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Tom Odom
01-18-2006, 04:37 PM
Moderator's Note

There is another thread 'AFRICOM and the perception mess' and this was closed 3rd November 2012:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14537 (ends)


It is about time we did this. Unified Command divisions of Africa have been a long standing cause of operational confusion. I certainly felt its effects during Op Support Hope and studied the same phenomenon in earlier Congo adventures.

Tom


Army Times
January 23, 2006
Pg. 23

Officials Look To Put Africa Under One Watchful Eye

Continent now split between two commands

By Gordon Lubold, Times staff writer

As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld considers how to reorganize the military to address global threats in coming years, defense officials are exploring the possibility of putting Africa, long split between the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, under one unified command.

Such a move has been discussed for years, but as U.S. operations evolve in the Horn of Africa, officials say the time has arrived to do something.

Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, said the area of responsibility for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, created after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, could be expanded to include all of Africa. The move could take advantage of the fact that the command structure is already in place in Djibouti, and there would be no need to create additional staffs.

“It seems to give us an opportunity,” Whelan said from her Pentagon office. “It opens a door for us potentially to look at … and work in Africa in a new and different way, and I think we ought to examine it.”

Whelan, respected in and outside the Pentagon for her experience of more than a dozen years working African issues, said the joint task force in the Horn of Africa has evolved many times since it was created and, given the situation on the ground in the region, it may be time for it to evolve some more.

Africa, an operational backwater for the U.S. since the botched operation in Somalia in 1993, is becoming increasingly relevant in the war on terrorism, officials say. Experts say that terrorist groups, squeezed out of places like Iraq and Afghanistan are moving to areas in North and West Africa and elsewhere. Many nations cannot effectively govern themselves, leaving a welcome mat for terrorist groups.

The ebird link is http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060118411954.html

Jedburgh
04-30-2006, 03:21 PM
Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB649.pdf)

Failed states offer attractive venues for terrorist groups seeking to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). State failure entails, among its other features, the disintegration and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative structure responsible for overseeing those forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation. These circumstances make identification of terrorist groups operating within failed states very difficult, and action against such groups, once identified, problematic.

Terrorist groups that are the focus of the current GWOT display the characteristics of a network organization with two very different types of cells: terrorist nodes and terrorist hubs. Terrorist nodes are small, closely knit local cells that actually commit terrorist acts in the areas in which they are active. Terrorist hubs provide ideological guidance, financial support, and access to resources enabling node attacks. An examination of three failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa—Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—reveals the presence of both types of cells and furnishes a context for assessing the threat they pose to the national interests of the United States and its partners.

Al Qaeda established terrorist hubs in Liberia and Sierra Leone to exploit the illegal diamond trade, laundering money, and building connections with organized crime and the illegal arms trade. In Somalia, Al Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al Islami established terrorist hubs that supported terrorist operations throughout East Africa. A new organization led by Aden Hashi ’Ayro recruited terrorist nodes that executed a series of attacks on Western nongovernment organization (NGO) employees and journalists within Somalia.

Analysis of these groups suggests that while the terrorist nodes in failed states pose little threat to the interests of the United States or its GWOT partners, terrorist hubs operating in the same states may be highly dangerous. The hubs observed in these three failed states were able to operate without attracting the attention or effective sanction of the United States or its allies. They funneled substantial financial resources, as well as sophisticated weaponry, to terrorist nodes operating outside the failed states in which the hubs were located. The threat posed by these hubs to U.S. national interests and to the interests of its partners is significant, and is made much more immediate by the growing risk that nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will fall into terrorist hands.

SWJED
08-08-2006, 03:37 PM
6 August Fayetteville (NC) Observer - Bureaucracy, Turf Battles Slow Progress (http://www.fayettevillenc.com/article?id=239120) by Kevin Maurer.


Senior special operations officers believe that the creation of an African Command would alleviate the cumbersome bureaucracy that is slowing progress on the Horn of Africa.

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa was created in 2002 to stop the influence of radical Islamists coming over the border from Somalia. The task force oversees an area roughly a third of the size of the continental United States and has or had forces working in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula.

But much of the Horn of Africa task force’s time is taken up by turf battles with the embassy, host nations and regional commands...

The creation of an Africa Command would allow one unit to set U.S. military policy for the region and create a cadre of planners who understand the region and have relationships with the host nations and embassies.

Africa is divided among three regional combatant commands.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees the Middle East, owns the Horn of Africa and Yemen. European Command controls sub-Saharan Africa, and Pacific Command controls all of the islands in the Indian Ocean...

Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, said an Africa Command would have some advantages.

Under a regional command structure, the staff would serve longer tours and “institutional” relationships between the command and the host nations and embassies would be created, Whelan said.

Unlike deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan where staff officers deploy in one unit, individual soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deploy to the Horn of Africa staff for tours of six months to one year.

“This is where people come to check off their war on terror box,” said a senior noncommissioned officer.

Most of the officers are not trained in aid missions, and they are not around long enough to see projects and programs from start to finish.

“There is a learning curve with the staffs that go out to these missions,” Whelan said.

She said many officers have to learn new regulations and missions since most are military officers trained primarily for combat.

“It is a whole new and different world. If you are brand new to all of that, you have a little ramp-up time. That can complicate things,” she said.

Rear Adm. Richard Hunt, the commander of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, told civil affairs teams in a meeting in July that they will have to win the “hearts and minds” of the embassies first...

Uboat509
08-08-2006, 08:23 PM
This will be interesting, I think. I doubt that CENTCOM will miss the HOA nor do I think that PACOM wants any part of Africa that they don't have to take. Both of those commands have plenty happening in their AORs to say the least but EUCOM is in a different situation. On the one hand, since the end of the cold war there just isn't a hell of a lot happening in Europe but on the other hand Africa is no dream AOR either. It lacks the resources and infrastructure that have allowed radical Islam to become so powerful in in the middle east and the character of Islam is different in much of Africa. I'm guessing that any command that takes over Africa is going to get last bite at the funding cake and what money they do get will be largely devoted to HA projects and training indig militaries. Not exactly anyone's dream assignment.

SFC W

Tom Odom
08-09-2006, 02:00 PM
The Unified Command splits on Africa go back to the day when USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA (the CENTCOM grandaddy) covered the AO. The 3-way split today (as it was in my day) divides the area, disrupts command, and diverts funds. Commands are typically loath to give up portions of their AOs regardless of interest because the size of the AO drives allocation of funds.

As for C2 it really gets interesting in the case of ops like Support Hope where USEUCOM and USCENTCOM controlled portions of the pie--coupled with the issues of working with USTRANSCOM as the supporting command. All of this then works to confuse ops when overlayed against other agency divisions along geographic lines, especially State and AID, with individual country missions underneath.

As for radical Islam in Africa, the proverbial fat lady has not yet taken the stage. The vast wealth that certain regions on the continent hold have been masked somewhat by the overlay of war, corruption, and crippling poverty. In particular Nigeria with its oil and the Congo with its minerals are relevant examples. Islam is making greater inroads overtime; Somalia is a relevant case. Lebanese connections throughout Africa are strong, especially in the Congo and its diamond/gold sector.

My take on the idea of a command for Africa is that it would be good for no other reason that it would retain the funding allocated to it rather than have it shifted to other priorities within a larger, broader command.

best
Tom

SWJED
08-25-2006, 12:12 PM
24 August Time Magazine - The Pentagon Plans for an African Command (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1328840,00.html) by Sally Donnelly.


In what may be the most glaring admission that the U.S. military needs to dramatically readjust how it will fight what it calls 'the long war,' the Pentagon is expected to announce soon that it will create an entirely new military command to focus on the globe's most neglected region: Africa.

Pentagon sources say that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is close to approving plans for an African Command, which would establish a military organization to singlehandedly deal with the entire continent of Africa. It would be a sign of a significant strategic shift in Administration policy, reflecting the need to put more emphasis on proactive, preventative measures rather than maintaining a defensive posture designed for the Cold War...

A defense source says the new command, which is part of Rumsfeld's ongoing worldwide reassessment of the military's division of labor, may be headed by Gen. William "Kip" Ward, a respected officer who is the Army's only four-star African-American general. Ward has boots-on-the-ground experience in Africa: he was a commander during the U.S.'s ill-fated mission in Somalia in 1993 and also served as a military representative in Egypt in 1998. Ward is currently the deputy commander at European Command, and as such oversees U.S. military relations with 43 African countries.

But a former military officer who thinks highly of Ward nonetheless says creating an entirely new command compounds an existing problem. "The size and number of headquarters already is skewed too far in favor of 'tail' at the expense of warfighting 'teeth.' Want to increase 'boots on the ground?' Eliminate or downsize some of these staffs, don't create more," says this observer.

Many military experts have long advocated paying more attention to Africa. While Central Command has had a small military contingent based in Djibouti (called Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa or 'CJTF-HOA') for several years, intelligence agencies and military officers have warned that the US should be spending more time and money in Africa....

Bill Moore
08-26-2006, 05:14 AM
I'm still sitting on the fence on this one. Another HQs, another requirement for personnel and money in a period where both of these resources are harder to come by. On the other hand, Africa in my opinion is a strategic region for the GWOT, and although many recognize that missions in Africa are still sorely underfunded, so a HQs dedicated to Africa with its own pot of money, and furthermore a core of key staff officers that eventually become somewhat expert on Africa's various cultures should help us facilitate our national security objectives there. One could argue using that logic that we need equivalent commands for SE Asia and South Asia, but obviously that is beyond our resourcing ability. I would think another option would be to form a temporary Africa Command with a mandate for 10 years, with the charter to form something along the lines of NATO. This is is a long bridge, but perhaps not one too far, they already have ECOWAS and AO and other regional groups. Admittedly they lack consensus, funding, and capacity, but we could develop that over time, especially with some assistance by partner nations like Canada and Australia. I'm not anti-French, but the fact is their colonial legacy and even recent behavior in the region makes them undesirable in my book. 10 years may not be enough, but at time our government could determine if it was in our interest to extend their mandate. Off the cuff thoughts, but I think something along those lines facilitates a partial exit plan and a much more stable and productive Africa.

SWJED
08-26-2006, 08:32 PM
My Prediction on Africa Command Coming True a Bit Faster than I Expected (http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002849.html) - Thomas P.M. Barnett Weblog

Africa: Africa Command Not European Command, Says Official (http://allafrica.com/stories/200405041070.html) - AllAfrica.com

---

On edit - here is another related link - Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA) (http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/). This is the official US Central Command page for CJTF HOA.

SWJED
08-26-2006, 08:41 PM
African Command: The Newest Combatant Command (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display-papers.cfm?q=252&title=African%20Command%3A%20The%20Newest%20Combat ant%20Command) by Lieutenant Colonel Paul P. Cale, US Army. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 2005.


African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of "seams" between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM's focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM's focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent...

SWJED
08-26-2006, 08:54 PM
A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/00winter/catoire.htm) - Commander Richard G. Catoire, US Navy. Parameters article, Winter 2000-01.


... To date, US foreign policy for Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has been reactive rather than proactive--generally driven by events rather than shaping events. Because of this tentative approach to the region, African problems have obliged the US military to undertake a continuing series of contingency operations, and the prospect for future interventions is high. If any region of the world warrants the kind of "shaping" now prescribed by US strategic doctrine, surely that region is Africa.

While US security interests in Africa are minimal and economic interests are currently limited (excepting the importation of oil and strategic minerals), the developed world does not ignore humanitarian tragedy. With its prominent position in the post-Cold War world, the United States will at times accede to international pressures to take the lead in addressing the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. For the immediate future, such initiatives will require the capacity to intervene militarily when appropriate. US reluctance to accept this responsibility would undermine important international relationships and ultimately could require a far greater commitment and involvement of resources when events finally force the US hand.

It is in the best interests of the United States to stay actively involved in the region to ensure that strategic objectives are accomplished and that diplomatic and political goals are achieved. The Department of Defense already plays some role in US efforts in Africa to promote democratization, to increase respect for human rights, to promote conflict resolution, and to generate economic prosperity. Those efforts could be more effectively managed by structural change within the Unified Command Plan.

If any region of the world warrants careful US attention to potential coalitions to alleviate greater reliance on US resources, surely that region is Africa. This is a key unified command role which can best be accomplished by creating a unified or sub-unified command exclusively for Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantages of creating "an area-oriented senior US military command," even if it is only an "economy of force" command headquartered in the United States, would far outweigh any perceived disadvantages...

SWJED
08-30-2006, 12:29 PM
29 August Marine Corps Times - DoD mulls proposed ‘Africa Command’ (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2067888.php) by Gordon Lubold.


... The proposed command, aptly called “Africa Command,” would include most of Africa, but would leave countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti to fall under the U.S. Central Command umbrella. Africa is currently divvied up between Central Command and U.S. European Command. Defense officials and observers have long considered the value of adding a new combatant command to the Pentagon’s list of five, but the issue has yet to take hold.

Now, however, it appears the Pentagon is making headway. The plan would require redrawing the lines of the Unified Command Plan, or UCP, which delineates U.S. Northern, Southern, Central, European and Pacific commands. Now add to that the possibility that there would be an “AfCom.

The outlines of a command for Africa appeared on a PowerPoint slide handed out at a briefing in the Pentagon on Tuesday. That briefing, about a major reorganization of the Pentagon’s policy branch, included a slide of a UCP Model that included the command, shown in orange. The map shows that several countries in eastern Africa would remain with Central Command, effectively creating the new command with all of what now belongs to European Command in Africa.

The briefing was led by Eric S. Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy. Edelman is leading an effort to make his branch better reflect the way other government agencies are organized for global operations. The Pentagon’s policy branch will reorganize in a number of ways, but also restructure the way its offices are organized for dealing with operations around the world. The slide with the map of Africa Command appeared by way of explaining how the building’s new policy areas would better mirror the way other U.S. agencies organize themselves across the world...

SWJED
08-30-2006, 10:09 PM
30 August Reuters - U.S. Considers New Military Command for Africa (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/30/AR2006083002733.html) by Will Dunham.


... With several war-ravaged regions and great expanses of ungoverned territory, Africa presents optimal conditions for extremists aiming to secure a foothold, many experts contend.

"There is certainly an increasing awareness of the strategic importance of Africa," said U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter, a Pentagon spokesman, "because in the post 9/11 world we have a much better appreciation for (threats emerging from) ungoverned territories."

The Horn of Africa region is of particular concern for U.S. counterterrorism officials. The State Department says Somalia and the sparsely populated Trans-Sahara region, especially Mali and Mauritania, offer safe haven for militants.

Al Qaeda, responsible for the 2001 attacks on the United States, is thought to have a presence in eastern and northern Africa, and Islamic fundamentalism appears to be increasing in some parts of the continent.

The State Department says a small number of al Qaeda operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continue to pose the most serious threat to U.S. interests in the region.

Although it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups are present in western and central Africa, the department has said fund-raising, recruiting and other efforts by al Qaeda and its affiliates in South Africa, Nigeria and across the Trans-Sahara region remain a serious worry.

Carpenter said populations in certain parts of Africa are vulnerable to extremists due to ideology, poverty and disease.

"Many of the militaries in Africa desire to have interaction with the U.S. so that we can help to improve their capabilities, to defend their borders, to prevent the transit of terrorists, to be able to realize their economic potential," Carpenter added.

A U.S. military task force in the Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, has about 1,800 troops. Its mission is "preventive in nature," Carpenter said. The task force aims to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups in the region, denying them safe haven and outside support, officials said.

Officials offered no timetable for a decision on an Africa Command and said no decisions have been made on where it would be headquartered or how many troops would be devoted.

"The intent of (creating an Africa Command) is not to put troops in Africa. It would be to streamline the focus and give appropriate undivided attention to the continent," a Pentagon official said.

SWJED
09-14-2006, 11:14 PM
14 September Reuters - Africa Key to Pentagon Counterterrorism Strategy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091400387.html) by David Morgan.


Nearly five years after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Africa has emerged as a leading front in a U.S. military campaign to deny al Qaeda a new safe haven in the continent's vast, hard-to-govern regions.

Small groups of special forces, known as A-teams and often numbering less than a dozen soldiers, have begun traversing the hinterlands of more than a dozen countries in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Sahara regions.

Pentagon officials say the main aim is to help African governments from Sudan to Senegal and Nigeria train and equip local troops to combat Islamist militants in swathes of open country, already known as havens for smugglers and bandits.

Meanwhile, even smaller units of U.S. civil affairs troops have traveled to remote villages to dispense medical care, dig wells and build schools, hoping to make militancy less attractive...

SWJED
09-22-2006, 09:36 PM
21 September Reuters - Rumsfeld Favors U.S. Military Command for Africa (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/22/AR2006092200965.html) by Will Dunham.


Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said on Friday he favors creating a new U.S. military command responsible for Africa, as the Pentagon aims to guard against potential threats to U.S. security arising from the continent.

Rumsfeld said he and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have pressed the military for six months for a proposal on setting up a command focused solely on Africa. Pace said Rumsfeld is due to receive a formal recommendation within a couple weeks...

SWJED
11-14-2006, 12:16 AM
14 November Christian Science Monitor commentary - Pentagon Imperative: A Spotlight on Africa (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1114/p09s02-coop.html) by Rep. Ed Royce (R), California.


Moving away from a strategic posture that has placed Africa on the bottom rung of priorities, the Pentagon is "fast tracking" the creation of a regional command dedicated exclusively to the continent, likely to be tagged "Africa Command."

This is a big step for the US military, which has long held this troubled continent at arm's length. While an Africa Command is overdue, it must be pursued with care and caution.

Africa's growing strategic importance is clear. Within a decade, 25 percent of US oil imports will come from Africa, mainly from Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola. Several African countries are potential terrorist havens or targets, as demonstrated by the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Radical Islam is spreading in Africa, in part due to the efforts of Sudan, a state sponsor of terrorism. Somalia is also under the sway of Islamist extremists.

The US military has intervened in Africa more than 20 times in the past 15 years, including in Liberia in 2003, when it helped end a brutal factional war. Today the US is providing airlift and other aid to African peacekeepers in Sudan's Darfur region. The need for such operations will continue.

Meanwhile, China is rapidly laying down stakes in Africa. China's commerce is mushrooming throughout Africa, and it is seeking to secure Africa's natural resources and markets. China is second only to the US as an importer of African oil. African governments generally favor China for its dogmatic opposition to external "interference" in their affairs. Closer US-Africa military cooperation, spurred by an Africa Command, would help offset this bias. Why concede Africa to Beijing, which undermines democracy, human rights, and transparency?

The Pentagon currently splits Africa among three regional commands: European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. European Command's responsibility for 45 African countries reflects colonial and cold war legacies. The Pentagon's Unified Command Plan, which establishes areas of responsibility, has been revised 20 times since 1946. Another change is overdue.

The core function of a combatant command is to plan for military contingencies in the region. Yet Central Command has its hands full fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - and watching Iran. While the European Command has been increasing its African activities, its key focus has followed the eastward expansion of NATO. The Pacific Command, meanwhile, is headquartered more than 10,000 miles from Madagascar. These commands are challenged to closely monitor Africa's troubled states and vast ungoverned areas.

A command dedicated to Africa would improve US intelligence in the region, which withered after the cold war and is now desperately needed. It would also enhance planning for future US involvement in Africa and would probably decrease associated costs...

Properly designed, a dedicated military command would give US ambassadors in Africa added leverage, not a bureaucratic competitor. The State Department, though generally lacking the military's can-do spirit, must remain the lead policymaker. The Pentagon's forte isn't human rights, democracy-building, and similar concerns. An Africa Command should keep a small footprint, much like the current Southern Command for South America. Another caveat: improved capacity to work with African nations in a crisis should not predestine an American intervention...

SWJED
12-06-2006, 08:49 PM
6 December AFPS - Officials Weigh Need for Africa Command (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2327) by Jim Garamone. Posted in full per DoD guidelines.


Defense Department officials continue to examine the idea of establishing a U.S. Africa Command, a top DoD official said here this week.

A team of DoD officials is looking at all options in examining the need for a new combatant command, Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, said in an interview.

Responsibility for U.S. military operations in Africa is currently divided among three combatant commands. The area from Kenya to Egypt is part of U.S. Central Command. The rest of the continent falls under the auspices of U.S. European Command. The eastern island nations are in U.S. Pacific Command’s area of operations.

“We are looking at different ways of organizing DoD for doing business in Africa,” Whelan said. “The different circumstances and threats have caused us to take a step back and look at the way we’re doing business.”

There is no set date for a decision on establishing a new command or finding another means for handling operations in Africa, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said today. Officials are working to decide on the best course of action: to stick with the status quo, to establish a subordinate command, or to stand up a full out combatant command, on par with European Command and Central Command.

The group will make its recommendations through the Joint Chiefs of Staff before presenting them to the chairman and the secretary for a decision.

Whelan said the security environment in Africa has changed fundamentally in the last decade. “You have a situation where the threats are not confined to state actors or geographically confined,” she said. “You don’t have to look to a state that has a large military to find an entity that can threaten U.S. security in a serious way.”

She said the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, brought that home in a very stark and tragic manner. “Africa is an environment that has the potential to be used by these non-state actors to achieve or at least move closer to their ends,” she said.

Africa has seen its own attacks. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, killing hundreds of innocent people, most of them local citizens. Other terrorist organizations have been regionally focused in the past, but now are expanding their interests and jumping on the al Qaeda bandwagon, Whelan said.

The United States military always has paid attention to the continent. In the past, the U.S. military has had bases in Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia and Morocco.

Poor governance, wars and population pressures are some of the human-caused problems on the continent, but natural threats need to be dealt with as well, Whelan said. “There are clearly challenges in terms of disease -- AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis -– are major threats,” she said. “Your issue is you have these major demographic changes caused by disease and the untimely death of the working-age population. The African population in many countries is now very young or very old, Whelan said.

A U.S. Africa Command would work at “preventing problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes,” Whelan said. “Instead of the United States being reactive, … we want to be more proactive in promoting security, to build African capacity to build their own environments and not be subject to the instability that has toppled governments and caused so much pain on the continent.”

She likened it to a fire department. Instead of waiting until a fire breaks out, U.S. Africa Command would be like firefighters who work with the community to promote fire safety or help businesses install sprinklers. “It may prevent a fire or lessen the magnitude of damage,” she said.

If officials decide to go ahead with a U.S. Africa Command, “you would clearly want to have it based on that continent.” But, she said, there are a lot of ways to “skin that cat.”

The command may have its main headquarters in the United States, but forward operating bases in Africa.

The command would not necessarily have a large number of people. The needs are so great in Africa that a little can go a long way, she said. The command would coordinate training teams, advisory teams, civil affairs teams, medical and veterinary aid to the continent. It would also help interface with other government agencies and non-governmental aid groups in efforts on the continent.

In short, it would not look like other U.S. combatant commands. “Africa Command will not be a cookie-cutter organization,” Whelan said. “If we go this way, it will be something different.”

Uboat509
12-07-2006, 03:54 AM
I am still not sold on the need for an Africa Command. The proponents like to point out that AQ is moving into Africa but it is not that simple. The character of Islam in Africa is different than in the ME. Even when AQ does get in it is a different and more complex relationship. Furthermore I just don't think that we can do a lot to save Africa from itself. It is one thing to save one corrupt/inept crushingly poor country but this is a whole continent of them. Certainly we need to maintain a presence there but I just don't think it needs as much focus as other areas where we are engaged. That being said I can certainly see placing all of Africa under EUCOM. Since the fall of the USSR EUCOM hasn't been doing much other than pining after GWOT budget and OER bullets ;) and screwing over 1/10 SF. I can honestly see no reason not to give it to them. They are already focused on it anyway.

SFC W

Bill Moore
12-09-2006, 09:55 PM
First, I think it is undeniable that AQ is pushing into Africa (nor is this a new development). The character of Islam varies in every region of the world just as the character of communism varied throughout the world, but regardless there are several Islamic extremists throughout Africa, especially in the North, but also in Northern Nigeria where they are enforcing a form of Sharia law. How can anyone deny the radical threat from Tunisa, Algeria, and Morocco to Europe? Additionally a great number (if not the majority) of foreign fighters going to Iraq to fight our coalition are from various parts of Africa (both the Horn and EUCOM's area).

Second, the next "major" war could be very well be over natural resources ranging from water to uranium to various metals to fossel fuels. Africa will be play a role, a role that China already foresees. China is investing heavily in Africa to gain influence, and they probably have a more realistic strategic outlook than we do in Africa (while we have the most talented strategic thinkers in the world, their influence is muted by our election cycles, it is hard to explain how important Africa "might" be our economy 20 years from now, when many voters can't afford health insurance today).

