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SWJED
03-30-2006, 12:07 PM
Moderator at Work

Today I have merged nine threads on Blackwater into one and so changed the thread title.(Ends)

30 March Norfolk Virginian-Pilot - Blackwater USA Says it Can Supply Forces for Conflicts (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=102251&ran=202519).


Stepping into a potential political minefield, Blackwater USA is offering itself up as an army for hire to police the world's trouble spots.

Cofer Black, vice chairman of the Moyock, N.C.-based private military company, told an international conference in Amman, Jordan, this week that Blackwater stands ready to help keep or restore the peace anywhere it is needed...

Until now, the eight-year-old company has confined itself to training military and police personnel and providing security guards for government and private clients. Under Black's proposal, it would take on an overt combat role...

Unlike national and multinational armies, which tend to get bogged down by political and logistical limitations, Black said, Blackwater could have a small, nimble, brigade-size force ready to move into a troubled region on short notice...

Peter Singer, a scholar at the Brookings Institution who has written a book on private military companies, said the concept of private armies engaging in counter-insurgency missions raises myriad questions about staffing standards, rules of engagement and accountability...

Tom Odom
03-30-2006, 02:02 PM
Lovely idea. Then we could hire mercs to engage in conflicts with no effect on the US scene beyond the bottom dollar. This seems to be a dangerous commercial extension of the drive to develop "lighter, more rapidly deployabe forces" in the interest of getting to conflict zones without a parallel--or more serious--effort at determining why you want to go in the first place. Faster is NOT always better.

I have studied and worked in environments where mercs get involved. We have already had serious side effects from merc security companies operating in Iraq.

Sounds rather Roman. I still believe that if a nation is not willing to put it's citizens and its policies at risk, then it should refrain from using mercs.

Tom

GS
03-30-2006, 03:19 PM
Executive Outcomes and Sandline certainly come to mind.

zenpundit
03-30-2006, 10:05 PM
There are all kinds of negative potentialities here but there are also positive ones in that small professional units operating under great power supervision may in some instances be better than:

a) Doing nothing

b) Relying on the most poorly disciplined, led and trained armies of the world to be at the forefront of UN peacekeeping.

c) Letting virtually unarmed UN peacekeepers become accesssories to atrocities via ineffectuality, as in Bosnia.

While Tom's caveats are well-taken the current system is nothing to write home about either.

Bill Moore
03-31-2006, 05:26 AM
Like Tom I have a lot of concern about sending contractors to wage our nation's fight, but I think Zenpundit's points are valid also. I wonder how effective a force like this would have been in Rwanda? They probably could have saved thousands of lives, but instead the U.S. and the Western world was embarassed and shamed by their political paralysis to respond with small military force. Executive Outcomes reportedly did an outstanding job in bringing the killing to a stop in Sierra Leone before they were asked to leave. Perhaps a company similar to Black Water could have been more effective in Bosnia than the Dutch military, and other so called peace keepers that made a laughing stock of the UN, then again without the credible threat of U.S. airpower to provide protection, a company like Blackwater probably wouldn't last a week against a force as large, well trained, equipped, and motivated as the Serbs. Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Philippines, Mexico, or isloated areas within Afghanistan and Iraq they may have a role, but a Bosnia type scenario is probably beyond their means.

The danger of this type of company is they can be employed without going through the political process that would be required to commit military forces, yet the advantage of this type of company is they can bypass the political process, thus give the President, or perhaps the UN, other regional organizations (like ECOWAS), or even other countries an option that can be employed quickly and effectively with minimal risk politically to the U.S. government.

I just wonder what happens when they get in over their head (like in Fallujah) in an area where the U.S. hasn't committed troops? Will the U.S. government be pressured to respond to get them out of trouble, or do we sit by and let Americans who were doing our (the U.S. military's) bidding for us get their butt kicked? Of course it will depend on the uproar created in the press.

Companies like this present our government with numerous hazards, but I think they also expand our national security options if.......

Tom Odom
04-03-2006, 04:37 PM
Bill and all,

The issue of using mercs is one of those that depends on the where and the why. My own experience in dealing with this issue came about in researching the 1964 Congo Hostage Crisis. Leavenworth Paper #14 resulted. Many have read Mike Hoare's Congo Mercenary and it was nomninally the basis for the film, The Wild Geese. Both are works of fiction; the film is more honest about its romanticizing than Hoare. The mercenary operations in the Congo were multi-level:

The Ground Force: the real organizer of the ground op was Colonel Vandewalle who had been the last head of security in the Belgian Congo before independence. He was Belgium's man in organizing the Katangan Secession under Mosie Tshombe with a variety of mercenaries including Hoare and Roger Trinquier. When Tshombe came back in the 1964 crisis so did Vandewalle and he ultimately lead the mercenary column into Stanleyville from the south to link up with the Belgian Paracommandos.

The Air Force: the CIA and the USAF set up a Congolese Air America using T-6s, T-28s, and A26s (AKA B-26s) and Bay of Pigs Cuban pilots to fly close air support.

The Covert Force: there was also a merc/black element attached to Vandewalle's column to extract key personnel from Stanleyville.

All of this worked and then it did not. The Stanleyville and Paulis ops did save a large number of hostages. But more hostages were killed elsewhere in the next year. The mercenaries ended up revolting against the new Mobutu government and fought their way out via Bukavu.

In 1994 I raised the idea of contractors to secure the refugee camps in eastern Zaire, given the large number of ex-Rwandan army and militia members active in those camps. I suggested the Israeli-Zairian security company SOZAIS and even had the retired Isaraeli colonel who ran the company come out to Goma to do a site survey. SOZAIS used active soldiers from the DSP (the Mobutu regime guaranteors trained by Israel) to provide contract security to businesses and indiividuals. Ultimately a form of what I proposed did take place when the UNHCR hired a force of nearly 1000 DSP soldiers with "advisors" to help improve security in the camps. This helped the international workers but did nothing about the larger security issues in those camps; the ultimate fall out was the 1996 clearing of the camps and the 1997 and 1998 invasions of Zaire with a current death total in excess of 3 million.

Perhaps a merc force could have sopped the geoncide if someone had had the will to deply such a force. But I would say that the world did have a force capable of doing just that (UNAMIR) on the ground with a Commander willing to do it and nothing was done. I doubt seriously that the RPA (the rebels) would have accepted a merc force on their turf because they were already dealing with the French intervention and French assistance to the former government. Later when the RPA did move on the camps in 1996 using client militias, the former government and the militias had hired Serbian mercenaries to help train and lead their forces. They fared poorly against the RPA; I suspect any merc force interjected into this cauldron in 1994 would have shared a similar fate.

the closest thing to standing merc force in the world is the Foreign Legion. It allows France to do things that the French public and the regular military would not accept. Sometimes that is good as in the case in Kolwezi in 1978. Sometimes it is not: French activities in supporting and training genociidal killers in Rwanda are well documented. The 1st REPs rebellion in Algeria was another case where the use of forces loyal only to themselves caused France great problems.

And we have used mercs from time to time as an extension or lead for our own policy. The Flying Tigers in China were true mercenaries, drawing bounties for each Japanese plane shot down. That is not to take away from the valor or reputation of the AVG; Read Pappy Boyington's book for a warts and all view of the AVG.

My take on mercs is always measured against our national interests. If it is sufficiently in our interests to get involved militarily, then it should be sufficienty important to use our established forces.

best
Tom

Jones_RE
04-03-2006, 11:19 PM
Mercenaries can provide several things to their employers:

1) Expertise. Mercenary soldiers may be better trained or more experienced than national forces. This probabably doesn't obtain in the US (with some possible exceptions).

2) Deniability. Mercenary soldiers may be hired in order to conduct military activities that the national forces do not wish to be held accountable for. This doesn't help the United States in our current conflicts - international media is more than capable of pinning a "contractor's" actions on the United States government. It's questionable whether mercenaries provide even a shred of deniabililty in the modern, information rich environment.

3) Expendability. National forces may be sensitive to their own casualties, but not to those of the mercenaries. The United States might make effective use of this trait, but for the fact that most of our private military companies are staffed by Americans. It was the gruesome murder several Blackwater employees that initiated the First Battle for Fallujah, for example.

4) Numbers. National forces may simply lack sufficient bodies to accomplish a mission and mercenary units can fill out the roster effectively. This is why the US employers PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan - there is an extreme demand for infantry who can conduct security operations of many different sorts. This demand is so high that jobs that would ordinarily go to riflemen or MPs are outsourced at six figure salaries.

I'm afraid that as long as there is a shortage of effective foot soldiers, and mercenary units are available (both financially, legally and politically) then the US military will make use of their services.

A "healthier" use of mercenary formations would be places in South Korea, where forces are unlikely to see ground combat. Similarly, using contract soldiers to accomplish various non combat tasks, such as security and maintenance duties at US bases, might free up individual soldiers who could be re trained as infantry.

Tom Odom
04-04-2006, 01:50 PM
Mercenaries can provide several things to their employers:

1) Expertise. Mercenary soldiers may be better trained or more experienced than national forces. This probabably doesn't obtain in the US (with some possible exceptions).

2) Deniability. Mercenary soldiers may be hired in order to conduct military activities that the national forces do not wish to be held accountable for. This doesn't help the United States in our current conflicts - international media is more than capable of pinning a "contractor's" actions on the United States government. It's questionable whether mercenaries provide even a shred of deniabililty in the modern, information rich environment.

3) Expendability. National forces may be sensitive to their own casualties, but not to those of the mercenaries. The United States might make effective use of this trait, but for the fact that most of our private military companies are staffed by Americans. It was the gruesome murder several Blackwater employees that initiated the First Battle for Fallujah, for example.

4) Numbers. National forces may simply lack sufficient bodies to accomplish a mission and mercenary units can fill out the roster effectively. This is why the US employers PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan - there is an extreme demand for infantry who can conduct security operations of many different sorts. This demand is so high that jobs that would ordinarily go to riflemen or MPs are outsourced at six figure salaries.

I'm afraid that as long as there is a shortage of effective foot soldiers, and mercenary units are available (both financially, legally and politically) then the US military will make use of their services.

A "healthier" use of mercenary formations would be places in South Korea, where forces are unlikely to see ground combat. Similarly, using contract soldiers to accomplish various non combat tasks, such as security and maintenance duties at US bases, might free up individual soldiers who could be re trained as infantry.

All "good" business arguments. And many of which work counter to training, fielding, and maintaining a national military force that reflects the national society.

Tom

Jones_RE
04-04-2006, 04:00 PM
I wholeheartedly agree. Note that mercenary strengths are only useful in the face of national weakness. A well trained, politically supported, and sufficiently large national force does not require mercenary help. Sufficient use of mercenaries, however, would naturally tempt policymakers to believe that there is no need to correct deficiencies in their force structures. Our current reliance on private military companies stems directly from a failure to pay attention to intangible factors in the national defense: soldier pay, recruiting and information operations as well as errors in the composition of the force (i.e. too much reliance on reserve and national guard forces, incorrect allocations of light units, etc).

shloky
04-05-2006, 09:29 PM
The arguments presented thus far are based on the assumption that the state has a monopoly on violence and PMCS's are extraneous to legitimate and effective forms of utilizing violence. (That is the impression I've gotten anyway)

That is true -currently PMC's are tools to be utilized by nation states, few others can afford or have a requirement for a brigade.

But if we look to the future we see current PMC's are innovators on the adoption curve because their target customer base is so small (marked in yellow). They've been at this stage for quite some time, but as this article illustrates, they're attempting to get better at what they do.

http://www.shloky.com/files/pmcadoption.jpg

As the PMC market evolves we'll see the positive attributes Zenpundit highlights become points/areas of competition. (Marked in red)

The major impact made by private security market will come as the state evolves (market state, decentralization driven by security concerns etc), which will increase its customer base, amount of primary participants and
competition.

Just some food for thought. It is not my intention to hijack the thread.

Regards,
Shlok

Strickland
04-06-2006, 01:11 AM
Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

GS
04-06-2006, 11:42 AM
Maj Strickland brings up a good point, but I think that a PMC ISO of a commercial interest in Economy of Force to the nth degree. They attempt to accomplish the objective with the smallest force possible, require no investment in infrastructure, and go away when hostilities have ended.

Tom Odom
04-06-2006, 12:51 PM
Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

I agree completely. Go back to the days of the Free Companies in the 100 Years War for "PMCs"; the reasons states have a "lock" on violence are many.

Any force that can be hired, can be bought.

Tom

MountainRunner
04-06-2006, 07:12 PM
I'd like to throw out a few bits to chew on...

When we talk about Blackwater's providing UN peacekeeping forces, we need to keep in mind their use is subject to the will of the international community, and not just the US. We need to remember not to always conflate international will w/ US goals. For a PKO, a SC decision needs to be made, otherwise we need to frame the discussion around the politics of that other group. My comments focus on the UN engaging Blackwater and not NATO, AU, or some ad hoc coalition, let alone solo state commission.

I suggest we consider what I argue is the mercenarial aspect of present pko's (a very controversal suggestion I know). If we look at PKO contributors as of December 2005, the top three contributors to PKOs -- Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India -- contributed over one-third of ALL UN Peacekeeping Forces, including police, military observers and troops. Meanwhile, the permanent members UN Security Council contributed only 3.7%, with China contributing more than the UK, US, and Russia combined.

As most know, these sub-contractor nations, notably those not on the SC, contribute the bulk of the forces and receive +/- $1000 per man per month for their contribution. Their participation is further subsidized when considering they rarely have their own transport and too often are in need of equipment. In practice, these are truly sub-contractors, contracting to the UNSC which established and mandated the mission -- the GA has no real roll in this. The SC clearly already uses money to mitigate a deficit of political will today. On its current trajectory this will continue and deepen as Western states continue to downsize and do not prioritize the need to participate and thus will not have the forces to contibute.

A significant point of discussion should hit on the perception of the force, whether it is a military, milob, or police force. In the US, we frequently disregard or ignore the perception of contractors and consider them expendable and deniable. However, in the AO and beyond this is simply not true. Their death or abuse reflects back onto the contracting state, perceived or real, and is amplified by the media (although generally not by US media). One purpose of PKOs, of course, is participation in the global sphere and we cannot forget this.

One reason the sub-contractor nations are involved in PKOs their state as TCNs. Blackwater, in promoting its well-known roster of Western former-SF and similar, most notably American (including the big and brawny / physically intimidating), may not be optimial in an especially polarized environment like this Administration has created today. The 'American' may not be seen as a peacekeeper but as lightening rod (perhaps that's good as the combantants cease fighting each other in the short-term). BW is likely to be seen as an American force under some cover. Lest we forget they may be 'tagged' as OGA, perception of the force is reality. Their reputation in Iraq, by they Iraqis, is critical. Their reputation in the US means nothing, they aren't peacekeeping in the US (well, they are / did along with other PSCs, but that's not under the UN).

Of course, further to this is as a private company continues to build up a capability, the need to use this capacity expands. Unlike a state that subsidizes military (and police) force through indirect means (i.e. taxes), the PSC only has direct means (i.e. contracts).

Just some thoughts for the worthy discussion we're having on this.

MountainRunner
04-06-2006, 09:19 PM
I neglected to add some further food for thought...

The increase in Chinese participation in PKOs is directly related to their desire to increase their profile and, I wonder if / might this inhibit SC hiring of a "third party corporation (TPC vs TCN).

Also, remember that Blackwater would have to be specifically licensed to participate in the PKO under existing US laws. Therefore, the US must have the desire for them participate... perhaps that how we do actually conflate US policy with international community's policy...

Tom Odom
04-07-2006, 03:43 PM
I applaud your points as they are very relevant to discussions of deploying any forces--national, UN or multinational like the MKO, or contract--into zones of conflict.

The reality of UN PKOs often surprises those who have not been on the ground with them. LTG Dallaire's shock and dismay over the uneven quality of his troops--especially the Bangaldesh Battalion and regrettably the Belgian Paracommandos--speaks volumes. The Canadians are the instutional memory and highest practioners of UN peacekeeping. General Dallaire had trained Canadian troops for such missions but had never been a participant. His experience in Rwanda was to say the least less than positive.

My own experience in UNTSO as an observer was similar. Individual observers were quite good, regardless of nationality. But there were definable blocks of marginal quality observers. And much of that had to do with the benefits and pay offered by the observers' countries for such duty. Some like the Swedes and Austrians spent years in the mission area because they received substantial tax breaks and other benefits.

The Fijian battalion in UNAMIR was essentially a contract force; the country would raise an entirely new battalion and send it to Sinai as part of the MFO. Then it would stand down from the MFO and transfer to UNIFIL. After that tour, it returned home (at least on paper) and a new unit began standing up.

UNAMIR 2 in Rwanda was much the same. Some contingents like the Canadians were professional soldiers who came fully equipped. But the slowness in putting UNAMIR 2 on the ground because many countries offered troops expecting to get "free" equipment. Ironically, the best and most effective contingent on the ground was the Ethiopian Battalion; they were also the worst equipped contingent. That opinion is shared by the Force Commander LTG Tousignant, the SRSG Ambassador Khan, Ambassador Rawson, the RPA Commnader/Defense Minister/Vice President, and yours truly. The reason for the Ethiopians effectiveness was they were: non-French speaking Africans which made them acceptable to the RPA; they were former rebels themselves and that made the RPA respect them; and they would shoot when necessary and ask later which made the RPA love them. Their "garrison" skills when it came to neatness and field sanitation would and did make Western soldiers shudder. But they did control their area and they worked well with the RPA.

When it came to policing the camps in Zaire, no one would take that mission. I have mentioned in this discussion my suggestion to go contract--one that ultimately was taken. The UN looked at using UNAMIR 2 to do the job; that was still born. Another company run by Brits looked at it; I ran into their negotiator on a UN flight in Nov 94. I knew him from Zaire and considered him to be a friend. He had another Brit with him who had retired SAS stamped on his forehead. I told them both to make sure that their statement of work allowed them to shoot people. They grinned and said they had asked for an "aggressive ROE". They did not get the job; it went to an element of the Zairian Army that was tied to the Israeli contractor I brought out to Goma. It was a bandaid on a sucking chest wound at best but it was the best we could come up with at the time.

Finally in 1996 the US and the Brits looked seriously at the issue and began planning the MNF as a way of prying the refugees out of the Zairian camps. But Ambassador Gribbin's stance that the MNF had to be able to shoot was not taken to heart. Fortunately the RPA "solved the problem" by clearing the camps even as the MNF HQs began its initial operations.

Despite all that I have said above, I still believe in UN PKOs as the best solution for problems like Rwanda and the camps in Zaire. Using UN forces puts a UN stamp on the problem, something that is most useful. That is not to say that UN peacekeeping and indeed the UN in general needs a dramatic overhaul if not a complete rebuild. Maybe if PMCs are the coming thing, then peackeeping/peace enforcement would be a good fit. In some ways that is already happening; the Canadian flight detachment in UNAMIR 2 was a purely commercial contract. They had all flown in UNISOM before coming to Rwanda.

Enough said fer now,

Tom

War Hammer
04-08-2006, 07:04 AM
I'm not sure that Executive Outcomes (EO) or any PMC would have made much difference in the Rhodesian civil war (1960s to 1980). The Rhodesians (depending on the stats) had a 1:17 or 1:43 kill ratio against the Marxist rebels. An incredible kill ratio. The Rhodesians had mercenaries (a couple thousand). Yet they still lost.

The SADF guys who formed EO are really a direct descendent of the Rhodesian military forces in many ways. After the Rhodesians lost, many of them joined the South African Defense Forces (SADF). They influenced the SADF special forces concepts, counter-insurgency and warfare tactics. South Africa’s counter-insurgency policy wasn’t exactly successful either. Probably because they didn’t learn anything from the failure of the Rhodesian experience. They continued to use the failed practices that their Rhodesian brothers taught them.

If EO was around and had to fight in the Rhodesian war, I highly doubt they would have made any difference against the Marxist rebels. Primarily because they were/are a reflection of the same Rhodesian forces that fought and lost in that war. Racking up a high kill ratio doesn’t cut it in counter-insurgency. Ian Beckett succinctly described the Rhodesian’s main problem:

it has been suggested that the apolitical nature of the Rhodesian armed forces prevented them from seriously coming to terms with the political aspects of guerrilla insurgency. There was never any real attempt at political indoctrination or instruction within the Rhodesian armed forces and to the end of the war guerrilla insurgency tended to be regarded as a military rather than a political problem to which military solutions alone should be applied.

http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part1.htm

I think the same could be said of the SADF and military oriented solutions to the counter-insurgency strategy of South Africa.

Check this website for articles and other great info on the Rhodesian civil war.

http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/political_overview.htm

These articles below detail some of the ways Rhodesian forces influenced the SADF.

O'Brien, Kevin A. "The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy 1979-1992." (Parts I and II) Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 86-105 and 13, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 107-142.

'Brien, Kevin A. "Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 27-59.

War Hammer
04-08-2006, 07:17 AM
When Executive Outcomes first appeared on the scene in the 90s, they said they were anti-communist and would never serve a communist cause. Yet they helped the marxist MPLA defeat the anti-communist UNITA faction in Angola. The EO mercs were the same guys that trained and fought alongside UNITA against the MPLA just a few years earlier. UNITA and the MPLA are/were corrupt, butchers etc... But UNITA led by Joseph Savimbi was our ally during the Cold War. Ronny Reagan called Savimbi the “George Washington of Africa.”

Many pro-PMC advocates look to EO's role in Angola as something divine. Why should I dance for joy at the thought that EO helped to bring about the downfall of UNITA? A one time U.S. ally who fought the communist Cubans and MPLA.

EO's role in Angola proved one thing, that mercs can be in it for the profit, not the politics. The EO SADF staff turned on the people who they helped train and fought for the people who ten years earlier they were trying to destroy. Classic mercs.

How are Rhodesian, South African and Israeli mercs trained in political assassination and viewing all solutions in war as "military" going to turn the tide against non-state actors?

SWJED
04-24-2006, 08:37 AM
Lecture notes from the Foreign Policy Research Institute (w/ video) - Private Military Companies and the Future of War (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.htm l) by Deborah Avant.


The topic “private military companies and the future of war” is a big one. Both parts of the title—“private military companies” and “the future of war”—are phrases that can be disputed. In my recent book, which examines the privatization of security and its impact on the control of force, I label these companies “private security companies” (PSCs) specifically because they provide a range of services, some of which are hard to categorize as military, per se. And while PSCs are integral to war efforts—more than 1 of every 10 people the U.S. deployed to the Gulf in the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom were PSC employees—some of the more controversial uses of private security have been in the aftermath of the “war.”

While all might agree that infantry soldiers should not be contracted out, in the midst of the insurgency in Iraq some PSCs have provided services that are nearly indistinguishable from what an infantry soldier would do. So it is in the grey area between what we would all describe as war and other violent settings that we can find the most interesting grist for thinking about the role of PSCs in the future of security. Indeed, PSCs have been in the news of late not because of their activities in Iraq, but because of their activities in New Orleans. Below I will offer a brief description of the market, discuss some of the benefits and risks it poses and suggest that their impact on the future of war depends, in part, on the strategies the U.S. and others undertake to manage the risks. I will end with what I see as the best avenue for moving forward...

Hat tip to Zenpundit (http://www.zenpundit.blogspot.com/)

SWJED
04-24-2006, 09:53 PM
Humanitarian Affairs Review - Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services? (http://www.humanitarian-review.org/upload/pdf/SingerEnglishFinal.pdf) by Peter Singer.


Private military services have taken part in conflicts from Bosnia to Iraq, supporting the work of governments, corporations and NGOs. Is this a healthy development? Peter W. Singer, from the Brookings Institution, warns the humanitarian community to be business-savvy before they take the privatisation plunge.

SWJED
05-03-2006, 10:56 AM
From Josh at The Adventures of Chester blog - Let Blackwater Loose in Darfur (http://www.theadventuresofchester.com/).


The executives of one of the most well-known private security firms, Blackwater, have offered to provide a brigade of peacekeepers in Darfur, if only someone will pay for it...


A few weeks ago, at an international special forces conference in Jordan, Black announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force to conflicts like the one in Sudan. ''We're low cost and fast," Black said, ''the question is, who's going to let us play on their team?"

In other words, the private security firms need something other than cash to pay for their peacekeeping; they need some sort of legitimacy. But legitimacy for what? Invasions? The establishment of private empires of sorts?...

Blackwater though, seeks to insert itself due to one particular detail of the particular externality of Darfur. Namely, no powerful state in the world has any inherent national interest in preventing the killing there, except solely out of a sense of altruism. Blackwater offers to solve the problem for them, if only someone will pay for it all.

Here's several ways that Blackwater can raise the capital necessary to fund the Darfur peacekeeping mission, and really score a PR coup at the same time...

Follow the link for discussion on the various options...

SWJED
05-03-2006, 11:00 AM
23 April Boston Globe - Peace Corp. (http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/04/23/peace_corp/?page=full)


Three years of fighting in the Darfur region of Sudan have left an estimated 180,000 dead and nearly 2 million refugees. In recent weeks, both the UN and the US have turned up the volume of their demands to end the violence (which the Bush administration has publicly called genocide), but they've been hard pressed to turn their exhortations into action. The government in Khartoum has scuttled the UN's plans to take control of the troubled peacekeeping operations currently being led by the African Union, and NATO recently stated publicly that a force of its own in Darfur is ''out of the question." Meanwhile, refugee camps and humanitarian aid workers continue to be attacked, and the 7,000 African Union troops remain overstretched and ineffective.

But according to J. Cofer Black, vice chairman of the private security firm Blackwater, there is another option that ought to be on the table: an organization that could commit significant resources and expertise to bolster the African Union peacekeepers and provide emergency support to their flagging mission.

A few weeks ago, at an international special forces conference in Jordan, Black announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force to conflicts like the one in Sudan. ''We're low cost and fast," Black said, ''the question is, who's going to let us play on their team?"

Private security companies like Blackwater have thrived in Iraq, where the US military has relied on them for everything from guarding convoys to securing the Green Zone. But these companies recognize that the demand for their services in Iraq will eventually diminish, and Blackwater, for one, is looking for new markets. It's not alone in seeing peacekeeping as a growth area. Competitors such as Aegis and Dyncorp have also realized that while conflicts like the one in Darfur may not bring them profits on the order of Iraq, there's no shortage of them. And if such companies are able to help the international community succeed in peacekeeping, it could improve the image of an industry that hasn't enjoyed much support from the press or the public.

Private military companies have had a hard time convincing the international community that privatizing peacekeeping would be as good for Darfur, and for the rest of the world, as for their industry. In part that's because of the mixed reputation their work in Iraq has earned them and because the explosive growth of the industry has raised fears that security contractors working for the US government in Baghdad (and post-Katrina New Orleans) could become bona fide armies for hire. But the discomfort also has deeper roots, in the complicated history of private intervention in these kinds of conflicts. When Kofi Annan was UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping, he explored the option of hiring the South African private military company Executive Outcomes to aid in the Rwandan refugee crisis. He ultimately decided against the option, declaring that ''the world is not yet ready to privatize peace."...

Much more at the link...

SWJED
05-03-2006, 05:43 PM
3 May Tech Central Station - Send in the Mercenaries (http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=050306G) by J. Peter Pham & Michael I. Krauss.


The crisis has taken another turn for the worse in the Darfur region of western Sudan. On April 26, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) warned that the security situation has so deteriorated that international aid agencies are no longer able to gain access to some 700,000 internally displaced people who thought they were "safe" because they had managed to get inside UN-managed camps. The latest attacks by government forces, Human Rights Watch reports (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aYAQZP784h5g&refer=top_world_news), occurred on April 24 on a village in South Darfur state called Joghana, which is about 6 miles from the town of Gereida, where about 80,000 refugees live...

Meanwhile, the most the international community has been able to agree to do is to reluctantly pass a Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States barring four Sudanese nationals accused of war crimes from international travel and freezing any assets the four may have abroad. Were it not for the seriousness of the crimes of which the four men are accused, the whole exercise would make great comedy...

U.S. forces are stretched thin by ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are rightly distracted by the need to keep military options open against soon-to-be-nuclear, apocalyptically minded, Iran. Meanwhile, as we noted in our earlier essay, other nations are reluctant to commit enough forces to shore up the undermanned "peacekeeping" operations of the African Union. So it's hard to imagine how sufficient resources will be found to take care of one task that could literally mean the difference between life and death for hundreds of thousands in Darfur: the protection of the camps where they have gathered and where they receive humanitarian relief. It's not asking much, but for now protection of these camps from Janjaweed killers seems beyond the capabilities of the international community -- unless, that is, we are willing to look outside the box and turn to private military companies (PMCs).

Generally, modern states have been reluctant to recognize the existence -- much less advocate the use -- of PMCs, viewing the enterprises as "mercenaries" who threaten the monopoly of states on the use of force. There is certainly a historical basis for this hostility towards private armed forces, especially in Africa...

On the other hand, there is an increasing amount of state practice -- the basis of a ius cogens legal argument of general acceptance -- in favor of the activities of PMCs...

