Getting the Basics Right in Afghanistan

[SWJED]

Getting the Basics Right
A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan
by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/134-scott-agoglia.pdf)


This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to trent.scott@us.army.mil or john.agoglia@us.army.mil.

Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan’s war.

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the list goes on – it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent’s influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space – literally and figuratively – for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability...

[Rob Thornton]

I, and I’m sure others in the communities of practice and interest, greatly appreciate the thinking that COL Agoglia and Lt Col Scott put into this paper to help us better understand the environment and the problems we face in Afghanistan. Such efforts are paying off by informing the broader communities and establishing relevance to a contemporary, real world issue. They are both helping to shape our choices now, and inform us on important related issues as they apply to possible future strategic and institutional concerns.

One of the things that I think the paper does very well is establish the linkage between strategic and institutional guidance and values with the tactical actions on the ground. In reference to the institutions which generate capabilities to meet the requirements incurred by policy objective(s) and environmental conditions, cogent pieces such as this present uniformed and civilian leaders with the consequences of institutional rigidity and/or institutional lurches as they relate to strategic, operational, tactical and institutional risk both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In reference to the generation of policy and strategy in a complex, interactive environment such as Afghanistan I thought the observation in the paper that:

“A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.”

reflects a much better understanding of a USG endstate that is feasible, and with the will of an Afghan government sustainable. This type of understanding results in what Secretary Gates recently qualified as a “Positive Outcome”, one that may be initially tolerable to the participants and stakeholders, and which can be built upon over time. This is not to say that this should be the outcome we expect at the conclusion of the campaign as we know it in Afghanistan, but that this is an objective that the USG should consider as a long term goal that will transcend our immediate involvement and ultimately be carried forward by US Country Teams yet to come (with continued Title 10 support.) It also qualifies the immediate role of all the USG and Multi-National partners of getting that objective to a point where it can transition to a point where it can be carried forward by different means.

The article further articulates that in order to increase effectiveness, and by extension I think long term efficiencies, and in order to decrease the risk to the over-arching policy objective to which means have been committed, our implementation efforts must be comprehensive and integrated. This generates a requirement for shared understanding of the environment that is reflected in the planning and execution of all our actions. This takes us back to the institutions which generate capabilities, the leaders who make policy and strategy, and the civil legislation which governs the creation, sustainment and increase/decrease of means.

The linkage is through and through, and we have to understand that what can happen on the ground is to a great degree made possible by how we understand those requirements at the tactical and operational levels, and respond to them from the NCR (meaning the USG writ large) with an eye toward communicating our efforts to the domestic and international audiences. Listening (not just hearing) and thinking about what COL Agoglia and Lt Col Scott are saying is paramount to being able to make good decisions. I would encourage all to take the time to read their article and to think about today – consider it a Veteran’s Day obligation.

Best Regards, Rob

[Schmedlap]

The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things.
I just read Bing West's article in the Nov/Dec 08 issue of The National Interest. One passage in particular really stuck out: "[W]e expect our military to destroy al-Qaeda by killing its members. The American military mission is not nation building. If poverty and poor government were the causes of insurgencies, most of the countries in the world would be at war. To prevent more recruits for the Islamic extremists, we'd like to have a tolerant democracy and a thriving economy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But if we make that a precondition for crushing al-Qaeda, we will be in Afghanistan for decades."

So, are we doing the right things? Reading that passage, my impression of West's suggestion is that we should worry less about whether Afghanistan has a functioning government. Just destroy the terrorist networks and be on our way. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.

Should our mission be to stand up a democratic government in Afghanistan? Or should we be focused on purging Pakistan's tribal areas of Taliban? It seems that if we accomplish the latter, then the former will be of much less consequence and, if we choose to pursue it, could be achieved with far less American blood.

[jmm99]

article is here.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20122

[William F. Owen]

So, are we doing the right things? Reading that passage, my impression of West's suggestion is that we should worry less about whether Afghanistan has a functioning government. Just destroy the terrorist networks and be on our way. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.
.

