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jkm_101_fso
11-11-2008, 08:09 AM
Had some homework in Grad School last week regarding contemporary application of the principles of war. Wanted to float it with you fellas.

Since 9/11, which principles of war have we best adhered to? In Afghanistan? In Iraq? Which have we neglected? Which principles are outdated? Do they still apply today? Or need revamped?

Right off the bat, I can name "unity of command" as a challenge/failure in Afghanistan.

I already did the assignment, so you are not doing it for me:)

Thought it was a great topic.

William F. Owen
11-11-2008, 09:58 AM
Had some homework in Grad School last week regarding contemporary application of the principles of war.

Which principles are you talking about? There's a couple of not very good lists of improper nouns and verbs, but they don't seem to have any useful application.

If you have some principle of your own, which you want to discuss I think that would be an extremely useful exercise.

RTK
11-11-2008, 01:51 PM
I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

William F. Owen
11-11-2008, 02:39 PM
I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

I was afraid that might be the case. For example, if "Economy of Force" is a principle, why isn't "Freedom of Action."

I never understood why these lists get written. They don't seem useful.

selil
11-11-2008, 03:06 PM
I was afraid that might be the case. For example, if "Economy of Force" is a principle, why isn't "Freedom of Action."


Because so is "simplicity"

John T. Fishel
11-11-2008, 03:08 PM
Freedom of Action is one I've seen on a few other national lists of Principles of War (if not that then something very like it:wry:). We tend to write them because we like checklists. there is nothing wrong with that as long as we don't see the list as the be all, end all. Rather, principles - seen in the less rigid way - can be useful in helping us consider whether we have taken account of the major areas of war that may present problems.

Unity of command is a principle that in most political-military conflicts the US honors in the breach. Ask yourself who is in charge of ALL USG activity (including military) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The answer is that there is no one person. In Iraq, neither Odierno nor Crocker is in charge of everything. thus the best that can be hoped for is unity of effort and that depends on the personal relationship.

Security is THE issue in both places. We've done pretty well in Iraq in the last couple of years, badly in Afghanistan.

My sense is that defining the objective was a problem in both places - again, better in Iraq recently than in Afghanistan. The objective in Iraq may well be an issue with the new Administration. It is certainly an issue in Afghanistan now and in the future. Hopefully, Petraeus is focused on that at his level but again, how will the Obama Administration see it?

Cheers

JohnT

jkm_101_fso
11-11-2008, 03:33 PM
I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

Exactly right. Apologize for not being more specific, Wilf.

Bill Moore
11-11-2008, 04:58 PM
Just a couple of thoughts, and with the caveat that I'm looking at the principles reference irregular warfare (where they fall short), but they're still very much relevant for conventional war.

Objective: a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. If you have this, then you obtain unity of effort with the right command relationships. This is a major shortfall.

Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.

Offense: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. While offense will always play a role, it could be argued that a good defense is more constructive in irregular warfare. Protecting the population in many ways is an offensive operation against the insurgent.

Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level.

Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.

We could address all of them, just wanted to throw a couple out.

William F. Owen
11-11-2008, 05:15 PM
Freedom of Action is one I've seen on a few other national lists of Principles of War (if not that then something very like it:wry:). We tend to write them because we like checklists. there is nothing wrong with that as long as we don't see the list as the be all, end all. Rather, principles - seen in the less rigid way - can be useful in helping us consider whether we have taken account of the major areas of war that may present problems.


John, I'm a huge believer in taxonomies as aids to planning and decision making, but I see no rhyme or reason to "Principles of War" in terms of lists.

"Mass" is not a principle, but "Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time." is nearly always useful. The word "Mass" does not have that meaning in it's normal usage.

My thanks to Bill Moore for pointing that out in good clear language

Ken White
11-11-2008, 06:00 PM
but do have one comment and a question for clarification. Question first:
...Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level. (emphasis added /kw) Sorry, I'm old and slow. I don't know what you mean by the highlighted comment???
Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.Just an observation; I'm not at all sure that the enemy advantages in either theater were or are unexpected; I'd submit we were -- and more damningly, are -- too big, bureaucratic and inflexible to react to and / or pre-empt them...

There are some exceptions to that generalization, fortunately. Not enough, unfortunately.

Added item of commentary for Ol' Wilf:
Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.While I broadly agree with you on the concept of principles, they are useful for some to organize thoughts. There are, as you noted, several such lists of varying utility. In any event, in US practice, 'Mass' is generally construed, usefully I think, as Bill stated it in that quote. ADDED: Wilf posted his acknowledgment of Bill's comment while I was typing... :(

Bill Moore
11-11-2008, 06:16 PM
Ken, since we're addressing the principles the of war, I think it is important to discuss how they apply at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. When I thought about surprise, I thought (and continue to think) it applied at the tactical level, but not at the operational/strategic level for irregular warfare.