...the role that PMCs play in international security has become even more significant, not only in providing armed support and peacekeeping services for weak states, but also an array of military services that major powers have outsourced. Analysts estimate that the PMC business is a $100 billion industry with several hundred companies operating in more than one hundred countries. In Iraq, for example, PMCs are a vital component in the U.S.-led coalition's efforts, with some 20,000 workers from Blackwater Corporation and other firms engaged in "security" tasks. Taken as an aggregate, PMCs in Iraq constitute the second largest contingent in the "Coalition of the Willing," handling everything from feeding soldiers to maintaining weapons systems for the U.S. military to guarding convoys and training a new police force for the nascent Iraqi government.

If no one else has the courage and will to act in Darfur, why doesn't the UN, or NATO for that matter, contract out the problem and let the free market save countless lives? If the African Union, whose troops are notoriously ineffective, finds the PMC option unpalatable, perhaps the credible threat of its use might compel the regional organization to come up with an alternative that will actually save the lives of innocent Darfurians, rather than merely observe their extermination.

SWJED
05-04-2006, 09:44 PM
Private military contractors, private military corporations or private military companies (PMCs) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_military_contractor) are companies that provide armed staff trained in combat, i.e. private military, for other corporations, organizations, individuals and state military forces. The term is also used for the staff of such companies.

When providing services to a State's military they may be described more generally as defense contractors (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_contractor). When working for a State's military the difference in nomenclature seems to be arbitrary, the chief distinction that may be made is that defense contractors supply specialized hardware and the personnel to support and service that hardware, while PMCs supply personnel with specialized skills, which often include combat experience. The 1949, Third Geneva Convention (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Geneva_Convention) (GCIII) does not recognize the difference between defense contractors and PMCs, it defines a category called supply contractors. If the supply contractor has been issued with a valid identity card from the armed forces which they accompany, they are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture (GCIII Article 4.1.4). If however the contractor engages in combat, on capture they can be classified as a mercenary under the 1997 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocol_I)) Article 47.c, unless they fall under an exemption to this clause as listed in Article 47. If on capture contractors are found to be mercenaries, they are an unlawful combatant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unlawful_combatant) and lose the right to prisoner of war status.

There has been a recent exodus from many special forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_forces) across the globe towards these private military corporations. The United Kingdom Special Air Service, the United States Army Special Forces and the Canadian Army's Joint Task Force 2 have been hit particularly hard. Operators are lured by the fact that entry level positions with the various companies can pay up to $100,000 a year, which is 2-3 times more than what an average special forces operator is paid. However, this conventional wisdom has been disputed especially in the United States where GAO research has detected no noticeable exodus.

The site provides links to many of the PMCs' web pages to include Blackwater USA. (http://www.blackwaterusa.com/)

GorTex6
05-05-2006, 08:26 PM
Are we suggesting to deploy a 4GW force to occupy one of China's major oil importers? :D

I want a T-Shirt (http://www.blackwaterusa.com/proshop/contents/media/BW_Short_Sleeve_Tshirt.jpg)

GorTex6
05-16-2006, 02:43 PM
Was a CIA station chief for Sudan. Most of his career was in Africa.

NDD
05-17-2006, 12:06 AM
If you had this capability, would you make it public knowledge?

zenpundit
05-17-2006, 10:44 PM
Are not binding international law on non-signatories BTW.

The Euros adopted the Protocol along with the old East Bloc that privileged Marxist guerillas whose methods normally violate the Geneva Convention but the U.S. did not. Claims advanced in this regard to PMC employees are simply that, mere assertions. The U.S. is legally free and clear to try irregulars who fight out of uniform or assert lawful combatant status for any PMC employees contracted by the Pentagon.

SWJED
05-18-2006, 12:37 PM
16 May Virginian-Pilot - Blackwater USA to Open facilities in California, Philippines (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=104492&ran=12576).


Fast-growing private military company Blackwater USA is expanding westward.

Blackwater executives say they plan to soon open a branch facility in southern California and a jungle survival skills training center on the site of the former Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines.

Both projects will be smaller versions of Blackwater's 7,000-acre compound in Camden and Currituck counties, where thousands of military and law enforcement personnel come each year for training. The company says it is the largest tactical training facility in the United States, if not the world.

The eight-year-old company has enjoyed phenomenal growth, winning hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of federal contracts to provide security and training services in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.

Chris Taylor, Blackwater's vice president for strategic initiatives, referred to the planned facility in southern California as "Blackwater West." He did not specify where it will be or when it will open.

In the Philippines, Blackwater President Gary Jackson said, the company has acquired about 25 acres at Subic Bay and will have access to thousands of acres of adjacent jungle for conducting jungle environment survival training, known by the acronym JEST...

SWJED
05-24-2006, 05:05 AM
23 May Associated Press - Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/23/AR2006052301096.html).

SWJED
05-29-2006, 12:30 PM
19 May Heritage Foundation paper - When Should the Government Use Contractors to Support Military Operations? (http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1938.cfm).


Military contractors are currently assisting militaries around the world with missions that range from training and supply chain management to fighting in battles. Military contractors are seen as having inherent advantages over militaries in resource constraints, manpower, and flexibility. Yet relying on military contractors has its share of risks, including potential shortfalls in mission success, concerns over the safety of contractors, loss of resources because a capability is outsourced, loss of total force management, and problems of compliance with administrative law.

With the increased use of military contractors and the advent of privatized military firms, the question is how to determine the right force mix to complete a task or mission in the most effective and efficient manner. Sometimes, military contractors may be the best choice; however, they are not a perfect fit for every mission or the right solution for all skill and manpower shortages.

When considering the use of military contractors, U.S. military leaders should assess the risks of employing the various options and then choose the best one. The Department of Defense (DOD) should adopt comprehensive guidelines for making these decisions, using a risk-based approach...

SWJED
05-31-2006, 08:12 AM
31 May Los Angeles Times commentary - Send in the Mercenaries (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot31may31,0,5570896.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions) by Max Boot.


...Pieces of paper, no matter how promising, require power in order to be enforced. The question is: Who will provide that power in Darfur? The African Union force deployed in 2004 has proven woefully inadequate. Its 7,000 soldiers lack the numbers, training and equipment to patrol an undeveloped region the size of France. They don't even have a mandate to stop ethnic cleansing; they are only supposed to monitor the situation.

If you listen to the bloviators at Turtle Bay, salvation will come from the deployment of a larger corps of blue helmets. If only. What is there in the history of United Nations peacekeepers that gives anyone any confidence that they can stop a determined adversary?...

But perhaps there is a way to stop the killing even without sending an American or European army. Send a private army. A number of commercial security firms such as Blackwater USA are willing, for the right price, to send their own forces, made up in large part of veterans of Western militaries, to stop the genocide.

We know from experience that such private units would be far more effective than any U.N. peacekeepers. In the 1990s, the South African firm Executive Outcomes and the British firm Sandline made quick work of rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone. Critics complain that these mercenaries offered only a temporary respite from the violence, but that was all they were hired to do. Presumably longer-term contracts could create longer-term security, and at a fraction of the cost of a U.N. mission.

Yet this solution is deemed unacceptable by the moral giants who run the United Nations. They claim that it is objectionable to employ — sniff — mercenaries. More objectionable, it seems, than passing empty resolutions, sending ineffectual peacekeeping forces and letting genocide continue.

sgmgrumpy
08-03-2006, 02:58 PM
Inside The Pentagon
August 3, 2006


DOD, State To Launch New Counterterrorism Work In Asia And Africa

The Pentagon is poised to shift as much as $100 million to the State Department for an effort to hire private contractors charged with enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of foreign militaries in 14 nations across Africa, Asia and Latin America, according to a senior Defense Department official.

The program, which involves an unorthodox sharing of resources, won the approval of Congress last year only after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a big push for it. It is designed to fulfill a key objective of the U.S. strategy for the global war on terrorism -- bolstering the capabilities of partner nations to fight terrorists within and around their borders.

Eight aid packages, each worth $10 million to $30 million, have been constructed to boost the maritime and land-based counterterrorism operations of military forces in Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, Senegal, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Some of the aid packages fund efforts in more than one nation; additional aid packages for other nations may be approved soon.

“This program is designed to give them the training and equipment so that they can take on common enemies and prevent terrorist sanctuaries in their territories that are a problem for them and for us,” Jeb Nadaner, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations, said in an interview. “This is [a Bush] administration program to get ahead of problems before they get full-blown.”

The security assistance packages are the product of programs nominated and coordinated by geographic combatant commanders and top diplomats at U.S. embassies. In general, the packages consist of relatively low-tech equipment -- no major weapon systems are in the offing -- designed to provide each nation with a better picture of activities within its borders and on the seas near its shores...

The long-term goal, he said, is to create a layered series of capabilities around the world among U.S. allies and partner nations so that they can undertake their own defense against terrorists...

The equipment sets include radar, surveillance tools and sensors, Global Positioning System navigation devices, communications equipment, computer systems and programs, small boats, small trucks and trailers, and spare parts for vehicles, said Nadaner.

Mark Garlasco, senior military analyst with Human Rights Watch and a former Pentagon intelligence analyst, said this aid might be useful in the war on terror. “But we have to understand that they might use the equipment in ways that the United States might not want it to be used,” in violation of international law, he said...

Peter Singer, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry,” said that to the extent the U.S. government hires private firms to conduct training of foreign militaries it misses an opportunity to develop an important, if informal, tool -- military-to-military relationships that might be called upon in a future crisis...

Of the eight military aid packages, three involve groups of nations. Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are grouped in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Program, designed to provide more effective control of certain West African waters through improved coastal surveillance and operational capabilities. Morocco, Algeria, Chad, Senegal, Tunisia and Nigeria are grouped together into an effort called the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which aims to build the capacity of these nations to share data about activities in the region.

Individual programs for Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka are focused on improving each nation’s maritime operations, particularly the strategic sea lanes in Southeast Asia.

With U.S. forces stretched thin by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld and Rice last year sought and secured permission from Congress to use Pentagon operation and maintenance funds for State Department foreign military training programs run by private firms...
-- Jason Sherman

sgmgrumpy
08-04-2006, 12:43 PM
Information on a Radio Talk Show conducted as well as a Newspaper reporters 6 part series on Blackwater.

The radio interview I thought was very informative on laws governing use of PMCs.


Their business is supplying security in an unsecure world. Training modern day mercenaries means big profit for private military companies and also helps ease the strain of an over-taxed military. But not everyone thinks this new approach is the best way to wage war. We'll talk about it on today's HearSay with Virginian-Pilot Reporter Bill Sizemore. [and IPOA's Doug Brooks . . .]
Radio Talk Show on PMCs
http://wmstreaming.whro.org/hearsay/08032006.wma

Another great investigative 6 Part Series on Blackwater

NOTE: You may need to REFRESH BROWSER AFTER LINKING TO GET THE ARTICLES.


Blackwater: Inside America's Private Army
The Virginian-Pilot
© July 23, 2006

Enter a world where the military has become a business – where citizen soldiers work for a private company whose currency comes from conflict. It’s a place some salute and others fear. And it’s right in our backyard.

PART 1
A New Breed of Warriors (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=107946&ran=29743)
These men are not soldiers, at least not anymore. All have military experience, but in order to become private security contractors, they must pass an eight-week, $20,000 course.

PART 2
Profitable Patriotism (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108003&ran=206428)
After the terrorist attack on the destroyer Cole, Blackwater USA found its future: providing security in an insecure world. Since, the Moyock, N.C., company has rocketed to the big time.


PART 3
On the Front Lines (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108057&ran=56149)
The growing presence of private security contractors on the battlefield in Iraq is uncharted territory, spawning questions about conflicting objectives, poor coordination and lack of accountability.


PART 4
When Things Go Wrong (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108113&ran=186344)
The lynching of four Blackwater USA contractors in Iraq in 2004 has had profound consequences on two fronts: in the course of the war, and with families back home.


PART 5
On American Soil (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108184&ran=230435)
Hurricane Katrina opened the door to a flood of domestic work for Blackwater USA. In New Orleans, the company protects FEMA's staff - at a cost of about $243,000 a day.


PART 6
New Horizons (http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108242&ran=18183)
Security contractor Blackwater USA, after long preferring the shadows, has taken a high-visibility U-turn - including its own skydiving team - to get out its story and drum up business.

Jedburgh
08-04-2006, 06:18 PM
From the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), Rome, Italy:

Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=AADBFBF0-1696-74CC-A1BD-1FAE43708D62&lng=en)

This study probes the question of how the rise and development of private military companies (PMCs) is affecting the authority of Western states to define and regulate the use of force. It is an inquiry into the extent to which private military companies are merely “tools” in the hands of the state, as often assumed. It is an inquiry into the extent to which the delegation of tasks to private actors also entails a privatisation of authority. It is an attempt to think about a link whose existence is often denied. In a typical vein one observer writes:

...most would argue that the power to authorise and delegate the use of military force should remain with states, preferably at the level of the UN Security Council. But once agreed, exactly what or who is deployed is less important – the issue then is to find the most effective and least costly alternative... (Shearer 2001: 30).

This report asks whether cost effectiveness is really the issue at stake and whether who is deployed is of limited importance. The political intuition it departs from is that who “is deployed” matters a great deal. It is absolutely essential for governments, for armed forces and for citizens not only to ask “what is most effective and least costly” alternative. They also need to ask what consequences different alternatives have for the authority over the use of force (and more specifically the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force). The aim of this study is first and foremost to spell out the lines along which such questions have to be asked and discussed...

SWJED
09-14-2006, 12:13 AM
35,000 Private Military Shooters in Iraq? (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/09/journal_35000_p.html)


PSCAI (http://www.pscai.org/) (Private Security Company Association of Iraq) estimates that there are 35,000 private military contractors (those who are using lethal force and employed by global corporations) in Iraq. Note that the vast bulk of these contractors are operating outside the realm of any counter-insurgency strategy (and by their actions, defined by their missions, typically undermine it).

... and from Popular Mechanics - PODCAST: Licensed to Kill (http://www.popularmechanics.com/blog/science/3901701.html)


Welcome to the shadowy world of the hired gun. We talk with Robert Young Pelton (http://comebackalive.com/site3.php), who's new book, License to Kill, details the three years he spent with private security contractors (http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/defense/1506812.html) in the high risk, highly paid world of military outsourcing. Former Marine infantryman Bing West (http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/defense/1675286.html) -- also a former assistant secretary of defense -- shares a grunt's view of the killings in Haditha, and explain why we shouldn't be so quick to judge...

MountainRunner
09-14-2006, 12:36 AM
If looking at 'private security forces' and not 'private military', the number is double (or possibly even quadruple) the 35k 'licensed' individuals. This from from PSCAI interviews.

SWJED
10-02-2006, 07:29 AM
2 October Washington Times - Private Firms Eye Darfur (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20061001-114438-5654r.htm) by Willis Witter.


Private military companies protecting American diplomats, aid workers and local officials in Iraq and Afghanistan are making a pitch to take over U.N. peacekeeping missions in Darfur and other global hot spots where the United Nations is unable to stop the killing.

Companies such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, DynCorp and Halliburton have mushroomed in size and number since the 2003 Iraq invasion, serving an increasing need to protect people and projects from terrorist attacks.

With a limited number of U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq, private companies fill a void with up to 100,000 employees, far more than all non-U.S. coalition troops combined. They do everything from serving meals on U.S. bases to protecting diplomats and visiting generals who venture outside the protected Green Zone in downtown Baghdad.

Some companies are looking beyond Iraq and seeking a greater role in peacekeeping, and the largely ineffective deployment of a 7,000-member African Union (AU) force in the Darfur region of western Sudan provides an opportunity.

Blackwater says it could get its people and equipment in Darfur in three weeks, provided U.N. members could agree on a plan. In comparison, it takes an average of six months for a U.N. peacekeeping team to deploy...

SWJED
10-10-2006, 08:25 PM
10 October Reuters - Contractor Deaths Near 650, Legal Fog Thickens (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101000514.html) by Bernd Debusmann.


The war in Iraq has killed at least 647 civilian contractors to date, according to official figures that provide a stark reminder of the huge role of civilians in supporting the U.S. military...

Their number in Iraq is estimated at up to 100,000, from highly-trained former special forces soldiers to drivers, cooks, mechanics, plumbers, translators, electricians and laundry workers and other support personnel.

A trend toward "privatizing war" has been accelerating steadily since the end of the Cold War, when the United States and its former adversaries began cutting back professional armies. U.S. armed forces shrank from 2.1 million when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 to 1.4 million today.

"At its present size, the U.S. military could not function without civilian contractors," said Jeffrey Addicott, an expert at St. Mary's University in San Antonio. "The problem is that the civilians operate in a legal gray zone. There has been little effort at regulation, oversight, standardized training and a uniform code of conduct. It's the Wild West out there."...

SWJED
12-11-2006, 08:47 AM
18 December issue of the Weekly Standard - Warriors for Hire (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/062fxarf.asp) by Mark Hemingway.


For obvious reasons, the location of the headquarters of Blackwater USA isn't well-publicized. Officially, the only public trace of the world's largest private military training facility is a post office box in Moyock, North Carolina, an unremarkable rib-shack pit-stop on the way to the Outer Banks.

But the place isn't hard to find. From Washington, D.C., head south. As soon as you cross the state line, follow the sound of gunfire until you find an armed compound half the size of Manhattan. Which is not to say the place sticks out--it's just very, very big. Blackwater is a company most Americans first heard of when four of its contractors were murdered in Falluja, Iraq, in March 2004, and their bodies desecrated on camera. It is the most prominent of the private security contractors in Iraq. You might think of the North Carolina facility as Blackwater's Fort Benning or Quantico...

Though the company is less than ten years old, it's already become the alpha and omega of military outsourcing. The target systems remain a multimillion-dollar business, but now the corporate flagship is just one part of a very large fleet. Indeed, it would be hard to understate Blackwater's capabilities:


A burgeoning logistics operation that can deliver 100- or 200-ton self-contained humanitarian relief response packages faster than the Red Cross.

A Florida aviation division with 26 different platforms, from helicopter gunships to a massive Boeing 767. The company even has a Zeppelin.

The country's largest tactical driving track, with multi-surface, multi-elevation positive and negative cambered turns, a skid pad, and a ram pad for drivers learning how to escape ambushes.

A 20-acre manmade lake with shipping containers that have been mocked up with ship rails and portholes, floating on pontoons, used to teach how to board a hostile ship.

A K-9 training facility that currently has 80 dog teams deployed around the world. Ever wondered how to rappel down the side of nine stacked shipping containers with a bomb-sniffing German shepherd dog strapped to your chest? Blackwater can teach you.

A 1,200-yard-long firing range for sniper training.

A sizable private armory. The one gun locker I saw contained close to 100 9mm handguns--mostly military issue Beretta M9s, law enforcement favorite Austrian Glocks, and Sig Sauers.

An armored vehicle still in development called the Grizzly; the prototype's angular steel plates are ferocious-looking. The suspension is being built by one of Black water's North Carolina neighbors--Dennis Anderson, monster truck champion and the man responsible for the "Grave Digger" (the ne plus ultra of monster trucks).

... It may seem callous that Blackwater is making a buck preparing police to deal with such horrific events. But somebody has to be in the business of worst case scenarios. It's not their fault that everywhere--from Colorado to Iraq--business is so good.

While Blackwater's training and logistics operations might be the heart of their operation, that's not the reason the company is on the verge of becoming a household name. Among its initial government contracts was one for antiterrorist training in the wake of the USS Cole bombing. A single marksman could have taken out the approaching bomb-laden boat, but most soldiers on deck weren't even carrying loaded weapons at the time. Recognizing a major weakness, the Navy awarded an "urgent and compelling need" contract to Blackwater to train 20,000 sailors in force protection. The company still executes that contract to this day. And from that start, it gradually expanded its roster of services available to the military. Enter the war on terror, and the military began looking for something beyond training and support services--actual manpower.

Blackwater is now one of the largest and most respected suppliers of "private military contractors" in Iraq. The company has carried out high-profile assignments--such as their exclusive contract to guard Ambassador L. Paul Bremer when he was the top U.S. civilian in Iraq--whose performance by a private company would once have been unthinkable...

selil
12-11-2006, 02:29 PM
...and second amendment contrarians think there is no such thing as militia's in the United States.

marct
12-12-2006, 12:28 PM
...and second amendment contrarians think there is no such thing as militia's in the United States.

One does have to wonder if John Hawkwood is their eponymous founder <wry grin>. Still and all, given their scope, are they a militia, a TNC along the lines of Executive Outcomes, or something entirely different.

Marc

Tom Odom
01-24-2007, 01:50 PM
Another_Black_Day_For_Blackwater

By ROBERT Y. PELTON
www.iraqslogger.com
01/23/07

Blackwater USA contractors are reeling from the loss of five
colleagues and a Little Bird helicopter in Baghdad today. IraqSlogger
has the exclusive details.

At 10:30am Baghdad time today a Blackwater PSD was escorting a State
Dept official to anministry meeting in Baghdad. The convoy began to
take small arms fire. They called for backup and the Blackwater quick
reaction force team responded from the Green Zone. They were also
ambushed by machine gun fire from the left and right. They limped back
to the Green Zone with two blown out tires. There were violent attacks
on two more Blackwater QRF teams and insurgents took a number of
casualties.

Blackwater dispatched their Little Bird helicopters to provide aerial
cover and suppressing fire. Blackwater has three Boeing Little Birds
(similar to Hughes 500) base out of the Green Zone that carry two
pilots and two door gunners each. The two door gunners hang out of the
rear doors of the helo with SAWs (Squad Automatic Weapons) designed to
provide suppressing fire.

Once the Little Birds engaged the insurgents, one door gunner was
killed and the rotor blades were damaged, and it returned to base.
Another Little Bird was shot down instantly killing all four aboard.
The shoot down was instaneous and no radio call was sent before
impact. The former 160th pilots are famous for their low-level, high
speed flights above Baghdad's rooftops. A tactic designed to avoid
small arms fire.

Then four Blackwater mobile teams were sent to recover the downed
helicopter. In addition a U.S. QRF was dispatched. An Army Apache
helicopter and a Stryker company came upon the downed helicopter. The
weapons had been stripped but the bodies were intact. Some of the
Blackwater pilots were the same pilots who served in Somalia during
the infamous "Black Hawk Down" incident.

The five dead mentioned include the one door gunner and the entire
crew of the relief Little Bird.

Blackwater has had a string of unfortunate incidents including most
recently the murder of an Iraqi security guard by one of its employees
while drunk on December 24th, an air crash of one its Casa 212
aircraft in Bamyian Valley in Afghanistan and the infamous murder of
four of its employees in Fallujah in 2004 by insurgents.

Ansar al Sunna has claimed responsibility for the downing of the
Little Bird but there is no confirmation of this claim.

This came in on the intelligence share forum on AKO this morning. We have discussed PMCs before on this site. I sympathize with the employees who were lost in this incident and their families. However, I still strongly question the wisdom of building private direct action military capacity outside normal channels of government command and control.

Best

Tom

marct
01-24-2007, 01:59 PM
See also http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/23/iraq-helicopter.html

Marc

carl
01-24-2007, 04:04 PM
Does anyone know if and where the following info is available:

1. Is there an entity other than the Dept. of Labor that tracks the number of civ. contractors killed and wounded in Iraq?
2. How accurate are the Dept. of Labor stats?
3. Some of the wounds are probably serious, does anyone track the quality of treatment these people receive?

I agree with the Tom about it being unwise to rely so heavily on civilian contractors; but, for whatever reason, they are putting themselves on the line and they should be looked after.

Stan
01-24-2007, 04:18 PM
Tom, a good pen, if I may say so.

You brought with you (10 years ago) a relatively simple and safe self-imposed ROE policy. We had no need to prove ourselves, we were more concerned with survival, and rightfully so.

You said to me early on, "go in with a spirit of acceptance, not judgement, things will more than likely work better". Well, you did have few at our favorite restaurant before that statement, but I recall it to this day !

You would later tell me to be careful - but you did that a lot !

When the Sozias Director (former Israeli LTC) came to snatch his blue flag, we would laugh, but we could see his experience in his words and jestures. He was indeed more than sufficiently trained and experienced to later make such absurd statements, and prepared to back them.

We would later see what inexperience does. A dumb attack was what I thought with perceptive folks all around us. They were however dealing with the FAZ (Zairian Armed Forces), not Iraq.

Indeed, an unfortunate incident with more US losses.

Regards, Stan

SWJED
01-24-2007, 08:28 PM
24 January Associated Press - 4 Americans in Iraq Crash Shot in Head (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/24/AR2007012400197.html).


Four of the five Americans killed when a U.S. security company's helicopter crashed in a dangerous Sunni neighborhood in central Baghdad were shot execution style in the back the head, Iraqi and U.S. officials said Wednesday.

A senior Iraqi military official said a machine gunner downed the helicopter, but a U.S. military official in Washington said there were no indications that the aircraft, owned by Blackwater USA, had been shot out of the sky. Two Sunni insurgent groups, separately, claimed responsibility for the crash.

In Washington, a U.S. defense official said four of the five killed were shot in the back of the head but did not know whether they were still alive when they were shot. The defense official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the record...

sgmgrumpy
01-24-2007, 08:51 PM
1. Is there an entity other than the Dept. of Labor that tracks the number of civ. contractors killed and wounded in Iraq?

The only one I know of that is even close to being accurate. I am told the numbers are actually much higher.


http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx

Danny
01-24-2007, 10:54 PM
It is tragic, this loss of civilians. But I would like to pose the simple question, "what do the losses have to do with whether firms like Blackwater are used at all?"

In other words, you can question the wisdom of the use of contractors, or you can justify their use. But the connection of the two issues (a) the use of them, and (b) potential or actual losses, elludes me.

It is either justified or not, regardless of the losses incurred - it would seem to me. Or perhaps I am missing the point. Perhaps this is simply a convenient opportunity to mention your general reluctance to use contractors, regardless of the fact that they sustained losses today.

T'would be a fairly significant change. Contractors are in significant use today in Iraq. In fact, it would seem that they have had relatively few casualties given the high usage (not to belittle the tragedy of the losses at all, just making statistical observations). It might be an informative statistic to know just how many contractors there are at any one time, compared with casualty rate. Then, compare this with Marines, Soldiers, etc.

Culpeper
01-25-2007, 01:03 AM
Wasn't there something in the news not too long ago that will place these types of security personnel under the UCMJ? Blackwater is another example of the new face on today's battle front. Apparently, Blackwater et al brings a certain amount of hatred against them from the enemy. You see, the enemy gets to execute these guys and the counterinsurgency gets hammered for far less offenses. Nevertheless, a successful counterinsurgency has to maintain a higher standard than the insurgency. Why is it that America always has to fight ruthless people. I think the last somewhat civilized and professional military we went up against was the Germans.

I wonder what people working for a company like Blackwater are going to do on their own for the execution, if true, of their fellow employees? I can understand shooting down the chopper in a fight but to murder the wounded really pisses me off. I realize that Blackwater folks are professionals but do you think they will exact some revenge?

Jedburgh
01-25-2007, 01:24 AM
....Contractors are in significant use today in Iraq. In fact, it would seem that they have had relatively few casualties given the high usage...
There are more "contractors" KIA/WIA in Iraq than you hear about in the headlines - partly because the stories get buried, partly because often they are not Americans. Just recently Unity Resources Group (http://www.unityresourcesgroup.com/), a company with which I have some contact, lost three personnel in an ambush in Baghdad (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6273123.stm) - but although the principal (http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-activist19jan19,1,623542.story?coll=la-news-a_section) was a US citizen (also killed), none of them were.

Wasn't there something in the news not too long ago that will place these types of security personnel under the UCMJ?
Washington Post, 15 Jan 07: New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/14/AR2007011400906.html?nav=hcmodule)

Tom Odom
01-25-2007, 02:02 PM
In other words, you can question the wisdom of the use of contractors, or you can justify their use. But the connection of the two issues (a) the use of them, and (b) potential or actual losses, elludes me.

The linkage is quite simple: if the US government decides it is necessary to put armed forces on the ground, then the US government needs to equip train and deploy US government forces to do that job. Contractors are offered as a "cheap" or "short term" fix for what are often self-created shortfalls. Sustained use of PMCs is hardly cheap or short term--and those self-created gaps remain gaps.

As for losses, the seemingly invisble use of contractors--especially in a direct action mode--only gets pulled aside when losses like this occur. Contract direct action forces are used in this manner because their losses are less an issue in Congress.

This was in the case in using mercs in Africa, especually the Congo.

Tom

zdfg
02-01-2007, 09:06 AM
These men operate under DoS/DS/WPPS regulation. They are trained, vetted, and fall under control of federal agents/agencies. It is cheaper to deploy former SPECOPS/COMBAT ARMS/LE personnel for specific mission sets that in many cases are at/or below their skills levels to augment missions that are above the skillsets of federal agents trained for low/medium security risk environments. It is cost effective to deploy them short term, than to recruit, train, maintain, retire a federal agent.

To refer to these men as mercenaries or purely as civilians is inaccurate. Most of these men are former TF160, Ranger Regiment, and SPECOPS. They share the ideology, motivation, and adherance to tradition of their uniformed counterparts.

jcustis
02-01-2007, 12:56 PM
zdfg, since your location show Kabul, would you care to share a short introduction?

If you are currently working contract security, your views would certainly be appreciated when the subject of PMCs comes up. As you have seen, the SWC has a forum dedicated specifically to PMCs, and we need members from that field.

