Grand Strategy

[slapout9]

Link to PPT on Grand Strategy at NDU early this year by Retired Colonel John Warden. Slap

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joint2008/papers/Panel%203_June%204_Warden-PPT.pdf

[Bob's World]

Two thoughts on this:

1. The U.S. does not currently possess a "Grand Strategy," and that is an incredible obstacle to virtually everything we do as a nation. As many have said:"If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there."

2. This product by Warden, while interesting, shows the Cold War roots that most of us were grown from. It is far to "Threat-Centric." While there will always be threats, as Warden lays out, they are difficult to predict. Far better to base a Grand Strategy on understanding and shaping the environment to be favorable to ones own national interests, but doing so in a manner so as to not unneccessarily generate future threats as second and third order effects.

[slapout9]

Two thoughts on this:

1. The U.S. does not currently possess a "Grand Strategy," and that is an incredible obstacle to virtually everything we do as a nation. As many have said:"If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there."

2. This product by Warden, while interesting, shows the Cold War roots that most of us were grown from. It is far to "Threat-Centric." While there will always be threats, as Warden lays out, they are difficult to predict. Far better to base a Grand Strategy on understanding and shaping the environment to be favorable to ones own national interests, but doing so in a manner so as to not unneccessarily generate future threats as second and third order effects.


Hi Rob, I agree we do not have a Grand Strategy.

2-what you (and others) call the "environment" is what Warden calls the Largest system you will operate in and he has and does have quite a bit to say about how important it is but nobody ever reports that fact...except me:wry:

PS there is an article he wrote called "The Art of Targeting" that was published in a Foreign War Journal that shows just how current his thinking is...all with the same model he has had for years. I am trying to find an English translation of it...when I do I will post it.


PPS (To All) when he (Warden) gave the above speech a vigorous debate followed between him and General Van Ripper before the moderator stopped it. He (Warden) would like to continue the debate with Van Ripper. How could we make this happen?? It would be a great SWC event in my humble opinion:wry:

[Bob's World]

Ok Slap, I'll go through it again. I confess a bias to thinking that whenever an airforce officer puts an option on the table it will somehow work its way around to support buying more F-22s, or to call for "global strike" as the preferred COA for apprending one bad actor laying low in some sovereign nation. I keep trying to get over this, but everytime I get close to being cured I bump into a call for "Irregular warfare F-22s" or "Indirect Approach Global Strike" (ok, I haven't actually encountered that last one yet...)

I'll look for the targeting piece.

[slapout9]

Rob, while you are waiting read this one on how Warden was applied to Terrorism. Written some time ago but is still as valid today as then.
PS he is not a big fan of the F-22....Big believer in Unmanned Air platforms. Big believer in Special Forces for COIN/CT Ops.

[/url].http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf

[slapout9]

Rob, here it is folks. Go to the website below and click PDF file in English edition. It is free no cost. Enjoy


http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?fecvnodeid=106588&ord588=grp1&ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord61=alphanavi&ord60=publicationdate&fecvid=33&v33=106588&id=14518

[Entropy]

Ok Slap, I'll go through it again. I confess a bias to thinking that whenever an airforce officer puts an option on the table it will somehow work its way around to support buying more F-22s, or to call for "global strike" as the preferred COA for apprending one bad actor laying low in some sovereign nation. I keep trying to get over this, but everytime I get close to being cured I bump into a call for "Irregular warfare F-22s" or "Indirect Approach Global Strike" (ok, I haven't actually encountered that last one yet...)


There's a lot of that going around :D

The cliff-notes version of why many in the Air Force consider the F-22 so important is because air supremacy is viewed as the enabler for everything else the AF does, particularly the BAI role. There is, obviously, AF culture to consider, but I think that factor is overemphasized by many AF critics.

As for the Warden/Pape debate, it strikes me as quite similar to the so-called Gentile-Nagle debate. I see the idea that there is some kind of a zero-sum choice to be a false one. The Air Force needs a balanced capability to conduct strategic missions as well as direct support to ground forces. Like anything else, what capabilities are needed and when are situational. The price of diversity is that one is likely to find that some of your military capabilities are not useful for a particular conflict.

PS: Thanks for the links, Slap, good stuff to archive!

[SethB]

I once mentioned in passing that I was unconvinced by the idea that "strategic bombing" had a strategic effect. I was prepared to counter arguments about the effect of bombing on Germany and Japan in WWII and North Vietnam in that conflict.

I was given a hypothetical about the awesome persuasive ability of an airstrike to effect the decision making of a dictator. But there is no need for hypotheticals there. We have bombed a number of dictators and I am hard pressed to think of a single case where it had the desired effect. Not unless backed by Soldiers and Marines.

In the mean time we have acquired a large number of very expensive vehicles designed to drop bombs of authoritarian regimes.

The reason that I bring this up in because the piece from Warden is a reinforcement of this thinking. Long wars may be undesirable, but the Second World War resulted in a decisive American victory, and the order that came from it has served the world well for the better part of a century.

Specific issues:

Consensus on Grand Strategy is a bit much to hope for.

Short wars sound great, and don't always work out. We all know a good example, and many of you have been there in the last seven years.

Lastly, the Air Force has an aging fleet of planes that may or may not be well suited to current and future conditions. As they replace them, there ought to be a strategy. There isn't. For instance, the money that is being spent on the new tanker could very well be spent on a new blended wing bomber that would reduce the need for tankers to the point that the demand for tankers would be around 10% of what it is now. Instead, the Air Force plans to purchase a large number of tankers to fuel planes that have been obsolescent since before their pilots were born.

Similarly, the F35 program is supposed to complement the F22 with a cheaper "low-end" plane. The problem is that like most programs it is over budget. When all is said and done, it may be cheaper to buy F22s. Or even the F/A-18, perhaps even reviving the land based version that was canceled in the developmental stage.

[CR6]

We have bombed a number of dictators and I am hard pressed to think of a single case where it had the desired effect.