I think the tactical level is obvious, we don't want to advertise when, where or who we're conducting the next raid against. On the operational and strategic level, our policy and objectives should be transparent. Ideally, pardon my American bias, they should provide a moral advantage over our enemy.

If you could see my facial expression, you would realize I was tap dancing. I need to rethink this one, but I still think I'm on to something to here. I'm just not smart enough to articulate it.

Ken White
11-11-2008, 06:48 PM
...If you could see my facial expression, you would realize I was tap dancing. I need to rethink this one, but I still think I'm on to something to here...QRK5. K.

Take your time; I'm sure it'll be worth the wait. :cool:

Rob Thornton
11-11-2008, 11:01 PM
Hi Bill, Ken - maybe a stretch under the ways we have used the PoW in the past but...

I could see where operational and strategic transparency and/or telegraphing can be useful. It could allow a partner some political flexibility, it could put provide the enemy with a requirement to make a choice - and if you did not have to commit, it could - to a degree - serve as tool of deception. It might also provide a population, tribe, group or government with time to consider where to place their loyalty (in the same vein that might backfire though). It could be used in a lot of ways.

Having said all that, I'd still like to retain the idea of surprise - of being capable of having the enemy, or the opposition under the impression my intent is to do one thing when in fact I intend to do another. It may facilitate freedom of movement in other areas. This is not limited to physical freedom of movement, but also meaning in the sense of resources and ideas, either mine or my partners.

In the physical sense allowing the enemy to establish an operational line of communications that I can monitor for the purpose of exposing a broader network, and then use to manipulate other areas, finance intelligence, etc seems to me a form of operational surprise. If that network is being sponsored or supported by a state, and I am able to use that to strategic end - to cut off support at will, or to achieve another purpose (such as capitulation, or acquiescence) - that may serve as both a form of operational and strategic surprise.

I want to be able to have both when I think its to my advantage.

Best, Rob

Ron Humphrey
11-12-2008, 12:20 AM
Could this be viewed from the perspective of a celebration. Planning requires all those involved to have a common vision of schedule, location, time, etc. Also an unfortunate sideeffect is that party crashers also know about it and will begin dedicating resources to it. The key to the tactical level surprise is who jumps out of the cake

Marilyn Monroe, or Seal Team One

Ken White
11-12-2008, 01:47 AM
Make it Rebecca Romjin and there is no problem of choice... :D

(I've seen Marilyn up close, long ago; not at all impressive at pistol range...)

Rob Thornton
11-12-2008, 11:33 AM
I was thinking more along the lines of that Heidi Klum commercial:D

Bob's World
11-12-2008, 10:19 PM
I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

Ok, I'm trying this "quote" function for the first time, so this might not format out right.

First, I am a HUGE believer in these principles. When working on a CONOP and going through the MDMP process, it is always worth the 5 minutes it takes to say "OK, how does this square against the principles of war." You'd be amazed how often that is the safety net that catches a flaw in the plan that is easily fixed before going final.

Second, OK this is off the top of my head, but I am pretty sure I can apply these to the PCE-strategy that you all have been sandpapering me on these past few days.

For example:
Mass: Ensure that the whole of government is engaged, or at least considered for engagement, for any action to assist the COIN activities of a Host Nation; and absolutely applied for those engagements that have been identified as decisive.

Maneuver: Ensure you have access to engage everywhere necessary, regardless of national borders, in order to fully address the situation that you have deployed American forces into theater for in the first place.

Offensive: Good COIN is proactive, not reactive. Begin aggressively working to identify and address issues of poor governance long before the situation degenerates into violence and requires military assistance to the Civil authorities.

Objective: Never forget that the Populace is the center of gravity. Fix the Government, neutralize the insurgent, but never forget it is all to support the populace.

Simplicity: Understand the problem you are trying to resolve, and then engage it and not the symptoms.

Economy of Force: Don't drop a bomb if you can use a sniper; Don't employ a Brigade Combat Team if you can employ an ODA; and Don't employ an ODA if you can employ a rifle squad; and above all, don't employ any American at all if the HN can do it themself.

Unity of Command: Host Nation is in charge. US AMB is the US lead, with the military chain answering to him.

Surprise: Work as diligently in your OPSEC to avoid it, as you do in your operational planning to achieve it.

Security: Always. Secure your force, and secure the populace. Do not destroy the village to save the village. This is the foundation that you will rebuild good governance upon.

John T. Fishel
11-13-2008, 12:29 AM
as far as unity of command is concerned.:eek: Unfortunately, often the HN is not and cannot be in charge. Thus, HN in charge, becomes a goal to be achieved - preferably sooner rather than later. Equally unfortunately, the American Ambassador is not always in charge. The escape clause is the exception to the Ambassadorial appointment letter that notes that military forces do not come under the Ambassador when a major military operation is undertaken. But, then, neither do non-military elements of the USG come under the command of the military commander!