If you aren't comfortable posting much in the open, please PM me or SWJED, and we will check things out and "certify" you as a real-deal BTDT.

zdfg
02-02-2007, 12:52 PM
Certainly. PM sent regarding background.

Stan
02-02-2007, 01:18 PM
To refer to these men as mercenaries or purely as civilians is inaccurate.

I was picked up by DoS/PM/WRA (Weapons Removal and Abatement) years back to work under RONCO with Humanitarian Demining. They were adamant about required skills and especially military background. Language abilities would be a plus.

I know several folks out of DS, most are or were cops, special agents and almost always former military officers and NCOs.

Welcome Aboard !


The linkage is quite simple: if the US government decides it is necessary to armed forces on the ground, then the US government needs to equip train and deploy US government forces to do that job. Contractors are offered as a "cheap" or "short term" fix for what are often self-created shortfalls.

On the other hand, Tom hits a sore point (he does that often). Once in place and other than a monthly paycheck, training, follow-on training and needed (relatively significant and yes, expensive) equipment never showed. Keep it cheap one said to me from the onset.

Regards, Stan

Tom Odom
02-02-2007, 02:10 PM
Anything I said above or anywhere else is not targeted at the individual, ZDFG, when it comes to PMCs. My target is again the decision maker who makes a decision to:

A. Accept risk in manning and equipment

B. When that risk proves severe, fill it as a shortfall with contractors

C. AND DOES NOT BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE ORIGINAL NEED WITH LONG TERM SOLUTIONS

When that last block gets checked, it becomes a self-licking ice cream cone, one with potentially great effects elsewhere. For instance, your listing of qualifications highlights one clear effect: creating these type PMCs sucks talent out of the standing forces.

I am not unfamiliar with decisions like this: I am at least partially responsible for one of the strangest use of PMCs in recent history: that of the UNHCR hiring a PMC drawn from the armed forces of a host nation to protect NGOs from genocidal maniacs on the territory of the host nation.

Why am I responsible? Because I thought of it and set events in motion.

Was it a short term fix? Yeah, as in placing a bandaid on a sucking chest wound.

Did it address --or allow someone else to address--the origin of the problem when it went from "short term" to "long-term"? Yes and No.

Yes in that it kept a lid on open violence against NGOs and that was my intent.

No in that neither the UN nor the key international players in the crisis were willing to take effective action until it was too late.

The result: the Rwandan Civil War morphed iinto what has been called the "African World War" and killed at more than 3 million people in the process (not counting those slaughtered in the genocide).

Best

Tom

Bill Moore
02-03-2007, 09:08 PM
Tom,

I share your concerns, but don't come to the same conclusion. What is wrong with solutions that make sense economically? If it is cheaper to use Blackwater and other PMCs to do critical fringe work like provide VIP security, why not? For the most part they are better trained and not encumbered by the military bureaucracy. We all feel for those and their families who are lost in this fight, but they understand the hazardous nature of their work, and unfortunately sometimes that risk comes to fruition. Of course it makes the news, then everyone starts second guessing the wisdom of employing them, but if their mission was providing security for the Dept of State, it is better that they provide it, then pulling our Special Ops types from the field to do it. It appears to me to a functional compliment to our manning strategy.

When a contractor commits a crime, as those mentioned above, they definitely need to get hammered, or hurts all of us. If that isn't happening, then it needs to get fixed ASAP.

We're fighting networked enemies with a hierarchical bureacracy, so if we can incorporate (pun intended) more flexibility in our approach I'm for it (however the problems you mentioned need to be addressed). I think some of our ideas on security are outdated. A private security company out of S. Africa did outstanding work in Sierra Leone, probably saved hundreds, if not thousands of lives, because they "had" the flexibility to act, while bureaucratic militaries sat on the side lines. However, do to fears of "mercenary" operations with all the old connotations, they were forced to pull out, and as anticipated the Gangs went on a murdering rampage.

I know you frequently mention the situation in Rwanda, would you have objected to a PMC if they could have saved thousands of lives?

This is a subject that governments need to reconsider. PMC's are highly practical and can save thousands of lives around the world, where professional militaries are simply prohibited from going due to their states' political processes. It really confuses what is right and what is wrong, but I'm a simple guy, if you can save lives with a PMC, then use them. What is key is the P "Professional".

Bill

marct
02-03-2007, 09:24 PM
Hi Bill,


This is a subject that governments need to reconsider. PMC's are highly practical and can save thousands of lives around the world, where professional militaries are simply prohibited from going due to their states' political processes. It really confuses what is right and what is wrong, but I'm a simple guy, if you can save lives with a PMC, then use them. What is key is the P "Professional".

As ZDFG probably noted, I'm one of the people who doesn't see a distinction between PMCs and mercenaries. Having said that, I actually don't have a problem with governments hiring mercenaries (outside of those raised by Machiavelli in The Art of War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War_%28Machiavelli%29)) in the abstract. I do have a problem wth the way a number of the current contracts appear, and let me emphasize the word "appear", to be constructed in such a limited manner. You mentioned the Sierra Leone case with Executive Outcomes. That was a good example of what could be done with mercenaries and, barring international pressure against them, the would have been able to guarantee security.

My complaint is not with mercenaries per se, as ZDFG notes, many are very well trained and highly disciplined. In fact, they are probably better trained, on the average, than many national army troops. My complaint is with the term PMC and some spurious attempt to create a new categorical term for mercenaries.

Marc

zdfg
02-04-2007, 05:36 PM
Thanks to those who offered a welcome. I'm happy to participate in these types of debates.

One of the major distinctions between contractors and the traditional usage of mercenararies is that PMC's are generally banned from participating in DA (Direct Action). This does not extinguish their right to defend themselves from death or grevious bodily harm, or prevent the same to another person.

The other major distinguishing difference is that the majority of the PMC's share citizenship with the host entity. An American guarding a gate at an American military base overseas under contract, should in no way be viewed differently than a DoD police officer, under color of authority, at a base in New Mexico. This is common on a number of CONUS posts, and an argument could be made as to why they are needed when a large MP/FPO contingent could be made available. Money, and mission requirements, length of training ramp up, length of perishable assignments, reliability. A guy with all that, now making XXX number of dollars a day, performing a subset a task order he was originally performing under less well paying, sometimes more demeaning circumstances also does not fit the traditional mercenary image. This person very well may have more loyalty to the nation, they simply serve under a different 'branch' for lack of a better term.

Furthermore, high threat VIP protection in the middle east has taken off as an artform, and niche all it's own. Contractor support was secured because certain available assets were judged unprepared.

Initially, there may have been some chest thumping about plausibility-deniability warriors, but that was short lived. The Wild West atmosphere died quickly under the strain from media scandals like Abu Ghraib.

Pentagon is pushing to bring DoD contractors under UCMJ, and FM's and doctrine are being developed to isolate DoD contractors under hierarchical chains of command that report to national authorities.

Strictly looking at this from the viewpoint of armed contractors. Support contractors are a different group altogether. Much like the distinction between combat arms and combat support. Mutually supportive, but apples and oranges.

Forgive my rambling, it's dark, I'm cold, and tired.

Stan
02-04-2007, 06:52 PM
Money, and mission requirements, length of training ramp up, length of perishable assignments, reliability. A guy with all that, now making XXX number of dollars a day, performing a subset a task order he was originally performing under less well paying, sometimes more demeaning circumstances also does not fit the traditional mercenary image.

Evening ZDFG !

It would appear (perhaps because I already do much the same under a DoS program) that PMC's remain attractively cheaper than their Active Duty counterparts, and for some time now remain largely unknow, both alive and dead. Kind of sad !

I however agree that some control mechanism such as the UCMJ should be employed for the good of all.


This person very well may have more loyalty to the nation, they simply serve under a different 'branch' for lack of a better term.

I concur with you wholeheartedly. Retired now for more than a decade, I am no longer content with GI grumbling, and feel quite good about being an American and absolutely hate the term "expat" !

Regards, Stan

marct
02-04-2007, 10:24 PM
Hi ZDFG,


Thanks to those who offered a welcome. I'm happy to participate in these types of debates.

I'm glad you're here and participating, too :). I far prefer getting information from people on the ground that the media or "official" reports - it's always more "real".


One of the major distinctions between contractors and the traditional usage of mercenararies is that PMC's are generally banned from participating in DA (Direct Action). This does not extinguish their right to defend themselves from death or grevious bodily harm, or prevent the same to another person.

I note that you are using the term "generally". I would have to assume, then, that there are cases where PMCs are used in DA - the more "traditional" role as it were. Again, let me reiterate that I am not, in principle, opposed to this at all. I am, however, curious as to the flexibility of PMC units based around their contracts.


The other major distinguishing difference is that the majority of the PMC's share citizenship with the host entity. An American guarding a gate at an American military base overseas under contract, should in no way be viewed differently than a DoD police officer, under color of authority, at a base in New Mexico.

Let me just say, and I do say this with respect, that I have to disagree with you on this. Let's take Afghanistan as an example. An American contractor, guarding a gate may be the same as a DoD police officer in CONUS, but are they the same as a member of a national army in a NATO deployment? The practice of using non-forces personnel in home nations bases is, I would suggest, different from using non-forces personnel in combat zones.

I think that the key to this difference lies in two areas. First, what any individual nation choses to use in its home area is up to them, and troops from other nations accept that under a "guest right" basis - the old, "when in Rome...". But in the field when the operation is run by the alliance (e.g. Afghanistan) and not a single country (as in Iraq)? In that type of a situation, I would expect that the loyalty of the contractor would be to their employer first, their country second, and the alliance third. I could easily be wrong on this, but that would be my expectation.

Second, I would have to question the legal limitations and code under which PMCs operate. The oft touted idea that PMCs will be brought under the UCMJ does not, to my mind, make exact sense if they are not national army troops involved in DA (I could certainly see it if they were involved in DA, although, even there, I would have problems in an alliance situation). Let me take an extremely simplistic example: certain charges that may be brought under the UCMJ and non-existant under the military justice codes of other nations in NATO (rules on alcohol and homosexuality come to mind). Why should a contractor, working in an alliance situation, be subjected to the US UCMJ?

I'm bringing this second point up for a fairly simple reason. What if you had a contractor who was not ex-US military? Should they be operating under, what to them, would be a completely foreign military code? Would it not maken more sense to attempt to create a Code that was acceptable to all members of the alliance involved? BTW, lest you think that this is unrealistic, such a code has been developed in the past for both the Condottieri and for the Landsknechts.


This person very well may have more loyalty to the nation, they simply serve under a different 'branch' for lack of a better term.

You may well be correct in his; I really have no way of knowing, and I would be really interested to see what you have to say on this topic. It strikes me that you are thinking of PMCs, at least in this instance, as mor of limitanii than legionnaire. Do you see this as a major trend?


Furthermore, high threat VIP protection in the middle east has taken off as an artform, and niche all it's own. Contractor support was secured because certain available assets were judged unprepared.

I think you are absolutely correct in this; and the same applies in Mexico and Columbia where kidnapping is an art form. Would you think that a VIP security contractor should come under the UCMJ?


Strictly looking at this from the viewpoint of armed contractors. Support contractors are a different group altogether. Much like the distinction between combat arms and combat support. Mutually supportive, but apples and oranges.

But still an interesting test case in a lot of ways :D.


Forgive my rambling, it's dark, I'm cold, and tired.


Always glad to hear you ramble :D.

Marc

120mm
02-05-2007, 06:43 AM
In my opinion, it is a GOOD thing that the military is losing its most talented members to PMCs due to better pay, working conditions and less bull####. The military needs to change those very things, vis-a-vis its most talented members. Perhaps a "talent drain" will cause the political types to force the military to change the archaic and wasteful way it conducts business.

The way things stand, vast amounts of incompetent non-contributors are grossly overcompensated, while the competent contributors are underpaid and treated like crap.

I do not see how the current "top-down" system will ever make good use of "transformation".

Tom Odom
02-05-2007, 02:25 PM
Tom,

I share your concerns, but don't come to the same conclusion. What is wrong with solutions that make sense economically? If it is cheaper to use Blackwater and other PMCs to do critical fringe work like provide VIP security, why not? For the most part they are better trained and not encumbered by the military bureaucracy. We all feel for those and their families who are lost in this fight, but they understand the hazardous nature of their work, and unfortunately sometimes that risk comes to fruition. Of course it makes the news, then everyone starts second guessing the wisdom of employing them, but if their mission was providing security for the Dept of State, it is better that they provide it, then pulling our Special Ops types from the field to do it. It appears to me to a functional compliment to our manning strategy.

....Bill

Bill

On PMCs and contractors in general, I see the 60,000 or so contractors on Iraq as economic insanity; 4 years does not a "short-term solution make".

On wisdom of PMCs doing the undoable, maybe just maybe in the name of the United Nations, OAS, OAU that makes sense. But in the name of the United States? We take oaths as Soldiers, Diplomats, and even Civil Servants to represent, sustain, and defend the Constitution. Our government is one of deliberate pollitical debate; we do not engage in private wars or wars as private enterprise. If we need PMCs or whatever you call them to fill in such missions. maybe just maye that mission is not ours.

As for Rwanda, aside from actively recruiting an Israeli-Zairios merc force on the ground, I also met with a Brit company that did our local security forces in Kinshasa and was looking at the mission in the camps. The senior rep in Zaire was Sam Melessi and I bumped into him and a Brit on the UN L-100 flight from Kigali to Nairobi. They were bidding on a camp contract; I asked Sam if he was going to be able to shoot folks as necessary. He responded that the ROE would be "liberally" interpreted.

If Sam's mission or the Israeli-Zairios force that actually got the mission had had the capacity to disarm the camps, then maybe, Bill, I would look on it as a success. They did not; the camps became another self-licking ice cream cone of contractors, NGOs, and UNHCR spenidning millions and millions of dollars to sustain 1 million bloody handed "refugees."

In contrast we had a force on the ground that could have taken on the mission--UNAMIR 2--but we as the world community lacked the will to use it. Later, the US and the UK would actually be in the process of finally doing something when the Rwandan military resolved the camp situation but sparked an even greater war.

As for niches in dip protection; again that is a self-licking ice cream cone. We justify the need to fill the need rather than addressing the origin of the need. If we have too many folks that need this sort of escort we have 2 options: reduce the numbers requiring the escort/protection or two increase the number of USG tranied escorts. Put the money into a sustained program versus a "short-term" fill that seems to only expand.

Best

Tom

SWJED
02-21-2007, 05:44 PM
21 February Virginian-Pilot - Blackwater Brass Forms Intelligence Company (http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=119833&ran=88794) by Bill Sizemore.


Cofer Black, vice chairman of Blackwater USA, announced Tuesday the formation of a new CIA-type private company to provide intelligence services to commercial clients.

The executive roster for the new venture, Total Intelligence Solutions, is loaded with veterans of U.S. intelligence agencies, including two other Blackwater officials.

A spokeswoman for Total Intelligence said there is no corporate affiliation with Blackwater, the Moyock, N.C.-based private military company, but the new firm clearly has a Blackwater stamp...

Blackwater's primary specialties are tactical training and security, but it is no stranger to the intelligence world. The 10-year-old company's first security contract, awarded in 2002, was for a classified operation. In his book "Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror," author Robert Young Pelton identified the company's client as the CIA.

The concept of marketing intelligence services to commercial clients is not new, Pelton said Tuesday, but the new venture represents "a continuing evolution in what Blackwater's doing."...

SWJED
02-21-2007, 05:52 PM
20 February Virginian-Pilot - Pentagon Investigates Blackwater's Expense Tab (http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=119795&ran=143615) by Bill Sizemore.


A two-year investigation has finally begun to shed some light on the trail of taxpayer dollars that paid for Blackwater USA's famously ill-fated security mission in Fallujah, Iraq, in March 2004...

Blackwater was at the bottom of a four-tiered chain of contractors. The Moyock, N.C.-based company says it billed the next company up the chain $2.3 million. At the top of the chain was KBR, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney's former employer, Halliburton Co

Now the Pentagon has calculated that by the time KBR got around to billing the government, the tab to the taxpayers for private security work had reached $19.6 million...

Last week, federal investigators identified $10 billion they said has been squandered in the war because of contractor overcharges and unsupported expenses. More than a quarter of that amount, $2.7 billion, was charged by Halliburton.

Because of the Fallujah ambush and its fallout, Blackwater is center stage in a case study of the booming, multi layered world of wartime contracting and whether the safety of America's private soldiers takes a back seat to corporate profits...

Double-billing by security contractors is another concern of congressional investigators. A January 2005 audit of a different Blackwater contract, with the State Department, found that Blackwater was charging the government separately for "drivers" and "security specialists," who were in fact the same people.

The audit also found that Blackwater was improperly including profit in its overhead costs, resulting "not only in a duplication of profit, but also a pyramiding of profit because, in effect, Blackwater is applying profit to profit."...

120mm
02-21-2007, 06:16 PM
Nothing pisses me off quicker than tying Halliburton to VP Cheney. Or the phrase "corporate profits".

I think it's time we started talking about the obscene "government profits" by "excessive and duplicative taxation and regulation".

Or the obscene "media profits", caused by republishing old news as new news.

jcustis
02-21-2007, 07:02 PM
Certainly a natural progression, given BW's network of contractors around the world. Outside of money, I'm ever so curious as to what other intangibles are making them so successful, compared to folks like MPRI. Or is it mostly hyped capability that still relies on getting the right people in after contract award?

Bill Moore
02-21-2007, 10:30 PM
Blackwater is networked with the special operations community and can frequently get the best people who are already well trained and vetted. MPRI used to focus on rank (or status) instead of skills. Although I worked with MPRI in Africa and was more than a little impressed at the talent they brought to bare on the problem; however, MPRI was (I don't know currently) more focused on preparing for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, not providing security and venturing into the dark side. Two different missions, unless MPRI has changed their focus. I do know they were bought out (they kept their title MPRI) by another Co, and that they have migrated into recruiting and ROTC, who knows what else?

wierdbeard
03-01-2007, 09:42 PM
If anyone has a POC for the HR dept of TIS I would appreciate it. I'd like to see what may be available on the outside since re-enlistment time is here...

SWJED
03-01-2007, 10:45 PM
Total Intelligence Solutions (http://www.totalintel.com/) - should find at least some type of HR link there...

AFlynn
03-12-2007, 03:20 AM
I'm wondering how the issues of accountability and oversight work in terms of private intelligence. Does anybody have more info on this?

Stan
03-12-2007, 08:52 AM
Hey wierdbeard !
Here's MPRI's very comprehensive listing:

http://mpriweb.mpri.com/IIF/Jobs/jobsummary.html


The HR Department maintains a database of professionals for consideration against future MPRI requirements. Acceptance into MPRI's database is not automatic. To be considered, please complete an Individual Information Form (IIF). You will be notified via email if your form has been downloaded into the database. A search of the database for potential skill set matches is accomplished as new contract requirements are received.

Regards, Stan

SWJED
05-27-2007, 07:23 AM
27 May Washington Post - U.S. Security Contractors Open Fire in Baghdad (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601394.html) by Steve Fainaru and Saad al-Izzi.


Employees of Blackwater USA, a private security firm under contract to the State Department, opened fire on the streets of Baghdad twice in two days last week, and one of the incidents provoked a standoff between the security contractors and Iraqi forces, U.S. and Iraqi officials said.

A Blackwater guard shot and killed an Iraqi driver Thursday near the Interior Ministry, according to three U.S. officials and one Iraqi official who were briefed on the incident but spoke on condition of anonymity because of a pending investigation. On Wednesday, a Blackwater-protected convoy was ambushed in downtown Baghdad, triggering a furious battle in which the security contractors, U.S. and Iraqi troops and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters were firing in a congested area...

Mark O'Neill
05-27-2007, 11:09 AM
Ater the Rhodesians lost, many of them joined the South African Defense Forces (SADF). They influenced the SADF special forces concepts, counter-insurgency and warfare tactics. South Africa’s counter-insurgency policy wasn’t exactly successful either. Probably because they didn’t learn anything from the failure of the Rhodesian experience. They continued to use the failed practices that their Rhodesian brothers taught them.

I think the same could be said of the SADF and military oriented solutions to the counter-insurgency strategy of South Africa.


It is true that many of the Rhodesians did join the SADF. It is also equally true that most of them did not stay for all that long. There is an abundance of evidence to support this claim.

The claim that they had a large effect on strategy is unsubstaniated. They did have an effect on TTP, but The RSA grand strategy was well and truly decided before Rhodesia 'fell'. Any half decent read of the publically available material shows that the 'Total Strategy' was well and truly in place before '79 / '80.

One also needs to distinguish between the willingness to incorporate willing and available troops at the tactical level (which, cynically could be viewed as newly stateless, and hence [especially when compared to RSA white conscripts from Stellenbosch or Capetown] 'cannon fodder') and adoption of Rhodesian strategy.

In fact, it would be fair to say that at the highest levels of the apartheid era white minority government in South Africa that Smith and the Rhodesians were regarded as strategically naive, albeit useful buffers to the 'frontline' states.

The minority South African's ultimately failed strategically for pretty much the same reason that the Rhodesians did - a lack of strategic rectitude. We all know of the importance of 'legitimacy' in COIN. There was never any hope (in anyone truly awake) that a policy such as apartheid would , in the long run, be acceptable. There is evidence to suggest that, in the end, the leadership of the SADF came to an awareness of this, and were fighting to buy time in order to allow the politicians time to realise this and negotiate an appropriate end to the 'insurgency'.

Arguably, the current nation of the Republic of South Africa is proof that they were at least successful in this aim.

This, perhaps, introduces one of frequently unexplored / under discussed 'truisims' of COIN 'victory' (I also include in this category rectitude and multiple interagency lines of operations) - ''compromise'. But, I digress.... that is another thread .. one day.

In summary, the role of Rhodesians in the RSA COIN strategy can be very easily overstated. (If you have any further doubt, do some research on how the Boers running the aparthied era minority government truly viewed 'rooineks' or (don't have the afrikaans word at hand) 'salt dicks'.

PS an interesting point for Australians, we have a federal act of parliament, The Foreign Incursions Act that makes it a crime against Commonwealth Law for an Australian Citizen to be a mercenary. It would be interesting to see how this would play out in the courts if an Aussie citizen was to be employed by Blackwater in their 'Brigade' in a foreign country,

tequila
05-27-2007, 11:51 PM
Perhaps the best evidence of South Africa's cynicism with regards to Zimbabwe's white population can be seen in its support for the "Super ZAPU" insurgency in Ndebeleland which specifically targeted white Zimbabwean farmers.

Menning
08-15-2007, 05:21 PM
I just finished reading Scahill's Blackwater. Is anyone else familiar with the book? I'm looking for some general feedback regarding the accuracy of Scahill's reporting/research and depiction of Blackwater USA. Also, does the ultimate fate of Executive Outcomes have any bearing on U.S. PMCs? For those out there with boots on the ground experience, what are the major positives/negatives of the privatization of services in combat zones?

Michael Shannon
08-15-2007, 07:28 PM
I've spent just over three years in Iraq as a security contractor and have read Scahill's book. My critical observations are he complains about Black Water's revenues without considering expenses, he doesn't take into consideration what a soldier actually costs to deploy long term versus a contractor and how many troops are actually needed to replace a single contractor and he doesn't provide any suggestions as to how to provide security for private orgnanizations in a war zone.

Granite_State
08-16-2007, 05:49 PM
I just finished reading Scahill's Blackwater. Is anyone else familiar with the book? I'm looking for some general feedback regarding the accuracy of Scahill's reporting/research and depiction of Blackwater USA. Also, does the ultimate fate of Executive Outcomes have any bearing on U.S. PMCs? For those out there with boots on the ground experience, what are the major positives/negatives of the privatization of services in combat zones?

Just posted on this in another thread, but I'd really recommend Robert Young Pelton's Licensed to Kill. Deals heavily with Blackwater, and also has a couple chapters on Executive Outcomes, Sandline, and the implications of PSCs vs. PMCs.

Could read Singer's book too, although Erik Prince criticizes him as having "very soft hands." But he would, I suppose.

bismark17
08-16-2007, 09:30 PM
Jeremy Scahill also has some video up on youtube. He appeared to me to be very slanted against the company and it's ownership.

RTK
09-17-2007, 11:58 AM
Associated Press BAGHDAD — The Interior Ministry said Monday that it was pulling the license of an American security firm allegedly involved in the fatal shooting of civilians during an attack on a U.S. State Department motorcade in Baghdad.

The ministry said it would prosecute any foreign contractors found to have used excessive force in the Sunday incident.

Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul-Karim Khalaf said eight people were killed and 13 were wounded when security contractors working for Blackwater USA opened fire in a predominantly Sunni neighborhood of western Baghdad.

"We have canceled the license of Blackwater and prevented them from working all over Iraqi territory. We will also refer those involved to Iraqi judicial authorities," Khalaf said.

Blackwater, based in North Carolina, provides security for many U.S. civilian operations in the country. Phone messages left early Monday at Blackwater's office in North Carolina and with a company spokeswoman were not immediately returned.

More here. (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/APWires/headlines/D8RN61R86.html)

Steve Blair
09-17-2007, 01:42 PM
but not a good move on Blackwater's part...assuming of course that the current story is what actually happened. I haven't heard enough about this yet to hazard a guess either way.

LawVol
09-17-2007, 09:12 PM
Much has been written here and elsewhere about the insurgency's tactic of using civilians as shields. They will often shoot from the crowd hoping to evoke a lethal response which helps them win in the IO realm and possibly creates new recruits from those directly affected (i.e. those wounded or friends/family of those wounded or killed). Could this be more of the same? By pulling the credentials of this company, are we actually giving the terrorists what they want? They have previously attacked the UN and some of our smaller allies to get them to pull out of Iraq. Is this an updated version of that tactic?

Disclaimer: I am not advocating a blank check for contractors and believe that any contractors that violate the law should be held accountable.

RTK
09-17-2007, 09:25 PM
Contract security firms, as a generalization, do more to screw up an AO than anything the owning unit can do. Often they don't coordinate with the owning unit. They are there and paid to protect their cargo, be it materials or people. FM3-24 is not part of their contract.

Tacitus
09-18-2007, 01:00 PM
Disclaimer: I am not advocating a blank check for contractors and believe that any contractors that violate the law should be held accountable.

As for being "held accountable", isn't this one of the big issues with using contractors, mercenaries, Hessians, hired guns or whatever term is in vogue these days? I don't think they are accountable to the UCMJ. Does the Iraqi courts system have any jurisdiction over this? I guess rather than bother with the hassle of trying something like this in court, just telling them to leave seems easier.

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 01:29 PM
Much has been written here and elsewhere about the insurgency's tactic of using civilians as shields. They will often shoot from the crowd hoping to evoke a lethal response which helps them win in the IO realm and possibly creates new recruits from those directly affected (i.e. those wounded or friends/family of those wounded or killed). Could this be more of the same? By pulling the credentials of this company, are we actually giving the terrorists what they want? They have previously attacked the UN and some of our smaller allies to get them to pull out of Iraq. Is this an updated version of that tactic?
The tactic of shooting from the crowd in order to attempt to elicit an undisciplined response that will kill civilians is directed at turning the population (and members of the Iraqi government) against the US and its allies (or simply deepening already existing resentment and anger). The bad guys don't really care if BW specifically stays or goes - they want us all out.

Your last statement is a false analogy. For example, the bombing of the UN HQ and the Jordanian Embassy in '03 were direct attacks specifically intended to drive those representatives out of Iraq, and, by extension, to send an explicit warning to the wider diplomatic community in Baghdad. BW just ain't important enough to target in that manner.

The Iraqi government insisting that BW get out is an unintended side-effect of the of the incident that caused it all. I'm sure the bad guys welcome their departure, but the resulting perceptions of indiscriminate killing of civilians are far more important in the big picture.

goesh
09-18-2007, 02:25 PM
Just my opinion but it boils down to whom the State Dept. and the big money boys want protecting them and what the latter wants, the latter usually gets. Some civilians in country may not want a close relationship with the military for any number of reasons, legitimate and non-legit. Since former military significantly fill the ranks of mercs, it is out of character for years of training and experience to be tossed out the window in a firefight as if they were gunslingers in town on a drunken binge. No doubt mercs complicate and impinge on AOs but non DOD covert ops piggyback on mercs from time to time too, they would have to.

Rank amateur
09-18-2007, 04:03 PM
I suggest that the incident is a little more significant than we may have realized. It calls into question the entire issue of whether we're in Iraq to liberate the Iraqis or for our own self interests, which is one of the key "hearts and mind" issues and winning hearts and minds is the ultimate objective.

How sovereign is a country that can't even enforce it's own laws?


The deaths struck a nerve with Iraqis, who say that private security firms are often quick to shoot and are rarely held responsible for their actions. A law issued by the American authority in Iraq before the United States handed over sovereignty to Iraqis, Order No. 17, gives the companies immunity from Iraqi law. A security expert based in Baghdad said Monday night that the order, issued in 2004, had never been overturned. Like others, he spoke on the condition of anonymity because the matter remains under official inquiry.

Senior officials, including Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, expressed outrage.