Third, the war against AQ is a war of ideas, if we're not there to show another way of life, we're handing a "future" bread basket to AQ. Yes, much of African now a basket case, but the potential there is limitless. As we all know Africa consists of several different nations, and several of them are developed and others are developing successfully. Africa is not a continent without hope, and I believe I'm being a realist when I state that.

The bottomline is that Africa is important now and will gain in importance in the out years. Does that mean we need a separate command? While I think a command solely focused on Africa with its own pots of money (that won't get diverted to Eastern Europe, Russia, etc.) is definitely a step in the right direction, I do have concerns on who the bill payers will be. That is a lot of senior officers, contractors, and enlisted personnel. It will become another regional command competing for money and forces in a time where both are getting harder to come by.

I don't necessarily think we should bite off on this unilaterally, but perhaps look at forming something along the lines of a NATO south like entity (Europe should be an equal bill payer for forces and dollars with the exception of France which continues to cause harm and resentment throughout much of Africa). This organization should incorporate the numerous African Regional organizations, with a focus on enabling them. This has been one of our strategies for some time (it isn't something I invented), but it has been grossly underresourced, and not popular enough politically in the U.S. or Europe to get the resources needed. Of course in the meantime China continues to increase its influence in the region. I'm not looking at China as an enemy, but as a serious economic competitor. If we don't have the political will, then we shouldn't waste our resources trying, but I hope we're not asleep at the wheel.

Jedburgh
01-10-2007, 01:31 PM
The current issue of Strategic Insights, from NPS's Center for Contemporary Conflict (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/index.asp):

Jan 07 special issue focused on Africa’s Security Challenges and Rising Strategic Significance (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/#current); includes the article Africa Command: Forecast for the Future (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/sieberJan07.pdf)

sgmgrumpy
01-11-2007, 04:03 PM
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/97winter/henk.htm


The novelty of the post-Cold War strategic environment is reflected in the changing jargon of American military professionals. "Humanitarian assistance" and "peace operations" were hardly key concerns of the national military establishment in the mid-1980s, though they have become prominent a decade later. Since the early 1990s, US professional military literature has been increasingly preoccupied, some would say obsessed, with discussions of what are identified as unprecedented roles for the national military establishment.

Interventions with military forces often figure in discussions of US involvement in Africa; indeed, in the 1990s no part of the world has seen a greater number of such interventions than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian relief operations, and peace support interventions tend to obscure the more enduring and more significant diplomatic and economic links between the United States and African countries. They also obscure routine military-to-military relations in the region, which have expanded in the wake of the Cold War.

The United States conducts military operations in Africa, just as it exercises diplomacy and provides aid, to further US regional objectives. The demise of the Cold War had an obvious effect on US objectives in Africa, and while each US administration is expected to put its own imprint on the nation's foreign policy, some American activities reflect enduring interests. This article identifies a set of desirable conditions that appear to have become de facto US national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Eddie Beaver
01-11-2007, 06:35 PM
I explained my opposition to this in more detail on my blog earlier. (http://hiddenunities.wordpress.com/2007/01/04/doing-wrong-by-doing-right/)

Essentially, the US needs to do a lot more on non-military fronts before they set an Africa Command up for failure.

A secondary point; an Africa command should be considered a test lab for tactics, organization and strategy. Why do we need to have a huge typical command structure? Such a command could be heavily focused on a small number of key personnel who help train African militaries in peacekeeping and stablization operations, develop important relations with governments, NGO's & civic organizations to counter AIDS, rampant crime and terrorism and place a heavy emphasis on developing the capabilities of police and auxilary forces to deal with natural disasters, disease epidemics, refugee crises and urban disorder. Why not focus on light infantry training (i.e. what H. John Poole advocates in "Terrorist Trails")?

If this command is focused on counterterrorism, it will be a tragic missed opportunity.

Tom Odom
01-11-2007, 07:02 PM
Eddie,

I know you have read my book and my comments on support to Mobutu. I agree with your concerns and you state them well.

I would also say, however, that barring establishing an Africa Command, the continent will be what it has been to date, a European Command or Central Command after thought--until something like Rwanda or Sudan gets those commands' attention.

JTFHOA has a broad program and I am encouraged by it. I would--like you--prefer to see much greater emphasis on AIDS as a security issue. But again without that critical unified command with its budget and focus such efforts are very likely to get the chop.

Again great post on your blog!

Best

Tom

Stan
01-11-2007, 07:39 PM
So well put, and by no means an easy task. Just ask Tom.

These days, if and when HA funds manage around a continuing resolusion, the fish bowl we know as the country team and eventually an assignments officer (typically the most junior and the least knowlegeable member in country with an already full plate) will or should begin a precious cycle of events that were originally intended to help the host nation. Basically, hopeless and a ton of paper. When the State dude does show, you better have one hell of a good presentation coupled with fresh bodies, mines, and whatever you can come up with for dinner, cause he's staying for that too !

That was the easy part.

The idea of an African Command leaves me wondering what kind of experience these good folks are coming with. Language and customs will not be nearly enough. Most have never tasted the games of DOS. Foggy Bottom produces some of the strangest members I have ever had the pleasure of dealing with.

We sat in one of the most inhospitable places in the world, and although the JTF had some fine soldiers along, things still went tango sierra in less than 45 days. With all that sierra going on, nobody in K/town was home. Tom had assembled a team that could get along in almost any situation, including Goma. By no means a small task. Mind you, these were senior NCOs and Officers with years and years of experience.

To now assemble a team of African Specialists and simply leave them to the dogs of the country team before they even get started, will be a fate far worse than Goma, Zäire.

I wish them the best of luck !
Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
01-11-2007, 07:53 PM
Or them like us, to complete the toast, my friend.

Hopefully an Africa command would build over time--just like any unified command and take advantage of those who have been on the ground in manning.

Remember, Stan, that guys like COL Fields and LTC Ball in 1993 and 1994 were allowing DHS to close African stations without comment. DHS closed the African Bureau and consolidated it with the Middle East Bureau. Fields wanted to close us; I saw MG Leide in Pretoria in Nov 93 and convinced him to keep us open. And then the fight to stand up a station in Rwanda took me 18 months to win--and cost me any chance of getting anything but another "prize" assignment, regardless of how much Jim Clapper, Jack Liede, or Pat Huges liked me. Those are the kind of guys (Ball and Fields) an African Command does not need.

Manned correctly, a dedicated command would do much to make courtship of the country teams an easier romance. For one thing, it would serve as a counterpart to State's African Bureau as well as Langley--and you know how much I love Langley.

Best regards my friend,

Tom

PS Your hardcopy book went in the mail today

Eddie Beaver
01-11-2007, 08:07 PM
Tom,

Agreed on Africa being an afterthought without the creation of an Africa command.

Perhaps a streamlined version of JTF-HOA could establish some semblance of progress in key countries and trouble spots.

Do you think it is realistic for us to pursue a stronger strategic and mil to mil relationship with South Africa, i.e. perhaps even establishing Africa Command on the ground there? I don't think Nigeria is the better option, especially with the intensity of their current and brewing crises.

(thank you for reading my blog post, I hope to write with more clarity and understanding in both the near future with more study of the subjects involved and in the mid-future (early next year) with some travels on the ground).

Stan,
Always good to have the voice of reason and experience added to Pentagon dreaming. You ask a very critical question that begs serious concern, not only for your reasons but for the wrong kinds of attitudes people could bring (an obsession with force protection to the point of rendering goals unattainable) and a question of quality personnel in case Africa command is inevitably treated as the red headed step child of priorities in a strategic landscape dominated by contractor-driven China fear and Middle East instability.

Stan
01-11-2007, 08:12 PM
Remember Ambassador Wells ? She could have been a Sergeant Major with diplomatic skills !!!

She not only was one hell of a lady, she also knew how to run the shop and could quickly identify people accomplishing their missions even in the sight of death. She later came to Estonia shortly after my retirement.

Although the Flags of the DHS were indeed tending to their own agendas (I hated what they were doing to you and, as an E7 other than my abilities and experience, had little to offer you), I still believe that if the Ambo is professional as was Mellisa (sp?) and able to recognize who was pulling their load, and keep the other bone-heads in check (that she did well) our bung hole in Goma would have been far easier to cope with and we probably would have had immediate help.

I think you told me on several occasions, that our ordeal in Goma would be settled or handled inside the Beltway. How correct you were. Goma simply provided the excitement and tourists.

I would then have to conclude that Flags will once again provide that fatal penstroke and fate of some fellow NCOs and Officers.

Thanks in advance for the Xmas gift ! I am pondering over yours.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
01-11-2007, 08:33 PM
Wells I never met. I remember you speaking of her wisfully everytime you had to deal with the Charge or his Deputy.

But Dave Rawson in Rwanda followed by Bob Gribbin were completely different than the clutch of village idiots we faced in K Town. Just as the RPA impressed us both when we crossed the border, so Rawson (and later Gribbin) impressed me. It was almost like the "diplomats" in K-Town were mimicking the FAZ while we operated like the RPA in Kigali.

I remember blowing my stack one day in Goma because the Deputy accosted me and complained that General Nix and I were not keeping him informed of what we were doing. He in his very best British accent* proclaimed, "Tom, I am a 3 Star equivalent!"

I was tired and you were not there to drag me away. I told him, "You are a 3 Star Asshole!" and then followed with as polite an explanation as I could muster that the General and I were busy doing things like bringing in aircraft and God knows what else. He was so shocked by my initial burst that he actually listened and nodded his head at everything else I had to say. But he did leave the next day:D

It all goes back to leadership--if the leaders are self-interested prima donnas, the rest of the mission will tend to follow in their paths.
Best

Tom

*the gentleman in question was from Oklahoma

Stan
01-11-2007, 08:35 PM
Thanks Eddie !
I enjoyed the refreshing opinion you have RE AFRICOM. Even as late as 84, the NGOs and CDC were buried in AIDS. We at least thought that "somebody's doing something" even though the task was far beyond reality and any funding.

I think (you know what they say about opinions and A holes) Pretoria is probably too far away from Central Africa, but from an NCOs point of view, would have to say it's at least stable enough for your team to come back to and relax. That, or burn out. Tom knows what that does....he watched me progress to that point with no way out. Sounds kinda dumb, but little details seem to be often overlooked on the beltway. Even in 85 we carried 2 passports. One with a South African visa and the other with whatever.

Medical and R&R required a South African visa.

I think that holds true to this day in that neck of the woods.

Regards, Stan

Stan
01-11-2007, 09:01 PM
Tom,
I would only later read about you and Rawson. I wondered, should I contact Tom, see what the F is going on there ? My DATT, a Navy 05 told me Rawson was not one to leave things idle and watch, rather get the troops in the mud. Hence all the press in DC.

Likewise, I said to the Commander, if the Colonel is still there, the troops are already in the mud !

I think we cooked this thread !
Regards, Stan

Eddie Beaver
01-11-2007, 09:35 PM
Is the US relationship with Rwanda stable and viable enough then for some form of proposed AFRICOM detachment there? I have heard a lot of promising things about their performance in Dar Fur....

Understood about the distance with South Africa, but one wonders about a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe... which I suppose the South Africans may want to handle much as they did Mozambique in the 90's....

Stan
01-11-2007, 10:49 PM
Eddie,
Back when I was handling the SAO training for Rwanda, we were gold. We were the candy men, bringing in our resources and (ahem) advice.
Rwanda was peaceful on the outside and we had no clue what was brewing inside.

I would think we still have a place there, but I am by no means an expert. I simply try to get along with people, even if I can't stand them. I have no idea how I do that.

These folks were professionals and expected the same from us. Perhaps why we were always welcome. Even the Zamish Chief remembered to bring beef jerky to the Rwandan Military Commander. Relatively small and a cheap jesture, but it worked. I think that would hold true today, but I have no desire to return and see if my assumptions are correct, even with beef jerky !

All of this BS aside, you're on the right track. Relatively close, air and sea ports and hopefully a friendly reception. Travel from there is a tad harder, but you would now be central and have a few exit strategies in hand.

Going to bed, too late to type !
Regards, Stan

marct
01-12-2007, 02:20 AM
Hi Eddie,

Really great blog post, although I think you might be being a touch too cynical in point two <wry grin>. Sure, the US has had a disastrous history in Africa but, as Tom noted, this might well be countered by the creation of an Africa Command. Personally, I think that anew command might be a good institutional starting point for creating integrated military and non-military teams (i.e getting some non-state actors in on our side). I would also view it as a chance to allow US allies (like us guys up here in de frozen North!) to get some decent logistical support and, if necessary, backup.

Marc

Eddie Beaver
01-13-2007, 05:01 AM
Marct,

I agree now that the formation of an Africa Command would be a positive step, but I just see the utter lack of comprehension of Africa at the higher levels in government.

Obviously, there are a great number of talented, devoted and highly capable diplomats, soldiers and other members of the US and Allied governments who have a good handle on Africa and understand many of the complex dangers, trends and opportunities there. Their efforts and talents are regressed though when they're being undercut by strategic neglect from above.

Cynical? Maybe, probably. Viewing the stupidity of this administration over Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe just makes me look at the past with less of a dumbfounded expression and more of an understanding of why we continue to make bad calls.

You are exceptionally right in we could and should do a lot more to offer support and work together in joint endeavors as allies and friends in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean political and cultural spheres and on the continent itself.

Tom Odom
01-13-2007, 05:18 PM
Is the US relationship with Rwanda stable and viable enough then for some form of proposed AFRICOM detachment there? I have heard a lot of promising things about their performance in Dar Fur....

Understood about the distance with South Africa, but one wonders about a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe... which I suppose the South Africans may want to handle much as they did Mozambique in the 90's....


Eddie,

I can only relate what had happened there while I was on the ground and what happened in the immediate aftermath. I would also recommend you look at Bob Gribbin's book on Rwanda--he was my 2nd Ambassador and worked with my replacement, then MAJ Rick Orth, a superb officer and now I happy to say a full Colonel who has 3 DATT tours under his belt. Rick has published some papers on Rwanda that you can find via Google.

I do know that we have been planning the Darfur deployment with the Rwandans; I say that because there was an MPRI advertisement four an MDMP instructor to go to Kigali. Frankly I that is much like shipping coal to West Virginia: the Rwandans can plan and execute quite well, thank you very much. At times I despair over our inescapable arrogance when it comes to that sort of thing, as if we are the experts on planning...

What they would really need would be coaching on how to integrate operations with us and international organizations.

best

Tom

jcustis
01-27-2007, 09:04 PM
Caught this snippet over at Lightfighter.net:


Pentagon’s African Command: Will It Float?

By Sandra I. Erwin and Grace V. Jean

While Pentagon officials fine-tune plans to create a new military command to oversee Africa, Navy leaders are floating a proposal to base that command’s headquarters on a ship at sea.

Supporters contend that a Navy ship offers extra security and flexibility to move around as crises erupt. The high-tech vessel envisioned for this role also would be uniquely equipped to handle all forms of top-secret communications and command-and-control functions, says Rear Adm. Barry J. McCullough III, director of Navy surface warfare.

For many years, the Navy has wavered on the idea of building a state-of-the-art “joint command-and-control ship,” and the project in recent years lost momentum as the Navy struggled to fund other ships. But the African Command would be a reason to resurrect a joint command-and-control ship, McCullough says. “Everyone knows we are going to stand up AFRICOM … But where are we going to headquarter that command?” An “afloat command” is one option being mulled over, he says. “You have to have something to put the commanders and staff on with the right C4ISR to execute the mission.”

If not aboard ship ("standby for heavy rolls"), where might an AFRICOM set down stakes. CONUS? Egypt or Djibouti?

If I ever had to suck down a joint tour, I could see myself doing it at a new command such as this.

Eddie Beaver
01-31-2007, 03:09 PM
A mobile command like this wouldn't be a bad idea. Maybe take an older aircraft carrier like my last ship due for decommissioning in 2008 (the Kitty Hawk) and utilize it like we did during OEF or how my new ship (the Abe Lincoln) was utilized for the tsunami relief campaign.

120mm
01-31-2007, 04:05 PM
As I also posted over at Lightfighter, I know a Naval Architect in Gloucester, who has been advocating such a ship for a couple of decades, now. His design would be completely self-sufficient, to include recreation and school facilities for dependents.

For those interested, his name is Philip C. Bolger, and his design is largely sail powered, as mobility would be secondary to station-keeping. Of course, a nuke plant would keep it at sea indefinitely.

A very interesting idea; also was broached by Popular Science a couple of years ago.

pcmfr
01-31-2007, 07:26 PM
My understanding is that AFRICOM HQ will remain in Stuttgart. I think a command ship is a bad idea for a number of reasons. First, nobody really wants to "live" full time on a ship for a 2 or 3 year staff tour. Dependents at sea, on a massive nuke powered cruise ship sounds keen, but it would not financially feasible. Nor would I want my family living on a big floating target while I was working off the coast of Somalia, Nigeria, etc. There are also bandwidth contraints, logistics and other issues that prevent this from being a viable option. JTF HOA was moved ashore from Navy command ships for good reasons.

SWJED
02-06-2007, 09:26 PM
6 February Voice of America - Gates: Africa Command Will Give US More Effective Approach to Continent (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-06-voa33.cfm) by Al Pessin. Posted in full per USG guidelines.


U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has announced that the U.S. military will create a new command for Africa. VOA's Al Pessin reports from the Pentagon officials say the command is to be established by September of next year.

Secretary Gates made the announcement at a Senate committee hearing.

"The president has decided to stand up a new unified combatant command, Africa Command, to oversee security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and, if directed, military operations on the African Continent," he said.

Officials say the new command's primary responsibility will be to work with African governments and militaries to try to avoid the need for U.S. military missions on the continent. They say it will have a larger diplomatic and aid component than other U.S. regional commands around the world. In addition, there will be an emphasis on training African militaries to enable them to better control their territory and keep terrorists out, and to improve their understanding of human rights issues and the need to respect civilian authority.

A Kenyan contingent prepares for a simulated joint military exercise with US forces (18 August 2006).

Currently, responsibility for operations in Africa is divided mainly between two commands whose primary duties lie elsewhere, with the Indian Ocean islands coming under a third unit, U.S. Pacific Command. Under the new structure, Egypt will be the only country in Africa not working directly with the new command. It will remain part of the responsibility of Central Command, which also covers the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia.

"This command will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War," he added. "This department will consult closely with the congress and work with our European and African allies to implement this effort."

Officials say a transition team will soon begin work near U.S. European Command headquarters in Germany to work out the details of Africa Command and to begin bringing together the personnel, equipment and military units it will need. Once the command becomes operational next year, officials hope it will be headquartered in Africa.

Analysts have largely welcomed the long-anticipated announcement, but they caution that the administration must make a major effort to ensure that the creation of Africa Command is not misperceived as a threat on the continent. Defense Department officials say they plan to do that.

SWJED
02-06-2007, 11:39 PM
6 February NY Times - Bush Creates New Military Command for Africa (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/world/africa/06cnd-africa.html) by David Stout.


The Pentagon will establish a new military command to oversee its operations in Africa, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced today.

Creation of the United States Africa Command, which had been expected, will “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa,” Mr. Bush said.

The president said he had directed Mr. Gates to have the command established by the fiscal year that ends on Sept. 30, 2008. The location of the new command will be determined after discussions with Congress and officials of countries on the continent, Mr. Bush said...

Mark O'Neill
02-07-2007, 10:07 AM
Two obvious options spring to mind, if the new Command were to be located outside CONUS (and I do not think that is a 'given').

1. If force protection etc were to drive considerations (especially if the posting was to be with dependants), RSA. Disadvantage is the relative removal from much of the 'action'. Advantage is the most developed economy and being in sub-saharan Africa' s 'superpower'.

2. Co-location with the OAU - in Addis.

Personally, I would be betting that the permanent Command base is in CONUS.

Regards,

Mark

sgmgrumpy
02-07-2007, 02:07 PM
I would convert the current SETAF HQ which is already in place in Vicenza, Italy. We already have a good SOFA with the Italian Government. The biggest problem with that option is limited space available for additional folks. In that area you do not build outward, you build on top of current structures.:D





In Search of a Unified Command for Africa by Eugene Yim Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA425916


The missions, responsibilities, and force structure of a combatant command must adapt to changing
strategic environment. As Africa undergoes intense transition, promise and opportunity exist
side by side with the perils of civil war, transnational threats, infectious disease, and
desperate poverty, which can significantly affect the U.S. national interests in the region.
However, the current UCP arrangement—division of responsibility for Africa among three commands
(USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM) and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa—does not
provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy and meet the current and
future challenges in Africa. The U.S. should give a higher priority to Africa by transferring
USCENTCOM and USPACOM’s African Areas of Responsibility to USEUCOM and establishing a sub-unified
command for Africa under USEUCOM. Such a dedicated sub-unified command will allow more effective
command structure to proactively shape the security environment in Africa and more effectively
handle any threats to U.S. national interests in the region.

SWJED
02-08-2007, 12:26 AM
No Extra Troops to be Based in Africa, says Pentagon (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020701654.html) - Reuters.


No extra U.S. combat troops will be stationed in Africa as a result of plans to create a U.S. military command for the continent, U.S. defense officials said on Wednesday.

The new headquarters will have a strong focus on helping African nations train their security forces and will include more U.S. government civilians than other regional command centers, the officials told reporters at the Pentagon.

President George W. Bush announced on Tuesday he had given approval for the new command, AFRICOM, which will be based initially in Stuttgart, Germany, but later move to an African location yet to be determined.

The creation of the new headquarters reflects increasing U.S. strategic interest in Africa. Washington is concerned that African nations with weak governments offer a haven for Islamist militants and is attracted by the continent's natural resources...

Mark O'Neill
02-08-2007, 01:12 AM
No Extra Troops to be Based in Africa, says Pentagon (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020701654.html) - Reuters.

Ok, based on that, delete my last regarding CONUS, my money is now on Addis.

120mm
02-08-2007, 07:54 AM
Hmmm... do you suppose they'd be interested in an IMA Transporation O-5 Reservist????

hendrikwitbooi
02-08-2007, 09:16 PM
. . . my money is now on Addis.

There certainly are advantages to being at the administrative heart of the African Union (AU). Of course, the US has been active in the Horn of Africa for decades, but I wonder if this doesn't hurt us in some ways. Black Hawk Down issues aside, the legacy of having supported one side then the other in the Ogaden conflict must surely be viewed with considerable cynicism in the area (then again, perhaps Somalian views no longer count). Also, might not the presence of AFRICOM in (nominally Christian) Ethiopia further the "us vs. them" sentiment on the Muslim street.

What about simply expanding our existing presence and accommodating AFRICOM in Djibouti? Recent US development aid has already gone a long way toward putting a benevolent face on the American presence there. It would be more politically neutral than locating in Ethiopia. And since we're already in Djibouti, it would be cheaper than creating a new command in landlocked Ethiopia. Thoughts?

davidbfpo
02-08-2007, 11:52 PM
How about the huge US-built and funded air base in Botswana? Built before South Africa's apartheid ended. Flew over on a Johannesburg to Windhoek flight - huge. Just why the USA built it was lost on the locals. Botswana is generally pro-western, is a democracy and has other facilities - plus South Africa is next door (not that SAfrica would relish a US base so close). Plus it is in the middle of nowhere. Biggest snag? Distance from the sea, requires overflying permission and hot (not that Djibouti is cool).

Or we could rent even more of Ascension Island to you!

Davidbfpo

sgmgrumpy
02-09-2007, 12:34 PM
21st Century Marines In Africa
published by the USMC Combat Developments Command
For
Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command


https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/featuretopics/Africa/files/BG_Material/21stCenturyMarinesinAfrica.pdf



Because Africa’s daunting economic, demographic, environmental, and political challenges appear to defy resolution, the issues of that continent will continue to pose potential threats to international stability and the interests of the United States. The sheer size and environmental complexity of Africa pose humanitarian needs and requirements for effective governance seemingly beyond the capacity of either individual governments or regional organizations to address. Ethnic and religious divisions produce frequent and severe incidents of disorder. Transnational entities seeking sanctuary for their terrorism or to exploit political weakness and foment discontent exacerbate existing instability. This paper provides a continental perspective, seeks to explore the nature of African challenges, and provides recommendations for the Marine Corps to better posture itself to meet those challenges.

Stan
02-09-2007, 01:02 PM
Hello SGM !

Overall, I think it's very thorough, but a tad too general.
Some of the information is a bit dated. Areas such as FMF and IMET and worse, HIV/AIDs.

Congo (then Zaire) for example, where we annually sent upwards of 70 people to the States under IMET, only produced a few bright stars. FMF related equipment was truely sad if the equipment stayed around long enough.