Do you happen to recall the "McCaffrey Wars" of the early 1990s? When GEN McCaffrey was USCINCSO he claimed authority over MILGP commanders in his AOR. It raised a firestorm. The US Ambassador to Colombia sent a blistering letter to everyone at State (and it leaked - no surprise). Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee in Guatemala canceled a military exercise that was already underway and ordered the US troops out of her country in 24 hours - it took 48! DEPSECSTATE Strobe Talbot tried to tell the Ambassadors that McCaffrey was right and they reminded him that they worked for the President not the SECSTATE (and certainly not a retread Time Magazine writer who just happened to hold the position of DEPSEC). In the end McCaffrey retired to become Pres Clinton's drug czar and Ambassador MacAffee continued to serve as an ambassador. Point is that the system while generally clear in normal times is very unclear when a major military operation is undertaken. Especially true in Iraq until the arrival of Petraeus and Crocker and still true in Afghanistan. And achieving unity of effort in iraq depended on the peronalities and will of the two men involved.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
11-13-2008, 02:00 AM
a dipstick here. Accuracy is always applauded, tho'

Just think, he may come back...:(

P.S.

Of course you're correct on the HN bit and unity of command. Always fascinates me how many people -- some in extremely high places -- miss the significance of that...

William F. Owen
11-13-2008, 07:35 AM
First, I am a HUGE believer in these principles. When working on a CONOP and going through the MDMP process, it is always worth the 5 minutes it takes to say "OK, how does this square against the principles of war." You'd be amazed how often that is the safety net that catches a flaw in the plan that is easily fixed before going final.


Really? I'm not for precisely the purpose you state. I find it does not catch enough, and is highly subjective. I appreciate your examples, but I don't agree with them. You don't use Mass in a way I would recognise.

The list is actually arbitrary, and different nations all seem to use differing definitions to support any particular principles inclusion.

... but, If they work for you, then Yallah! Being an adherent of Foch and Clausewitz, I don't pay much attention to them - :eek:

Bill Moore
11-13-2008, 08:28 AM
I don't disagree with any of Bob's points, they are all applicable in irregular warfare. However, and this has always been my beef with those to dogmatically embrace so called principles, his definitions, or more accurately his interpretations of the principles, have nothing to do with their real definition as intended when they were written. This is a classic case of a blind love affair. Again I like what he came up, but call it what it is, a whote of government approach isn't mass, it's a WOG approach. Developing a network isn't maneuver, its developing a network. It's a size tennis shoe, yea you cram you size 10 foot into it, but it won't make it a size 10.


Mass: Ensure that the whole of government is engaged, or at least considered for engagement, for any action to assist the COIN activities of a Host Nation; and absolutely applied for those engagements that have been identified as decisive.

Maneuver: Ensure you have access to engage everywhere necessary, regardless of national borders, in order to fully address the situation that you have deployed American forces into theater for in the first place.

John T. Fishel
11-13-2008, 12:40 PM
Be very, very careful using acronyms! As I told Rob in a private email when he introduced me to WOG for Whole of Govt, the acronym already exists and it is a very derogatory Britishism meaning "Worthy (or Westernized) Oriental Gentleman" used in the statment that, "The WOGs begin at Calais." :eek:

Cheers

JohnT

Eden
11-13-2008, 05:51 PM
To answer the original question that started this thread - there are more hijackers around here than you find in the average North Carolina border town - our number one violation of the principles of war in Afghanistan has been Unity of Command. It is why very little progress will continue to be made by CENTCOM/DOS/NATO/ISAF/EU and all the other private, governmental, and international satrapies that have planted their flagpoles here. The funny thing is, everybody agrees we've dorked it up, but nobody seems to be able to do anything about it.

Ken White
11-13-2008, 06:16 PM
...The funny thing is, everybody agrees we've dorked it up, but nobody seems to be able to do anything about it.and ain't politics and turf grand? Not...:mad::mad:

Bob's World
11-14-2008, 12:13 PM
It seems that based on how people think they either find greater value in the detailed writings of Clausewitz, or they prefer the distilled down simplicity of Jomini. Both participated in and studied the Napoleonic wars as the foundation of their respective work. I've always respected the main points made by Clausewitz, but never understood why he chose to bury them in reams of rambling text. I may be off base on this, but I believe he is the military theorist who is most often quoted, but least often read.

