Is US Fighting Force Big Enough?

[SWJED]

Is US Fighting Force Big Enough? (http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1014/p03s05-usmi.html) - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor


American's armed forces are growing bigger to reduce the strains from seven years of war, but if the US is confronting an era of "persistent conflict," as some experts believe, it will need an even bigger military.

A larger military could more easily conduct military and nation-building operations around the world. But whether the American public has the appetite to pursue and pay for such a foreign-policy agenda, especially after more than five years of an unpopular war in Iraq, is far from clear.

Last week, the Army released a new manual on "stability operations (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf)" that outlines for the Army a prominent global role as a nation-builder. The service will maintain its ability to fight conventional land wars, but the manual's release signals that it expects future conflicts to look more like Iraq or Afghanistan than World War II. While Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not publicly supported expanding the force beyond what is already planned, he has said the United States must prepare for more counterinsurgency wars like the ones it is fighting now - a hint that a larger military may be necessary.

Some analysts are certain of that need...

Much more at the link.

[Rob Thornton]

The article covers some good points and those quoted raise some good issues.

Frank Hoffman is quoted as saying,
"The Army is not fundamentally investing in new capabilities or creating any unique skill sets, or reducing training requirements or workload from conventional fighting,"

I think this is one of those issues that is evolving even as Mr. Lubold's article went to press. There is significant work being done to identify new requirements for personnel assessment, tracking and utilization being done on a number of levels. While it often seems like the institution moves on a geological wrist watch, that just may be indicative of its conservatory functions and the time required to demonstrate relevance. I would also note that there has been good dialogue at the leader level to adjust mission statements, CDR's guidance and pre-deployment training to reflect "D" METL use of resources (time being the most significant perhaps) vs. strict adherence to "C" METL. This is generally a leader call, and they seem to be making it. I think the institutions have done a reasonable job thus far in balancing their requirements while also resourcing initiatives in their PME or centers which can identify and explore rationale for change and acceptance of risk. It may seem like a small expenditure, but the returns have been fairly high yield with regard to helping military and civilian leaders understand the requirements of the policy objectives and the conditions.

Congressman Murtha is reported to have aruged
"Rep. Jack Murtha (D) of Pennsylvania recently argued that the cost of a bigger force is too much and could prevent the military from buying equipment."

That is a fair concern I think, but has to be considered against the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives. In this case it may not just pertain to military force but might also include military forces used in the full spectrum of operations IAW DoD Dir 3000.05.

We've recently seen how events in the U.S. economy affected world markets, is it a bridge too far to consider that what may happen in other places that while not demonstrating an immediate existential threat, may still require us to act in our interests, and possibly in a manner or timing that requires the employment military forces or force to do so? That may be hard to choke down among current domestic concerns, but if you wait to determine you need a bigger military until the time you need it, the consequences are probably OBE. Equipping the military to do the full spectrum of operations with the best available equipment is a tall order, but one that seems to be as much a question of priorities as sheer fiscal numbers. No easy answers there, but that is why when the budget goes to Congress, everyone needs to be educated.

Dr. Chu is quoted as saying:

"Few of those attempts, and fewer of those legislative proposals, ever mention the military," he says. If the country were to reverse that stand, "there won't be serious recruiting issues."

I think that gets to the other challenge, its one thing to put a number on the wall, its another thing to recruit, train, educate, and retain that number in a way that allows it to do the things you desire it to be able to do in a manner that reduces risk to your objectives. While I also applaud the expansion of national service opportunities, to omit the military from those opportunities might infer that legislators did not see it as national service, did not understand the requirements of growing the force they desire, or were concerned that to include military service might somehow be construed as unpopular by their target audience.

Every American should know that serving in its military is among the most important and best things they may ever do as Americans. It is among the greatest of ways to preserve the freedoms, opportunity and privileges they have inherited by birth and enjoy in life through the sacrifices of a relatively small number of Americans.

These are both tangible and intangible objects which so many in the world are envious of, and which must be defended against. Not only against those who would deny them to those in their own lands, but because as long as the freedoms we enjoy here at home exist they will remain attractive to others, and as such a threat to those who hate them. This makes our freedoms subject to attack, not only here at home, but abroad as we interact with others in trade or the exchange of ideas.

When military force is committed,it is done so to secure or advance some interest which translates to something we hold worthy here at home. As such every American should not only be afforded the opportunity to serve in our nation's military, but encouraged by its civilian leadership to do so where able.

Best, Rob

[dogtown]

This is actually something that has concerned me for some time. Looking back at the Cold War, we've always had a "quality over quantity" approach to military power and a result of that mindset is our increasing reliance on technology. Comparing the force requirements (and planning mindset) difference between Desert Storm and OIF make this even more clear, yet our obvious potential adversaries in the next fifty years come from the opposite mindset and threaten to overwhelm us with numbers. We appear to increasingly be attempting to make up our shortcomings in numbers with technology, and while that has proven useful in conflicts, it also highlights a danger anyone who's ignored basic land nav skills over GPS has no doubt learned.

How do we balance the issue of technology vs numbers? That seems to be the crux of the issue. Technology has always given us an edge in the fight and our inability as a national to mobilize the numbers like we have in the past has made it easier to support an emphasis on technology. How do we find the middle ground?

[AmericanPride]

I don't think it's neccessarily a conflict between quantity and quality, as that assumes the defense budget is fixed. The Iraq War has demonstrated that money can come to those who ask for it (depending who is asking who of course). I think the budget conflict is a small part of the larger issue (which may or may not be a "problem" depending on who loses out) of omni-balancing between political factions with an conservative, skeptical, and consequently expeditionary view of the world and the role of American military power in it and those factions with a more liberal and internationalist bent. Why are stability operations necessary for American political aims? Why is that capability not a priority or even a concern for the other great powers? Which demographics gain and which lose by the necessary domestic trade-offs created by doubling the size of the armed forces?


the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives.

I think that's the central issue as far as military planners are concerned. The larger issue, of course, is why we (used loosely) are pursuing particular policy objectives and the consequencese those decisions generate for the use, shape, and size of military power.

EDIT: My final point is that I do not think these issues are necessary or enduring because the questions (and consequently the answers) will change as our domestic situation changes and different political factions exercise varying degrees of influence.

[William F. Owen]

"We need an Army of XXX,000 "

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

IMO, the issue isn't the number of men. It's the X-number of men who can do A and also B. - and that is why, how many men you need in a Platoon, Troop, Squadron, Company, and what they must be able to do is the THE ARGUMENT, if you want to talk about how big an army you need.

[Rob Thornton]

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

Will, that is the challenge. It is rooted in the discussion about what you want your military to be capable of doing for you as an instrument of policy, and what kind of results are you willing to live with on the back end - which is generally the side that contains more unknowns. In this case it has an interesting twist, because while we know we'd like to have to other USG agencies doing some of these unknowns, the military remains the "tool" most likely to be doing them for a number of reasons. This is made somewhat more difficult because the capabilities to meet some of these types of requirements are not collective based, but resident in individuals.

I know allot of smart folks who have produced numbers - they all strike me as having some subjectivity in them, i.e. they are estimates. This is not bad, war and policy has a way of resisting business like efficiencies - it has always seemed like a good idea if you can have enough to keep something out of contact to retain your flexibility. The resulting question is can you afford it/live with it, and if not, can you sacrifice something else to get there? Its hard for folks (a population) to rationalize keeping something on hand when they cannot understand why, or how it relates to their interests in contrast to other seemingly more immediate needs. This may be more true when we say we not only need to recruit good people, but as we train, educate and develop them, we must find ways to retain them and their families.

A professional military takes more time and resources to build and sustain then a conscript one (relative to size and not accounting for costs brought on in respect to effectiveness and efficiencies); however a professional military can do things "differently" that a conscript one.

A conscript expansion offers some flexibility, but you have to be able to live with what the implications and consequences are on a number of levels to rely on conscription to fill out/augment your base formations. Again, what do we want our military to do, and can we live with the notion that regardless of what we thought we wanted it to be able to do 5 years ago, new policy requirements will inevitably create situations that were unanticipated and don't fall neatly into that established lane. How much is the flexibility to better achieve your objectives worth? How much risk are you willing to assume and where?

Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

In this case it has an interesting twist, because while we know we'd like to have to other USG agencies doing some of these unknowns, the military remains the "tool" most likely to be doing them for a number of reasons. This is made somewhat more difficult because the capabilities to meet some of these types of requirements are not collective based, but resident in individuals.

This is the root or my concern. The US Military and others is/are trying to do things which are NOT best facilitated by the military instrument. Bandying numbers around is like saying the meaning of life is 47. It may be true, but there is simply no evidence that it is, since it assumes the answer is a number. As they say in Isreal, "How much is a suit for an orphan?"

The question should not be "Is the Force big enough?" - but what can the force of X number do?