The paper lists Congo's HIV/AIDs Prevalence Rate at the 5 to 15&#37; range. CDC's studies in the late 80's indicated 35%. I suppose it could have declined, but I'm not sure how.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
02-09-2007, 01:23 PM
Stan

you are correct on the AIDs rate; it is higher. Also spot on assessment of IMET and other security assistance; it has to be done by country, otherwise it is not only useless, it is dangerously misleading.

I did note that the report did discuss Attache and FAO slots and that is a good thing.

more later when I get to read it in detail

best all

Tom

Stan
02-09-2007, 03:55 PM
Tom,
As always, dead on the money. How the Hotel do we classify the entire continent as one ?
My trips to Chad would open my eyes. Holes in every building. Hell it looked like an impact zone for M1s.

What did LTC Babbit say in one of his profound reports on the Congo civil war ? Wait for it !

I got it, "A solid shot tank round was found in a residencial area." :eek:

How hard did we laugh ? I had cramps for weeks :D They are now considered UXO :cool:

OK, I'm done (for now).
have a safe trip !

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
02-09-2007, 06:18 PM
What did LTC Babbit say in one of his profound reports on the Congo civil war ? Wait for it !

Yep!

Also I remember the "nixon" routine when he flew back in from Bukavu--"I was not spying"--as we steered him onto the plane out of Goma.

Then again he ended up advising VP Al Gore on Africa :eek:

After I was over in Rwanda and went back to the States for a couple of weeks with VP Kagame's visit to see the SecDef, I ran into one of my classmates from French in 1983, Gus Lorenz He was working OSD-ISA-Africa and we of course worked on Kagame's visit as ISA was the action office. Gus had gone to ZAMISH (for the uninitiated that was the US security assistance offcice in Zaire); you probably knew him.

Anyway he was somewhat upset because I had over the past year--as you know--hammered the point that the FAZ (Zairian military) was broken. He felt that I was too harsh; I suspect because he wrongly felt it reflected on ZAMISH personnel. Of course, my replacement in Zaire did her best to rebuild the FAZ's reputation in the next 2 years; 1996 thru 1998 proved just how correct we were and how wrong they were.

But again on Brazza, I often wondered as they were our escape hatch and we were their escape hatch, what would have happened had the two Congo's gotten their rhythm of discontent in synch. I guess we could have hijacked the ferry and hid in the middle of the river.


Best

Tom

Stan
02-11-2007, 10:53 AM
Tom,

You recall, that ferry nearly sank leaving her passengers in the prop wash as the ship's Captain gunned the motors in a feeble attempt at escaping the onslaught of passengers. I had the APO mail from Brazza and decided to fly that morning. :cool:

Yes, I know Gus. He was there when things were smokin' to the tune of 7 million. We even had our very own English language teacher under contract from CONUS. Gus was optimistic, even when our boss, an AF O-6 was not ! We would settle disagreements with a weekend party :D Sam, the English teacher would get drunk, cry and, consistent with his *African-American spirit would sing "Swing low, Sweet Chariot, Coming for to carry me home" and I would fall over from laughing as the Army Admin Officer (a huge Ranger) would perform bodily gestures as if we were all deaf.


Also I remember the "nixon" routine when he flew back in from Bukavu--"I was not spying"--as we steered him onto the plane out of Goma.

This reminds me of the current thread RE DIA and her personnel. We did our job, got slammed and he moves on to create the acronym UXO with Gore and party. Truely, a sad state of affairs.

Regards, Stan

wm
02-12-2007, 04:08 PM
In the thread on Ph.D. advisors in Iraq, I have advocated for a regional form of the old Country Team, one that includes a lot more than just DOS and DOD membership. Take a read of the following links for words similar to my proposal. However, consider the source—the DOD public web site. We can only hope . . .


http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2965

http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2946

http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2940

http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/AFRICOM_PublicBrief02022007.pdf


I worry that the transition team will locate itself in “EUCOM land” at Kelley Barracks. I would prefer to establish it on some neutral site away from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM direct influence.

Does anyone out there have insights about RADM Moeller, the exec director of the transition team?

hendrikwitbooi
02-12-2007, 10:36 PM
Or we could rent even more of Ascension Island to you!

Do you have any oil there, David?;)

Southern Africa (ZA, Namibia, Botswana) might be a good place for the new command, but, as someone already mentioned, it's some distance away from the action. I think the Americans are mostly worried about the Sahara and the Sahel, and want a dedicated training command on the continent to oversee programs such as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). I wonder how Gaddafi would feel about having AFRICOM in Libya?:p


Africa, which represents 35 percent of the world’s land mass and 25 percent of the population, is growing in significance, and . . . (from one of the defenselink.mil links)

Stuff like this just annoys the crap out of me, especially when you can google the correct information in five minutes. Whatever happened to attention to detail in the military?

wm
02-13-2007, 03:01 AM
I wonder how Gaddafi would feel about having AFRICOM in Libya?:p


I actually thought that Benghazi would make an interesting and relevant site for the AFRICOM HQ--good port, sizable population--relatively close to the current trouble spots in the Horn and Sudan--not too far from what I beleive may well will be the next locus of African troubles in the Niger/Mali/Burkina Faso/South Algeria region. Down side is the distance from southern Africa--we might need a forward command post in Botswana too.

If Qaddafi is really interested in rejoining the "civilized" world, he might be more amenable than we think.

John T. Fishel
02-13-2007, 04:29 PM
I've been reading this thread for a while and, although I don't believe that organizational change is really the answer to anything, it can facilitate the resolution of some problems. For this reason, if for no other, I welcome the creation of Africa Command. Among the things wit will accomplish are:

1. Put DoD and DoS on the same regional sheet of music. It aligns the regional unified commands with with State's regional bureaus - at long last (and with the partial exception of NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM - WHA.
2. It will make it easier to coordinate among OSD, the Joint Staff, AFRICOM, Africa Bureau, AID. CIA, and others.
3. It will make life much, much easier for DoD's Africa Center for Security Studies and give it a single unified command master.

AFRICOM certainly provides a new opportunity to focus more and coordinate policy more effectively on an important region.

TROUFION
03-01-2007, 08:05 PM
The last post here was 2 weeks ago any news on the status?

Further a quick google of African sites popped up this article. It provides a different perspective.

http://allafrica.com/stories/200702140349.html

Here is a quote:

"The African Union and the Peace and Security Council were established to entrench democracy, create economic development and monitor and secure peace but have not been allowed to develop and mature enough to deal with the continent's problems. Africa does not need another US base aimed at "promoting" peace and development. Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which would be forced to engage with US interests on military terms."
Business Day (Johannesburg) OPINION, February 14, 2007, Posted to the web February 14, 2007, Michele Ruiters, Johannesburg SA.

The author's focus seems a bit off as he is more concerned about a physical base and the troops he believes would be stationed there. He is concerned about the cultural effects of a large footprint set up, not about a C2 organization that facilitates and coordinates effort. But it is an indication that prior to setting up USAFRICOM a lot of PR work needs to be done. That is unless I'm missing something, the intent of the new command seems very beneficial from my understanding:

The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reports:

" The Pentagon, which crafted the proposal with the aid of the State Department and other government agencies, envisions the new command to be unique among its global combat headquarters. Because African nations do not pose a direct military threat to the United States, Defense officials said, the AFRICOM operation would focus far less on preparing troops for major combat in the area. Instead, it would stress military training programs to help local governments secure their borders and take steps to guard against crises such as Darfur as well as contain outbreaks of deadly diseases such as AIDS and malaria . Unlike in other traditional command posts, the four-star general who would be in charge of AFRICOM would probably have a civilian counterpart from the State Department to coordinate nonmilitary functions of the US government. The expectation is that diplomacy and economic and political aid will often prove more critical to achieving US goals in Africa than relying on military solutions."

SWJED
03-03-2007, 10:08 AM
Craddock Discusses Africa, European Command Changes (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3244) - AFPS, 2 March 2007.


Establishing U.S. Africa Command will mean big changes to U.S. European Command, the top U.S. military commander in Europe said at a news roundtable here today.

Army Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, said initial operating capability for U.S. Africa Command is tentatively set for Oct. 1, with full operational capability set for Oct. 1, 2008.

All the African nations currently under European Command will transfer to the new command. All the nations of the Horn of Africa will transfer from U.S. Central Command, and Madagascar and the Seychelles will transfer from U.S. Pacific Command.

The new command will be based in Stuttgart, Germany, for the time being. Officials ultimately hope the command will transfer its headquarters to Africa, Craddock said.

The teams working to set up AFRICOM are working in Washington and Stuttgart on the new command’s manning, functions and missions. Craddock has taken the opportunity of the change to look at and refocus the mission of U.S. European Command...

TROUFION
03-05-2007, 08:57 PM
FYI-

http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/AFRICOM_PublicBrief02022007.pdf

wierdbeard
04-03-2007, 04:27 PM
this article appears on the allafrica.com site today.

Africa: Bush Approves U.S. Army for Africa

here is an interesting excerpt.


UNITED States President George Bush has approved the formation of a U.S. army to permanently operate in Africa, a move viewed by many as part of a wide plan to increase American hegemony on Africa.

The U.S. would have wanted to place the base in Algeria but the government of that country vehemently refused and the U.S. is now scouting for another country, especially one with access to the sea.

Mohamed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister was yesterday reported in the People's Daily Online as having strongly questioned the motive behind the military venture.

"He questioned why no one had ever proposed for any anti-terror co-operation with Algeria in the 1990s when terrorist violence went rampant and wrought havoc?"

link:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200704030206.html (http://http://allafrica.com/stories/200704030206.html)

TROUFION
04-24-2007, 12:23 PM
USAFRICOM:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070423/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/africa_command

SWJED
04-30-2007, 08:12 AM
30 April Washington Times - U.S. Force Aims to Secure Africa (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070430-124131-8532r.htm) by Jason Motlagh.


The United States hopes by year's end to establish an Africa Command that will anchor military operations across a continent seen to be of increasing strategic importance and threatened by transnational terrorists.

The new force, known informally as AfriCom, will preside over all countries on the continent except Egypt and is expected to be operational by the fall, according to Pentagon officials. They say it is needed to secure vast, lawless areas where terrorists have sought safe haven to regroup and threaten U.S. interests.

"Part of the rationale behind the development of this command is clearly the growing emergence of the strategic importance of Africa from a global ... security and economic standpoint," Rear Adm. Robert Moeller, head of the Africa Command Transition Team, said earlier this month. "This allows us to work more closely with our African partners to ... enhance the stability across the continent." ...

Jedburgh
05-18-2007, 09:09 PM
CRS Report, 16 May 07: Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf)

...A transition team has begun establishment of the new command, which is expected to begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and achieve full capability as a stand-alone command by October 2008. DOD has signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and US officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable location for the command’s headquarters. The transition team and the new command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until a location on the continent is secured. The Pentagon has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent....

SWJED
05-28-2007, 09:40 AM
28 May Washington Post - U.S. Africa Command Brings New Concerns (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/27/AR2007052700978.html) by Walter Pincus.


The creation of the Defense Department Africa Command, with responsibilities to promote security and government stability in the region, has heightened concerns among African countries and in the U.S. government over the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, according to a newly released study by the Congressional Research Service.

The Africa Command (AFRICOM) was announced in February by the Bush administration and is scheduled to begin operations in October with temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM would have traditional responsibilities of a combat command "to facilitate or lead [U.S.] military operations" on the continent, but would also include "a broader 'soft power' mandate aimed at preemptively reducing conflict and would incorporate a larger civilian component to address those challenges," according to the CRS study...

John T. Fishel
05-28-2007, 12:06 PM
The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

SWJED
05-28-2007, 12:13 PM
The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

... and in the absence of unity of command, it would be nice to at least have unity of effort. Sometimes I think that our cultural intelligence efforts should focus on our interagency partners - at least then we might lower our expectations of who does what and when.

John T. Fishel
05-28-2007, 03:55 PM
You are so right. Unity of command is a subset of unity of effort. I despair of ever getting unity of command in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unity of effort, however, is possible and often achieved especially when combattant commanders define their mission as supporting the ambassadors in their AOR. Unfortunately, when they don't (and sometimes even when they do) their control of resources may thwart unity of effort.

wm
05-29-2007, 12:17 PM
You are so right. Unity of command is a subset of unity of effort. I despair of ever getting unity of command in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unity of effort, however, is possible and often achieved especially when combattant commanders define their mission as supporting the ambassadors in their AOR. Unfortunately, when they don't (and sometimes even when they do) their control of resources may thwart unity of effort.

One wonders how we could achieve either unity of effort or unity of command on the African continent. DoS is divided into a number of petty fiefdoms worldwide (AKA Ambasadorships). USAID seems (from the outside anyway) to be rather autonomous within State, and each of of its various funding activities often seem responsible only to themselves. AFRICOM may appear to have the advantage of internal unity of command, but one wonders how true this is. It will still need to draw on the resources of other U&S commands (like JFCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM) to get much done. Does the JS J3 shop have another 3-star who can be detailed as another "czar" to manage US interagency efforts in Africa.:rolleyes:

Seriously, though, we seem to be working with an outmoded concept to some degree. The notion of the "country team" has been overcome by globalization. Perhaps we ought to think about "region teams" instead. Forming AFRICOM may well be a step by DoD towards recognizing the need to readress American organization for international relationship building. But, are the other elements of US government involved in international affairs working towards an organization to support the same type of regional focus?

TROUFION
05-29-2007, 01:23 PM
There was talk at the begining of the establishment of JTF HOA, when AFRICOM started looking like a possibility, of establishing the senior position in AFRICOM as a psuedo-proconsul. This position would be the senior Civilian Ambassador for the continent, to subordinate all the other Ambassdors to the one. It was/is a radical idea that the DoS would most likely have trouble digesting. BUT it would lend Unity of command and much needed credibility to the AFRICOM combined DoD-DoS concept.

And talking of Unity of Effort, I have always thought Unity of Effort was developed by those folks out there who have never been in command, who want to protect fiefdoms, turf, and who do not want to be subordinate to anyone. Unity of Command is what it is, the best method to organize a unified action in any and all environments. The argument of complex situations never held water with me. There always has to be a single position of command to break impasses and to ensure a unified methodology, a single intent.

Tom Odom
05-29-2007, 02:08 PM
There was talk at the begining of the establishment of JTF HOA, when AFRICOM started looking like a possibility, of establishing the senior position in AFRICOM as a psuedo-proconsul. This position would be the senior Civilian Ambassador for the continent, to subordinate all the other Ambassdors to the one. It was/is a radical idea that the DoS would most likely have trouble digesting. BUT it would lend Unity of command and much needed credibility to the AFRICOM combined DoD-DoS concept.

That would be a radical step and one that would run up against the reality of political appointee ambassadors versus career foreign service officers very quickly. The closest we came to having a "pro-consul" in the Rwandan saga was the appointment of Ambassador Richard Bogosian as the "Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes Region," much like Phillip Habib to the Middle East in the Reagan years. Ambassador Bogosian was able to get some cross-border cooperation going between embassies but it was often a tough sell. Burundi was a problem with the Ambassador there a political appointee. He by the way has a book out this year from University of Texas Press with a chapter dedicated to my behavior as a conspirator envoy of the US Department of Defense. Zaire (Congo) was another problem but in this case a career foreign service officer ambassador who had been chief of mission elsewhere.

I offer all of this because while I believe strongly that Africa Command is a great idea and one long overdue, I have no expectations that a sudden spirit of cooperation is going to blossum between the agencies. To the contrary, there will be (and already is) a backlash of suspicion/angst and general urinating on fire hydrants behavior by the various players because DoD has long minimized its interest in the continent. Creating a command signals a change in attitude and that creates tensions.

Best

Tom

John T. Fishel
05-29-2007, 04:14 PM
The notion of a DOS counterpart to a combattant commander has been around a long time. I remember it well from the 1980s in Central America. Seemed logical to all of us DOD types. Unfortunately, it runs counter to the desires of both the host country governments and the American ambassadors. No host government is going to do business with the US Regional Ambassador; it will expect to do business with the US through the President's personal rep to the country ie the Ambassador.

You can only get interagency unity of command if the President names a commander with the authority to hire and fire his interagency subordinates. (He also needs to be willing to exercise that authority.) In the absence of that authority, the only thing left is coordination to, hopefully, achieve unity of effort. I would like to see commanders named so that unity of command could be achieved but I have yet to see a President willing to impose that kind of authority - except to ambassadors through the post -JFK appointment letter.

bourbon
06-14-2007, 05:12 PM
Esquire, 6/11/2007: The Americans Have Landed, By Thomas P.M. Barnett (http://www.esquire.com/print-this/africacommand0707)

A few years ago, with little fanfare, the United States opened a base in the horn of Africa to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters. By 2012, the Pentagon will have two dozen such forts. The story of Africa Command, the American military's new frontier outpost.

SteveMetz
06-14-2007, 05:18 PM
It is about time we did this. Unified Command divisions of Africa have been a long standing cause of operational confusion. I certainly felt its effects during Op Support Hope and studied the same phenomenon in earlier Congo adventures.

Tom



The ebird link is http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060118411954.html


Tom,

Have you had any involvement in the creation of AFRICOM? I have a Yale grad student working with me over the summer doing some research on it, and I'm trying to figure out who to link him up with. He's contacting Mike Smith who is now at State, and he and I are going to try to get to EUCOM and JTF-HOA over the summer (who could pass up a visit to Djibouti in August!!).

Tom Odom
06-15-2007, 02:15 PM
Tom,

Have you had any involvement in the creation of AFRICOM? I have a Yale grad student working with me over the summer doing some research on it, and I'm trying to figure out who to link him up with. He's contacting Mike Smith who is now at State, and he and I are going to try to get to EUCOM and JTF-HOA over the summer (who could pass up a visit to Djibouti in August!!).

Steve,

Dr, Hans Pawlisch at the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, was wanting me to put in for the command historian position. I can send you an email address for him next week when I go back to work.

Best

Tom

SWJED
06-24-2007, 11:27 AM
24 June Washington Post - North Africa Reluctant to Host U.S. Command (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/23/AR2007062301318.html) by Craig Whitlock.


A U.S. delegation seeking a home for a new military command in Africa got a chilly reception during a tour of the northern half of the continent this month, running into opposition even in countries that enjoy friendly relations with the Pentagon.

Algeria and Libya separately ruled out hosting the Defense Department's planned Africa Command, known as AFRICOM, and said they were firmly against any of their neighbors doing so either. U.S. diplomats said they were disappointed by the depth of opposition, given that the Bush administration has bolstered ties with both countries on security matters in recent years.

Morocco, which has been mentioned as a possible site for the new command and is one of the strongest U.S. allies in the region, didn't roll out the welcome mat, either. After the U.S. delegation visited Rabat, the capital, on June 11, the Moroccan foreign ministry strongly denied a claim by an opposition political party that the kingdom had already offered to host AFRICOM. A ministry statement called the claim "baseless information."

Rachid Tlemcani, a professor of political science at the University of Algiers, said the stern response from North African governments was a reflection of public opposition to U.S. policies in the predominantly Muslim region...

Mark O'Neill
06-24-2007, 12:52 PM
As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.

Tom Odom
06-24-2007, 12:58 PM
As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.


Mark,

I concur on southern Africa. It would also help with infrastructure issues that would cripple a HQs effectiveness in Western Africa.

Best

Tom

SteveMetz
06-24-2007, 01:00 PM
As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.

I absolutely cannot imagine the South Africans allowing it. They remain almost pathologically leery of being seen as an American proxy. For a long time, they refused assistance from the African Crisis Response Initiative.

I would think Ghana would be the most likely choice--they're reasonably close to the U.S., a functioning democracy, and sort of centrally located. Uganda also might be a possibility. You're right about Botswana but it's harder to get in and out of Gabarone than Accra or even Kampala. I would also think that Senegal might make the short list. I'd like to see that simply because it would make heads explode in France.

Mark O'Neill
06-24-2007, 01:15 PM
I absolutely cannot imagine the South Africans allowing it. They remain almost pathologically leery of being seen as an American proxy. For a long time, they refused assistance from the African Crisis Response Initiative.

I would think Ghana would be the most likely choice--they're reasonably close to the U.S., a functioning democracy, and sort of centrally located. Uganda also might be a possibility. You're right about Botswana but it's harder to get in and out of Gabarone than Accra or even Kampala. I would also think that Senegal might make the short list. I'd like to see that simply because it would make heads explode in France.


I think that your perceptions of the current South African administration are probably right. However, I think the next one, particulalry as some of the ANC 'old and bolds' from the old days retire and drop off the twig, might be a different scenario. I think that guys like Ramaphosa, who had quite a different (and later generation) experience of the struggle will not necessarily subscribe to some of the old prejudices to the USA.

I agree with you about Ghana.

Ken White
06-24-2007, 08:55 PM
but the name, applied to a US Military Command is fairly benign. As are the names Central, Northern and Southern. European is locale specifc but it's been around so long no one notices.

OTOH, naming a new Command for a specific and troubled continent at a time whee we're in one of our periodic 'throwing our weight around' modes is probably not very smart.

I have no question that the long standing division of the continent among three Commands should be rectified for many reasons but an innocuous name would soothe the concerns of many. Regardless, we've done it and named it.

That did not mean we then had to go shopping for an office building and get embarrassed by having our credit card rejected -- totally predictably -- in several countries. Hopefully, we will not be dumb enough to bully our way in somewhere.

If Southern Command can operate from Miami, so could Africom...

SteveMetz
06-25-2007, 12:17 AM
but the name, applied to a US Military Command is fairly benign. As are the names Central, Northern and Southern. European is locale specifc but it's been around so long no one notices.

OTOH, naming a new Command for a specific and troubled continent at a time whee we're in one of our periodic 'throwing our weight around' modes is probably not very smart.

I have no question that the long standing division of the continent among three Commands should be rectified for many reasons but an innocuous name would soothe the concerns of many. Regardless, we've done it and named it.

That did not mean we then had to go shopping for an office building and get embarrassed by having our credit card rejected -- totally predictably -- in several countries. Hopefully, we will not be dumb enough to bully our way in somewhere.

If Southern Command can operate from Miami, so could Africom...

But remember that Southern Command operated for decades from Panama. And old SOUTHCOM hands will tell you that it was more effective then.

As an old Africa hand, I kind of feel like that if none of our erstwhile partners on the continent want to host a training, advisory, and security assistance command, maybe we should just write them off.

Rob Thornton
06-25-2007, 12:34 AM
What was the piece in the article that talked about the command being distributed throughout Africa in existing structures? While distributed commands face some challenges, it would seem to provide allot more capability to existing embassies and consulates. It would be more integrated with OGAs, get better & more timely Intel from the field, and probably reduce the public visibility of the overall command. These days IT and collaboration from fixed sites has some good advantages. Also consider it as one less Force Pro headache - plus helps ensure the command will not get bloated.

Mark O'Neill
06-25-2007, 01:01 AM
Also consider it as one less Force Pro headache - plus helps ensure the command will not get bloated.

Rob,

Where is the fun in that?

Isn't building units, HQ and 'empire' the default game that all Western Militaries like to participate in?

A game for 2 to 1,000 players, it gives the satisfying illusion of progress without the problematic requirement for innovative thought or policy implementation...

No one loses a job or promotion for earnestly creating additional organisation and process in the face of a systemic problem.

Yours Cynically,

Mark

Ken White
06-25-2007, 02:48 AM
But remember that Southern Command operated for decades from Panama. And old SOUTHCOM hands will tell you that it was more effective then.

As an old Africa hand, I kind of feel like that if none of our erstwhile partners on the continent want to host a training, advisory, and security assistance command, maybe we should just write them off.

...there and as a visitor to SOUTHCOM then and later, no question said old hands are more than right. However, as you know, there's a reason SOUTHCOM is now (but probably not forever) in Miami. I'm merely thinking aloud that the same rationale applies to AfriCom at this time. Two or three years in the future will likely be a bit more propitious. I'm probably a tad over reactive on the PR angle in this and many things because I keep seeing us getting tromped in that arena -- and not only by erstwhile enemies... :wry:

Not being at all familiar with Africa and lacking a willing host you may be correct on a write-off but given we've announced the Command even that wouldn't be easy.

Ken White
06-25-2007, 02:55 AM
Rob,

Where is the fun in that?

