John Robb's "The Switch" [Archive]

Bill Moore

11-16-2008, 03:56 AM

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/11/the-switch.html#comments

Traditional guerrilla movements and insurgencies were founded on strict ideologies or political agendas. As a result, their organizations tended towards hierarchy and strong central control. However, the advent of a dominant global market (that no organization, despite claims to the contrary, controls) and the subsequent and inevitable weakening of the nation-state changed that. It substituted market values for ideological or political values and insurgencies are quickly changing to reflect that.

This "switch" also means that control of the nation-state became is nearly useless in an environment where success was only generated by competition within a global market system at a local level. As a result, modern or 21st Century guerrilla movements/insurgencies increasingly don't put ideology or politics first (although there are some high profile hold-outs, reversals such as al Qaeda suffered in Iraq demonstrate that an inability to invert goals is the path to failure). Increasingly, they put economics first, or more specifically: they focus on the ability of the group and its members to generate wealth. They do this through the integration of their military capability with production centers and supply routes that power the multi-trillion dollar flows of Black Globalization. This connection provides them with the ability to: grow support, grow operations, etc.

John Robb can be painfully arrogant and doesn't have much of a grasp on history, but he is still very much value added to the collective body of futuristic thinkers on warfare.

This post is interesting (although not entirely accurate from a historical stand point), and so are the comments provided by his readers. It is definitely relative to the SWJ community, since one of the key lines of operation according to our COIN doctrine is economic development.

Some of the key take aways (my perspective):

1. The black or underground economy is nothing new, but the global demand for black products by increasingly wealthy countries is larger than ever, as is the ability to shift mega dollars around the world in seconds.

2. Ideology is still critical to insurgencies, and is still the main driving force of most "true" insurgencies, even if it is a thinly veiled attempt to cover up the main effort which may be organized criminal activity. I would agree that criminal organizations are many ways similiar to insurgencies, so his points are still valid. Regardless, many failed insurgencies have evolved into organized criminal groups.

3. The challenge of the global market on our stability efforts is immense, and one need look no further than Mexico, Columbia and Afghanistan for well known examples. The opium problem in Aghanistan continues to challenge our efforts and presents us with a wicked problem.

4. How do you make the Nation State relevant economically to the populace(a key to controlling and governing their populace) when the global trade in underground drugs, humans, pirated software and videos, is so lucrative, and what drives the many local economies? What can the State offer? When the State attempts to control this so called illicit trade due to pressure from other States, they are in effect declaring war of sorts on their own entrepreuers, their own people (sort of like excessive taxes on small businesses, but much worse), so the State is labeled an enemy, and a criminal insurgency starts. There are no easy answers to this.

5. Robb didn't address the ability of terrorists/insurgents to raise money locally with the drug trade, kidnappings, etc. They are no longer dependent on some mosque in Saudi anymore, they have adapted the street gang model to generate money (supplements other funding efforts), thus raise thoursands of dollars through extortion, pedaling black market gasoline in Iraq, kidnapping in the Philippines, selling drugs everywhere, etc...

More thoughts on this later, I just wanted to get out to the community for now.

Cavguy

11-16-2008, 04:15 AM

Bill Moore

11-16-2008, 04:17 AM

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27644191/

Terrorism, as one Treasury official noted, is “not a rich man’s sport.”

An analysis of some of the most notable attacks show that al-Qaida and others it has inspired have spent between $5,000 and $500,000 to carry out the attacks. Although the numbers in most cases is an approximation—and may not include all costs, such as training—they serve as an indicator of how little is needed to get the world’s attention.

Michael Sheehan, the former counterterrorism director for the New York Police Department, says the department has long been guided by a “4 x 10” rule – “10 men + 10 weeks + $10,000 = 10,000-pound bomb.”

This summary bears out the rule.

The Mafia Is Italy's Biggest Business

http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=6238022&page=1

Organized crime is the biggest business in Italy, according to the latest study by the country's shopkeepers association, Confesercenti.

In this file photo, an Italian carabinieri walks near a burnt bus in the La Valle bus depot at San Donato Mineo, in the south of Italy. Over 30 buses were burnt in the early morning to terrorize the owner of bus company and the arson is blamed on the N'Drangheta, the Calabrian Mafia.

The biggest business operating in Italy today is organized crime, according to the latest study by Italy's shopkeeper's association, Confesercenti.
That Italy's mafias do a booming business, particularly the drug-related variety, is common knowledge. But the effect on the country's legitimate businesses such as tourism and food production had not been as clear until the Confesercenti released the figures, which are staggering.

Cavguy

11-16-2008, 04:23 AM

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27644191/

The Mafia Is Italy's Biggest Business

http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=6238022&page=1

Ok, this is organized transnational crime/smuggling, which has been going on - oh - since the beginning of history. There is little new here. The link between crime and insurgency didn't emerge in the last 10 years.

Bill Moore

11-16-2008, 08:19 AM

Can someone provide me some examples of these "market driven guerrillas" that have made nation states irrelevant?

It is painfully clear to most that Robb's hyperbole is Robb's self marketing methodology, and it will eventually backfire if he ever presents himself in forum to debate his ideas; however, I still find an occassional post of his useful. In this case, it prompted me think about our economic development line of effort as it relates to COIN.

To answer your specific question above, I think I listed three examples already, Afghanistan, Mexico, and Columbia. I agree irrelevant is normally too strong a term, but in Afghanistan that "may" be the case, as I don't see what viable economic alternative the State has to offer for the opium trade. I hope I'm wrong, but there are plenty of Afghan experts who monitor our posts, so hopefully they'll weigh in.

Mexico in my opinion is currently at war with organized crime, and it is an insurgency, because the criminals are fighting for political control in certain areas of Mexico to facilitate their activities.