I believe I think more like Jomini when it comes to breaking down a problem. Keep breaking it down until you find the simple, fundamental truths that lie at the heart of it. This works for me, but again, recognize that for many it does not. They find themselves with a concept that is too pure, and that they are unable to apply to an operational environment. Wilf is not the first theorist to take shots at Jomini's work, and won't be the last. I will say this, though, about the principles of war that he developed and that have been so central to US military doctrine for generations; I have encountered plenty of officers who could rattle them off by rote, but had little grasp of what they really meant or how to apply them effectively.

Won't say which is better, don't know that one is. Just know what is better for me. So, I read both, but find Jomini's approach easiest to work with.

William F. Owen
11-14-2008, 03:49 PM
It seems that based on how people think they either find greater value in the detailed writings of Clausewitz, or they prefer the distilled down simplicity of Jomini. Both participated in and studied the Napoleonic wars as the foundation of their respective work. I've always respected the main points made by Clausewitz, but never understood why he chose to bury them in reams of rambling text. I may be off base on this, but I believe he is the military theorist who is most often quoted, but least often read.

Yep, CvC did like to ramble, but he deserves sticking with. Personally I think CvC needs an almost Talmudic method of study. Unfortunately this is a complete anathema to the modern military mind, which wants a disturbing degree of certainty and conformity.


I believe I think more like Jomini when it comes to breaking down a problem. Keep breaking it down until you find the simple, fundamental truths that lie at the heart of it.

When it's done well, this is powerful stuff. The struggle to do this is the most worthy endeavour of military thought.


Wilf is not the first theorist to take shots at Jomini's work, and won't be the last.

I will admit to not being as well read in Jomini, as I am Clausewitz - so my "shots" at Jomini may be more based on the my perceived usefulness of Clausewitz than any actual complaint with the old Swiss soldier.

jkm_101_fso
11-14-2008, 04:04 PM
Won't say which is better, don't know that one is. Just know what is better for me. So, I read both, but find Jomini's approach easiest to work with.

I once had a Prof say that he imagined that Clausewitz was the kind of guy that could explain to a commander all the ways he could lose a battle; and Jomini was the kind of guy who would tell you how to win the battle. Not sure if there is any truth to that.

Ken White
11-14-2008, 04:17 PM
Jomini was a little too orderly for my taste; war ain't orderly... :D

Bob's World
11-14-2008, 07:40 PM
Jomini also is really more tactical than strategic, from an age when good tactics equaled good strategy in large part.

My favorite strategist (and U.S. General) was Grant, BUT THAT is a huge debate for an entirely different forum! BLUF is that he was the first military leader in the age of nations (vs. Kingdoms) to realize that no longer was ulitmate victory found in simply destroying the other side's Army or Navy, or in capturing a capital. Victory now required destroying the will of the other side's populace (damn, there is that pesky populace rising up again) to fight. His letter to his subordinate commanders upon assuming overall command of Union forces is a lesson in genius. Recognition of the Decisive Point (defeat of the will of the confederate populace) and sending his two most able and trusted commanders (Sherman and Sheridan) against it. Recognizing the most critical supporting effort (defeat of Lee's army and the capture of Richmond) and the need to position himself with a capable, but less tuned to his style and intent, commander of the Army of the Potomoc (Meade). And yes, I am quite comfortable in being at odds with those who worship at the church of Robert E. Lee, and who misunderstand the nature of Grant's larger campaign and choose to focus on Meade's campaign instead.

Too bad the European's ignored the lessons of that war, certainly WWI would have been fought much differently and perhaps WWII avoided if they hadn't. Instead they continued to play "destroy the army" and "capture the flag," with a generation wasted for no strategic effect.

I hope we are learning the right lessons from the current conflicts, because the world continues to change in ways that are as significant as changes born of the American and French revolutions.

But as to Jomini and the principles of war, I realize I did a quick bastardization to apply them to PCE, but I think they have a universal value that makes them helpful to buinessmen, salesmen, coaches and even students figuring out how to manage their study time. Obviously not all apply to every situation, but simple checklists help us all stay on track when the optempo of life starts to overwhelm our decision making capacity. On the otherhand, when your "mental position" is being overrun, that is no time to pick up "On War" for little quick guidance....

Bob's World
11-14-2008, 07:50 PM
(Oh, and I realize Grant did not task Sheridan with the Shenandoah valley campaign originally. Forget the name of the commander of that army that he chose to keep in place for continuity, but later replaced with Sheridan when he failed to grasp what was needed of him.)