“This is a big crime that we can’t stay silent in front of,” said Jawad al-Bolani, the interior minister, in remarks on Al Arabiya television. “Anyone who wants to have good relations with Iraq has to respect Iraqis. We apply the law and are committed to it.”




When push comes to shove, will we ignore the Iraqi government to protect ourselves? It looks like we might.


Because Blackwater guards are so central to the American operation here, having provided protection for numerous American ambassadors, it was not clear on Monday whether the United States would agree to end a relationship with a trusted protector so quickly. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker praised private security companies in a speech on Sept. 11, referring to Blackwater by name.

“This incident will be the true test of diplomacy between the State Department and the government of Iraq,” said one American official in Baghdad.


Which demonstrates the point I've made several times when discussing "marketing" in other threads. People judge you by your actions, more so than by your words, no matter how good your spin is.

The entire NY times Article is here (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/world/middleeast/18iraq.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin)

Patriot
09-18-2007, 04:43 PM
Do not believe the lies Blackwater is pumping out about the recent events in Al Mansour. None of what they are saying is true.

Steve Blair
09-18-2007, 05:09 PM
Do you have links or information (that can be posted without issues) to back up this statement? Providing something would be greatly appreciated, if for no other reason than to provide contrast to anything Blackwater happens to put out.

Merv Benson
09-18-2007, 07:06 PM
I think Jedburgh and Steve Blair both make good points. I suspect the events surrounding the exchange of fire were much more nuanced than either side is revealing at this point. One point that should never be forgotten in these situations is that the enemy's war crime of fighting without an identifiable uniform endangers civilians in every confrontation. Civilian casualties would be greatly reduced if he obeyed the laws of war.

Whenever we are attributing causation this point should be raised to reinforce the point of the enemy's responsibility for civilian casualties. It could well be that there were other factors that put the Blackwater guys in a bad light, but this one factor puts the primary responsibility for endangering civilians where it belongs, on the enemy.

Confederate Yankee (http://confederateyankee.mu.nu/archives/240854.php) cites a report that indicates some of those doing the shooting at the convoy were wearing Iraqi Police uniforms. This adds another dimension to the event and may also explain the Iraqi political reaction.

selil
09-18-2007, 07:24 PM
Civilian casualties would be greatly reduced if he obeyed the laws of war.

Where did I see that quote... something like "The laws of war are usually applied after the war has ended".... something like that.

marct
09-19-2007, 05:51 PM
With emotions running high and conflicting reports coming out, what do we actually know about the incident that an be verified rather than just what spokespeople are saying? I think we can all agree that the main stream media are sometimes a touch biased, to say nothing about the people who manipulate them. Personally, I would really like to see some specific evidence just so that.

Patriot, you said


Do not believe the lies Blackwater is pumping out about the recent events in Al Mansour. None of what they are saying is true.

Without breaking any OPSEC considerations, can you suggest any sources that contradict the BW line? BTW, I'm not in any way trying to say that you are incorrect. I find the limited information I have seen to be open to all sorts of interpretations ranging from a staged AQI PR attack through to the BW crowd being drunk and "gettin' rowdy". And, honestly, I take the BW official line with a pinch of salt.

All, what I'm getting at is that this has the potential to be (maybe "is" would be more appropriate :wry:) a major flashpoint, PR issue. If this was an AQI PR attack, we need solid evidence that people will believe. If it's another Abu Ghraib in the making, then that needs to be addressed as quickly as possible.

Marc

Steve Blair
09-19-2007, 06:26 PM
To be honest, I tend to lump Blackwater statements into the same group as Microsoft statements that they are not a monopoly....:wry:

Blackwater has a vested interest (read money...both for current and future contracts) in presenting a particular spin on things. When it becomes especially troubling to me is if the government backs their spin without any sort of transparent investigation. I'm not saying this has happened or is happening...but rather identifying one of the many points of concern I have with this incident.

I do feel that PMCs are often allowed to slip through the cracks when it comes to accountability...a very disturbing trend.

Jedburgh
09-20-2007, 10:39 PM
...I do feel that PMCs are often allowed to slip through the cracks when it comes to accountability...a very disturbing trend.
A good op-ed from 17 Sep 07 that speaks to that point:

Banned in Baghdad: Reactions to the Blackwater License Being Pulled (http://www3.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/singer/20070917.pdf)

....Private military contractors have been involved in all sorts of questionable incidents, since the very start of the Iraq enterprise. U.S. military officers frequently expressed their frustrations with sharing the battlefield with such private forces operating under their own rules and agendas, and worry about the consequences for their own operations. For example, Brigadier General Karl Horst, deputy commander of the US 3rd Infantry Division (responsible for Baghdad area) tellingly put it two years back (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/09/AR2005090902136_pf.html), These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There’s no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath.”

No one has kept an exact count of the incidents, but some notable examples include:

• The Aegis “trophy video” (http://www.flurl.com/uploaded/Bareknucklepoliticscom_EXCLUSIVE_10122.html), in which contractors took video of themselves shooting at civilians, set it to the Elvis song "Runaway Train," and put it on the Internet.

• The alleged joyride shootings of Iraqi civilians by a Triple Canopy supervisor. They became the subject of a lawsuit after two employees, who claim to have witnessed the shootings, lost their jobs.

• Armed contractors from the Zapata firm detained by U.S. forces, who allegedly saw the private soldiers indiscriminately firing not only at Iraqi civilians, but also at U.S. Marines. Again, they were not charged, as the legal issues could not be squared. Private military firms may be part of the military operation, but they and their employees are not part of the military, or its chain of command or its code of justice.

• Abu Ghraib, where reportedly 100 percent of the translators and up to 50 percent of the interrogators at the prison were private contractors from the Titan and CACI firms, respectively. The U.S. Army found that contractors were involved in 36% of the proven abuse incidents and identified six particular employees as being culpable in the abuses. While the enlisted U.S. Army soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib abuse were court-martialed for their crimes, not a single private contractor named in the Army's investigation report has been charged, prosecuted or punished. The Army believes it lacks the jurisdiction to pursue these cases, even if it wants to.....

tequila
09-21-2007, 12:33 AM
Remarkable that this incident (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14527473)never made the news at the time. The killing of the Iraqi vice president's bodyguard at Christmas by a BW contractor has made the rounds, but I never heard of this despite apparent press witnesses and a mil investigation:



NPR witnessed a similar scenario two years ago. A State Department convoy, protected by Blackwater, raced out of a compound. Guards immediately shot at a car killing an old man, his son and his daughter-in-law. Blackwater said the car was driving erratically. A U.S. military investigation concluded Blackwater had used excessive force. No one was prosecuted.


Sunday's incident seems to be the final straw — not just for Iraq's prime minister, but for the public. Outrage was bubbling on the streets.


Karim Muhammed, who owns a furniture store, said he's seen people killed by foreign security companies. He said Iraqi officials should have done something about this a long time ago.


"Why do they consider American blood first class, and ours a cheap commodity?" Muhammed said. "Are they better than us?"


And Samir Samir said he fears the private security companies far more than the U.S. military.


"The U.S. military is subject to its own laws and monitoring," Samir said. "Who monitors the security companies?"

Sarajevo071
09-21-2007, 06:23 AM
Iraqi Report Says Blackwater Guards Fired First


A preliminary Iraqi report on a shooting involving an American diplomatic motorcade said Tuesday that Blackwater security guards were not ambushed, as the company reported, but instead fired at a car when it did not heed a policeman’s call to stop, killing a couple and their infant.

The report, by the Ministry of Interior, was presented to the Iraqi cabinet and, though unverified, seemed to contradict an account offered by Blackwater USA that the guards were responding to gunfire by militants. The report said Blackwater helicopters had also fired. The Ministry of Defense said 20 Iraqis had been killed, a far higher number than had been reported before.

In a sign of the seriousness of the standoff, the American Embassy here suspended diplomatic missions outside the Green Zone and throughout Iraq on Tuesday.

“There was not shooting against the convoy,” said Ali al-Dabbagh, the Iraqi government’s spokesman. “There was no fire from anyone in the square.”
...

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/world/middleeast/19blackwater.html?ex=1347854400&en=e582bb554958b9be&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

Sarajevo071
09-21-2007, 06:26 AM
Where Military Rules Don't Apply
Blackwater's Security Force in Iraq Given Wide Latitude by State Dept.


Blackwater USA, the private security company involved in a Baghdad shootout last weekend, operated under State Department authority that exempted the company from U.S. military regulations governing other security firms, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials and industry representatives.

In recent months, the State Department's oversight of Blackwater became a central issue as Iraqi authorities repeatedly clashed with the company over its aggressive street tactics. Many U.S. and Iraqi officials and industry representatives said they came to see Blackwater as untouchable, protected by State Department officials who defended the company at every turn. Blackwater employees protect the U.S. ambassador and other diplomats in Iraq.

Blackwater "has a client who will support them no matter what they do," said H.C. Lawrence Smith, deputy director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq, an advocacy organization in Baghdad that is funded by security firms, including Blackwater.

The State Department allowed Blackwater's heavily armed teams to operate without an Interior Ministry license, even after the requirement became standard language in Defense Department security contracts. The company was not subject to the military's restrictions on the use of offensive weapons, its procedures for reporting shooting incidents or a central tracking system that allows commanders to monitor the movements of security companies on the battlefield.

"The Iraqis despised them, because they were untouchable," said Matthew Degn, who recently returned from Baghdad after serving as senior American adviser to the Interior Ministry. "They were above the law." Degn said Blackwater's armed Little Bird helicopters often buzzed the Interior Ministry's roof, "almost like they were saying, 'Look, we can fly anywhere we want.' "
...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/19/AR2007091902503_pf.html

Rob Thornton
09-21-2007, 10:50 AM
Today's SWJ OPED Round Up and Yesterday's OPED Roundup both had some of the recent commentary. The United States will have to grow (considerably - perhaps more then planned) its tools of foreign policy - the Military, the Foreign Service, CIA, Justice, and the Inter-Agency etc. if it wants the flexibility to meet its commitments without filling the holes and cracks with PMCs - the PMCs saw the hole we (America) created and filled it.

We created our reliance on PMCs - this is a self-inflicted GSW. There should be no surprises that contracting out the nation's interests can result in consequences other then we had intended. When you put on the uniform you are different, and when you take it off you are different. Being asked to employ violence while in uniform means excepting the responsibilities and the strengths of the convictions and values the uniform represents - the straight jacket is the UCMJ, and unit loyalty. Taking off the uniform and taking on personal risk and doing violence for a paycheck is different - I don't know if there is a better illustration then that.

To me, the question is where do we go from here? I'd also add that even if we decide to fill our own holes - a process that a few years at the very minimum to fix (in a perfect world), goes beyond recruiting - toward competition with the PMCs to retain some of our best trained mid level folks, and to some degree relies on the political leadership to authorize, fund and equip the increase in manpower, and relies on the American public to volunteer on a much larger scale for service.

Even so - PMCs will probably still be seen on the battlefield. They have made their value on the world market known - and there are others who will contract their services.

sgmgrumpy
09-21-2007, 12:45 PM
I am not defended what happened, but when we talk about UCMJ and all the other DOD rules, you also have to find out or know what type of contract the individuals are operating under. DOS never has, and never will allow DOD to control what they do. It’s like a bad marriage.

Everyone is focused on this particular BW incident and forgetting or at least maybe not knowing that these particular BW folks are operating under a DOS WPPS Diplomatic Security which is NOT a DOD contract. They work for State Department, so labeling them as military contractors is not an accurate designation but of course the media seems to jump on that terminology. They are performing duties what normally would be filled by Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Special Agents (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86789.pdf).

It’s amazing what’s contracted now days. Just go to and look through some of the pre-solicitations for contracts. Don’t forget to browse by branch or agency (http://www.fbo.gov/spg/index.html)

You don't even want to know the amount of a three year contract that was awarded to a Company to provide protection to a foreign dignitary and his family living in Calif., USA :mad:

Steve Blair
09-21-2007, 12:57 PM
Then maybe someone should try nailing the accountability to DOS and see how fast they can scamper for the darkness....

tequila
09-21-2007, 01:43 PM
sgm - If you think contracting is out of control on the DoS/DoD side, I suggest avoiding what is going on in the intel side (http://news.yahoo.com/s/news21/20060901/ts_news21/the_outsourcing_of_u_s_intelligence), in all the alphabet soup agencies: DIA (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/06/AR2006050601088_pf.html), CIA, NSA, etc (http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/hillhouse).



Over the past six years, a quiet revolution has occurred in the intelligence community toward wide-scale outsourcing to corporations and away from the long-established practice of keeping operations in US government hands, with only select outsourcing of certain jobs to independently contracted experts. Key functions of intelligence agencies are now run by private corporations. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) revealed in May that 70 percent of the intelligence budget goes to contractors.

For all practical purposes, effective control of the NSA is with private corporations, which run its support and management functions. As the Washington Post's Walter Pincus reported (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/06/AR2006050601088.html) last year, more than 70 percent of the staff of the Pentagon's newest intelligence unit, CIFA (Counterintelligence Field Activity), is made up of corporate contractors. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) lawyers revealed at a conference in May that contractors make up 51 percent of the staff in DIA offices. At the CIA, the situation is similar. Between 50 and 60 percent of the workforce of the CIA's most important directorate, the National Clandestine Service (NCS), responsible for the gathering of human intelligence, is composed of employees of for-profit corporations.

sgmgrumpy
09-21-2007, 01:58 PM
Ah Yes,

The Spy who Billed Me! (http://www.thespywhobilledme.com/the_spy_who_billed_me/)

You gotta watch those intel types. They are sneeky:D

tequila
09-21-2007, 02:26 PM
Yup, Ms. Hillhouse wrote the NATION article - an excellent piece of work. I'm still struggling to see the upside of doing all this stuff in the private sector. Seriously, are we saving that much money?

marct
09-21-2007, 02:40 PM
We created our reliance on PMCs - this is a self-inflicted GSW. There should be no surprises that contracting out the nation's interests can result in consequences other then we had intended.

Agreed, Rob. But I want to point to one horrific example of what has happened with a too strong reliance on mercenaries, especially when there is no form of accountability: the Thirty Years War and, in particular, the Massacre at Magdeburgh.

I know, at the moment it is a false analogy, but it keeps cropping up n my mind as a worst case scenario and, quite frankly, with not a darn thing happening to reign these people in and make them accountable it is, in my cynical opinion, becoming much more likely. We have already seen the reactions of many Iraqi's to the actions of PMCs being uncontrolled and, in many cases, unpunished. This is an IO winfall for AQI and any other insurgent group. And, more importantly, let me just note that incidents like this one and others actually make a Jihad quite legal in even the most mainstream forms of Sunni Islam.


Even so - PMCs will probably still be seen on the battlefield. They have made their value on the world market known - and there are others who will contract their services.

Quite true but, with respect Rob, it is in some ways irrelevant, at least in the sense that we can take it as a given for the future. What is of primary importance now and in the future is getting mechanisms that hld them accountable for their actions.


I am not defended what happened, but when we talk about UCMJ and all the other DOD rules, you also have to find out or know what type of contract the individuals are operating under. DOS never has, and never will allow DOD to control what they do. It’s like a bad marriage.

Everyone is focused on this particular BW incident and forgetting or at least maybe not knowing that these particular BW folks are operating under a DOS WPPS Diplomatic Security which is NOT a DOD contract. They work for State Department, so labeling them as military contractors is not an accurate designation but of course the media seems to jump on that terminology. They are performing duties what normally would be filled by Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Special Agents (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86789.pdf).

Does this mean that they have some form of diplomatic immunity:confused:? Even if that is the case, there is precedent for expulsion and requesting the originating nation to lay charges. This happened in Canada a while back with a Russian diplomat who killed someone in a car "accident" (BA content of .02+). I suspect there are other precedents for it as well.

To my mind, this means that the people involved in this incident should be expelled and indicted in the US under US law. As sgmgrumpy noted, there are private "security" details in the US - I can just imagine how US citizens would react to some of them randomly firing into traffic!


To me, the question is where do we go from here? I'd also add that even if we decide to fill our own holes - a process that a few years at the very minimum to fix (in a perfect world), goes beyond recruiting - toward competition with the PMCs to retain some of our best trained mid level folks, and to some degree relies on the political leadership to authorize, fund and equip the increase in manpower, and relies on the American public to volunteer on a much larger scale for service.

I definitely think you're right about that, Rob. Hmm, I really don't know US military policy as well as I should, but aren't officers available for recall after they leave? Would it be feasible (or even possible :confused:) to add a rider to the legislation/admin rules (whatever) to he effect that if hey are engaged in "civilian" employment in a battlezone they, as individuals, are subject to the UCMJ?

Marc

marct
09-21-2007, 02:42 PM
Hi Tequila,


Yup, Ms. Hillhouse wrote the NATION article - an excellent piece of work. I'm still struggling to see the upside of doing all this stuff in the private sector. Seriously, are we saving that much money?

My gut guess is that it all depends on how you are doing your accounting. If you bear no fiscal responsibility for IO disasters or cleaning up the messes they are leaving, then yes, it does make fiscal sense. If, on the other hand,you have to account for cleaning up the messes, then I don't see how it makes sense.

Stan
09-21-2007, 02:45 PM
I'll but defend DIA, where most of the services lend out their soldiers, keep said soldiers in promotion limbo by placing them within 71L (administration for the uninitiated), and about the point they become productive, their gone, or frustrated into leaving. I retired :D

There's no where left to go but DA civilians, and even they won't stay for peanuts.

Then there's the analysts (somewhere in the basement). They need at least three masters, two languages, 10 years of experience (anywhere will do) and absolutely no sunshine (windows).

I recon all those available Blackwater dudes will be lookin' for a DC job :eek:

Steve Blair
09-21-2007, 03:06 PM
I definitely think you're right about that, Rob. Hmm, I really don't know US military policy as well as I should, but aren't officers available for recall after they leave? Would it be feasible (or even possible :confused:) to add a rider to the legislation/admin rules (whatever) to he effect that if hey are engaged in "civilian" employment in a battlezone they, as individuals, are subject to the UCMJ?

Marc

I believe this is the case for officers, but EM are not subject to recall (one of the reasons Calley was the only one ever really put on trial for . That would just shift the PMC hiring targets a bit.

It was hinted at earlier, but I think the best way to hit these bastards is in the wallet. Kick 'em out, levy substantial fines/penalties, turn them over to local authorities in some cases (and this one certainly sounds like one of those cases), and block them from future employment with US governmental agencies.

skiguy
09-21-2007, 04:02 PM
Rob, that is an excellent post, sir!

Dumb question time (I haven't asked one in a while:D). Do civilians embedded with the military fall under UCMJ rules?

marct
09-21-2007, 04:08 PM
I believe this is the case for officers, but EM are not subject to recall (one of the reasons Calley was the only one ever really put on trial for . That would just shift the PMC hiring targets a bit.

Okay, I really didn't know if it was for both. If that's the case, then you're right, it would just shift the hiring targets. Drat:mad:!


It was hinted at earlier, but I think the best way to hit these bastards is in the wallet. Kick 'em out, levy substantial fines/penalties, turn them over to local authorities in some cases (and this one certainly sounds like one of those cases), and block them from future employment with US governmental agencies.

Steve, I agree that at the institutional level this would work, and I would certainly recommend proceeding along those lines, but I don't think it would work at either the individual level, for IO or for building a "rule of law". Individuals who commit these types of crimes must be held personally accountable for their actions.

I would suggest, as an immediate response, that a joint Iraqi, MNF and State department investigative unit be established to investigate and determine the appropriate legal recourse for any future incidents. I would also hope that a specific legal code be established for the operation of PMCs where they are not covered by other codes. Furthermore, I believe that if at all possible, and I'll admit it may not be possible in some cases, I would like to see punishment meted out in the country and specific local in which the incident happened, otherwise any claims we are making about helping to establish a rule of law are invalidated on their face.

Steve Blair
09-21-2007, 04:23 PM
I would suggest, as an immediate response, that a joint Iraqi, MNF and State department investigative unit be established to investigate and determine the appropriate legal recourse for any future incidents. I would also hope that a specific legal code be established for the operation of PMCs where they are not covered by other codes. Furthermore, I believe that if at all possible, and I'll admit it may not be possible in some cases, I would like to see punishment meted out in the country and specific local in which the incident happened, otherwise any claims we are making about helping to establish a rule of law are invalidated on their face.

I'm very much in favor of handing them over to local authorities or if that's not possible conducting any proceedings in the same area as the incident. My comments weren't directed as much at the IO level as they were the institution, so I didn't mentioned some of the things you brought up (great points, btw). We do need legal codes and transparent proceedings to show host nations that those things do work and do get done with as much impartiality as possible (something we are not always very good at, admittedly), but I think you also need to smack the companies in the wallet to really get their attention.

Uboat509
09-21-2007, 04:23 PM
Let me make a few points. But first let me say that I am by no means a Blackwater apologist. I have enough friends in the industry to know that Blackwater has some significant issues.

1)Is there an official report of an official investigation by US forces out there somewhere that I have missed? So far I have seen a lot of media reports, many of which are based on Iraqi reporting. I have been here long enough to know that uncorroborated Iraqi reporting is not the gold standard for accurate unbiased reporting. If this was a military unit would we be piling on or would we be saying that we should wait for the results of the official investigation?

2)I hear a lot of really huge numbers for the number of "Private Military Contractors" here but I don't hear anybody in the MSM trying to make the distinction between the actual military contractors, who are, by far the minority and the support contractors, the cooks, clerks, mechanics, truck drivers etc, many of whom never even leave the FOB.

3)My feelings about the use of contractors fall along these lines. First of all, they take a lot of the support functions that we would normally do which frees us up to focus on operations, which contractors are most definitely not doing. Often times they do these functions better than their military counterparts because that is all they do. In the military we have a lot of crap that we have to do in addition to our main job.

4)I believe that contractors will save us a lot of money in the long run. Once we leave Iraq or at least severely reduce our footprint those contracts begin to dry up. Once the contract is done then it's done. We don't have to worry about it anymore whereas if you swell the ranks with all the service-members you need to perform all of these functions then you will still have them after the need is gone. Yes, we pay many contractors more money than we pay their military counterparts but we do not train them, nor do we feed, house, and clothe them back in the states. We don't worry about their career progression or education. When we are done with them we let the contract run out and that's it. Anybody who lived through the draw-down of the mid-nineties knows the immense ass-pain that the Army went through to reduce the troop totals after the cold war. I don't want to ever do that again.

Just my .02USD.

SFC W

tequila
09-21-2007, 04:31 PM
Rob, that is an excellent post, sir!

Dumb question time (I haven't asked one in a while:D). Do civilians embedded with the military fall under UCMJ rules?

Apparently so (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/01/dfn.ucmjcontractors070105/), according to Peter W. Singer (http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/psinger/20070112.htm).

I don't think Blackwater falls under these rules or any DoD regulations since their primary contract is with the DoS (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/19/AR2007091902503_pf.html), as in this particular incident.


...

Over the past year, the military has issued a series of "fragos," or fragmentary orders, designed to impose greater accountability on security contractors operating under Defense Department contracts. Blackwater was not covered because it reported to the State Department.

The new rules included procedures for the registration of weapons and streamlined the reporting of shooting incidents. The U.S. military's director of security for the Green Zone (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Baghdad+Green+Zone?tid=informline), where approximately three dozen private security firms are based, has conducted sweeps that netted hundreds of unauthorized weapons.

The military also required companies to obtain operating licenses through the Interior Ministry to operate legally in Iraq. The licenses added another layer of accountability: Licensed companies were given colorful numbered decals to attach to the sides of their armored vehicles, clearly identifying them as belonging to a security firm.

...

None of the new orders applied to Blackwater, which has received $678 million in State Department contracts since 2003 and operates under the department's authority.

"I'm not gonna go chasing after non-DoD organizations, going, 'Uh, you didn't submit an incident report for this,' " said Maj. Kent Lightner of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Army+Corps+of+Engineers?tid=informline), who monitors shooting incidents involving private security contractors under Defense Department contracts ...

Steve Blair
09-21-2007, 04:32 PM
Contractors for services are a slightly different proposition from the gun-toting PMCs that sparked a great deal of this discussion. As I mentioned in another post some time back, the Army has used teamsters and other contract employees for the majority of its history. In most cases they worked with transportation issues or scouting/translation. In those cases they were considered post employees and could be fired by the quartermaster and/or the post commander with no notice. In Vietnam PAE did a great deal of support work as well. The issue here is that contractors are now being used in a direct combat (or close to direct combat) role with no real oversight and a great deal more firepower than they had in the past.

Part of the reason for any sort of pile-on is the record of the PMCs in general (which has been rather to very trigger-happy). If that starts getting in the way of accomplishing the mission, then you have to look at it. But with the number of high-end political players who use PMCs, I'm not sure you'd see an official investigation for some time. And even then official investigations are not always without bias.

marct
09-21-2007, 04:44 PM
1)Is there an official report of an official investigation by US forces out there somewhere that I have missed? So far I have seen a lot of media reports, many of which are based on Iraqi reporting. I have been here long enough to know that uncorroborated Iraqi reporting is not the gold standard for accurate unbiased reporting. If this was a military unit would we be piling on or would we be saying that we should wait for the results of the official investigation?


Part of the reason for any sort of pile-on is the record of the PMCs in general (which has been rather to very trigger-happy). If that starts getting in the way of accomplishing the mission, then you have to look at it. But with the number of high-end political players who use PMCs, I'm not sure you'd see an official investigation for some time. And even then official investigations are not always without bias.

Uboat, I think you have raised a really good point, but I have to ask a counter question: given that these particular employees are DoS, is the military even allowed to investigate them? The quote that Tequila tossed up certainly seems to imply that they a) aren't empowered to do so and b) are under a lot of pressure not to do so. Baring the (unlikely) chance that State will, what are we left with but an Iraqi investigation?

Furthermore, if part of the mission is to stand up an Iraqi government that operates by rule of law, I don't think that we can afford to dismiss their investigation out of hand. Yes, I know that there have been a lot of problems with them in the past, but I think that this incident is generating enough interest Stateside that they are going t keep their investigation fairly transparent.

Marc

marct
09-21-2007, 06:40 PM
I just came across this in the LA Times (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-brooks21sep21,0,4584140.column?coll=la-tot-opinion&track=ntothtml)


As for the corporations so eagerly lapping up the contracting dollars, there's no conspiracy -- it's just the good old profit motive. If the White House wants to sell off U.S. foreign policy, someone's going to buy it. Prince, the former Navy SEAL who founded Blackwater, is straightforward about his company's goal: "We're trying to do for the national security apparatus what FedEx did for the Postal Service."

Since FedEx rendered the post office irrelevant for all but the most trivial forms of mail, this means you can kiss our national security apparatus goodbye.

Uboat509
09-21-2007, 08:42 PM
Pardon me if I don't get excited about anything that Prince says. As I stated earlier, it is well known that Blackwater has some significant issues and Prince is at the root of those problems. That said, there are a lot of good guys working for BW. I am not anymore willing to throw the contractors who are the center of this incident under a bus than I am to throw the Marines at Haditha under a bus, based on media reports.


Contractors for services are a slightly different proposition from the gun-toting PMCs that sparked a great deal of this discussion. As I mentioned in another post some time back, the Army has used teamsters and other contract employees for the majority of its history. In most cases they worked with transportation issues or scouting/translation. In those cases they were considered post employees and could be fired by the quartermaster and/or the post commander with no notice. In Vietnam PAE did a great deal of support work as well. The issue here is that contractors are now being used in a direct combat (or close to direct combat) role with no real oversight and a great deal more firepower than they had in the past.

I am sure that most of the people on this board are aware of the difference between the armed and unarmed contractors. I wasn't trying to insult anyone's intelligence. I was just making a point about the huge numbers being thrown around by the MSM. When John Q. Public hears that there are 100,000 "PMCs" running around Iraq he immediately thinks that there are 100,000 thousand armed mercenaries running buck wild in Iraq and that just isn't the case. To my knowledge there are NO PMCs being used in a direct, or even near direct combat roles. We aren't outsourcing warfighting. Most of the armed contractors are engaged in security operations.

SFC W

skiguy
09-21-2007, 09:32 PM
Apparently so (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/01/dfn.ucmjcontractors070105/), according to Peter W. Singer (http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/psinger/20070112.htm).



New Reasons To Prosecute Civilian contractors now might be punished for disrespecting an officer, disregarding an order
...
If private individuals want to do military jobs for profit in war zones on behalf of the U.S. government, then they should agree to fall under the same laws as U.S. soldiers, he said.




I agree completely. This is as it should be. If a civilian is over there doing COIN operations, is embedded with and doing the same things as or is supporting military personnel, and is under the same leadership, then he should be punished for the same things as the military guys are. It's just as important for the civilian to obey orders as it is for the Army/Marine guy.


“We’re deeply concerned that the broad and arbitrary application of the UCMJ imposes a whole range of behavioral requirements” on contract employees, Soloway said.


So what? Soloway makes no sense. A civilian should show just as much respect and have the same willingness to follow his leader wherever he goes, just as anyone else in the military would do. If not, then don't go into a conflict zone and work along side them. Stay home and be a desk jockey if it causes that much concern.
JMHO

sgmgrumpy
09-22-2007, 03:21 AM
Blackwater employees are under investigation. (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070922/ap_on_go_co/us_blackwater_probe)




WASHINGTON - Federal prosecutors are investigating whether employees of the private security firm Blackwater USA illegally smuggled into Iraq weapons that may have been sold on the black market and ended up in the hands of a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, officials said Friday.