My concern, and I stand by it is the following:

How do you make the Nation State relevant economically to the populace(a key to controlling and governing their populace) when the global trade in underground drugs, humans, pirated software and videos, is so lucrative, and what drives the many local economies? What can the State offer? When the State attempts to control this so called illicit trade due to pressure from other States, they are in effect declaring war of sorts on their own entrepreuers, their own people (sort of like excessive taxes on small businesses, but much worse), so the State is labeled an enemy, and a criminal insurgency starts. There are no easy answers to this.

You said the Mafia in Italy (and elsewhere) is nothing new. You're right, but the power of organized crime has increased considerably in recent years due to the effects of globalism. Not only do they have more money to subvert governments (Mexico is one example, Russia is another), they are getting increasingly sosphisticated. The reason I posted the article about the Italian Mob being the biggest business in Italy is two fold, one to point out that the black economy is bigger than the legal economy in a G7 country, and two to point out the connection between the current economic crisis and how that is empowering some criminal organizations. It is clearly a much more serious threat to national security than it has been in the past.

As for supporting insurgents and terrorist, I only point that out as a reminder. Chasing money in their bank accounts is important, but as the article points it is fairly easy to raise the money needed through decentralized criminal activities. Again it there is no one magic node that we can target to shut down their operations.

P McCarthy

11-16-2008, 02:13 PM

In the spirit of discussion - while I may not agree with the suppositions posted within the articles, could Somalia be an "isolated" example of "market driven guerillas"?

It has been suggested in several articles that Somalia has heavy Al-Qaeda influences, has been the target of US military action due to the involvement of the embassy bombings - and yet - piracy proliferates in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

High ransoms, extortion, and loosely organized bands of pirates prey on every size of boat that traverses the Somalia coast.

Could this be driven by insurgent ideology or be a method of making money for a lawless, impoverished society?

Thanks for your thoughts and insight.

Pat

Bill Moore

11-16-2008, 04:55 PM

My knee jerk reaction, is that the piracy we're seeing off the coast of Somalia isn't new, but the intensity of it is due to a relatively recent (past 20 years) loss of State control, more weapons available on the open market (pirates probably have greater capability, and success begets success, because they have more money to buy faster boats and more weapons), fewer viable economic alternatives.

Somalia is a country in the non-integrated gap, and what I have read to date their criminals are integrated into the global economy, but simply tapping into it by holding ships and crews for ransom. I'm sure there is more to the story, I'm basing this admittedly lame assessment off about three newspaper articles :o.

However, their operations are having an effect on the global economy. This problem should be relaatively easy to suppress to an acceptable level again if the international community is willing to take the harsh actions needed against the pirates, so the risk out weighs the gains in their decision making calculus, but the long term permnanent fix (nothing is permanent) is regaining State control and creating alternative economic models for the coastal populations of Somalia.

Entropy

11-16-2008, 05:08 PM

When I read about non-ideologically driven ("market") insurgents, the first two things that popped into my head were mercenaries and pirates. They still exist today, of course, but not nearly at levels seen in previous eras.

I think there's some ethnocentrism here as well. One person's "illegal" or "black" market is another person's legitimate enterprise. The opium trade in Afghanistan is but one example. If Afghanistan produced widgets instead of opium, the Taliban and other groups would get their funding from widgets just as easily. What would John Robb's argument be then?

Cavguy

11-16-2008, 05:16 PM

To answer your specific question above, I think I listed three examples already, Afghanistan, Mexico, and Columbia. I agree irrelevant is normally too strong a term, but in Afghanistan that "may" be the case, as I don't see what viable economic alternative the State has to offer for the opium trade. I hope I'm wrong, but there are plenty of Afghan experts who monitor our posts, so hopefully they'll weigh in.

Afghanistan - one can argue it never had a functioning government, and always has been run by smugglers and traders. Nothing really new and groundbreaking there - like warfare, the tools have changed, but not in a game-changing way. In fact, one can postulate that non-state actors act as nation states themselves when considering decisions regarding entry for conflict.

Mexico - yes, a large problem now. However, the government is theoretically quite capable of clamping down on it, but like all of these movements, it is a cycle.

Columbia - I think there is a strong case that Columbia has done exceedingly well at neutering FARC after a 20 year struggle.

Smuggling and crime have been with us through history and will continue to. There are plenty of periods where pirate groups controlled entire regions (Barbary pirates, 'Japanese' 16th century piracy along China's coast, and lots of others) This movement towords entropy and back to order is the natural rythym of history.

Yes, there are less barriers than before to these groups because of the "flattening" of the world. I still have seen nothing that indicates that the nation-state is extinct anytime soon.

For all three of your examples - if the west legalized drugs, and taxed it, would Robb's theory still hold? Same for prostitution (sex smuggling?)?

Bill Moore

11-16-2008, 06:42 PM

This movement towords entropy and back to order is the natural rythym of history.

Yes, there are less barriers than before to these groups because of the "flattening" of the world. I still have seen nothing that indicates that the nation-state is extinct anytime soon.

For all three of your examples - if the west legalized drugs, and taxed it, would Robb's theory still hold? Same for prostitution (sex smuggling?)?

We're in violent agreement, but I don't think a problem needs to be new to present a significant threat. Probably 100% of us who are regulars on the SWJ would agree that Irregular Warfare is nothing new, yet if you look the amount of effort being applied to adjust to this "new" threat, you would think that earth has been invaded by Aliens.

The threat has evolved, and State has not yet adjusted to it. If I even have point (you now have me wondering if I do), it is that the State needs to recognize this threat and address it. Your comment on Afghanistan is correct, but we still have to address it if our goal is to make Afghanistan a viable nation-state. Regarding Mexico, that conflict has just started in ernest, but if you read the article and numerous others you know it isn't restricted to Mexico, their drug cartels are global in every one of our States. Is that a global insurgency? I don't think so, but it is geting close.

The Columbians have done very well against the FARC, but he FARC is only one problem, the problem now is that the various criminal groups are becoming decentralized, and they are undermining other governments in the region, and I even recently saw a report of S. American durg cartels undermining a government in Western Africa. We're a long ways off from achieving success.