So the UGS policy is wrong, useless or never going to work? You may well be right. Your observation is annoyingly accurate and useful.

...but the requirement is still to make the stupid policy work.

The bit of COIN thinking that seems to be missing, is what activity US/NATO Forces security effort protecting and why? I've often asked this an no one (even an Afghan diplomat I met in London) seems to have a useful answer.

If military force cannot provide effective security - and thus break the will of the insurgent, what use is it?

[Rex Brynen]

. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.

There was no lack of governance in Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida was at its zenith there—the Taliban was in control of most of the country, and exerting far more effective government control than anyone else had managed since 1992 (or earlier).

This isn't to say that ungoverned spaces aren't a problem (see Pakistan, FATA), only that the rise of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan doesn't quite fit that model.

[Entropy]

This is a very important paper and I second Rob's call for everyone to read it. The authors, in my view, understand many of Afghanistan's intricacies and peculiarities more than most. I also think Rob quoted the central thrust of the paper, which I'll quote as well for effect:


A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.

One striking aspect of this piece is that while it does focus on tactics, it implicitly points to another way at the policy/strategy level. And I think this may explain some of the dissonance I see in the piece. To give one example, the author's note:


This may prove problematic for coalition forces operating in the Pashtun heartlands, where the local populace naturally views foreigners with a degree of xenophobia that makes it more challenging to positively influence their perceptions. In this case, coalition forces need to encourage, persuade and teach ANA and ANP to operate in and amongst the people in order to generate a thorough understanding of the environment. To be effective, this will depend on robust information sharing procedures between coalition forces and the ANSF at the tactical level.

The problem here is that in many cases in Afghanistan, anyone outside the local area is considered a "foreigner" which would likely include any ANP or ANA. There still exists in many areas of Afghanistan little recognition of ANY authority outside what the authors call "informal" structures. It's one thing to get a group of locals to recognize one central authority over another - it's quite another thing to get them to recognize ANY central authority to begin with when they've never recognized any such authority. In some cases I think the coalition might have mistaken a desire for independence from any central authority as support to our opponents and created enemies unnecessarily.

This ties into another concern I have that the focus should be on protecting the population. While this is clearly needed in many areas, in others the people don't want protection, particularly from outsiders. Not coincidentally, many of these areas overlap with those with a xenophobic bent. So what should be done in those areas where the people do not want protection and simply want independence from all outside authority? I think the author's cogent advice and #1 consideration to intimately understand the local operating environment is apt, but once those conditions are understood the application of something other than "population-centric" COIN may be in order. I'm glad the authors focus on the very important consideration that the conflict in Afghanistan is diverse and that local environments differ significantly. I might suggest, therefore, that the solutions in those localities may be equally diverse and should not be limited to one set of COIN "best practices" or principles nor even COIN itself. For example, sometimes the best tactic may include doing nothing at all and at other times it may include conventional means. My point here is that Afghanistan is too diverse to place too many doctrinal limits on options at the local level.

And that ties into a final concern, based on this line (emphasis added):


The current operating environment in Afghanistan is extraordinarily complex, lethal and diverse; it is more than simply an insurgency.

It is much more than an insurgency. As the authors point out, the coalition is not very good at figuring out what actions are insurgency and which are something else (criminality, local disputes, etc.). Although probably beyond the scope of this paper, I think those areas of the conflict that lie outside of our notions of insurgency need close examination and study if we are to achieve any kind of desirable end state in Afghanistan. In some areas insurgency may not be the problem, so using COIN tactics to attempt to solve those problems could be counterproductive.

Despite these minor criticisms, this is a very important piece of work that should be required reading for anyone with interest in, or deploying to, Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

Well, along with Wilf... :D

I'm not at all sure the article adds much to the discussion of the problem. I see the same thing lacking in it I do in most discussions of Afghanistan -- what is the goal, the desired end result? Seems to me that lacking a stated goal and more importantly one that is realistically achievable, it is rather difficult to prescribe cures.