The U.S. Attorney's Office in Raleigh, N.C., is handling the investigation with help from Pentagon and State Department auditors, who have concluded there is enough evidence to file charges, the officials told The Associated Press. Blackwater is based in Moyock, N.C.



In Saturday's editions, The News & Observer of Raleigh reported that two former Blackwater employees — Kenneth Wayne Cashwell of Virginia Beach, Va., and William Ellsworth "Max" Grumiaux of Clemmons, N.C. — are cooperating with federal investigators.



The News & Observer, citing unidentified sources, reported that the probe was looking at whether Blackwater had shipped unlicensed automatic weapons and military goods to Iraq without a license.

JJackson
09-22-2007, 10:59 AM
To my knowledge there are NO PMCs being used in a direct, or even near direct combat roles. We aren't outsourcing warfighting. Most of the armed contractors are engaged in security operations.

SFC W

Given that the there is no front in this war and engagement may be initiated anywhere at any time by the opposition I am not clear on the distinction between warfighting and security operations. Anyone with a weapon (or even just their bare fists) should be subject to some form of rules of engagement and punishable if they use excessive force. If the DoS have armed employees who are operating outside the law (isn't that a fair definition of a terrorist?) they should be culpable for allowing that situation to develop and the buck should stop with the Secretary of State.

Uboat509
09-22-2007, 02:38 PM
Given that the there is no front in this war and engagement may be initiated anywhere at any time by the opposition I am not clear on the distinction between warfighting and security operations.

Warfighting operations are those operations where we are seeking contact with the enemy. Security operations are those operations which are concerned with just that, security. They are not seeking contact with the enemy and, in fact, often take steps to avoid it but can and will fight if neccesary.


Anyone with a weapon (or even just their bare fists) should be subject to some form of rules of engagement and punishable if they use excessive force. If the DoS have armed employees who are operating outside the law (isn't that a fair definition of a terrorist?) they should be culpable for allowing that situation to develop and the buck should stop with the Secretary of State.


No one is saying that they should not be subject prosecution if they are operating outside the law. They absolutely should face the full penalty of law if they did violate the law. I am just unwilling to make the assertion that they did violate the law based on media reports.



(isn't that a fair definition of a terrorist?)

That's part of the definition.

SFC W

marct
09-23-2007, 02:44 PM
From CBC.ca


Iraq has incriminating Blackwater tape: official
Last Updated: Saturday, September 22, 2007 | 9:04 PM ET
The Associated Press

Iraqi investigators have a videotape that shows Blackwater USA guards opened fire against civilians without provocation in a shooting last week that left 11 people dead, a senior Iraqi official said Saturday.

He said the case was referred to the Iraqi judiciary.

Interior Ministry spokesman Maj.-Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf said Iraqi authorities had completed an investigation into the Sept. 16 shooting in Nisoor Square in western Baghdad and concluded that Blackwater guards were responsible for the deaths.

He told the Associated Press that the conclusion was based on witness statements as well as videotape shot by cameras at the nearby headquarters of the national police command. He said eight people were killed at the scene and three of the 15 wounded died in hospitals.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2007/09/22/iraq-blackwater.html)

I'm sure it will be on YouTube soon:cool:

Steve Blair
09-23-2007, 02:58 PM
Warfighting operations are those operations where we are seeking contact with the enemy. Security operations are those operations which are concerned with just that, security. They are not seeking contact with the enemy and, in fact, often take steps to avoid it but can and will fight if neccesary.

I think part of the argument here is that many PMCs currently in theater are exceeding their security brief. Overly aggressive security operations are often only a hair's breadth away from combat operations, and can in fact do major damage to the mission. But since the average PMC is operating on its own brief they only really have to pay attention to their bottom line.



No one is saying that they should not be subject prosecution if they are operating outside the law. They absolutely should face the full penalty of law if they did violate the law. I am just unwilling to make the assertion that they did violate the law based on media reports.

And that again gets to heart of it: whose law are they subject to? If any. I know there's been a stampede of jurisdictions rushing in here, but that almost guarantees that any proceedings will drag on forever and in the immediate scheme of things become useless. And we're still faced with an IO disaster, which is compounded many-fold if it turns out that what we had was a bunch of trigger-happy mercs who unloaded on a crowd (as opposed to a PMC team defending itself against an attack).

Granite_State
09-23-2007, 11:05 PM
Let me make a few points. But first let me say that I am by no means a Blackwater apologist. I have enough friends in the industry to know that Blackwater has some significant issues.

1)Is there an official report of an official investigation by US forces out there somewhere that I have missed? So far I have seen a lot of media reports, many of which are based on Iraqi reporting. I have been here long enough to know that uncorroborated Iraqi reporting is not the gold standard for accurate unbiased reporting. If this was a military unit would we be piling on or would we be saying that we should wait for the results of the official investigation?

2)I hear a lot of really huge numbers for the number of "Private Military Contractors" here but I don't hear anybody in the MSM trying to make the distinction between the actual military contractors, who are, by far the minority and the support contractors, the cooks, clerks, mechanics, truck drivers etc, many of whom never even leave the FOB.

3)My feelings about the use of contractors fall along these lines. First of all, they take a lot of the support functions that we would normally do which frees us up to focus on operations, which contractors are most definitely not doing. Often times they do these functions better than their military counterparts because that is all they do. In the military we have a lot of crap that we have to do in addition to our main job.

4)I believe that contractors will save us a lot of money in the long run. Once we leave Iraq or at least severely reduce our footprint those contracts begin to dry up. Once the contract is done then it's done. We don't have to worry about it anymore whereas if you swell the ranks with all the service-members you need to perform all of these functions then you will still have them after the need is gone. Yes, we pay many contractors more money than we pay their military counterparts but we do not train them, nor do we feed, house, and clothe them back in the states. We don't worry about their career progression or education. When we are done with them we let the contract run out and that's it. Anybody who lived through the draw-down of the mid-nineties knows the immense ass-pain that the Army went through to reduce the troop totals after the cold war. I don't want to ever do that again.

Just my .02USD.

SFC W

All good points. But here's a question that relates to all contractors: in COIN/LIC/UW/term of choice, which is what we're probably going to be fighting for the foreseeable future, front lines are amorphous or even non-existent. Combat troops are in more danger than everyone else obviously, but even guys on FOBs get mortared. With the surge's move away from big FOBs and into more contact with the people and indigenous security forces, it would seem that support personnel would also probably be in more danger in the short term. What happens when your Sri Lankan or Nepali truck driver or cook decides that even the relatively large wages he's making aren't worth risking death, and decides he's headed home? Leaves us in a pretty tough spot if it suddenly happens en masse, doesn't it?

Granite_State
09-23-2007, 11:06 PM
Pardon me if I don't get excited about anything that Prince says. As I stated earlier, it is well known that Blackwater has some significant issues and Prince is at the root of those problems.
SFC W

Can you elaborate on this?

RTK
09-24-2007, 12:22 AM
Can you elaborate on this?

Eric Prince is countersueing the families of some of his dead employees. He's a piece of work. Actually, IMHO, a piece of $hit.

Granite_State
09-24-2007, 01:44 AM
Eric Prince is countersueing the families of some of his dead employees. He's a piece of work. Actually, IMHO, a piece of $hit.

The four who died in Fallujah I take it?

Granite_State
09-24-2007, 03:14 AM
From Colonel Patrick Lang's (SWJ/C member I think) blog:

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/09/all-mercenaries.html

JJackson
09-24-2007, 01:08 PM
Uboat:
Apologies if I did not make my point very clearly. I appreciate the difference between going out looking for a fight and getting into one when you would rather not have. What I was trying to argue was that given the situation on the ground it is inevitable that Blackwater et.al would end up in an armed engagement at some time at which point they should have some kind of binding ‘rules of engagement’/ ‘terms and conditions’ with their employers – in this case the DoS. If they operate beyond those rules then there should be a defined procedure and sanctions. If – as seems to be the case – they do not have a clearly defined operating environment then either it is because the DoS wanted it that way or they were just negligent in failing to anticipate the consequences of putting an armed force into that breach. Neither of the above options are acceptable on the part of the DoS.

As to who did what in this engagment; I dont know and is not really relevent.

Koyuavci
09-24-2007, 03:43 PM
I've never posted here, but find most of the discussions insightful. This one I felt needed a few points clarified.

I am a special agent with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), which for those that don't know, is the law enforcement and security arm of the Department of State DSS (http://www.state.gov/m/ds/)

My previous assignment was in the Regional Security Office, U.S. Embassy Baghdad.

DSS has approximately 1200 special agents worldwide. We are in every embassy and most consulates, plus many domestic assignments. As with the rest of the civilian USG, we were caught unprepared for operations in a war zone. In a normal country, the embassy would have long since been closed. DSS and DoS are not designed to function in a combat zone, although we are learning. To state the obvious, DSS is trying to conduct civilian security operations in a war zone.

There are three options for DSS to conduct our mission:

1. Ask the military for support. Is there a brigade plus available, plus a helicopter squadron? RSO Baghdad has over 4000 people in Iraq. This includes Blackwater, Triple Canopy, some DynCorp, plus DoS employees. There are some military elements working with the RSO already.

2. Direct hire to replace the contractors. Most of us on the ground would love this, please talk to your congressman to increase our budget so we can hire an additional 2000 - 3000 people, plus buy helicopters. We are happy to MAYBE get an additional 200 agents in FY08.

3. Use contractors to fill the "temporary" void. The option we took.

Remember, in 2003, almost everyone thought we'd be done by now. DoS went the short term answer and now we are stuck with it for the time being.

As far as oversight, DSS agents are with most of the BW details. I won't give away our SOPs, but we cover as much as possible with the limited special agent staff.

DSS special agents also investigate all shootings. There will be a full report on this one. For those that mentioned DoD investigating, I am sure RSO Baghdad will work with them if necessary. For the most part, all the federal LEOs worked well together there.

Concerning prosecution, once again, talk to your congressman. DSS realized quick that there was no reliable mechanism for prosecuting non-DoD civilians. Let me explain. In a normal country, a non-DoD civilian accused of commiting a crime would be turned over to the host country. The embassy would do all it could to ensure a safe and fair trial. Decisions have been made not to turn Americans over to the Iraqis, for now. There also isn't a civilian version of the Military Extra-Judicial Act (MEJA) When the Christmas shooting happened, there were many "pundits" wanting the accused brought to trial in the U.S. DoJ and others came in and took the case from DSS. But nine months later, they too have realized there isn't a mechanism for prosecuting non-DoD civilians. I personally told several Congressional staffs and high level DoD and DoS visitors that a civilian "MEJA" was needed. Ask your congressman to work on this.

I know my comments have a cynical/snide tone, but too many people aren't thinking on this one, their passion against contractors is blinding them. Am I a contractor apologist? Hell no, it was a huge mistake to give all the contrators the latitude the USG did. However, maybe someone can correct me, but I don't believe any other federal agency (including military) sends agents with their PSDs? DSS probably has more direct contact with their contractors then any other agency. Some may say that if we have so much contact, then why do we seem to have more incidents. The unwritten answer and very seldom mentioned, is that DSS is not willing to take casualties. We've lost 2 agents and 20+ "contractors" in Iraq. While that pales to the military casualties, remember, we are a civilain law enforcement agency. DSS is not willing to lose a convoy if there is anything we can do to prevent it. Maybe our close contacts allows us to see the "contractors" as Americans, not just rented help.

One last thing, none of us know what happened in this incident. There is an ongoing investigation that will get to the bottom of it.

marct
09-24-2007, 04:10 PM
Hi Koyuavci,

Thanks for the post, it helps clear up some of the structures and options DSS and DoS had.

I must admit that I find the decision not to prosecute or hand over contractors to be a poor one. It might have made sense in 2003, but we are well beyond that now. As for suggesting I write my congressman, that wouldn't do any good since I'm a Canadian :D.

It does strike me, however, that that particular decision has some serious implications towards undermining the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. In effect, it appears to be saying that the official branch of the US government responsible for recognizing foreign states does not recognize Iraq since it does not grant that the Iraqi government the right to exercise minimal sovereignty(i.e. internal LE).

Marc

Rex Brynen
09-27-2007, 03:15 AM
From the NYT: Blackwater Logs Most Shootings of Firms in Iraq (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/middleeast/27contractor.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp)


The American security contractor Blackwater USA has been involved in a far higher rate of shootings while guarding American diplomats in Iraq than other security firms providing similar services to the State Department, according to Bush administration officials and industry officials.

And in a less serious vein, see Pat Lang's blog, Sic Semper Tyrannis on Blackwater Fever (http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/462571/21898293) (I'm not sure as to the original source--Pat has it in quotation marks).

jcustis
09-27-2007, 03:18 AM
David Kilcullen made an interesting point today that I think bears mentioning. At the end of the day, BW has not lost a principal in Iraq. Most other outfits cannot say the same thing.

That adds a lot, I think, to the inertia behind them and DoS details.

UrsaMaior
09-28-2007, 03:57 AM
Were it not for this special place (ie a discussion board for COIN) I would have not asked this question, since it is kinda provocative (I apologize for that but it's difficult to put it another way).

With all respect sir, what is going to bring more results in Iraq?

Protecting principals at all costs or a more positive iraqi public opinion?

If I might add in my humble opinion there is a direct link between not using snipers due to force protection and the esteemed above opinion of Mr. Kilcullen.

Uboat509
09-28-2007, 07:40 AM
Were it not for this special place (ie a discussion board for COIN) I would have not asked this question, since it is kinda provocative (I apologize for that but it's difficult to put it another way).

With all respect sir, what is going to bring more results in Iraq?

Protecting principals at all costs or a more positive iraqi public opinion?

If I might add in my humble opinion there is a direct link between not using snipers due to force protection and the esteemed above opinion of Mr. Kilcullen.

I'm not really sure what your point is. Are you suggesting that we tell these guys not to protect their principle (and themselves) if there might be I/O implications?

I'm also not sure what your point about snipers was.

SFC W

sgmgrumpy
09-28-2007, 10:05 AM
The Spy who billed Me Blog (http://www.thespywhobilledme.com/the_spy_who_billed_me/)


The Washington Post describes a "Quick Report" by the Regional Security Office at the US Embassy in Baghdad describing the Blackwater shooting incident from September 16th. I obtained the same report today (uploaded here). The report is far from enlightening, but the WaPo seems to have missed a few interesting details. (For the following to make the most sense, please read the actual report or the WaPo rendition.)

Stan
09-28-2007, 02:17 PM
With all respect sir, what is going to bring more results in Iraq?

Protecting principals at all costs or a more positive iraqi public opinion?

Sorry, but I don't get your point ?

Should BW personnel have sacrificed their principals in exchange for a more positive Iraqi public opinion ?

What do Snipers have to do with BW ? One is military and the other is a contractor tasked to protect State Personnel.

Jesse9252
09-28-2007, 02:57 PM
I think this excerpt from a new Brookings Institution report by Peter Singer might highlight the point UrsaMaior is trying to make:

Viewed through the corporate lens, where a premium is placed on protecting assets above everything else, this behavior is certainly understandable. But it un-dermines the broader operation. As far back as 2005, U.S. officers in Iraq like Colonel Hammes were worried, “The problem is in protecting the principal they had to be very aggressive, and each time they went out they had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of the road, being overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off the road, making enemies each time they went out. So they were actually getting our contract exactly as we asked them to and at the same time hurting our counterinsurgency effort.”

A real world example illustrates how this process plays out. An Iraqi is driving in Baghdad, on his way to work. A convoy of black-tinted SUVs comes down the highway at him, driving in his lane, but in the wrong direction. They are honking their horns at the oncoming traffic and firing machine gun bursts into the road in front of any vehicle that gets too close. He veers to the side of the road. As the SUVs drive by, Western-looking men in sunglasses point machine guns at him.

Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how “The Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work.” Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365 and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year (And that assumes that he doesn’t tell his mom or wife about the incident, upon which they likely to tell everyone in the neighborhood about how the Americans almost killed their boy/husband, multiplying the equation further).
I think UrsaMaior is trying to get us to look at the cost-benefit ratio of protecting these principals. If the force protection requirements for a State Dept. official are so high that their merely moving from one place to another has significant negative repercussions for the overall mission, perhaps they shouldn't be in the country in the first place?
Is it fair to ask civilian government employees, like we ask the military, to assume more risk for the sake of helping the counterinsurgency effort?

The full report can be read here: http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/singer200709.pdf

Stan
09-28-2007, 03:12 PM
Hey Jesse !
I'd go back to this recent post first (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=26828), which should clear most of the controversy up.

The principal is probably not at all interested in being there, but should still be protecting in order to perform his/her job.

Costs ? If the principal gets dead, it will indeed get expensive and he/she will eventually get replaced. Talk about gettin' expensive to manage.

I fully agree with you, they have no business being there right this second, and probably don't want to be (there).

I've seen embassies reduce staff and close for far less reasons.

Tom Odom
09-28-2007, 03:41 PM
This one is an interesting wrap up


Blackwater guards killed 16 as U.S. touted progress
Before the shooting stopped, four other people were killed in what would be the beginning of eight days of violence that Iraqi officials say bolster their argument that Blackwater should be banned from working in Iraq.

During the ensuing week, as Crocker and Petraeus told Congress that the surge of more U.S. troops to Iraq was beginning to work and President Bush gave a televised address in which he said "ordinary life was beginning to return" to Baghdad, Blackwater security guards shot at least 43 people on crowded Baghdad streets. At least 16 of those people died.

Two Blackwater guards died in one of the incidents, which was triggered when a roadside bomb struck a Blackwater vehicle.

Still, it was an astounding amount of violence attributed to Blackwater. In the same eight-day period, according to statistics compiled by McClatchy Newspapers, other acts of violence across the embattled capital claimed the lives of 32 people and left 87 injured, not including unidentified bodies found dumped on Baghdad's streets.

The best known of that week's incidents took place the following Sunday, Sept. 16, when Blackwater guards killed 11 and wounded 12 at the busy al Nisour traffic circle in central Baghdad.


More at this link (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/20047.html)

UrsaMaior
09-28-2007, 05:31 PM
Sorry for not being crystal clear, but I wanted to put things as polite as possible. Although I have not read the Brookings report, basically I was trying to ask what Jesse9252's first sentence says. I obviously accept that they need to be ptrotected, my only question is what "added value" do PMCs have over military personnel.

BTW not-being a native speaker what do these principals exactly do? Are they a sort of senior diplomats?

Stan
09-28-2007, 05:52 PM
Good Evening from the Baltics !


Sorry for not being crystal clear, but I wanted to put things as polite as possible. Although I have not read the Brookings report, basically I was trying to ask what Jesse9252's first sentence says. I obviously accept that they need to be ptrotected, my only question is what "added value" do PMCs have over military personnel.

BTW not-being a native speaker what do these principals exactly do? Are they a sort of senior diplomats?

I won't pretend to know just who the principals are, nor just how senior they are and what they're doing in Iraq. I normally do not defend State on any level, but I will herein fully concur with the post from Koyuavci (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=26828).

That is, those folks are beyond a doubt out of their element and scope of work.

Regards, Stan

ilots
10-02-2007, 12:50 AM
DSS special agents also investigate all shootings. There will be a full report on this one. .... DSS probably has more direct contact with their contractors then any other agency. .....One last thing, none of us know what happened in this incident. There is an ongoing investigation that will get to the bottom of it.
Post of the thread. Thanks for the info -

Likewise, it is my understanding that the DOS/DSS also has very specific requirements for those seeking to contract under the WPPS program.

Stan
10-02-2007, 07:50 AM
By Chicago Tribune and The Associated Press (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003918090_blackwater02.html), Tuesday, October 2, 2007


WASHINGTON — The controversial private security firm Blackwater USA has fired 122 of its guards in Iraq for a laundry list of problems. Among those terminated, 28 were fired for weapons-related incidents, 25 for drug and alcohol violations and 16 for inappropriate or lewd conduct.

House Oversight Committee Report released Monday (http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf)


State Department Responses. Documents provided by the State Department raise serious questions about how State Department officials responded to reports of Blackwater killings of Iraqis. In a high-profile incident in December 2006, a drunken Blackwater contractor killed the guard of Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi. Within 36 hours after the shooting, the State Department had allowed Blackwater to transport the Blackwater contractor out of Iraq. The State Department Charge d'Affaires recommended that Blackwater make a "sizeable payment" and an "apology" to avoid this whole thing becoming even worse." The Charge d'Affaires suggested a $250,000 payment to the guard's family, but the Department's Diplomatic Security Service said this was too much and could cause Iraqis to "iry to get killed." In the end, the State Depafment and Blackwater agreed on a $15,000 payment. One State Department offrcial wrote: "We would like to help them resolve this so we can continue with our protective mission." The State Department took a similar approach upon receiving reports that Blackwater shooters killed an innocent Iraqi, except that in this case, the State Department requested only a $5,000 payment to "put this unfortunate matter behind us quickly."

More at both links...

Uboat509
10-02-2007, 08:13 AM
In the vast majority of instances in which Blackwater fires shots, Blackwater is firing from a moving vehicle and does not remain at the scene to determine if the shots resulted in casualties.

They're kidding, right? Remain at the scene? Clearly the author(s) of this report does not understand the difference between Iraq and the US. It would be a very poor PSD indeed that hung around the scene of a shooting in Iraq. That is just BEGGING to get killed by the bad guys.

SFC W

goesh
10-02-2007, 03:17 PM
:p You guys wait here, I'm going down that side street over there to check for blood - I think I hit that guy running that way:p

Any man that can do the work has a prima facie cover sheet in the book that can be 'adjusted' to meet the immediate need(s) and there is always a "other duties as required" clause in the book. I'll bet a pair of Russell boots: http://www.russellmoccasin.com/boots_mountainhunting/mt_tlctoelachunter.html
that when some of the 'dismissed' lads are done with their whoring and drinking, they'll do another hitch in the 'raq, but that's just MO. These crews and the spooks and hillbillies that ride with them have been around for centuries and aren't going anywhere anytime soon, again IMO.

Rob Thornton
10-10-2007, 01:40 PM
In the vast majority of instances in which Blackwater fires shots, Blackwater is firing from a moving vehicle and does not remain at the scene to determine if the shots resulted in casualties.

They're kidding, right? Remain at the scene? Clearly the author(s) of this report does not understand the difference between Iraq and the US. It would be a very poor PSD indeed that hung around the scene of a shooting in Iraq. That is just BEGGING to get killed by the bad guys.

In today's news they talked about the PMC that just killed 2 women and wounded the kids. Here are some things we considered when decided how to use force. In the end its a complicated decision process with lots of things influencing your decision and it all happens in seconds

1) I always looked for who was in the car - in general families don't do SVBIEDs - SVBIEDs are generally solo affairs, and drive by shootings are generally 3-4 males in an Opal - there might be 1-2 additional vehicles. The "drive by" is not generally a good thing to try on US convoys - too many MGs and mean dudes. Occasionally you might see a AIF vehicle which tries to get in front and slow you down to make you a better target for the IED overwatch - but mostly those tactics are employed against ISF. Bottom line - there are things you watch for that help you decide what is going down and what you need to do.

2) SVBIEDs will often sit along MSRs at Intersections - also true with IEDs, and complex ambushes - it just improves the chance of hitting your target - my point is that the AIF know where to try and hit you, and you generally know where they are trying to hit you - this should allow you to increase your Force Pro posture. If you are going into a new area- coordinate and find out and provide the info so somebody can facilitate your move.

3) Increased traffic patterns of all types indicate a certain amount of health returning to the city. When we first got there we were very aggressive and often "drove it like we stole it" - we were a small element and often had trailers full of crap we were taking back to our COP from the FOB. We also only knew the MSR routes and were not wired into the atmospherics. This eventually changed as we got more comfortable and understood the city and its neighborhoods. The way we did this was by getting out in the city with combined IA and CF patrols and with unilateral IA patrols. If all you do is go from a FOB to some other place, you never really understand any of this - things never change- and every neighborhood looks bad and every car is an SVBIED. You also probably never see the Iraqis as anything but an impediment between your start point and your destination.

4) Toward the end we just understood that if you want people to act normal and see you as someone on their side you have to stop scaring the crap out of them. Trust me an 1114 or even a big SUV is damn near the biggest thing on the road - and while people are stubborn you still have lots of flexibility - ever drive in NY or D.C.?

5) As such we installed the biggest damed horns we could find - the type that have sirens on them - its an attention getter and wakes people up. It was the best tool we put on the trucks. We had augmentees early on who like to throw water bottles and potatoes - we had to correct their actions - because they had not lived among the population, they did not understand their actions - the augmentees saw it a less then lethal alternative that also provided them an indicator of intent. They did not understand that it made the team less safe since we had to operate under a different set of circumstances then they had been accustomed to.

6) We kept the crew served weapons up and loaded, but the weapon of choice in the turret was the M4 and M9. The pistol has a psychological effect there that is difficult to convey, the M4 allows you to put a weapon into action quickly and selectively. If you are unsure you don't necessarily need to put a belt from the M240/M2/GPMG/PKC into the car - you can put a couple of 5.56 into the air, or into the engine block.

In regards to leaving the scene - if you can't secure the scene - then ensure you do a battle handoff with someone who can. Not reporting it to the MSC so it can get handed off to ISF is non-starter and indicative of doing something wrong. This is one of those issues that can put a small element’s actions at odds with our larger goals - this is a problem. If the actions of small PMC elements are out of step with our larger goals then we have to weigh their benefit to us in that light.

As always everybody's experiences are going to differ, but those are the things we thought about as we moved to this place or that within the context of doing our mission which was much broader than just getting there.

Best Regards, Rob

Uboat509
10-15-2007, 05:36 PM
1) I always looked for who was in the car - in general families don't do SVBIEDs - SVBIEDs are generally solo affairs, and drive by shootings are generally 3-4 males in an Opal - there might be 1-2 additional vehicles. The "drive by" is not generally a good thing to try on US convoys - too many MGs and mean dudes. Occasionally you might see a AIF vehicle which tries to get in front and slow you down to make you a better target for the IED overwatch - but mostly those tactics are employed against ISF. Bottom line - there are things you watch for that help you decide what is going down and what you need to do.

Generally yes, this true but the bad guys know this also. That is not something I am willing to bet my life on this one. As for drive bys, did these guys have gun trucks or were they in the usual contractor standard up-armored SUVs? Everybody knows that an SUV means contractors and they don't have gun turrets.


2) SVBIEDs will often sit along MSRs at Intersections - also true with IEDs, and complex ambushes - it just improves the chance of hitting your target - my point is that the AIF know where to try and hit you, and you generally know where they are trying to hit you - this should allow you to increase your Force Pro posture. If you are going into a new area- coordinate and find out and provide the info so somebody can facilitate your move.

3) Increased traffic patterns of all types indicate a certain amount of health returning to the city. When we first got there we were very aggressive and often "drove it like we stole it" - we were a small element and often had trailers full of crap we were taking back to our COP from the FOB. We also only knew the MSR routes and were not wired into the atmospherics. This eventually changed as we got more comfortable and understood the city and its neighborhoods. The way we did this was by getting out in the city with combined IA and CF patrols and with unilateral IA patrols. If all you do is go from a FOB to some other place, you never really understand any of this - things never change- and every neighborhood looks bad and every car is an SVBIED. You also probably never see the Iraqis as anything but an impediment between your start point and your destination.

4) Toward the end we just understood that if you want people to act normal and see you as someone on their side you have to stop scaring the crap out of them. Trust me an 1114 or even a big SUV is damn near the biggest thing on the road - and while people are stubborn you still have lots of flexibility - ever drive in NY or D.C.?

5) As such we installed the biggest damed horns we could find - the type that have sirens on them - its an attention getter and wakes people up. It was the best tool we put on the trucks. We had augmentees early on who like to throw water bottles and potatoes - we had to correct their actions - because they had not lived among the population, they did not understand their actions - the augmentees saw it a less then lethal alternative that also provided them an indicator of intent. They did not understand that it made the team less safe since we had to operate under a different set of circumstances then they had been accustomed to.

6) We kept the crew served weapons up and loaded, but the weapon of choice in the turret was the M4 and M9. The pistol has a psychological effect there that is difficult to convey, the M4 allows you to put a weapon into action quickly and selectively. If you are unsure you don't necessarily need to put a belt from the M240/M2/GPMG/PKC into the car - you can put a couple of 5.56 into the air, or into the engine block.

We had rifles in the turret also but I preferred a shot gun. It makes a hell of a bang and get attention but still gives you a lethal option in your hands if you need it. I'm not really sure what 5.56 MM into an engine block will do, not much I am guessing but if it comes to the point that I am no longer firing warning shots I am not going to shoot at the vehicle. I am going to shoot the driver, or whatever the percieved threat is.


In regards to leaving the scene - if you can't secure the scene - then ensure you do a battle handoff with someone who can. Not reporting it to the MSC so it can get handed off to ISF is non-starter and indicative of doing something wrong. This is one of those issues that can put a small element’s actions at odds with our larger goals - this is a problem. If the actions of small PMC elements are out of step with our larger goals then we have to weigh their benefit to us in that light.