I have arguing for legalizing drugs for some time for that very reason, but unfortunately that option appears to be too politically incorrect to be an acceptable course of action. How would legalize pirated DVDs, CDs, etc.? Much smaller scale problem, but still a problem.

I think there's some ethnocentrism here as well. One person's "illegal" or "black" market is another person's legitimate enterprise. The opium trade in Afghanistan is but one example. If Afghanistan produced widgets instead of opium, the Taliban and other groups would get their funding from widgets just as easily. What would John Robb's argument be then?

Entrophy, I can't speak for Robb and I don't want to be seen as coming to his defense, I simply discussing a problem area. However, I don't think the problem is mercenaries, it is more sosphisticated than that and contrary to your assumptions (unless you're talking about the Middle Ages, before the advent of the Nation State).

I think if the Taliban controlled any form of economic production (widgets or drugs), then Robb's argument would be the same, it is non-state controlled so it is a black economy. I agree that another person may thnk his enterprise is legitimate, but if we believe in the nation-state construct and his enterprise is not legal, then it isn't legitimate.

Entropy

11-16-2008, 07:55 PM

Bill,

The thing with Afghanistan is that there has never really been "state" control of economic activity. I personally believe, based in part on this history, that such control is unlikely anytime soon. In many areas of Afghanistan the locals don't recognize any kind of "state" control and never have. Can one therefore claim that all economic activity that takes place in those areas is "black" or "illegitimate?" I don't think so, and believe it would be a mistake to blindly treat it as illegitimate.

The point I tried to make is that just because we may view some kind of economic activity as illegitimate from our perspective, it doesn't necessarily mean it that others view it the same way. There are many more contemporary and historic examples where "states" have not "controlled" economic activity. Look across the border at the tribal areas of Pakistan. The state has little to no control over economic activity there. This was even codified to a certain extent in the Pakistani constitution - collection of taxes in the tribal areas in unconstitutional.

That insurgents or groups in conflict with a nation-state would use economies outside of government control seems kind of obvious. Has this not always been the case? John Robb then says:

It should be apparent that "the switch" to economic agendas in combination with decentralized organizational structures makes modern guerrillas much more dangerous than ever in history.

I think he needs to read more history.

Ken White

11-16-2008, 08:44 PM

The thing with Afghanistan is that there has never really been "state" control of economic activity. . . Can one therefore claim that all economic activity that takes place in those areas is "black" or "illegitimate?" I don't think so, and believe it would be a mistake to blindly treat it as illegitimate.All true.
...John Robb then says . . . I think he needs to read more history.Also true... :wry: That or just get out more... :D

slapout9

11-17-2008, 12:06 AM

1- In Colonel Jones article about PCE's he talks about understanding the purpose of the organization. Criminal organizations are generally profit oriented, they may do things to influence a government but they don't want to overthrow one.

2- The Mafia doesn't mess with other peoples religions or ideologies.

3-They look at the population as customers, they don't care about the rest. They don't believe in free markets....they create them and strange as it seems they take care of them.

4-They often make large donations to their own religious organizations.

5-They take care of their own organization...they would never sign a treaty that gave away an advantage to another organization.

6-They would never let large groups of people in their organization be without work, thus they generate great loyalty.

7-They are patriotic, they support the US and did many things during WW2 that allowed us to win.

8-They could tell you what to do with the drugs in Astan, but I doubt we will go that route.

Bill Moore

11-17-2008, 02:11 AM

Entrophy, no one in their right mind would argue your points on Afghan's history. That isn't the issue, the issue is that our objective is to establish a viable Nation-State, and if it can't control the economy (at least more than it influences now), is our objective feasible?

Slapout, you're living in the past regarding the Italian Mafia, which is a shadow of what it once was in America, but has regained new strength in Italy and other parts of the world. The Italian Mafia (just like the Russian, Mexician, Albanian, Chinese mafias, etc.) are not supporters of the U.S. government. Just because the U.S. government used them as surrogates for a couple of operations, ones they were well compensated for I'm sure, doesn't make them loyal citizens of our country.

In Colonel Jones article about PCE's he talks about understanding the purpose of the organization. Criminal organizations are generally profit oriented, they may do things to influence a government but they don't want to overthrow one.

There is little difference between the type of subversion the Mafia's conduct and the overthrow of the government. If they own the key politicians, judges, police chiefs, etc., then they in effect had a successful coup. They may not want to establish a Marxist government or Sharia law, but they sure as hell want to subvert the law, which is ultimately the purpose of a State.

They take care of their own organization...they would never sign a treaty that gave away an advantage to another organization.

If you're implying they wouldn't work with other groups, that has been proven false. They'll jockey for a stronger position, incorporation, and perhaps eventually eliminate the competition if it fits their design, but they have consider flexibility in thei policy objectives. :)

They could tell you what to do with the drugs in Astan, but I doubt we will go that route.

Even the Italian mob is running drugs now, so I doubt they're going to undermine a source by helping us help.

What's this love affair with the Italian Mob all about? Were you on their payroll when you were in Miami Vice?

Bill Moore

11-17-2008, 03:25 AM

http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e/presentation-e/labrousse2-e.htm

Services are exchanged between organizations, political and criminal, essentially at the ring level. Following is an example of such an exchange which puts Islamists and Mafia members in contact with each other: in Milan in November 1994, Italian police stopped Djamel Loucini, no. 3 of the FIS, who was suspected of having engaged for three years in an intensive traffic in weapons intended for resistance groups. To organize the deliveries, Loucini had first relied on rings of North African drug traffickers operating in southwestern Germany. They provided him with their logistical support (in particular couriers) to convey weapons via France, Spain and Morocco in exchange for access to Loucini's financial operations to launder revenues from their illegal activities. Settled in Italy since January 1994, Loucini had gained access to the Mafia's underground channels - in particular the drug connections of the Neapolitan Camorra and the labour trafficking connections in western Sicily - to assist in transporting weapons to Algeria.