Ken White
11-14-2008, 08:07 PM
...I hope we are learning the right lessons from the current conflicts, because the world continues to change in ways that are as significant as changes born of the American and French revolutions.True; it's the changes, particularly (obviously?) the subtle ones that get overlooked, that trip people...
Obviously not all apply to every situation, but simple checklists help us all stay on track when the optempo of life starts to overwhelm our decision making capacity. On the otherhand, when your "mental position" is being overrun, that is no time to pick up "On War" for little quick guidance....The aviators and artillerists would certainly agree; us dumb grunts can't read so we tend to ignore checklists -- and books that don't fit in jacket pocket... :(

reed11b
11-14-2008, 08:55 PM
The aviators and artillerists would certainly agree; us dumb grunts can't read so we tend to ignore checklists -- and books that don't fit in jacket pocket... :(
If at first you don't succeed, your not using enough firepower.
Reed

jmm99
11-15-2008, 05:57 AM
I've followed this thread, not from the standpoint of Ken's class 1 person (cuz I can't); but from the interface of his class 2 person, from the other side of the lens (cuz I read). The following seems wise to me.


(from Ken - Anti-Intellectualism Thread)

First priority will always be to win in combat -- that takes a certain mentality, mental toughness and willingness to take risks, make decisions (for better or worse...) as well as a degree of physical toughness and stamina to cope with the demands of campaigning (I like that word). This ability is a cognitive skill and requires some study but much practice. It is effectively an experience derived skill requiring considerable personal discomfort and sacrifice. It has little relationship to any civilian pursuits. Not everyone is equipped to do it or wishes to.

Second priority is to be intellectually superior to all possible opponents. This requires a great deal of study in many fields, some of which have little apparent benefit to warfighting. It also requires an ability and desire to move easily back and forth between a military oriented world and the broader civilian and academic worlds. It too entails much sacrifice in sometimes similar but mostly quite different measures than the field campaigner. Not everyone is equipped or wants to do that either.

Now, what does this have to do with spear tips, and plans & strategies ?

What follows is something I've been dwelling on for a couple of months - so, it won't be a long post.

A WWII poster (quoted by Summers in his foreward to Shelby Stanton's The Rise and Fall) read:


"At the end of the most grandoise plans and strategies is a soldier walking point."

Know of three battles that are personalized to me since they were the major battles of my dad's battalion (1/117INF). All were tip of the spear situations, where it gets very messy.


1. Mortain. 1/117 received the tip of the spear (SS armor) and broke it. Very fluid situation with one effective INF company left, backed up to the regt. arty where the German tanks were stopped.

2. Aachen. 1/117 lead battalion to punch through Siegfried Line. It broke through the first day, but with very heavy losses to the lead assault company (happened to be my dad's).

3. Stavelot. 1/117 again received the tip of the spear (SS armor; same unit as at Mortain). Pretty much one sided and the German spear tip was broken again (no tears, it had just come from Malmedy).

Each of these battles has had its share of books, with neat maps of pincer movements (planned, thwarted or executed), etc. All of that is very sterile, which is as it should be.

The thought that gets to me is that the First Principle of War is really:


"... a soldier walking point."

It seems it has always been that way. Don't know whether the following is a "tactical plan" or an "after-action report". It comes from the Neolithic, a cave painting in Spain, and may have been painted before the event as anticipatory magic, or after the event as a celebratory offering.

I think the men in the painting would fit in well with the soldiers who are having this discussion.

William F. Owen
11-15-2008, 07:45 AM
Too bad the European's ignored the lessons of that war, certainly WWI would have been fought much differently and perhaps WWII avoided if they hadn't. Instead they continued to play "destroy the army" and "capture the flag," with a generation wasted for no strategic effect.

Sorry, but I profoundly disagree with this assertion. The "Europeans" studied the US Civil War in great detail - but saw nothing that new, bar the use of telegraph and railways, and were not short on their own combat experience from the Crimea. The war that was improperly studied, and could have aided some thinking was the Russo-Japanese War.

Prior to WW1 all European Armies trained to for wars of movement and encounter battles. WW1 trench deadlock was unavoidable, and a very rapid progression of military thinking that saw it go away within 3 years of fighting. WW1 was not created by stupid Generals, or poor leadership. Many Generals were extremely skilled men.


But as to Jomini and the principles of war, I realize I did a quick bastardization to apply them to PCE, but I think they have a universal value that makes them helpful to buinessmen, salesmen, coaches and even students figuring out how to manage their study time.

I strongly recommend you read Robert Leonhards, "Principles of War for the Information Age."

slapout9
11-15-2008, 11:54 AM
It seems it has always been that way. Don't know whether the following is a "tactical plan" or an "after-action report". It comes from the Neolithic, a cave painting in Spain, and may have been painted before the event as anticipatory magic, or after the event as a celebratory offering.
I think the men in the painting would fit in well with the soldiers who are having this discussion.


jmm yeah Ken knows the caveman that did the drawing:D:D:D

Ken White
11-15-2008, 03:42 PM
Will no one rid me of these meddlesome priests... :(

:D

Rob Thornton
11-15-2008, 06:10 PM
he was on the cutting edge of technology and thought even then:D

Ken White
11-15-2008, 07:07 PM
................ :d

Bill Moore
11-15-2008, 07:18 PM
I noted your clean shaven retired photo on the bottom left, but you're obviosuly dying your hair.