Did they not report this? If they did not report it at all then that is a definite nogo but I certainly wouldn't fault them for not trying to secure the scene. Again, they probably don't have gun trucks and, in any case, their first responsibility is to the principal.


As always everybody's experiences are going to differ, but those are the things we thought about as we moved to this place or that within the context of doing our mission which was much broader than just getting there.

Best Regards, Rob

marct
10-16-2007, 03:46 PM
This just showed up on CBC.ca today.


....The problem with trying contractors for crimes in other jurisdictions is: whose rules apply?

Lawyers who discuss this issue often look at existing military or civilian law. They say that if a contractor is charged with a crime and appears in a non-military court, all the rules of evidence normally applicable in that court would apply. If, for example, a contractor appeared in U.S. Federal Court, they say it would be difficult to obtain a conviction there for an event that happened in another country. And, if a civilian contractor appeared before a court martial, the lawyers could argue over jurisdiction.

There is, however, an example from a relatively recent era — the years after the Second World War – that could help clarify the issue.

From the 1930s to the defeat in 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army employed thousands of gonzoku, which roughly translates as the now-familiar term "civilian contractor."

After the war, many gonzoku were charged, tried and convicted for war crimes, mainly for the abuse of Allied prisoners of war. That means there are strong precedents that civilian contractors are subject to international humanitarian law and prosecution for war crimes, including murder and crimes against humanity.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/military-contractors.html)

Presley Cannady
01-11-2008, 11:03 PM
Yup, Ms. Hillhouse wrote the NATION article - an excellent piece of work. I'm still struggling to see the upside of doing all this stuff in the private sector. Seriously, are we saving that much money?

I don't know about money, but one thing's for sure. A government paycheck won't attract or keep people who do SIGINT these days, and those it does can't keep up with the private sector. My impression is that the government simply contracts certain lines of crypto and search innovation into secrecy.

SteveMetz
02-21-2008, 10:31 PM
I'm getting some love in the latest Blackwater newsletter (http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2008/archive/021808btw.htm).

Rob Thornton
02-21-2008, 10:57 PM
All in all - a pretty good approach to educating the work force. I'm impressed, and I think if read and discussed it could help them integrate with us on the ground - kind of like "here is what is important to the boss right now". I wonder if they have gone as far as implementing some kind of continued education program?
Rob

Danny
02-21-2008, 11:01 PM
Steve, would you prefer that they disagree with you? I'd be delighted to see my prose highlighted. As my friend Michael Ledeen said to me once (to encourage me to continue), "The goal of writing is to change someone's mind, we know not whom."

By the way. I took note of your dapper new look ... hat, glasses, Gamecocks rag behind you (to convince us that you are, um, the young collegiate type?). You banking on the ladies visiting the SWJ?

SteveMetz
02-21-2008, 11:19 PM
Steve, would you prefer that they disagree with you? I'd be delighted to see my prose highlighted. As my friend Michael Ledeen said to me once (to encourage me to continue), "The goal of writing is to change someone's mind, we know not whom."

By the way. I took note of your dapper new look ... hat, glasses, Gamecocks rag behind you (to convince us that you are, um, the young collegiate type?). You banking on the ladies visiting the SWJ?


I don't care whether they agree or disagree...so long as the magazine is out of their weapon at the time.

Rank amateur
02-21-2008, 11:59 PM
More potential book buyers.:)

Cliff
06-02-2008, 01:02 PM
Article today on Fox News:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,361322,00.html

Looks like Blackwater may be getting a COIN aircraft - a Super Tucano (really not a "Fighter Jet" as Fox labeled the headline).

This deal was previously reported when the order was made back in Aug '07. Sounds like it has now been approved by the Brazilian govt based on a USG request.

Wonder whose pilots they are going to train? Reports in '07 had a spokeswoman claiming "only US" pilots would be trained.

Interesting implications no matter who it ends up being...

Mercenaries, folks from "other" govt agencies, or the AF?

Anyone out there have more info?

V/R,

Cliff

Tom Odom
06-02-2008, 01:08 PM
Article today on Fox News:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,361322,00.html

Looks like Blackwater may be getting a COIN aircraft - a Super Tucano (really not a "Fighter Jet" as Fox labeled the headline).

This deal was previously reported when the order was made back in Aug '07. Sounds like it has now been approved by the Brazilian govt based on a USG request.

Wonder whose pilots they are going to train? Reports in '07 had a spokeswoman claiming "only US" pilots would be trained.

Interesting implications no matter who it ends up being...

Mercenaries, folks from "other" govt agencies, or the AF?

Anyone out there have more info?

V/R,

Cliff

Just that we are going back in history. We did this in the Congo in the 1960s with merc air using ex-pat Cuban pilots. Some good things some bad. Notably however it was an air suppression centric rather conventional flying ground column operation with mercs, foreign advisors (Belge and US), and piss poor ANC troops. The Cuban pilots got paid by rounds expended so guess what? They never brought any rounds back.

If it was me on the ground, I'd rather have mortars and artillery.

Tom

Cliff
06-02-2008, 01:24 PM
Just that we are going back in history. We did this in the Congo in the 1960s with merc air using ex-pat Cuban pilots. Some good things some bad. Notably however it was an air suppression centric rather conventional flying ground column operation with mercs, foreign advisors (Belge and US), and piss poor ANC troops. The Cuban pilots got paid by rounds expended so guess what? They never brought any rounds back.

If it was me on the ground, I'd rather have mortars and artillery.

Tom

Tom-

Were they Cubans who left post Castro? Is there more info on this somewhere? Just wondering - thanks!

V/R,

Cliff

Tom Odom
06-02-2008, 02:03 PM
Ciff,

They were "Bay of Pigs" Cubans hired by the CIA through a front company called WIGMO which operated out of Miami. They flew B-26K Invaders, T-6s, and T28s. See LP 14 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/odom/odom.asp#1-11)

Here is an excerp from my end notes on this effort:


In attempting to forestall a complete ANC collapse, the CIA established a covert air force. Using front organizations- the Western International Ground Maintenance Organization in Lichenstein and the Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation in Miami, Florida- the agency hired ground maintenance personnel and Cuban exiles to pilot the force. American officials were careful to disassociate the United States government from these operations by maintaining that the Cubans were hired by the Leopoldville government. This policy collapsed in June when the news media documented that American pilots had been flying combat missions. Faced with this embarrassment, the State Department was forced to promise to prohibit such future activities. Ironically, the American officials on the scene, who shortly afterward became distressed by Tshombe's use of white mercenary troops, never considered these contract pilots in the same light. Regardless of such fine distinctions, the instant air force was soon in full operation using T-6s against Muléle's rebels. These aircraft provided air cover sorties for UN evacuation operations around Kikwit during early 1964; UN pilots, glad to have the T-6s around, turned a blind eye to the nature of the pilots. As the year progressed, the CIA continued to expand this operation and others to meet rising demands. By one account, the agency had a Cuban force of 200 infantry, around 30 pilots, and 60 ground personnel in the Congo by 1965. Some of these infantry were to have a critical role in support of Dragon Rouge. Still, this covert support was not intended to secure the Congo; the only way to accomplish that objective was to retrain the ANC. State, "Congolese Rebellion of 1964," pt. 1, 2-6; LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Memos and Miscellaneous, vol. 1, 11/63-6/64; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum for Governor Harriman, Subject: Chinese Communist Involvement in Congolese Involvement in Congolese Insurrections, 11 August 1964, LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Memos and Miscellaneous, vol. 3, 8/64; Vandewalle, L'Ommengang, 63-64; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 136; Message, STATE 336 to AMEMBASSY Leopoldville, transmitted 4:09 p.m., 15 August 1964, LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Congo Cables, vol. 3, 8/64; Fred E. Wagoner, DRAGON ROUGE: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (Washington, DC; National Defense University, 1980), 29; and Barbara A. Wilson, "The Congo (Republic of the Congo- Leopoldville) Since January 1964," in Research Notes on Insurgency Potential in Africa South of the Sahara (Washington, DC: American University, August 1966), 77-78.

oblong
07-14-2008, 12:57 AM
I really don't know enough to make any judgement about Erik Prince or Blackwater, but I thought this was amusing:

http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/07/13/3543928.htm


In the meeting, Prince and Gary Jackson, Blackwater's president, said our May 18 story, "Blackwater survives rough time," contained three errors:

--We reported that Presidential Airways, a sister company to Blackwater, had received a $91 million contract for air charter work in Guam. Prince said it was much smaller. When we provided documents, Blackwater responded that The N&O was "not as misguided as we thought."

RTK
07-14-2008, 03:41 AM
I really don't know enough to make any judgement about Erik Prince or Blackwater, but I thought this was amusing:

http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/07/13/3543928.htm

Shortly someone with ties to Professional Soliders will be along and give the scoop on Prince and the snake he is.

Jedburgh
07-17-2008, 12:28 AM
Army Times, 14 Jul 08: Erik Prince Interview (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/07/military_princeqa_071408w/)

.....Blackwater’s reputation has been tainted by several high-profile incidents that have garnered negative publicity (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3978), most recently a Sept. 16, 2007, incident in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in which a Blackwater personal security detail escorting a State Department convoy allegedly shot 17 Iraqi civilians.

In a July 7 meeting with the Military Times editors and reporters, Prince vigorously defended his company, which he said had a guiding principle of “operational excellence.”

The following are extracts from that meeting, edited for brevity and clarity....

Noble Industries
09-02-2008, 02:48 AM
Corporate intelligence companies, ones that you can Google and find a business card for, will be a thing to watch. Especially in terms of oversight.

I imagine that for those who could find them, much like the A-Team, there were always companies that handles intelligence type operations, if only within the business/corporate context.

Outsourcing, it’s not just for telephone companies!

jonSlack
09-02-2008, 03:01 PM
I'm wondering how the issues of accountability and oversight work in terms of private intelligence. Does anybody have more info on this?

The Spy Who Billed Me (http://www.thespywhobilledme.com/) is an interesting blog on the topic.

Jayhawker
09-02-2008, 04:11 PM
I'm wondering how the issues of accountability and oversight work in terms of private intelligence. Does anybody have more info on this?

Well that is the BIG Question, isn't it? Perhaps a "quality control division" is necessary within each government department that hires them.

And if a commercial entity hires them, well, then, their lawyers better be "good." And my definition of "good" would be the one meant by John Hersey in his opening of the novel "A Bell for Adano," which of course is hard to find.

Jayhawker


- Treat with respect the power you have to form an opinion.
- Marcus Aurelius

goesh
09-03-2008, 02:44 AM
Conceptually, the void between State and Defense is one of friction which corporate America has always been able to easily manipulate and happily exist in, so Mercs doing serious Intel within this 'crease' should come as no surprise to anyone. They can dodge and weave through accountability 'til the cows come home by hopping on the same outsourcing band wagon corporate America uses. Government oversight is essentially perpendicular, ideological and Law driven, a top and bottom can eventually be found. When profit and efficiency are the driving engines, we are forced to look more horizontally and things just drop off the end, forever. Given the state of the world, there isn't much choice but to happily coexist with these mercs in my opinion.

JT Clark
09-14-2008, 10:36 PM
Corporate Intelligence- do you think I'll be able to trademark the term COINT? ;) is here to stay. Although firms like Aegis and TIS are military suppliers, and many other firms boast a roster of ex-SF and/or intel types, for the most part the field is much more, ahem, corporate than people imagine. The bread and butter work is made up of background checks on potential partner companies and/or key hires.

Other scenarios include gathering intel in an acquision or tender situation, where the private intel company provides services that the usual consultant mix of lawyers, accountants, technical advisors etc cannot deliver- ie somewhat more privileged information.

Much of what is required by a client is open-source that just needs to be uncovered, however information gathering may extend to basic surveillance and questioning of third parties. There have even been publicly reported cases of such firms running surveillance and counter-surveillance ops for sporting teams given the capital involved in sport these days.

Michael Smith has put together an informative summary on some of the main players today here:
http://www.michaelsmithwriter.com/pdf/intelligence_companies.pdf

jmm99
12-07-2008, 07:13 PM
If this post belongs elsewhere, please move it to that location.

The Federal District court cases involving the five Blackwater contractors will start in earnest Monday, when the indictments are unsealed. Before we get to that point - and the complex legal issues which are involved - the following article giving their bios is worth reading.


Bio sketches of 5 indicted Blackwater guards
By The Associated Press
Saturday, December 6, 2008
(12-06) 10:59 PST , (AP) --

The Justice Department is expected to unseal indictments Monday against five Blackwater Worldwide security contractors for their roles in a deadly 2007 shooting in Baghdad. A look at the contractors and summaries of their military service records. ...

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/12/06/national/w103358S29.DTL

In politically-charged cases of this kind, one should start with looking at the defendants as human beings; and then make judgments based on the evidence which is introduced in court.

Stan
12-07-2008, 08:07 PM
While this doesn't change anything, I gathered little from their young ages and junior rank, and, relatively little about their awards and decorations.

Their actions regardless of age, merits and leadership skills are in question.

However, their marching orders were not their own and I see no good whatsoever in cooking these 5 and saving the hierarchy along the beltway.

Ken White
12-07-2008, 08:23 PM
in all aspects.

Tom Odom
12-08-2008, 01:34 PM
However, their marching orders were not their own and I see no good whatsoever in cooking these 5 and saving the hierarchy along the beltway.

Absolutely and I have had the opportunity to talk to those who saw this situation developing--the classic the bridge is out so would someone please start slowing the train--and were unable to focus attention on it. The train did not make it over the gorge.

Tom

Polarbear1605
12-08-2008, 06:15 PM
Since the Blackwater guys are going to Federal Court, I suspect they are going to be charge for violations aginst the Rules of Law (read MEJA here). I have a feeling that this is going in the same direction as the Sgt Nazario case. Sgt Nazario and two of his squad were charge with killing 4 prisoners during the battle of Fallujah under the new MEJA (MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT). In the Nazario case, since there was no evidence, the prosecutor used judical waterboarding (GI Wilson and William McNulty terms) to try and get the Marines to roll on one another.
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/07/the-judicial-wa.html
Looks like the same scenario here. It will be interesting to see what evidence the government does have to support the charges. This gets back to an issue I would love to discuss: What applies here the Rules of Law or the Law of Armed Conflict (Rules of War). I think the political powers are finding they can't get their scape goats under the Rules of War and, consequently, they are running to their mama's political civil law bosoms.

Stan
12-08-2008, 06:39 PM
Since the Blackwater guys are going to Federal Court, I suspect they are going to be charge for violations aginst the Rules of Law (read MEJA here). I have a feeling that this is going in the same direction as the Sgt Nazario case. Sgt Nazario and two of his squad were charge with killing 4 prisoners during the battle of Fallujah under the new MEJA (MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT). In the Nazario case, since there was no evidence, the prosecutor used judical waterboarding (GI Wilson and William McNulty terms) to try and get the Marines to roll on one another.
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/07/the-judicial-wa.html
Looks like the same scenario here. It will be interesting to see what evidence the government does have to support the charges. This gets back to an issue I would love to discuss: What applies here the Rules of Law or the Law of Armed Conflict (Rules of War). I think the political powers are finding they can't get their scape goats under the Rules of War and, consequently, they are running to their mama's political civil law bosoms.

Hey Polarbear, Welcome to the Council ! As time permits you, please go here and introduce yourself (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=39). Helps us with where you're coming from.

I'm not very familiar with SGT Nazario's case. From the links you provided, it appears the NCO was on active duty. In such an instance I would wholeheartedly agree with you, the NCOs should have faced a Courts Marshall, judged and observed by peers and superiors.

The Blackwater PMCs are unfortunately not subject to the UCMJ and already looks like these relatively young former Marines and Soldiers will bear the brunt of their (in)actions instead of a few rich bandits in DC.

Regards, Stan

jmm99
12-08-2008, 07:40 PM
In this case, my plan is to stick pretty close to what I see the law to be; and generally will leave aside what I think the law should be - see below at end. The defense lawyers appear to be taking an aggressive media position in this high-profile case. That is part of their strategy and others can comment on that.

The first procedural step has been taken by defense counsel, which apprarently will start in Utah.


Venue fight: Blackwater guards plan Utah surrender
Venue fight looms as Blackwater guards plan surrender in Salt Lake City
MATT APUZZO and LARA JAKES JORDAN
AP News
Dec 07, 2008 15:26 EST

Five Blackwater Worldwide security guards indicted in Washington for the 2007 shooting of Iraqi civilians plan to surrender to the FBI Monday in Utah, a person close to the case said, setting up a fight over the trial site. ....

http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=479861

What is going on here ? The idea of defense counsel is to force a trial in Utah Federal court. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure cover the proper venue of a criminal trial in most cases.


FRCP Rule 18. Place of Prosecution and Trial

Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 2008, eff. Dec. 1, 2008.)

http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/Rule18.htm

Since the alleged offenses were committed in Iraq, FRCP Rule 18 does not apply directly. So, we must look elsewhere for the law. The law of venue is summarized by CRS in this report.


CRS RS22361
January 6, 2006
Venue: A Brief Look at Federal Law Governing Where a Federal Crime May Be Tried
Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, American Law Division
.....
(pp.4-5)
Venue for Crimes Committed Outside Any District.

The Constitution recognizes that certain crimes, like piracy, may be committed beyond the geographical confines of any federal judicial district. The application section now declares, “The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia,” 18 U.S.C. 3238.

http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8391:1

And, indeed, here is the statute.


18 USC § 3238. Offenses not committed in any district

The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00003238----000-.html

Historically, this statute goes back to our founding days, when pirates were a major concern of Federal criminal law. If the pirates were brought back to the port of New York, that is where the trial had to occur. So, defense counsel has set up the arrests in what they apparently feel is the best place for them to try the case.

------------------
Polarbear1605 is a heavy hitter - aren't all Marine LTCs (even if allegedly retired).

In another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=61763#post61763), Ken commented:


Reasoned discussion is good but emotional reaction to extreme provocation is hard to suppress.

So, I'll do some law on this case - and will generally sit back and enjoy both the reasoned discussion and the emotional reactions.

Polarbear1605
12-08-2008, 08:07 PM
Hi Stan,
"The Blackwater PMCs are unfortunately not subject to the UCMJ and already looks like these relatively young former Marines and Soldiers will bear the brunt of their (in)actions instead of a few rich bandits in DC."
Yep and agree, I understand they are not subject to the UCMJ. Are they subject to the Rules of Armed Conflict (Gevena Conventions). In other words, did they kill Iraqi civilian violating the principles of military necessity along with distinction and proportionality?
lol...let the mind twisting begin. Bob

selil
12-08-2008, 08:24 PM
The more I read the more I realize a PhD won't be enough. I need an International law degree too. dang it.

Stan
12-09-2008, 07:08 AM
Hey Bob, Thanks for the intro!

This DOJ press release is pretty damning even if remotely accurate. A SAW and M203 :o, IMO exceeds proportionate use of force on civilians. The press rep makes it clear the individuals are responsible, not Blackwater :mad:


Guards Used Grenades (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7769435.stm)


Hi Stan,


The Blackwater PMCs are unfortunately not subject to the UCMJ and already looks like these relatively young former Marines and Soldiers will bear the brunt of their (in)actions instead of a few rich bandits in DC.
Regards, Stan

Yep and agree, I understand they are not subject to the UCMJ. Are they subject to the Rules of Armed Conflict (Gevena Conventions). In other words, did they kill Iraqi civilian violating the principles of military necessity along with distinction and proportionality?
lol...let the mind twisting begin. Bob

Tom Odom
12-09-2008, 01:08 PM
This opinion piece is on the mark except that it gives the agency responsible for supervising the contract--the Department of State's Diplomatic Security Services--a walk as well. And the author just has to use it as a larger indictment of the Bush Administration; he privilege but it dilutes the relevancy of the piece.


A Whitewash for Blackwater? (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/08/AR2008120803297.html)

By Eugene Robinson
Tuesday, December 9, 2008; Page A19

The federal manslaughter indictment of five Blackwater Worldwide security guards in the horrific massacre of more than a dozen Iraqi civilians in Baghdad may look like an exercise in accountability, but it's probably the exact opposite -- a whitewash that absolves the government and corporate officials who should bear ultimate responsibility.

John T. Fishel
12-09-2008, 02:29 PM
First, the facts of the incident are in dispute. The indictment "alleges" that the guards opened fire w/o cause and indiscriminately. The defense argues that they were under attack and returned fire. The facts should be brought out in the trial. Second, no facts regarding Blackwater policy have yet to be brought out even in the media articles that I have seen. To hold the Blackwater execs responsible requires, I think, showing that they either had a policy for rules of engagement that violated the laws of war or that they were criminally negligent in their lack of enforcement of legitimate rules of engagement. Third, to hold DOS personnel criminally responsible would, I think, require showing that they knew or should have known both the laws of war and the rules of engagement and did not take steps to enforce both - if, indeed, they were violated - a fact in dispute as noted above.

My point is that the only way I can see of getting to the bottom of this in terms of criminal law is to try the guards which could produce sufficient leads to bring charges against others - or not, depending on the facts.

Since I'm not a lawyer, I'd be curious how this analysis stacks up - JMM.

cheers

JohnT

Polarbear1605
12-09-2008, 02:35 PM
Stan said: "IMO exceeds proportionate use of force on civilians" and I agree, but the question then becomes why are they charged with manslaughter instead of killing civilians beyond military necessity exceeding proportionality? Maybe it is me, but I see a transition here from the rules of war to the rules of law for political purposes and not justice. My question then becomes what is the procedure or what are the rules for making that transition. We see this same thing in some of the military cases in both Iraq and Afgan. So the next question is should we make a transition between the rule of war and the rules of law?
In the contractors defense (and I am not saying this happened, but just throwing it out there for thought), if you are in the middle of an ambush firefight, where everyone is runnning and ducking, and an unknown individual approaches you with his hands in the air (in a country full of suicide bombers) what would you do???

Understanding we don't have all the information, for example, were the contractors operating under a set of ROE (Rules of Engagement), and were they authorized the use of deadly force? There should be something in the State Department Contract with Blackwater that addresses this ... please don't tell me the State Department hired these guys without providing some type of ROE.

BTW: Stan and Tom thanks for those two articles it is interesting when you compare them, the more balanced article seems to be a non-US source.

120mm
12-09-2008, 04:28 PM
Stan said: "IMO exceeds proportionate use of force on civilians" and I agree, but the question then becomes why are they charged with manslaughter instead of killing civilians beyond military necessity exceeding proportionality? Maybe it is me, but I see a transition here from the rules of war to the rules of law for political purposes and not justice. My question then becomes what is the procedure or what are the rules for making that transition. We see this same thing in some of the military cases in both Iraq and Afgan. So the next question is should we make a transition between the rule of war and the rules of law?
In the contractors defense (and I am not saying this happened, but just throwing it out there for thought), if you are in the middle of an ambush firefight, where everyone is runnning and ducking, and an unknown individual approaches you with his hands in the air (in a country full of suicide bombers) what would you do???


Thanks for making the point about transitioning law. I've tried, and failed to succinctly make that point for the last few years. But I think you've discovered the crux of the problem.

jmm99
12-09-2008, 05:54 PM
These are three relatively straight up accounts - McClatchy (at the end) is most useful for our purposes.


Blackwater charges: 14 counts of manslaughter
US unseals Blackwater indictment: 14 counts of manslaughter for deadly 2007 shooting in Iraq
LARA JAKES JORDAN and MATT APUZZO
AP News
Dec 08, 2008 12:09 EST

Five Blackwater Worldwide security guards surrendered on 14 counts of manslaughter and dozens of other charges Monday in connection with an investigation into a deadly 2007 shooting at a busy Baghdad intersection. .....
.....
Though the case has already been assigned to U.S. District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina in Washington, attorneys want the case moved to Utah, where they would presumably find a more conservative jury pool and one more likely to support the Iraq war.

http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=480738

Judge Urbina, we have have met in the Uighurs cases ("War Crimes" thread). Seems a good judge (probably pro-defense), but I expect I would also be more comfortable with a Utah jury if I were defending these indictments.


New York Times
Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps Indict Others

WASHINGTON — In the first public airing of an investigation that remains the source of fierce international outrage, the Justice Department on Monday unsealed its case against five private security guards, built largely around the chilling testimony of a sixth guard about the 2007 shootings that left 17 unsuspecting Iraqi civilians dead at a busy Baghdad traffic circle.

In pleading guilty to manslaughter, the sixth security guard, Jeremy P. Ridgeway of California, described how he and the other guards used automatic rifles and grenade launchers to fire on cars, houses, a traffic officer and a girls’ school. In addition to those killed, there were at least 20 people wounded. ....

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/09blackwater.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all


McClatchy
Posted on Monday, December 8, 2008
Blackwater indictment details chaos at busy Baghdad circle

WASHINGTON — A 35-count indictment unsealed Monday of five Blackwater Worldwide security guards on manslaughter charges for the September 2007 shooting deaths of at least 14 Iraq civilians at al Nisoor Square in Baghdad, along with the guilty-plea agreement of a sixth Blackwater employee, provide the first official account of what took place that day. .....

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/57350.html

Of the three, McClatchy provides four source documents:

Ridgeway's proffer [this is what he will say when he pleads guilty] - here (http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/us-v-ridgeway.pdf)

Indictment of Ridgeway for killing al Khazali [passenger in the KIA] - here (http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/us-v-ridgeway2.pdf)

Indictment of 5 Blackwater guards [the meat of the case] - here (http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/grandjury.pdf)

Justice Department news release on the indictments [for a DoJ release, this is pretty much straight up] - here (http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-nsd-1068.html)

OK, all of us have some reading to do. Thought I'd post this first; see a client for a while; and get back to the case later today.

Stan
12-09-2008, 06:51 PM
IMO exceeds proportionate use of force on civilians.


... and I agree, but the question then becomes why are they charged with manslaughter instead of killing civilians beyond military necessity exceeding proportionality? Maybe it is me, but I see a transition here from the rules of war to the rules of law for political purposes and not justice. My question then becomes what is the procedure or what are the rules for making that transition. We see this same thing in some of the military cases in both Iraq and Afgan. So the next question is should we make a transition between the rule of war and the rules of law?
In the contractors defense (and I am not saying this happened, but just throwing it out there for thought), if you are in the middle of an ambush firefight, where everyone is running and ducking, and an unknown individual approaches you with his hands in the air (in a country full of suicide bombers) what would you do???

Bob, I fully concur, the rules currently in place have changed with such frequency and the contractors in question were in a position of self-preservation (in their opinion, which is the only one that counts at that time and place) and were probably the last to know of the politics involved. But, I can't stop there. This situation is also a severe question (lack) of leadership and possession of leadership skills (in the absence of). The contractors are young and their bios and awards speak for themselves. Sorry, but this is not a situation I would place young E-4s or E-5s in without sufficient supervision.

It is my personal opinion that they were in a situation without proper guidance, and, we now have a 6th member who felt his moral limits were breached. To echo the comments thus far, there's something missing.


Understanding we don't have all the information, for example, were the contractors operating under a set of ROE (Rules of Engagement), and were they authorized the use of deadly force? There should be something in the State Department Contract with Blackwater that addresses this ... please don't tell me the State Department hired these guys without providing some type of ROE.


I've been a contractor for years following my retirement. ROE in my contracts? Surely you jest :rolleyes: When a USG entity submits and tenders bids for a "contract" there's tons a paper, but hardly enough text to cover inevitable situations such as this one. Let's be straight, the clients under the defendants care were happy to be alive, and, were hardly in a position to bitch about the services :D


BTW: Stan and Tom thanks for those two articles it is interesting when you compare them, the more balanced article seems to be a non-US source.

Interesting point. We really do try to cover our Alphas and recognize our Soldiers, but we need to also remain focused and strike a balance regardless of the sources (we've got quite a collective bunch of professionals herein).

Tom Odom
12-09-2008, 07:06 PM
Good post Stan and good discussion Polar Bear.

My position is simply that an agency contracting its security out does not contract out the responsibility for the actions of that security force--JMM I am speaking from personal not legal perspective.

The same thing holds for the contractor and assigning the duties of the members who actually perform the work. In the case of DSS after this episode, they restructured their training and and their supervisory roles to where a DSS member has to ride shotgun with these teams enough to certify them.

That is all fine and good. Changes needed to be made and they made them. But if the DoJ is going to charge these young men, then what happened to the BW execs who selected them, trained them, and supposedly led them? What happened to the DSS structure in country at the time? If they were not supervising effectively were they relieved or simply moved?

Tom

jmm99
12-09-2008, 08:15 PM
First, morals and ethics


Tom Odom

My position is simply that an agency contracting its security out does not contract out the responsibility for the actions of that security force--JMM I am speaking from personal not legal perspective.
....
The same thing holds for the contractor and assigning the duties of the members who actually perform the work.

No argument from this choir on the moral and ethical obligations you outline.

I'm reminded of a very good client (MAJ in OSS - later very successful in another field; but now deceased) who always wanted to discuss the morals and ethics of what was to be done, as well as the "legalities". So, bravo for that approach.

Second, legal framework


JTF

First, the facts of the incident are in dispute. The indictment "alleges" that the guards opened fire w/o cause and indiscriminately. The defense argues that they were under attack and returned fire. The facts should be brought out in the trial.