Isn't building units, HQ and 'empire' the default game that all Western Militaries like to participate in?
. . .
Mark


overriding reson d'être. In US parlance, flags and spaces make stars... :)

Ken White
06-25-2007, 03:29 AM
Great. We can work with this. We're already in Djibouti, I noted in my 13 Jun Jane's that our White Hatted friends say they're going to almost permanently keep a small deck Gator in the Gulf of Guinea for training and support. So we put the command in those two locations and this justifies the Command aircraft TDA to bump up from a C21 or UC 37 to a C20. Or maybe even a C40. Of course, a couple of SH 60s will be required to ferry from the LSD to the nearest airport. Plus extra spaces due to the aircraft support contract management and the distributed model. The potential is endless... :D

Seriously, the distributed model has merit, might be a worthwhile experiment.

SWJED
06-25-2007, 09:24 AM
Esquire magazine - The Americans Have Landed (http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707#story) by Thomas P. M. Barnett.


A few years ago, with little fanfare, the United States opened a base in the horn of Africa to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters. By 2012, the Pentagon will have two dozen such forts. The story of Africa Command, the American military's new frontier outpost...

TROUFION
06-25-2007, 01:51 PM
The balance between kinetics-direct action and whatever you want to call it - the other stuff. Inoculating Africa from Fundamentalist Islamism. The underlying question, can USAFRICOM continue to manage the balance?

I know I am probably in the minority on the SWC about this but it bothers me. The SOCCOM leadership in the GWOT, (I had an extensive class at NPS on the History of SOF taught by Dr. Kalev 'Gunner' Sepp, everyone in the class was SOF except myself, we had this conversation, I held my own but it was 12:1 against me on this very topic) mainly the ability to crossboundary amongst the COCCOM's. If I was the Commanding Officer of CJTF-HOA or of USAFRICOM I'd have a problem with independent 'wire within the wire' operations. Especially if a point target effort could undermine years of cultivation.

I look at it like this: when the German Codes were broken in WWII there had to be a balance, when and how to use the info gained to interfere with German actions. Too blatant a hit would tip the Germans that the code was broken, too little action and why break the code in the first place.

I see the DA piece as a necessity but not the primary action. It is like chemotherapy used once the patient is so sick there is no choice. As opposed to innoculations to prevent a patient getting sick in the first place.

-T

Ken White
06-25-2007, 03:50 PM
in my view, returned to the Army (and at least some SEAL teams to the Navy) and USSOCOM should keep the DA, SR and allied tasks. The major problem in the services has been the melding of the SOF culture with that of the broader service and that is a really significant issue, a big hazardous disconnect, that someone better get a handle on before it creates a minor disaster.

The two sides are totally distrustful of each other -- both with some very legitimate complaints and both with some self righteous flaky complaints. A major mistake the Army made IMO was to create the SF Branch. The cross fertilization that was available before at all ranks was more beneficial than is the slightly increased competence due to the formation of the branch. I realize that's not going to change either but some method of breaking down the barriers better be explored.

That is not to say that I disagree with SOF, I'm a firm believer and a former practitioner. JSOC was necessary, USSSOCOM was possibly not -- I give them credit though for being innovative, developing a rapid and effective procurement system and some great capabilities but they are over secretive (with some justification and then, most everyone is over secretive) and way too parochial. They're doing some innovative and very good things but it's supposed to be a national effort.

So let me join you in that minority. I am a SOF Believer of the first water but not a USSOCOM fan. I railed against Barbwire Bob when he was lobbying to get it set up -- not that anyone paid much attention -- and I think it was a mistake. Immaterial, really, it's here and Parkinson's Law will apply.

Thus, we will have dual chains of command in operation until a bunch of people get badly, totally, publicly killed by foul-ups due to that duality and the distrust for the community of the Big services (and vice versa). That's the American way. Regardless of how the Command morphs, I'd be willing to bet at some time, most if not all elements in theater will be responsible to the Theater Commander.

wm
06-25-2007, 04:28 PM
Great. We can work with this. We're already in Djibouti, I noted in my 13 Jun Jane's that our White Hatted friends say they're going to almost permanently keep a small deck Gator in the Gulf of Guinea for training and support. So we put the command in those two locations and this justifies the Command aircraft TDA to bump up from a C21 or UC 37 to a C20. Or maybe even a C40. Of course, a couple of SH 60s will be required to ferry from the LSD to the nearest airport. Plus extra spaces due to the aircraft support contract management and the distributed model. The potential is endless... :D

Seriously, the distributed model has merit, might be a worthwhile experiment.

A while back when the formation of AFRICOM was first being bruited, I recommended a 2 HQ arrangement on a N-S axis. The E-W axis also works. I'd suggest the main site be in Equatorial Guinea--Bioko (the island formerly known as Fernando Po) would be my choice as the primary HQ with a forward operating facility based out of our current facilities in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti (with the appropriate plussing up to make it suitable for a 4-star to be in residence as required). This would be very fashionable--much like folks who winter in Miami and summer in Maine.

Ken White
06-25-2007, 05:05 PM
On a further note, I note the Navy now has the support mission at Lemonier and that is a good thing; they build better buildings, feed better and bigger meals and have great coffee 24 hours a day. I strongly recommend that where ever Africom goes, the Navy get the support package. For the good of the assigned troops... :)

I'm busy cogitating the four star quarters, the expat restaurants and chefs in Djibouti and the interface with the French. :D

Rob Thornton
06-25-2007, 05:12 PM
Well,
If we did go with a N/E/S/W HQs distro - we'd invariably learn how to screw up the following phrases "Hello", "How Much", and "Where is the bathroom". As for Navy chow - only if they hire the guys who run the Chief's mess.

Ken White
06-25-2007, 05:20 PM
Well,
If we did go with a N/E/S/W HQs distro - we'd invariably learn how to screw up the following phrases "Hello", "How Much", and "Where is the bathroom". As for Navy chow - only if they hire the guys who run the Chief's mess.

Es verdad, Mon Ami, zu verstehen! Dame binjo?

Rob Thornton
06-25-2007, 06:27 PM
Hey Ken,
Funny - from my Amharic lessons I can recall "Tenastaling" and "Terpezza" - there was no real incentive to learn as the only girls you could pursue in 1987were those from approved nations -plus we had a great guy who drove us around and made all our deals for us - on the other hand - when I PCS'd to Madrid as my follow on - I learned to habla might damn quick.

As for the CPO's mess - well, I'd be willing to take a per-diem cut to finance it.

Ken White
06-25-2007, 07:02 PM
Yes, isn't it absolutely amazing the benefit offered by pillow speakers in the grasp of a new language?

If I were younger I'd do some research on that. I don't remember why but it sounds like a good idea. I think. :wry:

Something that's always fascinated me is the difference between truly cognitive skills and their genetic allies. Went to Monterey for Farsi, left early due to a UOR and never truly got proficient. Forgot most of it due to lack of practice then and swore it was totally gone. Then, 20 years later in Atlanta bumped into an old Iraniha Colonel from the Shah's day and amazingly most of it came back really quickly. Gone again now and not too many from Iran on the Redneck Riviera... :)

Jedburgh
07-02-2007, 03:46 PM
ISN, 2 Jul 07: Questioning AFRICOM's Intentions (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17811)

As US plans for an African command (AFRICOM) operations base forge ahead, perceptions that the base's raison d'etre is to gain control over regional oil assets and counter growing Chinese influence are growing.

While Washington is proffering AFRICOM as a largely benign organization, Africans remain wary, having seen that a US military footprint in Djibouti led to operations such as Somalia, and believe that the Pentagon could not resist intervening to protect US investments in oil producing nations such as Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea if their regimes were toppled.....

SWJED
07-13-2007, 12:28 AM
11 July Reuters - Bush Picks Black General to Lead Africa Operations (http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN126384.html) by Kristin Roberts.


U.S. President George W. Bush on Tuesday nominated Army Gen. William Ward, the highest ranking black in the U.S. military, to lead the new Africa Command and coordinate military operations on the continent.

Bush's decision in February to create Africa Command came after months of discussion inside the Pentagon and reflected increasing U.S. strategic interest in the continent and worry that Islamic militants were finding safe haven there...

More...


Africa Command will first be part of European Command and have some operational capability by October. It should be a stand-alone, operational command by the end of fiscal year 2008, which ends September 30, 2008.

The Pentagon has not decided where to put Africa Command's headquarters. Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, in June said the command might set up staff offices at different places around the continent.

Jedburgh
08-03-2007, 03:28 PM
2 Aug 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?:

Theresa Whelan, Dpty Asst Secretary of Defense for African Affairs (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/whe080207.htm)

...there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense and security matters. The creation of a single U.S. DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DoD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DoD generally, or for AFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID has clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DoD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed....
Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/shi080207.htm)

....For more than 50 years, Western developmental assistance to Africa was hampered by insecurity. The end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa laid the necessary pre-conditions for Africans to set their own integrated security and development agenda. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, meanwhile, precipitated a hard re-examination of international security assumptions in the West. What should emerge from these trends is engagement with Africa based on a convergence of interests. Africom essentially represents a re-packaging of current US military partnership initiatives with Africa under a coherent organisational structure. The skepticism it has raised among African states and societies indicates the need for Washington to reassure its prospective African partners that Africom acknowledges the lead role of Africans themselves in determining their own security, development and governance priorities. In the African context, this means at least a great an emphasis on poverty alleviation as it does on military professionalsim. US security assurances in Africa must therefore depend on quiet, sustained support for Africa’s own prescribed agenda for renewal.
Wafula Okumu, South Africa Institute for Security Studies (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/oku080207.htm)

...The hostility that it has faced so far points to the fact that Africom could turn out to be an expensive endeavor, both in terms of resources and long-term U.S.-Africa relations. It should not come as a surprise that Washington’s designs for Africa are now viewed with skepticism. Oil, China and terrorism are being seen to be the principal concerns of the U.S. initiative. If the coordination of a securitized development policy for Africa is part of the U.S. strategy, then it is seen by many local observers as essentially secondary and subordinate to the main aim....
J. Peter Pham, James Madison University (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov:80/110/pha080207.htm)

...In the end, I know of no other factor which may have as much influence on how AFRICOM is initially received as the decision concerning its basing. The selection of the site will have both positive and negative impacts on the new command’s strategic effect and will, in turn, dictate AFRICOM’s ability to influence and support the various elements of American national power in helping build a secure, stable, and prosperous African continent.

Given the larger perspective of the history of colonialism and its still deleterious consequences, including those having to do with perceptions, as well as the practical question of infrastructure and security, I would counsel the basing of the command headquarters in the United States, with a forward, mobile headquarters deployed as needed. This option would afford maximum operational flexibility, while avoiding the negative consequences of opening ourselves to accusations of neo-colonialism and militarization. In this scenario, sub-components may, of course, be based on the continent in support of African initiatives, for example, a training mission working in partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Accra might well indeed be based in Ghana....

Beelzebubalicious
08-04-2007, 06:37 AM
Anyone have their fingers on a good US policy statement or strategy for the Horn of Africa? Is there one? How will this change policies and practices?

SWJED
08-16-2007, 10:10 PM
Focus on U.S. Africa Command (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/focus-on-us-africa-command/)- SWJ Blog. Kudos to many who posted here (on this thread) for pointers to reference material - much appreciated!


As a lead-in – to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry – I thought I’d post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command – U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM’s mission.

Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power – read interagency…

Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations…) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library – Thanks!...

Beelzebubalicious
08-17-2007, 10:48 AM
"...In the end, I know of no other factor which may have as much influence on how AFRICOM is initially received as the decision concerning its basing. The selection of the site will have both positive and negative impacts on the new command’s strategic effect and will, in turn, dictate AFRICOM’s ability to influence and support the various elements of American national power in helping build a secure, stable, and prosperous African continent."

I read somewhere that the base will be in Germany or somewhere outside Africa b/c of the political issues. It would probably be best to be more decentralized and low profile anyway. Centralize command and control, but decentralize functions.

Stan
08-30-2007, 02:58 PM
AllAfrica (http://allafrica.com/stories/200708300344.html) regarding AFRICOM - "South Africa's defence minister says not only the Southern African Development Community but most of the African Union rejects the United States' new Africa Command (Africom), reports a South African newspaper."


Any country that allowed itself to be a base for the US strategic command in Africa (Africom) would have to live with the consequences, Lekota said.

Africom's recent creation has been interpreted as the US suddenly recognising the strategic importance of Africa to the US.

Last month it was reported that Lekota was not responding to US requests for him to meet the first Africom commander, Gen Kip Ward.

Briefing the media yesterday, Lekota said the Southern African Development Community (SADC) defence ministers had, at the summit in Lusaka this month, decided that no member states would host Africom and more armed US soldiers.

He said this was also the "continental position" of the African Union.

However, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has evidently already offered her country as a base for Africom.

Simon Tisdale wrote in the London-based Guardian: "Africom marks the official arrival of America's 'global war on terror' on the African continent."

TROUFION
08-30-2007, 11:41 PM
It needs some heavy Public Relations work. This has to be a sell situation, the US and Gen Ward in particular need to go on an all out media blitz, selling the benefits, the needs, the new softer approach, the low profile HQ, no battalions will be based there etc. Can't just stand it up and expect them to all love the idea. Hell the Al Qeada types and maybe even china are probably stoking the counter-media, starting rumors of colonization, invasion and permamnent basing of armor divisions etc.

Old Eagle
08-31-2007, 12:39 AM
The Grunt (troufion) is dead on.

The SADC made grand pronouncements based on our enemies' ability to sell the "counterstory" to what's really going on. This is KILLING me!!!

AFRICOM is a good news story for the US, UN, Africa, ALCON. While we have dithered, our enemies (with some healthy skeptism by the MSM) have twisted the story line. AFRICOM is now being portayed as a boogie man and those of you w/African experience understand that a combination of RUMINT and the supernatural have a huge effect on the audience.

Get on message. Get the message to the people. Put a face on this story.

Ken White
08-31-2007, 12:55 AM
it. Our egos are too big. "We're from America and we're here to help" is supposed to be all it takes. Never is -- then we get our feelings hurt, act stupidly and start kicking shins.

State and DoD are equally bad at it.

Killing USAID and USIA were not the smartest moves we've made lately.

Tom Odom
08-31-2007, 01:07 PM
it. Our egos are too big. "We're from America and we're here to help" is supposed to be all it takes. Never is -- then we get our feelings hurt, act stupidly and start kicking shins.

State and DoD are equally bad at it.

Killing USAID and USIA were not the smartest moves we've made lately.

I have it! We will put them on the supports terrorism list! Yeah, that's the ticket! Surely they will love us, now! :D

We have, truly, porked this one.

Tom

Self: Stop calling me, Shirly
Self2: But you're soooo cute!

Stan
08-31-2007, 01:51 PM
I have it! We will put them on the supports terrorism list! Yeah, that's the ticket! Surely they will love us, now! :D

We have, truly, porked this one.

Tom

Self: Stop calling me, Shirly
Self2: But you're soooo cute!

Now that's the ticket ! Then, once on the 'list' we can get the DOJ to send the FBI in and dump their funds. Following the subsequent SNAFU, DOD will again dump massive amounts of money into the very same hole we started with in 84 :eek:

TROUFION
08-31-2007, 01:53 PM
I'm sensing some negativity here....

Stan
08-31-2007, 02:02 PM
I'm sensing some negativity here....

Hello Foot Slogger !

Only fitting to provide you with some Belgian French :rolleyes:

Welcome to Africa...err WAWA...
Beinvenue !
Bien avant le début de la guerre dans l'est du Zaïre !

Ask Tom what a tour in Zaire or Rwanda really means, besides being extremely unhealthy :D

kwtusn
09-08-2007, 05:40 PM
First timer, so bear with me.

Will admit most of my experience over the past decade is living and working in the Middle East, especially with GCC and HOA navies/Coasts Guard. Was fortunate enough though to spend some time this summer traveling around Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tunis) and of course the elephant in the room during all discussions was the establishment of AFRICOM. Was surprised that fairly consistently negative reactions came from our Country Team members, while Host Nations were generally positive. Believe the embassies may be down on the idea because any efforts to approach problems from a regional perspective automatically marginalizes the work of the country teams. They get graded on how well they work the needs/issues of their individual countries, and the center of gravity within State resides at the embassies, not the Regional Bureaus in DC. While most of the Africans we spoke with were military (either uniformed or MOD civilians), they were reasonably supportive of the concept.

That said, seems to me the best approach for us will be to work to enable the solution set developed by the Africans -- working with, by, and through the African Union. HN interlocultors were adament that the AU was not your grandmother's OAU, that they were serious about making it work. And while they've thus far shied away from tackling the really big problems (Zimbabwe for instance), they have committed to working the smaller (?) issues in Darfur and Somalia. May not be as big, fast, or well organized as we would want to see, but it's a start.

Working to empower the effectiveness of the AU security institutions also offers a possible solution to how we structure AFRICOM. If we really want to partner with this supranational organization, we have a reasonable explanation for where and why we establish a limited footprint on the continent. The flag and a truly small command element goes to Addis (seat of the AU HQ), working hand in glove with the US Mission to the AU. The AU Military planners are establishing five regional rapid reaction multinational Brigades (North, South, East, West, and Central); we distribute our presence by colocating five small JTFs comprising mostly planners and logisticians at each of those five Brigade HQs as partners and strategic enablers. That way we work hand in glove with the AU solution set, create the long-term relationships required to plan exercises, build trust, and better understand how our capabilities can best help them resolve their issues. By colocating with AU elements, we provide adequate reason (domestic political topcover?) for HN governments to accept this small footprint -- rather than them establishing a purely bilateral relationship with the US, they are merely accepting US support for their already agreed African solution.

As others have already pointed out, it may be possible to sea-base one or more of these regional JTFs -- an afloat JTF operating in the Mediterranean, and/or the Gulf of Guinea provides ready opportunity to work with the North, West, or Central Brigade HQs. They are still sorting out exactly where each of those Brigades will be based, but we have opportunities to partner from the beginning in ways that can be acceptable to Africans, and useful for our own security concerns. If we establish a HQ in any other location than the AU has already selected, no matter how supportive the HN government may be, we will be simply imposing a US solution that marginalizes and trivializes planning they have already done.

Again, my sense is that in candid (i.e., not when engaged in public political posturing) conversations African leaders welcome a US involvement that respects their needs and desires (one comment often expressed: "we may be poor, but we aren't stupid"). They are particularly interested in seeing us take a regional perspective -- something our current embassy-centric posture inhibits. A regional command facilitates that, but only if we are willing to craft something fundamentally different from what we have done in the past. A small-footprint, distributed command structure that mirrors the African's chosen AU organization, that empowers and enables its success, may have the best chance of succeeding.

Interested in hearing the thoughts, reactions, flamesprays of the more experienced Africa hands out there.

-- Kurt

Ken White
09-08-2007, 06:48 PM
of other regions; you have just caused me to smack my head in utter chagrin.

The reluctance of Country Teams to support regional or command wide programs is an issue I grumbled about on many occasions and had to devote some effort to countering. Mostly because, dummy me, I missed the Center of Gravity. I think a lot of us did. I put it down to egos but I should have realized -- known -- there was a bureaucratic focus that was as or more important. :o

Excellent post. Thanks.

Stan
09-08-2007, 09:07 PM
Hey Kurt, welcome to the forum !

First and foremost, please take a moment and introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441).

I have six tours as a military member in embassy environments (five in Sub-Sahara), so I get where you're coming from. The CT is and always should be led by its boss, the Ambo. If we're talking about a political appointee driven by his/her own agendas that's one thing and relatively short lived. If, however we're talking about a career SFS member, it's now a question of leadership. I've had the pleasure of both.

Tasking a regional embassy CT to do anything is beyond a doubt a painful process. If the Ambassador is on board you’ll have a fighting chance; but more than likely the most junior and inexperience officer in the embassy will be point man.

I have some doubts about AFRICOM being welcomed by the Africans. There will be some that see the immediate cash and benefits, but others will see nothing but troops and further political maneuvers on the Dark Continent.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
09-10-2007, 02:11 PM
Hey Kurt, welcome to the forum !

First and foremost, please take a moment and introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441).

I have six tours as a military member in embassy environments (five in Sub-Sahara), so I get where you're coming from. The CT is and always should be led by its boss, the Ambo. If we're talking about a political appointee driven by his/her own agendas that's one thing and relatively short lived. If, however we're talking about a career SFS member, it's now a question of leadership. I've had the pleasure of both.

Tasking a regional embassy CT to do anything is beyond a doubt a painful process. If the Ambassador is on board you’ll have a fighting chance; but more than likely the most junior and inexperience officer in the embassy will be point man.

I have some doubts about AFRICOM being welcomed by the Africans. There will be some that see the immediate cash and benefits, but others will see nothing but troops and further political maneuvers on the Dark Continent.

Regards, Stan

Like Stan I have multiple tours with embassies or around embassies. Two of those tours were as the DATT, one of which I was lucky enough to have Stan as my NCO Operations Coordinator in Zaire for the 1994 Goma/Bukavu Refugee festival. The players brought machetes versus guitars...

I would say that personalities are everything, whether you are talking the Africa Bureau or the Embassies. In the case of the Africa Bureau in 1994-1996 that was George Moose and he was relatively effective depending on which DAS worked your country. In the case of Zaire, our DAS was NOT high speed low drag and neither was our Charge--we did not have an ambassador. Our Charge was anti-military and bureacratic in the extreme. he was not even going to go on the initial reaction team to Goma until the Bureau called and ordered him to be there when the USAID Administrator hit the ground. Our Charge insisted that this was all going to blow over in 2 weeks and continued to do so long after 2 weeks had passed. Given such a personality, it should not surprise you that the same guy wanted a by name list of crew and PAX on any and all US A/C flying in Op Support Hope. He threatened to refuse country clearances until I called his bluff.

On the other hand my experience in Rwanda was 180 degrees the other direction, both the Ambassador and the DAS were activists. The Ambassador asked for my help and he asked for help from USEUCOM. More importantly he ran a CT that was a team and yes we were definitely a COG when it came to power broking. But we used it in a positive sense; if you wanted something from Rwanda you had to bring something besides platitudes to the table. Visits were welcomed as long as they were visits to help. We had had our fill of genocide tourists--and in one case a gorilla tourist--so the Ambassador did winnow the list of wannabe visitors.

In some ways, a destributed AFICOM will do better than a single HQs if the elements work to make themselves part of the country teams. That should help overcome much of the BS from both sides.

Good discussion

Tom

wm
09-10-2007, 06:02 PM
Get on message. Get the message to the people. Put a face on this story.

This (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20657234/site/newsweek/)latest on line account definitely is not what you were calling for, now is it?


Sept. 17, 2007 issue - America is quietly expanding its fight against terror on the African front. Two years ago the United States set up the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership with nine countries in central and western Africa. There is no permanent presence, but the hope is to generate support and suppress radicalism by both sharing U.S. weapons and tactics with friendly regimes and winning friends through a vast humanitarian program assembled by USAID, including well building and vocational training. In places like Chad, American Special Forces train and arm police or border guards using what it calls a "holistic approach to counterterrorism." Sgt. Chris Rourke, a U.S. Army reservist in a 12-man American Civil Affairs unit living in Dire Dawa, in eastern Ethiopia, says it comes down to this: "It's the Peace Corps with a weapon."

Sometime in the coming months, after a vetting process to find a good partner country, the United States plans to establish a new headquarters in Africa to spearhead this armed battle for hearts, minds and the capture of terror suspects. The Pentagon says Africom—the first new U.S. strategic command established since 2002—will integrate existing diplomatic, economic and humanitarian programs into a single strategic vision for Africa, bring more attention to long-ignored American intelligence-gathering and energy concerns on the continent, and elevate African interests to the same level of importance as those of Asia and the Middle East. Africom joins 10 other commands, including CENTCOM in Florida, the now famous nerve center for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the establishment of a major American base in Africa is inspiring new criticism from European and African critics of U.S. imperial overreach.

kwtusn
09-11-2007, 01:11 AM
Very much appreciate the on-the-ground observations from you guys who've spent significant time inside country teams. When you point out that it almost always comes down to personalities, all I can say is "amen, brother!" Like most seemingly intractable bureaucratic tangles, when you get a few people who are focused on the mission and not interested in who gets credit, problems are easy. But when the pissantry takes center stage, even the simplest tasks become insurmountable.

Wish you could organizationally kill off the pissants, but since that will never happen, seems to me putting in place structures that have broad, regional perspectives have the best shot at looking across the stovepipes and providing opportunities for people to develop the relationships upon which organizational trust can develop. While there are many good, broad-minded Chiefs of Mission (both FS and political), just as their are many broad-minded military officers who truly believe in the strengths of joint and interagency partnerships, simply assuming that everyone has bought into the ethos may not be planning for success. Working the interagency, especially in an immature theater like AFRICOM, may require the same degree of UW savvy displayed by our SOF brethren; you have to know who the local sheiks are, figure out what motivates them, figure out how to match needs and objectives, learn the local tribes, clans, and families, study the nuances of the local dialects, and chip away at the problems with patience.

