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slapout9
10-31-2008, 02:10 PM
This is from the SWJ blog and one of the best documents I have read. We could even use it here at home USA (United States of Alabama):D



http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/121-jones.pdf

Eden
10-31-2008, 03:20 PM
It's hard to criticize the basic idea that spreading good governance is a better long-term solution for the world's ills than just killing bad guys. After all, that has been a basic tenet of the National Security Strategy for the last decade. But COL Jones, I think, depends too much on the assumption that troubled states share our belief that government exists for the good of the governed.

Many states - I won't be so cynical as to say most - are organized for the good of the governors, not the governed. Where we have become involved in counterinsurgency, the supported state will pay lip service to our values and stated goals because they want our money, manpower, and killing power. They will give nominal and often half-hearted support to our initiatives in good governance. But...the institution of good governance practices would work against the ability of the elites to maintain their power and sources of income. Even amongst the exploited populace our ideas of good governance often do not resonate, or are seen as positive threats. They welcome the material largesse we bring, but resist the softer aspects of what we consider good governance ( a strong central government, protection of minority rights, rule of law as opposed to customary privilege, etc).

So, a populace-centric as opposed to a threat-centric (not my terms but his - I hate any idea incorporating the pseudoword 'centric') strategy would certainly be as problematic in counterinsurgency.

Ken White
10-31-2008, 03:29 PM
Not least because he reinforces my long standing point that Goldwater Nichols and the "We won WW II" mentality have given the Geographic CinCs way too much clout in setting national foreign policy -- by default, admittedly but it still needs to be corrected.

Every person in Congress and all their staffers should be forced to read this.

State, with all its flaws needs to lead our foreign policy effort worldwide...

William F. Owen
11-01-2008, 07:58 AM
But COL Jones, I think, depends too much on the assumption that troubled states share our belief that government exists for the good of the governed.

Exactly.


Populace-Centric Engagement (PCE): A holistic family of engagement that places primacy on understanding and facilitating meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance, as shaped by its own unique culture and values. PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails.

This is pure western/white thinking. Try explaining this to some very influential middle eastern families, or talking about this in Africa. It's the quickest way to chase folks into the hands of China and anyone else who just wants a baggage free beneficial relationship.

...and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him. The spanner does not tell the plumber how to fix the leak, any more than the brick layer tells an architect how to built a house.

Tom Odom
11-01-2008, 01:47 PM
...and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him. The spanner does not tell the plumber how to fix the leak, any more than the brick layer tells an architect how to built a house.

As a Lieutenant Colonel, Wilf I was intimately involved in strategic level policy on central Africa. I wrote the campaign plan for the area in Kigali for US European Command and it was picked up virtually word for word. Your methaphor is both inaccurate and misleading. Inaccurate in that the trades have a direct effect on the total design because the design can only use what a trade can provide. Misleading in that there are any number of colonels, majors, and captains who have had strategic effect.

Tom

slapout9
11-01-2008, 03:01 PM
1-What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea.


2-Here is some white man/western thinking. In another article Colonel Jones talked about an International Civil Rights Act that correlates to our domestic Civil Rights Act. Both based upon our Constitution and used to guide our Domestic and Foreign Policy.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS4Qw4lIckg


Link to SWJ original article by Colonel Jones
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/46-jones.pdf

William F. Owen
11-01-2008, 03:35 PM
1-What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea.


You are signing (get it?) to the choir. Rank has nothing to do with it. Sometimes the lower the rank, the better the idea.


As a Lieutenant Colonel, Wilf I was intimately involved in strategic level policy on central Africa. I wrote the campaign plan for the area in Kigali for US European Command and it was picked up virtually word for word.

Probably because you were the best qualified in that circumstance, based on proximity and experience. You were doing what countless British Army officers have done for generations, all over the empire, usually with beneficial strategic effect.

My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall.

"War is the setting forth of policy with an admixture of other means."

Ken White
11-01-2008, 03:50 PM
I noticed the same item Wilf highlighted:
"...PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails."but took it differently, I cued in on this portion "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.

* As it appears we tried (are trying???) to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is flat not going to happen... :rolleyes:

The principal benefit of his paper to me is that it espouses removal of DoD from de facto primacy in foreign affairs and accurately points out that this:
Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE): A program of engagement designed to defeat a specific enemy or alliance of separate enemies. TCE is driven by the key concept that ultimate victory is achieved by defeating the threat.is not the best way to look at the rest of the world bar a potential existential threat.

I gotta agree with Slap; "What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea." I'm about as rank as anyone and I have some good ideas. Occasionally. Well, rarely... :D

Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:
"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is.

slapout9
11-01-2008, 04:52 PM
[QUOTE=Ken White;59358] "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.

Exactly!!

Tom Odom
11-01-2008, 05:20 PM
Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:
Quote:
"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."
I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is

Wilf the fear as you state it is a red herring when it comes to soldiers versus diplomats as in many cases soldiers are in fact diplomats. Separation of affairs political from affairs military at the strategic level is a impossible and trying to do that is dangerous.

Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.

I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.

Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.

I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.

Tom

Ken White
11-01-2008, 06:27 PM
I seem to have that problem here a lot; my fault for lack of clarity and using too much shorthand I guess. Penalty of a wordy old Dude who thinks he's a comedian trying to be brief. Apologies to all. I'll try to do better.
Wilf the fear as you state it is a red herring when it comes to soldiers versus diplomats as in many cases soldiers are in fact diplomats. Separation of affairs political from affairs military at the strategic level is a impossible and trying to do that is dangerous.Totally agree, the issue is who has primacy -- who's in charge?
Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.I totally agree and I acknowledge that those on the spot do set often policy and must do so; again, the issue is who's the adviser and who's the decider on the spot...
I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.I also agree totally with that. That, in fact, is the point of my comments.
Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.I think we have a misunderstanding. I totally agree with this and with the country team concept -- and nothing I have written says one thing remotely in opposition to that; so I'm unsure why you would assume that I'm opposed to an idea that works.

What I am opposed to as I thought I rather specifically said is the de facto situation that lets the geographic CinCs set much of our foreign policy as opposed to the DoS doing that. I fully understand that due to several reasons, not least funding and reach, DoD is doing that by default and not particularly because (in some cases) they want to do so.

I'm also aware of the fact that State is not capable of doing that well at this time and I believe I mentioned that; What I'm pointing at is a, IMO, to be desired situation versus what I know (and understand why) is.

Just as the Ambassador -- flawed though he may be -- has primacy on the Country Team (and is a fool if he does not listen carefully to his DAO), so State should have primacy in regional policy and they, not DoD, should set the policy (but not the specifics) of contacts and operations about which they -- and the National command authority -- should listen to DoD (who need to be more forthright and honest in their advice...).

If you saw this from me ""...that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is."" and thought that was a knock on anyone or anything, it was not -- it was merely a comment that perhaps too briefly stated my opinion that DoD (as a corporate entity) has over the years made some decisions by default or specific Administration permissively that were in strong contradiction to State positions and that some of those have been in error. A few have been correct and State was wrong. That and I did not clearly state my broad point -- I agree with Jones that a threat centric approach has not been good for the Nation.
I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.That, too... :D

William F. Owen
11-01-2008, 06:31 PM
I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda.

Exactly! I have no argument with that, but I assume that you limited your advice to that flowed from your military expertise, and relevant local experience.

Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

I also submit that the circumstances where this may be appropriate or actually in the interest of the US Govt. are pretty limited. When the Aliens turn up, they will say "take me to your leaders." Not "how can we meet your requirements?"

Tom Odom
11-02-2008, 03:10 PM
and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.

Let's go back to where I came in and it was due to this statement. I agree that State should have lead and with Ken's concerns on Unified Commands. But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.


Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

Well again I did it as a LTC and I had to fire 2 Majors who tried to do it when they decided the policy set by the CT was in error.


...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

Sure it is, one done in conjunction with the foreign policy as captured in the campaign plan. Saying it is not a military task is wishful thinking; we had enough of that in 2003 I would submit.

Tom

slapout9
11-02-2008, 05:42 PM
De Oppresso Libre-(To Liberate The Oppressed) is the motto of Special Forces and since oppression is often part of the cause of an Insurgency it certainly is a Military problem.

Colonel Jones makes some very good points about this and why poor governance is the true root cause that has to be dealt with, and since violent force has often already been used it will be a military problem. But it is a special military problem hence the reason SF was created in the first place.

Governments are created to provide for the health and safety of ALL the people, but insurgencies start whenever Governments begin to protect only certain members of the populace and forget or ignore the other members and that begins the process of an alienated populace that either begins an insurgency internally or the alienated populace will be subject to exploitation by an outside element or both.

Which is why Colonel Jones makes the point that COIN operations are so protracted and costly in nature and are prone to reignite at some point in the future. The core problem of poor governance was never completely solved. Which will lead to certain portions of the populace becoming alienated again and creating a rich source of recruits for the future cause.

He also makes the point or warning about our being careful about being on the right side of the revolution...a good piece of advice IMO. Again COIN takes so long because we often choose the wrong side to support because of some idealogical dispute(hearts and minds thing again) as opposed to looking at the environment/situation these people are in and how poorly they are being treated by their government.

William F. Owen
11-03-2008, 08:02 AM
But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.


I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.

Soldiers are instruments of policy. They should have nothing to do with formulating the policy, bar advisory input.

I submit T.E. Lawrence as an object lesson in someone failing to understand the bounds of carrying out policy and setting it.

William F. Owen
11-03-2008, 08:11 AM
De Oppresso Libre-(To Liberate The Oppressed) is the motto of Special Forces and since oppression is often part of the cause of an Insurgency it certainly is a Military problem.


Well De Oppresso Libre is certainly more catching that "Selectively free the oppressed in line state department policy and ensuring that we end up with a foreign leader who is well disposed towards to the US, regardless of his/her human rights record."

PCE sounds good, but it must be done in line with overall interest of the US Govt, and that may well mean allowing people to be oppressed, if you want to do business with the leadership that has their hands on the power.

Tom Odom
11-03-2008, 02:15 PM
I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.

No, you said this. Using bold and an all caps response does not change what you said in the first place.


and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.

As for the pronoiuncement that Colonels do not set or define foreign policy, that makes great slogan but is in fact in error. Much of what emerges as a nation's foreign policy toward another nation begins on the ground. What the colonel is writing about has eveything to do with him and his mssion.

Tom

wm
11-03-2008, 05:29 PM
Funny thing about the military and political spheres—they proceed toward success in almost exactly opposite ways. Successful political change is implemented slowly and incrementally by way of consensus. Successful military operations tend to be quick and violent. I suspect it is very valuable to have a country team whose members include people who can assess what kind of action needs to be taken and then act. In fact, I pointed out in a thread a long time go (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=9901&postcount=96) that we need to have state and defense joined at the hip to make this stuff work right.

Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq. Someone else on this thread masterfully described a Ph.D. as a person who has gone from a macroscopic grasp of knowledge to becoming an expert in a piece of minutiae (I admit I have wordsmithed that other post greatly). What we really need are people who can see that many folks are stakeholders and have a part to play in the solution; we need people without blinders on or otherwise afflicted with tunnel vision. We need some folks who are wise, not just smart. Solomon, where are you???

William F. Owen
11-03-2008, 05:29 PM
As for the pronoiuncement that Colonels do not set or define foreign policy, that makes great slogan but is in fact in error. Much of what emerges as a nation's foreign policy toward another nation begins on the ground. What the colonel is writing about has eveything to do with him and his mssion.


So do you mean that when the man on the ground comes to write his reports, and recommends actions, that such recommendations could be said to be "setting and defining foreign policy."

I guess the line from "Charlie Wilson's War" - "we don't have a policy on Afghanistan" - must have been true.

Tom Odom
11-03-2008, 06:04 PM
So do you mean that when the man on the ground comes to write his reports, and recommends actions, that such recommendations could be said to be "setting and defining foreign policy."

I guess the line from "Charlie Wilson's War" - "we don't have a policy on Afghanistan" - must have been true.

Ignoring the later sarcasm, I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.

Tom

William F. Owen
11-04-2008, 05:48 AM
Ignoring the later sarcasm,

No sarcasm intended. At was an attempt at mood lightening, observational humour.


I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.

All those things are good. In the British Army, that is what the "MILO" -military liaison intelligence officers - used to do. Maybe they still do. I have not carried a drunken one back to his hotel in 15 years.

Sure, always good to have military input from the coal face, but that is distinctly different from an officer on the ground, deciding to back X group against another or to reverse a policy already in place. Best he can do, is to argue his case and then act when instructed to do so, his plans first having been scrutinised by the diplomats. Historically the best I can offer is the difference between Allenby's success in the Palestine campaign, versus MacArthur getting himself sacked in Korea.

To whit, and my concern in this thread, while I applaud the Col Jones's insights as to "PCE", his paper does not, to mind, make clear that PCE is a going to have to be set against a very stringent and very specific policy context.

"...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." cannot be, or underpin, an overall approach to operations. It's like basing FM-3 on the universal declaration of human rights. Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.

Tom Odom
11-04-2008, 01:25 PM
Sure, always good to have military input from the coal face, but that is distinctly different from an officer on the ground, deciding to back X group against another or to reverse a policy already in place. Best he can do, is to argue his case and then act when instructed to do so, his plans first having been scrutinised by the diplomats. Historically the best I can offer is the difference between Allenby's success in the Palestine campaign, versus MacArthur getting himself sacked in Korea.

Again Wilf, a military officer serviing in a country team as an attache or a security assistance officer is a diplomat. As for backing a group, that is another decision that can be made at the local level if it is done so under a general policy umbrella.

There are varying degrees of influence and decisionmaking authority accorded officers serving in such positions depending on country, crisis, and national interest. In the larger countries that would be much less than you would find in Africa or Latin America. It tends to be a case of management by exception; the framework is established and you make the decisions within that framework. If once Washington hears of those decisions, they accept, you are good. If not, then you may face recall. But if you believe that every single decision is vetted and scrutinized by a panel of policy makers, you are mistaken. It does not work that way, nor should it.


Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.

That makes a nice neat slogan, Wilf, and I know you like to repeat it. It bears little resemblance to the reality of the Congo, Iraq, or Afghanistan.

We will have to agree to disagree.

Tom

Rob Thornton
11-05-2008, 12:56 AM
Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.
That makes a nice neat slogan, Wilf, and I know you like to repeat it. It bears little resemblance to the reality of the Congo, Iraq, or Afghanistan.

Wilf,
I'd have to say military power, in the context of being an element of U.S. national power, is for achieving U.S. political objectives. While it is perhaps best suited for compelling others to conform to our will, it can, is and has been used for other purposes such as freeing those being compelled or terrorized by others. Context matters.
To this end, there is a "build" component to our use of the U.S. military. You may not qualify this as the use of "military force", or even the use military power, but it is clearly the use of military forces. I'd submit that while one can argue the semantics of the "ways", the result is "means" committed to an end.

Best, Rob

William F. Owen
11-05-2008, 05:39 AM
Wilf,
While it is perhaps best suited for compelling others to conform to our will, it can, is and has been used for other purposes such as freeing those being compelled or terrorized by others. Context matters.


...and that is central to my thesis. Freeing the oppressed still requires violence, as an instrument. Unless you are using armed force, there is little point in using armed forces. I am not talking hurricane relief or any other of the "can do" missions. I am talking about what underpins doctrines, configuration and training.

Context is critical, but force is force. Military force should be force and not the pedalling of influence. Leave that to the other arms of Government.

Eden
11-05-2008, 03:04 PM
I have to admit when I read COL Jones' piece, my first reaction was 'mehhhh...' It doesn't appear to me to be saying anything particularly new or insightful. We should support good governance. OK. We should rely less on brute force. Check. The State Department should have the lead on foreign relations and setting foreign policy. No objections there.

Having followed the thread since, I'm surprised such a pedestrian essay should generate so much controversy. I mean, there are no new ideas there. And, practically, it is doubtful we could implement a PCE if we wanted to.

First of all, where good governance already exists, it would be superfluous. Where governance is poor, it is usually because an entrenched minority is governing for its own benefit. Promoting good governance is going to put us at odds with the existing power structure in many places - that is, we will become insurgents more often than we would be counterinsurgents.

Second, in those places where governance is poor but the government is altruistic, the cause must be poverty - of resources, of technology, of markets, or some combination thereof. Certainly we should promote good governance in those spaces, but I am skeptical of the US ability to truly address underlying, endemic problems such as those even where our indigenous partners are willing participants.

Thirdly, I don't see our State Department as becoming proponents of good governance in any but the most superficial sense. They are diplomats, trained (and organized) to deal with states and state structures, not with populations. I just don't see them becoming agents of change capable of reforming poorly governing states.

Finally, I'll repeat what I said earlier: I don't believe many outside the west share our paradigm of the purpose of government. The idea that governments exist 'for the people' is relatively new, though I will admit it is an idea in the ascendent.

I'm willing to be convinced otherwise. Can anyone provide an example of successful PCE? Especially, can anyone provide an example of successful PCE where the engaging power had to work through a local government - that is, where the engaging power did not rule directly the territory under consideration?

Beelzebubalicious
11-05-2008, 07:51 PM
State Dept, in and of itself, can't do PCE, but USAID can and does do this. There are numerous examples in various countries.

I think there's a disconnect or misunderstanding regarding good governance. Governments, whether national or local, have certain functions to perform and meeting basic needs is the most important (providing security, delivering services, etc.). That's just governance. Most governments in developing countries and fragile states don't even perform their core functions well and that's where institutions like USAID can help to strenghten the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government. Beyond this, good governance refers to reaching out to and including citizens in decision-making, being open and transparent, etc. These aspects of governance are often new and unwelcome by other governments, hence the unwillingness. But providing core functions effectively and efficiently can and should reduce the root causes for frustration and dissatisfaction.

The new term now is good enough governance as good governance is a bit of a stretch for most governments. It has to be a model that works in the local context, is phased to address priorities and accepts the inherent trade-offs and realities of working in these countries.

We need to stop beating the drum of good governance. Frankly, the US govt doesn't do it all that well itself (in the broadest and most complete sense of what good governance entails).