Although it is not out of the question that certain criminal rings might convert to the revolutionary cause, particularly when that cause is a religious one, the reverse is what most often occurs.

http://jihadwatch.org/archives/001650.php

ROME (Reuters) - Italian investigators have found a link between Islamic militant groups and the Camorra, one of Italy's main organized crime groups, a top anti-Mafia investigator said on Monday.
"We have evidence that groups of the Camorra are implicated in an exchange of weapons for drugs with terrorist groups," Pierluigi Vigna, Italy's national anti-mafia prosecutor, told reporters at the foreign press club.

Asked what kind of groups, he said: "Islamic terrorist groups."

http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi012.htm

By 1981, Pakistani laboratories, with the Sicilian mafia as their intermediaries, were supplying over 60 percent of the US heroin demand and an even greater proportion of Europe's market. By the mid-1980s, an individual mafia cosce, the Badalmenti, was distributing bulk heroin directly across America through the facade of local pizza parlors and accumulating extraordinarily profits.

While the modern mafia may have grown Mercury's wings to move drugs across Asia to the Americas, the logic of laundering brought its cosce back home to Palermo to seek a safe haven for narco profits. Such an expanded local base may also have contributed to mafia's growing penetration of the Italian state. With a vast capital from its role as heroin broker, the mafia increased its control over the hidden politics that operated at the intersection of the Italian state, parties, corporations and criminality. Specifically, the better capitalized mafia cosce were able to begin dictating the agenda for public works and the allocation of their illegal profits, reaching beyond the South to the whole of Italy

http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/anti-terrorism-advisory-council/atac-vol-04-04.pdf

Italian investigators have found a link between Islamic terrorist groups and the Camorra, one of Italy's main organized crime groups, a top anti-Mafia investigator said Monday. "We have evidence that groups of the Camorra are implicated in an exchange of weapons for drugs with terrorist groups," Pierluigi Vigna, Italy's national anti-mafia prosecutor, told reporters at the foreign press club. Vigna, whose Rome-based office coordinates the work of magistrates investigating organized crime in Italy, said he could not give more details. Pressed further, he suggested the cooperation came about after a member of the Camorra, the Naples-area version of the Sicilian Mafia, converted to Islam and met in prison with Muslims who had been arrested in Italy. Aked what kind of terrorist groups, he said: "Islamic terrorist groups."

http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/TNOC_LINKS_STUDY_REPORT.pdf

have reported arm smuggling activities by Italian and other European crime organization to Palestinian groups in the middle east, and between Italian crime groups involved in both arms and drug trafficking and various Arab clients through the Syrian Government. Terrorists in Italy are said to have assisted the Sicilian mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra and Calabrian gangsters in smuggling narcotics.

Bill Moore

11-17-2008, 03:36 AM

http://westernfrontamerica.com/2008/04/23/mexican-drug-cartels-terrorist-recruiting-fighters-train-soldiers/

Mexican drug cartels are now advertising for young men to step up and to come and join their ranks to fight the Mexican army. The ads and banners premise those who join will make good money have food and a place to stay even while in training. “Operative group ‘The Zetas’ wants you, soldier or ex-soldier. We offer a good salary, food and benefits for your family. Don’t suffer anymore mistreatment and don’t go hungry.”

Mexican drug cartels according to recent press reports have military style training camps on and near the border with the United States. These Training camps are for military-style killers. Federal authorities say these camps have Afghanistan and other middle eastern instructors who teach the latest military fighting tactics that are utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Islamic radicals that are fighting and killing American and allied troops in those countries

Former Mexican national security adviser and ambassador to the United Nations, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, stated, that “Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups are using Mexico as a refuge

And globalism at its finest:

It is well known that the Russian mafia is deeply entrenched in the criminal fabric of the Mexican drug cartels and still today plays an important roll in providing guns and other weapons to the cartels and are purveyors of, drug smuggling, money laundering, prostitution, trafficking in women from Eastern and Central Europe and Russia, alien and terrorist smuggling, and kidnappings for ransom.

O.K., I have it off my chest now.

Ken White

11-17-2008, 04:28 AM

FNH P90 and Five Seven Pistola to penetrate Federale Armor...

William F. Owen

11-17-2008, 07:05 AM

Frankly, I thought this was one of the stupider things I have read in awhile.

Long on buzz-word hyperbole and unsupported statements, low on facts.

Can someone provide me some examples of these "market driven guerrillas" that have made nation states irrelevant?

This is a hack piece, pushing a weakly historical buzzword laced idea for book and speaking fees. I am prepared to be argued wrong. I'm not denying the existence or threat of trans-national groups, but is he seriously saying they won't be ideologically based?

Having read it, and browsed the web-site, I agree and it begs a question as to accuracy and usefulness. There is some old 4GW stuff in here, so I don't hold out much hope. I like a respect, both Lind and Hammes, but I still think 4GW is not helpful, and this seems to be progressing the same basic ideas.

Let's invite the guy over and see what gives?

Bill Moore

11-17-2008, 07:57 AM

I made the mistake of starting this discussion with a post from Robb, and now the focus is on Robb instead of the real issue the nexus between transnational crime and terrorism, and the so what factor of it all. A lick on me, but in an attempt to get the discussion focused once again...

http://search.loc.gov:8765/query.html?col=loc&qt=A+GLOBAL+OVERVIEW+OF+NARCOTICS-FUNDED+TERRORIST+AND+OTHER+EXTREMIST+GROUPS&qp=url%3A%2Frr%2Ffrd%2F&submit.x=13&submit.y=19

Mexico’s three major drug cartels are being superseded by a half-dozen smaller, corporate style, trafficking networks. In a process that mirrors the post-cartel reconstitution of drug trafficking networks in Colombia, this “new generation” of Mexican drug traffickers is less prone to violence and more likely to employ sophisticated technologies and cooperative strategies. The processes that are driving Mexican drug trafficking organizations toward establishing cooperative networks of increasing sophistication and decreasing visibility are likely to intensify in the post-September 11 environment. As a result, Mexican drug trafficking networks are likely to emulate their Colombian counterparts by investing heavily in counterintelligence, expanding and diversifying their legitimate enterprises, and concealing transnational partnerships that could attract undue attention from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies

This is another excerpt from the interagency study posted to the Library of Congress website. It is well researched; however, this assessment made in 2002 couldn't be more off the mark. While half of it is on the mark, you have probably seen the reports on the documentaries on their counter intelligence capabilities, but so much for cooperation between the gangs. Greed is greed, and the groups are fighting one another and the government to gain a bigger share of the action.

