Secretary Gates at National Defense University

[SWJED]

Secretary Gates at National Defense University (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/09/secretary-gates-at-national-de/) - links provides full transcript, highlight excerpts, video and press on yesterday's address by SECDEF at NDU.

[Tom Odom]

Great speech and to my mind the following is the most important part:


Limits and Modesty

First, limits about what the United States - still the strongest and greatest nation on earth - can do. The power of our military's global reach has been an indispensable contributor to world peace - and must remain so. But not every outrage, every act of aggression, every crisis can or should elicit an American military response, and we should acknowledge such.

Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. The Taliban dispatched within three months, Saddam's regime toppled in three weeks. Where a button is pushed in Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul. Where a bomb destroys the targeted house on the right, leaving intact the one on the left.

But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to upend the immutable principles of war: where the enemy is killed, but our troops and innocent civilians are spared. Where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or awed into submission, instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block

The problem I see is that he was addressing the wrong audience--those students know the truth of what he had to say.

Tom

[Cavguy]

This one is for COL Gentile: ;)


"COIN and Stability Operations ... the recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing adequately to address the dangers posed by insurgencies or failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos, and criminality. Let's be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland - for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack - are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states. The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. We do not have the luxury of opting out because they do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war."

[Entropy]

Fanstastic Speech. It was hard to choose, but I think this is my personal favorite passage:


Thirty-six years ago, my old CIA colleague Bob Komer, who led the pacification campaign in Vietnam, published his classic study of organizational behavior called Bureaucracy Does Its Thing. Looking at the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus during that conflict – military and civilian – he identified a number of tendencies that prevented institutions from adapting long after problems had been identified and solutions were proposed:
• The reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, and when faced with lack of results, to do more of the same;
• Trying to run a war with peacetime management structure and practices;
• A belief that the current set of problems were either an aberration or would soon be over; and
• Where because a certain problem – in that case, counterinsurgency – did not fit the inherited structure and preferences of organizations – it simultaneously became everybody’s business and no one’s business.
I cite that study not to re-litigate that war, or suggest that the institutional military hasn’t made enormous strides in recent years. It is, however, a cautionary reminder that these tendencies are always present in any large, hierarchical organization, and we must consistently strive to overcome them.

The more things change, the more they stay the same I guess.

[Norfolk]

Bob Gates is such a class act. It's really too bad (really too bad) we can't count on him being around for another presidential term or two.:wry:

[Ron Humphrey]

Bob Gates is such a class act. It's really too bad (really too bad) we can't count on him being around for another presidential term or two.:wry:

I guess you can't really blame him for not necessarily wanting to continue all things considered:(

Either way I think it can never be said he and his family haven't given this country way above and beyond the call of duty.

Wonder if he might consider D#%5I%$ aaaww nevermind:D

[MSG Proctor]

The military's struggle to adjust to the counterinsurgency mission in Iraq "came at a frightful human, financial and political cost," Gates told an audience of military officers at the National Defense University here. "For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon that they had to overcome," he said.

While having a military skilled in fighting major conventional ground wars is essential, Gates said, such a war is unlikely in the near future. Yet the Pentagon has placed comparatively too much emphasis on developing high-technology weapon systems aimed at potential state adversaries such as China or Russia that take years to develop, he said, noting that the 2009 budget contains more than $180 billion for such conventional systems.

Such weapons often envision a computerized, idealized version of warfare that Gates suggested is unrealistic.

"Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories," he warned, adding that officers should "look askance" at notions of future conflict that imply "adversaries can be cowed, shocked or awed into submission, instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house."

Instead, Gates said, the Pentagon needs to be able to rapidly purchase and field more low-tech capabilities. "Our conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution in years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions -- the wars we are in -- require 75 percent solutions in months," he said.

Full article here (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/29/AR2008092903067.html?hpid=moreheadlines).

[MSG Proctor]

Instead, Gates said, the Pentagon needs to be able to rapidly purchase and field more low-tech capabilities. "Our conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution in years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions -- the wars we are in -- require 75 percent solutions in months," he said.


This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now - and its still too slow and unresponsive.

Low-tech capabilities: READ: 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

[Tom Odom]

This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now - and its still too slow and unresponsive.

Low-tech capabilities: READ: 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

Come on. Look at weapons development, doctrine, and tactics changes in WWII. We literally developed fielded and won with new aircraft, ships, and weapons in a matter of 4 years and that includes the largest flash to bang in history so far at Hiroshima.

In contrast we have crept along like an old man since 9-11 when it comes to tactical changes and systems development. MRAP is just such a case. The realization that OIF was an insurgency took two years to sink in at the highest level.