Ken White
11-15-2008, 07:41 PM
Sticks and Stone, etc .etc. HA! What, me worry... :cool:

BTW, for all those engaging in this abuse, I will magnamanusslie (or whatever that word is) provide this LINK (http://www.grecian-formula.com/faq-grecian.html). ;)

Your turn will come... :D

Bill Moore
11-16-2008, 03:10 AM
Posted by William Owen
Sorry, but I profoundly disagree with this assertion. The "Europeans" studied the US Civil War in great detail - but saw nothing that new, bar the use of telegraph and railways, and were not short on their own combat experience from the Crimea. The war that was improperly studied, and could have aided some thinking was the Russo-Japanese War.

I think some key historians would disagree with you. The theory I seen was that the wars in Europe prior to the American Civil War were wars between kingdoms and the focus was on defeating the other side's military. On the other hand, the American Civil War was focused on the society as a whole, not just against one another's Armies. Some called it the first total war in the Modern Age.

Agree or disagree, and I'm simply voting present on this one. I think the argument is relevant, because the principles of war are very applicable to Napoleon's Day where great Armies determined the outcome of the conflict. To some extent that held also held true through the Great World Wars, but in WWII there was considerable coercion conducted against the civilian populations (carpet bombings, Hiroshima, etc.) where the center of gravity shifted from fieled forces to the opponent's national will to continue, verus the material means to continue.

Since the nature of war has changed, it would seem that the principles would have to be adjusted accordingly. It is more than adjusting to the information age, we now have enemies that we cannot mass against, that do not have a center of gravity, etc. Great Armies will not determine the outcome of asymmetrical conflicts.

A principle by definition means it should never be violated. Using that as a standard, and using the Global War on Terrorism or Long War as the model, it should be relatively easy to see what principles apply and what ones don't. Furthermore, if the principle applies in one situation (like Desert Storm), but not in another like our current fight, is it still a principle?

Does it even matter in the long run?

AmericanPride
11-16-2008, 04:26 AM
Since the nature of war has changed

I disagree with this assumption. The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object. Strategy, which is dependent on time, place, resources, technology has certainly changed. I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

Cavguy
11-16-2008, 04:31 AM
I disagree with this assumption. The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object. Strategy, which is dependent on time, place, resources, technology has certainly changed. I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

Have to agree with you. The nature of war has not changed since inception. Tactics, methods, tools all change, but not its nature as a fundamentally human endeavor - as much psychological and physical.

Bill Moore
11-16-2008, 07:59 AM
The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object.

AmericanPride if this true, then simply apply my proposed test for the principles listed and see if works. Maybe the nature of war is the wrong choice of words, but how we and our "conduct" war is clearly different, and I don't "think" the principles apply equally, and sometimes not all based on the "nature" of the conflict.

Bill

William F. Owen
11-16-2008, 08:19 AM
I think some key historians would disagree with you. The theory I seen was that the wars in Europe prior to the American Civil War were wars between kingdoms and the focus was on defeating the other side's military. On the other hand, the American Civil War was focused on the society as a whole, not just against one another's Armies. Some called it the first total war in the Modern Age.



OK, fair point, but what lessons should the Europeans have taken from the US Civil War to inform the conduct of WW1? I can't see any, having come across this assertion before. The Russo-Japanese War made predicting some of the operational conduct of the Western Front marginally predictable, but I can't how any of the relevant points being present in 1865.

William F. Owen
11-16-2008, 08:24 AM
I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

My major concern about the so called "Principles" is we are discussing those feature in FM-100.5 or FM-3.0 and not those which originated the concept. This assumes a supremacy in US military thought, which the historical record does not readily support.

...and, are there "Principles of Psychology?" Does anyone list the "Principles of Engineering?" - so why can we list "Principles of War" and assume they are accurate and useful?

AmericanPride
11-16-2008, 10:28 AM
AmericanPride if this true, then simply apply my proposed test for the principles listed and see if works. Maybe the nature of war is the wrong choice of words, but how we and our "conduct" war is clearly different, and I don't "think" the principles apply equally, and sometimes not all based on the "nature" of the conflict.

I would assert that all conflict has the same nature: violence for the achievement of a political objective. Whether or not the "conduct" between opponents through different time periods and from different locations is not the same does not change that said belligerents are striving, through conflict, to attain a desired end-state. That 'end-state', when stripping away the particular identity of the combatants, also fundamentally requires the submission of the enemy. There is no "right" way to reach this end so long as it is accomplished. The principles which ostensibly lead one to success do so on the basis of the nature of war; therefore guiding (or determining), not originating from, its conduct. If principles were to be based on a particular "conduct", then they would be relevant only so far as that conduct wins wars.