Tom Odom
11-05-2008, 07:54 PM
We need to stop beating the drum of good governance. Frankly, the US govt doesn't do it all that well itself (in the broadest and most complete sense of what good governance entails).

Now that is a mouthful of truth...:D

I doubt Washington will swallow :rolleyes:

Tom

Ken White
11-05-2008, 08:28 PM
er. all three? four??...

Eden is correct in that overall it's a sort of pedestrian article but COL Jones does seem to argue two points with which I agree.

First and most important is a condemnation of threat centered engagement:

"Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE): A program of engagement designed to defeat a specific enemy or alliance of separate enemies. TCE is driven by the key concept that ultimate victory is achieved by defeating the threat."

I said before and will repeat, that is not the best way to look at the rest of the world bar a potential existential threat.

I'll also again say what I said early on the thread reference governance: ""I noticed the same item Wilf highlighted:
"...PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails."but took it differently, I cued in on this portion "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.

* As it appears we tried (are trying???) to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is flat not going to happen...""

I think that sort of agrees with you on not getting wrapped around the good governance foolishness -- none of our business and, as Eden and Beelzebubalicious said, we have enough problems in that area ourselves without trying to hassle others.

Beelzebubalicious
11-05-2008, 09:51 PM
populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best

Not to get too sticky, but this statement needs further analysis. Do any of us really choose our form of governance? I didn't choose democracy. I accepted it. We can choose our leaders, mainly through elections or by other means (coup d'etat), but we choose them so that they create a government that we support and that suits us best. In terms of the last phrase, "suits them best", this is where it gets tricky. Do people even know what suits them best? In many cases, a more authoritarian government might be best and a democracy a disaster. I spent 2 years in Ukraine where most people preferred an authoritarian government and leader. They pined for the kind of strength and leadership that Stalin provided. Nobody wants Stalin back, but they want a strong leader.

This gets me back to choosing leaders and elections and whether people really know what's in their best interest. I was also in the West Bank in December 2005 preparing a proposal for a USAID-funded project. We had a good project designed, but the Palestinian people elected Hamas and that was that. It was, by all reports, a legitimate election. People wanted a change from the past and Hamas had legitimacy in terms of delivering services and listening to the people. They also had strong Islamic values which many people shared. But, like our own recent election, it was more of a referendum on the past administration.

In that case, the US had an opportunity to try and work with the democratically elected government and decided not to. It was a mistake. There are radical elements in Hamas, for sure, but were they all bad? Is anyone or any group all good? Hell no. You gotta work with what you have. If the USG had worked with Hamas, I wonder what would have happened. Could we have strenghtened the moderates, cornered and pushed out the radicals and helped them establish a functioning government?

slapout9
11-06-2008, 12:58 AM
For Eden and everybody, I have sent Colonel Jones an email to see if he will respond from the horse's mouth so to speak...so we shall see. Slap

slapout9
11-08-2008, 11:05 PM
New Article from SWJ Blog by Col. Jones. "Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency"


http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/128-jones.pdf

William F. Owen
11-09-2008, 05:00 PM
New Article from SWJ Blog by Col. Jones. "Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency"
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/128-jones.pdf

Some of Col Jones statements are too absolute to be useful.

For example he talks about "failure of governance." In the three insurgencies, I know best, Sierra Leone, Algeria 1991-present and South Thailand 2004-present, there was no failure of governance.

In SL the bad guys came over the boarder and started killing, robbing and raping. It was criminal insurgency with no popular base. The solution was the kill the insurgents. Having a popular democratic government in Freetown made very little difference. I submit Angola showed some of the same problem, when Jonas Savimbi went "bush" after 92.

Thailand, most folks were fine, till some Muslim extremists started killing local Buddhist Thais, and terrorising folk.

Algeria was stable and functioning (not a democracy, but no arab country is) till an extremist minority started killing folks they didn't like.

What is more Muslims in England are no more subject to bad governance than I was when I lived there.

Ken White
11-09-2008, 06:08 PM
The earlier had some merit; if only in pointing out the Empire's lack of attire (or camouflage) but I sorta scratched my head after this one...

jmm99
11-09-2008, 09:46 PM
I've had difficulties with COL Jones' articles, which mix legal and military language and concepts in something of a pot-purri. That accords with his background.


E.g., Juris Doctorate from Willamette University (1995); Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College (2006); also a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon (2001).

Without doubt, his is a brave attempt to create a needed interface between communities that use different terms (for the same or similar things), all derived from different cultures.

I hope we can agree that, in a small war environment (and in its pre-small war environment), three of the components (leaving other components on the shelf for the time being) are:

1. judicial system

2. police

3. military

What do they do if there are communication difficulties (often semantic). Here is one suggestion (snip from another thread).


john t fishel
Now, we political (and other social) scientists have a solution for such semantic discrepancies. It is called "operational definition." Essentially, we define (or redefine) a word the way we want to use it and say to our interlocutors that if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word you had better be using my definition of it.
......
jmm
... except I would amend the last clause to read: "...if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word, we had better be using our definition of it." Mutuality, reciprocity, all that good stuff.

Here is an good example (I hope). Slap and I can communicate without the need for a translator, within the scope of our respective professions, because the judicial system (judges, prosecutors, public defenders, defense attorneys) and the police have been joined at the hip for so long that our "operational definitions" are well in place. Thus, we (US) can speak of a unified criminal justice community (## 1 & 2) - which does not mean that everyone agrees on everything - it does mean that we understand what we are arguing about.

On the other hand, the military community is not joined at the hip with the criminal justice community - in part because of constitutional and legislative provisions imposed for good reasons; in other part, because the criminal justice community primarily has been concerned with internal US matters, the military with external US matters. The exception is found in our Civil War and Reconstruction - a period of our tragic, personal experience with "small wars". There, the lack of mutual "operational definitions" led to more than one misunderstanding and conflict (e.g., Ex Parte Milligan).

Another interface which COL Jones brings into play is that between civilian policy makers and the military at the national strategy level, where mutual "operational definitions" are again critical to making progress. In the US, lack of communication has been ameliorated by men with military experience occupying the Oval Office (roughly 75%). The UK experience seems different, at least with its PMs (roughly 25%). As our all-volunteer model continues, we might move more toward what I perceive as the British model. My perception may be all wet.

I couldn't really begin with substantive comments on the two articles - pro & con arguments and modifications for almost every paragraph - perhaps. E.g., we learn that:


(first article, p.5)
The U.S. is unique in that it did not create an ideology to fuel an independence movement; instead an ideology developed that demanded that the nation be independent.

Now, there are various theories about the American Revolution. The one that forms my opinion (and all are really just that) is the more traditional view that economic factors (the Crown's trade regulations adverse to the colonies; and its limitations on westward expansion expressed in the Quebec Act), combined with a peculiar American view of English law (the "ideology"), were the bases for declaring independence.

The American "ideology" (which the Brits found insane - and justfiably so, in light of mainstream English legal history) was a radical extension of the Magna Carta, Simon de Montfort, Coke's Institutes and John Locke to what the rebelling colonists (perhaps a third of the whole) thought was a "new land". Part of that ideology was a selective incorporation of some English laws (as "adapted to American conditions"), and outright rejection of others. That process began with the Mayflower Compact and continued through the colonial period. As such, the American Revolution was more an American Evolution.

Ron Humphrey
11-10-2008, 04:07 AM
ALL,

Perhaps this supports JMM's statements about communications in that to me the latter contribution makes perfect sense in both it's presentation and applicability to what I "think" I have learned about insurgency in history.

Although Wilf may be right about absolutes I'm not sure I see how the statements Col Jones made aren't still true.

If the bad guys come from somewhere outside them their not insurgents they are(take your pick: Criminals, outsurgency, enterprise, etc). If these bad guys get enough locals(populace) to stand behind them by whatever means you have an insurgency. If the govt as it stands however is still able to effectively fulfill its obligations to the larger populace then does this not in essence mean that the opposition still remains more of a belligerant than a truly counter government movement. At least in so far as how any outside parties considerations for what type of assistance is required for that govt.

Also think in terms of the US or Britain in the large number of existing counter govt actors who remain simply LE problems due explicitly to the fact that they are not able to move enough of the populous to their chosen cause. This would seem to be particularly applicable to the theory that in almost all forms of insurgency the populace "are' the final determinate for what a movement is or isn't.

Sorry for the rambles but nothing new here:wry:

Bill Moore
11-10-2008, 04:32 AM
Ken just pointed out that this post already existed, so I'm transferring what I thought was a set of brand new ideas. I can see you guys addressed many of the concerns, but I tend to agree with Slapout on this one, with some caveats addressed below. Assuming we don't do this, and TCE isn't working all that well, what do you suggest?

COL Jones' article deserves serious discussion. Personally I disagree with many of his assumptions (or at least my perception of what I think he is attempting to communicate), but there are also a number of good ideas presented that are worth discussing.

In an insurgency/counterinsurgency type conflict it is generally assumed that the population is the center of gravity (this does not relieve leaders from assessing every situation for its unique causes and centers of gravity, or risk re-learning the fact that assumptions are the mother of failure). What exactly does it mean when we say the population is the center of gravity to the insurgent and the counterinsurgent? I think simply nodding our heads up and down in agreement leads to simple, but flawed strategies based heavily on civil military operations, propaganda, and other outreach initiatives. These activities are critical, but only if they support a strategy that brings the conflict to an acceptable settlement or end game.

Jones described population centric engagement (PCE) above initially as understanding and facilitating meeting the requirements of a target populace, which is fine, as long we’re working through the host nation government and assisting them in meeting the requirements of their populace. However, he suggests we should focus our message of inalienable rights, self-determination and the right and duty of every populace to rise up in insurgency in the face of poor governance. It appears that he shifts the argument from how to win an insurgency by focusing on the population to how to undermine the government (subvert) with a message that gives legitimacy to the insurgents. In some cases we do, especially during the Cold War when oppressive communist regimes were being challenged around the world, but the flip side of this argument is that many insurgencies are not interested in improving their societies, but simply gaining power whether it is to establish a narco-state, sharia law, an oppressive communist regime, etc. They are able to mobilize support through coercion and propaganda where the State can be falsely blamed for local woes. In other words, enemies of the State can create perceptions that have little to do with reality. Perhaps the State failed to counter their propaganda effectively, but that is hardly a reason to assume the insurgency necessarily has the high moral ground. Jones argues that insurgencies arise when conditions of poor governance exist that cannot be resolved through legal/legitimate means. In many (perhaps most) cases this is true, but insurgencies are not always the result of poor governance, this assumption can be dangerously misleading.

Another area that I would debate is the proposal to do away with Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE). Targeting the enemy at the tactical level is not a strategy, and it is normally doomed to fail if it doesn’t support a strategy designed to achieve our policy goals; however, failure to address the threat is equally short sighted. Assuming that it is our interest not to see a particular government fall, then we still have to help them neutralize the subversive elements within their society. Winning support from the population is generally essential to facilitate neutralizing the threat, but the point is both strategies must be pursued in a harmonious manner. I would agree that we could ignore the TCE approach entirely if we used PCE as a preventive measure before the situation deteriorates into an insurgency, but once an insurgency begins, there is still a requirement (admittedly subordinate to the political line of operation) to neutralize it.

Points that I agree strongly with:

- In TCE, intelligence truly does lead operations. The question then becomes, what is leading intelligence?

- focus of the daily briefs shouldn’t be on so called high value targets, but on how to fix the government (thus further isolating the threat).

- A TCE approach reinforces VEO ideology, a PCE approach undermines it.

- When the U.S. stops taking the position with others that we are in charge of everything, it will stop being held responsible for everything as well.

- If Al Qaeda ever forms a State, then it just becomes one more weak state that can be defeated easily by a stronger state.

- U.S. gov response to the Civil Rights movement in the 60’s was an excellent example of PCE, because it admitted shortcomings and passed the Civil Rights Act to address those shortcomings, thus preventing a full-fledged insurgency.

A great article, it deserves serious consideration by the SWJ community.

jmm99
11-10-2008, 09:04 PM
I will start here with the basics of Jones I (the first article)


(Jones I, p.2)

1. Populace-Centric Engagement (PCE) ....

2. Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE) ....

3. Good Governance .....

4. U.S. Ideology ....

Leaving aside, for the time being, ## 3 & 4 (which will generate a lot of heat), and starting with a very, very basic situation, let's look at ## 1 & 2 from my vantage point - a big county geographically, a little county in population.

Here, we have the following law enforcement resources (leaving aside village and township police):

1. Michigan State Police Post.

2. County Sheriff's Office.

3. Two city police departments, and two public safety departments at the universities in the two cities.

Not a very large army, but they do co-operate and get the job done. How do they look at Population and Threat ? Here is the HoCoSO mission statement:


Our mission is to preserve and encourage a safe community and to enforce the law with compassion, fairness, honesty and integrity. We will enhance our commitment through hard work, education and technology.

http://www.houghtonsheriff.com/

The first clause ("...to preserve and encourage a safe community...") is certainly Populace-Centric; but what of the second ("...to enforce the law ..."). You have to ask "enforce the law against whom" - and, to that, the answer requires that there be a threat, usually carried out. So, at some point, Populace-Centric Engagement moves to Threat-Centric Engagement.

Now, our Sheriff "Slim" (who ain't slim) would not likely use those terms - "get that egghead stuff away from me, Mike" - but he would likely explain it in an historical example, as he has done here (http://www.houghtonsheriff.com/cgi-bin/getnews.cgi?story=20):


According to Anglo-Saxon custom, if someone broke the law it was not just a crime against the victim, but a crime against the whole community. ...
....
Under Anglo-Saxon rule it was the duty of the citizens themselves to see that the law was not broken, and if it was, to catch the offenders.....

Or, to translate what is clear to Slim and me, into the jargon of the articles: Populace-Centric Engagement of the Threat.

What you will find by talking to cops here (besides the fact that they are not dumb) is that they have a very good handle on their respective populations - admittedly small populations. So, they can tell you who are the "good people" (who sometimes do slip), the "bad people" (who slip regularly) and those "we're not sure of". Their focus is on the "bad people" and their associates (the ones "we're not sure of").

Once a "threat" develops to the probable cause stage (a "criminal"), then we are into the criminal justice system. Now, cops are not social workers - they do not have the resources to address the underlying problems which, if solved, might prevent a "threat" from reaching the "probable cause" stage.

It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.

-------------------------------------------------
Some terms are not easily defined. My own take is that examples are often more enlightening than attempts at formal definitions. I am placing four terms in a rough pecking order, based on where they fit into the "flow chart" of GC III, Arts. 2, 3 and 4.

1. criminal - GC III is NA.

2. terrorist - GC III, Art. 3 ?

3. insurgent - GC III, Art. 3 or Art. 4; it depends.

4. belligerent - GC III, Art. 4

That is just a start.

Bob's World
11-10-2008, 09:21 PM
All,

Ok, as the author of this debate, I imagine I have a duty to show up and either defend my position or fall back. This is all very interesting, and very helpful to me to see which points spoke to people (good or bad). This is definitely a spiral development learning process for me, and I am constantly refining my thinking and will absolutely look seriously at all of the comments provided here.

In review of the article, I probably tried to put the proverbial 10 lbs into a 5 lb bag, and there are some points that weren't given adequate context to make them as clear as I should have. While these few comments won't clear up all of the controversy, perhaps they will help:

1. Insurgency and all of the related mission-sets (UW, COIN, FID, CT, etc) all strike at that most fundamental and emotional of relationships:that of between a populace, its governance, and those outside actors who would intervene to influence that dynamic. In the end, the difference between a successful campaign and a failed campaign is generally one of nuance. A fair criticism was "there is nothing new here." True enough. Insurgency has not changed. What I had hoped to offer that was new was perhaps some small nuances on the various aspects of this dynamic that I believe would tilt our engagement toward being both more in tune with how we see ourselves as Americans, and toward greater success as well.
2. One thing that has changed is the environment. The real heart of the current surge in globalization is the way populaces are connected with each other like never before. This means that the counterinsurgent has a much tougher job. Governments, like never before, must actually perform. While all governments are likely to fall short in this regard, they better ensure that they have at least provided their populace with legitimate means short of insurgency to express their dissatisfaction. PCE is designed to recognize this new environment. No longer is being an effective counterinsurgent enough, nor is simply running an elaborate information campaign. Populaces like never before have access to information that gives choices as to who to grant sovereignty to, and also gives them courage to act (i.e., they know they are not alone, and they don't have to belive the official gov't line).
3. Lastly, while I do not advocate that the U.S. caused the problems currently going on in the middle east, we do, I believe, need to take responsibility for our actions there. This was a major Cold War battlefield, and 60 years of policy aimed at denying the Soviets access to the region left scars that can, and should be addressed. We did what we needed to do to win, and there is no need to apologize for that. Now we must do what we need to do to move forward. In my view, that is to put both the governances and the populaces of the region on notice that we believe in the principle of Popular Sovereignty and certain principles (uncolored by current concepts of US Democracy or US values applied to those principles); and to be more a global mediator than a global policeman. This will require a strong mix of carrots and sticks; and will be met with healthy skepticisim by governments and populaces alike.

Not sure if this helps, but I stand by for additional intellectual punishment!

Ken White
11-10-2008, 09:45 PM
On your recap and summation, I think I caught the gist of item 1 from the original essay. What resonated with me was the "If you have a hammer, everything is a nail" aspect and the suggestion that maybe we should put away our hammer unless we need it. So I'm in agreement on that. Strong agreement, in fact.

On item 2. I'm inclined to be skeptical. I think the insurgent has an easier job today and that, mostly due to societal changes in the last 40 years, governments have a much more difficult job in demonstrating an ability to perform. My belief is that the the culture of near total dependence on government that has developed in the populace in all the European hearth nations (including the US) has migrated through western media and cultural interplay an has thus embedded itself pretty much worldwide. People are placing demands on government that governments cannot possibly meet. I believe that to be true in the US, in Europe and in most of the world to include our current areas of concern. This syndrome gives potential insurgents a great deal of added influence.