Failure to see the significance of this threat is extremely dangerous in my opinion, and it parallels our failure to prevent the attacks on 9/11 due to our lack of imagination. We're not talking simply rifles, p-shooters and marajuana, but billions of dollars of illicit trade, major weapons systems to include surface to air missiles, and a dangerous network that can facilitate reach throughout the entire U.S.A.

There are two issues here:

These criminal enterprises are not just competing against governments, they are subverting governments (replacing governments in many areas) and in many ways they are insurgencies without an ideology (and I don't like agreeing with Robb). They will shift with the markets, and if Middle Eastern Terrorists are paying top dollar (or with drugs) to smuggle their folks into the U.S. or for weapons the criminal enterprises will provide the goods and services. More than ever are available since the end of the Cold War.

The information is all available open source, numerous organized criminal elements and now terrorist organizations opening shop in Mexico so they can link into the services and products provided by the Mexican Mafia because of the access they can provide to the good ole U.S.A. and its markets. The Mexican mafia has a well established and growing network in almost all 50 states. This is just one example, there are other examples of other criminal in in Europe and Asia that provide the similiar services and products. The nexus isn't new, just more dangerous than it has been in the past.

As for inviting Robb to the forum good luck. I tried to debate him on his website based on some of his interpretations of history and when he couldn't respond to the first challenge he replied I don't think you should participate here :rolleyes: He is another Rush Limbaugh in some respects, just another loud mouth with very little depth. He isn't a Lind or Hammes, he is a software geek that likes to frame problems using software and networking terms. The most amusing aspect is he seems to believe he is the only one who gets it, but on the other hand, based on some of the comments throughout this council, he may have a point. There appears to be a significant lack of understanding of emerging threats. Hiding behind the myth of it isn't anything new reminds me of the three monkeys (see no evil, heaar no evil, speak no evil). New or not, it is still a problem that needs to be dealt with.

Bob's World

11-17-2008, 12:41 PM

Ideology is prehaps the most misunderstood aspect of Insurgency. Throughout the GWOT our national strategy has identified it as the strategic Center of Gravity, and launched our entire national security aparatus on quest to "Defeat Extremist Ideology."

Robb goes to the other end of crazy and says that ideology and politics are no longer important for "modern insurgency."

Insurgency is insurgency, the principles don't change, but the environment does. In today's globalized world the state system is having less relative power and importance as populaces gain in the same. But they are still here, and will be here for decades, and probably centuries to come. Another big change is the rise of non-state organizations, like AQ, that are now waging UW much as states always have.

Ideology is absolutely a critical requirement to any and every insurgency. It is the message that speaks to the populace, and takes a position that the target government is either unable, or unwilling to co-opt. You must have one to run a successful insurgency. However, though you must have one, the nature of it is not particularly important so long as it accomplishes the purpose stated here. We focus far too much on "defeating ideologies," and not nearly enough on addressing underlying causes that make a populace susecptible to such seditious messaging.

As Chairman Deng said regarding ideology: "It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice."

So, while I would agree that our focus on ideology is currently terribly wrong; to suggest that it, and more aburdly politics (insurgency is politics) are no longer relevant offers nothing helpful to the debate.

slapout9

11-17-2008, 01:02 PM

What's this love affair with the Italian Mob all about? Were you on their payroll when you were in Miami Vice?

I have no love affair with the Mob, Bill. No I wasn't on their payroll and didn't expect a comment like that from some one of your statue Bill. I don't call you crack smoking stupid because you want to legalize drugs do I?The points were in reference to the article YOU posted by John Robb about Market Oriented Guerrillas and to make some points about how there are such organizations but they are not true insurgencies, but they will use their tactics, but it is all about the money to them. Many of your later posts just support this in my opinion, look at points 1,2,3 to start. All The Way, Sir

Entropy

11-17-2008, 01:59 PM

Entrophy, no one in their right mind would argue your points on Afghan's history. That isn't the issue, the issue is that our objective is to establish a viable Nation-State, and if it can't control the economy (at least more than it influences now), is our objective feasible?

I've argued elsewhere that our objective isn't feasible. I've suggested the best that might be achieved is a state like Pakistan which only has effective control over 1/3 of its supposedly sovereign territory with the remainder being run more like a colony than anything else. I also tend to think we should be trying to coopt the opium trade instead of trying to get rid of it - at least for the time being. There are more important things to accomplish than moralizing about opium, IMO. Opium production is a long-term problem that can't be solved until other things happen first.

I don't think state control of the economy is at all necessary. Just look at the early USA - the economy was almost completely controlled at the local level and the further in the boonies you got, the more local the control. For a largely agrarian country like Afghanistan with a diverse ethnic character, I don't think centralized control of the economy is either desirable or possible, particularly given the difficulties that already exist attempting to get some kind of centralized political control/authority.

And one can consider the opposite case. I've been reading a bit about the Baluchs recently. It turns out that pretty much all of the major economic activity that takes place in the Baluch areas of Pakistan are controlled by the central government (resource extraction, major construction projects, etc.). Even workers are imported. Not surprisingly, this activity benefits the punjab majority next door almost exclusively and provides very little to the Baluchs. Not a good situation and some believe another major Baluch insurrection is only a matter of time.