My major concern about the so called "Principles" is we are discussing those feature in FM-100.5 or FM-3.0 and not those which originated the concept.

I share the same concern. It is currently 0430. I will attempt to mount a defense of the US Principles of War later in the day.

AmericanPride
11-22-2008, 01:32 AM
I think the only questionable US principle of war in relation to the general nature of conflict is "mass". The idea of massing combat power at a decisive time/place in order to gain victory in a short period of time is not, I believe, applicable to war in general; but specific to conventional armies fighting similar opponents.

Ken White
11-22-2008, 02:53 AM
LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Embassy_Siege).

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_embassy_hostage_crisis).

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Entebbe).

These were all successful, none are literally 'conventional armies fighting similar opponents.' There are many more examples though few US available for study due, principally, to excessive caution (a US trademark), our distressing tendency to overclassify everything and too many senior US people sharing your incorrect view of the principle. One noteworthy thing about all Cited actions is that there were no General officers involved in the actual operations...

The intent of the principle is to provide adequate combat power (people, firepower, activity) at a decisive point to achieve temporary superiority over the opponent for long enough to achieve a favorable result. Further action may or may not be necessary or desirable.

One should use some care in the use of the words 'victory, 'defeat' and their synonyms -- those words can paint a false picture in the minds of many.

Bob's World
11-22-2008, 01:02 PM
To adddress Bill Moore's sage observation, perhaps the only problem, or at least the primary problem, with the Principle's of War is the last word of their Title. These were developed in an age, and adopted by America in an age, where "War" was defined as this clash between states and their respetive militaries.

When one opens the aperture on their definition of war the principles start to get fuzzy. In a war where one is dealing with an insurgency, to try to apply these tactics to defeat of the insugent force without having an effective holistic COIN program that addresses the entire spectrum of Populace, Governance, and the Insurgent, will leave you in a quagmire that you will not likely emerge from victorious.

As to WILF's steadfast assertion that there was nothing for European's to learn from the Civil War, it seams that he always switches to talking tactics, when the assertion was made in regard to strategy. The major advance in tactics came from a German Captain, and we all still use those squad tactics today. (One of my greatest admiration's for the German military is that they would in mid-war listen to and adopt such a major change coming from so junior of an officer).

But the real lesson of the Civil War is at the Strategic level, that you could no longer win by simply destroying armies and navies, or capturing capitals. In wars between nations you must defeat the will of the other side's populace or what will follow the fighting will either be a tenuous and temporary peace (WWI), or a follow-on Insurgency (many examples, with Iraq being the most recent). As I asserted in my original post on this issue, most American historians miss this lesson to this day. The cult of Lee, and the love of fire and maneuver blinds leaders to this day as to what the true nature of war is, and what the true measure of victory is as well.

It's all about the people. We forget or neglect that to your peril.

AmericanPride
11-22-2008, 01:05 PM
Ken,

Good examples. Instead of saying to what 'mass' is only applicable, I should have pointed out where I think it's inapplicable. When conducting a strategy of insurgency, the aim, as I understand it, is to avoid massing (people, effects, etc) in the first place, as it presents oneself as a vulnerable target to a superior enemy. It is not always necessary for the insurgency to mobilize "adequate combat power at a decisive point to achieve temporary superiority" because the physical destruction of the enemy is not the goal. Thoughts?

Ken White
11-22-2008, 03:04 PM
My wife says it's the result of too much bourbon over too many years. :eek:

However, do recall these are principles, not rules -- therefor the interpretation is broad. In your scenario, I suggest it IS necessary for the insurgents to mobilize (their peculiar type of combat power) at a decisive point and time to achieve temporary superiority. An example would be the massing of local citizens in Afghanistan to protest US air strikes insuring that foreign TV cameramen were present while doing so -- no intent to destroy the opponents forces but only to influence opponents actions by swinging public opinion. Another is the disruptive fights and tactics in the Iraqi Parliament to protest possible acceptance of the SOFA.

Yet another is the currently favored massive use of IED and suicide bombers to achieve not a temporary military superiority or an expected physical destruction of the enemy but to psychologically convince the voters of nations involved in operations to withdraw their troops simply due to upset and annoyance at the loss of even small numbers of troops with little apparent progress. Since each strike is by itself inconclusive, they mass the number of strikes in an attempt to obtain a conclusive result.

All those provide or seek a temporary superiority of one sort or another over their opponents by the application of more than ordinary effort at a point or time when it is believed advantage may be accrued. Of course, if the insurgents are engaged in any combat operations, then the more directly attributable and combat power related 'mass' -- more people (or firepower) at one point than the COIN effort can muster -- applies.