Don't know who wrote that press release quoted previously, but it lumps together too many missions in ways that promise to scare off potential supporters -- whether African or US State Department. It's the lack of nuance that causes trouble, not what it actually describes. Just not terribly well written for a broader international audience.

Bottom line, seems to me we need to get AFRICOM up and running, with a healthy buy-in from the right broad-minded leaders within State. If we concentrate on working by, with, and through the mechanisms designed by Africans themselves, and stay focused on enabling them to maintain their region-wide perspectives with regional solutions, we'll run into fewer brick walls, at least initially. But this one's going to take some patience.

-- Kurt

kwtusn
09-12-2007, 11:40 AM
Reuters.com
September 10, 2007

U.S. Mounts Charm Offensive For New Africa Command

By Mark Trevelyan, Reuters

LONDON - The launch of a new U.S. military command for Africa is aimed at helping the continent to boost its own security and not at projecting American power or countering Chinese influence, a U.S. official said on Monday.

Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, rejected what he called a series of "myths" surrounding October's launch, also including the idea that it was linked to growing U.S. appetite for West African oil exports.

"The command is focused on African solutions that are led by Africans. ... We do not see this command getting involved in operations. There will be no new troops assigned to Africa as a result of this and there will be no new bases associated with it," Henry told reporters in London.

"We think the solutions to Africa's security problems need to be indigenously developed in Africa. Some outsiders can help, but they can't do the heavy lifting."

The comments were part of a U.S. charm campaign to counter critics' charges that its strategy in Africa is driven by greed, imperialism or competition with China, which has mounted its own strong diplomatic and economic offensive on the continent.

Responsibility for Africa, until now split between three U.S. regional military commands, will be transferred on October 1 to the new Africa Command (AFRICOM). Its head, General William Ward, will eventually be based on the continent and detailed talks are expected in coming months to decide where, Henry said.

The United States currently has around 1,500 troops based in Djibouti in east Africa, and provides training and support to nine north and west African countries through its Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership.

Henry said the evolution of the militant Islamist threat in Africa would depend partly on the pressure the United States was able to bring on al Qaeda elsewhere.

"Al Qaeda has a tendency to 'squirt'. You close in on them, get your hands around them and different parts squirt out to different areas, and where it squirts is into ungoverned territories," he said.

He cited Somalia, where Islamists routed earlier this year are waging an insurgency against a weak interim government, as a "poster child for how bad things can get" when countries lack strong governance and security.

"It's a fully ungoverned area and so the (terrorist) threat always exists. And so it is an area of significant interest to us to make sure that it does not get worse and no formalized training camps start to develop there," Henry said.

He said "our concern continues to be heightened" about al Qaeda's north African arm, which claimed responsibility for two suicide attacks in Algeria last week that killed at least 57 people.

Despite the emphasis on developing indigenous African security, Henry did not rule out the possibility that Washington would intervene with its own forces if it had intelligence pinpointing a top al Qaeda figure in an African country.

"It would depend on a myriad of circumstances. If we thought that someone was going to unleash an attack somewhere in the world that was on the scale of 9/11 or greater, we're obviously going to do something about it," he said.

But "it's obviously best to work with the host country", Henry added.

kwtusn
09-14-2007, 12:37 PM
This (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20657234/site/newsweek/)latest on line account definitely is not what you were calling for, now is it?

No one ever said it was going to be easy! :(

See the below from African press:

Country Moves To Halt U.S. Military

(THIS DAY (LAGOS) 14 SEP 07) ... Juliana Taiwo


GULF OF GUINEA -- The Federal Government has begun moves to frustrate the plan by the United States to establish a military base in the Gulf of Guinea.

The oil-rich gulf is bordered by Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe US has been desperately wooing some countries in the West Africa sub-region to allow her establish a military base to protect the strategic gulf for sometime now.

The move, according to US, is to protect the area from alleged external aggressions but with America now looking in the direction of Africa for her energy needs given the instability in the Middle-east, many analysts say the move is to protect her oil interests.

Defence sources, however, told THISDAY last night in Abuja that the Federal Government was already discussing with heads of government of the African Union and leaders of the sub-regional body, the Economic Community of West African State, on how to block any move by US to establish a base in the gulf.

"Nigeria is not taking the issue lightly at all and the government is not going to allow the US establish any military base anywhere in the ECOWAS region. The interest of the US government in the Gulf of Guinea has reinforced the commitment of the government to intensify its efforts at providing the needed security in the sub-region," the source said.

It was learnt that the Federal Government was worried by the terror alert raised by the US authorities last week and saw it as a ploy to label Nigeria and countries in the sub region as unsafe in order to get the opportunity to create a military base in the region.

As a first step to checkmate that plan, the FG has vowed to frustrate the campaign by the US to establish a base in the gulf.

"The government of this country is not ready for any blackmail. What they cannot get through the back doors they want to get through blackmail. We are not going to succumb to that game," the source said.

THISDAY also learnt that the Defence Headquarters has concluded plans to visit Pentagon, in Washington, to further discuss the issue with the US government.

"In a few weeks from now, some top military personnel will be in the US to present papers on the plans by the African Union to establish an African Command, which will be charged with the responsibility of providing the needed security in the continent.

"We really want to let the US and other countries of the world know that we are capable of protecting the resources within our continent. Nigeria is one country that will continue to move against any plans by the US government to establish a military base in our sub-region. We cannot afford to allow them do that, otherwise we will be finished as military," he said.

Last month, a delegation of the Government of Equatorial Guinea had visited Nigeria and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerian Navy in the area of security, training and equipment.

Currently, US has some presence in the Gulf of Guinea and its forces have been engaging in frequent patrol of the gulf.

However, US interest in the gulf has been increasing amid rising oil exploration in the region.
It was being alleged that West African Navy fleet lacks the capacity to protect oil platforms in the gulf.
As far back as June last year, US explained that its presence in the Gulf of Guinea was aimed at protecting an area regarded as one of the richest sources of hydrocarbons in the world from international criminals.

"We hear a series of stories for our presence in the Gulf of Guinea, but I want to say that we are concerned for Nigeria and we want to help her protect the region from the hands of maritime criminals," said the Commander of US Naval Forces in Europe and Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, Admiral Henry Ulrich.

"In all parts of the world, the US and any good nation want a safe coast for those countries who are supplying energy, and that is why we are often there. So there is nothing to fear for Nigeria," Ulrich said during a Seapower Africa Symposium in Abuja in June last year.

Ulrich had also disclosed that the US planned to increase its naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea in order to ensure maritime safety in the region.

US Naval official said it was necessary to secure the area from international criminals, including terrorists, sea pirates and smugglers.

The gulf's oil and gas deposit is put in the region of 10 billion barrels.
Statistics show that as of 2004, Africa as a whole produced nearly nine million barrels of oil per day, with approximately 4.7 million barrels per day coming from West Africa.

Also, African oil production accounted for approximately 11 percent of the world's oil supply, while the continent supplied approximately 18 per cent of the US net oil imports.

Both Nigeria and Angola were among the top 10 suppliers of oil to the US.

kwtusn
09-14-2007, 12:48 PM
Tom -- I have to agree with you and Stan. It always comes down to leadership and personalities. It's no different in the interagency. Everyone who complains about how screwed up the interagency is, and how "someone needs to fix the interagency" -- as though it were some kind of hermetically sealed black box -- need to look in the mirror. WE are the interagency -- all of us who work in various parts of it. For it to work right, we need to make it work right.

I'm with you though that a few "difficult" personalities in key positions can make that job a lot harder than it needs to be. But it generally seems that the dysfunctionality of the interagency is inversely proportional to the distance outside the Beltway... a few mission-focused people out in the field have been able to work wonders with the right leadership.
-- Kurt

Stan
09-14-2007, 01:02 PM
No one ever said it was going to be easy! :(

See the below from African press:

Country Moves To Halt U.S. Military

(THIS DAY (LAGOS) 14 SEP 07) ... Juliana Taiwo


GULF OF GUINEA -- The Federal Government has begun moves to frustrate the plan by the United States to establish a military base in the Gulf of Guinea.

Hey Kurt !
SIERRA...It's Friday :D

Thanks, great post, but I also want to read the remainder of the story and see where it originated from.

Do us a favor and attach the hyper link so we can read the whole thing ;)

Toolbar, second row, looks like a globe with a chain link below.

Thanks, Stan

Old Eagle
09-14-2007, 01:07 PM
Tom Barnett has been active in the AFRICOM debate. If you are familiar with his "future war" construct, he posits the development of a two component force -- Leviathan (kinetic, in & out lethal forces) and SysAdmin (longer dwell forces to establish order and infrastructure). His Esquire article on TF HOA captures his observations on how this functions on the ground.

His vision for AFRICOM is as a SysAdmin force, a truly interagency coordinating body. Commanded by a RETIRED 4-star, w/Ambassador as DCINC (oops -- we don't call them that anymore). Focus on developing security and infrastructure that wins the long conflict, but kill the bad guys who need killing.

I'm sure I do disservice to his very sophisticated argument.

Stan
09-14-2007, 01:19 PM
Take a look at what some of the African Leaders are saying at All Africa DOT COM. (http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010835.html)

They are content at seeing the same thing (which is no suprise)...Welcome to the Heart of Darkness.

I understand we have til September 08 to get AFRICOM smokin', so there's still time to sell this Tuna Boat.

Who's the taker ?

I'm not starting a pole (they never, ever tell you who won), but my bet is Rwanda. A perfect tiny little NATO base, with land, sea and air access. Hell, Bill Gates was just there offering Windows and fast internet connects :eek:



It's money and status, little else.

Rhodesian
09-14-2007, 06:42 PM
Mugabe apparently sees a base in Botswana as a direct threat to his authoritarian rule. All the more reason to put one in there! IR



From The Nation (Kenya), 13 September

Plans to base US Africa Command in Botswana causes tension
Kitsepile Nyathi


Harare - Plans by the United States military to set up the proposed Africa
Command in Botswana will further polarise the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and delay regional integration because of the West's
treatment of the Zimbabwe crisis, analysts have warned. Zimbabwe, which has
become a divisive topic in the 14 nation block, has in the past spoken
strongly against Botswana's decision to continue hosting Voice of America
(VOA) transmitters. It claims they are being used by the US to transmit
anti-Mugabe propaganda. Botswana has also repeatedly denied accusations by
its neighbour that the US has a military base near the capital Gaborone,
which might be used to effect regime change in Harare. After the explosive
Lusaka SADC heads President Robert Mugabe reportedly walked out of a closed
door session protesting against a frank assessment of the situation in
Zimbabwe by his Zambian counterpart, Mr Levy Mwanawasa, the proposed US base
has emerged as another poser for regional leaders. Mr Mugabe reportedly told
a shell shocked, Mr Mwanawasa he was aware of meetings the Zambian leader
held with Western intelligence about Zimbabwe. The SADC leadership is
bitterly divided over Zimbabwe with leaders who led guerilla movements
during liberation wars in the sub-region siding with Mr Mugabe, while the
'new generation' of leaders such as Mr Mwanawasa and President Festus Mogae
of Botswana have spoken strongly against Harare's human rights record.


Last week, President Mogae was forced to issue a statement on the proposed
base to diffuse the storm but critics say he did little to allay fears that
his country was collaborating with the West. "We have not taken a position
(on AFRICOM) because we don't know how the animal will look like," he told
University of Botswana students during a public lecture. "We are still
discussing the issue." AFRICOM is a new unified combatant command of the US
military with the responsibility of covering Africa. According to the US
department of defence, the initial plans are to create a sub command under
the supervision of the US European Command and must begin initial operations
next month. The command will be temporarily housed at Kelley Barracks in
Stuttgart, Germany until it is fully established in a yet to be determined
African country by the end of September next year. Announcing plans to
create the command in February, US president, Mr George W. Bush said it will
"coordinate all US military and security interests throughout the
continent." Mr Mogae revealed that Botswana was not the only country
approached by the US to host the command saying discussions had also been
held with South Africa. But Dr Themba Nhuka, a political analyst at the
National University of Science and Technology (NUST) said the Mugabe
government has seized news about the setting up of AFRICOM in Botswana to
drive home its claims that some of its neighbours are working with the West
to topple it from power. "Mugabe has a siege mentality," Dr Nhuka said. "To
divert attention from the worsening crisis at home in the past, the
government has taken issue with Botswana for hosting VOA radio transmitters
that broadcast 'hostile' propaganda aimed at regime change by the Americans
and they have now seized this AFRICOM story to their advantage."


He added that "unfortunately most SADC leaders buy into these claims because
they regard Mr Mugabe as a liberation icon" and this will further alienate
fellow leaders who see the Zimbabwean leader as a stumbling leader to
regional integration and economic growth. In Botswana, Zimbabwe's argument
seems to be gaining currency among Mr Mogae's opponents with the official
opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) having already petitioned that
country's parliament against AFRICOM.. "It is our duty as the BNF and indeed
it is the duty of every Botswana citizen who cherishes peace, tranquility
and democracy to vigorously prevent President George Bush from using
Botswana as a spring board for his military and oil based economic
manoeuvres," read the party's petition. SADC had set a target of next year
to reach full regional integration but differences over issues such as
immigration and on how to deal with states that refuse to adhere agreed
democratic and political principles such as Zimbabwe are seen delaying its
success. Mr Lloyd Nhuka of the University of Botswana says the setting up of
AFRICOM in either Botswana or South Africa will further polarise the region
as it would fuel suspicion among political leaders. He said some countries
such as Zimbabwe "were challenging US hegemony" while others were seen
embracing "the superpower's policies." Unfortunately SADC will become the
battle ground for competing US and Chinese interests to the detriment of
regional peace," he said.

SWJED
09-14-2007, 07:28 PM
Two of my favorite cartoonists (Cox and Forkum (http://www.coxandforkum.com/)) on Mugabe:


http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/mugabe1.gif

SWJED
09-14-2007, 07:32 PM
http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/mugabe2.gif

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/mugabe.gif

kwtusn
09-15-2007, 02:55 AM
Stan -- still getting the hang of this :confused:. Sorry, I don't have the link. The piece I copied was forwarded to me as a .txt file (easier to read on bberry), without the original link. I copied the entire story as forwarded. In the future I'll back-check it via google to be sure I've got the whole piece. That said, because of the nature of the forwarding service I'm pretty confident in the sourcing.
-- Kurt

african007
09-16-2007, 07:30 PM
And Africa means it.
NO US base anywhere near anywhere. Here's a site that elaborates the determination and mobilization against it...
Africa Against Africom DOT org (http://africaagainstafricom.org)


I love SWJED's avator, can I borrow it?

Stan
09-17-2007, 02:07 PM
And Africa means it.
NO US base anywhere near anywhere. Here's a site that elaborates the determination and mobilization against it...
Africa Against Africom DOT org (http://africaagainstafricom.org)


I love SWJED's avator, can I borrow it?

The short answer to that question is NO !

Botswana: Botswana Discusses Africom (http://allafrica.com/stories/200709060965.html)

Maybe not such a bleak outlook afterall.

Nigeria: Gulf of Guinea - Govt Soft-Pedals On U.S. Military (http://allafrica.com/stories/200709170011.html) :eek:

Seems the oil-rich hardliner is having problems financing his cheap talk. I wouldn't wait for 'Africa Against AFRICOM' to post that trivial tidbit :wry:

So African007, it's one down and three to go :D

davidbfpo
09-17-2007, 09:27 PM
I am sure ages ago I mentioned there is a huge American built air force base already in Botswana; it was pointed out when I flew from Joburg to Windhoek years ago. Described then as a "white elephant" and was sitting in the middle of the desert.

Check the maps for supply routes for a base in Botswana. Will Namibia, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe allow overflights? South Africa, which has a working transport infrastructure, is the only route in for supplies. Will they really co-operate?

Yes, business and money talk. So check how long the overland routes are.

How about sending a small expedition to try the base out? Remember the AIDS epidemic in Botswana is widely acknowledged as setting the country backwards.

I still say Ascension Island is suitable for the west coast of Africa. Yes, it is offshore, has an airfield (which you operate) and it is British - so we'd agree if asked.

Now back to my armchair.

davidbfpo

Stan
09-18-2007, 08:10 AM
Hello David !

I am sure ages ago I mentioned there is a huge American built air force base already in Botswana; it was pointed out when I flew from Joburg to Windhoek years ago. Described then as a "white elephant" and was sitting in the middle of the desert.

Check the maps for supply routes for a base in Botswana. Will Namibia, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe allow overflights? South Africa, which has a working transport infrastructure, is the only route in for supplies. Will they really co-operate?

Yes, business and money talk. So check how long the overland routes are.

How about sending a small expedition to try the base out? Remember the AIDS epidemic in Botswana is widely acknowledged as setting the country backwards.


Indeed a huge facility with great access. Here's a good picture from Airliners Dot Net (http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0492400/M/). I think blanket overflights much like in the 80s and 90s are still fairly easy, with DAOs in most of the countries. Overflight and landing is an African cash cow, and the USAF needs gas and parking, and almost always pays :wry:


I still say Ascension Island is suitable for the west coast of Africa. Yes, it is offshore, has an airfield (which you operate) and it is British - so we'd agree if asked.

Now back to my armchair.

davidbfpo

I have some very fond memories of Ascension. I would hop on one of Charleston's outbound 141s on a Tuesday and catch the return on Sunday afternoon. I managed to keep up with the Hash runs via HF on One Eleven upper, so knew exactly when the Hares from VC Beer Garden were hosting :)

Before we submit any requests, we may need to discuss that nasty habit of driving on the wrong side of the road :D

Regards, Stan

Stan
09-19-2007, 05:53 PM
From All Africa (http://allafrica.com/stories/200709190881.html) via The UN News Service (New York), 19 September 2007


The situation of children in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has gone from bad to worse, with 60,000 people newly driven from their homes by fighting in North Kivu province, exposing youngsters to the dangers of forced recruitment and sexual exploitation, according to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

The agency has received a report of 54 cases of children recruited in northeast Kivu "and to the west we've heard that there's forced recruitment of all males over the age of 15," Mr. Harneis said. "In the last couple of weeks, we believe that hundreds of children have been recruited into militias, which brings the total number of cases to well over 1,000."

kwtusn
09-20-2007, 07:31 PM
Navy Times

DoD planning 5 regional teams under AFRICOM (http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/09/defense_africom_070919/)


By John T. Bennett - Staff writer
Posted : Thursday Sep 20, 2007 5:40:35 EDT

Much of the work for U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. military’s newest geographic command, likely will be done by five teams, each deployed to and designed for a specific region of the continent.

The plans for these “regional integration teams” are still being laid, but Pentagon officials want a “split-based, tailored presence” there, not a one-size-fits-all approach that might produce dividends in one region but chaos in another, according to Defense Department documents prepared in mid-September.

One team will go to the northern, eastern, southern, central and western portions of the continent, mirroring the African Union’s five regional economic communities, the briefing documents say.

The idea is to “establish regional presence on the African continent which would facilitate appropriate interaction with existing Africa political-military organizations,” one of the Sept. 14 briefings says.

The regional teams will link to African Union organizations, “Africa stand-by force brigade headquarters [and] U.S. AID support hubs,” according to the slides.

More at the above link

Tom Odom
09-21-2007, 12:01 AM
:eek:
Navy Times

DoD planning 5 regional teams under AFRICOM (http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/09/defense_africom_070919/)



More at the above link

Man if I volunteered I know where my butt would be:eek:

No way

Stan
09-21-2007, 07:25 AM
:eek:

Man if I volunteered I know where my butt would be:eek:

No way

And IF you did volunteer, I know where my skinny alpha won't be :wry:

SWJED
09-25-2007, 10:59 PM
New AFRICOM Staff to be Mainly Situated Outside Africa (http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=49013) - Stars and Stripes by Charlie Coon.


The U.S. military’s newest command, Africa Command, could have only a small minority of its people actually working on the continent.

Theresa Whelan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, told a Washington- based think tank last week that 80 percent of the command’s staff would live outside of Africa.

Whelan did not say where the majority of staff would be located, but the command, called AFRICOM, is currently forming up in Stuttgart, Germany. The Defense Department has previously called Stuttgart a temporary headquarters for AFRICOM.

The command is scheduled to begin initial operations on Monday. It would coordinate U.S. military activities on the continent such as military-to-military training and support of humanitarian missions...

Beelzebubalicious
09-26-2007, 07:26 AM
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE:BALANCE OF POWER? (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB627.pdf)
by
Lieutenant Colonel Mary Jo Choate
United States Marine Corps


"The military components of the TSCTI are solid, but there needs to be more investment in the other elements of national power, especially the Economic element. The U.S. needs to dig deep into its pockets, and convince the global community to do likewise, to support long-term programs to reduce poverty and social alienation. Although the TSCTI is touted as an interagency program, the majority of its “face” is military. The interagency partnerships and dovetailing programs are insufficiently tied to TSCTI, and the Information element of national power – both the Information Operations and Public Diplomacy, depending on whether the target audience is the bad guys or the good guys (the people of Africa; the taxpayers and elected officials at home in the U.S.) – needs to be leveraged more often and more effectively. This is how we win hearts, minds and future resources. A program without funding is a fantasy."

goesh
09-26-2007, 01:39 PM
help with filling the bellies, their minds will follow - start providing solar cooking devices to the women to free them up from gathering wood and dry dung all the time so they can spend more time at other tasks, like cooperative income generating projects - a partial solution, nothing more - as a bush mother once told me, " If didn't have to gather so much wood, I could have a bigger garden".

Personally, I'd stamp some propoganda on the side of the box that held the cooker: the cartouche of the all-seeing eye, below that on one side a little American flag with a woman bleow it shaking the hand of an African woman whose national flag is above her head. Food for thought, eh?

Beelzebubalicious
09-26-2007, 05:18 PM
I think you're on to something here. Forget about "winning hearts and minds", that's tired. It's all about winning stomachs and guts!

VinceC
10-02-2007, 07:25 AM
U.S. Africa Command
Stuttgart, Germany
Press Release 08-001
October 1, 2007

Washington, DC – U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, officially stood up today when the organization reached its "initial operating capability" (IOC) to start functioning as the Pentagon’s newest regionally-focused headquarters.
General William E. "Kip" Ward was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on September 28 as AFRICOM's first commander.

AFRICOM’s IOC marks a realignment of the U.S. Defense Department’s regional command structure, creating one headquarters staff that is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 53 countries on the African continent.

www.africom.mil (http://www.africom.mil)

Beelzebubalicious
10-02-2007, 05:35 PM
Will AFRICOM actually change USG policy in Africa, or will it only change the interagency coordination structure?

TROUFION
10-02-2007, 06:07 PM
DOD and DOS cannot change policy as they do not make policy, they only execute policy. That said a dedicated organization executing policy SHOULD give the policy makers -POTUS and Congress a better leveradge point and better insight into the inner workings of Africa, thus it SHOULD lead to better policy.

Tom Odom
10-02-2007, 06:13 PM
DOD and DOS cannot change policy as they do not make policy, they only execute policy. That said a dedicated organization executing policy SHOULD give the policy makers -POTUS and Congress a better leveradge point and better insight into the inner workings of Africa, thus it SHOULD lead to better policy.

Not true, mate. They do set policy as guided by the White House via the NSC, and by Congress. There is an Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for that reason alone.

What Africom should do is better streamline policy execution especially when it comes to monies.

Best

Tom

TROUFION
10-02-2007, 06:18 PM
The deputy undersecretary for Policy is an advisor, they can generate the policy but it still takes effect only when the POTUS gives the nod. of course he is not truly involved in every little thing the advisors do the work.

The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy adviser to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is a member of the President's Cabinet and of the National Security Council.

The undersecretary for policy--The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is to consistently provide responsive, forward-thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national security objectives.

Tom Odom
10-02-2007, 06:55 PM
The deputy undersecretary for Policy is an advisor, they can generate the policy but it still takes effect only when the POTUS gives the nod. of course he is not truly involved in every little thing the advisors do the work.

The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy adviser to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is a member of the President's Cabinet and of the National Security Council.


And having done it for real on the ground, the DoD, State, and the Unified Commands set the policies for all intents and purposes through the inter-agency process. The Nat Sec Advisor's ultimate role is the monitor that process and advise the President when more direct intervention is required. The good Nat Sec Advisors know when things are off track and use the weight of the President to get the process going. Tony Lake did that after the genocide; I wished he had done more before and during. In recent times, that is to me where Condi Rice failed. She did not keep the interagency process in balance.