[Ron Humphrey]

Gentlemen,

Just on the face of it doesn't or at least shouldn't this conversation be more about what missions international politics are likely to dictate than what forces are likely to be assigned to do?

By this I mean to say Responsibilities / Capabilities should be of primary discussion. As the roles of the Joint Chiefs and others is to inform the decisions of their political masters rather than direct them it would seem rather counter-productive to worry about that over which those within the military hierarchy have little control. If instead our defense leadership are able to effectively present what acceptable responsibilities are within normal considerations and accepting that there will be exceptions for which we much be prepared, than perhaps we end up with a more appropriate and balanced version of what the endstrength should look like.

Unclear I'm sure but not quite sure how else to put it?

[Rob Thornton]

Will, a reasonable question:


The question should not be "Is the Force big enough?" - but what can the force of X number do?

I'd also say its counterpart might be:

What can a force of "X" not do?


Also worth considering:
"X" is not always going to be quantitative; "X" has a qualitative aspect as well, and that one is defined by the requirements. The requirements = policy/military objectives + conditions. Which may get to the root of what Ron is asking as both the conditions and the policy/military objectives are subject to change in ways that cannot be predicted very well. They are both interactive, and unstable.

Best, Rob

[Ski]

Instead of focusing on vaporifics like "how many people do we need" I suggest some of the bigger brains in CAC start working on a strategy to equip, resource, train, and sustain an Army that loses 50% of its budget due to severe economic malaise.

Defense funding is discretional. The upcoming baby boomer retirement phase is going to put immense strain on the federal budget, with special insight required on how to fund Social Security and Medicare. Since defense has the largest piece of the pie, it is most likely to get cut when other entitlement programs start running out of money.

I'd start with looking deeply at the 1920-1935 period with the American and major European armies.

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - I would suggest that its a good idea, but the responsibility to do so rests within DA and OSD? Best, Rob

[AmericanPride]

Since defense has the largest piece of the pie, it is most likely to get cut when other entitlement programs start running out of money.

I think that depends on who is holding (the most) power when that decision comes to the forefront. I doubt that forcing large numbers of highly visible professionals (read: servicemembers) into a poor economy will attract political support from the military itself or from pro-military demographics. There's several historical examples of similar problems occurring (the demobilization of the Continental Army in 1781 and the Bonus Army in 1932). A strong and publicly popular Chief of Staff could (attempt to) preserve the institution against an unpopular and divided Congress. Truman, for example, I believe holds the lowest ever recorded popularity for a President after his dismissal of MacArthur in 1951. The general pacifism of the 1930s does not exist in strength, and so I think it would be extremely difficult to make drastic and lasting cuts to the defense budget without first changing America's attitude toward the military and its on-going operations around the world.

[Old Eagle]

The U.S. Armed Forces are correctly sized now. They will also be correctly sized in the future, regardless of what that size is. However, that "size" (really a capability/capacity cap) will limit what we use that force for. It will mean that the U.S. cannot run willy-nilly (especially unilaterally) at every boogie man that raises its ugly head. Other elements of national power will have to play a greater role.

And for those potentially massive, can't afford to lose contingencies, we'll have to have well-prepared alliances and coalitions to lend a hand.

This is not being fatalistic or idealistic, it's simply being realistic.

[Ski]

Rob

HQDA and OSD do not write doctrine for the Army.

CAC does, and that's why they should start putting on their thinking caps and get cracking.

[selil]

At a Homeland Security meeting recently the speaker was talking about the "ALL HAZARDS MISSION CAPABILITY" of DHS. I started grumbling. Continually they threw that homilie about all hazards out. Well dang it where is the zombie outbreak response plan? Oh you say that likely won't happen? Well suddenly you aren't all hazards.

If you want a "good enough" or "better than the rest" military you are setting a totally different goal. Those are metrics that are determined by outside entities actions. I think I would rather start with a grand unified theory of military training and create the flexible, trainable, large scale, go just about anywhere military. Mission specific units should be at a minimum and the military size should about 1 percent of the US population.

[Rob Thornton]

HQDA and OSD do not write doctrine for the Army.


Ski - I know, but they do write and inform defense policy. Until the DoD civilian leadership and senior service and Joint military leadership (to include the Joint and Service staffs) have that discussion and submit budgets based on what they think we need to do the job we're asked to do, the issue of the doctrine required to make use of what you have is a cart before a horse.

It may be something of a chicken and egg - but my point was TRADOC does not set the DoD budget, they address DOTMLPF issues. This means until we come to some agreements on ends, ways and means, roles and missions, etc. its may not be a good idea to address the DOTMLPF issues in such a way that become either self constraining, or do not meet the needs of policy. Lets not forget the role of the GCCs in interpreting and responding to both steady state/or standing policy objectives, and those new objectives created by crisis - it becomes a Policy/Mil OBJ + Conditions that create the requirements to which the force providers must generate resources and capabilities to meet. The services and functional commands should not go down the road of taking stuff off the menu that the GCCs are asking for - that is a decision that gets into the three branches of Govt (Exec/Legis/Jud) real quick. We owe them the costs and the consequences, but the authority belongs to the civilain leadership.

I share some of your concerns, but I don't think its a good idea for the military to set conditions which will constrain the policy needs and requirements based on what we anticipate to be funding short fall.

I'm not in CAC, but my sense is they are doing the things they need to be doing based on their mission - e.g. they are writing the doctrine that needs to be written.

Best, Rob

[120mm]

I am in CAC and I wished it were so, Rob.... But it's not necessarily so..., but in the words of Forrest Gump, "that's all I'm going to say about that..."

Personally, I think we can, as a country, make our military smaller, but only while simultaneously increasing the scope and effectiveness of our non-military elements of power, as well as increasing our HUMINT to a manifold extent.

[Ken White]

I think...
This means until we come to some agreements on ends, ways and means, roles and missions, etc. its may not be a good idea to address the DOTMLPF issues in such a way that become either self constraining, or do not meet the needs of policy.It has been my observation over the years that we're highly unlikely to ever get such an agreement that has the slightest permanence and therefor lends itself to the coherent development of doctrine -- or even of force structure. The Politicians will always want and get wiggle room barring a major existential threat -- as WW II was perceived to be.

Accordingly, this:
...my sense is they are doing the things they need to be doing based on their mission - e.g. they are writing the doctrine that needs to be written.is probably as correct as it can be under the circumstances.

As it has generally been and will most likely continue to be... :cool:

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,
I think we are in agreement. There is always going to be tension because of the relationship to domestic policy (and politics) and foreign policy. It never ends.

While some general doctrinal principals can be produced that are enduring in light of the above conditions is good, my concern is that for the supporting institutions to try and guess what those conditions will be vs. responding to the needs of the policy and the GCCs tasked to realize them results in developing capabilities as we'd like them to be vs. capabilities that meet the changes in requirements.

The added danger in that may be that before long we start seeing the conditions as we'd prefer they be vs. as they are because we force fed the kool-aid through out all the instituions and it got the whole DOTMLPF body drunk.

So doctrine just keeps ambling along, sometime bringing back old ideas under new names, sometimes reflecting new requirements in new ways, sometimes blending old and new.

120's point:


Personally, I think we can, as a country, make our military smaller, but only while simultaneously increasing the scope and effectiveness of our non-military elements of power, as well as increasing our HUMINT to a manifold extent.

is a good one, and we are finding out just how hard increasing capacity in the other elements of national power is to do. Not just in terms of recruiting, training, educating, appropriating, retaining - but also in terms of cultural functions, laws and rice bowls. Last year I heard a comment by a retired GO who linked the ability to build capacity in the other elements of power to congressional committees - there was a good dose of "where you sit is where you stand" in the remark, and I think its probably true.

Again Ken's point about the politics of power and the conflict between domestic and foreign policy holds true. The rational for change seems to be such that it must be both immediate and undeniable, i.e. existential in a way that keeps you up at night either worrying about your vote as it relates to retaining your job, or worrying about the huns at the door. The problem with the former is historically (throughout time and place) it seems to be more important than the latter. The problem with the latter is you don't always know it until its a done deal. Both may be made more likely given the level of self interest, lack of education on the issues and lack of personal accountability present throughout a given society:(.

Best, Rob

[sapperfitz82]

Did we see this disconnect (size vs. capability) play out with Rumsfeld's plan for Iraq?

I mean, did he believe that the size force we sent in could do the job because some previous size force in our history would have?

Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?

Is this an indicator of anything?

I have seen a dramatic drop in aggressive patrolling in Afghanistan from 02-03 to 05-06 and have heard of more of the same from friends there now. (Foxhole view, I know) A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.

Do these examples point to a misuse (or under-use) of our troops on the ground? If so, and if our current conflict is what is driving the "bigger military" idea I think there is any easier answer.

Our performance in this war as a military has not been as good as it could be. I don't mean this on a personal or personel level. I am speaking of raw capability and results.

The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.

My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded). We need to recalibrate our force's incentives for going home and squeeze more productivity from the ones already deployed. This would reduce the perceived need for a larger Army.