I agree on Item 3. What happened is really immaterial if regrettable; it's happened and cannot be undone. We need to move forward and we can do that, hopefully without repeating the mistakes of the past. Putting the hammer in the tool drawer for use only if necessary would help...

Bob's World
11-10-2008, 10:07 PM
I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."

As I like to point out to all of my British friends, there was certainly effective governance in the British Colonies in America. Highest standard of living in the world at that time, the essentially free protection of the greatest military in the world, and also probably the greatest civil liberties (if you were white and male) in the western world as well. And yet the upper class led an insurgency.

Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be. This is not rational, it is just how it is. This was true in America, and also in the other countries mentioned (Thailand, Algeria, etc).

Similarly, governance can be incredibly ineffective and not be "poor." Again, it is all in the eyes of the populace. A government discounts this concept at their peril...

To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution. Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.

Bill Moore
11-10-2008, 10:46 PM
posted by jmm99, It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.

Good post, but one that I thinks supports a PCE approach. One element of good governance is providing security to its populace, failure to do so is a failure of the government of the worst type. Your argument only addressed one aspect of the government, which is the police. Jone's is arguing for a Whole of Government Approach, so at the town level, we're talking about everything the Mayor can influence, and what is overlapped on top by county, State, and Federal Government.

Sheriff Slim sounds like he lives/works in a relatively safe community, but I would argue the mission statement would change if you were a cop in a city where certain sections of it were controlled by gangs (or insurgents). Law enforcement then has an obligation to build a safe community, failure to do so could result in the people organizing to address the security problem (outside the law), or seeking relief by joining forces with the criminals or insurgents because the government failed them.

You're points on targeting the criminals were correct. This is the apparent weakness in the population centric approach, although Jones did state it allowed TCE when applicable. Of course if it is applicable if you're fighting an insurgency; however, the there are different ways to get after the threat. Using Jones' example of the Civil Rights Movement, the government took away their cause, thus prevented an increase in tension and defused the situation. The government may be able to turn the populace against the insurgent as we did in Al Anbar. Ultimately the government must get the people to support the government without coercion or the government loses. All that said, key enemy subversives must still be neutralized. The difference is now the TCE is a supporting activity, not the main effort, and never a strategy.



There is much to disagree with in Jones' article, but

Ken White
11-10-2008, 10:46 PM
...To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution...I can generally agree with the first four paragraphs. The one dissected above and below herein sort of confuses me. Sorry, you'll have to forgive me, I'm old... :confused:

I could make a very valid argument that the American Revolution was in fact started by a small faction of trouble makers and that many in the populace of the time here were in fact being ridiculous -- but all that is for another thread and another time. :wry: For this thread:
...Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'

slapout9
11-11-2008, 12:39 AM
Just got home awhile ago and read my emails and I was going to tell everyone that Col. Jones had agreed to reply to this thread,but......it looks like he is already here:)

Bill Moore
11-11-2008, 01:27 AM
To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution. Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.

First, I think there are many cases where a handful of trouble makers did mobilize the population. The government may or may not have set conditions where the populace is susceptable to being mobilized. Your argument remains valid, because it is still a contest for winning over the population, but don't forget that many insurgents initially rely on coercion to mobilize support or neutrality. To counter that coercion requires something of a TCE to eliminate that threat.

As for American ideas, your article was full of them. You did mention that the population has a duty to raise up against their government if it is seen as unworthy. Tell me how that fits the situation in the UK, where a internal and external actors are attempting to mobilize/radicalize the Muslim population to conduct terrorist attacks if the UK doesn't allow them to practice Sharia Law. Based on your argument, the Muslims have an obligation to raise up and fight the government, and we as Americans have an obligation to provide moral support.

I assume this is not your intention, but simply reading your article would indicate you may recommend supporting these radical groups if the government can't respond to their call for change. What they're advocating is a far cry from a Civil Rights Bill. The government could meet them half way, and compromise and perhaps develop one government with two laws, but I just don't think that will work.

My example is harsh, and perhaps even unfair, but I think it demands an answer. It may go a long ways to clarify what your intended strategy is.

I could take it further, and argue we should have supported Castro (actually I think we should have, they would no longer be communist if we did), Idi Amin, etc.

William F. Owen
11-11-2008, 05:53 AM
All,

Ok, as the author of this debate, I imagine I have a duty to show up and either defend my position or fall back. This is all very interesting, and very helpful to me to see which points spoke to people (good or bad). This is definitely a spiral development learning process for me, and I am constantly refining my thinking and will absolutely look seriously at all of the comments provided here.
Good on you, and many thanks for showing up. Makes you a class act.

A fair criticism was "there is nothing new here." True enough. Insurgency has not changed. What I had hoped to offer that was new was perhaps some small nuances on the various aspects of this dynamic that I believe would tilt our engagement toward being both more in tune with how we see ourselves as Americans, and toward greater success as well.

not being an American, I'll probably never understand, but my guess is that the heart of the issue is people not living in fear of their lives from violence. If it takes a dictator to make that happen, I have no problem with it. Stop the killing and all else follows

One thing that has changed is the environment. The real heart of the current surge in globalization is the way populaces are connected with each other like never before.
I think this is not correct. The vast majority of the world does not have computer and internet access. There are now more nation states than there have ever been, so nationalism is still key. Conflict is mostly about land, and who controls it.

Populaces like never before have access to information that gives choices as to who to grant sovereignty to, and also gives them courage to act (i.e., they know they are not alone, and they don't have to belive the official gov't line).
reference my last.

but I stand by for additional intellectual punishment!
take out the word "intellectual" and it sounds like you went to a British Public School! :D

jmm99
11-11-2008, 07:38 AM
What I described was meant as an example, not as an argument. An example of what ? - A safe community whose residents are themselves involved enough to engage in Populace-Centric Engagement of the Threat (whatever it might be). In short, the endgoal of our little excursion in COIN theory - Pleasantville. To repeat, Pleasantville is the endgoal.

How you get from Unpleasantville to Pleasantville will depend on how screwed up Unpleasantville is. And, depending on where our particular Unpleasantville lies on the spectrum, the mission statements will have to be adapted for each of the three components I've mentioned: 1. judicial system; 2. police; and 3. military.

I've left out other components, not because they are unimportant; but because you have to crawl before you can walk. I did not present anything that purported to be a complete solution.

And, to anticipate Ken White, I am fully cognizant that changing Unpleasantville into Pleasantville may not be possible - in short, we may have to be satisfied with a somewhat better Unpleasantville, that is "acceptable".

Wherever Unpleasantville is on the spectrum, I think we can agree that it is necessary to know the "bad people", "the ones we're not sure of" and the "good people". And, to separate the "bad people" from the rest of the population. I suppose I could cite Galula and Trinquier chapter and verse here, but you already know them.

So, the particular solution, in any case, will involve both Populace-Centric Engagement and Threat-Centric Engagement in some mix. To argue otherwise, makes about as much sense as arguing that the US Army should be an all-conventional force or an all-counter-insurgency force.

Now, if Unpleasantville is a particularly nasty place, the initial solutions will have to be very authoritarian (relative to what we in our US criminal justice system believe is acceptable) - and the military will have primacy in addressing the problem. If the environment can be stabilized, then police and judicial systems (again, probably not your friendly district court) can start to do their thing. And, other components, as needed, as well. If the ACLU would somehow help - use it.

I believe an interesting at-home exercise for all here would be to imagine a situation where your little Plerasantville is about to be occupied by a military force, whose ideology is diametrically opposed to the mainstream ideology of Pleasantville, and which you cannot defeat by conventional military means. How would you organize the insurgency ? Sort of 2008 Red Dawn in Pleasantville. How nasty could you make Pleasantville ?

Ron Humphrey
11-11-2008, 11:48 AM
The more this discussion progresses the more I keep thinking about the whole idea of Insurgent, causes, coercion, etc and it occurs to me that honestly isn't the greatest thing any insurgent these days has going for them is that they don't really have to wait for a govt to get to the point where it can't provide enough services but rather with the information age and of course massive growth of younger population simply choose to propogandize new and often unfeasible requriements for a govt that are very far outside of its ability to address simply due to the lack of need for such things before.

In this context pretty much any country US, UK, Canada, Iraq, Balkans, Russia, China, you name it are easy targets for outside interests simply due to how foreign they are and what "new" requirements they or their cause bring with them.

??:confused:

jmm99
11-11-2008, 09:52 PM
Starting first with governance, where you use the American Revolution as an example, you define your terms as follows.


(from bob's world)
I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."
....
Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be.

A few months back, Marc Tyrell and I discussed - with general agreement between the two of us - the failure of the US to gain support from either Canadian language group (from my perspective, the French speakers) in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.

There, I used the term "legitimate government" (also in quotes there) in a manner substantially the same as your definition of "Good Governance" - that is, it must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question.

In 1776-1815 Canada, we have the French-Canadians (from my viewpoint), the Scots and English (from Marc's viewpoint) and the United Empire Loyalists who came to Canada after the Revolution (again from Marc's viewpoint). No doubt that that mixed population came to the conclusion that the Crown was both "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance".

So, however you define it formally, we agree that "Good Governance" depends on the "perspective of the populace in question."

Now, moving to the "States", we can examine the perspective of the colonists as a matter of history. All who examine the historical record can agree that there were three groups in the North American colonies (excluding Canada): UELs, Neutrals and Rebels. Where people differ is what %s belonged to each group, variations by region, etc. Which brings me to my practical question.

How do we measure "Good Governance" in a particular country today with the sort of accuracy that would allow accurate intelligence analysis to inform a counter-insurgency effort ? Would you poll the populace to determine the "UELs, Neutrals and Rebels" ? What questions would you ask ? In short, what is your outlline for using the concept of "Good Governance" in the field ?

-----------------------------------
Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.

To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?

If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").

Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.

jmm99
11-12-2008, 05:23 AM
This article, recently threaded here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=59876#post59876), has a good comment on the dichotomy between formal and informal governance in Afghanistan:


(pp.4-5)

Key to understanding the operating environment is both understanding the specific causes of conflicts in your tactical area of operations and understanding exactly what “governance” means to local Afghans. Coalition forces have proven notoriously incapable of differentiating between conflicts involving insurgents, vice local conflicts over scarce resources vice intra- or inter-district struggles over the distribution of power. Related to this, there does not appear to be widespread understanding of the relationship between the informal and formal structures of political power.

In its most basic sense governance is the provision of essential services, such as human security, food, water and shelter, as well as an acceptable degree of conflict resolution and justice for wrongs committed. This basic type of governance has been prevalent in rural Afghan communities for centuries; however, it is under threat today not only by insurgents but also by attempts to overlay a more formal governance structure on top of the informal structures. There has been historically, and it remains today, tension between the informal structures of political power (the mullahs, the mahliks, the tribal shuras) and the imposed, formal structures of political power (District and Provincial Governors, the ANP) at the local level. All politics is local, especially in Afghanistan. Understanding this distribution of local power is vital if we are to promote “legitimacy” of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster. A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome. And it should not be assumed that ANA or ANP, just because they are Afghans, inherently understand the tensions between the two structures of local governance or that they will be necessarily capable of maintaining a suitable environment of co-existence without substantial prompting, persuading and persistent encouragement.

Comprehensive understanding of the operating environment only comes through persistent and pervasive interaction with the people who determine the social dynamics of the environment. [italics in original] ...

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/134-scott-agoglia.pdf

The article does not outline a methodology for determining the precise metrics of support for one form of governance or the other. The concept of "pervasive interaction with the people" looks field anthropological.

The comment quoted does not as such distinguish between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance"; but (see quote from p.3 below) they do speak in terms of "legitimacy and effectiveness."

Based on the following comments, "the imposed, formal structures of political power" is neither (the context is primarily the Pashtun areas):


(from above)

Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster.

(p.3)

In many parts of the country, especially outside of major population centers, the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA is under considerable threat not only from insurgents but also from widespread corruption and patronage, traditional tribal power structures, a xenophobic society in the south and east, and a lack of tangible, synchronized reconstruction and development.

The authors recognize primacy in their focus on the population, with secondary focus on the enemy's armed force:


(p.6)

3. Protect the people. If SCHB is to work, it is vital coalition forces (and by default the ANA) achieve the right balance between “hunting insurgents” to disrupt, and protecting the population and contributing to building human capacity. The former - killing and capturing insurgents - does not always contribute positively to the need to protect the people and build capacity and in our attempts to kill or capture we often sacrifice longer term enduring positive effects for short term tactical effects. This distinction between being population centric in our operations, which should be the main effort, vice being enemy centric, which is a supporting effort and a means to the end, sets the tone for the way we conduct operations, the way we interact with the people, and the way we relate to ANA, ANP and other GIRoA agencies. We do not have the balance consistently right across Afghanistan.

A caution is probably due here - based on history.

From the fall of DBP in 1954 to approximately May 1959 (start of the Laos dustup and formation of Transportation Group 559), one can fairly argue that the Diem government should have employed a population-focused approach - it did to some extent. In later 1959 through 1964, the PAVN (NVA) unleashed its cadres into SVN (roughly 100K southern Viet Minh traveled north in 1954-1955 for training and incorporation into PAVN).

After those 1959 events, GSV faced (but did not really recognize) the advent of the Second Indochina War - an externally-supported threat. See, Pentagon Papers, vol. I (esp. last section before the documents annex); and Fall's, The Two Viet-Nams, for a more professional analysis. The point is that the balance in a "small war" can shift rather quickly.

Bob's World
11-12-2008, 01:18 PM
I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad. Not a call to coddle criminal actors.

Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.

To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.

What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.

Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government.

Meanwhile, if you have VEOs operating in the area, they must be dealt with AS A SUPPORTING EFFORT to the larger operation. First, sort out the PURPOSE for each organization operating. If it is a nationalist insurgency, is it a revolution, a separatist movement, or is it a resistance movement (that you likely gave rise to with your own clumsy misguided intervention efforts in the first place)? Tailor your engagement, again working through and with the Host Nation security forces, accordingly. If it is merely a criminal organization, deal with it as such. If it is an isolated group of malcontents, likewise. If it is a cell of either state or non-state actors working to incite insurgency to support their own agendas (unconventional warfare); then you must tailor a “counter unconventional warfare” campaign to deal with the specific threats. One cannot simply apply a blanket Counterterrorism approach to every group that uses terrorism as a tactic. To do so tears at the very fabric of the populace you are trying to support (yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).

So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.

slapout9
11-12-2008, 01:53 PM
Bob, you post not only has a lot to offer about COIN but it also has a lot to do with LE (Law Enforcement). We can deal with the violent elements but other branches of guvmint (Thats Southern slang) have to deal with the why are people doing this in the first place and what do we need to change to stop it. See our drug discussion at Small war in Mexico.

Ken White
11-12-2008, 04:20 PM
I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad...Which were:""Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'"" However, I think that one item in your recent comment:
Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings...will significantly impact the ability of the US to do what you suggest. That statement gets me to the not fully answered item in my queries:
So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.I suspect most here -- most in the US, maybe even the world -- would agree with that. Many of us have long believed along those lines to one degree or another. The question is:

How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?

Steve Blair
11-12-2008, 04:33 PM
How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?

I don't know that you can...without some major restructuring and rethinking of some basic operating methods.

Most US things these days run on a two-year election cycle. It's short term thinking at its finest...or worst. As an institution the government (and by extension our education system) doesn't value history or the contextual thinking that goes with good history, so they look for brand names or Band-Aids that can be slapped on and carry something through the next election cycle. Since the average decision-maker only knows the US system, he or she assumes that it must be best...because it's worked for him or her. I think it also matches up with the technology obsession that seems to drive much of our thinking. If you can build a better chip, or change a blown fuse, certainly you should be able to apply the single part idea to something as complex as a region or a culture....:eek:

To break the cycle you'd need some good, long-term planning (as in something more than two years or less), and people who actually have ability with cultural and historical analysis (and this isn't as common as many might suspect). Then you'd have to have leaders who are willing to listen to and act on those recommendations. Needless to say, I'm not overly optimistic.

wm
11-12-2008, 06:57 PM
Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.

To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.

What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.

Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government. An alternative view of governments is that they largely exist as another form of welfare. They tend not to do much that has real value-add to the society they allegedly rule. With perhaps the exception of defense and law enforcement, societies would tend to be well shut of them. One might view a government as legitimate only insofar as the rest of the folks in the country do not find the tax (AKA diversion of some part of the fruits of one's labors away from one's own use) required to keep this otherwise useless collection of leeches as too onerous. Instead of executing policies through the government, a better approach may be to convince the government to be less intrusive in the lives of those who allow it to live off the fat of the land.

(yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).
As noted above, this last is just backwards in large measure--the function of most of the pieces of government is to provide some work to what would otherwise be a portion of the populace that is without much value (except perhaps as entertainment--maybe that explains the surge in actors/actresses/pro athletes getting elected lately). The general populace provides support to them by paying them and allowing them to think their "work" has real value. Government, on the view esposed in this response, is actually a form of welfare, as noted previously. The populace supports government, not vice-versa.

So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
Changing focus makes a great deal of sense. Success entails a need to get the governments elsewhere to recognize that they only are allowed to continue as long as the demands they put on the producers of value in their country are not viewed as excessive. Once the general populace starts to feel that the diversion of their productive work to support the "village idiots" who "govern" them gets too high, change is inevitable. If the government resists too much, then that change will probably become violent. Replacement movements (AKA rebels, insurgents, guerrillas, etc.) gain purchase because they suggest that they will be less of a drain on the people's earnings than the incumbent government is. (Alternatively, they claim that they will provide some value to offset the economic drain they put on the people.)

However, since those who govern anywhere tend to be deluded into thinking that they are producers of something of real worth, the likelihood that the light will dawn on them is quite small, IMHO. This, BTW, is also the explanation for why one rarely finds a government that admits its "failures and shortcomings." To do so would be to deny the government's "value-add" and acknowledge its true status as "value-less."

jmm99
11-12-2008, 08:21 PM
an excellent point summary. Period.

And, it includes an unintentional "funny" as well. The concept of a COL at SOCOM making a "a call to coddle criminal actors" gave me a mind's-eye picture that I wish I had the talent to draw. Anyway, thanks for a bit of cheer in what is a bleak, rainy day outside.