William F. Owen
11-22-2008, 03:28 PM
As to WILF's steadfast assertion that there was nothing for European's to learn from the Civil War, it seams that he always switches to talking tactics, when the assertion was made in regard to strategy. The major advance in tactics came from a German Captain, and we all still use those squad tactics today.


A. I certainly was not limiting my comments to the tactical level, but I fail to see how the "Strategy" of the WW1 was informed by the US Civil War. If it was, then whose strategy?

B. Do you mean Captain Wilhelm Rohr? If so, again I strongly disagree. The French had developed their own minor tactics doctrine as had the British.

Bob's World
11-22-2008, 04:46 PM
Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...

William F. Owen
11-23-2008, 05:20 AM
Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...

Absolutely not. I am very willing to consider any evidence to the contrary. If you can show me how the European commanders cognisance of the strategies of the civil war could have altered WW1, I would be extremely interested. I may be entirely wrong.

I just don't see how the conduct of two tiny, barely "post Napoleonic armies" with almost infinite manoeuvre space, usefully informs the conduct of 3-4 massive European industrial age armies, with comparatively very small battle space, and entirely different weapons capabilities.

The European Generals of 1914, were mostly skilled military men. ..but all - German, French, Russian and British, ... were all wrong footed by the conditions that prevailed.

As to Rohr, I will concede he is an important figure in the development of combined arms theory, but he is not the originator of modern minor dismounted tactics.

reed11b
11-23-2008, 06:20 AM
Wilf, look at the casualty figures in the CW for assaults on entrenched positions and the telling effect of small increases firepower capabilities (minnie bullet and improved cannon technology) and the limitations of railroads for strategic manuever. I may be wrong, but I believe that's a start.
Reed

Bob's World
11-23-2008, 11:23 AM
The Strategic lesson of the Civil War, I believe, is that Grant caught onto the fact that wars between nations (vice Kingdoms) could no longer be won by strategems aimed solely at the defeat of the other side's Navy or Army, nor by capturing their capital. Wars now required the strategic goal of defeating the other sides entire populace's collective will to continue the conflict. This is why he very deliberately sent his two most trusted Lieutenants, Sheridan to the Shenandoah and Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas, to specifically target Southern will. Meanwhile he stayed with and closely supervised a capable but less trusted Meade in a critical supporting effort of defeating Lee's Army and capturing Richmond. All the focus of those who observed the campaign was on Lee, the superior tactician, and the strategic brilliance of Grant was clouded by the brutal realities of his relentless pursuit and constant re-engagement with Lee's retreating Army; and the horror at what it required to crush a populaces will to fight.

My point is that the Europeans DID NOT apply this strategy in WWI. Instead they focused on destroying each other's armies and attempting to sieze each other's capitals. German will was left intact, and was possibly even strengthened by the allied victory and the peace terms forced upon their undefeated populace.

Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.

No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.

Knowledge is easily acquired by hard study and rote memorization of what others think (what). Understanding requires a thoughtful application of that knowledge to unique factual circumstances (why). Perhaps next would come wisdom, which would be knowing when to continue to engage, and when the wiser course is to simply walk away (when). And with that, I will walk away from this particular topic. I always try to seek understanding, but still struggle with wisdom...

William F. Owen
11-23-2008, 03:38 PM
My point is that the Europeans DID NOT apply this strategy in WWI. Instead they focused on destroying each other's armies and attempting to sieze each other's capitals. German will was left intact, and was possibly even strengthened by the allied victory and the peace terms forced upon their undefeated populace.

In 1870, five years after the US Civil War, Prussia defeated France, by defeating it's Army and surrounding it's capital. Moreover I submit, had the Germans got to Paris in 1914, France would have collapsed. What worked in one war cannot be universally applied to another.

The allies tried to circumvent the Western Front, with the "Eastern Strategy" as early as 1915, aimed at knocking most of Germany's allies out of the war and causing them to sue for peace, without the destruction of their army or the occupation of their capital.

In fact Foch's and other writing of circa 1904 shows that no one was intent on the destruction of armies any more, as they were simply too big. European tactical and strategic thought was centred decisive action at key points to inflict defeat.


Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.

The Europeans, had fought the Crimean War ten years before the US Civil War. It saw the use of rifles, telegraph, and railways, all to an extent that European militaries were aware of and had planed for their greater use in future wars.


No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.

What they lacked was the experience of something that had never before happened in military history, and study of the US Civil War would not have prepared them for. I submit that only detailed study of the Russo-Japanese War would have given them any insight.

William F. Owen
12-01-2008, 07:34 AM
Reading some of Trotsky's observations on the principles of war, he makes a very good argument as to why they are actually technology and epoch specific, and why they are mostly useless. This is pretty much summed up in the way Soviets list their own "principles of War."

If anyone has any references to a commentary on Trotsky writings by any western inter-war writer, I would be fascinated to see it.