I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.

[patmc]

Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?

I would argue that there was no real planning for an insurgency, and when it did begin, nobody at the top was willing to declare it so, and adjust strategy accordingly. Pax on the ground saw the issues and dealt best they could, but when higher pulls the too few troops to secure a country of millions off the streets and back to FOBs, you can only do so much.


A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.

If there was a patrol in every valley, the Taliban would just wait it out. If we built Combat Outposts in every valley, the Afghans may see us as occupiers. No win either way. Need to convince the Afghans its in their own best interest to keep the bad guys out.


Do these examples point to a misuse (or under-use) of our troops on the ground? If so, and if our current conflict is what is driving the "bigger military" idea I think there is any easier answer.

I was in Iraq in 05-06, so I cannot speak of conditions now, but while I was there, forces were consolidated to FOBs. There were lots of people that never left, though in their defense, they were CS/CSS, so there was no real reason for them to leave. Unless you want to give every MOS a non-standard ILO mission, you need more combat arms if you want to put more bodies out in the fight. Same problem in Vietnam... 500,000 pax, only 60,000 infantry in the fight (that number is pulled deep from professional readings past, so if it is off, someone please correct me). The Army has a very heavy tail.



The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.

If policy remains "reasonable," volunteers will continue to leave the service due to burn out. If the Army is going to constantly do 1 on, 1 off, it will eventually wear out. The goal of 1 on, 2 off, is still ways off for BCTs if the commitment continues. There needs to be a drawn down in CENTCOM, or relocation from somewhere else. Otherwise, the force is not big enough.


My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded).

Can't speak to this, but those units patrolling and living at COPs may disagree.


I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Sounds good (well, semi-good) on paper, but how would you quantify or verify these goals? What happens when the goals/missions change 1 month in? "Hey, we pacified the area, you didn't say anything about keeping foreign fighter infiltration routes closed. We're done, send us home." Individual deployments up to 2 years if/when mission creeps? Goodbye to the volunteer force. Everyone in today is sacrificing more than 99%, but unless "you spread the wealth around" that is probably too much.



Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.

Commanders should not be counting the days, though as humans, they likely are. They should be caring for their Soldiers, and accomplishing the mission. Adding points for redeployment may lead to cheating, backstabbing, etc... It would also send your best performers home the quickest and destroy unit cohesion and integrity. You may save 10-15K needed in a division, but you might add that many in the staff/bureaucracy needed to track these points/goals.

[Ken White]

Did we see this disconnect (size vs. capability) play out with Rumsfeld's plan for Iraq?Had Rumsfled's plan been followed, we'd have been out of there in less than 90 days and there likely would have been no 'insurgency' -- though there certainly would've been some mayhem. His plan got changed and arguably, the changer also was instrumental in disbanding the Iraqi Army and Cops -- without which there'd have been a far different insurgency of far shorter duration.
I mean, did he believe that the size force we sent in could do the job because some previous size force in our history would have? Partly that and partly he over relied on technology; remember, he was briefly an Aviator... :D
Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?Four times the number of troops would've made little difference; Iraq is too big to dominate without well over 1M troops on the ground. Even then it would be dicey. If you're going to rotate units, then you'd need about 4M troops; we can't afford it, couldn't fill -- and don't need it.
I have seen a dramatic drop in aggressive patrolling in Afghanistan from 02-03 to 05-06 and have heard of more of the same from friends there now. (Foxhole view, I know) A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.[quote]Worse problem than in Iraq; Afghanistan is even bigger, more populous and the terrain is far rougher -- and the people are more warlike. Adding X number of troops will make little difference and we don't -- couldn't -- have enough to 'occupy and pacify' the whole country.

As for the patrolling, I hear the same thing and also hear that it is very much unit peculiar; that is it's true with some units but not with others thus I suspect it's a matter of risk averseness in Commanders.[quote]Our performance in this war as a military has not been as good as it could be. I don't mean this on a personal or personel level. I am speaking of raw capability and results.I've been around since WW II and our performance in every war I've seen has been mediocre at best (with occasional rare and great exceptions in all of them). We've been saved by the fact that our opponents have generally been worse than we have. We will this time as well. Both theaters.
The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.I agree with that.
My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded). We need to recalibrate our force's incentives for going home and squeeze more productivity from the ones already deployed. This would reduce the perceived need for a larger Army.

I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.Has some merit; I see two problems. The Army is risk averse but that is a reflection of the nation from which it comes, it reflects the values of this country and we have, as a nation, become quite risk averse. I don't think that will change soon. Thus the first prob is that you'll put Commanders at career risk for failure and in an Army that refuses to test people who are going to lead in combat that isn't likely to fly.

The second problem is that the proposal would be difficult to balance because of the vagaries of life and combat; Unit A gets an easy zone and goes home in six months; Unit B gets a hot spot and is there for three years. Unit C has a great commander and does well, Unit D has a dork and stumbles over everything. I could foresee big time morale and attitude problems...

[Ken White]

...
The Army has a very heavy tail.Priceless!

I also agree with his Post. Good one...

[Entropy]

We may end up with no Army at all if we don't get the procurement mess under control. This is simply criminal (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3784715&c=AME&s=TOP):


As part of 18 new reports for the Bush administration, the panel found that over the last seven years changes to initial program plans have cost the DoD $328 billion. Such program changes, typically referred to as "requirements creep," have helped swell the price tag for the department's major programs from $783 billion to $1.7 trillion, according to the panel.

Of that increase, $401 billion, or 44 percent, was caused by program cost growth.

On one slide, the panel uses striking language to express its concern about the skyrocketing cost of the Pentagon's next-generation systems, warning it could "in times of budget stress, threaten the core of the institution."

One chart included in the briefing shows that $205.7 billion of the $401 billion in seven-year program cost growth was generated by just five programs: The Army's Future Combat Systems ($69.7 billion), the tri-service Joint Strike Fighter ($66.8 billion), the Navy's SSN-774 attack submarine program, the Chemical Demilitarization initiative ($23.4 billion) and the Air Force-run Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program ($18.5 billion).

More than 90 programs from across the services accounted for the remaining $195 billion in cost growth. In the coming years, the board warns, the situation could affect the state of the American force.

$328 billion from requirements creep - that averages to about $47 billion a year. I wonder how many soldiers the Army could have trained and equipped for that.

[Ken White]

We may end up with no Army at all if we don't get the procurement mess under control.

$328 billion from requirements creep - that averages to about $47 billion a year. I wonder how many soldiers the Army could have trained and equipped for that.As they say... :wry:

Though I'd add that the problem, as the articles states, involves ALL the services, not just the Army. The LCS and the F-35 both suffer from the malady. Don't even start on the EFV and the Army's checkered small arms history. The phenomenon is as American as Apple Pie unfortunately. Who of us has not been in a Drive through or checkout line and watched people ahead of us dither over choices. Penalty of having too much money and too much time on our hands...

I recall A Bundeswehr LTC years ago remarking on Kärcher's Decon device that "...the Americans have bought a few for test. They will now engineer it for seven years until it doesn't work and then will buy in quantity."

Sad but true.

[Entropy]

Though I'd add that the problem, as the articles states, involves ALL the services, not just the Army.

Oh yeah, didn't mean to suggest otherwise, but to point out if all the services hadn't changed requirements, we'd be able to have a bigger Army without an increase in the budget - theoretically, of course.

The services simply can't continue like this - something has got to give.

[Ken White]

...The services simply can't continue like this - something has got to give.realize that their personnel system (DOPMA !!!) forces them to rotate unqualified or poorly qualified people into positions they should not have on a two to three year cycle in a fruitless attempt to be 'equitable' and create an Officer Corps of generalists. How has that worked out for us, all things considered?

Each change at the Action O, Branch and division Chief and Project Manager level introduces a cascading series of 'desirable and necessary changes.' While aiming for state of the art -- a moving train -- is desirable it is costly and in many cases totally counterproductive.

When you add the changes desired by senior leaders -- who also rotate entirely too rapidly -- above the Project Managers, you get a never ending series of ECPs that the contractors absolutely love. They bid in low, knowing that will occur and that they can thus realize a healthy profit.

Add to all that micromanagement by Congroids and their staffers (not at all influenced by Lobbyists ...) and you have a recipe for a mess.

That's where we are. So. How to fix it?

All we gotta do is clean out Congress, reduce their staff by 60% and make it functional, discard DOPMA, select people who are competent in the field for jobs, quit rotating people to 'manage personnel' every 18-48 months and stop trying to prove everyone can do anything.

No problem... :mad:

[Entropy]

All we gotta do is clean out Congress, reduce their staff by 60% and make it functional, discard DOPMA, select people who are competent in the field for jobs, quit rotating people to 'manage personnel' every 18-48 months and stop trying to prove everyone can do anything.

No problem... :mad:

Gee, is that all? :D

Quite depressing....