Second, no facts regarding Blackwater policy have yet to be brought out even in the media articles that I have seen. To hold the Blackwater execs responsible requires, I think, showing that they either had a policy for rules of engagement that violated the laws of war or that they were criminally negligent in their lack of enforcement of legitimate rules of engagement.

Third, to hold DOS personnel criminally responsible would, I think, require showing that they knew or should have known both the laws of war and the rules of engagement and did not take steps to enforce both - if, indeed, they were violated - a fact in dispute as noted above.

This seems an accurate framing of the legal issues - who says Oklahoma jailhouse lawyers ain't good. :)

Basically, we are talking about Article 119 charges here - which get harder and harder to prove as you go up the food chain.

I'd like to expound on this and the actual pleadings more, but the stuff really is hitting the fan here & and I'm in a time bind. Maybe tonite.

John T. Fishel
12-09-2008, 09:43 PM
and the indictment, one thing that struck me immediately is the allegation that the BW guards, under contract to DOS, were in support of DOD. I suspect that allegation is necessary to bring the case under MEJA. But, it is factually untrue. DOS is not in support of DOD. Nor is DOD clearly in support of DOS. They are separate operations and the degree of mutual support was always a function of the personal interaction between the American Ambassador and the American military commander. Good luck, US Attorneys making that case:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
12-09-2008, 10:46 PM
Good luck, US Attorneys making that case:rolleyes:Yet another flawed law by our great Congress...

I'm really looking forward to the US Attorneys efforts to hook 'em with this:
"(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime...for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. LINK (http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/fed_cap_off/18_usc_924.htm). :o

Polarbear1605
12-09-2008, 11:48 PM
Yet another flawed law by our great Congress...

I'm really looking forward to the US Attorneys efforts to hook 'em with this: LINK (http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/fed_cap_off/18_usc_924.htm). :o

Ah-Ha! Ken brings up another issue with the Rules of Law (and I think this is some good news). With the rules of law, the rights of the accused kick-in...innocent until proven guilty, habeus corpus, sealing the crime scene, etc. Now think CSI Las Vegas... ballistics reports, finger prints, all that crime scene evidence that is necessary to convict someone of manslaughter...was there a crime scene investigation at Bagdad's Nisur Square...for example, enemy fire would have yielded enemy shell casings.
JMM...thanks for the documentation...reading it now and it is a big help. :)

Schmedlap
12-10-2008, 12:04 AM
Has anyone given a rationale or theory for why 5 guys would drive out to a busy intersection, block traffic, and start shooting people indiscriminately?

selil
12-10-2008, 12:46 AM
Ah-Ha! Ken brings up another issue with the Rules of Law (and I think this is some good news). With the rules of law, the rights of the accused kick-in...innocent until proven guilty, habeus corpus, sealing the crime scene, etc. Now think CSI Las Vegas... ballistics reports, finger prints, all that crime scene evidence that is necessary to convict someone of manslaughter...was there a crime scene investigation at Bagdad's Nisur Square...for example, enemy fire would have yielded enemy shell casings.
JMM...thanks for the documentation...reading it now and it is a big help. :)


Forensics now you've stepped into my terrain. Yes there was an attempt at gathering evidence from the reports. Whether chain of custody was attempted or not I don't know. The reports suggest that military and civilian authorities tried to gather physical evidence. It would be interesting to know what kind of evidence has been gathered from surveillance video, gun truck video, bystanders, etc.. but I am unaware of that.

Forensic evidence though is nothing without the narrative and context to support it in a court.

Polarbear1605
12-10-2008, 12:50 AM
Nisur Square? I think this is a google earth shot of the Square. Let me know if it is not the square.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=8&pictureid=45

Ken White
12-10-2008, 02:08 AM
Has anyone given a rationale or theory for why 5 guys would drive out to a busy intersection, block traffic, and start shooting people indiscriminately?glad I stopped carrying the rifle in the car due to my reaction and words directed at those nearby when I encounter traffic blocking an intersection for no discernible reason other than gross stupidity...

Seriously, good question and one that I also have not seen asked or discussed. There are a lot of things here, based on the limited and rather poor information publicly available that do not add up at all.

I have no particular leaning one way or the other in this other than that I have doubts about what has come out so far and I agree with Tom that the Contractor and the agency that hired the Contractor have some obligations here that do not thus far seem to be met.

jmm99
12-10-2008, 03:13 AM
from Ken
... I stopped carrying the rifle in the car ...

if one has an "anger management" issue - as apparently both of us have. In the trunk allows some time for reflection. Not my normal practice here in CC cuz the probability of an encounter is remote.

Use of the 30-year machine gun statute, in this case, is an example of extending it beyond its intended purpose. I've warned conservatives repeatedly about too draconian criminal laws (lest someday, you be on the receiving end) - and there are executive orders out there which are worse for legal gun owners. All good things can be abused when carried too far.

Just got to eat supper an hour ago; so, I just DL'd the pleadings. Haven't even read them yet.

However, you guys are IDing all the issues and digging the facts. See you later.

Ken White
12-10-2008, 03:33 AM
if one has an "anger management" issue - as apparently both of us have.Nah, no prob for me, I'm too lazy to get too irate -- I do enjoy fulminating at stupidity though. I get to fulminate a lot... :D
Use of the 30-year machine gun statute, in this case, is an example of extending it beyond its intended purpose. I've warned conservatives repeatedly about too draconian criminal laws (lest someday, you be on the receiving end) - and there are executive orders out there which are worse for legal gun owners. All good things can be abused when carried too far.Yea, verily.

Plus, in this specific case, looks like they're stacking charges and that's usually a clue the Prosecutors are uncertain of their case. :wry:

Schmedlap
12-10-2008, 04:50 AM
Seriously, good question and one that I also have not seen asked or discussed.

I think the silence speaks volumes. The underlying assumption in reports about Blackwater is the that they are greedy, trigger-happy mercenaries who have no concern for the lives of Iraqis. I'll grant the trigger-happy bit. But, the level of discourse in the media about Blackwater in particular, and private contractors in general, has created an atmosphere in which any and all acts of evil are assumed plausible.

jmm99
12-10-2008, 04:57 AM
"they're stacking charges". I suspect the 30-year mandatory charge is intended to scare 5 young men, who probably have not much experience with criminal proceedings.

Courage and bravery in battle doesn't equate to coolness in the courtroom. Once defended through jury a Marine (Vietnam, who had gone through some bad stuff there) - assaulting and resisting an MSP trooper in the course of an arrest. Long story short, jury not guilty. Guy said that the trial (especially his testimony - but more so, the six hours it took the jury to decide) was the worst thing he had gone through in his life.

Guy became a good friend of mine - nice guy, but a little rough around the edges and didn't like to be provoked. What I didn't tell him when the jury was deliberating was that the jury's Alpha Dog was the younger brother of a guy who was one of my good friends in high school and also was a Marine. Didn't think there was a chance in hell of that guy convicting - and he ended up being the jury foreman.

As you say, combat is comparable to no civilian profession. And, on the other side of the coin, trial experience is not comparable to any other profession either.

Ken White
12-10-2008, 05:46 AM
I think the silence speaks volumes. The underlying assumption in reports about Blackwater is the that they are greedy, trigger-happy mercenaries who have no concern for the lives of Iraqis. I'll grant the trigger-happy bit. But, the level of discourse in the media about Blackwater in particular, and private contractors in general, has created an atmosphere in which any and all acts of evil are assumed plausible.True. The media are trying to be fair as they see it and they don't want to be a civil suit target but they still are dropping innuendos.

OTOH, trigger happy Americans are not a myth, they are very real. The US Army and the US Marines have the worst fire discipline of any western armed forces I've seen. I hear it's getting better and I know that they're trying to switch rifle marksmanship to outcome based training and that will certainly help.

However, in the past, we were pathetic. Those kids all served on active duty at a time when the rule in Iraq as nearly as I can tell from the outside looking in (and from my 11B son who made OIF2) was kill anything that looks dangerous or try to do so. So they may have picked up bad habits; had them exacerbated by the work environment.

One of my fond memories of the Dominican Republic is sitting in the center of Santo Domingo every night for three weeks and watching 2/6 Mar and 2/82 Abn Div get into firefights with each other, fortunately doing almost no damage other than a couple of wounded. One from Korea is always routing my outside the lines patrols back through the British Commonwealth Division sector so the 5th Marines wouldn't shoot us up. One from Viet Nam is beaning a kid with a steel helmet for firing his M16 on full auto -- always a no-no for anyone working for me -- and him saying "I had to, he was shooting full auto at me and you always say proportionate response." Sigh. I had no response to that. Can't win 'em all...

Aforementioned son said on last trip to Afghanistan, keeping people from firing on automatic and keeping the SAW and 240 gunners from replying to occasional stray rounds from outside the wire or rounds at night was a constant. We are trigger happy, excessively so and it is NOT a good thing.

Ken White
12-10-2008, 06:21 AM
Partial repeat:
But, the level of discourse in the media about Blackwater in particular, and private contractors in general, has created an atmosphere in which any and all acts of evil are assumed plausible.Apropos of that, the WaPo has an article titled "Private Contractors sought as Guards in Afghanistan" LINK (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/07/AR2008120702676.html). Being the Post, it's fairly straightforward.

However, I've seen it cited on several so-called military blogs which I will not dignify with a link; those run by journalists, pundits or wanna-bes that allude to the Blackwater Case and make snide remarks about the new contracting effort.

Given the option of hiring contractors or putting about a quarter of your strength on the perimeter which precludes them from doing their job of hunting and countering bad guys and without even going into the math on the number of Battalions that such hiring means will not have to rotate in-country as often I must say I am once again impressed by the awesome knowledge and thought processes of many...

Obviously, we could put all the troops out in the boonies but they do need break on occasion and they need a secure area for that break...

The Draftee Army mantra and thought process lives on. Hey, guys -- we aren't that big nowadays -- and don't need to be, there are other ways to do bidness...

Sheesh.

Polarbear1605
12-10-2008, 03:57 PM
Another interseting question(s) is: Who conducted the investigation?? Federal Marshals? and who initiated the investigation within the State Department (Bagdad or DC?) This may help discovering what some of the politics are?

Stan
12-10-2008, 05:34 PM
Bob,
Here's several links (http://news.google.ee/news?q=fbi+investigating+blackwater+guards&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&um=1&hl=en&sa=X&oi=news_result&resnum=4&ct=title) regarding the FBI's investigations since 2007. Looks like at least four trips to Baghdad to date.

You'll also note the case is being moved to D.C.

Regards, Stan


Another interseting question(s) is: Who conducted the investigation?? Federal Marshals? and who initiated the investigation within the State Department (Bagdad or DC?) This may help discovering what some of the politics are?

Polarbear1605
12-10-2008, 05:58 PM
Thanks Stan for the article links. So the DOS gets the FBI to investigate ... under MEJA?
Whoa! I think everyone should read this one.
http://townhall.com/columnists/JacobSullum/2008/12/10/lawless_justice&Comments=true
Makes a case that MEJA does not apply to DOS contractors.

jmm99
12-10-2008, 07:36 PM
The issues that will come up will be:

1. Venue of case (DC or Utah). The Federal magistrate (a lawyer, but not an Article III judge) has transferred the case to DC. That decision can be appealed.

2. Jurisdiction over case (MEJA). This will be the key pre-trial legal issue, which should in the long run go up to SCOTUS (simply to clarify what the MEJA statute means).

3. Trial of Merits (Manslaughter). This will hinge entirely on the facts. The basic law of manslaughter is simple, whether under USC or UCMJ; and they are basically the same.

The law of self-defense is going to be more complex. In Ridgeway's proffer (linked above in post #15), DoJ seems to rely on the following as the standard for self-defense:


6. As a condition of their employment as State Department contractors, defendant Ridgeway and the other members of the Raven 23 convoy each signed a written acknowledgment form, agreeing to abide by the use-of-force policies set forth in the State Department Mission Firearms Policy for Iraq.

The Mission Firearms Policy provided:

The touchstone of the Embassy Baghdad policy regarding the use of deadly force is necessity. The use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known to the individual at the time . . . The necessity to use deadly force arises when all other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to a specific individual or other person have failed or would be likely to fail. Thus, employing deadly force is permissible when there is no safe alternative to using such force and without the use of deadly force, the individual or others would face imminent and grave danger.

Mission Firearms Policy, United States Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, at 4 (emphasis in original).

The Mission Firearms Policy also recognizes that the reasonableness of a belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the individual on the scene, who may often be forced to make split second decisions.

It will be a long-time coming before we reach the merits of the case (item # 3). In is quite possible that these defendants simply cannot be tried under any law (item #2).

As to the politics of this case, we can be assured that whatever today's politics may be, they will be different in 60 days when the DoJ and Wash. DC US Attorney are re-organized under the new administration.

Stan
12-10-2008, 09:06 PM
Thanks Stan for the article links. So the DOS gets the FBI to investigate ... under MEJA?
Whoa! I think everyone should read this one.
http://townhall.com/columnists/JacobSullum/2008/12/10/lawless_justice&Comments=true
Makes a case that MEJA does not apply to DOS contractors.

Interesting that. I did find another article (by no means the details that JMM has at his fingertips :cool:).

Law's unclear (http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics/AP/story/806076.html) if U.S. can prosecute Blackwater guards


Who was this employee, and what was his or her function? Would protecting, say, an agricultural attache amount to "supporting the mission" of the Pentagon?

That could be one way of defining whether the act really applies. More broadly the question could be: Five years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, is the ongoing occupation primarily a military or a diplomatic operation and is the State Department subordinate to the Defense Department in the Iraq venture?

Iraq is a combined operation, in which State supports the Department of Defense and the Department of Defense supports State, each intertwined in service to a unified U.S. objective. So maybe that's the answer, and the Blackwater guards lose on the jurisdiction issue.

jmm99
12-10-2008, 09:59 PM
but Anna Faris is, but only in my dreams.

Stan's McClatchy link spells out the problem - parsing "supporting"; for which, legislative history is sparse:


Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., the author of the 2004 amendment and of the original MEJA, said simply on the Senate floor June 16, 2004, that "this amendment would give the Justice Department authority to prosecute civilian contractors employed not only by the Department of Defense but by any federal agency that is supporting the American military mission overseas."

The indictments (linked above - p.1 of this thread) emphasize this:

Ridgeway


At all times relevant to this Information:

1. On or about September 16,2007, defendant JEREMY P. RIDGEWAY was employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1), that is:

a. The defendant was an employee and a subcontractor of Blackwater Worldwide, a company contracting with the United States Department of State, who was employed to provide personal security services in the Republic of Iraq, which employment related to supporting the mission of the United States Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.

and the Others


At all times relevant to this Indictment:

1. On or about September 16,2007, defendants PAUL ALVIN SLOUGH, NICHOLAS ABRAM SLATTEN, EVAN SHAWN LIBERTY, DUSTIN LAURENT HEARD, and DONALD WAYNE BALL, were employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §3267(1), that is:

a. The defendants were employees and subcontractors of Black water Worldwide, a company contracting with the United States Department of State, who were employed to provide personal security services in the Republic of Iraq, which employment related to supporting the mission of the United States Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.

The use of "employed by the Armed Forces" in the first paragraph has caused confusion here and elsewhere - because they weren't employed by the Armed Forces in the general meaning of that term.

We'll see what Judge Urbina will do with this one. His decision in the Uighur cases is no precedent here. In fact, there is no precedent here.

John T. Fishel
12-10-2008, 11:12 PM
facts like who is supporting whom?:eek: The historical norm is that the Ambassador and his mission is the supported element (Presidential Letter of Appointment) except in cases where a major military operation is being conducted. In that case, the Ambassador runs a parallel operation with DOD but not in support of DOD. (However, a friend who is a former US Ambassador insists that in all cases the Ambassador is the supported element.) Part of the problem - sorry about this JMM - is that lawyers actually write legislation. Thus it makes darn little difference what Sen. Sessions intended; it is only important what the legislation actually says.

One question that I have - goes back to Polar Bear's point - is why we couldn't simply try these guys for the violation of the Law of Land Warfare. We are signed up to the various treaties and conventions that make up said law and even the statute of the International Criminal Court puts primary responsibility for prosecuting war crimes (violations of the laws of war) on states rather than on the ICC. Indeed, we have so prosecuted in the past although not civilian contractors. Moreover, American legal tradition does not require a statute law to prosecute - violations under the common law can also be prosecuted, at least within recorded American history.

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
12-11-2008, 02:05 AM
starting with:


from JFT
Do we really trust judges to decide facts like who is supporting whom?

Assuming this is a rhetorical question, please tell us who should be deciding this case, or for that matter, the "War Crimes" cases. We're open to any concrete proposals. In fact, you can provide us with a new Article III for the Constitution, spelling out who should decide matters of law and fact.

And with


Part of the problem - sorry about this JMM - is that lawyers actually write legislation.

Again, tell us who should draft laws. I personally have no vested interest in having lawyers draft laws. In fact, I expect lawyers would be better off financially if all laws were drafted by non-lawyers. At least that has been my experience with wills, trusts, deeds and contracts drafted by non-lawyers - yum, yum $ $.

and with


Thus it makes darn little difference what Sen. Sessions intended; it is only important what the legislation actually says.

OK, the first rule of legislative construction is to apply the plain meaning of the text. But, what if the text is ambiguous ? So, a secondary rule is to look to the legislative history. Also true that rule can be abused since it can lead to "judicial legislation" (J. Scalia has pointed that out in several cases; but he is also one to pound legislative history when it supports his result).

The alternative is to apply a strict and absolute plain meaning test - if there is not a plain meaning, the statute is void for vagueness. Perhaps, that is the rule we should adopt and rigidly adhere to - it would get rid of a hell of a lot of laws. So, please provide us with a draft of your constitutional amendment to do just that.

and with


One question that I have - goes back to Polar Bear's point - is why we couldn't simply try these guys for the violation of the Law of Land Warfare.

Tell us which law of land warfare you are proposing. There are a hell of a lot of laws governing land warfare. Which one would you use to prosecute this particular case. Saying we should use the "Law of Land Warfare", or should or should not use the "Rule of Law", may mean something to you - but those terms mean nothing to me, except as generalities.

and with


Moreover, American legal tradition does not require a statute law to prosecute - violations under the common law can also be prosecuted, at least within recorded American history.

Not in Federal courts since the War of 1812. I'd have no real problem with the common law as the basis for criminal prosecutions - as propounded in Bill Crosskey's 2 vol. set Politics and the Constitution (1953), which I pull from the shelves to read for pure enjoyment - good stuff, available here (http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&bookkey=81076).


When the first two volumes of William Crosskey's monumental study of the Constitution appeared in 1953, Arthur M. Schlesinger called it "perhaps the most fertile commentary on that document since The Federalist papers." It was highly controversial as well. The work was a comprehensive reassessment of the meaning of the Constitution, based on examination of eighteenth-century usages of key political and legal concepts and terms. Crosskey's basic thesis was that the Founding Fathers truly intended a government with plenary, nationwide powers, and not, as in the received views, a limited federalism. ...

Please note: if you want to go to a complete and pure common law system, I'd not object. But, common law is explicitly and wholly "judicial legislation" - and, if we cannot "trust judges to decide facts", do you really want that common law system ?

All of your points are good ones for discussion in the context of this case. However, he who pleads against a position has the obligation, if anything is to be learned, to also plead the specifics of the alternative position.

John T. Fishel
12-11-2008, 03:04 AM
states that the Supreme Court (and inferior courts by extension) shall have "...jurisdiction both as to law and fact..."* but I have a real problem when judges decide fact and are simply wrong about the facts (as in Clinton v. Jones - or was it the other way around?). I'm afraid that I don't have a better solution in this case but I certainly hope that the judges will recognize that the facts don't really support any interpretation of who is supporting whom.

Law of Land Warfare, I understand, is a set of treaties, conventions, and customs. It is also my understanding that treaties to which the US is a party are US law on a par with any other Federal statute (although SCOTUS tossed a curve ball on that in addressing the death penalty case for a Mexican national). Still, the element of custom in the "Law of Land Warfare" is a sort of common law function. And, yes, common law is judge made - but restrained by both precedent and those very customs. But why am I telling you this? you know it better than I do:D. Still, it seems useful to me to suggest that if we catch a pirate or two, we ought to try them aboard ship, convict them, and hang 'em from the nearest yardarm according to the ancient sea laws/customs against piracy. In a somewhat analogous fashion, it seems to me that we have jurisdiction over the Blackwater contractors and can try them for violations of the several treaties, conventions, and customary laws - either that or as illegal combattants, or both.:cool:

Regarding who should draft laws: personally, I think it ought to be the legislators with the help of hired Napoleon's corporals to make sure the draft laws are understood to mean what the dafters intended.

My point regarding Sen Sessions, however, was that his comments on his intent are less than sufficient guidance. As you point out, plain text comes first, then legislative history. But legislative history is usually recorded in the mark-up of the bill and later in the statements of the members of the committee that reported it out. Whether Sessions was the sponsor (sole or as amember of a group) is less relevant than the collective intent of the members of the reporting committee. Again, we should always remember that legislation is nearly always a compromise among the members of a committee.

Cheers

JohnT

*as John Marshall quoted Art III in Marbury where he arrogated to the court a power that James Madison said would have caused him to reject his own Constitution!

Schmedlap
12-11-2008, 04:34 AM
I think the prosecution is attempting to "prove too much." The guards were supporting the State Department. Does Ambassador Crocker answer to Odierno? Or even to Petraeus? If not, then this seems like a pretty clear expression of intent for our policy in Iraq to be one of not a military operation supported by the state department, but of a dual mission where each department has its own mission. DoD and State have two purposes in the same area, just as a police department and fire department have two purposes in the same area. If I'm a security guard at the fire station, then that doesn't mean that I'm supporting the police department.

Jeff Sessions made an interesting comment, but the prosecution has chosen their argument. They're arguing that the contractors were supporting the mission of the Department of Defense. I think the defense can rather effortlessly argue that the DoD is supporting the State Department, not the other way around.

jmm99
12-11-2008, 06:41 AM
continued, as to:


JTF
... but I have a real problem when judges decide fact and are simply wrong about the facts (as in Clinton v. Jones - or was it the other way around?). ..

I also have problems when judges decide facts wrongly - so, I appeal and appeal again (2 levels of appeal in NY, MI & US - which exhaust my bar admissions). I probably lose the appeals unless the judge's findings are clearly erroneous - something about the idea that factual questions arise because reasonable men (oops, persons) can differ in their inferences drawn from the same facts.

If anyone has a better solution as to how facts should be found, I'm sure most judges would buy it. They hate finding facts - so, whenever possible fact finding is put to the jury (you didn't mention that institution). Or, they decide cases based on what is stated in the allegations of the pleadings - as in most of the "War Crimes" cases - only Judges Urbina and Leon have held merits hearings.

and this:


I certainly hope that the judges will recognize that the facts don't really support any interpretation of who is supporting whom...

The judge (presumably Urbina) will be presented two different factual and legal arguments as to "supporting". The definition of "supporting" (whatever version) is a mixed question of law and fact - which means it will be decided de novo in any appeal (probably two, since SCOTUS probably will get into the act unless the 5 plea-bargain out). I've no firm position on that issue - I think it could go either way.

and this


Regarding who should draft laws: personally, I think it ought to be the legislators with the help of hired Napoleon's corporals to make sure the draft laws are understood to mean what the dafters intended.

Who are the "Napoleon's corporals" ? - we've excluded lawyers per your first post. Actually, I'd go with the requirement that only legislators draft the laws - especially, the appropriation bills and the tax laws - and absolutely exclude all hired or outside "assistence". That would limit both the number and length of laws. Anybody think the Pentagon and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, to name but two of the 1000's of special interest groups, would buy that.

Just a thought, but what I suggested for Congress is pretty much what happens in our courts - e.g., a Federal judge (district or appeals) has 1 or 2 law clerks; a SCOTUS justice usually has 2 clerks. So, the decisions that are so griped about are prepared mostly by the principals who have to sign off on their opinions and take individual responsibility.

and this


...as John Marshall quoted Art III in Marbury where he arrogated to the court a power that James Madison said would have caused him to reject his own Constitution !

You might check the identity of the defendant in that case - one James Madison, I believe. Since when did defendant Jim own the Constitution ? But, better, you do realize that the actual holding of the case was to limit the scope of review by SCOTUS ?

The issue of judicial review is interesting - Crosskey goes into it in depth. You probably can find that set in a good law library - but, be prepared to sit down as well with the Federalist Papers, and the full texts of the statutes and cases he discusses.

Now. to a few points where your particulars are specified - and where you will find me in general agreement.


Law of Land Warfare, I understand, is a set of treaties, conventions, and customs. It is also my understanding that treaties to which the US is a party are US law on a par with any other Federal statute (although SCOTUS tossed a curve ball on that in addressing the death penalty case for a Mexican national). Still, the element of custom in the "Law of Land Warfare" is a sort of common law function. And, yes, common law is judge made - but restrained by both precedent and those very customs.

Slight amendment on treaties. For purposes of its application in domestic law, a treaty is effective there, if by its terms, it is self-executing. If the treaty is not self-executing, Congress must enact a law making it effective in domestic courts. Second, even if the treaty is self-executing or is made effective by a Congressional statute, it is superceded by a subsequent Congressional statute to the contrary.

And, of course, a treaty must comply with the Constitution - unless, of course, you wish to exclude judicial review of statutes and treaties - per defendant Jim when he was provoked by justice John Marshall (whose middle name was Michael - not really, I made that up, JMM). "One Worlders" want all treaties to be self-executing with supremacy over the Constitution - if you are inclined in that direction, we are at odds.

In connection with that, you made the most important point of all: "common law is judge made - but restrained by both precedent and those very customs." The problem that I see is not "judicial legislation" as such - that to some degree has always been present in both UK and US law (both common law and statutory interpretation). The problem is a sometimes reckless disregard of precedents, and the customs that underlie those precedents. If precedents are disregarded, the law becomes unpredictable. The contrary argument is that we must do "justice" in each case - which means "justice" in the eyes of that particular judge or justice.

There are precedents that should be overruled - those that have been buried by the sands of time - in short, the customs that underlaid those precedents no longer exist (slavery, as an example). Or, the precedents were so wrongly decided that they should never have been made in the first place. Those cases are comparatively rare - but a great satisfaction to the lawyer who manages to overthrow an unconstitutional precedent of "ancient" vintage (only once in my career).

Which brings us back to adopting the Laws of War as our criminal law - So, here's the statute (just made it up):


All acts and omissions contrary to the Laws of War shall be tried before a [tribunal - whatever type of court you want]; and the defendant, if found guilty [insert your own proof standard of guilt] shall be executed by firing squad [or such lesser punishment as the tribunal shall determine].

Anybody see anything wrong with this statute ?

I like this one.


Still, it seems useful to me to suggest that if we catch a pirate or two, we ought to try them aboard ship, convict them, and hang 'em from the nearest yardarm according to the ancient sea laws/customs against piracy. In a somewhat analogous fashion, it seems to me that we have jurisdiction over the Blackwater contractors and can try them for violations of the several treaties, conventions, and customary laws - either that or as illegal combattants, or both.

No real objection to this one re: pirates and terrorists (one of my points in another thread) - a panel of experienced officers and SNCOs would constitute a "competent tribunal" under the minimum standards of GCs, common Art. 3 (IMO - many others will violently differ).

A serious question to the experienced officers and SNCOs who happen to be reading this. Would you want this mission added to your other duties ?

BTW: the Blackwater guys, as US citizens, might want to object to this procedure - something about the Bill of Rights, perhaps (a point, I've also made elsewhere).

BTW: If you really want to go to "illegal combatants" and violations of the Laws of War, you might want to consider prosecution under the real War Crimes Act. Nobody's been prosecuted under that act yet, but there is always a first time - as Chuckie, Jr. found out under the Anti-Torture Act.

and finally


My point regarding Sen Sessions, however, was that his comments on his intent are less than sufficient guidance. As you point out, plain text comes first, then legislative history. But legislative history is usually recorded in the mark-up of the bill and later in the statements of the members of the committee that reported it out. Whether Sessions was the sponsor (sole or as amember of a group) is less relevant than the collective intent of the members of the reporting committee. Again, we should always remember that legislation is nearly always a compromise among the members of a committee.

Good summary of how to use legislative history. Which is why I have an open mind on the question. If I were Judge Urbina, I'd order a pre-trial evidentiary hearing and hear all of the facts relevant to the statute's history and to the relationship between DoD and DoS in Iraq.

Quite a workout, John. We have to stop meeting this way.

jmm99
12-11-2008, 07:14 AM
Just ran into this comment by Selil in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=61867#post61867) (post # 9); with some slight punctuation editing


Theory is just that - theory. If it were tested, it could be law. That is why it is Einstein's theory of relativity and Newton's law of gravity. There are a whole lot of misconceptions about epistemology floating around.

I've not thought of the jurisprudence of statutes and common law cases in that way, but it makes sense. That is, a statute is really just a theory until it is tested in a actual case - as we are now doing.

A common law case is a test ab initio - the result (what we call common law) comes from the direct experience of that case.

Hat tip, Sam.