Schmedlap quoted Bing West "...To prevent more recruits for the Islamic extremists, we'd like to have a tolerant democracy and a thriving economy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But if we make that a precondition for crushing al-Qaeda, we will be in Afghanistan for decades." I believe that is quite accurate -- and I'm not sure I see a desire on the part of any other nation (other than perhaps Pakistan, mayhap Russia and India to an extent) to stay in Afghanistan for that extended period.

Wilf's question
"The bit of COIN thinking that seems to be missing, is what activity US/NATO Forces security effort protecting and why? I've often asked this an no one (even an Afghan diplomat I met in London) seems to have a useful answer."is pertinent and valid -- I also have seen no answer to that question.

Rex Brynen made the comment that:
There was no lack of governance in Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida was at its zenith there—the Taliban was in control of most of the country, and exerting far more effective government control than anyone else had managed since 1992 (or earlier).That's not totally correct -- there were significant exceptions to the rule of the Talib from Ismail Khan to Massood; several areas whre their footprint was quite light -- but it's close enough to actuality to qualify and is a very pertinent comment. It raises the specter that a 'western' approach to governance there may be a lot of wishful thinking.

Entropy adds as always some sensible commentary and very importantly points out:
I might suggest, therefore, that the solutions in those localities may be equally diverse and should not be limited to one set of COIN "best practices" or principles nor even COIN itself. For example, sometimes the best tactic may include doing nothing at all and at other times it may include conventional means. My point here is that Afghanistan is too diverse to place too many doctrinal limits on options at the local level. (emphasis added / kw)

I'd simply add that Afghanistan is too diverse also to accept the probable desired end state the western nations involved would most like to see and that some realistic expectations and goals would seem to be a priority requirement...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,

I agree with your observation


I'd simply add that Afghanistan is too diverse also to accept the probable desired end state the western nations involved would most like to see and that some realistic expectations and goals would seem to be a priority requirement...

as we perceive it right now. I'd add that if the conditions remain as they are there is no reason to expect it to change.

But I don't think that is what was being argued in the paper.


“A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.”

That sounds pretty flexible, and while it does not nail down an endstate, I do think it creates the framework for a dialogue on one. Ultimately I think the responsibility for a USG policy endstate is something that has to be created outside of Title 10, but must also be informed by it.

I think the issues they bring up extend beyond OEF.

Somebody remarked the other day that JTF's get stood up and never go away as we were looking to frame an endstate for a problem the notional JTF was given. The tendency was to reach higher and craft an endstate that had the ring of indefinite infeasibility about it - one of those at perfect peace with its neighbors, integrated into the region, monopoly on violence, economically viable sort of endstates. It was also one that nested perfectly with the USG policy objective given to us.

We talked about it for awhile, and how the broader USG problem was a political one. It was a problem that the Country Team had been designing programs around for some time but which because of a change in conditions, military force was introduced. The question became what is the JTF endstate which gets the conditions to a point where the programs under the country team, perhaps beefed up with some additional Title 10 resources could be resumed under Title 22 authority. Or put another way, when do we hand it back and break down the guidon?

This makes sense, given that policy objectives pursued through diplomacy, which may not require military means outside of Title 22, or "normal" relations, are those in which we have not decided to force a decision. Our tolerance levels are not yet exceeded. These types of enduring objectives seem to lend themselves to ideas and idealism as there is no hurry to bring them to heel. They also form the basis of exchange no matter if the commitment is real or not, and have as much to do with how we define ourselves, as how others define themselves. Its kind of like the pursuit for peace in the ME - if it ever happens I think it will be hard to really know how we got from one place to another because while there may be a rush to establish causality, the truth may more aptly resemble glaciation.

I think there is a difference between the overarching USG endstate/policy objective that may have an indefinite nature as it relates to continued diplomatic engagement, and an endstate which the military can achieve in support of it. Once a feasible, supporting military endstate is identified (assuming we get it right), then we put our lethal and non-lethal efforts toward that end. The balance between how much towards lethal and how much towards non-lethal is based on the conditions. I think this is the point the authors were making about what needs to happen at the tactical end - and who can actually do these things as conditions permit at the moment.