[wm]

When you add the changes desired by senior leaders -- who also rotate entirely too rapidly -- above the Project Managers, you get a never ending series of ECPs that the contractors absolutely love. They bid in low, knowing that will occur and that they can thus realize a healthy profit.

Add to all that micromanagement by Congroids and their staffers (not at all influenced by Lobbyists ...) and you have a recipe for a mess.

That's where we are. So. How to fix it?

All we gotta do is clean out Congress, reduce their staff by 60% and make it functional, discard DOPMA, select people who are competent in the field for jobs, quit rotating people to 'manage personnel' every 18-48 months and stop trying to prove everyone can do anything.

No problem... :mad:
Don't forget to get rid of "low bid/best value" as an award criterion. I suspect a big piece of cost increases is due to contractors underbidding and then getting price increases granted as the programs get well entrenched. This can happen with or without government ECPs. From an earned value management (EVM) perspective, things look great until too late. Contractors can game the system and earn big EVM points doing egg-sucking work early on. If a contractor puts off the really hard tech development stuff until late in the materiel development effort, program costs tend to skyrocket late in life.

I think the operative logic (or is that illogic) is once you're more than a quarter way into the program, you need to keep throwing money at it in order to save the investment you've already made (not to mention all the jobs that the program has created in Congressional districts across the country). I think any program's likelihood of cancellation is inversely proportional to the number of Congressional districts in which the contractor and its subs have operating locations. I also suspect that the likelihood of cost overruns is directly proportional to that number of Congressional districts as well.

[Ken White]

...
I think the operative logic (or is that illogic) is once you're more than a quarter way into the program, you need to keep throwing money at it in order to save the investment you've already made (not to mention all the jobs that the program has created in Congressional districts across the country). I think any program's likelihood of cancellation is inversely proportional to the number of Congressional districts in which the contractor and its subs have operating locations. I also suspect that the likelihood of cost overruns is directly proportional to that number of Congressional districts as well.That part, in particular is distressingly correct... :(

The good news is that my unnecessarily dour prescription of a fix while obviously unlikely on several levels is not the only way the trend can be reversed. The move toward spiral development is a good start and reversal of the trend for excessive in-process changes can be accomplished to a great extent far more simply with some firm direction from those on high by simply locking the design at the 'good enough' stage. Hopefully, they can and will do that. Equally (more??? :wry: ) hopefully, Congress will assist rather than impede that process...

[Tom Odom]

That part, in particular is distressingly correct... :(

The good news is that my unnecessarily dour prescription of a fix while obviously unlikely on several levels is not the only way the trend can be reversed. The move toward spiral development is a good start and reversal of the trend for excessive in-process changes can be accomplished to a great extent far more simply with some firm direction from those on high by simply locking the design at the 'good enough' stage. Hopefully, they can and will do that. Equally (more??? :wry: ) hopefully, Congress will assist rather than impede that process...

And in a related matter, the idea that Senator Stevens will continue to run for office after his conviction and pending appeals makes the likelihood of a sudden rush to reform from within Congress doubtful

Next week will tell many tales

Tom

[wm]

That part, in particular is distressingly correct... :(

The good news is that my unnecessarily dour prescription of a fix while obviously unlikely on several levels is not the only way the trend can be reversed. The move toward spiral development is a good start and reversal of the trend for excessive in-process changes can be accomplished to a great extent far more simply with some firm direction from those on high by simply locking the design at the 'good enough' stage. Hopefully, they can and will do that. Equally (more??? :wry: ) hopefully, Congress will assist rather than impede that process...

Would that it were so simple--we used to have spiral and incremental development as alternatives. But in the planned revision of the DoDD 5000.01, spirals go away and all we have are increments developed on mature technology. The intent, I think , is to prevent cost overruns due to tech development costs being postponed until later in a program because of unknowns or requirements creep. However, this means we will probably have to keep doing new cycles of technology development for each new increment (and all the Acq paperwork to go from pre-MS A to post MS C for each increment)--big loss of time and effort here I think. I'd like to see the cost benefit analysis for increments vice spirals.

[Ken White]

...But in the planned revision of the DoDD 5000.01, spirals go away and all we have are increments developed on mature technology. ... I'd like to see the cost benefit analysis for increments vice spirals.Or maybe I saw a blurb on it and didn't want to believe it...

Why do I have visions of future revolving doors going through my little brain...:rolleyes:

Sigh.

One step forward and two back. Agree on your your desire for an analysis; hopefully someone will trigger an effort.

[wm]

Or maybe I saw a blurb on it and didn't want to believe it...

Why do I have visions of future revolving doors going through my little brain...:rolleyes:

Sigh.

One step forward and two back. Agree on your your desire for an analysis; hopefully someone will trigger an effort.

Someone probably views the move to only increments as a streamlining of the process.

After all, now we will only have one route forward in acquisition--simpler is better, right ? :confused:

[Tacitus]

And in a related matter, the idea that Senator Stevens will continue to run for office after his conviction and pending appeals makes the likelihood of a sudden rush to reform from within Congress doubtful

Next week will tell many tales

Tom

Tom, I don't know if you have seen the Alaskan election returns or not. But it looks like a victory for (drumroll, please)...Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, of all people.

I believe that makes him the first person in the history of our republic to be re-elected to the U.S. Senate after having been found guilty of a felony. Any Senate historians out there who can come up with another, correct me if I am wrong. I thnk it takes 2/3 of the vote in the Senate to expel a Senator. Stay tuned for more on this one.

Same Bat-Time, same Bat-Channel.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, I don't know if you have seen the Alaskan election returns or not. But it looks like a victory for (drumroll, please)...Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, of all people.

I believe that makes him the first person in the history of our republic to be re-elected to the U.S. Senate after having been found guilty of a felony. Any Senate historians out there who can come up with another, correct me if I am wrong. I thnk it takes 2/3 of the vote in the Senate to expel a Senator. Stay tuned for more on this one.

Same Bat-Time, same Bat-Channel.

Hey mate

yeah I saw that this AM

incredible

[sapperfitz82]

PATMC
If there was a patrol in every valley, the Taliban would just wait it out. If we built Combat Outposts in every valley, the Afghans may see us as occupiers. No win either way. Need to convince the Afghans its in their own best interest to keep the bad guys out.
Problem is that we have defined ourselves into a box as not being occupiers, conquerors, crusaders, etc. Now we have to figure out how in heck we call ourselves “winners” and leave. The locals don’t understand this either, they just want us gone, whatever we are. As long as we are just and equitable in the prosecution of our war, the occupied will usually wait out the interim. We should not be worried as being seen as what we are, we must act as we are and then leave. Yeah, the Talibs will wait, that is what they’ve been doing. The part WE”RE waiting on hasn’t, and may not happen. The DOS needs to build the nation to the point that our national security goals are met and the DOD can call it a day, bigger army won’t fix that. Let’s be efficient while we wait is my point.

PATMC
Can't speak to this, but those units patrolling and living at COPs may disagree.

Well, I don’t like to air out others laundry, but the ol’ BLUFOR does give away when folks are on patrol, and I was a lonely dot out there more often than not. When I did see other dots, they were in BN strength. There wasn’t a lot of small unit action going on. Are there units doing the business? absolutely, just not enough of them.

PATMC
If policy remains "reasonable," volunteers will continue to leave the service due to burn out. If the Army is going to constantly do 1 on, 1 off, it will eventually wear out. The goal of 1 on, 2 off, is still ways off for BCTs if the commitment continues. There needs to be a drawn down in CENTCOM, or relocation from somewhere else. Otherwise, the force is not big enough.
I have heard a lot about this boogey man as well. I don’t really see it happening, maybe you have different numbers. My thought has been that if the mission is made relevant to the men, they will die for it. You’re saying, yes, but only if that doesn’t take too long. I don’t mean to be cute, but there is a real disconnect here and it comes from pandering to the pampered.

My squad re-upped for 6yrs each (minus one) after 11 months in Afghanistan and with full knowledge of the deployment to Iraq coming 9 months after our return home. They believed in the mission. They also knocked out a year of college while doing three days out of the wire and two days in for those 11 months. They understand the bennies too.

Quite simply, the standard of living at war has never been better, the tours have never been shorter (for this duration a war) and we are still saying “not good enough?” We need a history lesson and the Indian wars of the sub-continent and the American west are in order.

PATMC
Sounds good (well, semi-good) on paper, but how would you quantify or verify these goals? What happens when the goals/missions change 1 month in? "Hey, we pacified the area, you didn't say anything about keeping foreign fighter infiltration routes closed. We're done, send us home." Individual deployments up to 2 years if/when mission creeps? Goodbye to the volunteer force. Everyone in today is sacrificing more than 99%, but unless "you spread the wealth around" that is probably too much.

Defining these are what the generals get paid to do. I think everyone understands that FRAGOs happen.

