstances? Maybe we just don't play there--we confine ourselves to state versus state conflicts. But as General Tony Zinni likes to say of Marines, "Oh, we indeed do windows." The question is, how do we do "windows" in this 4GW world?

Haven't quite figured that out yet.

[Entropy]

Eric,

As an ex-squid turned zoomie who is too ignorant on these topics, I just wanted to say how glad I am you're here and posting so voluminously. I am learning an awful lot from these discussions and look forward to more.

[Ken White]

Question from Ken is how successful the 4GW concept has been in changing planning and fighting. Very good question and cuts to the heart of a problem the concept so far is dodging.Sort of my suspicion; I meant to include MW with 4GW in my question but I wasn't clear and I suspect that changes the answer very little if at all.
Has it changed planning and warfighting? Jury is out on that. We see the problem now. We just don't know what to do about it, how we fit in, how we are relevant. We're all over the map on that.That summarizes a part of my concern. If the purpose is to get us all on one sheet, neither concept is working very well. Yet each has its devotees and even acolytes who will brook no heresy...

Not a good situation to my mind.
The above illustrates primarily a 4GW problem--and I'm not talking about the Hammes definition, but the Lind/Schmitt/Wilson/Nightengale one. This is a problem I don't think we've got a real answer for. One that my friends in the State Department would say we can't possibly be expected to have an answer for. Ouch. Marines like General Tony Zinni well understand it and articulate it.

Bottom line: 4GW "theory" in the USMC provides a usable diagnosis...but unlike 3GW/MW, there is no prescription!I'm opposed to prescriptions, I think they inhibit flexibility of thinking and my experience with a number of mantras (or fads...) that have popped up over the last 60 plus years has not enamored me of the latest batch.

I understand that US Armed forces Senior Leaders are all too often cautious, risk averse and put the sanctity of the institutions they run ahead of many things (including, to their credit, themselves in many cases). Thus, doctrinal change has been instigated by young Field Grades and Commanders and that goes back to pre-WW II, then to HMX-1 and the use of hoptiflopters in Amphibious Landings which occurred back in my young 0231 (then, not todays, it's 0321 now, I think) days, proceeds forward through MW, Air Land Battle to today. We have developed a working model to produce change but I submit it's not very efficient. Better than nothing, I grant...

My dream is of a set of services that have innovative leaders who aren't excessively risk averse to drive this stuff top down. All we have to do to achieve that is select the right folks. To do that, we simply need to change the personnel systems to the supporting effort they should be instead of the supported element they are, get rid of DOPMA and its insistence that all are equal and keep Congress out of the personnel business.

I realized that 50 years ago; still haven't figured out how to bring it about...:wry:

[reed11b]

Thus, doctrinal change has been instigated by young Field Grades and Commanders and that goes back to pre-WW II, then to HMX-1 and the use of hoptiflopters in Amphibious Landings which occurred back in my young 0231 (then, not todays, it's 0321 now, I think)

wait,wait..were you a marine or a paratrooper??? I am sooo confused now:confused:
Reed

[Ken White]

wait,wait..were you a marine or a paratrooper??? I am sooo confused now:confused:
ReedMarine 49-53, Guard and Reserve 53-56, Army 56-76 (~14 of it Abn), DAC 76-95 -- that's all called masochism...;)

[reed11b]

Marine 49-53, Guard and Reserve 53-56, Army 56-76 (~14 of it Abn), DAC 76-95 -- that's all called masochism...;)

DAC = defense ammunition center?
Reed
P.S. I was feeling old recently..now I feel rather young again, thanks Ken;)

[Ken White]

I don't do ammunition, I use it or teach others how.

[selil]

Marine 49-53, Guard and Reserve 53-56, Army 56-76 (~14 of it Abn), DAC 76-95 -- that's all called masochism...;)

Once a Marine always a Marine. Everything else is just a job.

[Ski]

The bottom line is that the doctrine - whether it be from military sources, such as FM 3-24, FM 3-0, JP3-0, etc or non-military sources (Lind, Barnett, Sepp, Hoffman, etc) is changing exceptionally quickly because the military is not the center of gravity (hey, look at that, Clausewitz) in these conflicts yet the military is being used to try and solve these "wicked problems."

I suspect the frustration levels within the militaries is going to continue to rise over the next decade or so, mainly because it's being used as the primary instrument of foreign policy.

I don't think, at this stage, there is a right answer. To paraphrase Boyd from another thread, "Don't talk to me about doctrine, it becomes dogma the day after it's written."

[zenpundit]

My apologies for the delayed response on my part. I'll do my best to catch up now with the questions and rebuttals.