--------------
Since Tim McVeigh is mentioned, and the Civil Rights Movement has also been mentioned, I offer a brief comment. Some might well argue that the CRM was not an insurgency - whatever. Along with the CRM went another movement - let's call it the Anti-CRM; and parts of that were definitely into terrorist territory. From that latter movement, descended a number of groups and individuals who moved far out of the mainstream of their populace - and, for that matter, far out of the mainstream of "right wing groups".

Unfortunately, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols (a Michigander from Dexter, not far from the U of M) were not "nut jobs". From all I've read of them and the case, they had their ideology; probably saw themselves as patriots; and took it as their right and duty to rebel against what they perceived to be an oppressive government. The Turner Diaries and the Declaration of Independence make a bad combination.

While people can say "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", that equation fails when you are the recipient of the terrorist's act - whatever he might think of himself.

--------------------
I do have one question based on your first sentence: "... a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad."

Could you give us a point summary on that, as well. That is a question that many have raised and are raising - e.g., who is in charge in Iraq ? (not seeking an answer for that country, but a generalized one for the future).

reed11b
11-12-2008, 08:48 PM
The question is:

How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?

Maybe you take the DoD off point for awhile. Maybe there is some value to the statement that the military should not be in the business of nation building. Maybe some of the hard won lessons that the Army has learned about COIN, should really be lessons learned by other organizations. You can not take the military out of the equation in OIF and OEF, but perhaps you can seriously evaluate the need to use military force in the future. As a soldier, I am always gung-ho to "go in" be it a shooting war or peacekeeping, but I also recognize that the military has limits. It may be the most multi-funtional agency we have, but it is not the only, and at times it has seemed that way. When I deployed to New Orleans in 2005, all the people on the ground were from the DOD. Where the heck was FEMA? When my unit was doing civil affairs like missions, where the heck were the NGOs, State, Contractors, etc etc. I will now retire to my bunker to sit out the returning fire
Reed

Bob's World
11-12-2008, 09:20 PM
In theory, State Department, through its Country Ambassadors, is in charge; the civilian lead for US engagement in every country where we operate. This is made murky by the concept of "GWOT," which is a DoD lead, and requires engagement of various types in countries around the world. State will say "We don't have the people and the resources to lead." Which is true. DoD has the people and the resources, but is too threat centric in its approach, and while State does not interfere with "war," what of all of the short of war engagement required to keep a situation from sliding into full blown conflict? Result is confusion, inefficency, and a generally disjointed scheme of engagement.

Its complicated. We work better with simple. ("Don't complify, simplicate!"). Easiest way from my foxhole is to simply call an end to the GWOT. I can work with guidance like:
"The war is over, but the mission continues. State, take point. Defense, help them formulate a plan of action and be prepared to provide a lionshare of the manpower and resources to implement it. Rework these VEO lists to sort out insurgents from criminals and terrorists. Also ensure whatever plan you bring me is focused on those countries where we have vital national interests, and is not designed to simply keep 'friendly dictators' (like friendly fire, it isn't) in power or sustain the status quo in the face of heavy resistance from the populace and the major changes that have occured in world over the past 20 years. The Cold War has been over for two administrations, so ensure this plan looks at the whole of government and recommends institutions, policies, and relationships that are long overdue for a major revision. Also, ensure that you have a detailed plan for assessment of all of the major players involved in any given region on the front end of any engagement. And never forget, there are those out there, both state and non-state who want to see us fail, and failure is not an option."

The President-elect is not a Cold Warrior. What was widely attacked as his greatest weakness, lack of foreign policy experience, may in fact be his greatest strength. We are well into a new, post Cold War era. This will require new forms of engagement that recognizes the growing power and options for sovereignty that populaces have, and that is a book that has not been written yet. We enter uncharted ground, but we go forward aware of our vulnerabilities, and armed with a national ideology well suited to the world that is emerging. Not to control that world, but to hopefully lead by example and to use our positon and influence to make it a better world for everyone. Idealistic? Certainly, but then I am an American, and idealism comes easy to us.

Ken White
11-12-2008, 10:00 PM
In theory, State Department, through its Country Ambassadors, is in charge . . . This is made murky by the concept of "GWOT," which is a DoD lead . . . DoD has the people and the resources, but is too threat centric in its approach. . . what of all of the short of war engagement required to keep a situation from sliding into full blown conflict? Result is confusion, inefficency, and a generally disjointed scheme of engagement.I really do agree. "However," he said, clearing his throat...

I'm not at all sure the GWOT or Long War is the problem; it doesn't help, certainly but that dichotomy existed long before 9/11 and the GWOT concept. It even existed prior to Goldwater-Nichols although in a less obvious and powerful version. Since G-N, DoD has been fairly well funded and has extended the reach and clout of the CinCs while State has been consistently underfunded and undermanned. The fault for that can be laid at the feet of the Congress while acknowledging that neither DoD nor State has been exactly forthcoming, helpful or above board in this matter.

Thus, I think just eliminating dumb terminology won't fix it, it'll be applying a band aid -- and a Sponge Bob bandaid (apply appropriate TMs to the foregoing) at that; We Americans excel at that and most of them are worthless. You've got to turn Congress, DoD AND State around. Thus my question HOW do you do what you suggest.
Its complicated. We work better with simple. ("Don't complify, simplicate!"). Easiest way from my foxhole is to simply call an end to the GWOT. I can work with guidance like:
"The war is over, but the mission continues. State, take point. Defense, help them formulate a plan of action and be prepared to provide a lionshare of the manpower and resources to implement it . . . The Cold War has been over for two administrations, so ensure this plan looks at the whole of government and recommends institutions, policies, and relationships that are long overdue for a major revision . . . And never forget, there are those out there, both state and non-state who want to see us fail, and failure is not an option."I strongly agree conceptually, practically, I think you forget:
The President-elect is not a Cold Warrior. What was widely attacked as his greatest weakness, lack of foreign policy experience, may in fact be his greatest strength...while all that is true and he can -- may well -- dictate what you suggest. Unfortunately, long experience shows us that his predecessors have done such diktats with little success. His ability to get Congress, DoD and State to do what he tells them is severely constrained by the bureaucracy and those in it who will not agree with him and can -- and will -- stall until he's gone. Thus my question, how do you get the Elephant to turn? Much less be agile...
...Idealistic? Certainly, but then I am an American, and idealism comes easy to us.Yes it does and me, too. However, over 45 years of working for our Fedrul Guvmint done taught me to be one a them awful cynics, too. :(

reed11b
11-12-2008, 11:13 PM
While there is little specific in your writing that I directly disagree with, something about the style and tone remind of a lot of the writing out in the late 90's prior to 9/11. The common theme I was seeing at that time was that the role of the US and the DoD was to be a "global good neighbor". What was meant by this was that we needed to support and foster democratic governments wherever possible to reduce the animosity towards our country.
While some of that appealed to the humanitarian in me, much of it sounded like the "democratic manifesto". This I felt would be seen as hostility in many parts of the world. History has validated this as far as I am concerned. If you want to be a "global good neighbor" you have to value all human life and treat people as equals. I feel that this is likely beyond our means as well. Ideology and absolutes tend to bite us in the rear. I appreciate your attempts to avoid absolutes in your writing, but an ideological undertone remains. SO what is the US and DoD's role in the world? So the GWOT is a non-starter, but what do we replace it with? What resources does the State Department need and where do we get them from? If I did not value what you have written so far, I would not push as hard, since proving people wrong is not my thing.
Reed

jmm99
11-13-2008, 04:11 AM
All my mind's eye sees is - A pink bunny in a tux, with a bullwhip, turning elephants ....

I like that concept; but it won't replace Roadrunner and Ole Wily Coyote..

I did have a relevant thought before the cartoon flooded my head - that being that the respective functions of DoS, DoD, and the rest of the cats that have to be herded - now image of a border collie herding cats intervenes - have to be defined by numerous laws, regs and interagency agreements.

Thought also occurs that some of this may be found in the Operational Law Handbook (2007; should be a 2008 update out or soon). Perhaps, we should be looking at the present normative structure - and working from there ?

Ken White
11-13-2008, 04:24 AM
and follow its broad guidance. That would certainly be different... :wry:

Regrettably, the ONLY 'normative' structure in Washington is Congress and until you fix it or fire it up somehow; little will be accomplished. I think it has something to do with the Golden Rule, he who has the gold rules... :(

My suspicion is that competition for dollars, egos and turf outweigh the legal aspects...

jmm99
11-13-2008, 04:50 AM
the Constitution does that - and generally vests foreign affairs and military powers in the Executive Branch. So, there are some ways to work around Congress without reducing yourself to the status of John Yoo. But, that still leaves a lot of cats to be herded in the Executive Depts. I was suggesting that's where the idealized US Embassy organizational plan begins.

PS: I will send a suitable portion of my big L by suitable common carrier. My daddy told me to always listen to SNCOs with respect - and share generously with them so they might let you win at poker.

Ken White
11-13-2008, 05:25 AM
Not only the raw dollars and amount thereof -- that's pretty straightforward. Hmm. Bad choice of words, let me restate that -- that's pretty well standardized. The problem is what pots those dollars are in -- and Congress micromanages that to the nth degree...

State may get more money -- but they'll get it in appropriations that are spent in the US, not in some other country.

Which is why the Coast Guard, the CIA, the FBI, the Air National guard and a whole host of other organs and agencies have significantly increased the population of West Virginia among other things...

And State's National Passport Agency is in New Hampshire...

Anyway, the Executive agencies do indeed have some problems but many can be ascribed correctly to Congress and the way it does business.

jmm99
11-13-2008, 06:08 AM
with one senior senator and another who began as a dinosaur trainer. But, New Hampshire ?? ....

Given your logic - which my daddy told me to follow without fail, the only solution then is to move the host nation populace to West Virginia - thereby insuring that all appropriated $ are spent in the US.

Works for me.

slapout9
11-13-2008, 12:45 PM
--------------------
I do have one question based on your first sentence: "... a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad."

Could you give us a point summary on that, as well. That is a question that many have raised and are raising - e.g., who is in charge in Iraq ? (not seeking an answer for that country, but a generalized one for the future).
I will take a shot at this and see how well I understand PCE.
If I understand the theory, I would give the example of...Iran. We supported the Shah and look where that has gotten us. I am not saying we should have supported his overthrow and neither does the PCE theory, but it would have alerted us to stand back and see what happens or better yet advised the Shah to make some changes or he will have big problems and we will not support him since it would conflict with the long term interests of his people and US interests.

Bob's World
11-13-2008, 01:32 PM
I appreciate your attempts to avoid absolutes in your writing, but an ideological undertone remains. SO what is the US and DoD's role in the world? So the GWOT is a non-starter, but what do we replace it with? What resources does the State Department need and where do we get them from?
Reed

Of course I don't think that I am absolutely right either, but I do over emphasize the shift to truly focusing on the populace because up until now there has been so much emphasis in the other direction. Those who think every organization that has any contact with AQ, regardless of how small, is a ‘VEO” and needs to be added to the target list don’t need any help. Those who think that continuing to prop up regimes around the world that do not represent any form of Popular Sovereignty simply because they are willing (when, and to the extent that it is convenient) to support U.S. actions or provide access to resources is good policy also don’t need any help. So if I appear to overstate a counter position, it is simply because as jimm99 is fond of saying, an elephant is hard to turn. (However, remember, I am a Green Beret, and "too hard" is not an assessment we put much stock in)

I did not just wake up and come to the positions that I take. It is based on years of study of Insurgency history and theory, history (the cold war and American Revolution are particularly relevant; all while also being neck deep in actually having to design and direct actual GWOT engagement and working day in and day out with senior SOF leadership. Some key conclusions from this:

1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is best understood if one considers it as a continuous dynamic between every populace and its governance. Most sit comfortably in what I would call “Phase zero,” and it is the daily efforts of civilians who enforce laws, provide services, maintain infrastructure, etc, within a governing context that allows the populace to operate within the system to express their dissatisfaction and implement change that keeps those states in that phase. If the services fall short, or if the system does not allow legal dissent, or if some segment of the populace is in someway excluded or even disrespected, conditions will creep up into Mao’s phase one of insurgency. This makes effective COIN civilian business, and it is only when the situation has deteriorated terribly that the military is required to help bring it back to where the civilians can once again handle things.

2. The U.S., in the course of bearing the mantle of “World Leadership” following WWII and in certainly leading the effort to win the Cold War was forced to make a series of compromises to our core principles and ideology as a nation in our engagement policies in order to win that war. The Middle East was a major battlefield, and we sustained governments like the Saudis in power; overthrew governments in Iran, Syria, and Iraq (twice for Iraq); supported the formation of Israel, etc; all in the name of winning the Cold War; and it worked. We won. The problem was that we did this for so long, and so many important political and economic relationships were tied to this line of engagement; and 3 generations of Americans also saw this as “normal,” so we did not stop waging the Cold War when it ended. This left frozen in place a regional system of governances that were sustained not by the will of their own people, but by the will of our Government. In effect, bad governance abounded, and the U.S. stood between those populaces and any chance of effecting change of their own governments.

3. Globalization accelerated at the same time the Cold War ended. This allowed a couple of key things to occur in the Middle East that accelerated conflict there. First, it connected these many distinct Muslim populaces with each other, both within the region, and without, allowing movements to challenge the status quo to grow and feed upon each other. It also allowed the rise of non-state powers to wage Unconventional Warfare (the efforts of an outside party to incite insurgency within another state). Bin Laden saw an opportunity to achieve his two primary goals of taking down the Saudis and removing U.S influence from the region, and began a UW campaign. The time was right, and his message spoke to these populaces in a major way. This caused many to join AQ outright. More importantly it generated tremendous popular support that facilitates and funds his networked operations, and encourages and supports nationalist insurgencies throughout the region.

4. When we were attacked we discounted the effects of the nature of our engagement in the region and focused on destroying AQ. While this is natural and understandable given the circumstances, it also enflamed the underlying causes of the conflict at the same time that we were engaging the outward manifestations. We were attacking the symptoms, and not the root causes. Nothing I propose should be taken as a call to stop attacking the symptoms; instead I am saying that we need to shed several flawed assumptions about the nature of the conflict and refocus our engagement on the root causes of the conflict in a manner that places populaces first, and that we need to modify our engagement against the symptoms in accordance with this fresh understanding so that we do not inadvertently make the problem worse.

This is why Colonels muddle around in strategy. Far enough removed from the policy to be able to look at it objectively, and close enough to the actual art of insurgency and counterinsurgency to truly understand what is going on in those types of conflicts.

So, what is the U.S.’s role? Use our power and influence to secure a good future for our own people, but to revise how we go about doing that to better operate within the world as it currently exists. We need to set some time tested techniques aside and develop new tactics for the current environment.

What is DoD’s role? First, to fight and win our nation’s wars; to deter those wars where ever possible; to put the credibility behind our nation’s policies; to be an example of patriotism and professionalism not just to the American people, but to the world; and to recognize that the military will always be the “excess” capacity that our government has to deal with crisis, be it at home or abroad, regardless of the nature of that crisis.

What does State need? First they need the mission. Once they have the mission, we can sort out roles. Clearly DoD will continue to provide a lion’s share of support. Do we need a new, non-military organization heavy on “governance” skills? Perhaps. It’s a new world and we need to look at new options.

What do we replace GWOT with? I recommend “Peace.” As Admiral Olson recently said: “What we've been calling "GWOT" or "The Long War" is the new normal that will endure."


Guys look, I am a strategist. There are good men out there fighting and winning the tactical fight. My oldest son is a SPC 4 infantryman on his second tour in Iraq as part of that good fight. We fought the good tactical fight in Vietnam too, and lost because we had the wrong strategy. Our strategy for this current fight is flawed as well. If some part of my work helps us make that strategy better, then I will have done what I could to help make sure that all of that great effort is not in vain.

Ken White
11-13-2008, 04:02 PM
Pun intended.

For JMM:

Re: NH, no clue but I'll bet money that somewhere, some time, there was a powerful Senator or Congressman from NH on one of the Foreign Affairs Committees in Congress that needed some bacon. There are examples from all -- repeat, ALL -- government agencies all over the country, every State -- and they almost invariably increase the cost to those agencies of doing business. They also breed inefficiency...

Slapout said:
"I am not saying we should have supported his overthrow and neither does the PCE theory, but it would have alerted us to stand back and see what happens or better yet advised the Shah to make some changes or he will have big problems and we will not support him since it would conflict with the long term interests of his people and US interests." That's the common wisdom version and it may be partly correct; it is also partly incorrect. One could strongly disagree on both the US interests and Iranian population aspects.

I think the issue with PCE and with your example is that the near term ('people-centric" ??? -- or for the USG policies, perceived voter centric ???) view is allowed to shape policy as opposed to the great benefit of a longer term approach. People sometimes; often, in fact; think they want things that are really in the "Be careful what you want, you may get it" vein. Iran in 1979 is a good example -- the Ayatollahs killed more people in two years than the Shah had in 25. Been downhill there ever since also. For the US as well...

I'll address Bob's excellent post separately after I run an errand... :D

Eden
11-13-2008, 04:52 PM
I've been wrestling with your work for the last few days - thought-provoking and useful it certainly is. I suffer from the historian's curse in that one can almost always come up with an example to undercut any argument, but in general it is hard to disagree with your central premise.

I think that the one remaining objection I have is that you seem to conflate terrorism and insurgency. Insurgency does, in the majority of cases, arise in response to government's failure to satisfy the desires and needs of the populace. Any counterinsurgency strategy, as you point out, must focus on meeting those desires and needs. The art comes in balancing military and non-military action.

Terrorism, however, often arises out of well-governed spaces. In the 70's and 80's, terrorists were Irish, German, Italian, Japanese - not always third-worlders. In teaching this point, I sometimes show my students a clip from Die Hard. Classical terrorist theory, in fact, seeks to provoke 'poor governance' rather than exploit it. As for our modern breed of terrorists, wouldn't you agree that promoting our brand of governance in the Islamic world is just as likely to provoke more terrorist activity?