In this part of the world, too much state control is often a bad thing because the state is rarely fair. The state favors certain groups at the expense of others. The Baluchs are only one example. In the case of a strong Afghan central government I don't think the result would be much different.

Just my 2 cents.

11-17-2008, 02:38 PM

As Chairman Deng said regarding ideology: "It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice."
It is also important to consider the pragmatic point about cat ownership that is left unsaid in this quotation from Mao. Some owners could care less about the cat's efficacy as a mouser. In some instances, the color of the cat is all that matters to its owner. To rephrase the Chairman, "It matters not whether a cat can catch mice, only whether it is calico."

A couple of points about this whole "raison d'etre" for rising against an installed government:
1. Governments’ primary focus ought to be to secure their people from invasion/assault by other people. In a world in which such invasions are much less likely, governments switch to other items of business (AKA ideologies) to justify their existence—such as establishing a more ”just” economic infrastructure.
(BTW, I suspect that the debate about what kind of force structure we need falls into this same category—Defense needs to justify a military organization whose primary mission has traditionally been to secure the country from invasion. The odd thing is that the only time the US was truly threatened by such an invasion, the Army was unable to prevent it—look up the Battle of Bladensburg.)
2. Things like the drug trade and prostitution could be legalized and taxed, but they would still lend themselves to an illicit underground operation—take a look at the smuggling of tobacco products from the South to the North to avoid high taxes. The numbers racket still flourishes even in states with lotteries too. Another "ideological" consideration here is the “moral” aspect that such a legalization would indicate—American society at least (and probably a host of other countries’) seems unable to tolerate government support for “immoral’ activity—sex and drugs being strong examples.

Regardless of how well governments do whatever it is they do, folks will not get all of their needs satisfied. So they will seek to satisfy those needs from non-licit sources. The move to "black" markets is motivated by many reasons--lower cost, less regulation, less social stigma, better customer service, to name a few. However, I submit black markets will alway exist.

In light of the above, establishing a valid government in Afghanistan is an inappropriate end state—particularly if that “valid” government is supposed to be one that “fixes” what are identified by we Westerners as the economic woes of the country. Even if some old "itches" are removed, new ones will arise that will require an underground/alter government (like the Mafia; the Taleban; the Crips; or Bingo, Beano, and the Dominican and Franciscan Orders) to scratch them.

Ken White

11-17-2008, 02:56 PM

...So, while I would agree that our focus on ideology is currently terribly wrong; to suggest that it, and more aburdly politics (insurgency is politics) are no longer relevant offers nothing helpful to the debate.It also seems to me we are starting to revisit our focus. One can only hope...

Bob's World

11-17-2008, 03:46 PM

Galula's book (which is far and away the best breakdown of insurgency that I've read) looked at Mao's approach to insurgency and ideology. Mao changed ideology 4 times, continually keeping a finger on the pulse of the situation and the concerns of the populace and changing messages and themes accordingly. He understood that his goal was political, and that the ideology was just a tool to motivate the populace to aid in his political campaign. At the end of the day the Chinese populace never got what Mao promised, but Mao got the political change he sought.

Its easy to lose sight of the big picture when the peripheral issues can be so overwhelming, and when voices of motivated novices can be so loud. I find it is best to take the advice of Henry David Thoreau on this:
"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."

Ideology is a "branch", as is Bin Laden himself and any other key leader. The roots lie within the populace, and each populace is unique.

This is my soapbox, and I will stay on it until sounder logic can push me off.

William F. Owen

11-17-2008, 04:10 PM

At the end of the day the Chinese populace never got what Mao promised, but Mao got the political change he sought.

Yep. Pure Clausewitz, and the same is true of organised crime. Criminals use violence to create political change - essentially one where they control the who they need to, to do what they want. Look at Pablo Escobar.

This is my soapbox, and I will stay on it until sounder logic can push me off.

I have one or two boxes myself. When sounder logic is apparent, the box crumbles. No one needs to push you off.

slapout9

11-17-2008, 06:06 PM

Link to the Mafias 10 commandments.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492449/Police-discover-Mafias-Ten-Commandments-arresting-Godfather.html

Bob's World

11-17-2008, 06:10 PM

I see a lot of talk about the growth of international crime networks, and how often there are connections between these profit motivated organizations and politically motivated organizations. These "strange bedfellows" type of arraingement make a lot of sense, but they don't in turn blend the purposes of the organizations. There is a significant community within the military that want to take the war to the criminal organizations because they can make such linkages to AQ or Hezbollah, etc. This is dangerous ground.

We must be careful to resist the urge to make easy conclusions and stay focused on what an organizations primary purpose for action is when determing how to best engage them. Otherwise we risk expanding the war to defeat AQ far beyond its actual parameters, and risk actually lending credence to Bin Laden's propaganda and dragging otherwise disenterested populaces into the fight that prior to our engagement were simply out to make a buck.

If I ran AQ, I would absolutely want to use existing drug networks to raise cash through the sale of Afghan opium, and more importantly to gain covert access to the U.S. Similarly, if I ran a Latin American drug cartel, I would want access to quality, inexpensive opium, and also to leverage source of personnel who are willing to assume tremendous personal risk in delivering my product to market. This does not in any way change or blend the original primary purpose for either organizaiton. They are just maximizing their common ground.

slapout9

11-17-2008, 06:25 PM

If I ran AQ, I would absolutely want to use existing drug networks to raise cash through the sale of Afghan opium, and more importantly to gain covert access to the U.S. Similarly, if I ran a Latin American drug cartel, I would want access to quality, inexpensive opium, and also to leverage source of personnel who are willing to assume tremendous personal risk in delivering my product to market. This does not in any way change or blend the original primary purpose for either organizaiton. They are just maximizing their common ground.