In approximate order:

CavGuy:


Zen, I don't see how it's a "challenge", because you can't use 4GW to predict anything, only describe and environment. I'm confused. How is 4GW or whatever construct I use "predictive"? It's a descriptor of a condition, not a theory.

4GW contains a number of operative premises regarding the nature of warfare - (an aside- I like how you identified some of them as evironmental though, Lind focuses a lot on actors' intent but that's not the whole picture) - the premises carry with them a logic on the effects that uses of force are going to produce. While I have some reservations about 4GW myself, in the interest of testing I propose to apply that logic strictly to whatever case study/scenarios on which we can reach agreement as the initial starting point ( see my respnse to WM below)

Bill Moore


...although openly publishing suspected pro's and con's of two belligerent's strategies while they're fighting could very well shape the outcome if they browse this site. To keep it objective it would have to be done via e-mails to the referee.

Point taken. Good thinking.

Wilf Owen:


Very happy to participate, except I agree with a lot of the 4GW positions, and CAVGUY has got it right, with his reservations about the idea. My "beef" with 4GW is the overall concept, not the detail of its parts. I have the same beef with MW.

Thank you Wilf. Approach the challenge, if we all can agree on one, in the way you think is most useful in making your point. I'd prefer the anti-4GW side have as free a hand as they require in the interest of a fair test and an interesting discussion.


One of my "Rules" for modern operations is DO NOT KILL CIVILIANS. If you simply aim for that, then a lot/some of the 4GW constructs evaporate as a concern. Why doesn't 4GW just say that?

My guess would be that Lind also sees "punitive expeditions" and "Hama solutions" as a rare but necessary part of a strategy of "containment" for the encroaching disorder of a 4GW world. That however, remains a guess. Ask Lind if you get a chance.

Ski


I'm up for a wargaming scenario with a 4GW lens. Will be enjoyable, especially if Herr Oberst Walters and Zen are on my side

My thanks Ski !

WM


I'd be more than happy to play but I suspect that the predictive power of 4GW theory (if it has any, which I doubt for the same kinds of reasons given by CavGuy and Bill Moore) is not where Zenpundit proposes the contest. I submit that it may lie in assessing where and how the next outbreak of violence will occur, not in deciding how it will end up.
Do the 4GW advocates want to take on this challenge instead?"

Good idea! I'd be up for that as well if Ski and any other "takers" are agreeable. We might want to consider narrowing it to say, three regions selected by a neutral party rather than making the target zone as "planet earth". But I'm flexible.


BTW, I note that Zen proposed a one against many effort--the "traditionalists" nominate a prognosticator "champion" to be subjected to a riposte from a 4GW "Red Team"--certainly sounds like a traditional (dare I say attrition-based warfare) approach--use mass to ensure you trounce your opponent

You have misread my original suggestion. Actually I'd rather go solo against a team than the reverse. My interest is trying to play this not as myself but in as true a spirit to van Creveld and Lind as I can manage - minus the odd reverence for the Wilhelmine Reich. I think the two sides should be well represented as we want a first-rate exchange here. Otherwise, there's no point.

[Entropy]

Marine 49-53, Guard and Reserve 53-56, Army 56-76 (~14 of it Abn), DAC 76-95 -- that's all called masochism...;)

Wow! That's hugely impressive (and yes, masochistic), but you need to add the council to end of that list - you may not be getting paid, but your prolific and valuable posts sure give the impression you're still working! :D

[AmericanPride]

Zenpundit and others,

I'd like to observe the "challenge" and learn what I can from watching the exchange.

[TT]

Any number of issues and points have been left hanging in the discussion so far. Eric has made a very good effort to address some them (my understanding that 4GW was aimed specifically at Marines, and etc, conforms very well with what Eric has pointed out). Now it may be that these loose ends are ‘hanging’ as everyone has gone back to read the other two threads mentioned earlier; nonetheless, at the very real risk of being pedantic (my occupational hazard), to push th discussion onwards I want to clear away more deadwood.


Zenpundit posted: I agree that that seeing "Generations" of warfare in strict linearity is very problematic. IMHO it's better as a simple taxonomy than a chronology.


The key here, it seems to me, is Zenpundit’s use of the word ‘seeing’. They original authors of the 1989 article and the authors of the subsequent one in 1995 were clear that they did not see the development of warfare as being ‘linear’, except in the broadest sense. They argued that a) the shift from one ‘generation’ to the next was not even or sequential; b) the evolution from one to the next proceeded over decades, upwards of 70+ years before the next main approach to warfighting consolidates; and c) that elements of the preceding generation would be found in the subsequent generation (and/or that two generations can exist coextensive within the same military – Lind makes this argument constantly when he contends that the US military is a 2nd and 3rd Gen military).