I don’t really see the sacrifice, sorry. I have missed a lot of birthdays, first steps etc (I have 5.9 kids and have been absent more than half my enlistment, or roughly 3.2 kids), but the missions were not that demanding, the down time is excessive in most places (Kandahar, Gardez, Salerno, Baghdad-little more intense, Baghram) and we eat pretty good over there. War is purgatory these days in other words, and we should expect more from the men. We aren’t far from 2 yr deployments when mission creeps anyway, my last deployment order didn’t come with an end date and we didn’t find out it was 15 months until three months in.

[patmc]

First off, made it into Sierra Vista, AZ last night. Wow, after 4 years of pine trees, this place is heaven. Just have to get used to the altitude.



Problem is that we have defined ourselves into a box as not being occupiers, conquerors, crusaders, etc. Now we have to figure out how in heck we call ourselves “winners” and leave. The locals don’t understand this either, they just want us gone, whatever we are. As long as we are just and equitable in the prosecution of our war, the occupied will usually wait out the interim. We should not be worried as being seen as what we are, we must act as we are and then leave. Yeah, the Talibs will wait, that is what they’ve been doing. The part WE”RE waiting on hasn’t, and may not happen. The DOS needs to build the nation to the point that our national security goals are met and the DOD can call it a day, bigger army won’t fix that. Let’s be efficient while we wait is my point.

Agree on this, except I don't know how long an interim the Afghans will tolerate. Also, it is DOS' job to help other states rebuild, and PRTs are working to this, but as designed right now, State does not have the manpower or forward capability to "rebuild" a place like Afghanistan. Army can be used more efficiently, but unless we or the Afghans "surge" reconstruction, the Army will just be there forever.



Well, I don’t like to air out others laundry, but the ol’ BLUFOR does give away when folks are on patrol, and I was a lonely dot out there more often than not. When I did see other dots, they were in BN strength. There wasn’t a lot of small unit action going on. Are there units doing the business? absolutely, just not enough of them.

Above both our pay grades, but again goes to efficient use of the force we have, and the realties of METT-TC in Afghanistan. Poole argues in his books for US small units that live off the land and patrol for weeks on end. I don't see Roger's Rangers returning any time soon, though.



I have heard a lot about this boogey man as well. I don’t really see it happening, maybe you have different numbers. My thought has been that if the mission is made relevant to the men, they will die for it. You’re saying, yes, but only if that doesn’t take too long. I don’t mean to be cute, but there is a real disconnect here and it comes from pandering to the pampered.
My squad re-upped for 6yrs each (minus one) after 11 months in Afghanistan and with full knowledge of the deployment to Iraq coming 9 months after our return home. They believed in the mission. They also knocked out a year of college while doing three days out of the wire and two days in for those 11 months. They understand the bennies too.

Again, agree on most points, but I saw the retention problem in my unit. BN made mission for re-enlistments, but as the 2, I had to process the paperwork for many of them that were switching MOS and reclassing. I also had the other half that were ETSing. There are not enough mid to senior level NCOs, and guys are making E6 in less than 5 years without the schools and experiences. We had a SEVERAL time DWI make the E7 list. Same with officers, near 100% promotions to fill slots. A lot of the guys we are retaining are motivated, but not necessarily the ones you want.

We can't pick out missions, and its pretty hard to convince everyone that the war will not be won without their full support. We escorted convoys, thankless and crappy mission. We struggled to keep guys motivated. Those who re-enlisted, reclassed or hoped we would go back to Artillery. All were ready to serve, but to be honest, most were not motivated to die to ensure Toilet Paper and Ice Cream got delivered safely. If you are at the tip of the spear, drawing blood, it is easier to see your contribution than if you are the shaft. If at their re-enlistment they were told, yo'u will go to Afghanistan or Iraq until the mission ends, most would have said, "no thanks, that's too long."


Quite simply, the standard of living at war has never been better, the tours have never been shorter (for this duration a war) and we are still saying “not good enough?” We need a history lesson and the Indian wars of the sub-continent and the American west are in order.

Agree on the living conditions for most, but Vietnam was one year and out. Gulf War 1 was less than a year. Panama, Grenada, Haiti, etc... were in and out. Post WW2, the Army has been fortunate in this regard. Many of the long wars of the past though, the nation went to war and people were drafted or sacrificed. The "savage wars of peace" were not always short and sweet, but again, today if you asked for volunteers to live in the jungle for years, you would get some, but doubt you would get enough. The US could try this and ask for volunteers in OIF or OEF until mission complete. (question: didn't we create the Marines to go live in the jungles for years, kidding sort of) I appreciate that in the scheme of history, one year is nothing, but my first fiance did not agree, and my new girlfriend is not too excited about it either.


I don’t really see the sacrifice, sorry. I have missed a lot of birthdays, first steps etc (I have 5.9 kids and have been absent more than half my enlistment, or roughly 3.2 kids), but the missions were not that demanding, the down time is excessive in most places (Kandahar, Gardez, Salerno, Baghdad-little more intense, Baghram) and we eat pretty good over there. War is purgatory these days in other words, and we should expect more from the men. We aren’t far from 2 yr deployments when mission creeps anyway, my last deployment order didn’t come with an end date and we didn’t find out it was 15 months until three months in.

God bless you brother for what you do, but many do consider time away from their families as a sacrifice. The Army won't survive without people willing to pay the price. Lack of mission and too much down time is bad leadership at the top. COLs and CSMs can surely find better missions, though I remain doubtful. 2 year deployment, hope not, and after the impact of the 15 month, don't know if the brass are willing to do that again. I know at Bragg, one of the BCTs lost a lot of people after they returned, or will lose when their contracts run out. They all said 15 months was just too much.

[sapperfitz82]

Yeah, I am familiar w/ that BCT, they lost me too. Good point on the reclass, I didn't consider that when I wrote the comment. Our company lost all their E-6's to reassignment. I would disagree to a point on the "shake and bake" NCO allusion, we made bad NCO's in peacetime (as I observed upon my enlistment [by the by, these grand, all encompassing statements are ment to be taken in the context of my experience, not some meta-researched scientific doctorate sort of way]) than are being rapidly promoted now. The trade is in maturity as far as I can tell, but their combat experience, IMO, greatly outweighs much that the NCOES has to offer. Nonetheless, we are losing depth across the board to fight this way, its true.

What is missing is the reason to stay gone this long, the "manifest Destiny" so to speak. We need a positive goal that compels our guys to gear for a "Long War." It appears the nation is not ready to devote more GDP to this fight, or at least the politicians aren't, if that is true, DOD still has to win the war. I am in favor of solving this problem with our current resources as best we can while we ask for more. I offer the mission based deployment as a motivator for those units that need it, applied to all of course.

And the Marines should stay in the woods, yes.

BTW, you just had your 82D post. Congrats, its a good number.

[Ken White]

First, on this:
Agree on the living conditions for most, but Vietnam was one year and out.Living conditions for most in Viet Nam were, to the extent possible, as close to todays as was possible at the time. That was also true in Korea, again relatively. In both those as in Afghanistan -- though not so much in Iraq -- time in the boonies was long and without creature comforts but that goes with the job.

As for Viet Nam being one year and out; true for the single enlistment folks and for those drafted. For those on a second or later hitch the rule was a year in the States and a year in Viet Nam, MOS dependent -- didn't need or use too many tankers, though a lot of them, did get sent as Grunts or Advisers. People with four or five tour in Viet Nam aren't all that rare. I know one guy with seven Purple Hearts, all entailing Hospital time, over four tours...

Point of all that is there aren't as many differences between then and now as many seem to think.
Poole argues in his books for US small units that live off the land and patrol for weeks on end. I don't see Roger's Rangers returning any time soon, though.I'm not a Poole fan and I think any Westerner who tries to 'live off the land' in Afghanistan is gonna be an advertisement for 'Weight Watchers ®' but I do think the only thing precluding smaller units out on their own is senior leader excessive caution. We are still risk averse to too great a degree. That said, I know some units in Afghanistan were / are prone to kick out Squad (and smaller) sized patrols while others will not.
...unless we or the Afghans "surge" reconstruction, the Army will just be there forever.Doesn't that depend on what ones desired end state actually happens to be? I suggest there's a happy and realistic medium between dropping a copy of the Federalist Papers and leaving versus the alternative of 'forever.' While pondering where that 'medium' should fall, recall two things; be realistic and aim for something achievable. Best is the enemy of good enough.
We had a SEVERAL time DWI make the E7 list. Same with officers, near 100% promotions to fill slots. A lot of the guys we are retaining are motivated, but not necessarily the ones you want.At the risk of drawing fire, I'll just say that I've known a slew of highly competent drunks, Officer and NCO. it's a tough job and it drives to a vice of some sort... :D

IOW, don't write those SFCs off. Nor the Officers who were just there. I'll also suggest that I'd rather have five guys who are motivated and drink than ten who are 'superbly qualified' but are not motivated -- whether they drink or not is really irrelevant...:wry:
...but many do consider time away from their families as a sacrifice. The Army won't survive without people willing to pay the price. Lack of mission and too much down time is bad leadership at the top. COLs and CSMs can surely find better missions, though I remain doubtful.True on the first, each person has his or her own level on that. Some will wave the Family goodbye for the job, some will not. Too much down time is bad, always has been -- penalty of a large bureaucracy. So is mission allocation and, believe me on this, COLs and CSMs have been known to fight bad ones quite strenuously and lose. It's not usually their call. That too goes with the territory and if the territory is not conducive to an adequate comfort level, people will -- and should -- find something else to do. The Green machine is better than it ever was, it isn't perfect but it is trying to improve -- and it will all work out.

