Anti-Intellectualism In The Army

[Cavguy]

All,

Found this 2002 ARMY two part article from a discussion on another thread, and thought it may be relevant to some of our other discussions:

PART 1 (http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS4R)

PART 2 (http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS56)

Money Quotes:


My purposes in this two-part article are to trace the origins and manifestations of this anti-intellectual bias within the American military tradition; to demonstrate the existence and pernicious effects of such an attitude even in the celebrated age of information now upon us; and to suggest measures for ensuring that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is capitalized on in optimal ways without impairing the warrior ethos of the profession.


The only external difference between the Contemplative Man and the Active Man in the officers' corps today is that the former may seek a doctorate, teaching tour, fellowship, attache assignment or other mind-expanding opportunities that the latter avoids like the plague because under the present career management system such excursions will time him or her out of transiting career wicket X, necessary if the officer is to remain competitive for brigade command and a possible star.


The Army has taken a laudable principle-getting officers off their duffs, out of their offices and down with troops where they can master their branch skills and learn to operate in the field-and implemented it with such compulsive zeal that those officers now arriving at the top know nothing but the field.

An exaggeration? Yes, but there is no question that the present system has produced a lopsided general officer corps infinitely more comfortable with practice than with reflecting on practice.


Several of the Army's brightest and most articulate captains and majors of the early 1990s survived their outspoken forays into the world of contending ideas and are doing well in their careers as they climb toward their first star. Unfortunately, however, they read the career tea leaves and have now clammed up. Their lately developed reticence recalls to mind Liddell Hart's observation concerning young British uniformed intellectuals:
Ambitious officers, when they came in sight of promotion to the generals' list, would decide that they would bottle up their thoughts and ideas as a safety precaution until they reached the top and could put these ideas into practice. Unfortunately, the usual result, after years of repression for the sake of their ambition, was that when the bottle was eventually uncorked the contents had evaporated.

The Army is doubtless correct in insisting on the man of action as the predominant model for the combat commander-let there be no mistake about that. But it is dead wrong in assuming that uniformed intellectuals-- simply because they have not negotiated every wicket in a general officer qualification course that could only have been devised by Genghis Khan's G3-cannot be men and women of action and hence are unqualified to command the higher line echelons. Moreover, the Army is on questionable ground in assuming that those who have been anointed by a zero-defects performance at each of the stations of the cross are thereby fit to serve in every general officer slot, even those for which they obviously lack the necessary intellectual qualifications. Rather than denigrating and marginalizing the uniformed intellectual, the Army should hearken to President Bush's call for a "renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps." It should implement the necessary promotion and assignment adjustments to assure that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is identified, cultivated and exploited in optimal ways, which would include service at the highest echelons.

It is time finally to acknowledge that the Active Man and Contemplative Man do merge in many versatile people, and that the Army has as much need for the qualities of the latter as for the former. The intellectual man-and woman-have a vital role to play in all professional endeavor, not least military endeavor, and it is thus a fool's game to squander precious intellectual capital on the basis of a historical anti-highbrow shibboleth. The army that rejects seminal thinkers, thereby depriving itself of innovative ideas and the instruments for continuous intellectual self-renewal, will ultimately be a defeated army, vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more wisely and quickly to the ever-evolving art and science of war.


More in the links. Thoughts?

[Shek]

Cavguy,

I think the opening quote captures the sense of anti-intellectualism beautifully.


Crossing the Plains on an expedition to Utah [in the 1850s], Major Charles A. May searched the wagons in an effort to reduce unnecessary baggage. When he reached the wagons of the light artillery battery, Captain Henry J. Hunt proudly pointed out the box containing the battery library. "Books," May exclaimed in astonishment. "You say books? Whoever heard of books being hauled over the plains? What in the hell are you going to do with them?" At that moment Captain Campbell of the Dragoons came up and asked permission to carry a barrel of whiskey. "Yes, anything in reason, Captain, you can take along the whiskey, but damned if these books shall go."

If given the choice of books vs. whiskey (in the absence of a General Order #1, of course :cool:), what would the most popular choice be today? If I were a betting man, my money would be on the whiskey. As an interesting omission, the author doesn't mention that Captain Hunt would go on to be Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac and instrumental in the repulsing of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.

Also, while not part of the article, I'd be curious to see others' reaction to the following quote from COL Mansoor in his book.


In the future, U.S. Army officers must spend as much time in the library as they do in the gym, or risk defeat in this kind of war.

-COL(R) Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise (p. 345)

While I agree with his statement now, prior to Iraq, I would have laughed at such a statement - why would you want to spend a handful of hours each week reading? Hopefully the current generation of company grade officers can see the folly of my previous thinking.

[patmc]

It may have been unique to FA, but I could probably count on one hand the number of FA officers I met that were more prone to lift a book than open it. Most of my classmates at OBC were sharp, well read, and informed. In the firing battery, our commander gave us readings, and we talked about history, politics, stategy, tactics, music, movies, anything to generate debate and discussions (though our Top 5 Best Bass Players of the 1970s discussion probably helped us slightly less than debating gun truck formations). My roomate and I in Iraq had a hobby of raiding MWR libraries for good books, and we spent the year trading. My last BN CDR assigned readings to all unit officers and senior NCOs to get them thinking for a deployment. He and the XO read and discussed OIF/OEF/COIN books, and asked us (the staff) for opinions during PT. We were expected to be strong, smart, and effective.

From the junior officers I know, there is hope.

[reed11b]

I certainly was referred to as "book smart" as a negative while I was in. Most officers were open to learning from non-army course work, but the NCO corp seemed to be of the opinion that they would be issued any knowledge they needed. Of course I was active from '93 to '97 (Not exactly banner years for the Army) and in the NG '01 to '06 (A time of severe transition for the guard) so my experiance may very little to do with current active duty NCOs. I would have to guess that the majority of the E6 and E7's I have meet through my job w/ the VA have been very intelligent, profesional and open. These soldiers were all my peers when I was on active duty, so perhaps I was part of a time of transition myself.
Reed
Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

[Shek]

Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

Reed,

There is an institutional bias, at least with regards to the officer promotion and selection system. On the path to battalion command, time in a muddy boots assignment post-company command is rewarded while a graduate school assignment is often considered a career killer. If you can make it to battalion (i.e., you "survived" despite going to graduate school), then your liability can turn into a capability, but it makes for a tough field grade hurdle.

Now, graduate school does not equal intellectual, and one can be an intellectual without graduate school, so don't read too much into that example, but I think it is sufficient to signal a bias.

[Rob Thornton]

At the SWJ get together last night at Sines we were laughing about the latest CAD FILEs cartoon in which the closing remark is "getting the most out of that online degree". The cartoon well characterizes the position we've placed ourselves in. Online degrees and combination programs like those with CGSC/ILE that combine to allow leaders to earn a degree while continuing to work a day job or while attending PME seem to offer a way address our education deficits in light of OE requirements.

However, as one of those working to complete an online degree on the side, I'm under no illusions about the limits of what such degrees can provide. While distance learning has gotten better and while it does get me a degree, the quality of interacting with a professor and fellow students in a real environment is absent. With the caveat that not all classroom environments are created equal, what I mean is that the time which is set aside to discuss the issues under scrutiny and build context is hard to replicate on discussion boards. The number of natural competitors which interrupt the building of context and understanding are numerous in the online degree program. It could be family concerns, the work load at the day job etc. As such, I'd qualify the education received through such programs as online and accelerated degree programs as inferior to being able to dedicate time almost exclusively to the thinking, writing and discussion that accompanies time set aside to attend a resident university program.