I think they scope it down further by saying that ISAF must facilitate the creation of "a suitable political environment" that allows "the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other."

The issue I hear them raising is that its just as much about "why" ISAF should do more, as it is "what" facilitation means. It sounds like that as long as ISAF sees its responsibilities in isolation of other USG and Coalition partner efforts then their efforts are as likely to be incongruous as supportive.

Anyway, its helping me work through a related problem - one I feel like we really have to have a better idea about as it relates to the use of military power in support of stability and reconstruction operations.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...But I don't think that is what was being argued in the paper.

""“A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.”"

That sounds pretty flexible, and while it does not nail down an endstate, I do think it creates the framework for a dialogue on one.My question is who is involved in this dialog? To me, the 'dialog' should be >67% Afghani and <33% All Others. Somehow, my perception is that you and the writers are not looking at it that way. If I'm wrong, my apologies.
Ultimately I think the responsibility for a USG policy endstate is something that has to be created outside of Title 10, but must also be informed by it.This is the reason for my policy wonk comment. I'm not at all sure what you mean here. Do you mean that the USG desired end state "must be a non-military solution even though the situation has military involvement?" If that's what was meant, I agree -- and I'll point out that said military involvement is --wrongly in my view -- driving the train. I understand that's by default but I also understand that we've been there for approaching seven years...
I think the issues they bring up extend beyond OEF.Agreed -- and beyond ISAF and beyond the USG, beyond NATO.
Somebody remarked the other day that JTF's get stood up and never go away as we were looking to frame an endstate for a problem the notional JTF was given. The tendency was to reach higher and craft an endstate that had the ring of indefinite infeasibility about it - one of those at perfect peace with its neighbors, integrated into the region, monopoly on violence, economically viable sort of endstates. It was also one that nested perfectly with the USG policy objective given to us.impossibility, infeasability, improbability -- the USG -- and DoD have a strong tendency to go for such solutions. I've been participating or watching for almost 60 years and it keeps getting worse instead of better. We need to get real, that's all. Park the superegos and just use some common sense. That seems to be too much to ask. :wry:
....The question became what is the JTF endstate which gets the conditions to a point where the programs under the country team, perhaps beefed up with some additional Title 10 resources could be resumed under Title 22 authority. Or put another way, when do we hand it back and break down the guidon?May I suggest without being pejorative that the put the other way version is closer to understandable English but it still is jargon. The point to me is that the JTF should NEVER have primacy unless all out major combat operations are the norm. That's the answer to your conundrum; DoD takes over by default and will not let go. It will not stop unless we break that model. DoD has been reluctant to let go as they -- correctly in my view -- perceive a huge vacuum at State. State in turn is reluctant to get assertive about what should be their turf because they're (1) short of personnel (2) short of money (3) have many people who do not want to go to less than desirable stations worldwide and deal with significant problems created by the fools we elect to office. It isn't easy. I know that. It still needs to happen. :(

Our Essay writers have a job that is in the default position and they're unsure how to let go. I totally understand that and I sympathize with them, I really do -- the ONLY answer to their problem is not to get to that point in the first place. Unfortunately, we are there, so a solution is required. I'm merely sating that any solution that is not principally an Afghan solution is highly unlikely to succeed. No more than that, really.
I think they scope it down further by saying that ISAF must facilitate the creation of "a suitable political environment" that allows "the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other."I understand that -- my point is that is not -- or should not be -- ISAF's job; IOW it ain't 10USAC, it IS 22USC (jargon is contagious :D) -- except it isn't really that either. Rightly or wrongly, we got NATO in there so it really and Afghan job with NATO support -- and they in turn are supported as necessary by ISAF; ISAF is the Caboose, not the Engine or even the Coal Car.
The issue I hear them raising is that its just as much about "why" ISAF should do more, as it is "what" facilitation means. It sounds like that as long as ISAF sees its responsibilities in isolation of other USG and Coalition partner efforts then their efforts are as likely to be incongruous as supportive.That facet I agree with, though I'd suggest it was far from adequately clear in the essay.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,


My question is who is involved in this dialog? To me, the 'dialog' should be >67% Afghani and <33% All Others. Somehow, my perception is that you and the writers are not looking at it that way. If I'm wrong, my apologies.