Exactly!

slapout9

11-17-2008, 06:42 PM

Link to Danger Room interview of John P. Sullivan of the L.A. Sheriff's Dept. A number of articles by John have been put up on the SWJ Blog spot. Very good article by John.

http://blog.wired.com/defense/

MikeF

11-17-2008, 06:48 PM

Gentlemen,

Over the course of the last three weeks, my thesis research on Iraq has been distracted by a more pressing situation in Salinas, CA- the home of John Steinback. I believe that my observations are particularly relevant for this thread, and y'all may find the topic interesting and compelling for further discussion.

Salinas, along with many cities in Northern California (NorCal), are facing what they perceive to be as a gang problem. Levels of violence, drug use, and other criminal activity metrics have increased exponentially throughout the last decade. Some neighborhoods of Salinas are deemed no-go zones or ungovernable. Despite $5m invested by Congress to establish an anti-gang task force created to serve as "the local model for national level anti-gang task forces," Sen Boxer Press Comment (http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=226222) progress is fleeting.

Local officials are exasperated. Local law enforcement is exhausted. In their own words, the situation is dire.

Just like in Iraq circa late 2006. The frightening realization is that I've walked this dog before. Even more frightening is that this problem is now in my own backyard, and we seem somewhat oblivious to it. It took us many years of fighting in Iraq to collectively realize that AQI was merely a symptom of a greater problem.

From my initial observations, I do not believe that Salinas has a gang problem-the gangs are merely symptoms of a larger problem that includes transnational terrorism, the drug trade, illegal immigration, prison reform, civil rights and equality, education, and poverty. As the world "flattens," Salinas is an example of the negative side effects of globalization.

Before I explain a portion of the greater problem that transcends the local government of Salinas and potentially leads further south to Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, I would like to introduce local recruitment tools and propaganda used throughout NorCal: Generation of United Nortenos. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9SyC4RUKVw) In this video, you'll notice that they've successfully recruited Elmo and Mickey Mouse to become gangstas. In other videos, the children recruited are reminicent of the children we captured in AQI training camps in Diyala Province.

Switching gears...

As noted in a previous post, Plan Colombia has effectively demobilized the AUC and marginalized the FARC. We have had tremendous success in lower levels of violence in the country (95% decrease in kidnappings, 50% decrease in homicides, 70% decrease in oil pipeline attacks, and 80% increase in trafficability along roads). Furthermore, the big media success was the hostage rescue.

However, the drug production and exports are still escalating- the primary focus of the original Plan Colombia is a failure. Additionally, the Colombia military continues to be plagued with an image problem through continued Alleged Human Rights Abuses. CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS (http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32250_20080912.pdf)

Throughout Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, etc...), outside of the regular issues of governance, the mayan population continues to remain disenfranchised, second-class citizenry.

In Mexico, we're seeing a significant rise in drug wars- the national police force is either penetrated, corrupted, or marginalized and the army is doing the fighting. As linked throughout this thread, the drug wars are threatening the stability of the government as the gangs are allegedly reinforced and trained by transnational islamic groups (AQ, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc..).

Back to Salinas...

Maybe none of this is related. Maybe Salinas just has a gang-problem.

Or maybe it is all inter-connected. I don't know. I'm just putting it out there for discussion. I read the original constitution (circa 1968) of the Norteno familia, one of the gangs in Salinas. What I read was 2/3s Che Guvera, 1/3 Chairman Mao sprinkled with some Ghandi.

The original organization was not a gang or shadow government. Originally, it was a community organization focused on the social, political, and economic progress of the perceived disenfranchised latino/hispanic community.

During the 1980's, ex-Vietnam vets joined the famila and militarized it using the hard fought lessons learned in their war.

I've adapted a Kilcullen quote on Afghanistan to summarize this thread...

Well, I doubt that an Anbar-style “awakening” is likely in Salinas. The enemy is very different from Al Qaeda in Iraq and, in any case, Salinas’ gangs have a very different makeup from Arab tribes. So even if an awakening happened it would likely play out differently from Iraq. Rather than talking about negotiations (which implies offering an undefeated gang a seat at the table, and is totally not in the cards)

I would prefer the term “community engagement.”

The local families, neighborhoods, and communities in some parts of Salinas have been alienated by poor governance and feel disenfranchised...This creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the neighborhood level, that the gangs have filled. Rather than negotiate directly with the gangs, a program to reconcile with local communities who are tacitly supporting the gangs by default (because of lack of an alternative) would bear more fruit. The gang movement itself is disunited and fissured with mutual suspicion...

I'm interested in y'alls thoughts. While I'm stationed in NorCal, I think I'm gonna try to provide some help to the local officials.

v/r

mike

Bill Moore

11-18-2008, 07:24 AM

I don't call you crack smoking stupid because you want to legalize drugs do I?

If I wasn't crack smoking stupid, I would probably assume you just did. :D Hey brother, I said legalize it, I didn't say I smoked it! I have a two beer limit and even that is on rare occassion.

YOU posted by John Robb about Market Oriented Guerrillas and to make some points about how there are such organizations but they are not true insurgencies, but they will use their tactics, but it is all about the money to them. Many of your later posts just support this in my opinion, look at points 1,2,3 to start.

Unfortunately this thread is becoming one of the more popular ones I created, unfortunate in that I have become the council's whopping boy, probably started by PCE himself Bob's World, which in fact is a 20th Century World that he knows well. I want to kick his ideological soapbox out from underneath him, and bring you back from the dark side airborne. I can't do it in one post, so I'll practice the subtle art of subversion. You know the subtle art of surreptitiously eroding people's beliefs systems and turning them against their governments (or other people or organizations). I'll give Bob credit, not only for his excellent article, but he indirectly addresses subversion when he speaks of ideology, but there are other ways to accomplish subversion than attempting to mobilize a population using a population using ideology. The true war being waged in the shadows is often the decisive war, not the maneuver war, so understanding subversive activities is critical to defeating the threat. If you take Bob's approach, you focus on the population and do what exactly? If their grievance is that the government can't protect them, then there are appropriate responses to that, responses we generally have failed to make (we've started trying in Iraq, but my experience was that the war in the shadows was still going on under our noses in many places, so the legal system was corrupted, business contracts were controlled by the insurgents, and politicians were coerced or bought). If the grievance is that the criminal economic system provides more than any legal economic system authorized, do you give in, or crush the criminals and the society dependent upon them? It is a much tougher problem set, and I'm not sure how the PCE approach plays out in this case. I'm sorry, but growing wheat isn't going to fetch as much money as poppy.