Now having said all that, I'm glad there are online degree programs as it gives me (and those like me) the opportunity to pursue a degree at a pace I can manage no matter if I'm TDY (currently), at home watching kids to give the wife a break, or at lunch. I did quit using TA as I was tired of incurring ADSOs while still paying for 20% and books while doing it on my time. I would not want to try and pursue a PhD in this manner, and am currently looking for options in that regard if that is the direction I decide to go.

Last week there was a good discussion about the requirements of the OE and the differences between training and education. Both are very important, however they are different. The best description I've heard is that training is better positioned to prepare us for the "known-knowns" and some of the "known-unknowns", while education is better positioned to prepare us for the unknown in terms of helping us think about things. The two are complementary, but some roles and responsibilities are characterized by requiring more of one then the other.

The discussion about complex, interactive environments at this weeks seminar turned to some of the deficiencies we are discovering in our DOTMLPF approaches. Note - Education is the unseen "E" and falls in behind the "L" in DOTMLPF. One senior mentor offered that it was "time to put an "E" as the first letter of TRADOC. Some joking occurred as it was mentioned that this might make it look like "E-Trade". The senior mentor, undaunted, said "we should spend less time worrying about how our acronyms sound and more about making sure the components and the relationship between the components are correct."

Ultimately I think the value we place on education must be articulated and accepted as it relates to the value it provides to the missions we undertake. This, like other related issues must be related back to elements of success or failure in terms we can acknowledge and which are visible. To really institutionalize it, we must resource it and reward it.

Best, Regards, Rob

P.S. Shek - I've got something I've been meaning to send you, and will try and get it to you this afternoon.

[John T. Fishel]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs. By single tracking FAOs, OPMS 21 made the FAO career more predictable. No longer would I and others be giving advice to would be FAOs that you need to be prepared to consider retiring as a Major a "successful" career because OPMS 21 made it all but certain that the successful FAO would make LTC and many would make COL. But because it took FAOs entirely out of branch competition it made it all but impossible for a FAO to command anything but a MILGP or DAO and certainly not a battalion or brigade. Thus, the only FAO generals we will ever see in the future will be products of the Fairy Godmother Office of PERSCOM - which you all know gives her favors entirely at random and very, very rarely.:rolleyes: Put in concrete terms the days of Generals Abizaid, Valenzuela, Woerner, and Loeffke, among others, are gone to come no more - until or unless we change the personnel system to make FAOs competetive for GO rank.

A question arises from this that, I think, is more central to the thread: Are the leadership skill sets reuired for command at the unified combattant command the same as those required at lower levels of command? Does being an effective BN, BDE, DIV, and Corps commander translate into being a successful and effective COCOM? ( A little "wht if" history here: If Fred Woerner had been given 90 more days as CINCSO - as he requested - rather than 60 days, would the Oct 3, 1989 coup have succeeded and rendered Just Cause unnecessary? In other words, were Woerner's FAO skills more useful than Thurman's more traditional command and bureaucratic skills?)

Cheers

JohnT

[Shek]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs.

John,

It did this across the board - it sent the signal that if you valued a graduate education, you had to either go to a functional area or try to do it in your spare time as Rob described. The results of OPMS 21 are captured to extent by the oped by Dr. Wong out of the SSI: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB731.pdf.

I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.). Because of the nominative nature, it would signal to the board that these officers were not only ACOM, but top ACOM performers. His thoughts were that it would take a generation of officers before it would be accepted as part of the culture (i.e., BN and BDE CDRs would initially poo poo accepting a slot to work at State or USAID, go to grad school, or work with a NGO/IGO because it wasn't their path to BN and BDE command; however, once these officers had progressed to positions of command, they'd be able to say that accepting a slot wouldn't harm your chance for command).

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

[Eden]

My sense is that anti-intellectualism in the Army has declined over the last decade or so. The career success of people like Mansoor, McMaster, and others seems to undermine the argument that you can't be both an intellectual and have a successful career - if you define that as brigade command and a shot at stars.

As it always has, the stresses of war have weakened the bureaucratic hammerlock maintained for years by an ossified personnel system. Merit - not career paths - seems to play a larger part than before in who rises to the top.

Having said that, there are two things we could do to encourage 'intellectuals'. Three, actually, but taking a flamethrower to HRC is not (yet) an option. First would be to make staying in more attractive to those 'intellectuals' who don't make the cut to, say, brigade command. Many of them might serve for another ten years or so if they weren't facing the prospect of increasingly peripheral/dead-end jobs with no prospect of promotion, raises, or the chance to meaningfully influence the course of events.
Secondly, and this is related, reduce the number of general and flag officers. Many, many general jobs today do not require general officers. A large percentage of one- and two-star jobs are little more than 'special project' posts that could be done as well or better by 'career colonels'. I suspect we would retain the services of more 'intellectuals' if we could offer them more hard work at the highest levels, rather than have them nursemaid a series of brigadier generals with one eye on their second star.

For an example, relook how George Marshall employed and nurtured 'intellectual' majors and lieutenant colonels prior to WWII. He had them doing things on their own that today would require at least a major general and a council of colonels.

[Cavguy]

Currently reading Tuchman's book on Stilwell and China for a grad school class.

If Stillwell was around today, he would have been a China FAO. He spent a good part of his career there, doing recon and MI work. He only had a few troop jobs and no combat experience in WWI. He became a 4-star and theater commander in WWII.

Something I was thinking about regarding this thread.

[patmc]

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

Agree on this, but my unit did have a semi-recent CSA library in the S1 shop, where you could sign out the books. It was the bottom shelf of the S1's personal cubicle though, so unless you worked in S1 or were on staff, you probably did not go back there too much. BDE also had them available, and they were stored in the BDE Command Team secretary's office, right outside his and the CSM's doors. Not placed to sell well.

Leaders can force the issue and make their guys read a book for discussion. At OBC, my platoon was required to read A Message to Garcia, sign the inside cover, and pass it on to next guy. My first month at work, my commander asked me if I had ever read the book. I replied yes, he said good. From then on, any time I asked for guidance he would just say, "A Message to Garcia. LT Rowan, go do your job." We LTs then read Pegassus Bridge to prepare for our deployment trainup and determined the number one lesson from the book was don't be an Airborne PL, you probably won't last long. If leaders set reasonable timeline and pick good book, it will get read.

[Tom Odom]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

[marct]

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

Not just the US Army either :wry:. I just finished presenting a paper on ethnographic knowledge in Greek-Roman-Byzantine PME, and you can really see the waves of use / non-use over a 2000 year period.

[wm]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

I suspect that a lot of this phenomenon is tied to the need to "make a good showing" to get that good OER and that impact/end-of-tour award. What that translates to in the real world is a lot of wheel reinventing as folks rotate into new positions and have to come up with something "new" to make a mark. The folks with the corporate memory that might have suggested "Been there, done that, got the t-shirt and it didn't fit" have all PCS'd or ETS'd. So we oscillate between yesterday''s "good" ideas and the day-before-yesterday's "good" ideas, the latter masquerading as something new and different.

As the article pointed out, folks tend to get promoted based on what they have done in the past, not based on what they can be expected to do in the future. In such an environment, is it any wonder that a person would reach back and reuse what got him/her elevated to the current grade?