Bob's World
11-13-2008, 05:45 PM
Eden,

Ok, first you made me go look up "conflate," but no, I don't "fuse together," or "confuse" the two; I actually try to do the opposite. Terrorism is a tactic, not a purpose for action. Many organizations, legal and otherwise, use terrorism as at tactic. The aerial bombing campaigns of the cities or Europe and Asia during WWII for example were arguably terrorist acts, but the sides were judged by there purpose for acting.

The term is generally not very helpful. Typically a group, like the ones you named, chose terrorism as a tactic to support their insurgent purpose. Not all, but most. One of my major concerns is that our intel community is run amok labeling every organization that uses terrorism as simply "Terrorists." Does this mean I simply apply Counterterrorism tactics against these many diverse organizations to win? Many would seem to think so.

No, to defeat (or better in the case of an insurgent, "neutralize"), an organization you must understand its purpose for existence and its purpose for action. If the US was willing to go into a country and kill every male taller than an M4, yes, CT tactics will solve the problem. Thank God we are not. So, if we are going to apply more civilized tactics, we better be smarter about how we go about it, or we will likely get mired into a long drawn out affair.

But implied in your observation is the fact that we must be precise in our terms as well as wise in our engagement.

When a populace conspires against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government (or now, non-state actor like AQ) seeks to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency it is Foreign Internal Defense.

Now, to step beyond doctrine a bit, when one seeks to defeat or neutralize another entity that is waging UW (again, like AQ), you are probably more acurately waging "CounterUnconventional Warfare" than you are CT. CT is so one-dimensional that it tends to degenerate to capture kill operations. CUW would be a much more holistic family of engagement that includes CT as a major LOO.

(And while what I have given you is what most of us SF guys see as the definitions, other than the CUW part that I am seeking to add to our jargon, the joint definitions and those of the civilian agencies vary tremendously)

Bob

Ken White
11-13-2008, 06:09 PM
Seriously. However, in the best spirit of bipartisanship, I will now dispatch Sappers against your wire... :D
...I do over emphasize the shift to truly focusing on the populace because up until now there has been so much emphasis in the other direction.For openers, I agree with your points 1. through 4. with a caveat on 4. -- you say
When we were attacked we discounted the effects of the nature of our engagement in the region and focused on destroying AQ. While this is natural and understandable given the circumstances...I'm not certain that the reaction was chosen was natural -- visceral, yeah but not natural. I do strongly believe it was not well thought out and was a great example of the short term-ism that is a natural and inescapable product of our governmental system and it's four to eight year -- two year if you count House elections which can have a strong effect even in off years -- cycles. My impression is that our strategists rarely consider that while our 'political masters' actually live it. BIG disconnect there...
This is why Colonels muddle around in strategy. Far enough removed from the policy to be able to look at it objectively, and close enough to the actual art of insurgency and counterinsurgency to truly understand what is going on in those types of conflicts.I agree that they should and am glad that they do but there are two minor problems that affect the value of that involvement.

1. The egos of Generals and Politicians on the national stage too frequently cause them not to listen to Colonels. That is a lick on the seniors and not on the Colonels.

2. While I think it important and beneficial that the Colonels do this, they are victims of their experience and tend to emphasize the military aspects (branch peculiar at that I might add) in their solutions. Even when rejecting current military mantras...
So, what is the U.S.’s role? Use our power and influence to secure a good future for our own people, but to revise how we go about doing that to better operate within the world as it currently exists. We need to set some time tested techniques aside and develop new tactics for the current environment.I can agree with that...
What is DoD’s role. . . What does State need? First they need the mission. Once they have the mission, we can sort out roles. Clearly DoD will continue to provide a lion’s share of support. Do we need a new, non-military organization heavy on “governance” skills? Perhaps. It’s a new world and we need to look at new options.I can even agree with that. Partly. I would suggest that we first need to assess -- truly ASSESS -- whether it is in our real and long term interest to continue trying to shape the world to our liking.

At least, in the terribly inefficient and costly while far from effective way we have been doing it since 1953.
What do we replace GWOT with? I recommend “Peace.” As Admiral Olson recently said: “What we've been calling "GWOT" or "The Long War" is the new normal that will endure."Not to be snide but good luck with that. Ain't gonna happen. There are too many malcontents in the world, too many pressures and the big guy is too inviting a target. We are not going to be given any peace.

That does not mean that we need to continue our current approaches and 'strategies.' No one messes with 600 pound Gorillas -- unless the gorilla proves himself so utterly lacking in agility that he can be annoyed to distraction if not defeated by a young chimpanzee...

That's where we are. If I weighed 600 pounds, I'd stay out of the Chimps cage but if one got close to me, I'd just kill him. Other than that, I'd leave them alone if they left me alone. Some of them -- not most -- would be likely to respond by standing off at a distance and throwing whatever came to hand. Not a prob; I can throw also -- and bigger stuff, harder -- and should be willing to prove that to them at the slightest provocation. They'll soon quit...
... We fought the good tactical fight in Vietnam too, and lost because we had the wrong strategy.Went there, did that. I submit the strategy was wrong, it put us in the country, so we agree on that but I think you mean (forgive me if I'm wrong) that our operational effort was significantly flawed and the TTP selected were inappropriate. That's what led to the loss. IOW, the strategy may have been flawed to an extent but the greater problem was selection of operational and tactical methods that were not appropriate. I submit the same thing could be said of todays conflicts.

Re: Viet Nam though, the strategy may have been wrong but it was the best that could be seen given available information at the time; it was a Cold war reaction. As you point out, that very artificial period of world history is gone. Future strategy should not be constrained by it.
Our strategy for this current fight is flawed as well. If some part of my work helps us make that strategy better, then I will have done what I could to help make sure that all of that great effort is not in vain.I can only applaud that as an intent and a goal and I wish you success.

I do agree that our strategy is flawed. I also suggest that an even larger problem is that once again our operational techniques were initially more problem than solution and only recently have matured to an extent -- I still question some of it, particularly in Afghanistan. Thus, I believe it absolutely imperative (redundancy for emphasis) that FID and COIN be embedded in US doctrine and training from today forward. We cannot predict where or when we may have to deploy or what we may have to do -- nor should we waste time and effort even trying or arguing about it (Gratuitous smack to all Naglites and Gentilites -- beware of all fanatics... :D ) -- so we must be full spectrum capable. Period.

I believe we can do that, that we must do that and that it is affordable if approached correctly. That does not negate my strong belief that it is in our strategic interest to avoid if at all possible such commitments.

Back to stragetry.

My only suggestion is that any US strategy HAS to account for our fractious populace, our woefully ignorant and dangerous Congress and and even more ignorant and woeful news media -- which can affect, albeit only slightly, the first two bodies. The finest militarily designed and oriented strategies that do not take into account the vagaries and attributes of the society that provides the Armed force and its strategists will fail. More importantly, such a strategy must take our system of government (as it really works, not the idealized civics view thereof) and its limitations into account and it absolutely must not accord the US with abilities and agility it cannot have.

jmm99
11-13-2008, 09:42 PM
Well, Mr. White, you were quite right in suggesting we follow the money. The available structures to play-out "COIN's" role in the "GWOT" are very much limited to the organizational charts, funding streams, etc., established by Congress and signed-on by the Executive (with or without "signing statements").

The whole schema is tied at the hip to the appropriation and budgetary classifications. Absent recourse to the legislative process, you would have to be something more than a John Yoo to make any serious deviations from the present structure.

So far as change here is concerned, me thinks we are left with the axiom: "Change what you can change. Accept what you cannot change. Have the wisdom to know the difference."

True that dollars, egos and turf > the "law" as we have it. I can't do much about dollars, egos and turf. So, I'm left with the legal aspects created by them.

BTW: the Constitution is not directly helpful. The Operational Law Handbook was quite helpful. After reading about 20 pages, the "Congressional intent" became very obvious. Suggest a read of Chapter 11 (about 60 pages) - and, for more enjoyable fare, read Chapter 21 (SOCOM; 16 pages).

----------------------------------------
Here are the relevant constitutional provisions, as I see them:


Article I

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....
....
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
....
Section 9. ....
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

Article IV

Section 3. ....
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States

Article II

Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States ....
....
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States
....
... and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, ... and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law. But the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
....
Section 3. ...
... he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Not a very specific plan, is it ? Note that the above provisions come into play when considering SOFA stuff.

---------------------------------------
This reference (may by now be updated for 2008) I found very helpful in bringing daylight to my swamp:


Operational Law Handbook (2007), 666 pages
The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School
International and Operational Law Department
600 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2007.pdf

The key to what is in place, what can be changed and what can't be changed (without amendment of many statutes) is found in Chapter 11, Fiscal Law, pp. 239-300. Its focus is on Title 10 (DoD) and Title 22 (DoS).

This excerpt pretty much sums the situation generally.


(p.299)

XV. CONCLUSION

A. Congress limits the authority of DoD and other executive agencies to use appropriated funds. The principal fiscal controls imposed by statute, regulation, and case law are Purpose, Time and Amount. These controls apply both to CONUS activity and OCONUS operations and exercises. The Comptroller General, service audit agencies and inspectors general monitor compliance with rules governing the obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds. .... Those found responsible for funding violations will face adverse personnel actions and possibly criminal sanctions.

B. JAs must ensure that the military’s participation in a Title 22 foreign assistance activity or in a Title 10 military cooperation or humanitarian operation accomplishes the commander’s intent and complies with U.S. fiscal law, regulations and policy.

While SOCOM must abide by U.S. fiscal law, regulations and policy applicable to it, it has a separate statutory authorization and funding schema. See Chapter 21, Special Operations, pp. 501-516. And a friendly agency (do they really exist - cf. friendly foreign intelligence services ?) can sometimes be convinced to write checks.

------------------------------------------
The following sections also bear on specific issues, relating back to the more general fiscal policy.


Chapter 6, Emergency Essential Civilians, pp. 119-124

Chapter 7, Contingency Contractor Personnel, pp. 135-143

Chapter 12, Deployment Contracting, pp. 303-319

Chapter 15, International Agreements, pp. 395-404

Chapter 17, Combating Terrorism, pp. 423-434 [1]

Chapter 20, NEO, pp. 493-498

Chapter 21, Special Operations, pp. 501-516 [2]

Chapter 22, Civil Affairs, pp. 517-526

Chapter 26, Joint Operations, pp. 559-600

Footnotes to above:

[1] From the Manual:


p. 434:
D. Status of Enemy Participants in Conflict. Taliban and al-Qaida lack some or all of the four attributes specified in Article 4, GC III; thus, they are unlawful enemy combatants (See January 22, 2002 NSC statement of U.S. policy regarding al-Qaida and Taliban detainees).

I happen to agree that Taliban and al-Qaida lack some or all of the four attributes specified in Art. 4. But, by jumping directly into GC III, Art. 4, the Bush Administration made life much easier for defense counsel of Taliban and al-Qaida detainees. So, in "Defending Hamdan", the defense offered expert evidence that the Taliban and AQ-Ansar did meet those attributes. That may have led to the partial verdict - juries do not publish opinions.

IMO: in fact and law, Taliban and al-Qaida cannot get past the "accept and apply" requirement of common Art. 2 of the GCs; and would then be subject only to the provisions of common Art. 3 of the GCs, if at all. See, "Defending Hamdan" (in Law Enforcement) for the argument.

[2] The following may have an update.


CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22017; Updated December 6, 2006 -
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress -
Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert, Specialists in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

------------------------------------
PS: Bob's World - Don't blame it on me - Ken started that elephant thing. "Green Baret", a article of cover, da head ? (a Marine would have fun with that one); but, if you want to be one, you sure as hell have earned the right to so self-define. The last clause is serious; the rest ain't.

Ken White
11-13-2008, 10:19 PM
Well, Mr. White, you were quite right in suggesting we follow the money. The available structures to play-out "COIN's" role in the "GWOT" are very much limited to the organizational charts, funding streams, etc., established by Congress and signed-on by the Executive (with or without "signing statements"). If you really believe that, I have a bridge I can let go for a mere pittance...

You are, I'm sure, aware that those items are mutable -- and that's an understatement -- and can be changed at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue with great speed and frequently some slight of hand. :wry:

And sometimes at both ends without the knowledge of the other end causing some,to me, amusing contretemps. Lord help the poor guys caught in the middle...
The whole schema is tied at the hip to the appropriation and budgetary classifications. Absent recourse to the legislative process, you would have to be something more than a John Yoo to make any serious deviations from the present structure.The classifications are the 'pots' I mentioned. If the rest of that means Congress can and will ignore the law and the Constitution and do pretty much what it wants, I agree. If it is to imply their hands are tied and they cannot do that, as I mentioned, I have this bridge... ;)
So far as change here is concerned, me thinks we are left with the axiom: "Change what you can change. Accept what you cannot change. Have the wisdom to know the difference."On this we can totally agree. I'd strongly suggest that a thorough knowledge of how the US government works is advised before one starts laying out policy advocating change. How it really works, not how it's supposed to work. Take a look at the Federal Budget and ponder the fact that it is beyond opaque, it is virtually incomprehensible to most. Those accounting classifications? They and many other things the GAO and many in government have tried to discard; many have tried to get the US government to use a standard commercial accounting process and GAAP. Guess who doesn't want to do that? Congress -- they like opacity...
True that dollars, egos and turf > the "law" as we have it. I can't do much about dollars, egos and turf. So, I'm left with the legal aspects created by them.Not to worry, Congress and the new Imperialer Presidency will likely take care for that for you.
BTW: the Constitution is not directly helpful.As I said -- I'll add that documents which are ignored (in particular by both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue) rarely are much help.
The Operational Law Handbook was quite helpful. After reading about 20 pages, the "Congressional intent" became very obvious. Suggest a read of Chapter 11 (about 60 pages) - and, for more enjoyable fare, read Chapter 21 (SOCOM; 16 pages).I'll pass, as you point out, a new version will be out soon. Uh, and which Congress was that, the one whose intent was obvious? Same number as next Quarters?

I'll also point out without giving away anything here that SOCOM has many other funding sources proving that yet again what you see is often not what you get... ;)
Not a very specific plan, is it ? Note that the above provisions come into play when considering SOFA stuff.Wasn't meant to be as you know; and true -- if they're heeded. My wife rarely moves the sofa, I understand I'm a lucky man and that some folks make a habit of of moving sofas on whims...

slapout9
11-14-2008, 01:02 AM
The Important thing to remember about PCE is there are lives in the Balance.

Lives In The Balance by Jackson Browne
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1z584iSa0I&feature=related

jmm99
11-14-2008, 02:34 AM
I have to reject your kind offer of the bridge. After reviewing your sales brochure, I am simply unable to see how the bridge would fit into my terrain - based on the state of my present situational awareness, of course. As you may or may not know, my primary concern is to preserve the separation of the 600-pound gorilla and the young chimps who live in my back yard. I cannot see, at present, how the bridge would help in addressing that concern.

Ken White
11-14-2008, 03:10 AM
The Important thing to remember about PCE is there are lives in the Balance.cost lives no matter what and there is not likely to be a balance...

So, don't go unless you gotta -- and if you do go, you better be ready to kill most everything. :D

Ken White
11-14-2008, 03:18 AM
I have to reject your kind offer of the bridge.If you must.
After reviewing your sales brochure, I am simply unable to see how the bridge would fit into my terrain - based on the state of my present situational awareness, of course.I agree, thoughtless of me to offer it with the Type A brochure; I'll forward the Type B and you'll note that the Bridge, like an erector set, can be multi purpose and its components can be assembled in many ways. Thus a gorilla proof -- but regrettably not totally chimp proof -- enclosure can be fabricated.

Much research has shown that complete Chimp proofing is not possible ergo one must devise alternate strategies. Elephant are quite wise if slow to act; gorillas are also wise and can act very rapidly when they wish to. This is a good thing.

Bob's World
03-04-2009, 11:48 AM
One blogger's response to a follow-on feature that explored this concept a bit more:

http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/03/03/a-populace-centric-policy-for-pakistan/

William F. Owen
03-05-2009, 07:22 AM
When a populace conspires against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government (or now, non-state actor like AQ) seeks to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency it is Foreign Internal Defense.


I would add the context of,


When a populace conspires to use military or violent means against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts militarily to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government uses military force (or now, non-state actor like AQ) to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency, by military means, it is Foreign Internal Defense.

Bob's World
03-05-2009, 10:43 AM
I would add the context of,


When a populace conspires to use military or violent means against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts militarily to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government uses military force (or now, non-state actor like AQ) to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency, by military means, it is Foreign Internal Defense.


That is one way of defining it to be sure, and you are not alone. Personally I find it much easier to grasp the true dynamics at work, and therefore the true solutions required to the problem, by looking at the military aspect as not some separate event, but as a capability that is brought into a much larger event when it rises to a level that the civil government can not handle by itself.

Phased in as needed, phased out as not needed. Sometimes bringing warfighting capabilities, and other times bringing the vast civil capabilities inherent in the manpower, training, organization, and equipment capacity that the military has on hand and uncommitted when not warfighting. Civil capacity is by designed pretty much maxed out. The governmental "reserve" is really its active military force first for overseas engagement, and reserve component military force for domestic engagement.

To look at insurgency and its many related missions as "military operations focused on defeating the threat" does two very dangerous things in my mind:

1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.

By looking at support to a foreign country's insurgency as "COIN" does one very dangerous thing: It causes you to look at their war as your war, and then you beging to take over, and then your very presence expands the insurgency by adding a "resistance" component to the "revolutionary" or "separatist" movement you came to help with. By keeping our intervention in the context of FID, we can focus on repairing the breach between the failed government and the revolting populace.

William F. Owen
03-05-2009, 10:58 AM
1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.


Yes and no. I absolutely agree that insurgencies are born from political social problems - as Clausewitz notes "War is a setting forth of policy" so insurgencies are like any other form of warfare.

The military should be applied to military problems. Politicians should be applied to the politics/social problems. Trying to get soldiers to do "social work" is pure poison and who ever came up with that needs to ditch it, some time soon, and keeping it going really does let the civilians off the hook, to solve the problem. All wars require all the instruments of policy. Insurgency is no different.