[Schmedlap]

I was happy as can be when I was patrolling dangerous streets with a bunch of 18-year-olds carrying assault weapons. Granted I was single and op tempo pretty much guaranteed that I would remain so (one year in Iraq, then one year in the field or at a training center, preparing to go back, repeat...), but I was willing to spend years on end in Iraq. I loved being an Infantry Officer and could see the contributions that we made almost everyday. When my "career progression" required that I move to a job behind a desk and do PowerPoint slides, I put in my separation paperwork. That was the motivation for many of my peers, as well. Retention bonus? Just give me my old job back. There are plenty of individuals who don't like the dangerous work and are willing to change the headings of the tables on the slide and make the colors more vibrant. I'm not one of them. Because of that, I'm no longer a Soldier. There are plenty others like me.

[Ken White]

...There are plenty of individuals who don't like the dangerous work and are willing to change the headings of the tables on the slide and make the colors more vibrant. I'm not one of them. Because of that, I'm no longer a Soldier. There are plenty others like me.More than many would think.

Some people leave the services due to family pressures -- and that ought to be okay with everyone.

Too many leave only because they're disillusioned and there's not enough challenge. No one should be okay with that...

[patmc]

I would disagree to a point on the "shake and bake" NCO allusion, we made bad NCO's in peacetime (as I observed upon my enlistment [by the by, these grand, all encompassing statements are ment to be taken in the context of my experience, not some meta-researched scientific doctorate sort of way]) than are being rapidly promoted now. The trade is in maturity as far as I can tell, but their combat experience, IMO, greatly outweighs much that the NCOES has to offer. Nonetheless, we are losing depth across the board to fight this way, its true.

Agree, people are being promoted faster than in the past, but people are also doing more than in pre War on Terror. We are growing up fast. That said, your experience at each level can only teach you so much. I spent my entire time as a S4 learning OJT, then as S2, same deal. Schools give you the technical skills you need. Leadership is earned and learned at units. Also, the vast majority of NCO's I worked with deserve more rank and rewards. There were just a few that all heads turned in the room when name was read on promotion list.



What is missing is the reason to stay gone this long, the "manifest Destiny" so to speak. We need a positive goal that compels our guys to gear for a "Long War." It appears the nation is not ready to devote more GDP to this fight, or at least the politicians aren't, if that is true, DOD still has to win the war. I am in favor of solving this problem with our current resources as best we can while we ask for more. I offer the mission based deployment as a motivator for those units that need it, applied to all of course.

Good point, and agree completely. The Soldiers still in today are here because they want to be (minus those stop-lossed, but they did volunteer at one point). The nation as a whole has not moved much farther than bumber stickers and ribbons. Exceptional many have, and are greatly appreciated, but as election showed: number one issue for voters - 60% economy 10% war on terror (read that this morning over breakfast, source forgotten after bagel). We have to use what we have, but asking for more does not hurt. (Spreading the wealth around...)


And the Marines should stay in the woods, yes.

BTW, you just had your 82D post. Congrats, its a good number.

Something we can all agree on, and I have now ruined the number. Not looking to start any flame wars or anything, but first day in AZ today, I was in a sea of black berets. Mine is looking sharp too though, and I'm really happy to be here.

[patmc]

I suggest there's a happy and realistic medium between dropping a copy of the Federalist Papers and leaving versus the alternative of 'forever.' While pondering where that 'medium' should fall, recall two things; be realistic and aim for something achievable. Best is the enemy of good enough.

Sadly, if given the chance, more Afghans would probably read the Federalist Papers than Americans, aside from the selcted chapters in American Government 101. That said, and though the Afghans could literraly have cities on a hill, they will likely not be the same as our ideal. Agree that best is usually good enough, as long as its good enough for the Afghans or Iraqis or whoever to accept.


At the risk of drawing fire, I'll just say that I've known a slew of highly competent drunks, Officer and NCO. it's a tough job and it drives to a vice of some sort... :D IOW, don't write those SFCs off. Nor the Officers who were just there. I'll also suggest that I'd rather have five guys who are motivated and drink than ten who are 'superbly qualified' but are not motivated -- whether they drink or not is really irrelevant...:wry:

There are definately those that drink and fight, and do both well. The NCO I mentioned was not very capable or motivated either, so the DWIs were icing. Having been to St. Barbara's Day Balls (Patron Saint of Artillery), dining ins, O'calls, Prop Blast, etc... I can agree that some of the best will have a few drinks on occasion.


So is mission allocation and, believe me on this, COLs and CSMs have been known to fight bad ones quite strenuously and lose. It's not usually their call. That too goes with the territory and if the territory is not conducive to an adequate comfort level, people will -- and should -- find something else to do. The Green machine is better than it ever was, it isn't perfect but it is trying to improve -- and it will all work out.

Agree that you get the missions you get, but the buck stops at the top. If large numbers of troops are not utilized or under utilized, those in charge need to find a better use for them, or send them home. If a BN has couple dozen guys who do nothing but eat and go to MWR, put them at a gate or guard tower to increase force protection, free up others, and give them a purpose. This is micro-managing yes, but idle hands will do bad things. If a BCT claims to own battlespace, put people out in the battlespace.


To Schmedlap. I came very close to getting out for the same reason and will reassess in couple years. My good buddy who is now excellent CPT in NG got fed up with slaving on staff and getting little satisfaction from doing paperworkwork. Main reason the CRSB served as a reward to those largely already staying in. The slides and briefings on CSRB all seemed to ignore that job satisfaction was primary reason guys got out.

[Ken White]

...Agree that you get the missions you get, but the buck stops at the top. If large numbers of troops are not utilized or under utilized, those in charge need to find a better use for them, or send them home.I totally agree but the problem may not be quite as simple as it seems. The problem originates with Staffs, not commanders or CSMs. Staffs. Staffs from DA on down -- they are the ones that come up with odd taskings and a lot of make work; convoy security missions for the wrong units who just happened to be untasked at the time. Easier to put them on it than find a unit that's designed, trained and equipped to do that. Oh, wait...

Consider also that generally the actual impact falls about three or more levels down from their august height so the fact that it is not always a smart, well considered idea is really immaterial to them. They're insulated from direct complaints and every experienced StaffO knows that valid complaints at Bn level get to Div and sound like minor problems while Corps considers them whining. Give it some thought.

How to fix it? The Commanders concerned are busy guys and cannot watch or know everything, they depend on their Staffs and subordinates to keep them informed -- and there is reluctance to do that -- keep the boss informed, I mean, simply because he is busy. It's a matter of what's important and that, unfortunately is in the eye of the beholder. Better to say little and not annoy El Commandante. That, BTW, is one area where CSMs do have some play and I acknowledge many will not get involved for some bad reasons...

Practically speaking and in general, to get it fixed, Unit Staffs have to fight with their Bosses Staff and force them to fight with his Bosses Staff(s) -- and too many are reluctant to do that on make work, force protection or 'local security' issues in order to save their fights for what they think may be more important issues. I submit that misuse of troops is a very important issue but I know that many staff types do not see it that way; all too many want to do is keep their Boss happy and out of trouble and if Joe suffers a teeny bit or some LT has a tough job for part of his tour, well so what...

While convoy protection has been a greater or lesser problem in all our recent wars, it has occurred to some degree in all, yet, in peacetime, it is difficult to envision much less justify a unit trained and equipped just to protect convoys. even if that were not so, it would be difficult to predict the size and number required. So we have to ad-hoc it. Fortunately, we do that well but it does offer discombobulation to the ad-hocced unit.

One thing that all our wars point out is that we are not flexible enough in organizing and equipping units for theater and conflict unique missions -- which will always exist. We generally get around to it but we're way too slow to adapt -- that and the multi level staff problem are what I meant by the penalty of the bureaucracy

I suggest that a real solution to the problem in question lies in better training of Staff Officers -- and in Commanders insisting on troops not being misused instead of just accepting it and saying that's what "Corps wants, just do it." I've been told that or something similar several times by fairly good Commanders. I have never been told to do anything like that by a really good Commander...
If a BN has couple dozen guys who do nothing but eat and go to MWR, put them at a gate or guard tower to increase force protection, free up others, and give them a purpose. This is micro-managing yes, but idle hands will do bad things. If a BCT claims to own battlespace, put people out in the battlespace.That, OTOH, is to me not a mission issue but a unit tasking issue, it is emphatically a Battalion level issue and it certainly does impinge on the CSM and /or CO. It also impinges on the Staff who had to have some part in the design it and if that abuse -- and it is that -- continues, on the Co / By / Trp Cdrs and 1SGs...