[Ken White]

That's the problem. At least in in my observation over the years that seems to me to be it. The Army -- all the services -- are pulled by several requirements that are, if not mutually exclusive at least sometimes difficult to reconcile.

First priority will always be to win in combat -- that takes a certain mentality, mental toughness and willingness to take risks, make decisions (for better or worse...) as well as a degree of physical toughness and stamina to cope with the demands of campaigning (I like that word). This ability is a cognitive skill and requires some study but much practice. It is effectively an experience derived skill requiring considerable personal discomfort and sacrifice. It has little relationship to any civilian pursuits. Not everyone is equipped to do it or wishes to.

Second priority is to be intellectually superior to all possible opponents. This requires a great deal of study in many fields, some of which have little apparent benefit to warfighting. It also requires an ability and desire to move easily back and forth between a military oriented world and the broader civilian and academic worlds. It too entails much sacrifice in sometimes similar but mostly quite different measures than the field campaigner. Not everyone is equipped or wants to do that either.

Both those Priorities require ever increasing technical knowledge but the first does not rise to the bar of excessive intellectual rigor while the second often does.

Third priority is to acquire, educate and train people to do those two things, to do so as fairly and equitably as possible and to rigorously select the very best for advancement in the two areas of expertise. Ideally, the process would select a number of 'Renaissance Men' (Usage of this term includes Females of many talents as well) who could or can move back and forth between the conflicting demands with facility and aplomb.

The problem in my observation in the US is that the third priority has been allowed -- no, forced -- to totally supersede the first two priorities. DOPMA * preceded the DA OPMS and forces OPMS -- all the services -- to do things that are massively contradictory to sensible management of the force and that are inimical to both priorities cited just above. Congress has micromanaged the effort for a number of reasons (including a lot of staffers who got RIFed and went to work for Congress with axes in hand...) to dictate an equitable outcome; to be fair, to control grade creep, to manage funding -- most of which have little to do with effective force management.

This system effectively presumes that all are 'Renaissance Men.' Since all are emphatically not such men (my guess would be < 5%), this produces an insoluble problem and, given some or even any pressure, the system defaults to the first priority...

What's needed is to acknowledge that life ain't fair and combat sure isn't, that the benefit of effective strategy and doctrine is a thing that cannot be assumed or wished to be equitable across the world; you have GOT to KNOW that your people do it better than others...

There are very few 'Renaissance Men' about; there are some to be sure -- and we all know one or more in the Armed Forces but it is a fact that there are not enough interested in a military career to populate the Officer Corps. Ergo, the process and system MUST recognize that everyone cannot be assumed to be equal. Simply because they aren't. A lot of factors and observations over the years indicate to me that there are a very few who make great commanders AND great Staffers; there are a great many more that do one thing well and the other less so **.

The problem is that in attempting to designing a one size fits all and 'fair' system, Congress and the DoD have ignored the Services varying needs and they have been forced to accept a cookie-cutter approach that is 'efficient' but not at all effective and does not meet varying Service needs.

The very differing requirements of Command and Staff work have been 'determined' to be not sufficiently different to require selective tracking; civilian personnel management principles that are not totally applicable to a military environment have been forced on all and the system has grown dysfunctional. Much of that is the fault of Congress; some is due to the personnel communities efforts to make their job easier and most of the rest of the problems can be laid to many thing including fate and the vagaries of war (and peace...).

Can such a system work at all? Obviously it does It has for many years. It produces an acceptable and competent product for the most part and has undoubtedly produced some great commanders and leaders in all the Services who can do both or all things well. I submit, however, that these are a smaller minority than is totally desirable and I further submit that in my observation, the number who achieve 'great' is declining over the past few decades. As one of my favorite LTGs once said, "All Generals are mediocre, I'm mediocre. The system will attack you if you're too good." That's not to say the FlagOs are not smart guys, they are -- but that they are systemically constrained.

The system thus does not. IMO, need to be totally scrapped but as a lowly Peon looking up at the august; I see that competition for promotion is way too intense and tends to breed a cut throat approach by some and I do not think that is fair to the Services, the Nation or the majority of the Officer Corps. I'm also pretty well convinced there are some folks who make great commanders and some who need to stay as Staff types or other specialists. I do realize that a command track and a staff track is unlikely in this country due to tradition if nothing else but that doesn't mean that such an idea is wrong. :wry:

* DOPMA dope:
The DOPM Officer Management System; an overview from RAND LINK (.pdf 52.6kb) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4246/R4246.sec2.pdf)

Ending Up or Out; Flaws in DOPMA LINK (http://www.g2mil.com/let.htm).
by Carlton Meyer, Editor G2Mil.com Retired Marine officer with some distinct views on current military topics. This, however, is a good summary.

Challenging Time in DOPMA; Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management, RAND Monograph LINK (http://192.5.14.110/pubs/monographs/MG451/)

** This applies to NCOs and even Privates as well. Let's face it, not everyone grooves on combat and living in the Boonies or urban grime with few or no creature comforts. Those who do not can do the job if necessary, millions have proved that and millions do it every day but those who like it will do a better job. :cool:

In any event, until the system is repaired -- I'd say replaced, really -- the differences between the very few 'Renaissance Men' and the many warfighters and many military intellectuals will continue to cause friction and oscillation toward one pole or the other as it has for many, many years. Look at old, 1950s Military reviews in your local library...;)

Not a major problem, broadly and effectively, an uneasy truce between the three categories will be maintained.

Defaulting to Priority One...

[John T. Fishel]

I mostly agree with you.:wry:

I would go further (as implied in my previous comment) that there are some who are good combat commanders but not so good theater commanders. Can anyone imagine Patton leading the combined invasion of Europe? So, we have tactical commanders, operational commanders, and strategic commanders - each requires some different skills. Then there are staff officers. There are also officers who make superb advisors but perhaps not nearly as good in command of US forces. At issue is how to get the military personnel system to do a better job of taking account these differences and making the best use of officers at all ranks and positions.

To return to the FAO example I used earlier: OPMS 21 made life much better and more predictable (or better because it was more predictable) for most FAOs. They could have a really interesting and rewarding career that would likely recognize their expertise as it does for the vast majority of their peers. That FAOs will not again be competetive for General is not a personal tragedy. But it is sad for the Army as an institution that it will have to put some Generals who simply can't hack it into positions that certain Colonels are eminently qualified for and would perform much better.

I have no answers but I do believe that we can design a system that takes account of all our requirements better than the current one does. That won't solve all problems - nor will any other proposal - but we should be able to reward multiple competencies and find 10 or so Renaissance Men and Women to fill the 4 star slots.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Particularly this, which needs to be reiterated for emphasis:
...But it is sad for the Army as an institution that it will have to put some Generals who simply can't hack it into positions that certain Colonels are eminently qualified for and would perform much better.

I have no answers but I do believe that we can design a system that takes account of all our requirements better than the current one does. That won't solve all problems - nor will any other proposal - but we should be able to reward multiple competencies and find 10 or so Renaissance Men and Women to fill the 4 star slots. Just so...

[Schmedlap]

... Dr. Wong out of the SSI... I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.).

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

[reed11b]

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

I disagree. You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders. Up or out kills most of them off at around the BC level if I am hearing the council members right. I would rather keep them in non-leadership positions longer then lose them entirely.
Reed
Sorry for the rambling nature of some of my posts, sleep deprivation is starting to catch up.