Best

Tom

Ken White
10-02-2007, 07:19 PM
I also know how our Guvmint really works. The Departments do effectively set de facto policy in many areas. Sometimes it's followed up with a de jure Presidential nod, sometimes not. Frequently it just fills a vacuum and stays around. It also is sometimes set not by a Department but by one of their minions on the ground and the Department involved embeds it.

That latter construct has gotten even more deeply entrenched since Goldwater Nichols gave the geo Cincs so much clout...

Also agree with Tom on the NSA but in defense of some would point out that a firm and more bureaucratically aware (is that a nice way to put it?) SecState or SecDef can hobble even the best NSA. That's happened to others aside from Rice.

Stan
10-02-2007, 07:26 PM
I'll echo what Tom and Ken said.

The arduous process falls far from the top of the food chain. Even hamstrung EUCOM held the purse strings and called many shots, far from the flag pole. There were of course those ammusing instances when CENTCOM would wage war from Florida :wry:

Contrary to the belief that Sierra always rolls down hill, Policy was drafted in the field (I watched it many, many times), and shoved up the pipe to DC.

With a purported 800 employees from DOD and DOS, AFRICOM will have far more influence over its 5 regional teams and should preclude what soldiers in the past endured as policy makers pondered over upheaval, civil war and genocide from the folks at ground zero.

Ken White
10-02-2007, 09:01 PM
in my observation... :rolleyes:

TROUFION
10-02-2007, 11:01 PM
They do set policy as guided by the White House via the NSC, and by Congress.

Hi gents, I think we like to argue..er discuss.. just for the hell of it sometimes. We get wrapped on words. In this case the difference beteween the intial question and the response: the question was can it CHANGE policy. My answer was that AFRICOM in and of itself cannot change a policy it will execute the policy that is already set. Tom's answer is that DOD or in this case AFRICOM can SET Policy de facto by virtue of being on the ground in direct contact and de jure by authority of the Under SECDEF for Policy. That does not mean they can change a policy. Setting means establishing new policy, changing means taking an existing policy and altering it.

I believe the answer is somewhere in between.

The scope of the policy inquestion is important. For instance lets talk hypothetically about the policy for DOD assistance to the Presidents AIDS eradication program. If the POTUS has the program up and running and it requires that abstinance be the principle method of birth control and that no money could be spent on other methods that would be a policy. A DOD person on the ground could say hey that is dumb why not give them condoms and then de facto purchases and delivers condoms. That would be a violation of the pre-exisiting policy. That would get the well meaning hardcharger on deck in a good deal of trouble. He would not be authorized to CHANGE the policy. Now if there was no policy SET regarding the purchase and distribution of condoms as a secondary method for the prevention and treatment of AIDS then the local command could purchase and distribute condoms therby setting a new policy. :D

Ken White
10-02-2007, 11:37 PM
DOD and DOS cannot change policy as they do not make policy, they only execute policy. That said a dedicated organization executing policy SHOULD give the policy makers -POTUS and Congress a better leveradge point and better insight into the inner workings of Africa, thus it SHOULD lead to better policy. (emphasis added /kw)

Think the words highlighted may be what what folks cued upon. :confused:

As for the changing, it can happen. Your example is unlikely to be changed because, as you note; it's a pet rock of the Prez. A possible current example of change would be the deals with the Sunnis in Iraq, a pet rock of somewhat lesser lights that got changed on the ground and wandered upstream. Been a lot of others over the years. :cool:

I can remember a young Colonel telling me in 1976 that there was no such thing as an implied mission below Battalion. I just laughed. There's always an implied mission; the result of execution may be medal or a court martial; sometimes in a race . Always interesting to see which one gets there first. :D

Tom Odom
10-03-2007, 12:15 AM
As for the changing, it can happen. Your example is unlikely to be changed because, as you note; it's a pet rock of the Prez. A possible current example of change would be the deals with the Sunnis in Iraq, a pet rock of somewhat lesser lights that got changed on the ground and wandered upstream. Been a lot of others over the years.

Ken

Agreed and great example. We are generally led to believe that campaign plans are not something that embassies and ambassadors and DATTs conceive and write. In our case in Rwanda in post genocide 84-95, White House poilicy was essentially "don't embarrass us or let us embarrass ourselves, again." That meant do what needed to be done but it was not a policy with a goal. We rock souped EUCOM, DoD, and the NSC by simply writing out what we were doing in a coherent campaign plan which EUCOM adopted pretty much as we put it, DoD echoed, and the NSC said to State, "THere ya go: there is our policy and its sub goals. Srate didn't like it (at least State in some quarters) but a fait accompli was hard to refute, when the Nat Sec Advisor said, "do it." the campaign plan was the rock; we then got money to make the soup.

Trufion,

As Ken stated with the highlighting, I posted because your response to Beez while correct in legal sense did not capture the reality of interagency squabbling and horse trading. Good discussion.

Best

Tom

Beelzebubalicious
10-03-2007, 09:36 AM
Interesting discussion, but I was really aiming at something a bit different. I should have phrased my question better. I should have said "Will the creation of AFRICOM actually change US Policy in Africa, or will it only change the interagency coordination structure?" So, not so much AFRICOM's role in creating and implementing policy, but how it's existence will impact policy directions.

Reason I ask is b/c officially, I see statements saying that AFRICOM will only help support USG policy in Africa. However, others see the creation and development of AFRICOM as a signal of a militarization of USG policy. Take for example, the following quote:


“There is strong fear and apprehension within Africa, within the United States, in Europe and elsewhere that AFRICOM signals the militarization of U.S. engagement in Africa at the expense of developmental and diplomatic interests,” added Stephen Morrison, an Africa expert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=4F454273-5173-4AE4-AB2A-61EAEE7181E9

Personally, I don't see it as a militarization, but I am interested to hear opinions on how having an African Command may impact or change policy.

Tom Odom
10-03-2007, 12:22 PM
Personally, I don't see it as a militarization, but I am interested to hear opinions on how having an African Command may impact or change policy.

Your view is correct. It is not. It is as stated above a way of focusing efforts, especially when it comes to budgets.

best

Tom

Stan
10-03-2007, 03:06 PM
I should have said "Will the creation of AFRICOM actually change US Policy in Africa, or will it only change the interagency coordination structure?"

The short answer, it will change both...but that's a good thing.
Overall, it will affect policy decisions because the new, improved 800-man system will do a much better job at coordinating.

Don't get me wrong, EUCOM did a damn good job coordinating interagency ops (EUCOM is and was interagency) with a very short-handed staff, and our immediate needs on the ground had to be transmitted via DC.

There's a glimmer of hope that AFRICOM will also employ some foreign language speakers :wry:

Beelzebubalicious
10-23-2007, 02:05 PM
VOA has just started a 5-part series on AFRICOM. Check out first installment at http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/US-Officials-Insist-New-Military-Command-To-Benefit-Africa.cfm

Jedburgh
11-07-2007, 02:45 PM
....the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, was created in 2005 as a five-year, $500 million endeavor with nine nations in Western Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, and Chad. Touted as a program that is as much a non-military development assistance initiative as it is a military-to-military training initiative, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative seems to complement the diplomatic, economic, law enforcement and informational programs concurrently being administered by the U.S. in Africa, but is the balance of (national) power right?
ISN Security Watch, 7 Nov 07: Africa's Unfolding Desert War (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18326)

....Under the US military program, started in 2005, US$500 million will be spent over seven years to train thousands of African troops drawn from the trans-Saharan area including Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco and Tunisia. US military strategy for West Africa, within the framework of the global war on terror, appears to be to work with the regional militaries to keep out suspected terrorist groups while securing oil interests in the Gulf of Guinea.

In doing this, the US appears to be labeling "virtually all Islamist reform movements as terrorist or, at least, highly suspect [...] regardless of local histories, national injustices or facts on the ground," argue researchers Paul M Lubeck, Michael J Watts and Ronnie Lipschutz in a February report (http://www.ciponline.org/NIGERIA_FINAL.pdf) for the independent Washington-based Centre for International Policy. It was the same mistake Western military interventionists made during the Cold War, they say.....

Jedburgh
11-24-2007, 01:58 PM
SSI, 21 Nov 07: AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism" "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB827.pdf)

The February 2007 decision to launch a new Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM (http://www.africom.mil/)) has already been met with significant controversy both in the United States and abroad. AFRICOM’s proponents claim that the new command accurately reflects Africa’s growing strategic importance and an enlightened U.S. foreign policy focused on supporting “African solutions to African problems.” Its critics allege that the command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing the Africa’s burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.

To overcome such misgivings, AFRICOM must demonstrate a commitment to programs mutually beneficial to both African and American national interests. Yet a shrewd strategic communication campaign will not be enough to convince a skeptical African public that AFRICOM’s priorities mirror their own. Indeed, much African distrust is justified. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and East Africa, though couched in a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win “hearts and minds,” have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on short-term objectives.....

Global Scout
11-24-2007, 02:59 PM
AFRICOM’s proponents claim that the new command accurately reflects Africa’s growing strategic importance and an enlightened U.S. foreign policy focused on supporting “African solutions to African problems.” Its critics allege that the command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing the Africa’s burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.

I think both the proponents and critics are correct. Very few nations act purely on altruistic motives (except in extreme cases of humanitarian suffering), but in this situation if the strategy is well thought out it should be a win-win situation for the U.S. and many nations in Africa.

Stan
11-24-2007, 07:23 PM
Africa Command Pledges (http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1583) to Partner with Other U.S. Agencies

Not a bad start, General. Now if we could just get those 'other agencies' to agree with you. :rolleyes:


The military's unified command responsible for engagement activities across Africa will work in tandem with other U.S. government agencies to assist partner nations there to confront poverty, disease, terrorism and other challenges, a senior U.S. officer said today.

"We are not looking to take the lead for any other government-agency work that they are doing today across the continent or our international partners," Navy Vice Adm. Robert T. Moeller, U.S. Africa Command's deputy to the commander for military operations, told "bloggers" and Internet reporters during a conference call.

AFRICOM will team with the U.S. State Department and other U.S. agencies and organizations to assist African partners to combat AIDS, malaria and other challenges that affect regional stability and security, Moeller explained.

"The establishment of AFRICOM is not about the deployment of [sizeable U.S.] forces to the continent or the establishment of bases," Moeller emphasized.

A key point is that African nations are taking the lead in their relations with AFRICOM, which will assist those countries in developing the capacities they need to help themselves, Moeller said. Source: DefenseLink

Nice links (http://www.africom.mil/africomLinks.asp) at the site !

SWJED
11-27-2007, 12:26 AM
Conversation with General William Ward, U.S. Africa Command (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/conversation-with-general-will/) - 27 minute interview.

Beelzebubalicious
01-02-2008, 03:06 PM
I recently stumbled across this article (http://www.sfbayview.com/20071228738/News/Web_Exclusives/Africom_The_military_projection_of_foreign_policy. html)written by by Jean Damu and published on Friday, December 282007 in the San Francisco Bay View, National Black Newspaper.

I was interested to note, to the extent that this article is representative, how black politicians and the Congressional Black Caucus view the establishment of AFRICOM.

Tom Odom
01-02-2008, 03:16 PM
It was from Uganda that the U.S. aided in the destabilization of Rwanda, which resulted in the 1994 genocide.

Here we go again with the US-Rwanda conspiracy but look at the author:


Jean Damu is the former western regional representative for N'COBRA, National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, a former member of the International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, taught Black Studies at the University of New Mexico, has traveled and written extensively in Cuba and Africa and currently serves as a member of the Steering Committee of the Black Alliance for Just Immigration. Email him at jdamu2@yahoo.com.

Beelzebubalicious
01-02-2008, 08:29 PM
Tom, other than general suspicion of USG and US-military objectives in Africa, what do you think drives the persistence of these beliefs?

Stan
01-02-2008, 09:02 PM
Military Review, January-February 2008 (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/McFateEngJanFeb08.pdf)

A short read, but I gotta disagree with more than half (for now).


The first effect is that Africa was never a number-one priority for any unified command. Each viewed its strategic imperative as being elsewhere, leaving Africa as a secondary or even tertiary concern.

Second, the three-part division of responsibility violates the principle of unity of command, increasing the likelihood of an uncoordinated DOD effort in Africa.

Third, owing to historical disinterest, DOD never developed a sizable cadre of dedicated African experts.

Lastly, Africa has never benefited from the advocacy
of a four-star commander whose undiluted mandate includes helping policymakers understand the perspectives of African countries and formulate effective African security policy.

Tom Odom
01-03-2008, 02:36 PM
Tom, other than general suspicion of USG and US-military objectives in Africa, what do you think drives the persistence of these beliefs?

Well in the case of the Rwanda-US Conspiracy, that has long legs well sustained by our friends the French and their former allies (and closet buddies) the genocidal killers of the former regime. They play the conspiracy crowd/alternate media/radical history crowd like a fine violin. Here is an example. (http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=13139)


DB: Are you saying you believe the RPF planned to incite genocide and began to do so back when they invaded in 1990?

JCN: Yes, because the final aggression that started on April 6th was the final attack, but since the beginning, they had planned to seize power and in order to seize power it was not in their interest to join a transitional government because they would eventually lose the elections anyway. Imagine any country, anywhere you go, the United States or any country from Europe, Asia…you can’t find a minority ruling the country. The only way for the RPF to do this, they had to find a shortcut that could help them seize and retain power and they have to use force and fear to maintain it. They also had to get support from all the countries that had their own interests in the region.

When the aggression started, the RPF told the world they wanted to bring back democracy to Rwanda. This was a smokescreen to hide their real agenda: minority rule. They got financial aid, advising, and military training from the U.K. and the United States through Uganda.

DB: Do you know who specifically was financing the RPF in the beginning, regardless of if they are foreign nationals or Rwandans?

JCN: U.S. and U.K. multinationals supported the RPF so that they could get access to loot Central Africa’s mineral resources, particularly in Zaire. To reach this goal, the RPF had to be connected to the Clinton Administration because they were the most influential in the U.N. There were also organizations that supported the Tutsi refugees based in the United States. Can you imagine the shameful attitude of the U.S. administration’s representative Herman Cohen against the Rwandan nation? He said that President Habyarimana’s body, the state symbol of Rwanda, would be dragged through the streets of Kigali and his government would be tried by a special tribunal.9

In a larger sense, Africa is no different than other post-colonial regions where Western neo-colonial aims are an assumption from which all facts are generated. As for the particular paper Mr Damu wrote for, I will leave that to you to form your own opinions. :D

ancien
01-03-2008, 05:13 PM
Well, because they also pass the rabit to the Belgians, I feel inclined to respond to this without getting oftopic in this thread.
In the 60's they said that we interfiered to much in the internal problems of the Congo, so in a feuwe countries they started to protest.
Concerning Rwanda, they said that we did not responded, so the genocide spread out.
THEY shoud make up there mind :confused:

MattC86
01-03-2008, 06:18 PM
Well in the case of the Rwanda-US Conspiracy, that has long legs well sustained by our friends the French and their former allies (and closet buddies) the genocidal killers of the former regime. They play the conspiracy crowd/alternate media/radical history crowd like a fine violin. Here is an example. (http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=13139)



In a larger sense, Africa is no different than other post-colonial regions where Western neo-colonial aims are an assumption from which all facts are generated. As for the particular paper Mr Damu wrote for, I will leave that to you to form your own opinions. :D

This just reinforces that whole theme of alternative narratives and IO. We know its not true, and some people intellectually know its not true, but how do we "prove" it's not true?

I think any potential mission in Africa, under AFRICOM or a different combatant command, from FID to a Restore Hope-type OOTW could smack of neo-colonialism to certain people. That seems to be why it's hard to get Europe to participate there - Romeo Dallaire catalogued the Europeans' (particularly French and Belgian) fear of appearing imperialistic in their old colonial stomping grounds in Rwanda in 1994. The US wasn't an imperial power in Africa, yet we're tarnished with the same brush in the eyes of the world.

Speaking of FID, do we do those kind of operations in Africa, outside the Horn? Or is even that a larger footprint than we want?

Matt

Tom Odom
01-03-2008, 08:09 PM
That seems to be why it's hard to get Europe to participate there - Romeo Dallaire catalogued the Europeans' (particularly French and Belgian) fear of appearing imperialistic in their old colonial stomping grounds in Rwanda in 1994.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

Ken White
01-03-2008, 08:57 PM
Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC... :D

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

Stan
01-03-2008, 09:44 PM
Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC... :D

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes :cool:

Ken White
01-03-2008, 11:17 PM
Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes :cool:

StriCom layout at Pope. My Battle group commander erred in front of Paul D. Said Colonel disappeared that night and was never seen at Bragg again, new Colonel arrived two days later... :wry:

ancien
01-04-2008, 01:44 AM
.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

I take your explanetion greatly into account, sir.
But I would like to contribute on the Belgian part in UNAMIR.

Unamir was created under a UN mandate. The origine of the Arusha agreement started with the agreement of N'sele after the RPF invasion in 1990. From thereone it got evolved to the OAU and then to the UN. At all these negotiations from the beginning, GOR, FPR, Belgium, France, US where involved ore supervising these negosiations. With respect to you, sir, but the US goverment new verry wel why we where there. You wrote two papers envolving Belgian interventions in Africa, so maybe there is a answer in those documents.

When Belgium contributed forces to UNAMIR, it was presented on the media that it was a request of president Habyarimana because the french where not a option for the FPR.
The message of that story is that the Belgians arrived in Rwanda on a UN mission where Belgian civilians lived and worked. So, as a Belgian UN soldier, you are a hostage from day one.

At that time nobody cared about Rwanda. Until the 6 april. It is frustrating that there are a lot of people who write books about Rwanda genocide, and all they start from the shootdown of the airplane toward the invasion of zaire ore from the 6 april back to 1990 and from there a jump to 1961 and the previeus years. The Rwandan problem goos back a lot further in time, in a timeframe where there where no europeans. At that time, Africa was all about litle kingdoms.

I'am not going to attack gen. Dallaire on a open forum regarding a few statements about us in his book or interviews, ore am I going to discus his own action. At that time before the 6 april when nobody new Rwanda, Whe where the only ones who had a grip on the situation and not the UN. We where spread out over Kigali in smal units and that strategy became very importend after the 6th april, but was very dangoures. There is not one army in the entyre western world that would do what we did at that time, no armourded vehicles, no gunhelicopters, no artilery, no havy weapons and NO MANDATE. There where times when other forces of UNAMIR would not come out of there bases, BUT THE BELGIANS DID. Concirning gen. Dallaire, he hat a hard and unworkable mandate, and after the shootdown of the airplane, the genocide, the amputated mandate of UNAMIR II and the refugy problem, he had the CNNthing on his neck.

So when the rest of the regiment, the French an the Italians arrived, it was the wish of the Belgian goverment to stop the mission whitsh we where very angry about, but it was made after consulting the partners in that croked peacedeal including the US goverment. At that time all the countries should have hold the line like 2CDO did on there own, they where a example how to work in a crisissituation with a UN mandate.

You where in Kigali, so it is posible that you now camp Kigali, then you now how many soldiers there can be stationed.
The squad of LT Lotin, 1SGT Leroy, CPL Bassinne, CPL Debatty, CPL Dupont, CPL Lhoir, CPL Meaux, CPL Plescia, CPL RENWA, CPL Uytebroeck, hold the line for more than half a day, AND THAT IS WHO WE ARE!

About the French part, your book has not arrived yet, sir

regards,

Tom Odom
01-04-2008, 02:20 AM
Ancien,

I made no criticism of the PC Regiment and intended that none be taken. General Dallaire's comments are a matter of public record and they dealt primarily with matters of behavior of young soldiers.

I understand the frustration of you and other regiment members after the death of your comrades. We did much the same in Somalia, just months earlier.

US pressure was indeed targeted toward a complete drawdown of all UN forces as the genocide began. Ambassador Albright at the UN refused to deliver that message and said so to the White House.

Finally as I said earler I believed then and still do that the PC Regiment performed well under dire circumstances and ROE that led to tragedy, What I found fault with was the Belgian government's decision to court martial officers for essentially following those ROE.

Best

Tom

ancien
01-04-2008, 11:14 AM
Sir,I was not formulating criticism on your part or do I take it as criticism from you ;)
I only want to ad some perspective insight in the Rwanda situation. For people who have no insight in the matter,they would make the wrong conclusion about us and the situation.

I now gen. Dallaire wrote about us in that matter, so did col. Marchal. For me as a soldier, I consider this below there position. For as long the military has existed in history, these event unfortunably happen. They both exepted the responsability of that mission, they could decline it, but for there personel reasens they exepted.

I olso take the stand, that putting a highranking officer in a courtroom concerning the squad of LT Lotin is very wrong. They where sacrafied. A intervention on camp Kigali by Belgian soldiers to rescue the squad could lead to sirieus danger to Belgian nationals in Rwanda, and the other UN units where not trained and willing to do so. But you wil not hear this coming from a politician.
We don't ask for honor in this, but we don't diserve to be castigated like that in the media. We worn the political leaders from the beginning that the peaceproces might break. Especialy, the Belgian politicians made huge diplomatic faulds in that matter.


regards,

Cavguy
03-16-2008, 06:43 AM
All,

Found the following at Intel Dump (http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/posts/1205624073.shtml):

AFRICOM's new logo/patch(?) below. I about snorted my drink all over the keyboard when I saw it.

http://www.africom.mil/images/AfricomCrestReduced.gif

Maybe I was just deployed too long or have it on the brain ... but quite a likeness to some ... ahem ... feminine parts. :eek: :confused:

Interesting choice of design. Can't believe no one involved in the production noticed the possible interpretations.

Judge for yourself. It's on http://www.africom.mil (http://www.africom.mil/), so it's not a hoax.:wry:

patmc
03-16-2008, 01:05 PM
If you want to make Africa happy, just stay in touch with Egypt.

Tom Odom
03-16-2008, 01:06 PM
Maybe I was just deployed too long or have it on the brain ... but quite a likeness to some ... ahem ... feminine parts.

Well it is curiously inviting....:wry:

Van
03-16-2008, 01:10 PM
Deliberate? It would certainly symbolize the underlying problem of Africa; Over-population.

Tom Odom
03-16-2008, 01:45 PM
And where is home plate?


JIM
So let's say you get there...what's
uh, third base feel like?

KEVIN
Oh, man, that's kind of sad.

Jim shrugs, embarrassed.

OZ
Feels like warm apple pie, dude.

JIM
Apple pie...
(then)
McDonald's or homemade?

Rob Thornton
03-16-2008, 02:20 PM
Marc - we expect a very detailed anthropological analysis on this - from the subliminal pieces of development - to the effects of wearing it in public:D Rob

Wesley Morgan
03-16-2008, 09:11 PM
I'm glad someone else sees it too...

marct
03-17-2008, 04:15 AM
Marc - we expect a very detailed anthropological analysis on this - from the subliminal pieces of development - to the effects of wearing it in public:D Rob

All I can say is the must have got their inspiration from here (http://books.google.ca/books?id=0JGMwO7Lo8kC&dq=%22the+vagina+monologues%22&pg=PP1&ots=esZH6wFyLj&sig=z3J7vDrAepGizA23wV_hPiAFDQE&hl=en&prev=http://www.google.ca/search?q=%22the+vagina+monologues%22&sourceid=navclient-ff&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1B3GGGL_enCA228CA230&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title&cad=one-book-with-thumbnail) :eek::D.

Rob Thornton
03-17-2008, 06:00 PM
Maybe its just in line with a whole of government approach - got to love the homonyms:D Best, Rob

Ski
03-17-2008, 07:39 PM
"30 Days to Cairo"

Unofficial motto of the SDF Armored Korps...so legend has it...:)

Vic Bout
03-17-2008, 08:26 PM
Georgia O'Keeffe.

SWJED
07-15-2008, 09:31 PM
Got this e-mail today. There is a teleconference with the author on Thursday and I requested a spot.


Dear Dave,

In a post about AFRICOM last year, you wrote: “Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right.” Refugees International is releasing a report this Thursday, July 17 that lays out recommendations for the US to get AFRICOM right, and much of it has to do with the interagency collaboration you proposed.

The report also analyzes the ways in which US foreign aid in Africa—and the world over—is becoming increasingly militarized, in some cases to the detriment of long-term security and humanitarian and development investment. On Thursday, July 17 at 12pm ET, there will be a phone briefing on the report with the report’s author, Mark Malan, and Ken Bacon, President of Refugees International.

In the report, Mark Malan (Peace Building Program Manager for Refugees International and former head of research for Kofi Annan’s International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana) asserts that AFRICOM is enabling the Department of Defense to take over funds that were previously managed by the State Department and USAID. For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%.