Tom

[MSG Proctor]

Mr. Tom:
In WWII there was very little resistance for the mobilization of the entire US economy in support of the war effort. It was do-or-die. Today there is significant political resistance to our war efforts and an entrenched Cold War defense bureaucracy that had no corresponding model in the 1939 War Department.

While we agree on the pace of change (please review my post - I said the pace is still too slow), the depth of change required now seems more severe than in WWII. Our nation also fielded 12 million military uniformed servicemembers for WWII out of a population of 160 million while now our total defense build is 2 million out of a population of 320 million. As far as defense spending as a % of the GDP (http://www.afji.com/2007/03/2545232), during World War II, it was 38 percent of GDP; during Korea, 14 percent; Vietnam, 9.5 percent; during the Reagan buildup, 6.2 percent. The % being spent on the GWoT is about 4.4% of the GDP (http://www.afji.com/2007/03/2545232)(2007 numbers).

In my estimation, the WWII War Department had to become bigger and better in a hurry, but it didn't have to become radically different from what it was in WWI aside from expanding the US Army Air Corps.

There is a culture of entrenched resistance in the Pentagon itself as Secretary Gates cites in his speech:


For example, this year's base budget request contains more than $180 billion in procurement, research and development, the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems. However, apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabilities to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict - and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts...

[Entropy]

IMO the reason's and differences between WWII and now are political. During WWII we had a nation at war, today we have a military at war and I think that makes all the difference.

The DoD and service procurement system is completely broken IMO, but I don't know how to fix it without the political support. Without that support, all these other factors throw a wrench into the works: Defense industry consolidation and lobbying where only a few companies can do a lot of this stuff; the legal problems where procurement gets delayed time and again because the loser ends up suing or whining to the GAO. And then there are certain members of our political class who seem to value the economic impact of procurement more than actually fielding new equipment.

I applaud Sec. Gates on this issue, but frankly I don't think that much will change as long as the military is the only organization on a war footing.

Edit: I agree with MSG Proctor - we posted on top of each other.

[MSG Proctor]

Well said, Entropy. Great points! While our military is at war, our country is at the mall. Also, excellent point linking development with political support.

[Tom Odom]

This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now

MSG Proctor

That is what I referred to. You are using absolute statements regarding history. Material solutions are NOT being developed in the shortest time in history. The changes that occurred then were far greater than anything that has happened in the past 7 years. We were far faster in WWII.

Are we too slow now? Yes, but you do not buttress the point by claiming we are making unpredented changes or setting speed records. To the contrary, you make the point by saying that we need such a political commitment if we are going to adjust as rapidly.

Entropy

Same statement. If your point is we need to change faster then I agree. The degree of commitment involved in WWII is the relevant variable.

As for the depth of change needed being greater today, maybe on the political side but I doubt it. The need is no greater; the will is lacking.

On the military side, fielding that 12 million force all happened in the space of 5 years --if you include the 1940's draft.

Frankly the degree and speed of change since 2001 has been a bad joke.

Tom

[MSG Proctor]

The degree and speed of change required is at an unprecedented level - regardless of the substandard deliverables. Maybe we can all agree on that.

I also stand by the need for 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with the TO&E of the 101st AASLT Division and 10th Mountain Division BCTs.

[Tom Odom]

The degree and speed of change required is at an unprecedented level - regardless of the substandard deliverables. Maybe we can all agree on that.

Nope. That is an open ended comparison that merely use hyperbole to make its point. The requirements to convert the US to world power status from 1940 to 1945 required as much speed and the degree of change was certainly no less than the changes you suggest today.

Is change needed? Yes. Is in needed soon? Yes. Is it needed at the highest level? Yes. We need to go back through nuts and bolts Key West circe 1948 process on roles and missions.



I also stand by the need for 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with the TO&E of the 101st AASLT Division and 10th Mountain Division BCTs.

Perhaps on the BCT numbers. As to their MTO&E not so sure. Agree we need greater troop strength where it counts most. I am very concerned that our developers are recreating at division and corps what modularity was to replace, the net result being that we have fewer boots where we need them most. I am not a fan of the current BCT M&TOE because it does the same thing: larger staffs and fewer shooters.