[Ken White]

Amazing how well that works -- but generally only on the right kind of people...

And that's a good thing. ;)

Added: Whoops, Ol' Reed snuck in ahead of this slow hunt and pecker. Yes. :D

The 'challenge' was directed at Schmedlap's comment above and was to be issued to guys with really short hair to get 'em to go to Princeton and to guys with a Doctorate in Scorpolostopical Studies to get them to learn to enjoy yelling 'Hooah!'

That, a challenge, will work with a lot of good guys -- though not with all. Further, as Reed says:
"...You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. "That is a very true statement -- if the force is to be manned at current levels or if an increase is possible or needed.

Cut the size of the force (a possibility but certainly another thread) and you can get enough masters of all things but I do not believe it possible at current strengths.

[120mm]

In my drill life, I teach ILE for reservists. This year, the good folks who write Phase II have removed all the "intellectual" classes to distance learning, except for the class which is intended to demonstrate that History, as well as other "soft" sciences, are undervalued in today's society.

Instead, we get to spend 16 hours on transformation.

How cool is that?

[Ken White]

to me. Er; I thought we'd already transformed -- except for the FCS, of course... :wry:

[Rob Thornton]

I would go further (as implied in my previous comment) that there are some who are good combat commanders but not so good theater commanders.

John, you bring up an interesting point, perhaps made more so by the types of operational requirements being taken on at the 05 and 06 levels. For some this may be back to the future, for many this is something they did not anticipate. Some of these requirements look an awful lot life "force generator" functions. From my perspective we are getting a look at the dual nature of even FG commands, where a least some of the requirements and qualities we once assigned to 2, 3 and 4 star commands are being both pushed down, and growing from the bottom up based on conditions.

I thought Ken's post #16 was superb in that it outlined the competing priorities. I'd say its worth considering that while they can sometimes be viewed in conflict, as priorities they seem to be converging on commanders in the field (John and Ken can ref. COL T's opening remarks in the case study interview).

As we go down the road of SC MAGTFs and SC BCTs, as well as functional based CJTFs designed to support a comprehensive USG approach and integrate MNPs to achieve political purposes in complex interactive environments, the consequences of the institution emphasizing one priority at the expense of the other 2 may prove acute and put the policy objective at risk. Consider that while there may be less institutional risk in full spectrum, multi-function organizations than say building specialized force structures which may prove unsustainable, mitigation of that risk is contingent upon reconciliation to an acceptable level those competing priorities which can help you bridge the operational requirements gap.

A recent discussion at a seminar I was at last week serves as another illustration of competing priorities and requirements - and references Shek's post #8. The issue was relative to achieving Unity of Effort through better shared understanding during the planning and implementation of comprehensive USG efforts. The discussion was that the USG develop "Gold" planners - i.e. those educated and trained in the assessment, design and planning methodologies of DoD and the broader Inter-Agency (as built around S/CRS). I'd caveat this by saying it was qualified as beneficial that the USG have multiple perspectives/approaches because each has strengths that very depending on the OE. However, to facilitate unity of effort, there is a need to have folks literate and functional on both processes / languages. All good up to this point.

However, when we went down the road of establishing a standard for a Gold Planner it brought up other questions. Consider the ways we articulate the requirements for "Joint Qualified" officers. There is a JPME standard and Joint billets are mandated by law. If you go down the purple road to find your way on the gold one, the legislation and programmatic lines have some interesting DOTMLPF implications (more perhaps for the non-DoD agencies). While as an institution we value command (leadership with responsibility and authority) above all other positions, the requirements for staff officers in support of CDRs with new requirements would also seem to have grown.

It seems that just as our policies and strategies are emphasizing different approaches to achieve our FP objectives based on what we perceive as relevant experience, our understanding of what is required from the institution to meet those requirements has to be questioned as well, or the institution risks its relevancy. This may be hard for us to swallow, and make for a rough road. It is interesting how this could become a test of wills between the institutions and the Executive's appointed civilian leadership. I think Secretary Gates has set an interesting precedence in "being heard" by the DoD bureaucracy while still making it palatable for the institution(s) - leadership defined. How his successor (assuming there is one) will manage it will be interesting. With regard to transformation we may indeed be in Kansas Toto:D


Sidebar discussion::D

Since I brought up the "Gold Planner" - consider the requirements on the other USG agencies - they have no THC (Transportation, Hospital and Convalescent) accounts of the type that make PME as we know and enjoy it possible. In order for them to produce Gold planners on the scale that would make them relevant, they will need to grow considerably, or be augmented in a way that makes it possible (such as LTG Caldwell offering the Inter-Agency to put some ACU faces to their spaces so they could attend ILE). If the requirement for Gold Planners were to get codified in any new legislation - it almost has to go along with a significant increase in numbers and ($$$) to make it possible.

Best, Rob

[Schmedlap]

You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders.

I'm not arguing for or against that. Dr. Wong's concern seemed to be not enough cross training between tactical leadership and educational self-actualization. My observation was simply that - if that is his goal - his solution probably will not achieve it.

Sorry for the confusion - I worded it poorly so that it sounded like I was stating a general opinion, rather than an opinion about his opinion.

[Van]

What I got out of COL Matthews article was that the intellectual and the political hack are often regarded as interchangable, and graduate degrees are a tool for promotion in lieu of military competence. He cited many examples of senior leaders with remarkable intellectual accomplishments who denigrated the "intellectual officers" coming from things like White House fellowships.

It almost came across as a cop-out; 'I can't slam political hacks 'cause there is one (or more) in my rating chain, so I'll slam their achievements (and ignore my three masters degrees).' Rather than take people to task for being suck-ups, attack them for being thinkers not doers.

I suggest that the U.S. Army does have intellectuals, but unless they want to get tarred with the careerist/politician brush, they are forced to conceal it (much like telling the young MI 2LT to go to the gym so combat arms guys will be more inclined to listen to him.)

This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan. (BTW - excellent sources report the Air Force has the same problem.) And in the Army's infinite wisdom, CAS3 has been dismantled and passed to the branches, where it is not a priority...

There's still hope, if we can pressgang GEN Caldwell and GEN Patreus to stick around for five or eight more years, we might be able to hold onto some of the gains in appreciation of intellectual achievement by soldiers.

[patmc]

This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan. (BTW - excellent sources report the Air Force has the same problem.) And in the Army's infinite wisdom, CAS3 has been dismantled and passed to the branches, where it is not a priority...

rant 2:
Agree completely, having just come off a year and a half of Battalion Staff. Even though I was branch detailed to MI, when I made promotable I was put in S4. After 7 months of deployment prep (deployment cancelled), I was finally sent to S2 for a year. I did all the admin security jobs, but no intelligence work. Because I was now MI, I was passed over for battery and the support company command, which went to FA officers. I was assigned all the fun additional duties, etc. The batteries ignore staff guidance until after there is a problem, then complain when things go wrong. The experience taught me a lot, but definately left a bad taste in my mouth. I honestly have little desire to go back to staff, and it will likely sway my future plans. MI is moving away from commands, so there is little reward, despite constant assurances that "all KD jobs are equal." Next assignment will likely include a deployment, where missions have meaning, so that may make the staff suck worth it.

[William F. Owen]

I can't say I have any real concerns about anti-intellectualism in the US Army. Not my game and none of my business.

BUT - as someone who takes military theory and science, very (way too?) seriously, I have another directly related concern, that covers ALL, not just US, military writing.