So we aren't in much disagreement at all...:D

Have fun in Aridzone... ;)

[sapperfitz82]

On the bright side of all this (misuse of troops), I fondly recall Gen Schoomaker red in the face chewing some butt at a remote base in Afghanistan when he saw a platoon of soldiers filling sandbags - for his benefit. The make work stopped quickly and locals were employed to fill sandbags. This type of leadership is sorely needed now, and probably always has been.

The use of contractors and locals for the busy work that needs to be done could reflect this shift from "have enough men to be ready for anything" to "have men enough who are ready for anything." I am much in favor of the second approach.

The bigger army problem, IMO, isn't one of numbers. More would be better. It is an attitude that "if only I had more guys, I would have to think of a better way to use the one's I have." An imperfect ancedote for this, I am sure we are all familiar with the area beautification that takes one day a week out of the training calender. I would return to on base housing to see the civilians mowing my lawn. I brought this to the SMA attention, ensuring him that my wife could mow the grass at home, if he would just send the civilians to the barracks so I could train the men. It comes as a shock to me that the managers of the Army find nothing wrong with taking guys off the "assembly line" to pick up trash or do landscaping. Any business who did this in the competitive market would be trounced.

So, first we must become more effecient. We now feel the pain of our poor management style, this is a great motivator to make things better. Then we add bigger numbers to the better system.

That's my pitch.

[Schmedlap]

An imperfect ancedote for this, I am sure we are all familiar with the area beautification that takes one day a week out of the training calender. I would return to on base housing to see the civilians mowing my lawn. I brought this to the SMA attention, ensuring him that my wife could mow the grass at home, if he would just send the civilians to the barracks so I could train the men.

I've always said, if I were to win to lottery, I would go back into the Army. And whenever one of those stupid details arose, I would hire a bunch of migrant workers to do it while I take my guys to a private shooting range.

[patmc]

Just saw on HRC, Army is projected to be short 5000 CPTs and MAJs next summer, so MAJ board is being bumped up 4 months, and promotion to CPT will also bump up one month. MAJ in 9, CPT in 3 +/-.

They are over on LTs right now, but only time will tell.

I think this is due to a combination of retention problems, transformation, and growing more BCTs. Nobody seems to be willing to stop and realize that you can't create slots if you have no plan to fill them.

Is a BN/BCT/etc... that is half filled to MTOE for Officers and Senior NCOs a force enabler? People are and will step up to fill the open slots, we had a CPT filling a MAJ slot, and 1LT(P)s filling CPT slots, but there reaches a point where people wear out or get overwhelmed due to lack of training and experience.

With regards to size of the force question, we can't fill slots now, so maybe adding 60-100K may not fix anything.

[Ken White]

to adapt, you can't expect much. I'm unsure why it is so difficult to transmute an individual replacement centric organization into one that supports rotating units -- unless it has something to do with the high number of people required to do the former and a lesser number needed for the latter. Nah, that can't be it -- that would mean that job security takes precedence over supporting the Army... :rolleyes:

Add to that the brilliance of CentCom staffers who took an Airborne Infantry Brigade intended for a high profile mission and instead put it on convoy escort duty for a year in MND-S and managed to turn a competent combat Brigade and a super high personnel (all ranks) retaining organization into one that put retention below the basement and became a borderline shambles that will take a lot of time to rebuild... :mad::mad:

When the Staff imperative at upper levels is to answer the mail as quickly and easily as possible instead of to do what's needed, right and sensible, bad things happen...

That said, we've been more short of these levels of experience before. Not that such knowledge makes it any easier for those who have to cope but it should reassure many that it can be done.

[Schmedlap]

... we had a CPT filling a MAJ slot, and 1LT(P)s filling CPT slots, but there reaches a point where people wear out or get overwhelmed due to lack of training and experience.

And instead of those 1LT(P)s getting a few months of XO, specialty platoon, or (gasp) extra line platoon time, they're screwing with PowerPoint slides, working through a mountain of paperwork, and hanging around with fellow officers instead of Soldiers. That's lousy preparation for future command.

[reed11b]

For all the institutional changes that could be made to free up trigger pullers,(i.e. shifting funding from RC to AD, reducing non-deployable commands, reducing support troops etc.) I feel the core fact is that A) if we need 15 month deployments to meet our current deployment needs and B) that does not free up a standing pool of units available to deploy elsewhere in a very turbulent world political/military atmosphere; then the Army is not big enough, period. So, do we need a long term enlargement or a short term one? Expanded recruiting or draft? I feel the POTUS elect's call to national service is the right track to expanded recruiting. I do feel that the military should remain voluntary, but we are burning through soldiers physically and emotionally at a non-sustainable rate, and if recruitment failed to bring in sufficient quantity of quality troops, then I would be open to a short term draft. I would focus draftees in the tail and not the teeth personally, but that's me.
Reed

[Ken White]

burning through soldiers physically and emotionally at a non-sustainable rate -- and I agree that is the case -- not because the Army is too small but because we aren't doing it right?

The 'it' being recruiting, selection and training on the one hand -- and the methodology and TTP of the operational and tactical effort in theater on the other hand. I submit that the former problem is due to a flawed personnel system and a tendency to select and train pretty much as the huge Army of the United States did during WW II -- and the latter is due to trying to operate with flawed organizations and techniques (also from WW II) overlaid with the terribly wrong Goldwater-Nichols structure...

And, as was said above:
And instead of those 1LT(P)s getting a few months of XO, specialty platoon, or (gasp) extra line platoon time, they're screwing with PowerPoint slides, working through a mountain of paperwork, and hanging around with fellow officers instead of Soldiers. That's lousy preparation for future command. -- that sort of business as usual mentality in an unusual time...

Slings and Arrows Welcomed. :D

[reed11b]

burning through soldiers physically and emotionally at a non-sustainable rate -- and I agree that is the case -- not because the Army is too small but because we aren't doing it right?

The 'it' being recruiting, selection and training on the one hand -- and the methodology and TTP of the operational and tactical effort in theater on the other hand. I submit that the former problem is due to a flawed personnel system and a tendency to select and train pretty much as the huge Army of the United States did during WW II -- and the latter is due to trying to operate with flawed organizations and techniques (also from WW II) overlaid with the terribly wrong Goldwater-Nichols structure...

And, as was said above: -- that sort of business as usual mentality in an unusual time...

Slings and Arrows Welcomed. :D

So here is the thing, I agree with you 100% on everything you mentioned, especially the flawed personnel system, BUT... even with those corrections, I think the Army would be too small for the current world conflict outlook. Still need to address them, since a draft is a political A-bomb and would create potential long term problems once the military needed to downsize, and expanded recruiting is possible, but only to a point.
Reed
P.S. I suppose I could try to dig up the hard numbers, but I'm actually fairly busy doing my actual VA job, and I am hopeful somebody here has them pre-generated.

[Ken White]

...even with those corrections, I think the Army would be too small for the current world conflict outlook.Not if we adapted what we do to what we have instead of trying to adapt what we have to do things we cannot do for all the reasons you earlier cited and which the DoD and Army leadership know, knew or should have known.
...a draft is a political A-bomb and would create potential long term problems...Agreed
...and expanded recruiting is possible, but only to a point.and both agree and disagree. I agree we can do it; I do not agree that we should do it.

[sapperfitz82]

we are burning through soldiers physically and emotionally at a non-sustainable rate, and if recruitment failed to bring in sufficient quantity of quality troops,
Reed

precisely because we are failing to train them properly. As Ken points out, our expectations are still geared to a peacetime service. Adding more numbers to these guys who are expecting to only be away every so often, who aren't mentally prepared for the psychological onslaught of room clearing during hours of limited visibility, driving through a nuisance minefield to get to work, who are fighting a civilian benefits provider from overseas so their family can get medical attention, who have to deal with mixed gender unit issues, blah blah blah… are going to burn out quick.
Why not fix all this stuff first, adjust our expectations to a wartime footing (i.e. there is a war on, sorry to inconvenience you) and try to save some of the institutional knowledge that is leaving too fast, instead of replacing it with more empty heads to be filled.
I understand that guys are burned out, I differ regarding the length/number of tours is the reason they ETS, PCS, or otherwise leave. It is a convenient way to sum up one’s frustrations, particularly for those who have no idea what Tricare is, or haven’t been deployed three Christmas’ in a row and received a penny on each of those LES’.
These, and more, problems should be fixed regardless of whether we grow or shrink the force. It might just be that if we make the military a more user friendly environment (in the sense of servicemen) we will see that these guys stick around longer and we don’t need a wider mouth on the funnel to get the same numbers on the other end.
The benefits to this are that we can continue to modernize the force and increase effectiveness. You get 4 inches of tail for every 1 inch of tooth. Adding more teeth does not, therefore, translate directly into effectiveness, though it does treat the symptom.