By the DoD definition of insurgency you're right, "most" criminal organizations are not insurgencies because they are not attempting to over throw the constituted government. Pardon my french, but the DoD defnition sucks. It only fits Bob's view of the world, but not the reality of today's world. Through subversion criminal organizations have taken control of areas (rarely the entire country), and they have in fact become the government in those areas. By the DoD definition it isn't an insurgency, but this isn't your grandfather's mafia either. Many of today's organized criminal groups present a serious challenge to many governments for control, and like insurgents they use a combination of armed conflict (thugs on steriods) and subversion. Intimitation of government officials, buying government officials, initimitating civilians, etc. are all forms of subversion, because they prove to those under this influence that the government doesn't have the power to protect them, or the money speaks louder than any State based ideology.

The argument that this is nothing new is weak and dismissive, much like the emerging threat of Islamic Extremists was largely dismissed in the 90s as nothing really new. You can look at it like a disease, such as drug resistant tuberculosis. Its been around a long time, and when we may attention to it and take the proper actions we control it. When we ignore it, it has a chance to morph into a tougher strain, which once again requires an urgent response to get it under control. The longer we wait, the more dangerous the problem becomes and harder it will be to get it back in the box.

This problem got much worse after the Cold War for a number of reasons well known to this council, and I would argue it got worse after 9/11 when we took our eye off the ball and shifted more focus to terrorism. The sky isn't falling, because the problem is still manageable if we act quickly, firmly and collectively with the international community.

Bill Moore

11-18-2008, 08:06 AM

Some interesting links that further inform the discussion.

http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:S2zVmJo4v1kJ:www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07winter/metz.pdf+profit+and+criminal+motivated+insurgencie s&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us

New Challenges and OldConcepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency, STEVEN METZ

Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.

In contemporary complex conflicts, profitability often is literal rather than metaphorical. There is an extensive body of analytical literature that chronicles the evolution of violent movements such as insurgencies from “grievance” to “greed.”7 The idea is that political grievances may instigate an insurgency but, as a conflict progresses, economic motives may begin to play a greater role.

Conflict gives insurgents access to money and resources out of proportion to what they would have in peace time. As Paul Collier, one of the pioneers of this idea, explains: Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from the conflict and these groups, therefore, have some interest in initiating and sustaining it.

Internal wars “frequently involve the emergence of another alternative system of profit, power, and protection in which conflict serves thepolitical and economic interests of a variety of groups.”11 Hence the insurgents, criminals, militias, or even the regime have a greater interest in sustaining a controlled conflict than in attaining victory

much more in the article, and Dr. Metz carries a high degree of credibility unlike Robb.

http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2364675/Lessons-from-African-wars-implications.html

Wars in Sierra Leone and Somalia have been categorised as 'criminal insurgencies'. Similar to some South American wars, namely those in Colombia and Peru, the 'rebellions' had no clear political aims or known spokespersons with the goal of gaining political power. The 'strategy' of the insurgents was to spread terror amongst the population so denying the government the ability to govern. The rebel gangs were thus able to rule their own territories to their own physical and economic advantage, Unfortunately government forces have been known to act as atrociously as the rebels in their efforts to suppress the insurgents' lawlessness. (4) The resultant violence and human rights abuses have often received world-wide media coverage.

The majority of African wars, which are thus best described as unconventional, seem to have made insurgency or revolutionary war doctrine irrelevant, at least for the present. They can best be described as intra-state 'ethno-political' and/or criminal conflicts. Unfortunately they tend to be very prolonged and come to no definite resolutions.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14632

For-Profit Terrorism, Dr. Justine A. Rosenthal

For-profit terrorists are not pure ideologues (though some may remain more true to the cause than others), and they aren’t purely criminals—because they continue to use political rhetoric as a front for their illegal activities. For the most part, for-profit terrorists start out with some real (and sometimes valid) political motivations. But when they shift their priorities and become pure profit-seekers, they turn into this new breed of terrorist.

There are three main catalysts that transform terrorists’ motivations from the political to the financial: destruction of the leadership structure; political changes that debunk the ideological basis of the group; and opportunities for financial gain so great that they subsume ideological motives.

This post is much more serious, and I'll end by diatribe here by pointing out what I think are the limitations to Bob's Populace Centric Engagement (PCE) strategy. In some, if not many cases, if you give the populace what they want it will simply make the situation worse. This is true where criminal insurgencies have established a degree of popular controll, and it is true when the bulk of a target populace wants to pursue a hate agenda (Rwanda). That said I trust he didn't want us to swallow his concept hook, line and sinker, but to use it as applicable, and I think it is applicable in many cases, and I still applaud the article, but I also think there are situations where a PCE strategy could fall short, and for these situations we need to go back and reassess the strategy.

Bill Moore

11-18-2008, 09:26 AM

After this post, I'll lay off for a few days.

I've argued elsewhere that our objective isn't feasible.

Please withdraw that statement, I never said that was "my" objective.

I don't think state control of the economy is at all necessary. Just look at the early USA - the economy was almost completely controlled at the local level and the further in the boonies you got, the more local the control.

Excellent point, and one I can't respond to intelligently without further study, but I believe early America (before Statehood) and shortly after independence was an immature and struggling nation. One could argue that we didn't truly become an effective nation until well after the Civil War in many respects, and as our country and economy matured, the need for a centralized economy largely controlled by government regulation became apparent.

At this point it turns into a philosophical debate, and I would be an unarmed opponent on this topic, but it begs the question what role should a nation serve in today's world? What roles should the nation be willing to give up? The answers may inform our policies, which in turn drive our strategies.