No apologies - you are partially right (at least wrt to me), I'd not really thought of it in percentages. It would seem that should be a goal that underpins some of the others. I am of the opinion though that if you can't get the Afghani to pick up the bulk of the conversation, then we're not facilitating, we're leading - and that is not where we want to be. I've been in conversations where the facilitator does most of the talking, it only works if the other participants have nothing to say, or are unwilling to say it - otherwise it just creates a backlash against the facilitator. It may do so anyway, there might be reasons why the other folks are not talking. In that case the facilitator has got to read the larger body and once he manages to get a discussion going, and reasonably on course he needs to back off, and only inject where absolutely needed. The goal I think should be to continually decrease his %. I also understand that is hard to do given the "are we there yet" pressures from the various domestic audiences the facilitator is subject to. No way around that I guess, but to continue to tell the kids in the back to hold their bladder.


I'm not at all sure what you mean here. Do you mean that the USG desired end state "must be a non-military solution even though the situation has military involvement?" If that's what was meant, I agree --

Yep, that is what I was driving at. I think the authors were too, but were spending the bulk of their argument trying to raise the issue of the form that military involvment should take - with the understanding that it would have to fill some of the gaps not being provided from civilians due to capability and capacity gaps within those organizations.


May I suggest without being pejorative that the put the other way version is closer to understandable English but it still is jargon. The point to me is that the JTF should NEVER have primacy unless all out major combat operations are the norm. That's the answer to your conundrum; DoD takes over by default and will not let go. It will not stop unless we break that model. DoD has been reluctant to let go as they -- correctly in my view -- perceive a huge vacuum at State. State in turn is reluctant to get assertive about what should be their turf because they're (1) short of personnel (2) short of money (3) have many people who do not want to go to less than desirable stations worldwide and deal with significant problems created by the fools we elect to office. It isn't easy. I know that. It still needs to happen. (bold added by me)

Michael O'Hanlon wrote a pretty good piece the other day that Dave captured on the OP-ED roundup that addresses this issue pretty well. As DoD folks begin to look at the transition point to State, what might appear as a more natural one is more difficult to put your finger on because State lacks the means, as such it degrades into a circular argument. If we expect them to pick up the responsibilities, we have to provide them the means to match their authorities. That is a big shift for the reasons you point out, but the sooner we start doing it, the sooner they will be able to do it (kinda sounds like energy policy too). Right now the question of "when does the JTF transition authority to the State" seems muddied by the lack of resources State can bring to bear in a flexible manner. DoD can move to an "in support" relationship, but that is not entirely clear either if they are in reality doing the heavy lifting because State is not strong enough.

If our strategic outlook is that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less, and that while not the perfect tool, DoD does have the capacity, then doesn't it make sense for the USG to go ahead and invest in the more appropriate tools? While DoD may have to adapt to be both more agile in some of its roles, and in order to be a more supportive USG partner, the real challenge I think is growing our other USG agencies. First, we (big USG we) have to accept the "why", then we have to get busy on the "how" - currently we seem to be trying to do both - and S/CRS seems to be making some headway. There are a number of reasons why, to include gg's concerns about the costs, but also to include the question of who is the best person to do diplomacy? - but in this case its not necessarily over at someone else's embassy given the conditions.


I understand that -- my point is that is not -- or should not be -- ISAF's job; IOW it ain't 10USAC, it IS 22USC (jargon is contagious ) -- except it isn't really that either. Rightly or wrongly, we got NATO in there so it really and Afghan job with NATO support -- and they in turn are supported as necessary by ISAF; ISAF is the Caboose, not the Engine or even the Coal Car.