The report argues Pentagon programs in Africa fund immediate, short-term security programs rather than the broader U.S. commitment to aid the growth of prosperous, stable countries. For example, more than half of the FY09 requested budget for Foreign Military Financing in Africa is for just two countries – Djibouti and Ethiopia – that are considered key partners in the continental War on Terror. As a result, 17 African Union member states have refused to host AFRICOM operations on their soil, viewing the US agency as an occupying force rather than a solution to long-term stability and security needs.

In spite of AFRICOM’s drawbacks, however, Refugees International contends that AFRICOM could have an extremely positive impact on the region. A meaningful collaboration among the State Department, USAID and the Defense Department could kill three birds with one stone: help the US and African nations to fight terrorism, assist African countries with sustainable economic development, and build goodwill on the ground among humanitarian agencies, African legislators and civilians.

The report will be available for download at 12 am, July 17 at www.refugeesinternational.org.

Ron Humphrey
07-16-2008, 02:40 AM
Got this e-mail today. There is a teleconference with the author on Thursday and I requested a spot.

The hearing today was rather interesting as well as somewhat painful. Looks like we might just get that discussion happening on what the military is expected to do and what it isn't/shouldn't and what civilian counterparts need in order to do their parts. That would be a good thing me thinks:D

Not said in so many words but definitely comes out in what seems to be the reasoning behind some of the questions

Featherock
07-16-2008, 02:55 AM
"For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%."

This is key. Can't wait for the report.

Jedburgh
07-16-2008, 02:54 PM
GAO, 15 Jul 08: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08947t.pdf)

....The initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed by DOD, met resistance from within the U.S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, which is critical to synchronizing DOD efforts with other U. S. government agencies. DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in the command. According to DOD, other agencies have limited resources and personnel systems which have not easily accommodated DOD’s intent to place interagency personnel in the command. Second, DOD has encountered concerns from civilian agencies and other stakeholders over the command’s mission and goals. For example, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have expressed concerns that AFRICOM will become the lead for all U.S. efforts in Africa, rather than just DOD activities. If not addressed, these concerns could limit the command’s ability to develop key partnerships. Third, DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of the command’s presence in Africa. Uncertainties related to AFRICOM’s presence hinder DOD’s ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD’s concept for developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved....

Beelzebubalicious
07-16-2008, 06:28 PM
There's a lot behind and in-between these numbers. Depending on how you slice it, assistance is up or down. A better and more in-depth analysis can be found at www.cgdev.org/files/15423_file_US_aid_to_Africa5.pdf and other locations.

Certainly, Africa has received a lot of funds for Malaria control and HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR and PMI) that are not necessarily "controlled" by the State Department or USAID. The Millenium Challenge Account funds are not controlled by USAID, but USAID sometimes manages the assistance.

I'd like to see if RI analyzes this properly and puts it all into context. They should also address, up front, their own biases and agendas.

Old Eagle
07-16-2008, 06:56 PM
SECDEF's speech on SWJ is very interesting in this connection.

Featherock
07-17-2008, 03:04 PM
Good point Beez. I'm going to check out your link.

And yes, SecDef's recent speech is consistent with some of the criticisms raised by RI in that report. I'm liking this trend, though, of getting people to re-think the erosion of DoS vs. the DoD in the foreign policy realm.

Beelzebubalicious
07-17-2008, 09:29 PM
I skimmed the report and pulled out this quote (below). I think the problem is that a ton of funding has gone into Africa but what the public sees is what appears to be a lack of results - more wars, more refugees, more problems.

The major contention, I think, is that the GWOT may have shorter-term goals of eliminating the threat of terrorism which may undermine long-term development efforts at capacity building, democratization, poverty reduction, etc. The point and frankly, the question remains, is whether long-term development goals, if funded sufficiently and implemented effectively will address the fundamental questions of security and terrorism. I think the DOD has answered, in part, that the efforts, largely on their own, have not produced results and that's why we have the problems we do now (and that's why efforts need to be coordinated)

Are short-term stability and counter-terrorism efforts counter-productive to long-term stability and development? Can we do both? I think we can , we have to and we are already doing it. Companies and organizations like RI need to figure out how THEY can get on board, not how the everyone else needs to. I didn't see much evidence of that.



The resultant militarization of aid in an effort to prevail in the war against terrorism and in pursuit of national security objectives is unlikely to enhance either national security or the ability of the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals. The history of counter-insurgency, as well as development theory and practice, points rather towards long-term failure.

Stan
07-22-2008, 08:06 PM
Russia's Pravda (http://english.pravda.ru/world/africa/22-07-2008/105848-africa-0): The USA has started to expand its military presence in African countries through humanitarian channels, which can only aggravate the tense situation in the continent.



The US aid contributes to the militarization of the region. Therefore, it is not ruled out that it will never be possible to establish peaceful communities in post-conflict African states.

The USA will soon set up a new organization, Africa Command (Africom), which will try to reach balance between US financial efforts in Africa, the interests of the Department of State, USAID and the Pentagon. Most likely, Africom will follow Pentagon’s instructions only.

Beelzebubalicious
07-23-2008, 06:28 PM
Yes, as if the Russians have a leg to stand on this issue...they do like to point out perceived, exagerrated, or otherwise invented US weaknesses and issues.

MattC86
07-23-2008, 08:56 PM
Did Dave get a spot on the conference call? I'd be interested in hearing what some of RI's people had to say about this, as well as other interested parties. . .

Regards,

Matt

Jedburgh
08-26-2008, 02:08 PM
JFQ, 4th Qtr 08, Special Feature:

U.S. Africa Command and the Principle of Active Security (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/16.pdf)

....Active Security is a persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to contribute to an enhanced level of dialogue and development. The goal of Active Security is to enable our partners to marginalize the enemies of peace; minimize the potential for conflict; foster the growth of strong, just governments and legitimate institutions; and support the development of civil societies.....
The Road to a New Unified Command (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/17.pdf)

.....It is exhilarating to create a new command in order to reflect the growing importance of our African partners, but turning it into a reality requires incredible amounts of detailed work, dedication, and energy. We appreciate the efforts of all who contributed to our establishment—from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, other participating U.S. Government agencies, Country Teams in Africa, and fellow unified commands (especially U.S. European Command). We also thank those who participated in the Implementation Planning Team and transition team, and ultimately the Servicemembers, civilians, and contractors of U.S. Africa Command. Achieving full unified command status is a major accomplishment, one that leads to greater security and stability on the continent of Africa and its island nations.
USAFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy? (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/18.pdf)

The U.S. Government is in a unique position to leverage a momentous and historic shift in military focus: that it is now possible to mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict by working with allies and partners to shape the international environment and thus promote stability and security.1 U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is the embodiment of this opportunity. Though American efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, they are nonetheless overly reliant on the Armed Forces and, as such, do little to alleviate the perception of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. But the Government can mitigate and reverse this perception by implementing an integrated 3D (diplomacy, development, and defense) security engagement policy.....
Legal Impediments to USAFRICOM Operationalization (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/19.pdf)

.....When one considers the broad mandate of U.S. Africa Command, one recognizes that the Department of Defense has made a serious departure from the historic role of the geographic combatant commander. The creation of this command is more than the paper transfer of areas of responsibility from the rosters of other commands; it marks a major shift in military function away from kinetic operations and toward capability-building via strategic engagement. Yet while the command sprints toward full operationalization, the realities of the operating environment appear overlooked. One finds a fragmented international agreement framework that, although satisfactory for the previous combatant commands, undermines the flexibility in engagement that is the raison d’ être of U.S. Africa Command. The limited existing framework lacks parity among sovereign states. Clearly, a concerted effort by Defense, with State approval, to negotiate and conclude comprehensive Status of Forces and Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreements will facilitate long-term USAFRICOM strategic objectives. Additionally, while the command hopes to fully engage its African partners, its fiscal hands are tied. A statutory regime that strictly limits the U.S. military contribution to stability, security, health, and welfare is unworkable. Authority for these efforts must be vested in the commander, using specifically appropriated funding. Accordingly, legislation that validates the nontraditional role of USAFRICOM should be favorably considered by Congress......

Jedburgh
08-27-2008, 09:19 PM
SSI, 27 Aug 08: U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB821.pdf)

What is the most effective long-term approach to U.S. counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)? The purpose of this paper is to lay the framework for answering this central question. The current struggle of the United States and its allies against terrorist groups and individuals motivated by Islamic extremism consumes U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. Never a centerpiece of U.S. foreign and defense policy, SSA is now a front in the conflict to counter global Islamic extremism. As in the past, however, SSA remains largely misunderstood and misperceived in the United States. Yet, the U.S. Government is now embarked on reform of U.S. policy toward the African continent with uncertain consequences.....
Complete 81-page paper at the link.

Michael F
09-17-2008, 12:45 PM
As an update on AFRICOM

AFRICOM to work with Congress on budget request
By Steve Mraz, Stars and Stripes
Mideast edition, Wednesday, September 17, 2008



U.S. Africa Command will work through the Defense Department to explain its budget request for the coming fiscal year to Congress, said a top AFRICOM officer on Monday.

The command, which is set to become fully operational on Oct. 1, is at risk of receiving 80 percent less funding than what was formally requested.:eek:

"If something bad were to happen, that would be bad," said Air Force Maj. Gen. Michael Snodgrass, AFRICOM chief of staff. "That’s a hypothetical. There’s no reason to even discuss hypotheticals. We’ll wait until we get a final budget amount. We’ll do an analysis on that budget amount, and we’ll have to determine what the way ahead is after that."

Last week, the House Appropriations subcommittee on defense recommended providing only $80.6 million in funding for fiscal year 2009. :eek: President Bush had requested $389 million for AFRICOM.

The Senate Appropriations Committee passed the 2009 defense bill, but the full report has not been available.

"We’re still in discussion stages, and we’re working with Congress on what the funding amounts are in the president’s budget that we put forward and what those are going to do for this command," Snodgrass said Monday after an AFRICOM town hall meeting. "I anticipate those discussions are going to continue, and we’re looking forward to our participation in that discussion."

Last week, the command went through an exercise that basically served as its "graduation event" as it prepares to become a full-fledged unified command, Navy Vice Adm. Robert Moeller, AFRICOM’s deputy to the commander for military operations, said.

By the end of the month, AFRICOM will have a staff of more than 1,000 — the majority of whom arrived in the past four-and-a-half months, Snodgrass said. Another approximately 300 positions will be filled during the next year, Moeller said.

For the coming fiscal year, AFRICOM’s main focus is to consolidate and manage the programs in Africa that it inherited from the three U.S. military commands that had responsibility for different parts of the continent, said Vince Crawley, AFRICOM spokesman.

"We feel confident that we’ll have the tools we need from our government, including the U.S. Congress, to accomplish our mission," Crawley said.

As far as what would happen if the funding was not worked out by Oct. 1, Crawley said typically when the government shuts down, the Defense Department does not.

Tom Odom
09-17-2008, 01:08 PM
Got this e-mail today. There is a teleconference with the author on Thursday and I requested a spot.

You know I don't know Mr Bacon, President of Refugees International, or Mr. Malan, this reports author, I do know Mr. Rosenblatt who is listed as President Emeritus from my Goma days.

Much of this criticism and advice for AFRICOM is agenda-driven and that agenda is making sure said NGOs get their slice of the pie. So while some of the concerns are valid and should be considered, the weight given those concerns and their very selection is influenced by agendas that have little to do with assistance to Africa.

Tom

Stan
09-17-2008, 03:07 PM
You know I don't know Mr Bacon, President of Refugees International, or Mr. Malan, this reports author, I do know Mr. Rosenblatt who is listed as President Emeritus from my Goma days.

Much of this criticism and advice for AFRICOM is agenda-driven and that agenda is making sure said NGOs get their slice of the pie. So while some of the concerns are valid and should be considered, the weight given those concerns and their very selection is influenced by agendas that have little to do with assistance to Africa.

Tom

And, to echo Tom's wisdom herein, the very people that literally sabotaged EUCOM's programs. This current acronym NGO has now pestered me for 2 decades.

Honestly, I'm sick of folks like these with wheezy agendas along the beltway, and freaks in the field... without a clue.

They have an (contractual) obligation and job to do, and the acronym NGO should not include political rhetoric (and, they should not be bothering the US Military trying to accomplish something on a shoestring budget in the friggin bush).

OK, I'm done :rolleyes: For now!

Tom Odom
10-07-2008, 12:48 PM
Granted CENTCOM will retain mssion control for Somalia but this is an oppostunity for Africa Commad to better explain its role, especially when the same NGOs who are complaining about a militarization of assistance to Africa are complaining about Western failures in Somalia.

Frankly on the heels of the 15th anniversary of the Blackhawk down episode, I am more than cynical enough to say that while the West may have a secondary role in what has happened in Somalia in those 15 years (and the decades before them) the Somalis are the main architects.

Tom



West has failed Somalia, say aid agencies (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/3147120/West-has-failed-Somalia-say-aid-agencies.html)

The West has "completely failed" the people of Somalia and must refocus efforts to give humanitarian workers safer access to desperate civilians, 52 aid agencies said in a statement.More than 3.2 million people, almost half of the country's population, need immediate help, a 77 per cent rise since the beginning of the year, they said.

But there has never been a more dangerous time for international aid staff to try to deliver assistance as violence has soared, including the assassination or kidnapping of aid workers.

"The international community has completely failed Somali civilians," said the agencies' statement, signed by Oxfam, Merlin, Save The Children and 49 others.

SWJED
10-08-2008, 05:09 AM
Africom Stands Up
by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Africom Stands Up (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/106-killebrew.pdf)


On the first day of October, the new United States Africa Command (Africom) became fully operational. The last major action proposed by former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the new command is chartered to support U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives across a huge continent and among an enormously diverse population. It's no secret that the decision to establish the command was controversial in Africa, and that reception initially ranged from cool to frosty, though that is said to be warming slightly.

Certainly the new command is making every effort to appear helpful and collaborative. The four-star command has two deputy commanders, one three-star for military operations and one ambassador for civil-military relations; its mission statement and other supporting guidance focus on "soft" activities like conflict prevention, consultation and aid. Signally, the title "combatant command," another holdover from the Rumsfeld era, does not appear, replaced instead by "regional military command" and the more historic "unified command." Considering the state of affairs on the African continent, this is all to the good.

Africom Stands Up (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/106-killebrew.pdf)

Tom Odom
10-08-2008, 01:00 PM
Good article as I would expect from this author.

On his essential points:

A. First, it's essential that every member of the command understand the essentially modest contribution that a headquarters of 1300 people can actually make in Africa, True. the main contribution of that HQs is focus: on the continent and about the continent in Washington DC.


B. Second, do not underestimate the great value of American diversity. While the conditions of the African diasporas to the United States was tragic, the consequences are that Africa is the ancestral home to a huge number of Americans, forging common ties of blood and kin not found with any other major power. Maybe but do not overplay this. Africans see African-Americans as Americans. The continent is not Ireland and the Quiet Man scenario does not play very well. Frankly my African contacts often saw attempts to play this card as pandering.


C. Third, given the scope and diversity of the continent, Africom's activities will necessarily bring the command much closer to U.S. diplomatic missions and the chiefs of missions, the resident U.S. Ambassador. Absolutely and it is here that Africom can make its greatest contribution with that 1300 person staff--that is to say connecting country team goals and initiatives in a coordinated campaign plan that Africcom can support with money, personnel, and influence. Getting an Ambassador who willing works with his military partners and having a military partner who understands who is charge makes for a wonderful partnership. I enjoyed such a partnership in Rwanda and we did great things as a result.

D. Fourth, the Africom staff, teamed with appropriate Department of Defense officials, should propose and support legislation designed to untangle the present laws and regulations governing military assistance. Absolutely. And the entire security assistance budget needs to be realigned on need, not political influence.


E. Fifth, and along the lines of military assistance, the number of African military officers attending U.S. military schools should be ramped up. Another big thumbs up. The attendance of African students is a learning experience for the student, the institution, and the other students. I dare say that US officers could stand to learn much from Rwandan officers when it comes to irregular warfare. Shared costs is a great idea; I would take it further. If it is important enough to offer a seat, offer payment for that seat according to needs.

F. Finally, Africom should vigorously resist the well-meaning suggestion, made in some quarters, that special schools or courses should be organized for African officers. Roger that! The very suggestion would be insulting.

On the idea of Africom in the US, perhaps. The suggested strengths of diversity might play a greater positive role under such a set up.

Tom

Michael F
10-08-2008, 01:42 PM
Africom is indeed a great opportunity.

As a European military, I do consider it as positive for the European military system too. Often, we do plan and do operations in Africa (Artemis or Eufor Kinshasa in DRC, Eufor Tchad,...) as part of the EU system. Having one interlocutor on the US military side will allow better coordination and possibly mutual assistance for both US and EU forces.

I hope they will also engage European capitals (very protective of their influence in Africa), make them understand Africom is not a threath (in terms of influence in Africa) but a partner. Some Liaison officers from France, UK, Portugal, Belgium, Germany,EU,...in Africom might be very usefull.

Tom Odom
10-08-2008, 03:20 PM
Africom is indeed a great opportunity.

As a European military, I do consider it as positive for the European military system too. Often, we do plan and do operations in Africa (Artemis or Eufor Kinshasa in DRC, Eufor Tchad,...) as part of the EU system. Having one interlocutor on the US military side will allow better coordination and possibly mutual assistance for both US and EU forces.

I hope they will also engage European capitals (very protective of their influence in Africa), make them understand Africom is not a threath (in terms of influence in Africa) but a partner. Some Liaison officers from France, UK, Portugal, Belgium, Germany,EU,...in Africom might be very usefull.

Agree Michael. When EUCOM had the mission, regardless of type, ie training, humanitarian, military assistance, demining or whatever, the first step was always reorienting a Europe focused organization on an entirely different region with its own complexities. The two standard problems are always distance to be overcome and communications. Transverse Mercator maps exacerbate the problem of distance; the DRC is the size of Western Europe as you well know, Michael. And even countries well experienced on the continent are challenged by those realities--France turned to contract air with Ukranian and Russian platforms in Operation Turquoise. They very quickly drained the region of aviation fuel. US TRANSCOM ended up refueling the critical nodes to keep the short and medium range aircraft flying during Support Hope. In all of this we were damn lucky that we had access to a cellular phone system in Goma.

Tom

max161
10-08-2008, 11:29 PM
F. Finally, Africom should vigorously resist the well-meaning suggestion, made in some quarters, that special schools or courses should be organized for African officers. Roger that! The very suggestion would be insulting.
Tom

What about a school modeled after WHNSEC (old School of the Americas), the Asia Pacific Center in Hawaii, or the Marshall Center in Germany? Why would it be an insult if we established a regional school just as we have done for Latin America, Asia, and Europe (but I guess to be fair we should establish one for the Middle East as well). Of course we do have some regional schools at the National Defense University already and I believe there is one for Africa there.

Dave

Tom Odom
10-09-2008, 12:55 PM
What about a school modeled after WHNSEC (old School of the Americas), the Asia Pacific Center in Hawaii, or the Marshall Center in Germany? Why would it be an insult if we established a regional school just as we have done for Latin America, Asia, and Europe (but I guess to be fair we should establish one for the Middle East as well). Of course we do have some regional schools at the National Defense University already and I believe there is one for Africa there.

Dave

Quite simply because it is a hot button issue, dealing with colonialism. Remember that the colonial period for the continent extended to 1980--depending on how you look at Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. That is the primary reason. Africom has stubbed its toe on this issue from the beginning.

Second is the reason for the schooling. If it is seen as a broadening expereince for the potential students then the separate schools idea pretty much kills that from the get go.

Third goes back to the first but place ii inside a US domestic political debate; does "separate but equal" ring a bell? I guarantee that such a bell would be rung. Remember also that in creating School of the Americas, we created a political lightning rod for the debate that raged around central America issues in the 1980s.

As Colonel Killibrew put it, the idea is well-meaning but laden with pitfalls.

Tom

Stan
10-09-2008, 01:02 PM
I would also echo Tom's comments with the fact that previous attempts at getting some African officers to "graduate" or even receive a certificate of completion was abysmal. The US Military course curriculum was far too advanced for most of our candidates (in addition to weak English). In certain cases we sent officers to NCO courses and even that barely worked out.


The ghettoization of African officers to second-rate schools -- for that is exactly how it would be perceived on the continent -- would be deeply resented, and would frustrate the strategic intent of schooling foreign officers in American classes, alongside American counterparts.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
10-09-2008, 02:48 PM
Good piece from the SWJ Daily Round Up by Austin Bey:



Into AFRICOM (http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2008/10/into_africom.html)
By Austin Bay

With the establishment of the Pentagon's new regional command for Africa, AFRICOM, addressing the complex political and social challenges of the African continent moves from diplomatic afterthought to shrewd long-term effort. The new theater command became operational Oct. 1.

For decades, American diplomats serving in Africa — particularly sub-Saharan Africa — referred to their region as "the neglected continent." I recall a conversation in the early 1990s with a U.S. Army officer tasked with supporting military attaches serving in embassies in southern Africa. Over breakfast he lamented the persistent lack of funds and personnel hampering State Department and Pentagon programs. U.S. military command structure reflected the "afterthought" status. Operations and assistance programs for most of Africa were administered by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Central Command (CENTCOM) had a chunk of Africa's northeast. Pacific Command (PACOM) was responsible for islands off Africa in the Indian Ocean.

As one of those officers I would say, Amen! Keep in mind that in 1993 as DIA Cold Warriors huddled to stay relevant, their linear thinking ran that every newly emergent former Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union republic need a DAO and the place to get them was from Africa. That was why DHS consolidated the old Africa bureau of the DAS with the old Middle East bureau. it was also why my first boss in DHS and African FAO and last Africa Bureau chief wanted to close Zaire in 1993.

Tom

Stan
10-09-2008, 03:24 PM
I would also add...


The headquarters' mission statement emphasizes interagency cooperation. AFRICOM "in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement ... to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."

That had we even had symbolic support from the Embassy, we could have accomplished far more. Even in Sub-Sahara's heyday with 7 countries of accreditation, we as US Military felt out of place at the country team. Direction and financial support is but one minor element when implementing 7 million dollars with a 6-man team (with a hamstrung embassy of over 500 official employees and 2,000 locals) :rolleyes:


Interagency cooperation — particularly State Department integration — is absolutely essential. That's why AFRICOM's deputy commander is a career Foreign Service officer.

I'd rather not comment on that one at this time :o

VinceC
10-11-2008, 10:08 PM
Tom,
Africa Command has mission authority for Somalia. Central Command retains its authority over the Gulf of Aden, where the majority of Somali-based piracy takes place.

Tom Odom
10-12-2008, 02:08 PM
Tom,
Africa Command has mission authority for Somalia. Central Command retains its authority over the Gulf of Aden, where the majority of Somali-based piracy takes place.

Thanks Vince!

That actually makes sense. And it makes the IO opportunity for Africom even greater. It is therefore classiNGO doublespeak to say we don't want a military com,mand for Africa even as they bemoan the need for greater security in Somalia.

Tom

Stan
10-13-2008, 02:22 PM
A little insight from Derek Reveron (http://www.acus.org/users/derek-reverton), October 01, 2008


Today marks the birth of the U.S. Africa Command (http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/happy-birthday-africom), “the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa...


Those looking for big, bold initiatives from AFRICOM will likely be disappointed. As Nick Gvosdev (http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/preferring-%E2%80%9Ceurasian%E2%80%9D-georgia-%E2%80%9Catlantic%E2%80%9D-africa) noted in an earlier New Atlanticist post, the command won’t be funded at expected levels. As is painfully obvious, the lion’s share of our military resources are being devoted to Iraq and Afghanistan, so there should be no worries about American forces flowing into Africa for good or ill purpose. Instead, AFRICOM will be an economy of force effort.

John T. Fishel
10-13-2008, 05:39 PM
Guys, the Africa Center for Security Studies (located on the NDU campus) has been in existence for several years. Its first Director was General Fullford USMC (ret.) and its Dean is African by birth with a PhD. The French participate in a way that is somewhat similar to the Marshall Center for the Germans. ACSS is one of the 5 DOD Regional Centers. Although most of its students are military, there are alos a number of civilians. ACSS, like the other centers, specializes in 2 - 3 week executive courses. Unlike the other centers, most of its work has been done in region (Africa). NESA and CHDS - also located at NDU - hold more of their courses on campus but also run programs in region.

to the best of my knowledge, ACSS has been well-received by the Africans.