If the US is trying to do FID, then changing the local governments policy is the task of the State Department and not the DoD. All military action has political and social consequences. The only thing currently lacking is the effective teaching of the enduring fact.

Surferbeetle
03-05-2009, 11:09 AM
Bob,


That is one way of defining it to be sure, and you are not alone. Personally I find it much easier to grasp the true dynamics at work, and therefore the true solutions required to the problem, by looking at the military aspect as not some separate event, but as a capability that is brought into a much larger event when it rises to a level that the civil government can not handle by itself.

War is not just limited to the 'traditional military operations' which first come to mind, economic warfare, information warfare, tribal warfare, and many other types of warfare are also involved. Competition for resources takes many forms, not just overt physical violence. I too prefer the broader definition, but Wilf's point is a favored approach by many and perhaps by the majority...


Phased in as needed, phased out as not needed. Sometimes bringing warfighting capabilities, and other times bringing the vast civil capabilities inherent in the manpower, training, organization, and equipment capacity that the military has on hand and uncommitted when not warfighting. Civil capacity is by designed pretty much maxed out. The governmental "reserve" is really its active military force first for overseas engagement, and reserve component military force for domestic engagement.

I look at this differently. While in Mosul my casual survey of the number of coalition engineers who spoke Arabic, who had a social network optimized for the the AO, and who fully understood the location and nuances of the existing public works and utilities infrastructure convinced me that engaging the civil public works and utilities capacity was vital. Iraqi's had the knowledge and numbers needed to assess the situation, and develop a targeted plan which addressed the situation we found on the ground. From my perspective by effectively engaging the 'host nation' we are able to truly mass upon the problem...military CMO force numbers are insufficient.


To look at insurgency and its many related missions as "military operations focused on defeating the threat" does two very dangerous things in my mind:

1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.

By looking at support to a foreign country's insurgency as "COIN" does one very dangerous thing: It causes you to look at their war as your war, and then you beging to take over, and then your very presence expands the insurgency by adding a "resistance" component to the "revolutionary" or "separatist" movement you came to help with. By keeping our intervention in the context of FID, we can focus on repairing the breach between the failed government and the revolting populace.

Makes sense.

Regards,

Steve

William F. Owen
03-05-2009, 11:18 AM
War is not just limited to the 'traditional military operations' which first come to mind, economic warfare, information warfare, tribal warfare, and many other types of warfare are also involved. Competition for resources takes many forms, not just overt physical violence. I too prefer the broader definition, but Wilf's point is a favored approach by many and perhaps by the majority...

...but that's not my point. War requires all forms of power, as war is political in nature. Even Neolithic, or wars between African/Native American tribes conforms to this norm.

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

Bob's World
03-05-2009, 01:17 PM
Bob,

I look at this differently. While in Mosul my casual survey of the number of coalition engineers who spoke Arabic, who had a social network optimized for the the AO, and who fully understood the location and nuances of the existing public works and utilities infrastructure convinced me that engaging the civil public works and utilities capacity was vital. Iraqi's had the knowledge and numbers needed to assess the situation, and develop a targeted plan which addressed the situation we found on the ground. From my perspective by effectively engaging the 'host nation' we are able to truly mass upon the problem...military CMO force numbers are insufficient.



Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.

First we declared war on the government of Iraq. Then, once that government was defeated, the Populace of Iraq declared war on the United States. Needless to say, this created one complex, dynamic mess that defies all easy models; and is a mix of several evolving models.

I am optimisitc that this unfortunate story will one day have an extremely positive ending to it; but even if it does, students of military history will be forced to study this little vignette for thousands of years to come. This will be due in part to the story of how it played out, but primarily to the unique location and transitory period between major historic eras that it will come to mark. Not the end of the United States; but the beginning of the end of the final residues of the Western Colonial system and classic application of the western model of sovereignty contained within the Treaty of Westphalia. The rise of popular power and competing entities to the state will mark the new era. My prediction.

I suspect the historic powers of the Middle East will re-emerge to dominate the region for the same reasons they did so for thousands of years prior to oil shifting the balance. Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Israel will all benefit from key terrain and enduring resources to be major players once again in the region.

Once we get our nose out of the oil trough long enough to look around and take a fresh longterm perspective I believe we will form new policies and priorities that puts in a better light with the majority of the populaces there.

Surferbeetle
03-05-2009, 03:40 PM
Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

Wilf,

You are correct on the importance of definition's, and I do get a bit lazy with words from time to time, but a precise definition of 'warfare' seems to be an elusive one. I know it when I see it, but what I know may not be the same as what you know even though there are commonalities in our view.

When I model hydraulic situations I can discuss precisely the effects of pressure, temperature, friction, and elevation upon water (as an aside I'd hang onto the Golan as well :wry:). When I model stocks I can less precisely discuss the effects of average costs, book value, currency fluctuations, dividends, upon price forecasts for specific stocks. We do not have this mathematical edifice for warfare and thus descriptions are much less precise.

I am outta time, so more on this subject later this weekend.

Best,

Steve

Ken White
03-05-2009, 05:49 PM
Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.pair of paragraphs raise a pair of questions.

Did we really invade because we thought the Iraqi regime was truly a threat -- or did we invade for another purpose and -- possibly foolishly -- use the potential of an Iraqi threat as public justification?

I think the answer to that question has a bearing on the discussion.

Re: the second quoted paragraph, totally correct observation but it does raise the question of why prior planning did not prevent poor performance on our part.

That may also have a bearing on your discussion.

The answers to those questions also tie with Wilf's earlier comment:
"If the US is trying to do FID, then changing the local governments policy is the task of the State Department and not the DoD. All military action has political and social consequences. The only thing currently lacking is the effective teaching of the enduring fact."To which I'd add that the State Department ought to have a great deal more say BEFORE we get frisky as well as considerably more input during and after...

(and yes, I'm aware of the personalities involved in the case of invading Iraq --as well as Congress' ineptitude and State's own guided descent into oblivion with the connivance of an unthinking and venal Congress )

Bob's World
03-05-2009, 07:29 PM
pair of paragraphs raise a pair of questions.

Did we really invade because we thought the Iraqi regime was truly a threat -- or did we invade for another purpose and -- possibly foolishly -- use the potential of an Iraqi threat as public justification?

I think the answer to that question has a bearing on the discussion.

Re: the second quoted paragraph, totally correct observation but it does raise the question of why prior planning did not prevent poor performance on our part.

That may also have a bearing on your discussion.

The answers to those questions also tie with Wilf's earlier comment:To which I'd add that the State Department ought to have a great deal more say BEFORE we get frisky as well as considerably more input during and after...

(and yes, I'm aware of the personalities involved in the case of invading Iraq --as well as Congress' ineptitude and State's own guided descent into oblivion with the connivance of an unthinking and venal Congress )

We see ourselves in a certain light, and continue to be surprised when others see us differently. I suspect the President truly believed that the Iraqi people would greet us with open arms. Perhaps if we would have gone in with a better plan designed to addressed longer term issues than the defeat of the Iraqi army they would have. We'll never know.

I'm reading a book currently on Afghanistan that points out a similiar window of opportunity lost at the point where the Taliban were defeated in Kandahar, and the various allies we coordinated with were jockying for power in that area. Better understanding of who these guys were, their relative histories with each other and the populace, etc would have been good info to make sure power ended up in the right hands. Book also makes the case that there was a security role for the Taliban to play as well that they were willing to take on.

The author implies US intrigue and intent to create chaos, but we really just aren't that sophisticated. Most of what she describes, while accurate, I suspect was due primarily to just not having all the info and having to take the word of the guys you're actually with. I think the agendas were mostly local.

To be fair though, that op went down very fast. But as we were discussing a few days ago, those "irrevocable choices" get made as to who you partner with, and sometimes they come back and haunt you. Real lesson is that this is complex business that goes way beyond military skills, and that the military must include a wide range of experts in their planning to ensure that they have shaped their operation properly, and created the right alliances, for the enduring stability that is sought.

Ken White
03-05-2009, 07:49 PM
...I suspect the President truly believed that the Iraqi people would greet us with open arms.Possibly true but the issue I raised was why we went. Going somewhere one is not wanted to remove a threat is one thing; going there to pose a threat is quite a different thing. That difference can significantly affect the debate in this thread.
Perhaps if we would have gone in with a better plan designed to addressed longer term issues than the defeat of the Iraqi army they would have. We'll never know.True, we won't know -- shame DoD, JCS and the Army did not do a better job. Or did the game change early on? My suspicion is that it did but that's really irrelevant now. What happened after the invasion makes little difference to the discussion; I'm not sure that why we went is as unimportant.
The author implies US intrigue and intent to create chaos, but we really just aren't that sophisticated.Most of what she describes, while accurate, I suspect was due primarily to just not having all the info and having to take the word of the guys you're actually with. I think the agendas were mostly local.We will have to disagree on that. While part of what you say is certainly accurate, we can be and are usually more sophisticated than we're generally credited. The soft bigotry of low expectations has its uses. :wry:

If one is going to be routinely accused of being stupidly evil, that can be used to good effect on occasion. :eek:
...the military must include a wide range of experts in their planning to ensure that they have shaped their operation properly, and created the right alliances, for the enduring stability that is sought.I agree but will also point out that the policy makers, regardless of what they say, are not always seeking enduring stability... :cool:

Surferbeetle
03-07-2009, 05:41 PM
Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

Does warfare consist of more than overt physical violence? Does Economic Warfare qualify as a component of warfare? What is warfare? Who is responsible for the definition?

First, I’d like to throw out some ideas to use to examine this question. These ideas include mapping & analysis (GIS), urban metabolism, differential diagnosis, indicators (metrics) & indicator populations, and monetary diplomacy.

Richard Florida in a thought-provoking piece in this months Atlantic entitled How the Crash Will Reshape America provides a series of interesting examples in the use of economic geography to map our self inflicted wound. He describes the concept of urban metabolism by which successful countries, mega-regions, cities, or boundary crossing places can be examined for their ability to convert various inputs into economic energy. He also discusses economic shifts from agricultural, to manufacturing based industrialization, to creative industrialization and where in America this is occurring.

(Added link: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903/meltdown-geography )

Jeffrey Sachs, in his book The End of Poverty, provides insights into the idea of using a differential diagnosis to assess the economic health of an area and to do something about it. He defines capital as consisting of Business Capital, Human Capital, Infrastructure, Natural Capital, Knowledge Capital, and Public Institutional Capital. His differential diagnosis checklist is presented as having seven components one of which includes poverty mapping, which as further described reflects an understanding of the uses of GIS and incorporates his definition of capital.

David Landes in his book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, and Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, both examine global economic bases of power & weakness and their myriad components across the centuries. William Gibson in his book Pattern Recognition tells a modern story about applied marketing, which provides insight into the gathering of metrics. Peter Bernstein, in his book Against the Gods The Remarkable Story of Risk covers applied mathematics through the ages. Max Boot, in his book The Savage Wars of Peace, provides a narrative and analysis of small wars and dollar diplomacy. The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare focuses upon the broad sweep of Western warfare.

All of these references are interesting reads and provide background to my thesis that warfare is defined as the competition for resources, it is multifaceted, and it is not limited to just overt violence. Warfare cannot be accurately described by just one thinker/examiner/researcher using one model (the parable of elephants & blind men always applies). Students and practitioners of warfare have a broadly scoped portfolio to master.

Clausewitz has been translated to say “destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war”. Being simple and concise this absolute briefs well, however it is a flawed analysis through its oversimplification of a complex world. How many times has history witnessed the destruction of a people due to warfare (in the absolute sense that Clausewitz implies here)? Clausewitz does, however come from a Germanic people famed for their skills in warfare and it is instructive to examine their transition from a reliance on overt violence to a reliance upon economics in the competition for resources. Mary Fullbrook’s book A Concise History of Germany, Kurt F. Reinhardt’s Germany: 2000 Years, and of course Wikipedia (I know, I know) will be my references for my brief flyby on Germany’s startling transition from warriors to applied economists.

The Roman Cornelius Tacitus (AD 54-120 or AD 55-116) wrote about the early tribal Germans in his book Germania. It is described as being slanted in favor of the barbarians and their idealized lifestyle. Weapons of choice were described as the framea (a short javelin), the francisca (hatchet), slings, and bow & arrow. Shields were used for defense. Tribal units were the Sippe (clan), the Hufe (hide – different lots of households), Hundertschaft (~100 households), and Stamm (tribe). Tribal feuds cost lives and were ultimately resolved in Weregeld (blood money), Fickle and independent Wodan was the HMFIC and it was all prophesied to end in blood and tears in the Ragnarok.

The massive Volkerwanderung (migrations) started before AD 375, resulted in profound societal upheavals upon the European Continent and set the stage for the ongoing and sometimes very bloody competition for resources seen in milestones such as AD 486 (Clovis defeats last Roman Governor in Gaul), AD 843 (Treaty of Verdun - division of Frankish Kingdom), 1517 (Martin Luther publishes 95 theses), 1525 (Albrecht von Hohenzollern joins the Protestant team), 1618 (Thirty Years War kicks off, food fights among Royalty, religious fights, peasant revolts due to economic downturn, etc.), 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), 1724-1804 (Immanuel Kant drops in for a visit), 1914 –1918 (WWI), 1941-1945 (WWII), and 1989 (Reunification).

Germany’s 2008 GDP is 2,897 billion USD (America 13,164 billion and Israel 140 billion for scale). Throughout it all: blood money, booty, bribes, indulgences, Reich taxes, loans, defaults, overseas economic exploration/exploitation, reparations costs, chemical & engineering mastery, and overt physical violence it is all about competition for resources and it is all warfare. Mapping & analysis (GIS), urban metabolism, differential diagnosis, indicators (metrics) & indicator populations, monetary diplomacy are tools to help see it more clearly however I say that in any analysis the parable of elephants & blind men always applies. Clausewitz does not have the definitive nor final word on warfare.

Surferbeetle
03-07-2009, 07:21 PM
Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

No arguments with this. The old ‘this is the real deal and all the training I have done to date has led to this’ feeling was very strong for me while reading the op order before we left. The experience was reminiscent of my first jump at airborne school. On the ground however, as time passed things changed, and accomplishing the mission (to include the CA/CMO mission) required the ability to adapt and overcome well beyond what was originally envisioned.


Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.

Respect and fear was very prevalent in the beginning of OIF 1. Much of the Hoi Polloi that I interacted with in my daily missions were cautiously looking forward to positive change. There was a glaring expectations mismatch however that bit us in the ass. Western TV projects power and almost god-like capability and this IO campaign had an effect. We did not meet these expectations (Ken brings an interesting point to consider about the intent behind this) and when became apparent to all that we would not meet these expectations, it all went downhill fast. The summer was the final straw, 125F +, no electricity, no water, small islands of transient security…it was much more dangerous than anything I had every done to date and taught me some interesting lessons about the human animal.


First we declared war on the government of Iraq. Then, once that government was defeated, the Populace of Iraq declared war on the United States. Needless to say, this created one complex, dynamic mess that defies all easy models; and is a mix of several evolving models.

Everybody has their own war experience, however my assessment was that we had a real chance to keep the lid on, in Mosul, at least. Disbanding of the Army and DeBathification were perceived as shoes to the face…failure to fix the electricity was a daily reminder to the populace and was perceived in many ways. The culture is oral/rumor based and perceptions quickly twisted in very Byzantine and strange fashion to this westerner.


I am optimistic that this unfortunate story will one day have an extremely positive ending to it; but even if it does, students of military history will be forced to study this little vignette for thousands of years to come. This will be due in part to the story of how it played out, but primarily to the unique location and transitory period between major historic eras that it will come to mark. Not the end of the United States; but the beginning of the end of the final residues of the Western Colonial system and classic application of the western model of sovereignty contained within the Treaty of Westphalia. The rise of popular power and competing entities to the state will mark the new era. My prediction.

You have marked the transition correctly in my opinion…


I suspect the historic powers of the Middle East will re-emerge to dominate the region for the same reasons they did so for thousands of years prior to oil shifting the balance. Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Israel will all benefit from key terrain and enduring resources to be major players once again in the region.

Once we get our nose out of the oil trough long enough to look around and take a fresh longterm perspective I believe we will form new policies and priorities that puts in a better light with the majority of the populaces there.

After all of this we are still cranking out monster SUV’s and undercharging for fuel…we truly need to get deadly serious about energy independence. This is the second time in my lifetime we have taken a shot to the pills on this subject (first time shame on…, second time…)

Bill Moore
03-08-2009, 07:55 PM
Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive. I'm an admirer of Clausewitz, not one of the many Clausewitz personality cult extremist members.

AQ said they were waging economic warfare upon us, and it started with the attack on the WTC with its severe economic impact, followed with the anticipated prolonged ground campaign that AQ believes is unwinnable by either side militarily, but in the end the conflict will destroy America's economy (and consequently the developed world's economy).

Understand you may not agree with the following, but I'm attempting to use the logic in the irregular warfare definition. If the definition of irregular warfare means that the population is the primary objective, then the primary objective of regular warfare must be the enemy's combat forces. If warfare is described by its primary objective, then it is logical to assume there good be something called economic warfare. I think we will find ourselves in agreement that this logic is flawed on many levels, but I think it equally unwise to dismiss the concept of economic warfare completely.

You also wrote FID only concurs when we provide military support to a host nation. That is factually flawed, because FID encompasses any support to a HN's Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) program to help ward off internal threats. It is a whole of government activity (as much as I hate that term). The military in some cases may not even play a role in it.

That brings me to my final point, one that should be debated. You wrote that Soldiers should not be used to solve social problems. IMHO it is this mindset that led to the initial failures we experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it conflicts with the lessons of history. Mao's army focused on both, the U.S. Army focused on both during WWII (martial law in Germany and Japan, enabling a transfer to a successful government), etc. Failure to address the underlying political and social issues in a conflict will almost always result in failure, and the military is frequently the only organization with the capacity to do so.

William F. Owen
03-08-2009, 08:16 PM
Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive.

What I actually said was,

War requires all forms of power, as war is political in nature. Even Neolithic, or wars between African/Native American tribes conforms to this norm.