As argued above by 'wm', terminology 'does' matter, for the terms used become simple references for, dare I say, a complex concept, and these terms become imbued with a connotation or understanding that obscures or even misleads. 4GW has this problem, and as Wilf points, MW has this problem. For 4GW, the use of the term 'generation' has led far too many people to interpret the original arguments to mean that war evolves in a strictly linear fashion.

If one thinks of Darwinian evolution (including disruptive equilibrium) which proceeds by fits and starts over time, with successful (or best fit) adaptations accumulating over time with the eventual outcome being a more competitive form, one better fitted to the surrounding environment, then the term ‘generation’ may not be that inapt (but I am 'definitely' not saying that this is why the term ‘generations’ was used by the original authors). In essence, this generalization of Darwinian evolution is consistent with their take on the ‘evolution of warfare’ – once a particular form of modern warfare (ie 1GW, 2GW, 3GW) is consolidated and mastered (don’t want to say 'perfected', for few probably are perfect in any particular form of warfare), opponents will start working to find ways to fight against this form of warfare, with unsuccessful adaptations being discarded and successful efforts being kept, with the successful elements over time consolidating into a new form of warfare (different from the proceeding ‘generation’) that a military uses to devastating effect against its enemies – and then the cycle starts over again as those opponents seek ways to adapt, offset, overcome.

Zenpundit’s follow-on point that ‘4GW is better as a simple taxonomy than a chronology’ connects directly to
Cavguy’s point:

It's a descriptor of a condition, not a theory.


Both ‘taxonomy’ and ‘descriptor’ probably fit very well with what 4GW is in terms of what has been written about it. But there is a ‘theory’ that underlies this ‘generations’ taxonomy. Here I tread with care given the earlier thread, also started by Cavguy, on Boyd, for the authors of the original article applied Boyd’s ‘The Conceptual Spiral’ -- which is the best expression of the general theory of change that Boyd was working towards (or achieved, depending on your point of view) -- to underpin their original argument about the possible emergence of a 4th generation of warfare (and yes, in the 1989 article they were hypothesizing only; they argued in the 1995 article they thought 4GW was emerging). To keep it very brief and so quote Hammond, Boyd’s theory of change is that a world that is uncertain, ever-changing and unpredictable
generates mismatches, and hence ‘one must continue the whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses and syntheses to comprehend, shape and adapt to unfolding, evolving reality that remains uncertain, ever-changing, and unpredictable’. In short, having applied Boyd's theory of change, the original authors then described the hypotheses of what would emerge in reaction to 3GW (remembering that elements of 3GW are part of the following emergent form of warfare).

The seemingly lack of theory is that in all their discussion and elaboration of 4GW, I am not aware that they have ever made clear in print their use of ‘The Conceptual Spiral’ to generate their orignial hypotheses about what a 4GW might look like. Their bad.

Have fun with your 'friendly' bet on competing approaches/theories(or if you take Ski’s interesting suggestion, wargame)! :D



Entropy posted Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology

WM posted: Seems to me that both the 30 Years War and the 100 Years War meet all of the criteria above. anyone want to call them 4GW struggles?
Oh wait, I forgot, 4GW only became possible after the Peace of Westphalia introduced the conditions that made 3GW possible.


I am not aware that the original authors claimed that 4GW was ‘new’, except in terms of it being different from the first three generations of ‘modern warfare’(and thus, as Eric made clear, 'new to Marines'). Further, it is not that 4GW 'only' became possible after the Treaty of Westphalia, though this is true to the extent that the original article referred to ‘modern warfare’ (state vs state). As Lind in particular argues, repeatedly, their conception of 4GW would be (was) a return to pre-Westphalian forms of warfare. Lind constantly recommends reading, Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century, to understand what 4GW likely will be like. What they argued would be (’89) (or was in the '95 article), ‘new’ in 4GW is ‘who fights’ and ‘what they fight for’.

The above aside, as most everyone has argued, there are no doubt problems with the concept, including the use of history (and this applies to Hammes equally) For criticisms other than those discussed here, see “Debating 4GW’ in Contemporary Security Policy (Aug 2005), which includes the original piece by Echevarria that led to his longer piece as well as other critiques by civilian and military academics.