Cheers

JohnT

Tom Odom
10-14-2008, 12:37 PM
Guys, the Africa Center for Security Studies (located on the NDU campus) has been in existence for several years. Its first Director was General Fullford USMC (ret.) and its Dean is African by birth with a PhD. The French participate in a way that is somewhat similar to the Marshall Center for the Germans. ACSS is one of the 5 DOD Regional Centers. Although most of its students are military, there are alos a number of civilians. ACSS, like the other centers, specializes in 2 - 3 week executive courses. Unlike the other centers, most of its work has been done in region (Africa). NESA and CHDS - also located at NDU - hold more of their courses on campus but also run programs in region.

to the best of my knowledge, ACSS has been well-received by the Africans.

Cheers

JohnT


John,

I am aware of the school but I differentiate between it and say CGSC/ILE or a career course where the foreign student goes to become one of a larger international body--or a hard skill warfighting course at Benning. I am guessing that COL Killibrew had the same in mind when he wrote the article we are discussing.

In that regard, I still favor the immersion of the exchange student versus the regionalization of education. In the case of the African branch so far from what I have garnered its objectives and its agenda have been limited and to my mind very much colored by its evolution as an extension of the Marshall Center--to wit the first thing we need to do for African militaries to build their capabilities for peacekeeping is to teach them MDMP.

Tom

h2harris
11-19-2008, 03:56 PM
www.military.com/news/article/us-in-cold-war-mode-in-africa.html?ESRC=eb.nl

"In hundreds of military training programs from the Sahara to the Seychelles, the U.S. is quietly bolstering Africa's ragtag armies to fight extremism so the Pentagon won't have to. Some experts have taken to calling this strategy -- not always admiringly -- "America's African Rifles" after Britain's 19th Century colonial troops." Chicago Tribune

Tom Odom
11-19-2008, 03:59 PM
Chicago Tribune reporting on AFRICOM and HOA. Not a bad piece but if you won a Pultizer for reporting on the Congo in 2000, I would hope for a better grasp of US efforts on the continent since the 1950s. Then again this is entertainment.


War on terror's hidden front (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-africa_terror1nov18,0,1892961.story?page=1)
U.S. military quietly trying to wage peace in Africa
By Paul Salopek | Tribune correspondent

IN THE AFAR TRIANGLE, Djibouti - The desert is a war.

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Cynthia Ramirez roared through it in an unmarked Land Cruiser, projecting the awesome might of the U.S. military into a wasteland little seen, much less penetrated, by outsiders. The landscape was like a slap—an eye-stinging waste of salt pans and glass-blue mountains that was still inhabited by Muslim warrior-nomads, the Afar, tough customers who long ago had swapped their traditional spears for Kalashnikovs.

Behind Ramirez, in an expanding cone of dust, bucked three more Toyotas, an Army truck loaded with corrugated metal sheeting, and 14 armed, sweating American soldiers and sailors. Their improbable objective: reroof a school at a fly-speck nomad camp called Lahossa.

...Vast, unstable, beautiful and poor, Africa was never supposed to present a threat to the United States. The last time the U.S. military paid any serious attention to the continent was two decades ago, during the Cold War, when American weaponry and advisers stoked proxy battles there against the Soviet Union.

Tom Odom
11-19-2008, 04:08 PM
yeah more of the Chicago Trib's recent discovery of AFRICOM

I just posted another Trib piece here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=60439&postcount=13)

Stan
11-22-2008, 07:58 PM
Not a bad article although I certainly expected more. I do however like the continued use of Ramirez. :D

Sorry, a relatively naive view on Africa and just how much we have done on the dark continent. Salopek has established just how much cash we need to prop up Africa, once and for all. Now all we need to do is figure out where that cash is. Congrats, you are light years ahead of the world's top thinkers :wry:


... Her men, meanwhile, stewed in their vehicles, debating the differences between Kmart and Wal-Mart.

A 15-year Army veteran, Ramirez was the closest thing the U.S. had to a hardened campaigner in the mold of the colonial troops that Europe once fielded across the world a century ago.

SWJED
12-11-2008, 10:41 AM
Africa Command Welcomes Army Component (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/africa-command-welcomes-army-c/) - SWJ Blog (via PAO Release)


Southern European Task Force cased its old colors, ending the airborne chapter of its history, and uncased its new colors signifying acceptance of its new mission as the Army component in support of US Africa Command in a ceremony here today. The ceremony followed an official announcement by the US and Italian governments Dec. 3 in Rome that SETAF would become US Army Africa.

“We are honored and privileged to be the first members of US Army Africa,” Army Major General William B. Garrett III, SETAF commanding general, said. “This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead.”

Army General William E. “Kip” Ward, commander of US Africa Command, and Army General Carter Ham, commander of US Army Europe and 7th Army, attended the ceremony, which highlighted SETAF’s long, proud history.

“I welcome all of you to the US Africa Command team,” Ward said. “I am confident that this great command is up to the challenge.”

Garrett, who was promoted from brigadier general to major general earlier today, said that while SETAF’s mission has changed, its relationship with the command’s Italian partners will not.

“The enduring relationship between the United States and Italy will only get stronger; new opportunities will spring from common objectives and a shared vision for a prosperous Africa,” he said.

SETAF, stationed in Italy since 1955, has a long history of operating on the African continent and working with African nations. During the past 15 years, SETAF has provided crisis response, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance on the continent.

During the next year, SETAF soldiers will learn and grow to lay the foundation for future success as US Army Africa, Garrett said. This foundation includes building and strengthening relationships with African army organizations, along with national and international partners, to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, he said.

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/southern-european-task-force-t-1/) - MG William Garrett, Small Wars Journal


On behalf of the entire SETAF team, I would like to thank the leadership at U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe, who have been instrumental in helping us transform to assume our new role.

We are honored and privileged to be the first members of U.S. Army Africa. This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead.

In Africa, we face a set of security challenges that may be unprecedented in complexity and scope – presenting dilemmas that do not lend themselves to a simple choice between use of force or diplomacy.

Members of the international community have long asked for increased global attention to African issues – particularly since genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, acts of terror, and crimes against humanity have come to symbolize modern conflict in Africa.

The creation of Africa Command, and now U.S. Army Africa, reflects our Nation’s determination to commit to a lasting security relationship with Africa – a long neglected continent whose impoverished people remain vulnerable to the ideology of violent extremism...

Rob Thornton
12-11-2008, 12:38 PM
Congratulations to MG Garrett and to SETAF. I can vouch that he is a leader who reaches down through the bureaucracy to take care of soldiers and the Army. Given the range of tough missions US Army Africa will take on, they are off to a good start.
Best Regards, Rob

davidbfpo
02-09-2009, 10:34 PM
An article that comments on many aspects of US policy in Africa, especially AFRICOM's support for Ugandab action against the Lord's Resistance Army (so will copy in that thread too): http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/

davidbfpo

Stan
09-15-2009, 07:18 AM
Digital Congo (http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/61031) commentary on AFRICOM's real agenda :rolleyes:

The author puts a brief positive spin on AFRICOM training the FARDC, but concludes their real mission concentrates on the protection of American miners against "possible predators". Citing instability in the east and discipline of certain FARDC units and their leadership.

More at the link...

davidbfpo
01-27-2010, 10:23 PM
Hat tip to Randy Borum (SWC) member, a SSI paper 'Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach' and in summary:
The security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue readily seen in the increased time, effort, and resources now devoted to the continent by such new organizations as the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). This paper seeks to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa by discussing the fundamental issues of economic development and political governance through which enduring stability and security might be obtained. Written as a primer for military and government staff members who may be unfamiliar with Africa but are assigned duties that involve participation in African affairs, this paper explains the historic and modern importance of Africa to American national interests. This report offers solutions in terms of improving African stability and security and a framework of several key issues which should give policymakers the knowledge they need to work in a constantly changing and very challenging environment.

Web link: http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2010/01/economic-development-for-secure-and.html

Seabee
03-31-2010, 08:33 PM
I wonder what the French think about this... ;-)

davidbfpo
03-31-2010, 09:44 PM
I wonder what the French think about this... ;-)

Seabee,

I cannot properly comment on the French response to AFRICOM, although as the French have stepped back from an overt, national military role and now look inwards to the EU an African role may have slipped out of the political "limelight". The debacle in Ivory Coast I understand was a particular shock to the expatriate presence across Africa. Note in the Ivory Coast peacekeeping was shared with a UN force.

The UK too has a low profile in Africa, with really only one military base left in Kenya, for exercises. We have stood aside from most UN / AU peacekeeping, Sierra Leone being the exception; although have contributed to security sector reform in a variety of places.

If the USA wants to play an active role with AFRICOM I suspect London is only too happy to see you learn, we might give advice but little of substance.

The crucial indicator for AFRICOM is the reaction of the African states and what recourse they make to its capabilities. Will AFRICOM participate, beyond logistics, in AU / UN peacekeeping? There are several key diplomatic players, not just Nigeria and South Africa; have any of them invited AFRICOM to overtly visit?

Seabee
04-01-2010, 01:04 PM
Seabee,

I cannot properly comment on the French response to AFRICOM, although as the French have stepped back from an overt, national military role and now look inwards to the EU an African role may have slipped out of the political "limelight". The debacle in Ivory Coast I understand was a particular shock to the expatriate presence across Africa. Note in the Ivory Coast peacekeeping was shared with a UN force.




It is a change i have not been following... I took part in 3 operations with the french army in the Central Africa region in the 1990s... there was noone else around... except a contingent of Belgians in Kinshasa

What I find amazing is the sheer size of Africom.... a HQ of 1300 people?

french operations (IMHO) were effective, but always minimalist...

I remember an evacuation of Expats and missionaries in Zaire, total force used, 1 Puma, we were 8 guys and the chopper crew, 350 kms over the bush, and in retrospect I don't remember there being a second Puma availible in case we needed evacuation... our backpacks were prepared so we could walk back if things went wrong ;-)

... ok... maybe they are too minimalist in this day and age.....

M-A Lagrange
04-01-2010, 01:26 PM
I will not even comment digital congo vision of the real agenda of AFRICOM... I love the congolese but sometimes...

About the presence of external forces in Africa, not much has changed as far as I know. There are more US troops here and there trying to do something in Somalia, Sudan and other lovely places but the "French" stay a major player. But they also are closing bases...

The challenge is not so much to have reaction capacity from US or European powers or even from South Africa. But rather having something workable with African troops. The darfur "African deployment" is here to prove that there is still a longway to go. :o

davidbfpo
06-12-2010, 10:17 PM
An update not on AFRICOM after:
About the presence of external forces in Africa, not much has changed as far as I know. There are more US troops here and there trying to do something in Somalia, Sudan and other lovely places but the "French" stay a major player. But they also are closing bases.

A French decision to exit Dakar, Senegal:
France is closing its military bases in Senegal and will pull out all but 300 of its 1,200 troops based there.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/10273849.stm

davidbfpo
12-14-2010, 08:24 PM
Maybe not the USA's AFRICOM, but the alternative African Union forces in an IISS Strategic Comment: http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/december/au-regional-force-still-on-standby/

Ends with a direct comment:
Meanwhile, AU peacekeeping operations will continue to be conducted by those countries that are willing and capable.

For Africa 'hands' this will come as no surprise, the AU suffers from the problems its predecessor, the OAU, had political declarations are rarely matched by real work and I am slightly puzzled by one nation's failure, Libya which has proclaimed its readiness repeatedly - IIRC with an article in the RUSI Journal.

Not that AFRICOM will "fill the gap".

JMA
12-14-2010, 09:45 PM
An update not on AFRICOM after:

A French decision to exit Dakar, Senegal:

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/10273849.stm

Why do you suppose the French need even 300 troops in Senegal?

Stan
12-15-2010, 09:52 AM
For Africa 'hands' this will come as no surprise, the AU suffers from the problems its predecessor, the OAU, had political declarations are rarely matched by real work and I am slightly puzzled by one nation's failure, Libya which has proclaimed its readiness repeatedly - IIRC with an article in the RUSI Journal.

Not that AFRICOM will "fill the gap".

Isn't this some real old news ? Something like back in June France and Dakar announced troop (and security) reductions ? I doubt AFRICOM will put 1,200 troops anywhere on the continent, yet alone in Dakar (they don't have that many French and/or Wolof speakers :D ).

JMA,
I could be mistaken, but I believe that President Wade considers the French to be his ally and strategic partner :eek:

JMA
12-15-2010, 01:05 PM
JMA,
I could be mistaken, but I believe that President Wade considers the French to be his ally and strategic partner :eek:

but 300 French troops are no more than a token presence, yes? ... unless they are some sort of Presidential Guard - which is not bad insurance for an African President.

Stan
12-15-2010, 07:19 PM
but 300 French troops are no more than a token presence, yes? ... unless they are some sort of Presidential Guard - which is not bad insurance for an African President.

JMA,
The best I can give you is my SWAG from a decade of Sub-Sahara and the French :wry:

It was just following Zaire's first uprising where a very small French unit managed to subdue and push the FAZ into the jungle in less than a day (while the Belgian military were stuck in Brazzaville). Had they not dropped their troops in then, our evacuations would have been a lot more interesting.

Then there's the party line:

They used to claim their presence was to protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments (strategic interests notwithstanding).

Then came Rwanda... where a relatively small French military force purportedly evacuated French nationals and certain Rwandans who just so happened to be accused of genocide :eek:.

So IMO, 300 experienced troops in Africa is a sufficient fighting force while waiting for enforcements to arrive and, in relatively peaceful settings more than sufficient to serve in military and advisory capacities.

How's that grab you ?

M-A Lagrange
12-16-2010, 08:35 AM
Stan,

In addition you can put the operations in Congo Brazzaville in 1997 and the operation in Liberia in 2003 or Artemis in 2004. Or the early stage of Licorne in Ivory Coast.

300 well trained troops as legionaires/special ops or shock paratroopers are much more than enough to resist and secure almost anything in Sub saharian Africa and give time to evacuate or bring additional troops.

Against South African soldiers may be not, but we are talking, I believe of troops from mighty powers as Cameroune, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire... Not even talking about Tchad or Republique Centre Africaine...

The balance does not only depend on the numerous ratio but also in fire power and deterence capacity. A well trained platton with anti tank armament and snipe capacity + a limited air support can do a lot against a bunch of crazy guys with AK a few RPG7.

300 troops is more than enough for immediat response to any threat against Wade and establish a "tete de pont" for bigger evacuation almost any where on the continent.

Stan
12-16-2010, 10:55 AM
Stan,

300 well trained troops as legionaries/special ops or shock paratroopers are much more than enough to resist and secure almost anything in Sub Saharan Africa and give time to evacuate or bring additional troops.

300 troops is more than enough for immediate response to any threat against Wade and establish a "tete de pont" for bigger evacuation almost any where on the continent.

M-A,
It wasn't long ago Carl asked me what I would do with the DRC and I responded with the same... Sweep in with two companies and destroy everything :eek:

Regards, Stan

SWJ Blog
07-12-2011, 03:40 PM
SFA in Africa, Training Video # 1 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/sfa-in-africa-training-video-1/)

Entry Excerpt:

For the Tuesday morning, cubicle-imprisoned... A lighter post to help get you through the day:





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davidbfpo
05-08-2012, 10:25 AM
This item popped up on the latest SW Journal article 'Thoughts from Khobar: Where Do We Go from Here?' as:
The Army is standing up regionally aligned brigades (RAB) for advisory and theater-cooperation missions in Africa beginning in 2013

Link:http://defense.aol.com/2011/10/11/new-army-units-to-tackle-military-co-op-missions/


The first of up to seven new Army units, created to train and help foreign militaries will be operational by the next fiscal year. The first of these "Regionally Aligned Brigades" will be assigned to Africa Command, but will be stationed in the continental United States....

The brigade will be responsible for working with foreign militaries on stability, security and training operations and should be ready to go by by fiscal 2013....These military cooperation units will be roughly the size as a brigade combat team....

I appreciate this idea / plan was floated openly in a briefing at the US Army Association and was not picked up on SWC. I hesitate to say the article refers to a UK colonel giving part of the briefing.

How AFRICOM would "sell" this brigade's use in Africa eludes me.

KingJaja
05-08-2012, 10:50 AM
I'll love to see how that concept could work in Nigeria (Northern Nigeria).

Fuchs
05-08-2012, 11:19 AM
The first of up to seven new Army units, created to train and help foreign militaries will be operational by the next fiscal year. The first of these "Regionally Aligned Brigades" will be assigned to Africa Command, but will be stationed in the continental United States....

...one of the reasons why U.S. military spending is NOT defense spending.

SWJ Blog
06-29-2012, 05:30 PM
US Military Plans Operations in Africa (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-military-plans-operations-in-africa)

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SWJ Blog
09-10-2012, 10:24 AM
Africa: A New Front in the US-Iranian Cold War? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/africa-a-new-front-in-the-us-iranian-cold-war)

Entry Excerpt:



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AdamG
10-09-2012, 08:43 PM
WASHINGTON - Small teams of special operations forces arrived at American embassies throughout North Africa in the months before militants launched the fiery attack that killed the U.S. ambassador in Libya. The soldiers' mission: Set up a network that could quickly strike a terrorist target or rescue a hostage.

But the teams had yet to do much counterterrorism work in Libya, though the White House signed off a year ago on the plan to build the new military task force in the region and the advance teams had been there for six months, according to three U.S. counterterror officials and a former intelligence official. All spoke only on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the strategy publicly.

http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/white-house-expands-covert-war-in-north-africa-1.4066968

gute
11-03-2012, 03:03 PM
Read this article this morning and the last part had me scratching my head:

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=960

davidbfpo
11-03-2012, 03:23 PM
Read this article this morning and the last part had me scratching my head:http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=960

Gute,

You are being polite! I assume you refer to this phrase:
The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, based in South Korea, will support U.S. Africa Command.

Even I know as a civilian this brigade is "heavy", let alone the distances involved in any deployment to Africa and given the potential for untoward events in NE Asia, could the US ever release even a BCT?

Logic would suggest the independent airborne brigade, long stationed in Italy, would be the RAB of choice.

Bob's World
11-03-2012, 03:49 PM
The first of up to seven new Army units, created to train and help foreign militaries will be operational by the next fiscal year. The first of these "Regionally Aligned Brigades" will be assigned to Africa Command, but will be stationed in the continental United States....

The brigade will be responsible for working with foreign militaries on stability, security and training operations and should be ready to go by by fiscal 2013....These military cooperation units will be roughly the size as a brigade combat team....

The only demand signal for this is inside the US military. "Building Partner Capacity" is the new "COIN." It is based upon a very flawed understanding of why certain countries are hot beds of instability, with associated insurgent groups among their populaces and exploiting UW actors working among them for reasons of their own. It also is much more about what we want to do rather than about what needs to be done.

As often as not, these countries are not unstable because they lack the "will or skill" (a term that we love to use that is so inaccurate, but that validates our perceptions), but rather because of the excess application of security forces to keep dissatisfied populaces in check.

If a family is in chaos because a man abuses his wife and children, you don't solve the problem by issuing the guy a bigger baseball bat and teaching him how to use it with greater efficiency. Or by providing "ops-intel fusion" to tell him which of her friend's homes she is hiding at for refuge from his abuse. Yet this is the general premise behind "BPC."

Rotating entire brigades in and out of deployment windows to perform this task is a recipe for disaster. This is why the Army developed its tremendous Special Forces, CA and MISO capacity in the first place. The recognition that some jobs are simply inappropriate for larger combat formations.

I realize the desire to retain force structure is driving much of the rationale behind this. As is the belief coming out of recent operations that conventional forces can and should do these missions. But if everyone is trying to do special operations, who is doing conventional operations?

Some may remember that after the Gulf War the Army decided that the Homeland mission already fully serviced by the National Guard was what they needed to do, so they were busily trying to elbow the Guard out of their way when the Balkans started to heat up. At that point Big Army dropped homeland missions like a hot potato, and ran to doing what they really wanted to do. Same will be true with BPC.

It was suggested to big Army nearly a year ago that they could actually become a major player in FID ( an operation they hate and do not understand) if they would be willing to adopt a true regimental construct and tailor and dedicate a single brigade to each GCC AOR; ideally on a post co-located with the Special Forces Group working that same region. This would allow them to not only develop true expertise and shape their training, manning and equipping to the unique aspects of the mission, but that would facilitate true "SOF-Conventional integration" as current strategies are calling for. But that doesn't validate much force structure, and it does not work within ARFORGEN, and it would most likely keep that conventional BDE in a supporting role as a force provider of conventional capacities to SOF-led operations. Needless to say it was rejected off hand.

No, instead we will attempt to deploy the lion-share of an entire BDE, who will want to own their "battlespace" (I can hear Ambassadors now, "battlespace??") with SOF-conventional integration meaning having that ODA work for the conventional battalion commander who's multi-country "battlespace" he happens to be in.

I hope we have the wisdom and courage to step away from this. It will no server our national interests well, and it will cause as much pain as it cures for the people it affects.

KingJaja
11-03-2012, 05:14 PM
If a family is in chaos because a man abuses his wife and children, you don't solve the problem by issuing the guy a bigger baseball bat and teaching him how to use it with greater efficiency. Or by providing "ops-intel fusion" to tell him which of her friend's homes she is hiding at for refuge from his abuse. Yet this is the general premise behind "BPC."i

Great insight!! Can I quote this elsewhere?

This is what most Africans fear about AFRICOM, that it will lead to more violence and more instability.

A few days ago, the Nigerian Army basically executed about 30 young men in the North East (hot bed of Boko Haram). What, exactly, can AFRICOM do except give them better guns and training to do more of the same in future and put the US in an even more precarious position in Nigeria?

AdamG
11-14-2012, 04:03 PM
NAIROBI, Kenya - The website's headlines trumpet al-Shabab's imminent demise and describe an American jihadist fretting over insurgent infighting. At first glance it appears to be a sleek, Horn of Africa news site. But the site - sabahionline.com - is run by the U.S. military.

The site, and another one like it that centers on northwest Africa, is part of a propaganda effort by the U.S. military's Africa Command aimed at countering extremists in two of Africa's most dangerous regions - Somalia and the Maghreb.

Omar Faruk Osman, the secretary general of the National Union of Somali Journalists, said Sabahi is the first website he's seen devoted to countering the militants' message.

"We have seen portal services by al-Shabab for hate and for propaganda, for spreading violence. We are used to seeing that. In contrast we have not seen such news sites before. So it is something completely unique," Osman said.

http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2012/11/14/1217560?sac=fo.military

SWJ Blog
02-05-2013, 02:41 AM
Missteps Define US Strategy in Africa (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/missteps-define-us-strategy-in-africa)

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davidbfpo
02-09-2013, 08:38 PM
After Mali rightly we should ask what went wrong - for the USA - especially using its agent, the Pentagon (DoD) and AFRICOM.

The title is shorter version of this comment:
It’s not DoD’s fault that an officer trained in U.S. military schools led a coup in Mali last March, one more thing which destabilized a weak state, but it is certainly the Pentagon’s fault that it enacts policies which seem wilfully blind to local politico-ethnic realities. Mali is hardly the first place DoD has followed an unwitting own-goal policy, but here the consequences were swift and painful.


Last fall Paris – which has better connections in its former African colonies than the U.S. ever will – was warning that Mali was on the verge of state collapse, with a jihadistan stretching over the region being a real possibility.

French concerns, however, were blown off rudely. General Carter Ham, the AFRICOM commander, stated bluntly that military intervention in Mali would fail, while our always tactless UN Ambassador Susan Rice publicly mocked French plans to bolster Mali against the jihad, which had regional African backing, as “crap”. Of course, last week, when American-trained Mali forces fell apart under jihadist assaults, leaving the country vulnerable to takeover by madmen, it was U.S. plans and policy which were revealed to be crap.

Link:http://20committee.com/2013/01/16/the-lessons-of-mali/

The author cites another article Adam Garfinkle's article:
The U.S. counterterrorism training mission in Mali made the stupefying mistake of choosing three of four northern unit commanders to train who were Tuareg. As the article says, when the Tuareg rebellion in Mali gained steam after the denouement of the Libya caper, greatly stimulated by the return of heavily armed Tuareg brethren from that fight, these three Tuareg commanders defected to the rebels, bringing soldiers, vehicles, ammunition and more to the anti-government side. Anyone who was surprised by this is an idiot, or at the very least a terminal ignoramus. And anyone in the U.S. military who failed to understand the ethnic composition of the country’s politico-military cleavages, such that he let U.S. Special Forces training be lavished on Tuareg commanders, was clearly insufficiently trained to do his job. And believe me, that’s about as nice a way to put that as I can summon.

Link:http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/garfinkle/2013/01/15/flogging-mali/

I do wonder how AFRICOM in particular will respond, given its reputation within Africa; as reflected in the thread: 'AFRICOM and the perception mess':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14537 Also relevant is
'Africom Stands Up':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6167

On Mali specifically there are two threads, 'Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9254 and 'Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17365