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

So I differentiate between WAR and WARFARE. Warfare is violence, thus the domain of an armed force/military. All instruments of power (economic, cultural, social etc) are used to in war, but they don't do any killing.

Does economics matter in War/conflict? Yes, hugely! It funds warfare and all the instruments of power, but it does not commit violence.

William F. Owen
03-08-2009, 08:30 PM
Does warfare consist of more than overt physical violence? Does Economic Warfare qualify as a component of warfare? What is warfare? Who is responsible for the definition?

Yes it does. War is the use of violence for political means. Violence is a qualifier, in the same way we differentiate between fraud and armed robbery.


Clausewitz has been translated to say “destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war”. Being simple and concise this absolute briefs well, however it is a flawed analysis through its oversimplification of a complex world.

I can't see how it is flawed. Remember the context of Clausewitz's main form of argument between, between war as it should be and war as it actually is. The analysis holds true, for any form of armed conflict. If all the insurgents in Iraq had been destroyed/defeated, the insurgency would have been defeated overnight. Could that happen in reality? No, of course not, but that does not undermine the basic principle of the force of arms. The primary use of armed force is to destroy/break the will of the enemy. If the enemy starves to death, it's because armed force stopped him getting any food.

The world CvC wrote in was just as complex and even perhaps more unpredictable than the one in which we live today.

As an aside, to yourself and Bill Moore I am only a reader or Clausewitz because I see no one else who is so consistently right, though far from perfect. EG: Mao read Clausewitz, and did nothing to contradict, or even improve upon him.

Bob's World
03-08-2009, 11:59 PM
Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive. I'm an admirer of Clausewitz, not one of the many Clausewitz personality cult extremist members.

AQ said they were waging economic warfare upon us, and it started with the attack on the WTC with its severe economic impact, followed with the anticipated prolonged ground campaign that AQ believes is unwinnable by either side militarily, but in the end the conflict will destroy America's economy (and consequently the developed world's economy).

Understand you may not agree with the following, but I'm attempting to use the logic in the irregular warfare definition. If the definition of irregular warfare means that the population is the primary objective, then the primary objective of regular warfare must be the enemy's combat forces. If warfare is described by its primary objective, then it is logical to assume there good be something called economic warfare. I think we will find ourselves in agreement that this logic is flawed on many levels, but I think it equally unwise to dismiss the concept of economic warfare completely.

You also wrote FID only concurs when we provide military support to a host nation. That is factually flawed, because FID encompasses any support to a HN's Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) program to help ward off internal threats. It is a whole of government activity (as much as I hate that term). The military in some cases may not even play a role in it.

That brings me to my final point, one that should be debated. You wrote that Soldiers should not be used to solve social problems. IMHO it is this mindset that led to the initial failures we experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it conflicts with the lessons of history. Mao's army focused on both, the U.S. Army focused on both during WWII (martial law in Germany and Japan, enabling a transfer to a successful government), etc. Failure to address the underlying political and social issues in a conflict will almost always result in failure, and the military is frequently the only organization with the capacity to do so.

I get exactly what you are saying and agree. When I read Wilf's reply, it seems he is taking your comments in a slightly different context than what I believe you intended.

I see this often. SF guys all began life as conventional military men, and then by inclination, ability, training, and ultimately experience, develop into a "special operator," working in the fringes of war and warfare in a way much more connected to the people (populace in which engagement occurs, allies, enemies, etc); and therefore take an understanding of "Irregular" warfare that I think is often lost on those who remained in the "our military team vs there military team" world of conventional operations. Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

Bill Moore
03-09-2009, 12:57 AM
Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

I feel like a 3 y/o kid because I want to keep asking why your quote above is true. Why don't they understand? Or am I missing the bigger picture? We're looking at the same problem set, but we see two different things entirely. Unfortunately there is a lot of truth in the statement that if you're a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.

Ron Humphrey
03-09-2009, 01:55 AM
Has anyone else tried replacing the terms war and warfare as they are used so often here, and replaced them with conflict?

I did and in some ways most still came across with the same basics, some on the other hand did not. Perhaps there is something there but not quite sure yet


Many might say there's little difference between warring parties and conflicting agendas but for some reason it feels like therein might be found a delineation worth exploring.

Sounds like something C might have tried to point out.

Ken White
03-09-2009, 02:49 AM
"Professionals separated by a common profession and language..."


Why don't they understand?I don't think a lack of understanding is the problem. Bound to be for a few but the majority I believe understand; they just are not inclined to want to get enmeshed in other cultures to a great extent. How many guys do you know in SF who do not enthuse about performing FID or similar missions but want to go to the CIF?
Or am I missing the bigger picture? We're looking at the same problem set, but we see two different things entirely. Unfortunately there is a lot of truth in the statement that if you're a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.That's part of it -- then again some people just don't like goat meat or rice. It's not so much that they do not understand -- just that THEY don't want to do it.

That's at least part of why there's an ongoing DA / SF disconnect. Been that way ever since the first SF was invented. Likely will be that way for our great Grandkids...:wry:

Bill Moore
03-09-2009, 03:22 AM
Ken, you're right, most of the bubba's on point prefer DA, and some of our leaders prefer to refer to DA as a decisive IW operation, instead of a being a supporting operation. It goes back to human nature, I prefer DA to living with Jose from a comfort standpoint. Most foreign populations in developing countries have less than desirable living conditions when it comes to hygiene, food standards, disease, violence, etc., (although the cultures in SE Asia can be enjoyable). While SF may not like to live with Jose, they'll do it if ordered to do so, and do it better than most. If you give guys a choice they'll generally take the most comfortable option.

slapout9
03-09-2009, 03:41 AM
Maybe there is no such thing as Economic Warfare but there are certainly such things as Economic weapons. Money is about the only substance that can have the same EFFECTS as Global Nuclear War...without the radiation problems.:wry: It can and has created conditions that have destroyed businesses, caused deaths, homelessness and joblessness just like war and certainly created an increase in crime. The fact that our western mindset wants to put a certain definition to a certain word or words does not make that definition a fact as opposed to an opinion. Further our enemies understand perfectly well what economic weapons can do.

Surferbeetle
03-09-2009, 06:24 AM
Followed the not-so/well beaten trail through the brush towards a landnav point WWII British Minister of Economic Warfare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Economic_Warfare) Pretty sure that Ken's been here and gone...

William F. Owen
03-09-2009, 06:34 AM
...and therefore take an understanding of "Irregular" warfare that I think is often lost on those who remained in the "our military team vs there military team" world of conventional operations. Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

Well luckily have a pretty good understanding of what some call "irregular warfare." - but yes language is a problem.

For example, I would try never to say "Irregular warfare," unless speaking to someone with whom I had little understanding of their operational references.

Surferbeetle
05-26-2009, 01:03 AM
Posted at PNAS, Growth, innovation, scaling, and the pace of life in cities (http://www.pnas.org/content/104/17/7301.full) by:

1. Luís M. A. Bettencourt
2. José Lobo
3. Dirk Helbing
4. Christian Kühnert
5. Geoffrey B. West



In this work, we show that the social organization and dynamics relating urbanization to economic development and knowledge creation, among other social activities, are very general and appear as nontrivial quantitative regularities common to all cities, across urban systems. We present an extensive body of empirical evidence showing that important demographic, socioeconomic, and behavioral urban indicators are, on average, scaling functions of city size that are quantitatively consistent across different nations and times [note that the much studied “Zipf's law” (ref. 31) for the rank–size distribution of urban populations is just one example of the many scaling relationships presented in this work]. The most thorough evidence at present is for the U.S., where extensive reliable data across a wide variety of indicators span many decades. In addition, we show that other nations, including China and European countries, display particular scaling relationships consistent with those in the U.S.

Bob's World
05-16-2010, 01:02 PM
Latest thoughts found on the ISAF Blog: http://isafcoin.blogspot.com


http://isafcoin.blogspot.com/2010/05/jones-insurgency-model_15.html

M-A Lagrange
05-16-2010, 03:56 PM
BW,

Just one word: BRAVO.
You have captured in this model what is ramping in the back of my mind since several month and years.

Saying so, I have a question for you. You assert that strong centralised government is needed (I mostly agree with that). But if I look at France, a historically strongly centralised country, tendency nowadays is to go for decentralisation (mainly for financial reasons). So my question is: don’t you think that centralised governance is also part of the problem in insurgency as it does not allow population to have her piece of autonomy? Knowing that, in such case, you give opportunities for weakness.

Sincerely

M-A

Bob's World
05-16-2010, 04:26 PM
BW,

Just one word: BRAVO.
You have captured in this model what is ramping in the back of my mind since several month and years.

Saying so, I have a question for you. You assert that strong centralised government is needed (I mostly agree with that). But if I look at France, a historically strongly centralised country, tendency nowadays is to go for decentralisation (mainly for financial reasons). So my question is: don’t you think that centralised governance is also part of the problem in insurgency as it does not allow population to have her piece of autonomy? Knowing that, in such case, you give opportunities for weakness.

Sincerely

M-A

M-A,

Thanks, I hope that there is something here that people can draw upon. As to government, what I said was that "Many believe that establishing a strong central government is the key to resolving insurgency."

In the final sentence prior to the conclusion I state my belief, and that is "Self-Determination is the path to Good Governance." Whatever flavor a particular populace believes is right for them.

Bob

Ken White
05-16-2010, 07:43 PM
Really. Only suggestion I'd make is change the name. The Jones Model it is and will always be but if it is to be adopted, it generally will require a bland, non-name so some quite senior person can adopt it as <i>his or her</i> idea. * Very few will dutifully and properly acknowledge the importance of subordinate's input and ideas...

It's good enough and important enough to need adoption...

* Partly tongue in cheek. Only partly...:wry:

Greyhawk
05-16-2010, 09:51 PM
I like this description:


Know your place:

COIN is the role of the GIROA; the coalition is supporting with FID

Is that policy, or "opinions he expresses here are his own"?

slapout9
05-17-2010, 12:20 AM
BW,outstanding. It should be applied to our own country first, then maybe the politicos would realize just how bad off we are. We are at 5 and sliding fast on all 4 causal factors. I like the fact that you point out that democracy does not appear in the constitution, to that I would add neither does Capitalism......Government is good when it is done by the people,for ALL the people, and not by a few Tali-banksters.


PS Ken is right on the name......May I suggest the Robin Hood Model!

Entropy
05-17-2010, 01:25 AM
BW,

Beautifully written and well argued essay!

My first question is: How does one distinguish the Somalia/Bangladesh/Liberian exceptions to your model?

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 02:17 AM
I like this description:



Is that policy, or "opinions he expresses here are his own"?


A growing number within the SOF Community recognize that when dealing with an Insurgency, COIN is the mission of the Host Nation; and that those who are there as guests are conducting FID, or IDAD, or SFA or some similar supporting mission. It helps keep your head clear and avoid mission creep when you don't assume the primary mission for yourself. It also helps to avoid perceptions that you are in fact in charge, and intend to stay that way, with a puppet regime at your beck and call. When one appreciates that creating perceptions of Legitimacy in the HN Government is arguably the number one mission; every little bit helps.

The conventional community, by and large, sees COIN through the lens of the hard lessons learned in Iraq. They also, by and large, see FID as a Special Forces mission. It may seem like a nuance to not call what we are doing "COIN", but it is a critical nuance. Perhaps an essentianl one.

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 02:44 AM
BW,

Beautifully written and well argued essay!

My first question is: How does one distinguish the Somalia/Bangladesh/Liberian exceptions to your model?

Western society is quick to judge States elsewhere as "failed" and typically apply a ruler that consists of "things expected in a Western, Westphalian State" to measure with.

Is Somalia a failed state by that measure? Certainly. Is Somalia also a state that is ripe for "insurgency"? Now, that is another question altogether. I think many states, primarily in Africa, are in the process of rejecting the forms of government and borders drawn for them by Europeans and finding their own way to a form of governance that works for them. I fear it will be a long and bloody path. Us judging them as "failed" and working to force them back to the conditions they are working to escape will not be particularly helpful.

Is Bangladesh "failed"? No, I think Bangladesh is just very poor, over populated, and situated in a flood zone. Everyone there knows this, this is how it has always been. When it comes to Effectiveness of governance, they score very low by western standards. When it comes to "Good Governance" I sense they do okay as assessed by their own populace. There are States in Europe who may well be far closer to insurgency than Bangladesh is; and no one is taking that risk as seriously as they should.

Liberia? I don't know much about how the Liberian populace feels about their government. That is the critical measure. We assess them and have concerns about how WE feel about the Liberian government, and our fears are valid as to how they affect us. If, however, the populace of Liberia perceives the governance to be "Good" there is low risk of insurgency.

The point being that the U.S. in the 1960s was on the cusp of insurgency with the African American populace. The leadership of Dr. King kept iit less violent than it would have been naturally, and the passing and enforcing of the civil rights act moved that segment of the populace back down the curve into the "peace" zone. It is well for all Americans to remember that if one were to assess and plot where key segments of American society lay on the Jones Model, they would not all plot in the same place. Some, as Slap indicated, are trending upwards in their perceptions. But as I told a hardcore, Tea Party attending, retired Marine Colonel friend of mine. "You're mad as hell, and extremely concerned about the direction government is going, but you are no where close to becoming an insurgent are you?" "No," he replied. "That's becuase you have hope. You know, that no matter what, in 3 years you will get to vote and that your vote will count, and that it 7 years no matter what you will have a new President." "Damn straight," he replied.

When we chip away at the puplic trust in our system, we chip away at our national security. By understanding the Jones Model, one understands not just what to focus on in Afghanistan; but also what to focus on in dealing with the Saudis or the Israelis, but when approaching domestic policy issues as well.

The "failures" that lead to insurgency are likely trending upward among populaces who live in states whose stability we take for granted (stabilty is never "granted," it is maintained and earned daily through the efforts of officials striving to provide good governance to all, equally); while those same factors may well be trending downward in states that we see as "failing" in other ways.

In other words, if you don't know what to look for, you will likely be looking for the wrong things, in the wrong places; and miss what is really important.

slapout9
05-17-2010, 03:44 AM
Some, as Slap indicated, are trending upwards in their perceptions. But as I told a hardcore, Tea Party attending, retired Marine Colonel friend of mine. "You're mad as hell, and extremely concerned about the direction government is going, but you are no where close to becoming an insurgent are you?" "No," he replied. "That's becuase you have hope. You know, that no matter what, in 3 years you will get to vote and that your vote will count, and that it 7 years no matter what you will have a new President." "Damn straight," he replied.

When we chip away at the puplic trust in our system, we chip away at our national security. By understanding the Jones Model, one understands not just what to focus on in Afghanistan; but also what to focus on in dealing with the Saudis or the Israelis, but when approaching domestic policy issues as well.

Except, I think there are factions of the Tea party and other groups that no longer have any hope and they are preparing for an insurgency. I was talking with some LE friends awhile ago and there is some scary stuff goin on that hasn't been present since the 60's and 70's:eek: When people show up at Political rallies......with Guns.... that is sending a very dangerous message.

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 06:09 AM
Except, I think there are factions of the Tea party and other groups that no longer have any hope and they are preparing for an insurgency. I was talking with some LE friends awhile ago and there is some scary stuff goin on that hasn't been present since the 60's and 70's:eek: When people show up at Political rallies......with Guns.... that is sending a very dangerous message.

The best yards are those that are maintained regularly throughout the year. Populaces are much the same.

As I said, all four causal perceptions must be monitored and nurtured constantly to keep a populace in "peace." What often causes governments to stumble is that they take themselves too seriously, and discount the perceptions of the people in favor for those perceptions they form of themselves from their fine offices, surrounded by those who owe their positions to their patronage.

Are there some Americans who question the legitimacy of the President? Certainly, you see this when they call for his Birth Certificate. There were many who questioned the legitimacy of President Bush as well due to the "hanging chads" in Florida. No one factor will result in insurgency, but when the factors begin to stack up it is best to nip it in the bud long before it goes violent. Thank God we addressed the Civil Rights movement as soon as we did, in the manner we did; but event that was long over due.

Insurgencies happen for a reason. Good Governance is hard.

Chris jM
05-17-2010, 06:43 AM
To echo the above praises, great concept and great article.

Putting the Jones model to work, I'm interested in the underlying problems in Pakistan as seen through this lens.

What is their underlying cause? A lack of justice? A lack of governmental legitimacy, especially in the tribal areas? How much of their population perceives their situation as hopeless?

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 11:50 AM
To echo the above praises, great concept and great article.

Putting the Jones model to work, I'm interested in the underlying problems in Pakistan as seen through this lens.

What is their underlying cause? A lack of justice? A lack of governmental legitimacy, especially in the tribal areas? How much of their population perceives their situation as hopeless?

It is too easy to focus on the surface issues. The violence, the poverty, the lack of infrastructure, the corruption, etc. All important indicators of deeper problems, but perhap not anything that time, money and effort should be committed against directly.

At the end of the day, the question for the U.S. in Pakistan is what are the naitonal interests that must be nurtured there.

The second question is then how to best nurture those interests in a manner that does not contribute to perceptions of poor governance;

and ideally implemented in a manner that encourages enhancements of good governance instead. Interests are best nurtured in a stable state, so it is in our interest to encourage and promote good governance. Such an approach is also likely to reduce the likelihood of dienfranchised members of that populace coming to the conclusion that they can only achieve their nationalist aims by first breaking the support of the US to that country / region.

MikeF
05-17-2010, 12:04 PM
It is too easy to focus on the surface issues. The violence, the poverty, the lack of infrastructure, the corruption, etc. All important indicators of deeper problems, but perhap not anything that time, money and effort should be committed against directly.

At the end of the day, the question for the U.S. in Pakistan is what are the naitonal interests that must be nurtured there.

The second question is then how to best nurture those interests in a manner that does not contribute to perceptions of poor governance;

and ideally implemented in a manner that encourages enhancements of good governance instead. Interests are best nurtured in a stable state, so it is in our interest to encourage and promote good governance. Such an approach is also likely to reduce the likelihood of dienfranchised members of that populace coming to the conclusion that they can only achieve their nationalist aims by first breaking the support of the US to that country / region.