I'm interested in your perspective on Operation Allied Force.

[Ken White]

In the mean time we have acquired a large number of very expensive vehicles designed to drop bombs of authoritarian regimes. ??? Authoritarian Regime bombs are new to me...:wry:
The reason that I bring this up in because the piece from Warden is a reinforcement of this thinking. Long wars may be undesirable, but the Second World War resulted in a decisive American victory, and the order that came from it has served the world well for the better part of a century.It wasn't that long, historically speaking and it arose from a uniques set of circumstances and thus, likely (but not undoubtedly) was an aberration -- as was the 'Cold War,' a fairly long war, an aberration...
Consensus on Grand Strategy is a bit much to hope for.Agreed.
Short wars sound great, and don't always work out. We all know a good example, and many of you have been there in the last seven years.Short wars ARE great. In order to insure a war is short, you have to do some serious thinking ahead of time (A trait that is not an American strong point) about what you want to accomplish. Short Wars are an achievable goal -- and relatively easily so at that -- but the civilian leadership of the nation and the military forces of the nation have to be in synch and capable of exercising the political will to keep it short and they must be willing to accept the fallout therefrom. That conundrum is what make wars more lengthy than they need to be.
Lastly, the Air Force has an aging fleet of planes that may or may not be well suited to current and future conditions...Very true. I agree with you. Unfortunately, while you and I can do great things, the Air Force has to deal with Congress...
Similarly, the F35 program is supposed to complement the F22 with a cheaper "low-end" plane. The problem is that like most programs it is over budget. When all is said and done, it may be cheaper to buy F22s. Or even the F/A-18, perhaps even reviving the land based version that was canceled in the developmental stage.Good idea. What do you then do with all the nations that signed on to the F-35 and sent money?

[SethB]

Ken, I'll clarify my thoughts later.

I really should know better than to post that late on a Friday night...

ETA:

My point was that the USAF has created the idea that the application of precision force can effect mindset and sway opinions. Things like "shock and awe." But reality seems to fall far short.

We have all of these bombers that the pilots say will enable them to end wars almost overnight, but I am hard pressed to call upon examples. Libya and Iraq certainly are not valid examples.

As far as dropping bombs on authoritarian regimes, I refer to the idea that bombingt a dictator or his family is a good way to end a conflict. I received a PM from another member who is of the opinion that one such strike went wrong, when that dictator supplied terrorists in order to retaliate against an ally. It seems to be hard to hit them, for one thing. I can think of only one head of state that has been killed in an airstrike, and that was Allende in Chile.

[SethB]

Ken, a couple more things.

Short wars are certainly great, second only to no war*, but some American wars suffer from incrementalism. They are entered into over time and by degrees. Similarly, it seems to be diffucult to prosecute a war when economy of force is taken to extremes.

As for our allies, I don't have an answer. I'm glad that my thoughts on this matter are of so little consequence. It saves me the burden of deciding what to do with so many billions of dollars and the goodwill of our allies.

*Where applicable.

Also, I was thinking of another conundrum. When we choose to purchase 183 F22s and 200 F35s we may be making too small a purchase. Essentially, those numbers will be split up geographically, and then further split by the fact that not all will be capable of operations at the same time. So in one region there may be only a handful of fighters. The Chinese, according to a professor of mine, have around 5,000 aircraft. While only arounf 20% of them are modern, it would seem conceivable that they could sustain higher losses and still wear our forces down. This is the kind of thinking that the AF Officers in my family use to justify aggressive purchases of 5th generation fighters.

[slapout9]

Short wars ARE great. In order to insure a war is short, you have to do some serious thinking ahead of time (A trait that is not an American strong point) about what you want to accomplish. Short Wars are an achievable goal -- and relatively easily so at that -- but the civilian leadership of the nation and the military forces of the nation have to be in synch and capable of exercising the political will to keep it short and they must be willing to accept the fallout therefrom. That conundrum is what make wars more lengthy than they need to be.

Ken, that is absolutely a critical point. Warden would give you a gold star;)

[SethB]

I'm interested in your perspective on Operation Allied Force.


I haven't forgotten to answer you!

Based upon what I've read, and I claim no deep knowledge of the war, NATO sought to end genocide in Kosovo by forcing concessions on the part of Slobodan Milosevic.

The air assault included strikes on three kinds of targets. Military targets, infrastructure, and senior leadership.

It is my understanding that the initial BDA was overly optimistic, that NATO claimed to have destroyed far more military material than it actually did, and that there was a great deal of international outrage over the destruction of civilian infrastructure, something which we have done in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.

It has been my impression that grinding up military units is the most effective way of persuading the enemy. Attacks on infrastructure and leadership may be helpful where they decrease military effectiveness or raise the costs of resisting, but the costs from destroying things like power plants and transmission facilities are high, especially if we intend to hold the ground.

Further, when the enemy is largely independent of things that can be attacked (like the Vietnamese during Linebacker II and, strangely enough, Germany during the 1940's) then attacks on infrastructure my be a waste of time, and an opportunity cost. I say Germany because the peak of their industrial output was at a time when they endured nightly air raids. Precision guided munitions may change the ability to hit the target, but the weak link, at least in the 1990s, seemed to be finding targets, especially when the enemy could and would mock up fake equipment to draw the US/NATO into wasting bombs on telephone poles.

Lastly, I don't know how much of Milosevic's decision to concede was based on air attack vs. how much was based on Russian pressure, given the regions history.

If you were there or know more about it, I would be glad to hear from you. My understanding of airpower is imperfect, to say the least!

ETA: As always, someone else said it first and better. I agree with Pape:


Robert Pape argues that many air power practitioners in the West have misunderstood the true value of precision-guided munitions (PGM) in the wake of Desert Storm. It is widely believed that PGMs enable the United States to win wars within just days, by targeting the enemy leadership. Robert Pape, however, argues that the true value of PGMs lies in the support of ground power. They have rendered joint operations between air and ground forces in conventional campaigns so much more effective that air power is now doing most of the work.