There is no doubt there is a problem, numbers will reduce the pain, but the leaders will leave for the same reasons unless we fix the lack of professionalism and job satisfaction they should expect.

[reed11b]

Good points all, however my reason for stating that 15 month rotations is unsustainable comes from a MH provider standpoint. Go over a year and PTSD (and other MH issues) rates shoot up, period. We have known this since WWII. Yep, realistic expectations help, but most studies suggest that more tours for shorter lengths would be healthier from a MH aspect.
Reed

[Ken White]

unfeeling or lacking in normal human compassion -- because I'm not. However. While mental health is and should be a concern, that it is not why the Army is in business and thus it is a secondary issue. Combat effectiveness is the primary issue and it must be.

What you cite is the result of a system as Sapperfitz82 says is a peacetime oriented but WW II based personnel and operational / tactical series of processes and systems that is determined to operate the way it has since 1945 even though the missions are different, combat elements and equipment are different and the people are really, really different. Doesn't work, does it?

He and I contend that systemic changes particularly in personnel selection and training but also including new organizations and employment techniques will lessen the MH impacts -- at least in so far as gross numbers affected. Keep doing what we've been doing but with more people and I guarantee you the MH problem numbers will go up to match the troop increase in percentage terms -- just as they have in the last two years.

Not that I'm gonna hold my breath waiting for that change, you understand. We're more likely to get your solution than mine...:(

[patmc]

The Army must have known this disussion was going on. Just found this on AKO, the Army is releasing the new "Army Strong... Strength Like No Other" campaign on Veterans Day.

http://www.usaac.army.mil/sod/ads/

I was excited that maybe they were updating Army Strong to showcase the courage, history, sacrifice, etc. especially if on Veterans Day. Instead, they are releasing another campaign to show you how the Company, School, and Team will make you better for your career after the Army.

Maybe on Veterans Day they could just show an interview with someone who jumped into D-Day, suffered through the cold of Korea, or walked the jungles of Vietnam, and finish off with a shot of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. What do I know?

[Ken White]

I need to start displaying Steve Blair's tag line which he stole from one of you guys out there:
"As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought."It certainly applies to all the ad campaigns since "Be all you can be"

[DavidvsTheWorld]

Found an interesting article by Times discussing the feasibility of national service and different suggestions on how to encourage it. Though not much directly related to military recruiting, some interesting ideas nevertheless, some of which have yet to be mentioned in this thread.

Here is the link in case anyone is interested:

http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1657256_1657317_1657570,00.html

[Ken White]

sort of blithering idiocy are never going to have to serve in their schemes?

There's a reason for that. Michael Kinsley's article in that series you linked is on target; Stengel is out to lunch and his math is flaky -- both on the costs and on the numbers of people.

We produce more people than we need for public service, all forms, so how do you determine who serves where and who doesn't serve at all...

[Tom Odom]

We produce more people than we need for public service, all forms, so how do you determine who serves where and who doesn't serve at all...

Starship Troopers--the Heinlein novel and NOT the movie

Seriously I agree that peeps throw these things out w/o fully engaging brain groups

But I also believe that levels of Federal benefits should be earned versus inherited. One example that comes to mind immediately is college loans. Another that comes to mind deals with the current discussion on expanding the foreign service. Make national service a prerequisite for entry into the Foreign Service. Many FSOs already do that as I am sure you know.

Best

Tom

PS

I am very much a Heinlein model fan in an ideal world but it will never happen lest the bugs actually send a big rock at earth :D

Hopes for any form of national service are probably equally Quixotic but man must dream

[reed11b]

Blah.. I have always been romanticized by the concept of national service, but I agree with Ken. Programs to eliminate college loan debt for graduates and programs to allow either grants or expanded loans for those still in school, combined with more exciting and fulfilling volunteer options would increase the number of individuals wanting to perform national service, but I don't think you can make it compulsory in a good way. Again..blah.
Reed
Blah is how I feel, i.e. dissapointment that the reality of National Service does not equal my romaticized version of it. It is NOT refering to Mr. Odom's post in any way.

[Ken White]

Starship Troopers--the Heinlein novel and NOT the movie.philosophy -- and the unfortunate fact that it isn't likely to be seen in our lifetimes... :(
But I also believe that levels of Federal benefits should be earned versus inherited. One example that comes to mind immediately is college loans. Another that comes to mind deals with the current discussion on expanding the foreign service. Make national service a prerequisite for entry into the Foreign Service. Many FSOs already do that as I am sure you know.I also agree strongly with that. A lot of Federal benefits are simply vote buying schemes enacted by a venal and stupid -- not ignorant; they are not ignorant and they are shrewd but they are stupid -- Congress critters. Most of those benefits don't need to exist and those that should need to be earned, not donated.

I sort of agree with Reed also:
"...Blah is how I feel, i.e. dissapointment that the reality of National Service does not equal my romaticized version of it."Nothing wrong with what you say, we ought to be able to do some form of service. Romanticizing and dreaming are okay, wouldn't improve without that but old cold reality and the selfishness of people sometimes bite. Unpleasant bite at that...

[Tom Odom]

But jousting at windmills offers a certain release...

I will continue to dream

[DavidvsTheWorld]

And I also agree that Kinsley's article offers a more realistic perspective than Stengel's. It seems any sort of compuslory service is unrealistic on multiple levels. However, should not further incentives be investigated in order to pull in a higher number of participants? And if so, do any of Stengel's suggestions merit further investgation/implementation? (Acknowledging that the money math is probably way off base.)

[Ken White]

...However, should not further incentives be investigated in order to pull in a higher number of participants? And if so, do any of Stengel's suggestions merit further investgation/implementation? (Acknowledging that the money math is probably way off base.)fix our education system to teach kids how to be functioning adults with some basic knowledge, a sense of what is achievable, knowledge that life is not fair, everybody is not equal and never will be and with no %^&$#@* self esteem; self confidence, yes -- self esteem, no.

As for his ideas:

The Baby Bond idea is a disastrous approach; it will 'cost' Billions and accomplish little. A year of service would be effectively a waste; most jobs would require nearly that much time in training for effectiveness, thus you'd be training people for a job they wouldn't be around to perform. Those who are inclined to volunteer will do so without the money; those who are not will not do so for the money -- which Congress will pilfer in any event...

National service as a cabinet position. Sheesh. The Cabinet is too big now; we've already ruined education in this country with a Department of Education; our housing and cities have become totally dysfunctional since the inception of HUD; Health Care costs have gone through the roof and one of the worlds better rates of several health statistics had gone into the cellar since HHS came on scene. We don't even want to get started on Homeland Security. By Stengel's own admission, volunteerism is high and climbing -- ask yourself why he wants to ruin that?

Education Corps? One problem in education today is incompetent teachers. He wants to put other people in the mix, people who have basically been coerced one way or another to be there. Smart...

The Rapid Reserve Corps is a terrible idea. FEMA can do what it has to do and is supposed to do -- it cannot do things that are beyond its capability as it was thought it should have performed during Katrina. Not as it should have performed but as it was thought it should have...

The National Service Academy is sheer idiocy -- does this guy not realize that our kids should be reading the Federalist Papers in Middle School; that public schools are failing because a lot of partly educated fools have destroyed US education. He wants a government run school to fix that...:rolleyes:

I'm dubious about asking Baby Boomers to do much of anything; thus far they seem to have screwed up most everything they've touched. I think they should be encouraged to retire and stay quiet. ;)

On the plus side, the Summer of Service is a good idea; the Health Corps and the Green Corps may depending on how and where implemented be worthwhile. All on a voluntary basis. Abraham Lincoln pointed out in 1863 that involuntary servitude was a bad idea.

[William F. Owen]

However, should not further incentives be investigated in order to pull in a higher number of participants?

I've mulled this for some time. "Serve a full 3 years and get 22% income tax relief for life etc."

...but the devil is in the detail. Also, do you really want to attract the anal, life planning, future conscious kid who is thinking about 22% income tax. Probably not.

[Entropy]

I love Heinlein as much as the next guy, and there is a certain attractiveness to the Heinlein federal service model presented in Starship Troopers, but I fear the reality would simply be a new class-based system and a new "federal service" aristocracy.

[Tom Odom]

I love Heinlein as much as the next guy, and there is a certain attractiveness to the Heinlein federal service model presented in Starship Troopers, but I fear the reality would simply be a new class-based system and a new "federal service" aristocracy.

We could be Dukes, Earls, and Barons.

I like it :D

[Entropy]

We could be Dukes, Earls, and Barons.

I like it :D

It's good to be the King! :D

http://www.ladyofthecake.com/mel/world/images/goodkng2.jpg