Tom

[Entropy]

Tom, I think we are in violent agreement - it is the will that is lacking. My point was that there is no political will to grease the wheels, tell the miscreants to shut-up-and-color, and get things done quickly. Even if Gates manages to get the Pentagon out of its DC mindset, there is the Congress and other factors that will continue to impede our ability to adjust rapidly. The political costs of going for a 75% solution are, sadly, quite high as well - look at the body armor controversy a few years ago. No one wants to vote for or award a contract on something that isn't 99% because when the shortcomings are revealed the DC blame-game will commence in earnest. I don't know, maybe I'm being too cynical, but I don't think these problems can be solved without the overwhelming support of the citizenry putting pressure on Washington to make the changes.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, I think we are in violent agreement - it is the will that is lacking. My point was that there is no political will to grease the wheels, tell the miscreants to shut-up-and-color, and get things done quickly. Even if Gates manages to get the Pentagon out of its DC mindset, there is the Congress and other factors that will continue to impede our ability to adjust rapidly. The political costs of going for a 75% solution are, sadly, quite high as well - look at the body armor controversy a few years ago. No one wants to vote for or award a contract on something that isn't 99% because when the shortcomings are revealed the DC blame-game will commence in earnest. I don't know, maybe I'm being too cynical, but I don't think these problems can be solved without the overwhelming support of the citizenry putting pressure on Washington to make the changes.

Agree 110%. I find the speed of development, fielding, and innovation to be the litmus for commitment to winning versus commitment to extended processes and higher costs. When folks were applauding just how great the new MRAP looked I was embarrassed that we have been so inept and angered that it cost Soldiers lives. Arrogant comments about "going to war with the Army you have" did not help; especially when we had units and Soldiers getting in hot water over aggressive logistics to keep their folks alive.

If we had done this in 1940, we'd be speaking German or maybe Japanese. Or Russian.

Tom

[jkm_101_fso]

I am not a fan of the current BCT M&TOE because it does the same thing: larger staffs and fewer shooters.

Booyah.
Exactly Right.
HHC BDE was almost as big (in numbers) as my entire BN.

[Uboat509]

Personally, I think that the fastest way to end this war would be to try to mobilize the country for war the way we did in WW II. As soon as John Q. Average started to feel the pinch he would be screaming for the war to be over and the poll driven politicians would be falling all over themselves to make it happen. As for garnering the political will out of Washington, forget it. I can't even go to political web sites anymore because rational discourse seems to dead now. Everything is partisan bickering (on both sides) now. Compromise is now considered weakness. How can you form a consensus out of that? Without something approaching a consensus how can you garner the political will necessary?

SFC W

[Cavguy]

Booyah.
Exactly Right.
HHC BDE was almost as big (in numbers) as my entire BN.

The only caveat I will add is that the larger BCT staff was in response to the additional tasks expected of a BCT - tasks that used to be the province of Corps and Brigdaes. BCT's never had to manage security force assistance cells, conduct information operations, conduct public affairs, operational-level planning, manage interagency add-ons (ePRT), conduct coordinated civil development, or build local governance.

One can argue a BCT shouldn't be doing some or all of these tasks - but the AOE MTOE was worefully inadequate to those demands, and thus required pulling lots of manpower from BN's to meet the demands for increased operations by a BCT. Now the BCT staff has those people organically since the Army envisions the BCT continuing its operational vice tactical focus.

No one is for bloated staffs, but the amount currently being required of a BCT requires a large and experienced set of operators.

[Tom Odom]

One can argue a BCT shouldn't be doing some or all of these tasks - but the AOE MTOE was worefully inadequate to those demands, and thus required pulling lots of manpower from BN's to meet the demands for increased operations by a BCT. Now the BCT staff has those people organically since the Army envisions the BCT continuing its operational vice tactical focus.

No one is for bloated staffs, but the amount currently being required of a BCT requires a large and experienced set of operators.

Getting off thread but OK. No argument on tasks or the AOE MTOE in current fight BUT the BCTs are still sucking manpower up--with a critical emphasis on experienced manpower. And we are rebuilding much of what was supposed to be replaced at the division and even corps by the more robust BCT staff. In all of this we have reduced the maneuver/shooter capacities at BN and below through end strength and again experience. Gratefully we have over the past 5 years at least won some gains in strengthening C3I capacity at the troop/company level.

Now back to the SecDef :D

I didn't see the speech as a one dimensional endorsement that Small Wars define the future. I saw it more as an endorsement that Small Wars will be part of that future and we must maintain capacity to deal with them. Interesting to see how changes wrought to force structure and capacity in this environment will adjust to MCO.

I do agree that the bureacracy is too slow inside the Beltway. It is not, as it as often said, a Cold War machine that was geared solely to a set conventional war and therefore unable to deal with a 21st Century War. It could be quite slow in the Cold War; it could also be very fast and efficient--when it needed to be. If you doubt that look at the Moon race as a Cold War non-kinetic effort involving lots of rocket fuel.