[Ken White]

Short wars are certainly great, second only to no war*, but some American wars suffer from incrementalism. They are entered into over time and by degrees. Similarly, it seems to be diffucult to prosecute a war when economy of force is taken to extremes.No war is obviously the best solution but it'll unfortunately be some time before we get to that point. In the near term, that incrementalism you cite is a function of the political will. It is a militarily unsound methodology and almost no thinking military person would indulge, given the option. In our system, they are rarely given the option; the urge for the Politicians to try to play G. Clemenceau generally rules.. Most commonly (Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq) they make the error of trying to fight nicely as opposed to planning to be incremental (McNamara being a particularly ignorant exception). Can't do that, trying to do it easy invariably causes more casualties (to include civilians) and lengthens the war.

Economy of force relies on many things, not least well trained and experienced troops. We have the most combat experienced Army outside of Africa but their experience is specific and their training is marginal, thus we are (for the most part, there are some exceptions) not prepared to execute economy of force missions of the type that can finish a short war successfully. Generally, for short; a large force is required. Economy of force missions generally are not conclusive and, if the troops get bogged down, can lead to lengthy combats . Iraq is an example though it is far more complex than that. It is also an example of Politicians trying to fight nicely...
As for our allies, I don't have an answer.I'm afraid I do -- they'll win -- LM will scream bloody murder if DoD tries to axe that one.

Also, I was thinking of another conundrum... The Chinese, according to a professor of mine, have around 5,000 aircraft.Meaningless. We have over 10,000. Important is what kind and what one can do with them. If I have 5,000 aircraft, can deploy 4,000 to operate against you, have a 60% operational rate and can mount two sorties a day with 80% assurance; that's 4K x 60% = 2,400 x 2 = 4,800 x 80% = 3,840 or about 4K sorties or strikes per day. If you have 10,000 aircraft but can deploy only 2,000 against me because the others are elsewhere and you have an 80% operational ready rate and can mount five sorties a day with 80% assurance (2K X 80% = 1,600 x 5 = 8,000 x 80% = 6,400 or about 6K sorties or strikes per day), you win -- and that doesn't even take quality of aircraft or training into account.

While only arounf 20% of them are modern, it would seem conceivable that they could sustain higher losses and still wear our forces down. This is the kind of thinking that the AF Officers in my family use to justify aggressive purchases of 5th generation fighters.They've only got about a 50% OR. I'm familiar with all the justifications. I'm sure the AF folks in your family are also familiar with the thinking of Congress which can spoil anything... :wry:

[George L. Singleton]

I was as a Reservist involved in early on post Cold War War Plans and Wargamming as involved the Muslim world we are now fighting in.

Ken White's comments are largely on target in that a token effort was set up to "study" potential hazards of emerging Muslim extremism, pure and simple, have no doubt, with only an 06 (my retired rank level) to head it up the "think tank" and very little staff and no budget nor "Hill" clout to speak of.

As Ken says in many words, my two cents is thus abbreviated.

It would be good if we in an unclassified manner could brain storm some proactive and constructive ways and means to help out, but now our entire military operating budget is caught up in the world economic crisis, too.

[davidbfpo]

As far as dropping bombs on authoritarian regimes, I refer to the idea that bombingt a dictator or his family is a good way to end a conflict. I received a PM from another member who is of the opinion that one such strike went wrong, when that dictator supplied terrorists in order to retaliate against an ally. It seems to be hard to hit them, for one thing. I can think of only one head of state that has been killed in an airstrike, and that was Allende in Chile.

I PM'd Seth and used the example of the Libyan bombing in April 1986, Op El Dorado Canyon, as an airstrike that went wrong, which targetted Gadafy's home and other military facilities. I refer specifically to Libyan support for the Provisional IRA in Ireland, with explosives and weapons, that is widely acknowledged to have extended 'The Troubles' for years. I'm not dismissing Lockerbie and other actions. Only in December 2003 did Gadafy renounce WMD and make other changes to Libya's stance on many issues.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

PDF file of Air Attack during Allied Force. One of the best explanations of the proper way to use a 5 rings analysis and use a Parallel attack to achieve your Objective.

Entropy, Capstone manual for SBW reading list;)

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/SAAS_Theses/Tolbert/Tolbert.pdf

[slapout9]

Link to PPT on Grand Strategy at NDU early this year by Retired Colonel John Warden. Slap

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joint2008/papers/Panel%203_June%204_Warden-PPT.pdf


I should have posted this at the start but I didn't:eek: here is the speech by Warden that goes with the PPT slide presentation. Expands on the slide presentation a great deal...should have posted it at the start but.......Slap

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joint2008/papers/Warden%20Paper_Panel%203.pdf

[oda175]

Good evening everyone. This is a great topical area that warrants additional discussion. The lack of a "Grand Strategy" has been a strategic challenge since the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The strategy I am referring to is that called "containment," which focused all elements of U.S. national power on to the U.S.S.R. and ultimately resulted in the collapse of a 40 plus year adversary. The challenge today is that we do not have a nation state to focus an overarching strategy on. The only exception to this would be the Peoples Republic of China. The current administration must develop a "Grand Strategy" so that all other strategies can be properly developed and implemented to meet the strategic challenges that face our great country.

[Ken White]

it raises questions.

How do you propose to get a coherent and lasting Grand Strategy in a nation that has changes in its political character every two, four, six and / or eight years?

Your point on there being no nation or group of nations on which to focus our near term strategy is of course correct. How do we strategically address that situation?

Having lived through the Cold War, I can tell you that containment wasn't quite as neat as a lot of folks today like to think it was... :wry:

[Steve Blair]

it raises questions.

How do you propose to get a coherent and lasting Grand Strategy in a nation that has changes in its political character every two, four, six and / or eight years?