But while I accept the validity of the criticisms, I have to agree with Eric that the ‘original conceptions as outlined in the earlier articles’ are useful – particularly if one takes account the underpinning theory and that the originators generally believe (I think I am correct in saying 'they' to mean all) see 4GW as only starting to emerge, in reaction to 3GW, and that this 'reaction' will continue evolve by fits and starts in the coming decades, so we are yet to see what the ‘consolidated’ result may look like (the 5GW superempowered individual would be encompassed with 4GW). I find it hard to argue with Sir Lawrie Freedman, who in the CSP debate argued that the ‘generations’ model for change in warfare, based as it is on selective history, probably is flawed, yet subsequently argued elsewhere that this ‘is not in itself reason for neglecting its prescriptive aspects’.

[William F. Owen]

Marine 49-53, Guard and Reserve 53-56, Army 56-76 (~14 of it Abn), DAC 76-95 -- that's all called masochism...;)

I knew you were good... but not that good! :)

[Cavguy]

Zombie thread revived .... like 4GW, it will never die.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/09/the-fallacies-of-fourth-and-fi/

[Joske]

A few months ago i read about the release of the "handbook of 5GW"

http://zenpundit.com/?p=3484

I searched the web to find some more information on the subject and ran into a bunch of blogposts on the subject and after some reading I am still not sure what they actually mean by it, I did find one post which gave an example of a possible 5GW action which would be something like the strategy of tension of operation gladio in Italy.
Which leads to my critique of 4GW and 5GW, first you have off course the generations model off warfare, the claim that war and warfare have fundamentaly changed and that they tend to proclaim that they predicted the future quite often. But as i try to discuss substance over defintions, i'd rather not discuss those.
On the other hand then my main critique is that for all their claims they have not contributed much to the understanding of terrorism, irregular warfare and war in itself.

Off course most off my information about this subject comes from blogs and articles as i did not have the chance of reading any of the books on the subject, so correct me if im wrong.

[John T. Fishel]

You're not wrong.:(

Cheers

JohnT

[Dayuhan]

To paraphrase Lind:

Whoever is first to coin, distribute, and become associated with an expression implying a generational change can gain a decisive advantage in professional prominence, book sales, lecture appearances and general name recognition. Those who recognize buzzwords for what they are open themselves to simply having to solve the problems in front of them, without demanding or attracting attention or recognition... which some would count as catastrophic defeat in the career world.

Needless to say, I remain unconvinced that any generational change is actually in progress. That doesn't mean we aren't up to our eyeballs in a sticky wicket, but I don't see how erudite babble about generations, systems disruption, open-source warfare, etc, ad nauseam are going to help.

[slapout9]

Some of the concepts of 4GW are important despite the rather strange name given to it. One is the concept that the Nation/State is the highest and most important form of Social Organization that people can use to govern themselves. And as we are seeing other forms of Social Organization are rising to challenge that concept.

As for concrete guidance to follow Lind has pointed out more than once that he nor anybody else knows for sure, because nobody has ever won a 4GW at least they haven't yet.

[jmm99]

(emphasis added by JMM to the second "political"):


As Hammes states: “Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks – political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit....

My comment deals solely with the political aspects of 4th-5th Generation warfare and not its military aspects (e.g., "swarming").

My first problem is calling the "political, economic, social" effort "warfare". The use of the "military" (whether one calls it a network, system or something else) is likely to involve armed conflict (organized group violence) - and hence is "warfare". The "political, economic, social" elements (the DIE in DIME), on the other hand, are not as likely to involve violence (although some may occur), or to give rise to an armed conflict.

Obviously, those DIE elements can occur concurrently with a military armed conflict (warfare); but they also can occur absent a military armed conflict (a point that Bob Jones also makes in somewhat different terms). Those political efforts are not well named as a part of "warfare", even though they may be coincident to an armed conflict (war). They are indeed a "struggle" (in terms similar to CvC's "struggle" between military opponents); but they are covered more in Sun Tzu's soundbites than in CvC's On War - and, of course, much more fully by such as Mao and Giap.

Regardless of what that effort is called, it is intended to "convince the enemy’s political decision makers" to bend to the opponent's will. Thus, its aimpoint is not primarily the opponent's military (although that may be a target of agitprop and subversion), but the opponent's civilian (political) side. While there are some CvC basics involved, calling it "warfare" mixes the two efforts (political and military).

The 4th and 5th Generation proponents should generally be given credit for preaching that there is a political struggle. That struggle can be ongoing and coincident to the military struggle in many armed conflicts (but not in all armed conflicts, they should add). Further, in the right circumstances, the political struggle alone can be successful, where resort to an armed conflict would not be. In the latter case (the political struggle alone), no "warfare" is involved at all.