Sorry for the jargon - its the effect of thinking about a related problem:D, however, it is good to have an idea where the authorities originate and why. I agree. I see two roughly drawn areas in the "support column". One is reference security, and by extension, building security capacity. That one is interesting because while there is the building of tactical security capacity, there is also the issue of development in other areas which make it possible and gives it a better chance of being sustainable. We find those gaps, and because there is no one available to step into them, we fill them - because we recognize that to wait may mean losing the initiative, and/or sacrifice of any gains we made recently. However, it may also mean retarding HN development. Its a tough call, and when we decide to do it, we ought to know why, and start developing a replacement as fast as we can.

I don't just mean stepping into a gap that should be filled by an Afghani capability, but one that may need to be filled for the purpose of facilitation by a non-Afghani civilian. I think that was the basis for the authors' observation that Lawrence's maxim of what is tolerable may not fit as well under all conditions, and that as such ISAF should be prepared to fill those gaps, while also working hard to place an Afghani capability with an Afghani there. As long as we are in the gap, we are as much an impediment to that 66% > 33% conversation as we might be a facilitator - however from the ground perspective, it may be they feel there are no other real options.

I guess that in order for us to transition, there has to be something to transition with, and something to transition to. Again, that goes back to your and others' observation that we have a "strategy deficit" that identifies a feasible end, identifies the best ways, and allocates the required means. In this case allocation does not just mean "best" fit of what is available, but considering our outlook, it also means creating the best means we can across our elements of power.

Thanks for helping me work through that - time to go see if I can put it to use.

[wm]

No apologies - you are partially right (at least wrt to me), I'd not really thought of it in percentages. It would seem that should be a goal that underpins some of the others. I am of the opinion though that if you can't get the Afghani to pick up the bulk of the conversation, then we're not facilitating, we're leading - and that is not where we want to be. I've been in conversations where the facilitator does most of the talking, it only works if the other participants have nothing to say, or are unwilling to say it - otherwise it just creates a backlash against the facilitator. It may do so anyway, there might be reasons why the other folks are not talking. In that case the facilitator has got to read the larger body and once he manages to get a discussion going, and reasonably on course he needs to back off, and only inject where absolutely needed. The goal I think should be to continually decrease his %. I also understand that is hard to do given the "are we there yet" pressures from the various domestic audiences the facilitator is subject to. No way around that I guess, but to continue to tell the kids in the back to hold their bladder.

The discussion about facilitation in the quotation above points out the crux of the problem as I see it. If the facilitator does most of the talking, then the group being facilitated really has no desire to "fix" the problem. When this point becomes apparent to the facilitator, it is time to pack up and go home. Any other choice seems to put the facilitator into the category of micturating up a rope.

An old saying goes, "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink." This is not completely accurate. You can make it drink after a fashion: hold its mouth and nose under the water and apply a vigorous suction to its posterior. I think, however, that neither the horse nor the drinking "facilitator" find this to be a really palatable solution. At some point, probably sooner rather than later IMHO, the horse needs to be left to its own devices. If it is too clueless about its situation to drink, then maybe it ought to be left to die of thirst.

[Ken White]

"...I am of the opinion though that if you can't get the Afghani to pick up the bulk of the conversation, then we're not facilitating, we're leading - and that is not where we want to be. I've been in conversations where the facilitator does most of the talking, it only works if the other participants have nothing to say, or are unwilling to say it - otherwise it just creates a backlash against the facilitator..."Well said!