The percentage of what is written that passes the "so what" test is not as high as I think we might collectively hope for. A lot (not all) of what is currently written by soldiers needs to be held to far greater rigour. - something I have already alleged with the wide acceptance of Manoeuvre Warfare.

Essentially there is a good percentage of what is written is not held to a a greater enough degree of "Intellectual Rigour" - so I guess there is some anti-intellectualism in that sense.

[Multi-skilled Leader]

We all know GEN Petraeus chaired the last BG board this past summer http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/next-generation-of-us-army-coi/

As one previous post stated, we hope to keep the likes of LTG Caldwell and GEN Petraeus around for the next 5 or 8 years to institute real change and support intellectuals in the Army.

If we looked "behind the curtain" into the Wizard's control room and changed the way we picked BGs, then we may send a message to rest of the Army that is good for muddy boots AND intellectuals, doers and thinkers, men of Action and Contemplative men.

If we were to allow officers to pursue their passions in the career field that they truly excel, we would have the best FAOs, infantrymen, signaleers, and strategists that the Army has ever seen. Then, we would thoroughly screen these COLs for selection to BG, with little or no prerequisites. They would not necessarily need "sponsors" in the board room. Like, "I know McMaster and he is a Cavalryman and an author and I need him for ARCIC." (Although that was a perfect pick and definitely from Petraeus). With a more thorough selection process, those that pursued their passions would rise to the top and they would be evident. With only 400 BGs in the Army and an Army in Persistent Conflict, we will need to shape the future BGs by looking at the selection process differently. Selecting those who are focused on the future Army Requirements, can establish a vision and get things done in the best interests of Soldiers.

Great discussion!

[Ken White]

I believe. I agree totally with what he says.

I do, however, have a somewhat pertinent but mildly off topic point to make based on one small item:
"...With only 400 BGs in the Army..."Use of the word 'only' possibly implies; a small number; there could or should be more; or a similar thought.

I'd throw out that the Army -- all the services -- are over-Officered. That is to say the ratio of Officers:Enlisted persons is too highly tilted toward the former. I strongly question that a Flag Officer strength that prevailed with 12+ million people in uniform in 1945 is needed when there are less than 2M today...

We should acknowledge that part of this overstrength is due to Branch / Service infighting and parochialism. Part is due, I think, to a cultural bias that is slow to change and I certainly acknowledge that part is based on a perceived real need. There are other minor reasons but all things considered, over 45 years of observation at all levels from Rifle company to walking the hallowed halls of 'E' ring, from Private to reasonably senior DAC have led me to strongly question the urgency and reality of that need.

I do understand that a critical part of the rationale is a potential and needed mobilization hedge but I submit that there are other and better ways to achieve that aim. The selected method, in part Congressionally imposed, provides much 'excess' and allows or forces the Army to put many competent people into mind destroying, make work staff jobs. (Note: been on a lot of staffs, watched even more. Have seen several that probably were not needed, some that existed only to justify a Flag slot, never served on or saw one that at TOE/TDA strength was not IMO bloated. My sensing is also that the Army is not alone in this less than desirable methodology). See also other comments on the topic by serving Officers on numerous other threads on this board...

That in turn, drives many competent people out of the Army (and Navy and Marines, speaking from personal knowledge; don't know about the AF). I can think of well over 20 good officers with great potential I've personally known over the years who departed as CPT / Lt or MAJ / LCdr due to that problem. Give it some thought...

[Schmedlap]

This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan...


That is nothing like my impression of staff time. While nobody enjoys it, I don't know of anyone who viewed it as punishment or anyone who viewed staff officers with contempt just because they were staff officers. Staff was regarded as one of those unpleasant tasks that we all need to endure during our careers. When someone did the job well (meaning that they made life easier on the companies) then they were tremendously appreciated. If they had a lousy attitude about the job and half-assed it and contributed nothing, then they were viewed with contempt - but it was due to performance, not duty position. I also never observed a bias towards putting particular people in staff versus command. It was an objective command-queue. If anything, it was too objective in that people who were not fit (or certainly less fit) for command went on to take command because it was "their turn" while someone much better qualified had to wait it out on staff for another year (even if this meant sending a company of Soldiers into Iraq with a lackluster commander, so as to not deviate from the command queue).

[Ken White]

and recollection than the Staff as punishment meme. Purgatory for some, yes; punishment? No. I'd add that even the 'purgatory' bit was, in some cases, just pro-forma griping. :wry:

Also my perception that competence and good performance are respected, regardless of rank, job or pertinence thereof or location and that sloppy work is broadly condemned. Griping is sacrosanct and respected by all; cross the very fine line into whining and you'll be nailed or ignored by most.

Most folks I've seen or known in the services seem to instinctively know the raw truth of that old cliché; "Anyone can do well what they enjoy, it's how well you do the things you don't want to do that tell what kind of person you are."

[120mm]

I'm torn about this particular issue: Intellectual knowledge is often inferior to intuitive knowledge or talent, imo.

Some of the most talented military minds I've seen, could not be even remotely described as "intellectual". On the other hand, some of the most intellectual minds I've met couldn't lead kindergartners to the candy store.

It's kind of like the sociopath picking up the sex therapist's wife; One knows, while the other does.

I will tell you this; attempting to cross the line between the execution level of the military and academia leads to a rocky road, full of gut-wrenching pitfalls, where an individual becomes perceived as being "neither fish, nor fowl, nor good red meat" for just about anyone....

[Ken White]

Track with my long term observations, I mean...

[reed11b]

I can't say I have any real concerns about anti-intellectualism in the US Army. Not my game and none of my business.

BUT - as someone who takes military theory and science, very (way too?) seriously, I have another directly related concern, that covers ALL, not just US, military writing.

The percentage of what is written that passes the "so what" test is not as high as I think we might collectively hope for. A lot (not all) of what is currently written by soldiers needs to be held to far greater rigour. - something I have already alleged with the wide acceptance of Manoeuvre Warfare.

Essentially there is a good percentage of what is written is not held to a a greater enough degree of "Intellectual Rigour" - so I guess there is some anti-intellectualism in that sense.
Wilf, I disagree. Military writing is designed for the end user and needs to be readable by a very wide base. I feel that military writing is successful in this. Holding military writing to a more formal discourse will create an environment were the process of writing the article takes precedence over the content. If you truly believe that Psychology and Medical and Historical and Engineering journals are lacking in "so what" articles, I would recommend some time in the local university library reading journals and enjoying ridiculously small sample groups, re-hashes of existing studies, and pure opinion driven articles. If what you mean is more research based writing, then heck yeah, I agree. However, I fail to find large numbers of research grants available for military theory outside of weapons testing, so how do you propose to support that change?
Reed
P.S. kinda feels weird to disagree with Wilf.

[Multi-skilled Leader]

Correction, there are only about 400 total GOs in the US Army through 4-star. It seems like Marshall was able to find a balance between the active man and contemplative man when picking his GOs, then we went to a centralized board and got fixated on what officers have done and how much time they spent in units. Degrees and getting published were not additions to an officers file but many times considered liabilities. "Why was he in that fellowship, when he could have been a Deputy BDE CDR waiting for his BN Command?"

The centralized board was supposed to create a true meritocracy, but Jefferson's West Point was too. So we're stuck with what we have. Nepotism through the ranks from West Point to the Brigadier General's board. "If you look like me and do what I do, then you will get promoted." "If the Army wants you to think out of the box they will send you to get a degree...etc." and other euphemisms.