Your point on there being no nation or group of nations on which to focus our near term strategy is of course correct. How do we strategically address that situation?

Having lived through the Cold War, I can tell you that containment wasn't quite as neat as a lot of folks today like to think it was... :wry:

You don't have to have lived through the Cold War to understand that...just be able to actually read and analyze a number of sources (to include documents from the actual period and not just retrospective studies).;)

That said, I think it's quite possible to argue successfully that the US has never really HAD a grand strategy of any sort (prior to containment...which was something of a patchwork strategy that ended up working) aside from the 19th century concept of Manifest Destiny...and even that seems more clear in retrospect than it did during the time in question and was driven more by economic considerations than an actual political agenda. Our two year cycle of "perpetual revolution" was alive and well even then, and that has always hindered our ability to form any sort of lasting strategic consensus. I don't honestly see that changing, and we don't have the sort of civil service structure that would allow for them to carry the strategic torch (as it were).

[Ken White]

LINK. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/18/AR2009021800785.html)

"I can do anything better than you..." as the old song says...:(

[Entropy]

It seems to me before we can figure out a grand strategy, we need a general set of national goals and/or aspirations. What do we see as our role in the world going forward?

It's also important to realize that what we may want as our role in the world and what we actually get are often two different things. I don't think we really wanted a Cold War after WWII, but events and our strong position following the war foisted it upon us.

[Steve Blair]

It seems to me before we can figure out a grand strategy, we need a general set of national goals and/or aspirations. What do we see as our role in the world going forward?

And even agreeing on this has historically been an issue based on the above-mentioned "perpetual revolution" of our election process and general lack of a British-style civil service system (which is not necessarily a good or bad thing...just an observation).

Historically the US has often 'discussed' such things, and it has often boiled down to "spreading democracy," although the general lines of that have never really been hammered out. Nor has the disconnect between our vision/version of democracy and the multitude of other iterations out there.

[Ken White]

We do need -- and we aren't likely to get...

I think that link I posted shows the discordance between our two main parties approach and that dichotomy, in this case 44 undoing what 43 had accomplished (or fixing what had been fouled up, viewpoint dependent), has been with us since the earliest days of the Republic. It was apparent during even a major war such as WW II and it has been even more apparent in all aspects of foreign policy to include during the Cold War. Unlikely to change.

That's why Churchill was probably correct: "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative." :wry:

[Ski]

Some Soviet theorists beleived Grand Strategy was a Western invention, and that it simply did not exist.

[Ken White]

Some Soviet theorists beleived Grand Strategy was a Western invention, and that it simply did not exist.realistically, it makes a lot of sense...

[Ski]

Ken

I only read about recently in an essay by a young Condeleeza Rice of all people.

The exact quote is:

"Perhaps this legacy accounts, in part, for the absence of a Soviet Liddell Hart or Clausewitz and for their discomfort with the concept of grand strategy. The term itself is clearly alien from the Soviet point of view. Soviet strategic thinkers often disparage it and always refer to grand strategy as a Western concept. As Marshal of the Soviet Union and former Minister of Defense V.D. Sokolovskii noted "They have advanced the concept of "great" or "grand" strategy...Some even extend this to all sphere's of a state's foreign activity. In our country, there is military strategy and it has never exceeded the boundaries of that which is military in its broadest form...the theory of comprehensive preperation of the country for war."

Rice, Condeleeza "The Evolution of Soviet Grand Strategy" in Grand Strategies in War and Peace edited by Paul Kennedy

This of course was possible because there was no serious examination of Soviet economic policies in relation to military or defense activities, which is really what ended the USSR.

[Ken White]

your comment on the economic side is almost certainly correct. Possible they did consider it but the ideologues wouldn't let them change.

I don't think the US has ever had a Grand Strategy however there's no doubt we have had and have some enduring policies -- not least on the economic side.

I think our policy, unwritten in a sense, of not tolerating threats and using disruption instead of co-option is a long standing thing as well but do not believe it rises to the level of a strategy because the application from Administration to Administration has been very different and occasionally not practiced. Containment was a policy for a long time but it was not, strictly speaking a strategy. Things to ponder.

Thanks again.

[Ski]

Ken

From what I have read, Soviet economics changed very little from the 1930's to the end of the state. The centralization of the economy occured under Stalin - with forced industrialization and collectivization of the farms.

There's also a very interesting article by Richard Betts called "Is Strategy an Illusion?" He uses ten critiques of strategy to develop his point, and it's a strong argument. If you are interested I can e-mail a copy of the article.

[Ken White]

PM on the way.

[Hacksaw]

Given its broad interpretation and the span of time in which it guided US policy... might we consider the Monroe Doctrine as the earliest US Grand Strategy???:confused:

Just a thought

[Ken White]

Is it a Grand Strategy -- or a subset and one of the earlier implementations of the policy of not tolerating threats?

[Steve Blair]

I would say that it was a subset more than anything else. Our early period was focused mostly on border defense and/or expansion (depending on the time period); something of a preview of our internal focus on most things with the outside world coming into consideration only when it threatened that focus.

[ipopescu]

Given its broad interpretation and the span of time in which it guided US policy... might we consider the Monroe Doctrine as the earliest US Grand Strategy???:confused:

Just a thought

There is a nice small book on grand strategy in early American history that I would recommend, John Lewis Gaddis- "Surprise, Security and the American Experience."

Robert Kagan's "Dangerous Nation" is also a good read on the topic.

[Ken White]

The first one; I don't have and have not read the second.

Gaddis uses the word strategy and policy almost interchangably. I believe that the book essentially agrees with what I was saying about 40 years before he wrote the book -- the US has never tolerated threats. The US likes disruption as a technique, he and I also agree on that (I've even been able to have fun in some of those disruptions. ;) ).

So. Are those two things strategy or policy?