COL Jones,

Sir, as I said before, I like your model. As a matter or manner of application, we're now getting into the realm of bargaining, negoitiation, and arbitraion. Game theory and economics provides some useful tools to understand these games; however, I'm still unsure how to arbitrate the hearts (emotions) of perceived poor governance.

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 12:26 PM
COL Jones,

Sir, as I said before, I like your model. As a matter or manner of application, we're now getting into the realm of bargaining, negoitiation, and arbitraion. Game theory and economics provides some useful tools to understand these games; however, I'm still unsure how to arbitrate the hearts (emotions) of perceived poor governance.

We can encourage, we can promote, we can enable. At some point we may even say enough, our national interest here are so extremely great, your governance is so extremely poor, that we conduct UW and assist the populace to form a new governance. That is why we have UW on the books.

What we need to begin stepping away from, however, IMO, are those relationships where we in fact promote Poor Governance. Where we have important national interests at stake, but where the government has come to act with impunity due to its reliance on the US to keep them safely in power out of our concern for those interests. This is where, in this new information age, we set ourselves up to be targets of "terrorist" attacks.

We came out of the Cold War proudly proclaiming that we stand for Democracy and the Rule of Law. Fine. Both of those pursuits, however, can lead to insurgency and terrorism if propogated among a populace that percieves itself to be hopelessy trapped under Poor Governance.

I would suggest the we modify our tune slightly. To proudly stand for Self Determination and Good Governance. Rule of Law and Democracy in some form are apt to follow in good time, and when they do it will be among a populace that is much more likely to perceive it's governance to be "Good."

slapout9
05-17-2010, 01:49 PM
The best yards are those that are maintained regularly throughout the year. Populaces are much the same.

As I said, all four causal perceptions must be monitored and nurtured constantly to keep a populace in "peace." What often causes governments to stumble is that they take themselves too seriously, and discount the perceptions of the people in favor for those perceptions they form of themselves from their fine offices, surrounded by those who owe their positions to their patronage.

Are there some Americans who question the legitimacy of the President? Certainly, you see this when they call for his Birth Certificate. There were many who questioned the legitimacy of President Bush as well due to the "hanging chads" in Florida. No one factor will result in insurgency, but when the factors begin to stack up it is best to nip it in the bud long before it goes violent. Thank God we addressed the Civil Rights movement as soon as we did, in the manner we did; but event that was long over due.

Insurgencies happen for a reason. Good Governance is hard.


BW, yes all 4 factors have to come into play. But where your model may need to be adjusted is when you are dealing with a developed country vs. a less developed country. The economic driver is more pronounced in developed countries, by that I mean a country such as the US which may be about to cut social services (California) has a greater chance of a Civil Emergency than a less developed country which has never known any type government supported population centric survival programs. I just invented that term:rolleyes:

In our case when the private sector fails and it has failed if the government does not step in and support the Entire population vs. a small protected class than Civil Disturbance is sure to follow. Watch California it is 1/8 of the US economy depending upon which estimate you believe. If those cuts happen on the scale that the Govenator is proposing....watch out.

The best selling COIN manual is about to be replaced by another manual, The US Army Civil Disturbance manual. I just watched the John Nash movie this weekend "A Beautiful Mind". In it there is a scene where he proves that Adam Smith was wrong! It is the "Governing Dynamics" that matter!

Which leads me to my final point about hope, if people can not survive economically until the next election cycle (years) it isn't going to matter. When the private sector fails all that is left is the government, when the government fails all that is left is Civil Emergency. Which is in your paper and I agree it is really a more appropriate term then this Insurgency stuff.;)

Time for more coffee.

Entropy
05-17-2010, 02:40 PM
BW,

You've sold me on your model as it pertains to insurgency, but I think we might disagree on it's application to Afghanistan.


Western society is quick to judge States elsewhere as "failed" and typically apply a ruler that consists of "things expected in a Western, Westphalian State" to measure with.

That's correct and I would ask whether we (the US and ISAF) are not making that misjudgment with respect to Afghanistan. Afghanistan, I would argue, is more like Somalia (and I agree with your description of Somalia) than the Philippines or Mao's China, or Malaya or any number of insurgencies.

The second issue I have is related: As you're well aware, there is more than one "populace" in Afghanistan and, as you've argued before, there's more than one "insurgency." This gets back to a point I've made many times before: Afghanistan's internal conflicts are not merely defined by insurgency but are a continuation of Afghanistan's civil war. The conditions which brought about the civil war have not fundamentally changed, rather those conditions and the civil nature of Afghanistan's internal conflicts are subsumed into what we call the insurgency. We think of ourselves and our goals assuming legitimacy, but in some ways we are just another faction, albeit the biggest and baddest, in Afghanistan's great political game. It is dangerous, IMO, to only think of Afghanistan in terms of insurgency and fail to recognize that our toppling of the Taliban did little to address long-standing internal conflicts.

My third point is that placating one population and moving them down the Jones scale below the violence threshold (and for Afghanistan the violence threshold line is comparatively much lower on the scale than most other countries/peoples) may cause another population to rise above the threshold and engage in violent insurgency. I cannot say for certain one way or the other, but I question the assumption underlying our strategy that there is a form of central governance in Afghanistan that will satisfy all parties. What I mean by this is that the conditions for "peace" or "suppression" of the insurgency may be mutually exclusive for the various populaces in Afghanistan and that "good" governance may mean, in the end, minimal or no centralized governance at all. This goes back the the fundamental question on whether the "nation" of Afghanistan, as defined by its political borders, can be a viable nation-state to begin with. I question whether Afghanistan's factions can perceive any kind of strong central governance as anything other than a vehicle to further factional interests or as a direct threat to those interests.

You seem to have some hope for Karzai's "peace jirga" which I do not share. It's clear to me that Karzai and the other major players either lack the leadership ability or the inclination to transform Afghanistan's factional interests into some kind of national interest. Or perhaps we need to recognize that goal is a long way off - the equivalent of expecting one who can't walk to run a marathon. The peace jirga is likely to end up as most of large jirga's do - a failure with, at best, transitory effects.


COIN is the role of the GIROA; the coalition is supporting with FID

Finally, we need to recognize that our mere presence in Afghanistan is enough cause for some in Afghanistan to engage in "insurgency." In another thread here, someone asked about Afghanistan's period of relative internal peace during much of the 20th century. This period was also a nadir for foreign interference in Afghanistan. Correlation =/= causality, but one might argue that Afghanistan's factions might come to a stable accommodation if only they were left alone.

And since you brought up MLK, I thought you might be interested in this Clausewitzian analysis (http://milpubblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/martin-luther-king-american-strategist.html) of King's strategy by Seydlitz89 (I don't know his real name, but WILF, I believe, knows him).

Bob's World
05-17-2010, 02:53 PM
________________________________________
Good comments all. As I developed this model over the past 8 years (yes, I'm a slow learner), one of the primary goals was to produce a tool that helped to look at all insurgencies with a fresh perspective; not necessarily to divine some one size fits all solution.

I do think this applies to a country like France or the US as well as it does to a country like Afghanistan or Algeria; because all of the above are populated by and governed by humans. The issues, the degree that one thing is relative to another, the perspectives and tolerances all will vary widely between countries, and between distinct populace groups within countries. This is human nature.

As to Afghanistan, this model has only been applied to Afghanistan in my head. I think the current approaches are generally consistent, but I would suggest a refinement here and there for consideration, using this model to make my case.

As to the Peace Jirga, I HAVE to put a lot of stock in it. It is our best chance for a resolution within the timeframe available that satisfies the populaces of Afghanistan; as well as those of the Coalition countries. Nothing will make everyone perfectly happy, but then again, the pursuit of perfection is rarely the path to happiness.

Entropy
05-17-2010, 05:49 PM
I do think this applies to a country like France or the US as well as it does to a country like Afghanistan or Algeria; because all of the above are populated by and governed by humans. The issues, the degree that one thing is relative to another, the perspectives and tolerances all will vary widely between countries, and between distinct populace groups within countries. This is human nature.

As to Afghanistan, this model has only been applied to Afghanistan in my head. I think the current approaches are generally consistent, but I would suggest a refinement here and there for consideration, using this model to make my case.

I don't disagree. I think your model is widely applicable which makes it a great tool for analysis. I think your model strongly reinforces the principle of subsidiarity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity), which itself is a model to determine the appropriate level of centralization in governance (and is a principle which I personally subscribe to).

Your model, however, is constrained by outside factors - on-the-ground reality, political limitations and our own preconceptions and mindsets. So when we think of "good governance" in the context of Afghanistan, we are limited by what exists (the current government) and what is reasonably possible. Your model helps, IMO, to expose some of those constraints and suggest alternatives - for example, we might consider the possibility that fostering more decentralized governance in Afghanistan is preferable to trying to improve the existing highly-centralized system. As an analysis tool, your model is useful because it should cause strategists and policymakers to question long-standing assumptions and consider alternatives.

Sadly, I think you're right that we are still largely rooted in Iraq. It seems to me we are applying lessons learned there to Afghanistan without adequately considering that Afghanistan carries a much different set of constraints which are incompatible with the COIN/FID methods employed in Iraq. This isn't just a military problem, but one that afflicts strategy and policy at the highest levels.

Also, eight years isn't slow. Hell, it wasn't until I was over thirty that I finally developed the introspective ability and maturity to find a compatible wife, much less be a good husband!

slapout9
05-17-2010, 06:39 PM
The Jones Model may prove most prophetic in the US. Start plotting the graph:eek: add the Boycott Backlash in California over Arizona Immigration and we are going to have one long hot summer.


http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/05/main-street-battles-wall-street-seiu-npa-gregory-baer-peter-scher-jpmorgan-chase-bank-of-america

marct
05-18-2010, 04:14 PM
The Jones model has now been published by SWJ and is available here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/the-jones-insurgency-model/).

Infanteer
05-18-2010, 05:08 PM
Col Jones,

Excellent read. I suspect that the difference of opinion between yourself and Entrophy is minimal based off his comment of the stable, unmeddled Afghanistan and your whiteboard diagram of how to get the right players (ie: all Afghan powerbrokers) to the table and the wrong players (ie: us) out of country.

A few comments/thoughts/questions:

1. When does an insurgency become a civil war? Are they the same? What is the difference between these and an insurrection. Are there official designations for all these forms of conflict?

2. Your acceptable level of violence line is very effective and very real. The thing I've noticed is that for Southern Afghans, the bar is much higher than what we in the west are used to. I'd imagine that this is likely due to a combination of 30-years of conflict as well as a cultural acceptance of fighting, especially foreigners.

3. It is probably not a coincidence that the Taliban and their associates have transitioned from open opposition to GIRoA/ISAF (which means large offensives, destroyed infrastructure and fleeing women and children) which is "above the bar" to a concerted IED campaign (which means loss of certain road use, random civilian casualties, and security force sweeps) which lies below that bar. The obvious reason is they moved "below the bar" because their organization simply wasn't able to handle the punishment of going at it with organized military forces. The other reason (+ or - in importance?) is that this is a level of violence that the Pashtun of Southern/Eastern Afghanistan will tolerate.

4. The COIN/FID distinction is important. The difference in mentality for a conventional army commander on the ground is between "What do I want to go do today?" (which commonly gets translated into "who's ass do I want to kick today?") versus "what does my Afghan counterpart want to do today?". "Going to get fruit and goats" may be a tough task for a conventional commander to accept, especially when he's trained for months to get on the ground and kick the insurgents around. But this distinction will not be made as FM 3-24 is in everyone's minds and COIN has entered regular military lexicon. To get around this, I started calling our effort "COUSIN" - Countering Someone Else's Insurgency (No it ain't FID, it's COUSIN! :p) I'd reckon that a large part of Comd RC(S)'s focus on Partnering is to move conventional forces into the FID domain will still allowing them to hold FM 3-24 aloft for all to see.

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 12:12 PM
For those watching events unfold in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, etc with interest, and listening and reading the growing debate as to if the US should back the status quo or remain neutral, or promote change, this thread may be of interest.

As to the base paper, I wrote a follow-up that might be cleaner read for World Politics Review, but one has to be a member to access. I will see if the editor will allow me to run it here on SWJ as well.

A Populace-Centric Foreign Policy. World Politics Review
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3296/a-populace-centric-foreign-policy

Intro to that piece from 2 years ago:

"Reports of the demise of the Westphalian system are premature, but the shifting of the relative balance of power between states, threats to states, and the populaces these threats emerge from is undeniable. A "populace-centric" approach to foreign policy would recognize the emergence and enduring nature of popular power, and free U.S. interests from becoming mired in fleeting governments or threats.

The Westphalian system is premised on the concept that all sovereignty over any particular populace is vested in the state. This system places strong importance on the location and control of borders, and empowers a single "sovereign" to speak for the entire populace. A number of recent cases suggest that a focus on developing relations not with the state, but with the underlying populace from which the state is formed, would provide the greatest leverage to achieving the fundamental goal of any strategic policy, which is to change the behavior of nations at the lowest possible cost in national blood, treasure, or credibility."

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 03:01 PM
For a limited time (until 13 Feb 11), the Editors at World Politics Review have made free access available to a follow-up article that takes a cleaner, more policy focused look at this topic. Here is the link:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3296/a-populace-centric-foreign-policy

My thanks to the good people at World Politics Review.

Cheers,

Bob

Dayuhan
02-05-2011, 09:07 AM
My objection to this lies less (predictably) in the "populace-centric" aspect then in what seems to be a very aggressively interventionist interpretation of what is "populace-centric".

For example, this sequence:


A way must be found to build strong states while at the same time recognizing distinct populaces. For example, the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be far more likely to see a successful conclusion by recognizing and unifying the Pashtun populace with some lesser form of embedded sovereignty than by enforcing a Westphalian border through the center of that population's traditional homeland.

As the U.S. prepares to shift emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan, such a change of perspective would set a new tone for that operation. Instead of a focus on preserving the current governments of both states by attempting to make them "more effective," while suppressing the Pashtun populace to make them less resistant to the course the U.S. has plotted out for them, a populace-centric approach would seek to understand and address the root causes of Pashtun popular discontent. Brokering a new form of sovereignty for this important regional populace, while at the same time working to strengthen and enable good governance on both sides of the border would perhaps bear more enduring results.

I don't see that the US has any brief go about building strong states anywhere else, still less to think about trying to unify the Pashtun populace and providing them with sovereignty. Attempting to do so would step all over the sovereignty of two existing nations and wreak all kinds of havoc on our relations with other populaces in the area. It would likely not get rave reviews even from the Pashtun, who to the best of my knowledge have never expressed any desire to be unified and granted sovereignty by America.

Any desire to benefit populaces has to be tempered by recognition of certain realities.

First, populaces may be empowered, but governments still exist. Many governments, even those we dislike or think despotic, still retain support from a substantial portion of their populaces, especially in nations with ethnic, sectarian, or tribal divisions. If we try to do end-runs around government to work with one populace we're likely to violently antagonize both government and some other sections of the populace, often with adverse consequences.

Second, we should not embrace the delusion that we know what the diverse populaces of other countries want. We don't. We are generally pretty clueless, and when we stumble around we the assumption that all populaces want what we think they should want we make a bull in a china shop look lithe and graceful. Energetic intervention in the misplaced belief that we are working for "the populace" is as likely to make a mess as any other kind of energetic intervention.

Third, not all fights are our fights and not all situations demand our intervention. Do these populaces want us involved? Do they trust us? Do they actually believe that we are working for their interests? If the answer to any of these questions is "no", might be better just to stay out.

When I see this:


It behooves the United States to be clearly viewed as being on the side of the populace.

I have to respond that nobody will ever view us as "being on the side of the populace". No matter what we do or say, we will be viewed as being on our own side. That's not always a bad thing: it's expected. Might be best for us to simply accept that and acknowledge that, and instead of pretending to "support the populace" just try to pursue our interests with a lighter hand and a bit more restraint.

I have no problem with the general idea of "populace-centric foreign policy". I just think it has to be tempered with recognition that governments exist and must be reckoned with, populaces are diverse, fickle, and have all manner of conflicting and inconsistent desires and interests, and we have neither the obligation nor the capacity to re-order government-populace relations in other countries, especially where neither government nor populace wants us involved.

A populace-centric foreign policy, like any foreign policy, will require a light hand, flexibility, realism, subtlety, and the wisdom to know when to stop and when not to dive into other people's problems. Without those features it could make as big a mess as any other sort of foreign policy.

Bob's World
02-22-2011, 08:56 PM
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011219122242386295.html

A parallel perspective on this topic from the other side of the equation.

Presley Cannady
02-25-2011, 02:03 AM
It's hard to criticize the basic idea that spreading good governance is a better long-term solution for the world's ills than just killing bad guys.

I'll take that bet, and I'll start by pointing out that the term "good governance is a better " is tautology. Try it out for size. Once you weed out the weasel words that presumably fix the statement to a set of facts on the ground, you could read the sentence "good is better than bad."

The piece doesn't go much farther in fleshing out a notion of "good governance" beyond some "[s]elf [d]etermined government formed from and by the populace of the region that is served by that governing body." You could phrase this as "good governance is government that looks like democracy when people are happy with it." If people aren't happy with it, it's not the institutional structure that's at fault--you're just doing it wrong.

So here's a question. What does a "population-centric" victory look like when what makes people happy isn't liberty and democracy, but kicking it with their homies around the tribal goat pen, stoning their sisters and daughters should a man even touch them the wrong way, and wondering if the new guy in town is a Jew or not? Elections or not, whatever passes for county life from North Africa to Central Asia isn't going to bloodlessly surrender millenia of custom any time soon.

If victory requires transforming the society that currently occupies the battlefield into one that finds happiness of a Western fashion, then let's swallow the pill and eradicate the ideology and culture underpinning it. If not, then the only question is who and how many you have to kill or bribe to get enough of the local [i]jefes firing on the enemy more often than us and each other. Hell, you might even get enough of them to work with you and each other to fix something that looks like a lasting peace. But if you're not up to spilling how ever much blood and treasure it takes to remake thousands of clans and millions of families in your image, then give up on the good governance canard.