So how does an officer culture change? Through senior leaders, board results, board makeup? Of course, many officers get over the issue of actually making GO when they are afforded time for degrees and contributing intellectually.

Looking forward to hearing your ideas...and thank you for stimulating these.

[DaveDoyle]

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton.

Many gung ho Ranger types see the value of education. The 75th Ranger Regiment has sent at least four Battalion and Regimental Commanders off to Harvard for fellowships recently, and I am the third field grade officer participating in a program the Regiment has developed with the School of Advanced Military Studies here at Leavenworth.

I think your comments about balancing contemplation with action are accurate, and the Army as an institution needs to foster that. I do not believe that balancing dilutes our field leaders, it more accurately broadens the force. Multi Skilled gets at the essence of the discussion by talking about leader selection -

If we looked "behind the curtain" into the Wizard's control room and changed the way we picked BGs, then we may send a message to rest of the Army that is good for muddy boots AND intellectuals, doers and thinkers, men of Action and Contemplative men.

Leader development, and diversification in leader development, is the other component that the Army needs to address.

[Ken White]

Correction, there are only about 400 total GOs in the US Army through 4-star.Knew that but my claim was / is still accurate; the raw number of GOs is about what it was at the end of WW II and the end strength is far, far less. While total Officer strength is down, there are still a slew and the ratio of leaders to led has gone from about 1:10 during late WW II to about 1:5+ today. As stated, I know why; I just think it is not helpful...
The centralized board was supposed to create a true meritocracy, but Jefferson's West Point was too.Heh, yes we are -- and it isn't a meritocracy... :wry:
So how does an officer culture change? Through senior leaders, board results, board makeup? Of course, many officers get over the issue of actually making GO when they are afforded time for degrees and contributing intellectually.In order, I'd say the first item as it sets the other two; and yes, they do.
Looking forward to hearing your ideas...and thank you for stimulating these.Well, I'm a Jack Singlaub fan; stand outside the entrances to the Pentagon at Five o'clock (until ten to catch most but not all the ActionOs who work late...) and fire every other person who walks out the door. I'd add move to all staffs and do the same. Well, that may be a little extreme :eek:.

I do seriously believe that many benefits will accrue from a thorough review of all TOE/TDA with a view to a 15-20% reduction in overall officer spaces. Even 10% would be good, save money, increase quality, etc. Of course, I lived through a couple of periods when actual officer strength in even high priority units was at 60% or so of authorized -- and, amazingly, everything got done with minimal hassle...

Others will differ, of course... ;)

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I disagree. Military writing is designed for the end user and needs to be readable by a very wide base. I feel that military writing is successful in this. Holding military writing to a more formal discourse will create an environment were the process of writing the article takes precedence over the content.

While I concur that the writing needs to be applicable to a very wide base, I don't see how that would reduce the need for rigour. I submit, that it's use by the end user means it should be held to the up-most rigour. I junk a lot of writing with that in mind.


If what you mean is more research based writing, then heck yeah, I agree. However, I fail to find large numbers of research grants available for military theory outside of weapons testing, so how do you propose to support that change?

Not necessarily research, but true study yes. A lot of what the military wants people to study, or supports the study of, seems driven by funding agendas. - and if Medicine and Engineering are the same, (which I don't believe they are) then I submit we can do better.


P.S. kinda feels weird to disagree with Wilf.
Do it more often. It'll get to feel better the more you do it. :D

[Entropy]

A couple of years ago, someone at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) decided that advanced degrees would be masked for promotion. Fortunately, that only lasted one cycle, I believe. Still, for the AF at least, the biggest determinants for reaching O6 and above appears to be attending PME in residence along with ratings in the top 10% among peers in terms of performance.

[Ski]

At this point, does it even matter?

Seriously.

We have an Army that is still expanding, and officers are is short supply from 03-05. There are entire YG's that will make 06 based off current extapolations on levels left within those YG's.

As long as the Army has a personnel system that requires any face be placed in a space, and a personnel system that puts the greatest value on "KD" positions, then you will never change the culture within the Army.

And with the lack of officers at the mid-levels ranks - and I agree with Ken, we are grossly overmanned from 04-0-10 - it simply becomes irrelevant whether one is an intellectual, a physcial specimen, or a walking Alice the Goon.

You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.

[Schmedlap]

You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.

Those are high standards. I know some folks who made the cut for O-4 below the zone with some pretty serious bad marks on their records (laws broken, gross misconduct, gross negligence, et cetera). They're well on their way to making O-5.

[Ken White]

... or a walking Alice the Goon.

You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.the kind words!!! :D

[jkm_101_fso]

Hey! I'll be one of those guys who gets promoted because everyone in his Year Group got out! Well, maybe. That's my plan, anyway.


As long as the Army has a personnel system that requires any face be placed in a space, and a personnel system that puts the greatest value on "KD" positions, then you will never change the culture within the Army.

The first thing to go should be the command queue. Of the CPTs that I know that got out between 4-8 years of service, this was the number one complaint. It is also a major complaint for the rest of us. Command is currently based off of "your turn" and not merit/performance. CCC shouldn't be a disqualifier, either. You don't need it to lead Soldiers. We give BN commanders so much responsibility, we can't trust them to look around their formation and choose their company commanders? Especially for deployments.

What blows me away is that I've SEEN and HEARD BN commanders acknowledge, privately, that certain captains have no business leading soldiers (this was in Iraq), but they will "let them finish their 12 months" then change them out. I could not believe it. I think good Bn Commanders will and do figure out how to get the best guys leading. I think quality BDE commanders should encourage that.

I'm not saying this because I feel that I was wronged by the command queue. Haven't been in that position yet. I was plagued as a LT with some terrible company and battery commanders; when there were great guys "waiting their turn" on staff. By the time they got in command, the damage had already been done.


And with the lack of officers at the mid-levels ranks - and I agree with Ken, we are grossly overmanned from 04-0-10 - it simply becomes irrelevant whether one is an intellectual, a physcial specimen, or a walking Alice the Goon.

Right now, I am in a training BN, after four-plus years in a line BN. I'm thankful to be here, for many reasons...but, I can assure you that my entire BDE is waaaaayyyyyyy overstrength on officers. It's rediculous. I don't know who designed the MTOE, but it's insane. There are officers doing jobs that E6s should be doing.


You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.

Insh'allah! I'm counting on it!

[jonSlack]

You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.

The Army Officer promotion system is no longer "Up or Out," it is "Out or Up."

[Cavguy]

The Army Officer promotion system is no longer "Up or Out," it is "Out or Up."

Recommend this for quote of the day!

I call it the "Special Olympics", everyone gets a medal.

[Jedburgh]

You're still getting promoted to 05 if you don't break the law and pass the APFT and height/weight standards.
Those are high standards. I know some folks who made the cut for O-4 below the zone with some pretty serious bad marks on their records (laws broken, gross misconduct, gross negligence, et cetera). They're well on their way to making O-5.
On the enlisted side, take a look at this spreadsheet (http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080421104349.pdf) detailing felony waivers by type of offense for enlistment in '06 and '07. Quick summary for '07: AF no felony waivers, Navy 42, USMC 350 - Army 511. The Army is also the only service that granted felony waivers for Indecent acts or liberties with a child, molestation. The overall numbers for this year are even higher.