[ipopescu]

Ken,
One of the things I find most frustrating when reading scholarship and commentary on US grand strategy is this frequent lack of distinction between the concepts of "policy" and "strategy". As a side note, this is Colin Gray's pet peeve as well, almost every paper he writes attempts to highlight the distinction between the two. I agree with Gray that the two are different things, but there is also a common argument that at the highest levels "grand strategy" is policy. I believe Paul Kennedy, Gaddis, and many of the current "establishment" national security experts subscribe to this notion.
As it happens, Duke's American Grand Strategy Program is having a big conference on the topic next week and Gaddis is opening it with a speech on"What is Grand Strategy?". So I'll report back next weekend on what the best and brightest of American academia agreed upon :)
Ionut






The first one; I don't have and have not read the second.

Gaddis uses the word strategy and policy almost interchangably. I believe that the book essentially agrees with what I was saying about 40 years before he wrote the book -- the US has never tolerated threats. The US likes disruption as a technique, he and I also agree on that (I've even been able to have fun in some of those disruptions. ;) ).

So. Are those two things strategy or policy?

[William F. Owen]

Ken,
One of the things I find most frustrating when reading scholarship and commentary on US grand strategy is this frequent lack of distinction between the concepts of "policy" and "strategy". As a side note, this is Colin Gray's pet peeve as well, almost every paper he writes attempts to highlight the distinction between the two.


...and in turn this highlights the near futility of attempting this discussion without clear and agreed definitions. Semantics is important, and critical when trying to provide useful, rather than theoretical guidance.

[Ken White]

more than any other thing...

Thanks, Ionut.

One can go to the Webster's definition and see that a 'strategy' is a defined plan to execute a policy or achieve a goal. The DoD Dictionary defines it thus: "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."

Based on that, seems to me a strategy is the method elected to achieve a result. A policy would seem to be a statement of a desired result. Elimination of threatS (plural) would thus seem to be a policy and the particular methods used to achieve that result in each particular case to eliminate a threat (singular) would be a strategy. Obviously, one could extend that to a series of subsequent or related threats but I question if that should be applied as the proper appellation over 200 years...

An interesting aside is whether disruption is a policy or strategy, it is notable that it is the preferred or most common US technique. That implies a question about the national psyche (which I know the psychologists and others rather foolishly contend does nor exist... ;) ).

However, I look forward to hearing what comes out of the conference (my policy); I await your report with bated breath (my strategery) :D

I do agree with Wilf that it is an important definition for those concerned with execution; believe that is less true so for the masses and even those fields of academe not directly concerned -- and that would include Historians IMO. Still, strategy is, I think, a frequently misused word... :wry:

[ipopescu]

I do agree with Wilf that it is an important definition for those concerned with execution; believe that is less true so for the masses and even those fields of academe not directly concerned -- and that would include Historians IMO. Still, strategy is, I think, a frequently misused word... :wry:

Here's how Oxford's Hew Strachan put it a couple of years ago (in Survival I think) in an article aptly titled "the lost meaning of strategy":
“The word strategy has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities...One of the reasons we are unsure what war is is that we are unsure about what strategy is or is not. It is not policy; it is not politics; it is not diplomacy. It exists in relation to all three, but it does not replace them.”

In an upcoming article for Contemporary Security Policy, I've chosen to stick to the following definition: strategy is the process of using military and non-military means to accomplish the desired political ends in a conflict; it is first and foremost a pragmatic enterprise whose role is to show the ways in which resources are employed to achieve the desired ends set by policy.

I personally don't like using the word grand strategy as a synonym to "foreign policy". It makes more sense in my opinion to think of strategy instrumentally, as something that helps one use the resources at its disposal to achieve the desired goals determined by its foreign and national security policy.

In the academic world, one of the most often quoted definitions comes from political scientist Barry Posen: "A grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself." Another common one comes from historian Paul Kennedy and moves in the direction of using grand strategy and foreign policy interchangeably: "the crux of grand strategy lies in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) interests"

[Ken White]

I think the problem with both Posen and Kennedy is that in the first case, he presumes a sense of continuity that will not exist for long in any society and not long at all in a democratic one due to the changes elections bring. The second case, Kennedy's solution, is as you say, mixing, commingling, conflating or otherwise confusing two sets of actions which probably should be viewed separately. I think it's safe to say he adds no clarity to my question. :wry:

Looking forward to the conference report...

[Ron Humphrey]

it raises questions.

How do you propose to get a coherent and lasting Grand Strategy in a nation that has changes in its political character every two, four, six and / or eight years?



This has always been my biggest issue with the idea of any real "Grand Strategy".

If you look at it in the simplest form I think you can probably keep it to Where do you want to be/have/exist in blank years.

Family planning
Career planning
etc.

Difference is in those you are truly limited to the realistic understanding that you probably only have control of what you do and outside influences will have to be dealt with as they come from where-ever you are on your path.

In governmental planning your not. Limited to you that is, you can also include influencers on a large scale which will work to affect the paths of others be it encouragement or discouragement of a given action or more often simply trying to enable political changes which you perceive to be more in line with your own.

So in response to the question you pose I would postulate that although it's true those cycles in leadership here are guaranteed to affect things in relation to our actions it's not necessarily true that they have to affect our FP in as dramatic a fashion as they tend to. Perhaps the fact that so many leaders come in presuming that others really care what you do as much as how you do what you do.

Regardless it doesn't seem completely out of the realm of possibility for those parts of our greater defense community that don't change out as often to be able to help those that do come up with a given set of general directions which wouldn't change because its things that both sides could agree upon.