Add to that the inherent politeness of folks from the ME and Afghanistan will literally PRECLUDE their joining in and saying forthrightly what they may want. They might address it obliquely and in a mode a lot of westerners would not grasp but they are unlikely to address it directly. This is a very critical point tha many in the west tend to forget or over ride.
...I think the authors were too, but were spending the bulk of their argument trying to raise the issue of the form that military involvment should take - with the understanding that it would have to fill some of the gaps not being provided from civilians due to capability and capacity gaps within those organizations.I agree and that was my perception; I'd only make the point that they're looking at a military solution or, possibly more accurately, a great deal of military impact on the final solution. My belief is that is the wrong way to go as it will only continue the military centric approach -- which obviously is not working too well regardless of the great efforts and sacrifices and I also am quite convinced that adding more Troops will not help; on the contrary, I think it will hurt..
Michael O'Hanlon wrote a pretty good piece the other day that Dave captured on the OP-ED roundup that addresses this issue pretty well. As DoD folks begin to look at the transition point to State, what might appear as a more natural one is more difficult to put your finger on because State lacks the means, as such it degrades into a circular argument.Saw that and disagree; here's why:
If we expect them to pick up the responsibilities, we have to provide them the means to match their authorities. That is a big shift for the reasons you point out, but the sooner we start doing it, the sooner they will be able to do it (kinda sounds like energy policy too). Right now the question of "when does the JTF transition authority to the State" seems muddied by the lack of resources State can bring to bear in a flexible manner. DoD can move to an "in support" relationship, but that is not entirely clear either if they are in reality doing the heavy lifting because State is not strong enough.That presumes it is the intent of and in the long term interests of the US to do that and do FID and such.

I strongly dispute that.

We are as a people --and we are emphatically a distinct breed of people -- not mentally equipped to do that. We have tried it numerous places since 1900 with varying success -- mostly without success -- and I'm a firm believer in the "One-Third" and "Two Year" rules. Many disagree with those but I suggest they're living in a dream world and history does not support their objections.
If our strategic outlook is that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less, and that while not the perfect tool, DoD does have the capacity, then doesn't it make sense for the USG to go ahead and invest in the more appropriate tools?Yep -- but the far more important question and one that is not being debated with any seriousness is:

Should our strategic outlook be that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less.

I submit the answer is a resounding 'NO." We are not tempermentally equipped to do it well; we are too impatient and into short term solutions; more importantly -- and this is important -- our governmental system and its rapid in world terms turnover is totally inimical to such operations.

Furthermore and frankly, nowadays the rest of the world isn't inclined that way either:
September 2008: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 61% of Canadians oppose sending troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 35% support it. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada's_role_in_the_invasion_of_Afghanistan)
More than two-thirds of Britons believe British troops should be pulled out of Afghanistan next year, according to an opinion poll released on Wednesday. LINK (http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/081112/world/afghanistan_unrest_britain_poll)

Can you say 'holding the bag" -- more importantly, how will most voters and Congress react to that. I submit it does not look good. We need to conduct a realistic, pragmatic look at our national goals and strategies and not just keep putting bandaids on the processes -- which is what we have been doing for all of my adult life. As the man said:

Doing the same thing over and over while achieving the same result is insanity.

[Anthony Hoh]

IMO we will never be able to articulate our final product because we are the facilitator. Before we can decide on why or what a "surge" (for lack of a better term) does/is. Shouldn't we pressure the GIRoA to tell us what their end state is? I mean Karzi is calling for the protection of Mullah Omar in an effort to co-opt him into the political process. (I am a fan of amnesty for insurgents, however that particular SOB owes me some blood!) But moves like this change the dynamics of what the Afghan government is trying to do. Until they make up their minds on where the ship is going, any attempts we make to steer the boat will likely do more harm than good. Before we can define our strategic aims as the third party counter-insurgent the host government needs to make some big decisions first.

[Ken White]

I'm not sure Karzai has a firm enough hold to do that (FWIW, I doubt anyone will in the near future in Afghanistan). We probably wouldn't like the answer if anyone could do that...

I do note that Karzai has said he believes strongly enough in talking to Omar that he said if the US and other Western countries disagreed, they could either leave the country or remove him. LINK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7732301.stm).

The Talib are mostly Pushtun, so is Karzai but a lot of other shakers and movers are from other ethnicities. A balancing act in a regrettable necessity and it's bound to be inherently unstable. Karzai leans to far one way and he'll have another Iraq like mess on his hands with a civil war ongoing.

No easy solutions. Not that there were ever going to be -- problem is, no one with any knowledge of the area and people was consulted (or really listened to) and no real thought was put into it other than "Do something. NOW" That's the American way...

No slack!