In addition, Schmedlap's comment is equally true for the NCO Corps - certain fields are so understrength even at the Senior NCO levels that personnel are not only being promoted beyond their ability and experience, but more than a few minimal achievers and oxygen thieves are in undue positions of influence with inexusable behaviors being overlooked or swept under the table.

Yes, for many outstanding young soldiers, there is an unparalleled opportunity to excel and a good number are performing well beyond expectations - but that positive aspect weighs a precarious balance against the damage that is being done by the proliferation of Joe #### the Ragman being irresponsibly promoted.

[120mm]

The one good point of a non-discriminatory promotion system, is that the creative-thinking weirdos are no longer eliminated because they don't fit the "hi-pro glow" model.

I'm thinking of a particular USAR 0-5 who was threatened with being passed over at O-2 in 1992 when I post this, of course...:o

[jmm99]

Not much to do with "Anti-Intellectualism in the Army"; but since crime stats were mentioned, I thought I'd chime in.

Broke down the offenses into catagories that mean something to me. My comments are my opinion, for sure; and I admit bias in certain directions.

Crimes of Violence or Potential Violence


Aggravated assault, assault with dangerous weapon, maiming (33, 43); Robbery, to include armed (8, 28) - 71 in 2007.

Sorry, but I presume "bad people" here. The criminals here were unable to control their violence in an environment where violence is not tolerated. The prospects of their controlling their violence, in an environment where controlled violence is allowed and is in fact a must be, seems problematic.

Liars


Check, worthless, making or uttering, with intent to defraud or deceive (over $500) (8, 12); Embezzlement (5, 12); Forgery; knowingly uttering or passing forged instrument. (Except for altered identification cards) (8, 27); Illegal/fraudulent use of a credit card, bank card, or automated card (value of $500 or more) (2, 6) - 57 in 2007.

Sorry, these folks probably all had a "good reason" for what they did - psychological denial, etc. I'd be worried that they'd lie (to save their own asses) in situations where the lies would get people killed.

Thieves


Breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony (18, 15); Burglary (36, 106); Grand larceny -Larceny (value of $500 or more) (26, 56); Grand theft auto (8, 11); Stolen property, knowingly received (value $500 or more) (8, 21) - 209 in 2007.

Possibly a pass here (see next catagory). IMO: The first two catagories are character flaws (hard to eradicate). Thieves may (repeat: may) act with situational ethics. Multi years ago, interviewed a PFC stationed in Hawaii who had gone home on leave, got drunk and B&E'd an occupied dwelling (no one was home at the time; and he was smashed enough to possibly have just wandered in). His problem: before going into the Army, he B&E'd an unoccupied building. Judge gave him a break then (hung up the charge, so no felony record, if you be a good boy). Clean service record; his company commander said not brightest star in his galaxy, but no UCMJ problems. Probation - nope. Same judge maxed him 5 yrs on a reduced charge (B&E occupied then = 15 yrs). So, situational and maybe the Army can handle thieves.

Druggies


Narcotics or habit-forming drugs; wrongful possession or use (marijuana not included) (71, 130) - 130 in 2007.

JMM Axiom: B&D > B&E ; trans. booze & drugs lead to breakings & enterings. Clean up the booze and/or drug problem and criminal issues in that and other areas often go away. If the Army wants to be a rehab center, that is up to the Army.

These four catagories are about 90% of total waivers if I added correctly.


GRAND TOTAL (249, 511) - above are 467/511 - roughly 90%

Finally, a brief comment on these:


Indecent acts or liberties with a child, molestation (1, 2); Rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, incest, or other sex crimes (2, 5).

Have to look at court records. E.g., a guy 18-19 could be convicted for having sex with his 15-16 year old girlfriend (or drunken pickup or whatever underager but age close) - and then fall into one of these crime catagories. It (prosecution under these facts) happens more than you might think. In any event, these sex crimes are a 1% factor.

My question is whether these waiver cases are followed up for statistical purposes to see where waivers should and should not be granted. Somehow, I doubt it (privacy acts, etc.).

Now, where are all the stats for serving officers, who got promoted despite rap sheets ?

[Ski]

JKM

One of my biggest pet peeves is the rotating command line that stretches from the top down.

Everyone has to get their shot. Does not matter if you are a Company Co or a Combatant Commander. After 2 years you are moving on.

Doesn't matter if you are a mouthbreathing dope or a 21st Century combination of Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphuis, Sun Tzu and Von Manstein. After 24 months - if you are lucky - it's on to the next job.

Why the 4 bangers don't completely collapse HRC still is a mystery to me. Just another one of a litany of examples where the Army succeeds in spite of the system. Amazing we've been able to keep it together over the last decade and a half with this abortion.

[Schmedlap]

Just another one of a litany of examples where the Army succeeds in spite of the system. Amazing we've been able to keep it together over the last decade and a half with this abortion.

I believe that this is attributed to Mother Teresa, but it seems appropriate: We have done so much, for so long, with so little, we are now qualified to do anything with nothing.

[Tom Odom]

I believe that this is attributed to Mother Teresa, but it seems appropriate: We have done so much, for so long, with so little, we are now qualified to do anything with nothing.

and expected to do so with a pleasant smile and an eye toward cutting costs :rolleyes:

[Ski]

If my CGSC class is any indicator Tom, the pleasant smiles are becoming fewer and fewer.

[Stevely]

JKM

One of my biggest pet peeves is the rotating command line that stretches from the top down.

Everyone has to get their shot. Does not matter if you are a Company Co or a Combatant Commander. After 2 years you are moving on.


It makes a mockery of any general leaving a legacy or making an impression in all but the most fleeting of ways - he won't be able to stick around long enough to make real changes, and his successor will likely undo everything he attempted, if only to make a name for himself. And of course the SES' will wait him out. My joy at Gen. Mattis taking over JFCOM was damped by this realization.

Farther down the line - why doesn't the Army stop insisting that officers must be great staff officers and great commanders alike? It comes to pass that there are those who excel at the former and suck at the later (and vice versa) - why not just identify who's who, and keep people where they're best suited?

EDIT: I realized I parroted what some others have said in the thread already in my second paragraph - that's what happens when you read the thread backwards and post before reading the whole thing...

[Ken White]

And of course the SES' will wait him out. My joy at Gen. Mattis taking over JFCOM was damped by this realization.Having been one of the evil coterie in a former lifetime, I can sympathize with you on that. Of the eight senior sillly-villians in my last headquarters, two of us were reasonably mission oriented if crooked and were willing to cheat, lie and steal to get things done -- not only willing to we did, got a lot done and didn't go to jail (amazing ourselves and many onlookers...).

And the supremely evil "we can't afford it" and "we have to protect the boss" types...

It was my observation that most other hindquarters were the same, there were always a few good civilians and senior Staff officers in there somewhere. Just find the good guys and use them to flank the dense, the dogmatic, the regulatory scrunches, the hidebound, the play it safe and the not on my watch types... ;)
Farther down the line - why doesn't the Army stop insisting that officers must be great staff officers and great commanders alike? It comes to pass that there are those who excel at the former and suck at the later (and vice versa) - why not just identify who's who, and keep people where they're best suited?This of course is the heretical part. Keep it up, you're doing great! I'm witchoo!
EDIT: I realized I parroted what some others have said in the thread already in my second paragraph - that's what happens when you read the thread backwards and post before reading the whole thing...And your edit snuck in; this is what happens when you type as slow as I do :(

[Ski]

And the Army now goes down to 37 months from commissioning to Captain.