I know thats garbled but hopefully you get what I'm trying to say:o

[Ken White]

So in response to the question you pose I would postulate that although it's true those cycles in leadership here are guaranteed to affect things in relation to our actions it's not necessarily true that they have to affect our FP in as dramatic a fashion as they tend to...with you. That is, the idealist and even the pragmatist that is I agree. The cynic that 45 years of Guvmint service has made me OTOH says "I wish..." :wry:

Egos. I think it's egos, Ron. They just can't help thinking they can do it better ...
Regardless it doesn't seem completely out of the realm of possibility for those parts of our greater defense community that don't change out as often to be able to help those that do come up with a given set of general directions which wouldn't change because its things that both sides could agree upon.You'd think so. Perhpas there are two parts to that. First, most of the parts of the defense community do change over perhaps too rapidly. Even on the civilian side where you'd expect more continuity. In a little over 15 years of Civil service I had six distinct jobs in four pay grades in three locations (and directly under under six Colonels and four three stars...). So the presumed continuity is not always there; we probably move people too often.

Secondly, it's been my observation that most Administrations I've seen in the 50 plus years I've been paying attention are not really comfortable with the Armed Forces. Eisenhower was an obvious exception and in his own way, Bush 43 was also. All the others were basically uncomfortable with the military and that includes Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Bush 41 who were all junior officers in one war or another. Kennedy and Ford were less uncomfortable than the others but Truman was almost anti-military in many respects. Notice I left out Johnson and Reagan whose 'service' doesn't really count.

Long way of getting to the point that most admins don't interface well and the Pentagram likes it that way -- gives them more freedom. Plus we have a culture that (quote)encourages speaking out(unquote) and will crucify you all too often if you do that too regularly or loudly. That does not encourage unbiased advice and one grows up in the system inclined to be circumspect. Few are willing to be outcasts for being outspoken. That's wrong but is unlikely to change.

Add to that the major problem: At what point, even if you give bold and accurate advice only to see that advice discounted and you get told to just do it, do you accept that the guidon is planted and execute the order?

[Ron Humphrey]

Add to that the major problem: At what point, even if you give bold and accurate advice only to see that advice discounted and you get told to just do it, do you accept that the guidon is planted and execute the order?

However I guess you do what we always end up doing one way or the other.

You head out where you've been directed, but since you know there's a darn good chance your gonna be flanked you do so in such a way as to hopefully be able to capitalize in the mis-direction to your advantage.

A says go right
B says go left
c&D say whatever the %## they want and

(E)nemy chooses to head straight in at you

If your lucky you put a minefield in the right place:D

[William F. Owen]

Because Political science is even less academically well founded than Military thought, I'd also submit that "Grand Strategy" may not actually be useful or even needed.

There is very little writing that disputes or even confirms the usefulness of the taxonomy of Tactics-Operations-Strategy and even then, "Grand Strategy."

In this case, I don't know what the answer is. I merely asking the question.

My own work on infantry doctrine, was made a whole lot easier, when I stopped using the words "Firepower" and "assault". I found they were actually blocks rather than enablers.

[Bob's World]

The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long, may well be an argument that supports Wilfs proposition above; or we may learn tragically that you can only drive at high speed for so long with you your headlights on before you encounter major obstacle that you can simply cut around or bull over. I don't know the answer to that one either, but I have a suspicion...

America has one over arching objective, and two main supporting objectives. The first is to maintain the American way of life. The following two are to secure the homeland and to maintain access to markets and resources. In conjunction with those objectives we have over the last 60 years or so shifted (some would argue "drifted" is more apt) from "doctrines" of "Containment" to "Intervention" to "Preemption."

What is really lacking is some statement of understanding of the envriornment that we are operating within, and how that then shapes how such doctrines can best be applied in order to best sustain the main objectives in a manner that does not abuse our global neighbors in the process. This is what I would hope that a Grand Strategy would provide. A vision and a context within which to achieve that vision. This would guide all of US government in how we approach our day to day business and craft our plans; and also help our friends and foes alike to interpret our words and actions more clearly and thereby avoid dangerous misinterpretations of deed or intent.

Such a product would be incredibly complex in its creation, but must be equally simple in its final form. Few things are harder than converting complexity to simplicity, but that would have to be the goal for this to be effective. I hope the new administration takes this on. Such a product would shape the parameters of everything from the recent "Stimulus package" to the way ahead in Afghanistan and Iraq.

[Ken White]

The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long...If I'm correct, it revolves around four and eight year increments of change.
America has one over arching objective, and two main supporting objectives. The first is to maintain the American way of life. The following two are to secure the homeland and to maintain access to markets and resources. In conjunction with those objectives we have over the last 60 years or so shifted (some would argue "drifted" is more apt) from "doctrines" of "Containment" to "Intervention" to "Preemption."More people would argue that we have been intervening around the world for over 200 years and that 'containment' was neither a doctrine or as pervasive as many seem to wish to think. We -- and other nations -- have also never hesitated to use pre-emption when it struck the fancy.
...I hope the new administration takes this on. Such a product would shape the parameters of everything from the recent "Stimulus package" to the way ahead in Afghanistan and Iraq.I regrettably conclude you're likely to be disappointed in that...

[Bob's World]

I fear you are correct, but we do our best and press on regardless.

[Ken White]

We always have. In spite of them.:wry:

The kids make it work.

[ipopescu]

[QUOTE]The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long, may well be an argument that supports Wilfs proposition above...
What is really lacking is some statement of understanding of the envriornment that we are operating within, and how that then shapes how such doctrines can best be applied in order to best sustain the main objectives in a manner that does not abuse our global neighbors in the process. This is what I would hope that a Grand Strategy would provide. A vision and a context within which to achieve that vision. This would guide all of US government in how we approach our day to day business and craft our plans; and also help our friends and foes alike to interpret our words and actions more clearly and thereby avoid dangerous misinterpretations of deed or intent.