Regards

Mike

[Tukhachevskii]

With all the talk of 4th, 5th and 6th (etc.) generational stuff I wonder where the "democratisation of technology" is leading us, perhaps cheap UCAVs (http://www.defensereview.com/hyper-lethal-mini-robotic-attack-helicopter-with-turbine-engine-debuts/) for domestic and international insurgents?:D

[Rex Brynen]

With all the talk of 4th, 5th and 6th (etc.) generational stuff I wonder where the "democratisation of technology" is leading us, perhaps cheap UCAVs (http://www.defensereview.com/hyper-lethal-mini-robotic-attack-helicopter-with-turbine-engine-debuts/) for domestic and international insurgents?:D

I foresee a time when all warfare is conducted by exchanging trendy jargon until one side surrenders:

"I leverage my asymmetrical assets, and swarm you!"

"I use decentralized, networked capabilities to neutralize your swarm, and counter with virtual strategic communications aimed directly at your transnational centers of (5GW) gravity!"

"Curse you! But your networked capabilities are no match for my viral cyber strategy and avatar-based resource mobilization! My every soldier is a sensor! My corporals are all strategic!"

"Your mother was a hamster, and your father smelled of elderberries!"

etc.

[jmm99]

from Rex
"Your mother was a hamster...

and the word I was looking for: "hamsterfare".

Cheers

Mike

[reed11b]

Your post.

Day = Made.:D
thank you sir.
Reed

[Joske]

My comment deals solely with the political aspects of 4th-5th Generation warfare and not its military aspects (e.g., "swarming").

My first problem is calling the "political, economic, social" effort "warfare". The use of the "military" (whether one calls it a network, system or something else) is likely to involve armed conflict (organized group violence) - and hence is "warfare". The "political, economic, social" elements (the DIE in DIME), on the other hand, are not as likely to involve violence (although some may occur), or to give rise to an armed conflict.

Obviously, those DIE elements can occur concurrently with a military armed conflict (warfare); but they also can occur absent a military armed conflict (a point that Bob Jones also makes in somewhat different terms). Those political efforts are not well named as a part of "warfare", even though they may be coincident to an armed conflict (war). They are indeed a "struggle" (in terms similar to CvC's "struggle" between military opponents); but they are covered more in Sun Tzu's soundbites than in CvC's On War - and, of course, much more fully by such as Mao and Giap.

Regardless of what that effort is called, it is intended to "convince the enemy’s political decision makers" to bend to the opponent's will. Thus, its aimpoint is not primarily the opponent's military (although that may be a target of agitprop and subversion), but the opponent's civilian (political) side. While there are some CvC basics involved, calling it "warfare" mixes the two efforts (political and military).

The 4th and 5th Generation proponents should generally be given credit for preaching that there is a political struggle. That struggle can be ongoing and coincident to the military struggle in many armed conflicts (but not in all armed conflicts, they should add). Further, in the right circumstances, the political struggle alone can be successful, where resort to an armed conflict would not be. In the latter case (the political struggle alone), no "warfare" is involved at all.

Regards

Mike

I find it quite logical that other fields then the military one matter in warfare, if i recall it correctly CvC said that breaking the will of the people was something of an end goal in every war ( and which should be accomplished through destroying the enemy army and taking his land, but i dont think he would object to a shortcut ).

Also i think that the importance of operations in the "other fields" become more important when the chance of a relative fast military-only victory lowers. This could for example be aplied to insurgencies or low intensity conflicts, but it also played a major role in for example the strategic bombing campaigns in world war 2 or even during world war 1 with blockades and zeppelin bombing raids.
And although i surely agree with the fact that the political aspect of warfare should never be ignored, it has always been a part of warfare and Mao and Che are two names who pop up into my head when i think of this point.

[Tom Odom]

I foresee a time when all warfare is conducted by exchanging trendy jargon until one side surrenders:

"I leverage my asymmetrical assets, and swarm you!"

"I use decentralized, networked capabilities to neutralize your swarm, and counter with virtual strategic communications aimed directly at your transnational centers of (5GW) gravity!"

"Curse you! But your networked capabilities are no match for my viral cyber strategy and avatar-based resource mobilization! My every soldier is a sensor! My corporals are all strategic!"

"Your mother was a hamster, and your father smelled of elderberries!"

etc.

Ahhhh Rex

that time is already upon us

That would be Leavenworts

Home of Jedi Knights, Harry Potter, and Design

Take that Voldemart, Violator of Doctrinal Purity and other notional virgins! :eek:

[slapout9]

Link to 2004 article by Bill Lind.


http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702