The services are not fighting a small war; the effort with regard to the size of the services makes it a large war. The rest of the government and the American public see it as a small war. I am not confident that anyone can change that without really establishing an atmosphere that accepts we all are in a large war. I am confident that no one is going to really do that in an election year.

Tom

[MSG Proctor]

Booyah.
Exactly Right.
HHC BDE was almost as big (in numbers) as my entire BN.

The reason I advocate more IBCTs is that they are cheaper than HBCTs/SBCTs and are highly effective in the type of warfare that the SECDEF refers to in the above quoted speech at the NDU.


The current modular BCT can conduct, analyze and develop its own ISR (as Cav guy points out);
The current modular BCT has the RSTA Squadron (Recon, Surveillance, Target Acquisition) which can do ISR or maneuver (best used as ISR);
The two true maneuver units (Infantry Battalions or Combined Arms battalions in the HBCT design) are augmented by a Fires Battalion that performs maneuver type operations in COIN fights;
The IBCT provides its own sustainment with the BSB/FSCs;
The effects-based operational approach to COIN based on targeting cycles and emphasizing nonlethal engagement requires a robust support staff - in COIN, the best weapons don't shoot.

[jkm_101_fso]

The only caveat I will add is that the larger BCT staff was in response to the additional tasks expected of a BCT - tasks that used to be the province of Corps and Brigdaes. BCT's never had to manage security force assistance cells, conduct information operations, conduct public affairs, operational-level planning, manage interagency add-ons (ePRT), conduct coordinated civil development, or build local governance.

One can argue a BCT shouldn't be doing some or all of these tasks - but the AOE MTOE was worefully inadequate to those demands, and thus required pulling lots of manpower from BN's to meet the demands for increased operations by a BCT. Now the BCT staff has those people organically since the Army envisions the BCT continuing its operational vice tactical focus.

No one is for bloated staffs, but the amount currently being required of a BCT requires a large and experienced set of operators.

It's easy to loathe a large staff. For that, I am intellectually lazy.

You are correct and what you said is all true. I would add that from my foxhole, I saw these staffers work on this areas specific to COIN at the BDE level, but the BNs ended up executing their specific tasks in many cases.

For example, we had a section on BDE staff (with a Major, three NCOs and two Soldiers) who had the sole mission of assessing CF/IA battle damage to civilian buildings and possessions, etc. I forgot what branch he was or what his position was called. Certainly a needed position and critical mission. Not sure it required a Major and five others with that as their sole mission.

Here's the point: when an incident occured in the BDE where the IA or CF damaged local property, said Major would just call down the battalion or MiTT responsible and tell them to take pictures, write a report and bring it to him at the FOB. From there, he would look at the pictures, read the report and make his analysis, call the BNs or MiTTs back, and tell us what to do about the situation. I would argue we probably could have cut the middle man out in this instance. If I am a commander that owns the AO, and I know what my guys did and I was there when it happened or shortly afterward, then I can probably make the decision on how to handle that. I don't need another layer of Bureacracy from BDE to help me do that, so that some Major can justify his existence. But maybe someday I'll be that Major. Then I will be a big, fat hypocrite.

I have many more examples, but they are not necessarily IRT too much staff, but that big staff certainly not going out of their way to support the BNs and MiTTs. My remaining beefs are with the Comptroller and ISF Cell. Stories for another day...

[wm]

It's easy to loathe a large staff. For that, I am intellectually lazy.


Here's the point: when an incident occured in the BDE where the IA or CF damaged local property, said Major would just call down the battalion or MiTT responsible and tell them to take pictures, write a report and bring it to him at the FOB. From there, he would look at the pictures, read the report and make his analysis, call the BNs or MiTTs back, and tell us what to do about the situation. I would argue we probably could have cut the middle man out in this instance. If I am a commander that owns the AO, and I know what my guys did and I was there when it happened or shortly afterward, then I can probably make the decision on how to handle that. I don't need another layer of Bureacracy from BDE to help me do that, so that some Major can justify his existence. But maybe someday I'll be that Major. Then I will be a big, fat hypocrite.(emphasis added by WM)


Ah Grasshopper, you learn the lessons of bureaucracy quickly

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

'Bureaucracy Does Its Thing' by Komer, which Secretary Gates refers to, is here (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R967/).

Another great point Secretary Gates made is we have to focus on the fight, while we keep an eye on the 'peer' threats, but we cannot focus on both at once. He supports that by pointing out while Russia has started flexing its muscle again, it is not nearly the threat the Soviet Union was.