When I raised a similar argument with a senior NSC official who worked in the Bush 43 White House I got a lot of push back and was referred to the 2006 National Security Strategy as a clear expression of such a strategy; I was also assured that the classified part of NSS, as well as the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP-GWOT) provide the kind of overarching framework that I was complaining that was missing.
I ultimately believe it is a matter of interpretation and of how one defines the notion of grand strategy (hence my focus on having some commonly accepted notion of the term when debating it). For example, some of the most respected scholars such as Gaddis gave favorable initial reviews of Bush's grand strategy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/133/gaddis.pdf)
I believe that one can find a general set of principles guiding the foreign policy of most administrations; sometimes they are written in formal documents, sometimes they can be inferred from their rhetoric and their actions. I also believe that there is some amount of continuity between administrations due mostly to external conditions. I understand and generally agree with Ken's point that due to changes in political leadership every four or eight years it is unlikely to have specific grand strategies passed on from one president to the next. However, I believe an argument could be made that on many particular issues the de facto policies do carry on from one administration to the next. For example, I don't think (actually that's more of a hope) Obama's decision on Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, or even Iran will be that much different from a McCain administration (or from Bush's, if you buy Chris Brose's argument (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4588))
So, while in some ways I share your general hope that the Obama administration will be able to develop a Grand Strategy of its own, I am much more worried about them being able finding specific solutions to the many policy challenges they face in Af-Pak (as they say now), Iraq or Iran. I believe I ultimately would prefer if they would focus less on grandiose plans and more on finding pragmatic solutions to the many problems they face. I guess you could argue that the latter may require the former, but I'm not sure that's really the case.

[DavidPB4]

The term grand strategy has an accepted use in war as the set of overall priorities that govern a war effort to its conclusion. In peacetime, a nation's overall goals in the world are open-ended. Thinking in terms of different timeframes may be more useful to peacetime thinking, and clarity in long-range foreign policy may be a better descriptor of what we need.

We still live in a nuclear era but not one with the stability of the Cold War. This is not because we face adversaries who are necessarily more likely to use nuclear weapons, although the possibility cannot be excluded. It is because the growing power and spreading number of other nuclear states will reduce over the next two or three decades the influence that America presently can exert around the world. As the educational gap closes, it will also be harder for the United States to maintain a lead over other large nations in civilian technology. America may even become less competitive if educational disparities at home become larger and if the problems in our private sector cannot be solved.

To an extent, our future problems are the result of our past success: other nations are now trying to follow our example, at least selectively, to enhance their power. Whether selective modernization can succeed remains to be seen but for the next half century the prospect is that we will be relatively less powerful than we were in the twentieth century.

So what should we do?

First, we must practice what we preach. We cannot improve education and economic opportunities for our own people if life in our urban areas remains as it is. The needs identified in the new counterinsurgency guide should apply first and foremost to the United States.

Second, in foreign policy, we will need to strengthen a sense of global community or belong to a community of nations that can hold its own and become more inclusive. Traditionally, we have stressed independence as our goal for other countries and for ourselves. The various iterations of counterinsurgency doctrine have been different ways to achieve this goal, which worked to our advantage as long as our share of relative world power held steady. But if our share diminishes over the next several decades, the external security of all states in the world will diminish. Independence will not be enough. We will need to imagine what stronger ties of community could work in such a fundamentally changed situation.

[jmm99]

from ipopescu
When I raised a similar argument with a senior NSC official who worked in the Bush 43 White House I got a lot of push back and was referred to the 2006 National Security Strategy as a clear expression of such a strategy; I was also assured that the classified part of NSS, as well as the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP-GWOT) provide the kind of overarching framework that I was complaining that was missing.

In short, we will tell you, the People, part of the national policy, which we admit has some holes in it. But, our classified annex fills all of the holes - you, the People, can trust us on that. Totally nuts - but that is how the NSC has operated as long as I can remember.

[Bob's World]

Good discussion all. I will be attending the conference at Duke this week, and look forward very much to both the programmed events, as well as the opportunity to conduct sidebar conversations and to hear the nature of the questions that emerge from the audiance.

(Oh, and I have spent a lot of time with the NSS and NIP-GWOT and other threat-based strategic documents, and they are not what I would consider "grand strategy." Similarly, I do not believe there would be any need to classify any aspect of a grand strategy, because as I said earlier, it is as much for our allies and opponents as it is for ourselves.)

[jmm99]

My objections to classified national policy are two-fold:

1. Practical: Blowback when the public finds out about the policy, and disagrees with it - or doesn't know what it should do with it.

2. Logical: A classified national policy known only to selected members of the administration cannot be a national policy. It can, of course, be an administration policy.

So, total agreement with


from BW
Similarly, I do not believe there would be any need to classify any aspect of a grand strategy, because as I said earlier, it is as much for our allies and opponents as it is for ourselves.

NSC stuff dealing with contingency plans or definite future plans is another story. Although, taking the Pentagon Papers as an example, the government and the People would have been better off if some of those documents had not been classified and had been released (even in redacted, executive summary form). Of course, that would have been inconvenient for the politics of the administrations in power.

[ipopescu]

However, I look forward to hearing what comes out of the conference (my policy); I await your report with bated breath (my strategery) :D



As promised :D, here are some of the more interesting observations that came up at the recent TISS/Duke conference "American Grand Strategy after War." Fellow SWC member Col. Robert Jones (aka Bob's World) was there as well, so he may also want to add on to this. But here's what I took away as food for thought. The following represent an assortment of the points made by various participants.

- There was a "Grand Strategic Deficit" over the past twenty years. We are worse in 2009 than in 1989. In the first seven years after Pearl Harbor, the US government did a far better job in regards to grand strategy than in the first seven years after 9/11.

- Truman's grand strategy was a more pronounced departure from Roosevelt's ideas than most historians recognized. FDR was blinded by his personal confidence that he can "domesticate"/"socialize" the Soviet Union and Stalin. His post-war vision of close cooperation btw the Four Policeman had a "utopian" quality. General point: planning for the post-war period during the war is often far different than the peace that emerges after the conflict ends; policy-makers need to constantly reassess their assumptions.

-Grand Strategy can emerge in three ways: 1. Ex-Ante (plan ahead, execute successfully (Bismarck), 2. Ex-post (people "discover" it later, i.e. deterrence), and 3. Incrementalism (formulate a strategy, it fails initially, you modify it, eventually gets "locked-in"), i.e. containment

-Was post WWII planning really more coherent than post-9/11?