Gotta keep the conveyor belt moving. Fill those space with faces.

[Ken White]

Had a Company Commander in 1969 who was a CPT with 29 months of service, none of it outside CONUS. In WW II, my old man went from Ensign to LtCdr in about 33 months. :D

The bad news is that during the Korean war, there were guys who went from Pvt to SFC in a year. :eek:

This too will pass... :cool:

[Ski]

Generalissimo White (that does have a nice ring about it, I have to say)

I don't care so much about it passing as I do the present. The contraction has to stop somewhere - we are pushing inexperience upwards, which leaves us with a disaster waiting to happen, especially on the individual level.

It's not officer attrition is wicked high.

[jkm_101_fso]

Yeah, I just found out that my BZ board for MAJ is now in January. Wow.

Not that I've got a snowball's chance (nor should I), but seriously.

I haven't been a CPT THAT long. I'm not even 30.

It's pretty crazy now; 3 years to CPT, 8-9 years to MAJ. Unbelievable.

[Old Eagle]

Frankly, I'm impressed that the Army has maintained as much discipline in the system as it has. As John T and Ken can attest, we went through some periods when that was not the case. During VN, TOS to CPT was 2 years. Benning was churning out OCS grads to beat the band. There was a program whereby company commanders could frock E-3s and above to buck sergeant - "acting jack", and there was an "instant NCO" program at the Infantry School (and perhaps other places) - shake & bake.

Additionally, years of combat have an impact on the maturity level and real world experience of the officers involved.

No things have definitely been worse.

[Ken White]

Generalissimo White (that does have a nice ring about it, I have to say)Eye of the beholder, I guess. Never aspired to be one of those so it rings hollow to me, YMMV.
I don't care so much about it passing as I do the present. The contraction has to stop somewhere - we are pushing inexperience upwards, which leaves us with a disaster waiting to happen, especially on the individual level.

It's not officer attrition is wicked high.As you should -- care about the present, that is. What I was trying to to do was provide some solace and mostly reassurance that 'this,too, will pass.' Know that doesn't make it any easier when the alligators are about but things do get better.

Just trying to point out was what Old eagle says below:

It's been worse...

[Schmedlap]

It makes a mockery of any general leaving a legacy or making an impression in all but the most fleeting of ways - he won't be able to stick around long enough to make real changes, and his successor will likely undo everything he attempted...

Just to expand on that - this occurs at every level. I was very, very lucky in that I was able to scam my way into staying put as a PL for a long time and then again remain as an XO for longer than normal (combination of good timing, stop-moves, and deployments). As an XO, I inherited what can only be regarded as an organizational, administrative, maintenance, and accountability abortion. It took a full two years to unscrew it all (probably could have done it in 10 months if we were not constantly doing FTX's, NTC, and OIF - but still). My supply "sergeant" (an E-4) and I were both poised to PCS at about the same time and I was scrambling to make sure that we did not switch out at the exact same time - I wanted some continuity. He asked me why I was so concerned about that. That was when I conveyed to him one of Schmedlap's truisms of the Army: "Almost every duty position that you fill in the Army will be broken down into three stages. First, you evaluate the cluster left behind by your predecessor. Second, you correct it. Third, you hand it off to someone else who screws it up, regressing to the point that you started at. Every once in a blue moon, you will inherit a smooth running operation, or you will hand off to someone who will not screw it up, or - and I've never seen this - both. If that ever happens, fight like hell to stay in that unit."

I hindsight, I would add two things to that. 1) You generally don't finish step two unless you've got enough time to do it. If you inherited a cluster or if you hand one off, it is likely because you did not have enough time. So, the guy who hands off the cluster to you isn't necessarily a turd - it might have been a predecessor 3 or 4 times removed. That said, the advice to "fight like hell to stay in that unit" seems all the more appropriate - the unit probably recognizes the value of keeping people put. 2) The vicious cycle seemed to occur primarily in non-command positions.

[jkm_101_fso]

Just got off the phone with a good friend who recently wrapped up his third Iraq tour. His thoughts and observations were very interesting, but for the purpose of this particular thread, he observed:

Witnessing more Officers and Senior NCOs relieved of command/responsibility than ever before. In fact, he noted the amount was "incredible". In all fairness, he is the type of guy that would be willing to give someone many chances, so he's not the vindictive or cutthroat type.

He believed that about 80% of them were completely deserved and the other 20% were not, or questionable, (scapegoats, etc.) He did mention that a few seemed like ridiculous micro-management (i.e., a 1SG being relieved by MNC-I commander because of negligent discharges)

Thought this was particularly interesting considering our discussions of company command, etc.

I can honestly say that during my two combat tours, I never saw anyone "relieved". I saw the COC "switch" guys out after 12 months to get them out of command, but not true "relief for cause".

[Ken White]

As it should. I can believe the percentages and they are probably about as good as you can get for accuracy based of human fallibility. Shame about the 20% in one sense but I bet if you dig, you'll find out most were the result of a series of small events that culminated in selection of one trifling event to provide a legally sufficient 'cause.' IOW, probably a lot more were truly deserved than is at first readily apparent.

ADDED: I don't know the circumstances on the 1SG cited but if a Co sized unit is having a spate of negligent discharges; somebody's wrong and needs to go. Hopefully, they also nailed in some fashion (not necessarily an Art 15) each individual and his immediate leader for each of said discharges. If not, that may be why the 1SG got zapped...

We don't relieve enough for cause and the tendency to just move people who don't perform is a bad peacetime habit that needs to be stomped out. It's partly induced by DOPMA and partly caused by political correctness and the insane requirements imposed on anyone who just wants to rid the Army of the excess deadwood that accrues at the >16 years of service mark. We should tolerate honest mistake and errors in training -- even some errors in judgment -- but clamp down viciously on malfeasance, obfuscation, evasion of responsibility and leadership, tactical and technical incompetence or failure (especially that last cluster).

The Peter principle is valid, the Army can at times prove that with a vengeance -- and in peacetime, it's ignored. That's bad. In wartime, it is not ignored, the longer the war and more people exposed to combat, the more rigorous they are in culling. That's good.

[Schmedlap]

My observations are in line with FSO's - at least on my last tour in Iraq. First two tours were a circus of negligence that was overlooked or downplayed. But even up until ETS, my observation was that any amount of negligence would be forgiven stateside. In fact, I am about 90% sure that the command queue was massaged to ensure that the known duds got their command time while stateside and then switched out to someone believed to be better in time to deploy. I guess it's better than letting known duds command in combat, but there's still something wrong with this picture.

[reed11b]

Ditto here. The exception being that gross negligence was rotated out of promotional command tracks, but they certainly remained in the Guard. The ones that suffer for this "kid gloves" approach is the enlisted. When I was active, my battalion inherited the LtCol that had been in charge of Ranger School when the two soldiers drowned in the swamp phase. Thanks to his paranoia about his career, he chaptered out a huge number of paratroopers, all of them E-4 and below, many justified, but some were not. I guess I'm the type that feels that if a soldier volunteers for service and makes the effort to try and succeed, he deserves second and third chances. The exception is combat, but my experience with enlisted vetting is that reality is the opposite. Poor soldiers are given extra chances because we need bodies during war time. Anybody else have enlisted experience in both peacetime and war that's wants to add to this?
Reed