- In the contemporary environment, greatest challenges to US interests come from domestic structures in other countries, not from the distribution of power in the system. We know we want troubled states to be at least stable in the short run and democratic in the long run, but we do not know how to help along that process.

-Process is very important in strategic planning. Eisenhower's Project Solarium as an example of successful strategy-making, and Obama should emulate that. But, as a counterpoint and theoretical observation: aren't you more likely to get bigger changes in grand strategy in the absence of formal planning mechanisms? Isn't so-called "zero-based" strategic planning a form of Kabuki theater most of the time inside the US government?

-American democracy is anti-strategic; consensus available at most only at the "bumper-sticker" level, but conflicts soon emerge when one move to policy, resource allocation, etc.
Related remark: US is unusually difficult to govern: separation of powers, weak government permeable to interest groups, coordination problems, partisan split/ideological polarization on the rise. Hard to maintain a coherent grand strategy

- There is a belief that partisan/domestic policy interests are botching the debate and that previous generations were far better in this regard. But the 40s looked better only when analyzed by the people in the 50s, the 50s and 60s when analyzed from the 70s, the Cold War consensus when analyzed from the 90s...

- wrong to think of "external constraints" vs. "domestic political interests" as the two factors shaping grand strategic options. The way people perceive the national interests and threats to them IS influenced of their political views. The big debate is on deciding on what our interests are.

- grand strategy or grand strategies of containment?

- Grand Strategy difficult in a moment of triumph; Bush 41 had process (great NSC team) without purpose, Clinton had purpose (i.e. enlarging MKTS and democracy promotion) without process

-US govt doesn't do "strategic interaction" btw grand strategy-operational art- military tactics; politicians need to understand in detail the workings of the military instrument in order to talk meaningfully about grand strategy. The academy should assist in educating policy-makers about what the military can and cannot do

-Strategy does at least three things: 1. relates means to ends; 2. clarifies policy by setting priorities. 3. conceptualizes resources as means (you need a strategy to transform a resource into a means)

-Post Cold War administrations focused on avoiding a new Cold War and managing great power relations peacefully, so was not there a grand strategy after all?

-Domestic policy and foreign policy are much more closely related than scholars often assume (Clinton's impeachment, Bush's response to Katrina spilled over in foreign policy as well)


Lastly, the paper presented addresses US grand strategy after WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Post-Cold War &pre 9/11, and Iraq. They are available here: http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/tiss/AGSReadings.php
The keynote address by John Gaddis is posted here:
http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/tiss/DebatingGrandStrategyDetails.php

[Ken White]

There was a "Grand Strategic Deficit" over the past twenty years.That's for sure...
In the contemporary environment, greatest challenges to US interests come from domestic structures in other countries, not from the distribution of power in the system. We know we want troubled states to be at least stable in the short run and democratic in the long run, but we do not know how to help along that process.I question that on two levels. Not at all sure we really care if other States are stable as long as there is no adverse impact on us. Nor am I sure that we do not know how to 'help' as much as we are constrained by our own domestic politics from doing so in the most efficient manner.
Eisenhower's Project Solarium as an example of successful strategy-making, and Obama should emulate that. But, as a counterpoint and theoretical observation: aren't you more likely to get bigger changes in grand strategy in the absence of formal planning mechanisms? Isn't so-called "zero-based" strategic planning a form of Kabuki theater most of the time inside the US government?Interesting thought and postulation. Eisenhower had enough self confidence and experience to let a Solarium run and sort the fallout -- few Presidents since have had those attributes and Obama certainly doesn't. That factor is what has caused the apparent Kubuki effect you note.
American democracy is anti-strategic; consensus available at most only at the "bumper-sticker" level, but conflicts soon emerge when one move to policy, resource allocation, etc.
Related remark: US is unusually difficult to govern: separation of powers, weak government permeable to interest groups, coordination problems, partisan split/ideological polarization on the rise. Hard to maintain a coherent grand strategy.In reverse order, I'd say it's impossible for us and the great and powerful are afflicted by the same short attention span that prevails in most Americans.
... But the 40s looked better only when analyzed by the people in the 50s, the 50s and 60s when analyzed from the 70s, the Cold War consensus when analyzed from the 90sThat's why all us old folks are not as upset about things today as most of you younger persons are ;)
The way people perceive the national interests and threats to them IS influenced of their political views. The big debate is on deciding on what our interests are.Heh. No kidding. And that 'decision' is strongly influenced by the ideology of the deciders...
grand strategy or grand strategies of containment?Makes no difference; our political milieu precludes either. Even the Cold War containment was not nearly as continuous and coherent as many today seem to believe.
Bush 41 had process (great NSC team) without purpose, Clinton had purpose (i.e. enlarging MKTS and democracy promotion) without process.True. Ideology again.
US govt doesn't do "strategic interaction" btw grand strategy-operational art- military tactics; politicians need to understand in detail the workings of the military instrument in order to talk meaningfully about grand strategy. The academy should assist in educating policy-makers about what the military can and cannot do.Good thought and I agree but doubt it will happen, too far from historic precedent. I suspect we will continue to stumble about sort of aimlessly.:wry:
Post Cold War administrations focused on avoiding a new Cold War and managing great power relations peacefully, so was not there a grand strategy after all?Not in my view -- aimless wandering in the same direction. Had there been such a strategy, we would've treated Russia differently.
Domestic policy and foreign policy are much more closely related than scholars often assume (Clinton's impeachment, Bush's response to Katrina spilled over in foreign policy as well).Amen to that. The Kennedy's went to Viet Nam for US domestic reasons; the Recessions of the 1950s left the US in the economic doldrums and the Brothers K decided to 'help' Viet Nam. Domestic politics are well involved in all our wars -- and everyone else's as well.

Thanks for the information.