John T. Fishel
12-11-2008, 01:46 PM
I should never have excluded the jury as an institution, although I generally fail to see the modern application of total ignorance as a measure of fairness on the part of the jury. That said, it is precisely the measure I would use for my Napoleon's corporals - intelligent but uneducated in legalese laymen; if they can understand it anybody should be able to, even lawyers!:wry:

Marbury v. Madison: In terms of the specific outcome according to the decision, the defendant, Madison, won. Bill Marbury didn't get his commission as a justice of the peace. Jimmy boy and his boss, Tommy J. got what they wanted, although cousin John chastized them in strong words - sticks and stones and all that. But the big winner, of course, was Marshall who created JR out of whole political cloth! I think the historical evidence weighs most heavily in favor of Madison's interpretation of Constitutional intent although hamilton does suggest it in The Federalist and the idea had been floating around since at least the time of Sir Edward Coke. That said, I don't object to JR in principal but to some of the reverence for it in all cases. There are times when the other branches supercede the Court, most obviously the Congress who may impeach judges for lack of good behavior. Can you imagine if Bill Clinton had simply refused to testify in the Paula Jones case and said, impeach me if you can? I suspect the outcome would have been no bill of impeachment and we wouldn't have wasted our time with Judge Starr's inquisition. Is JR necessary? The Brits have never had it - Coke lost that argument - and their independent courts seem to work pretty well. Would that work for us? Probably not - too much water over the dam (precedent).

So we are back to the Blackwater guards. Hopefully, Judge Urbina will exercise appropriate restraint and that we can find a constitutional way for justice to be done. Of course, we could just let somebody else's cops just pick them up and extraordinarily rend them to the ICC but then they'd be in jail forever waiting for the proceedings to get underway and come to an end - cruel and unusual punishment if ever such was.

Cheers

JohnT

Polarbear1605
12-11-2008, 01:52 PM
One question that I have - goes back to Polar Bear's point - is why we couldn't simply try these guys for the violation of the Law of Land Warfare. We are signed up to the various treaties and conventions that make up said law and even the statute of the International Criminal Court puts primary responsibility for prosecuting war crimes (violations of the laws of war) on states rather than on the ICC. Indeed, we have so prosecuted in the past although not civilian contractors. Moreover, American legal tradition does not require a statute law to prosecute - violations under the common law can also be prosecuted, at least within recorded American history.

Did I tell you folks I like the way John thinks. :D
John answered one of two questions I have about the prosecuting under the Rules of Armed Conflict. The first is if we went that route, what are the chances that the US could/would lose control and we would have US citizens standing trial at the Hague by the International Organization? Once we start the legal process in the good old USA could another country start a prosecution at the international level at the same time or after? One reason I ask this question is I know Iraq was not real happen about this incident. John if you could post a reference on the "state rather than the ICC" thing, it would be appreciated.

#2 If we charge someone for killing a civilian(s) that was not a military necessity; the Rules of Armed Conflict state the the "Field Commander" determines military necessity. Understanding that the the military has a well defined chain of command (and the UCMJ) but does the State Department? or another way to say it is; if the contractors are working for the State Department who determines military necessity??

John T. Fishel
12-11-2008, 02:48 PM
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html Here is a link with a brief summary and a link to the Statute of Rome. Remember, the the US is not a party and does not recognize its jurisdiction.

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
12-11-2008, 08:45 PM
are so far removed geographically. You and I could have some real fun arguing out JR, Johnny, Tommy and Jimmy - and you would not like Crosskey one bit. In my nocturnal musings last nite, I went to a Brit source, Plunknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, which is here (http://www.lawyerviews.com/lawsite/basicinfo/rarelawbooks.html), for his chapter on the development of legislative interpretation in the UK courts. This book is a great basic read - doesn't bury you as some of Maitland's stuff does. It and Max Sorenson's, Manual of Public Intetrnational Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968; no url handy) have been sitting out in my living room since I've been posting legal stuff here.

--------------------------------------
As to Napoleon's Corporals,


That said, it is precisely the measure I would use for my Napoleon's corporals - intelligent but uneducated in legalese laymen; if they can understand it anybody should be able to, even lawyers.

What is "legalese" is another living room conversation over a 12-pack. Once upon a time, I read through the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations (then a 3 vol. set - so a long time ago) and understood what was written. Thus, I conclude that I can understand Plain English, Legalese and everything in between.

As I've said elsewhere, my personal approach is client intensive - I teach and I am taught; they learn and I learn. Reflecting on it, I use the reverse of your Napoleon's corporals approach. First, do I understand what I draft - sometimes I don't on second reading. Second, does my paralegal understand what I write - if not, why not. Third, does my client understand what I write - same drill. Also, the same drill for what comes in written by another lawyer, or layman for that matter.

The comments on this blog about lawyers and legalese are not uncommon - have heard all of them and consequent arguments at least once in my life. Having reflected on that more than once, my conclusion is that I may be somewhat "unconventional" in my personal approach - a good reason to be here - non ?

In any event, I also have concluded that my dog is not in the conventional "lawyers and legalese" bun brawls - which IMO consist of a lot of Bravo Sierra, or at least a lot of stuff that is immaterial to me personally. So, to quote that icon of Southern manhood, "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn."

-------------------------------------
With those digressions, we return to the topic at hand. There is more to the legislative history than what we find in the media accounts (big surprise).

The "supporting" language was not a committee effort, but a specific amendment by Sessions, support by Schumer and 2 cents by Leahy. So, what Sessions says is very relevant indeed. And here you find the two pages that includes comments by all three.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2004_record&page=S6863&position=all

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S6864&dbname=2004_record

What they said is not "legalese" (hell, maybe it is, since I understood it); but I can see where two different inferences could be formed. No change in my non-position position - I think this is a toss-up based on the Congressional Record. I've not a clue as to what Judge Urbina will do with this mixed fact and law issue.

selil
12-11-2008, 10:09 PM
Now I want to stay away from law school.

jmm99
12-12-2008, 06:34 PM
At this point, we might consider parsing the word "supporting"


(second link in post #47)
SEC. ll. CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY.

Section 3267(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

‘‘(A) employed as—

‘‘(i) a civilian employee of—
....
‘‘(II) any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas;

‘‘(ii) a contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier) of—
....
‘‘(II) any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas; or

‘‘(iii) an employee of a contractor (or subcontractor at any tier) of—
....
‘‘(II) any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas;’’.

The Blackwater 5 come (if at all) under the last clause.

I hope we can agree that the word "supporting" is not some odd form of legalese. The interpretive problem is that "support" has multiple shades of meaning in Plain English (my Webster's has 7 shades for the verb, 5 for the noun). Consider "athletic supporter" - jockstrap or sports fan ?

The meaning which will be argued here by the defense will be a structural one - "The foundations support the building", etc., which Schmedlap nicely sums in his post above.


I think the prosecution is attempting to "prove too much." The guards were supporting the State Department. Does Ambassador Crocker answer to Odierno? Or even to Petraeus? If not, then this seems like a pretty clear expression of intent for our policy in Iraq to be one of not a military operation supported by the state department, but of a dual mission where each department has its own mission. DoD and State have two purposes in the same area, just as a police department and fire department have two purposes in the same area. If I'm a security guard at the fire station, then that doesn't mean that I'm supporting the police department.

Jeff Sessions made an interesting comment, but the prosecution has chosen their argument. They're arguing that the contractors were supporting the mission of the Department of Defense. I think the defense can rather effortlessly argue that the DoD is supporting the State Department, not the other way around.

The DoJ argument will be a symbiotic one - "The two drunks supported each other as they staggered down the street", or "The two units supported each other as they advanced in bounding overwatch formation".

I think Judge Urbina will earn part of his salary (*) in deciding this one. I suppose he could find the statute "void for vagueness", but that seems unlikely.

---------------------------------
* "Under 2008 rates, U.S. district judges earn $169,300 annually, while circuit judges get $179,500. Supreme Court judges are paid $208,100 except for the chief justice, who earns $217,400.", article is here (http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id=1199986622526), with chart of salaries from 1990-2007.

There are about 1100 Federal judges - so, a possible comparison would be to the comparable number of higher-ranked armed service grades (?).

Given the same law firm and credentials I had in 1968, a 2008 first year associate at that firm would make just short of Judge Urbina's salary (benefits would be roughly the same), data is here (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/business/31legal.html?fta=y) - 2nd paragraph from bottom (S&C).

So, while I am not a proponent of raising judges' salaries (given the present financial climate), they are not excessive compared to the private job market at an equal level (I expect Judge Urbina could retire and make a mil or two with the right private law firm; Judge Leon definitely could).

Polarbear1605
12-12-2008, 07:16 PM
Always invite a Marine to the party, whether boring or festive, they always add a bit of color to the affair.

Well it certainly looks like the State Department did not think out this security issue and its solution. I am wondering if they looked at any other methods/models besides hiring contractors without a legal structure to keep them accountable. The first one I am thinking about is; the Marine Corps has been providing security for DOS embassy's forever. All security guard detachments report to a Company Commander, usually a Major who has Special Court martial authority, and that also ties them back to the UCMJ. Any issues the embassador has with the Marine gets reported back to the Company Commander and it goes from there. Can a civilian sign away his legal constitutional rights upon employment with the DOS for the UCMJ? Maybe if we call them militia?

The next model (and I realize I am reaching on this one) is a Federal Judge responsible for out of country security contractors (We can station him at a port city in case we catch some pirates while we are mucking about in a foreigh country). I think a Federal Judge gets a Federal Marshal and Federal Marshals can get as many Deputy Marshals as needed or they can afford. I once got the opportunity to watch some Deputy Federal Marshals very effectively handle a Vietnamese Refugee issue in Guam (US Possession) back in 1975. Station the Federal Marshal and deputies in county to handle the investigations when these things happen???

Stan
12-12-2008, 08:11 PM
Hey Bob,


Always invite a Marine to the party, whether boring or festive, they always add a bit of color to the affair.

Fully concur :D


Well it certainly looks like the State Department did not think out this security issue and its solution. I am wondering if they looked at any other methods/models besides hiring contractors without a legal structure to keep them accountable. The first one I am thinking about is; the Marine Corps has been providing security for DOS embassy's forever. All security guard detachments report to a Company Commander, usually a Major who has Special Court martial authority, and that also ties them back to the UCMJ. Any issues the embassador has with the Marine gets reported back to the Company Commander and it goes from there. Can a civilian sign away his legal constitutional rights upon employment with the DOS for the UCMJ? Maybe if we call them militia?


Can't do much with your second para, but this one I have more than a decade of experience with. Goes back to my original post and comments. We all should be under the UCMJ regardless of the contracting agency. Keeps honest folks honest and would preclude all this Bravo Sierra.

Although the Ambassador can ultimately be the single individual to decide your military fate at post abroad, not everything goes back to the CO. The Regional Security Officer (DSS) often weighs in well before the Ambassador needs to. Suffices to say, the USMC has sent her best to posts and the minor infractions that tend to occur are not issues that burn an individual's career, and certainly not something that the CO needs to be informed of. The Detachment Commander has more than enough influence :eek:

To finally get around to your real question... Yes, the Ambassador as a civilian can and has in the past trashed an otherwise perfect military career with the stoke of a pen.

Regards, Stan

Ken White
12-12-2008, 08:32 PM
To finally get around to your real question... Yes, the Ambassador as a civilian can and has in the past trashed an otherwise perfect military career with the stoke of a pen.When I was in Iran the Ambassador for a really dumb reason convinced the Beirut Based SG Company Commander to relieve the Tehran Marine detachment NCOIC, an Italian from Boston and send him and two Black Marines back to the States. It was 1970 and said Ambassador desired no Black Marines at his Embassy. Unbelievable.

Four days later, I was the duty NCO and met the embassy flight. Down the ramp walked the same two Black Marines and the largest, blackest Gunnery Sergeant I ever saw. I of course offered 'em a ride to the Marine house. Turns out the former NCOIC reported what had happened, the Asst Cmdt, GEN Lew Walt called for the Gunny whom he knew, told him the story and asked him if he would accept assignment to Tehran. Lew Also sent a new Major to Beirut...

The Ambassador was recalled to DC very quickly, and was replaced permanently by his Deputy. I'd like to report that the Ambassador left the Foreign Service in disgrace but you know better than that...

Sometimes most things work out pretty well, though ... ;)

jmm99
12-12-2008, 10:30 PM
PBear
Always invite a Marine to the party, whether boring or festive, they always add a bit of color to the affair.

especially when they are white with a purple tongue. I'd expect that Lew Walt would have liked to have one of them to turn loose on the ambassador.

Anyway, guys, why not keep it simple so that the Marine and the lawyer could understand it. Just go back to using only Marines as DoS security overseas and we do not have to screw with new statutes, courts, etc.

John T. Fishel
12-13-2008, 02:17 AM
And, while we're at it give the RSO job to the USMC NCOIC.:cool:

Expand the Marines; get rid of Dip Security; expand the Foreign Service. Works for me.

Oh, and don't hire Blackwater....

selil
12-13-2008, 03:58 AM
And, while we're at it give the RSO job to the USMC NCOIC.:cool:

Expand the Marines; get rid of Dip Security; expand the Foreign Service. Works for me.

Oh, and don't hire Blackwater....

Isn't that like the original plan for embassy/diplomatic security?

Schmedlap
12-13-2008, 05:16 AM
I've got no issue with hiring and using Blackwater contractors (or other companies) in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. My issue is with how they are used, how they are supervised, and how they are selected. If the company is hiring dirtbags then the supervision necessary to utilize them effectively will be more cumbersome than having an empty slot. And if quality personnel are selected, but are given the mission of getting their client from point A to point B safely, no matter what it takes, then there will still be problems.

My Soldiers showed tremendous restraint and thought about the big picture repurcussions of their actions, often without needing to be prompted by me. It had nothing to do with their oath, with the UCMJ, or with their uniform. It had everything to do with their training, selection, and (to a lesser extent, imo) their supervision. Some of them are now contractors and I expect nothing less than admirable conduct from them. But if their orders are of the "whatever it takes" variety, then I can see how they might assume that "someone smarter than me made this decision. We'll make it happen." Frankly, it is much easier to rationalize such a thought in light of our response to 4 contractors being killed, burned, and hung from a bridge in Fallujah. How many civilians were killed in our response to that? Certainly fewer than would have been killed had the convoy wasted 20 or 30 of them in a 360 spray-and-pray response to the ambush.

reed11b
12-16-2008, 12:36 AM
And, while we're at it give the RSO job to the USMC NCOIC.:cool:

Expand the Marines; get rid of Dip Security; expand the Foreign Service. Works for me.

Oh, and don't hire Blackwater....
Heck no! I just discovered DSS, and I want that job. Purely selfish reasons to disagree but hey...
Reed

Polarbear1605
12-16-2008, 03:07 PM
Here is a link to another case apparently just starting:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28244088/
Their lawyer Colby Vokey is a former Marine and was appointed as SSgt Wuterich's (squad leader) defense council for the Haditha case. The squad leader is still awaiting trial. Colby Vokey plans to challenge MEJA's constitutionality.
Agree with Schmedlap's latest comments but we have to remember that "contractors" fill a number of roles to include training and logistics. The DOS seems to have issues with their armed contractors on security duty. Another ariticle;
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.htm l
But I am back to the same question; can a contractor agree to sign away his constitutional rights for the UCMJ and the 5th amendment exception?

Stan
12-16-2008, 04:03 PM
One of the reasons I hated contracted duties that involved significant risk. This catch-all phrase is indicative of how most Embassy personnel view the contractor. State calls them "expats" or even worse when working inside the embassy proper, "pits". My contracts from the early 2000's included a para regarding the "laws of the Republic of Estonia". If I foxtrotted up, I paid locally with no guarantee of extradition.


Finally, it is politically less costly to field PSCs. Private contractors are seen to be working for profit, of their own choice, and sending them abroad is not held to the same standard that sending national troops, working for their country.

jmm99
12-16-2008, 06:11 PM
PBear
But I am back to the same question; can a contractor agree to sign away his constitutional rights for the UCMJ and the 5th amendment exception?

Here are the answers (leaving out the long Sierra & Delta - since Stan is involved here, we should use his phonetic system).

1. I can waive any constitutional right I have, provided I give informed consent, etc. (all of the relevant "Miranda" warnings).

2. I cannot by agreement vest jurisdiction in a court that does not otherwise have it. For example, if UCMJ has exclusive jurisdiction over a charge, I cannot agree that the charge will be brought in Federal District Court.

Stan's example ("My contracts from the early 2000's included a para regarding the "laws of the Republic of Estonia") illustrates item #1, waiver of the US jurisdiction to which he would otherwise be entitled; and also the inverse of item #2. Estonia has courts which have jurisdiction; so that part of Stan's contract is also valid.

Narrow answers to the exact question asked - so, don't read anything more into it than is exactly stated.

jmm99
12-16-2008, 06:35 PM
In the following months, I expect to see many civil actions filed based on alleged acts or omissions in Iraq, brought against the high and the low. Some have already been filed. In addition, some criminal prosecutions would not be surprising.

What will happen to the pending and the expected cases will depend on the policies put in place by the Obama administration. So, in general, except for WAGs, we might as well go into hibernation for the winter.

Stan
12-17-2008, 06:53 PM
Blackwater should be dropped (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7788641.stm) as the main private security contractor for US diplomats in Iraq, a US State Department panel has recommended.


To echo JMM's last

So, in general, except for WAGs, we might as well go into hibernation for the winter.

Comes this !

A decision on the recommendation will be left to the incoming Obama administration, which will be in office when Blackwater's contract comes up for renewal.

120mm
12-18-2008, 12:39 PM
Blackwater should be dropped (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7788641.stm) as the main private security contractor for US diplomats in Iraq, a US State Department panel has recommended.


To be replaced by a different named entity which will employ exactly the same people. Someone I know who works PSD in Iraq claims to already know the name of the new organization.

wm
12-18-2008, 01:45 PM
To be replaced by a different named entity which will employ exactly the same people. Someone I know who works PSD in Iraq claims to already know the name of the new organization.

The above reminds me of my favorite quotation from that movie:


Major Strasser has been shot. Round up the usual suspects.

Stan
12-18-2008, 02:05 PM
The above reminds me of my favorite quotation from that movie:


I gotta get my on-line CV out of the Beltway Club soonest :o

Schmedlap
12-18-2008, 05:51 PM
Blackwater should be dropped for the same reason that we should close Gitmo. While neither is inherently inefficient or ineffective in their intended function, each one is a significant liability. If you do the math and subtract the public diplomacy liability from the operational asset provided, each one can clearly be replaced with something that provides nearly the same operational function, but with less of a public diplomacy liability. Example - as 120mm noted, one could simply create a new company with the same personnel and emphasize the severed relationship with Blackwater. You get the same intended utility with less public diplomacy fallout.

MikeF
12-19-2008, 05:16 PM
Ran into this article this morning. Thought it maybe of interest.

Logs Suggest Guards Fired In Defense
Washington Times
By Matt Apuzzo and Lara Jakes, Associated Press
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/19/logs-suggest-guards-fired-in-defense/


Reported incoming fire from police, insurgents

Radio logs from a deadly 2007 shooting in Baghdad cast doubt on U.S. government assertions that Blackwater Worldwide security guards were unprovoked when they killed 14 Iraqi civilians.

The transcripts of Blackwater radio reports, obtained by the Associated Press, describe a hectic eight minutes in which the guards repeatedly reported incoming gunfire from insurgents and Iraqi police.

Five guards face manslaughter and weapons charges for their roles in the shootings. A sixth has pleaded guilty. Prosecutors said the men unleashed an attack on unarmed Iraqis, including women, children and people trying to escape.

But the radio logs from the Sept. 16, 2007, shooting suggest otherwise. Copies of the logs were turned over to prosecutors by Blackwater.....

v/r

Mike

Ken White
12-19-2008, 05:34 PM
the exact time the first cap popped in the square, regardless of where it came from -- and I suspect that is unlikely -- then the radio traffic could've been initiated by the convoy as a preemptive cover story. This comment by a Defense Attorney:
"Unless these guys are lying to their command watch in real time, making up stuff, that's real-time reporting that they were taking small arms fire,"shows either considerable trust in his client or a great deal of naivete. We'll see...

jmm99
02-03-2009, 09:18 PM
From the AP, we have this (http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/02/02/pentagon-letter-undercuts-doj-in-blackwater-case-4/):


Pentagon letter undercuts DOJ in Blackwater case
Pentagon letter undercuts key argument for prosecutors in Blackwater manslaughter case
MATT APUZZO
AP News
Feb 02, 2009 18:41 EST

The Pentagon wrote in 2007 that Blackwater Worldwide contractors in Iraq are not subject to U.S. civilian criminal laws. That position undercuts the Justice Department's effort to prosecute five Blackwater security guards for manslaughter.
....
When Blackwater guards protected State Department diplomats, prosecutors told a federal judge last week, they were supporting the Defense Department's mission. By protecting diplomats, prosecutors said, Blackwater freed up Pentagon resources.

But in December 2007, the Defense Department disagreed. In a letter to Rep. David Price, D-N.C., Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England explained how the military handles allegations against contractors.

"I am informed that the Blackwater USA private security contractors working under a Department of State contract were not engaged in employment in support of the DOD mission," England wrote in the letter, a copy of which was provided by Price's office.

Thus, England wrote, federal prosecutors don't have jurisdiction to charge the Blackwater guards. He was writing in response to a letter from Price, who has long maintained that the loophole in the law should be closed.

Defense Department spokesman Chris Isleib said Monday that the views in the letter remain the view of the Defense Department. ...

The letter does not necessarily kill DoJ's case, since it will argue (as it does in the article) that the position of the Executive branch is to the contrary. That having been said, the letter is an admission against interest. One unresolved question is whether its weight and effect should be decided by Judge Urbina or by the jury. Have to wait for that answer.

John T. Fishel
02-03-2009, 09:52 PM
to assert that his department speaks for the entire USG! But, isn't that often the way lawyers think? I seem to remember John Marshall and Warren Burger both asserting that the law/Constitution is what they (a majority of SCOTUS) say it is. I don't recall seeing that statement anywhere in the Constitution.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
02-04-2009, 03:50 AM
it's not really that bad. The DoJ guy, in this particular case, not only represents the US government (administration), but also the United States of America, which includes both you and me. :D

The judge will (should) ask him: "Now I have this letter from the DoD staring me in the face. What evidence do you have that other departments have taken the contrary view ?"

As to the second point, this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Three_of_the_United_States_Constitution) works for me:


Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ....
....
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

but, if I recall correctly, we have discoursed this before - as to which you have a dissenting opinion on the subject of Judicial Review (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_review_in_the_United_States).

Since Judicial Review has been with us for 205 years, the revisionist argument definitely has a tough swim against the current. Sometimes I love the result; sometimes I hate the result - that being said, I accept the process and you do not. ;)

John T. Fishel
02-04-2009, 01:19 PM
I do agree that Judicial Review has been well established and not only is it not going away but it should not. ;)

That said, I would like to see the other branches do a bit better in defense of their own powers against the encroachment of the courts (through their use of Judicial Review). As Pres Andy Jackson said (in a rotten policy decision that has been a boon to my adopted state of OK:)), "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."

Final point: it is just too much fun to tease you lawyers.:D

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
02-04-2009, 05:29 PM
Final point: it is just too much fun to tease you lawyers.:DI can agree with that...;)

jmm99
02-04-2009, 06:50 PM
JTF
Final point: it is just too much fun to tease you lawyers.

KW
I can agree with that...

we all can gum ourselves to death. :D (please knock out teeth in little icon)

Since John has now accepted Judicial Review, I can throw in my two cents worth about the remedies available to the other two branches.

Brief Opinion piece:

I believe that each of the three constitutional branches has the right and duty to determine independently the constitutional issues that are within its realm.

In the case of the Executive, the President has the duty to execute the laws, but that duty does not extend to executing laws which the President determines to be unconstitutional (e.g., Andy Jackson & Abe Lincoln). Besides not executing the mandate of the Supreme Court (which has no independent enforcement powers except over members of its Bar), the President also can indirectly affect the Court by judicial appointments.

In the case of Congress, it can act to limit or change the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in many ways - although, there are practical and constitutional limits on that. Its ultimate sanction is simply to defund the Supreme Court, or any other Federal court.

These potential constitutional collisions have usually been defused by application of comity and reciprocity. The People tend to react when any one of the branches moves too far outside the norm.

Ken White
02-04-2009, 06:54 PM
we all can gum ourselves to death. :D (please knock out teeth in little icon)
...The People tend to react when any one of the branches moves too far outside the norm.and dat...:cool:

John T. Fishel
02-04-2009, 08:06 PM
Did you forget that Congress can impeach judges/justices? :wry:

Stan
02-04-2009, 08:14 PM
Did you forget that Congress can impeach judges/justices? :wry:

This is specifically the part that has always bothered me. Not that my meager existence as an Army NCO was boring, but that changing administrations often translated into new gun laws, higher (purportedly lower) tax laws and (ahem) refined legislative maneuvers (catchy French word for a strategic or tactical movement know as weaslin'). :mad:

I give up :rolleyes:

jmm99
02-04-2009, 08:35 PM
from JTF
Did you forget that Congress can impeach judges/justices?

I did, indeed - and I won't blame it on age.

That remedy, as a practical remedy against what are perceived as bad decisions by SCOTUS justices, seems to have been placed on the shelf when Samuel Chase (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Chase) was acquitted in 1805.

A brief summary of the arguments is here (http://law.onecle.com/constitution/article-2/53-chase-impeachment.html) (one of 500K Google links).


The Chase Impeachment

The issue of the scope of impeachable offenses was early joined as a consequence of the Jefferson Administration’s efforts to rid itself of some of the Federalist judges who were propagandizing the country through grand jury charges and other means. The theory of extreme latitude was enunciated by Senator Giles of Virginia during the impeachment trial of Justice Chase. “The power of impeachment was given without limitation to the House of Representatives; and the power of trying impeachments was given equally without limitation to the Senate.... A trial and removal of a judge upon impeachment need not imply any criminality or corruption in him . . . nothing more than a declaration of Congress to this effect: You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect you will work the destruction of the nation. We want your offices, for the purpose of giving them to men who will fill them better.”788 Chase’s counsel responded that to be impeachable, conduct must constitute an indictable offense.789 The issue was left unresolved, Chase’s acquittal owing more to the political divisions in the Senate than to the merits of the arguments.790

788 1 J. Q. ADAMS, MEMOIRS 322 (1874). See also 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 2356-2362 (1907).

789 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS at § 2361.

790 The full record is TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (S. Smith & T. Lloyd eds., 1805). For analysis of the trial and acquittal, see Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (1960); and [B]WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992). The proceedings against Presidents Tyler and Johnson and the investigation of Justice Douglas are also generally viewed as precedents that restrict the use of impeachment as a political weapon.

So, the question is still technically open. :)

PS: Bill Rehnquist was either very prophetic or lucky in becoming the modern expert on impeachments in 1992. ;)

Polarbear1605
02-06-2009, 09:48 AM
I am always surprised how the complexities of these discussions rattle around in my head keeping me wake at night (probably because I am a “keep it simple” person). I also feel strongly that the US Rules of Law do not apply to combat, especially when outside of the US borders. Let me make an argument here (as he pulls out my soap box) and this gets back to the Rules of Law vs the Laws of War. Under the Laws of War, people are either civilians or combatants. A civilian’s status changes to a combatant once they pick up a gun. The Blackwater folks, under the Laws of War, are combatants for this reason. Under US Law (Goldwater-Nichols), only one person in the region has Combat Command authority and they are (what we use to call) the CINC but now call the Combat Commander. It seems to me, that jurisdiction of combatants must fall under the authority of the Combat Commander (no matter who they work for in country). The Blackwater crew should therefore, be charge using the UCMJ for the violations of the Laws of War for killing civilians. Granted this argument has never been made but it seems to me that the defense lawyers should be disputing the charges on those grounds.

John T. Fishel
02-06-2009, 12:42 PM
JMM, for lesser judicial lights than SCOTUS, the impeachment remedy has been used often enough to be well remembered. One of the more intriguing cases was that of Judge Alcee Hastings who after being immpeached and removed from office by the Congress was elected to that august body by the good people of FL where he is today, Rep. Alcee Hastings - D.

At the SCOTUS level, Justice Abe Fortas (and LBJ appointment) was being investigated for elevation to Chief (as I recall) when some strange dealings came to light and the investigation took a turn toward impeachment. Fortas resigned before anything came of it - sort of like Nixon...

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
02-06-2009, 08:22 PM
your set of points are nearly right on, taking them one by one.


1. Under the Laws of War, people are either civilians or combatants.

Agreed - FM27-10 and 1949 GCs.


2. A civilian’s status changes to a combatant once they pick up a gun.

Agreed - same citations


3. The Blackwater folks, under the Laws of War, are combatants for this reason.

Agreed - same citations


4. Under US Law (Goldwater-Nichols), only one person in the region has Combat Command authority and they are (what we use to call) the CINC but now call the Combat Commander.

Agreed - but please note that is combatant command (COCOM). When we reach your next point, we have to deal with operational control (OPCON) and administrative control (ADCON). All of that has no particular legal impact where everyone is military and subject to the UCMJ.


5. It seems to me, that jurisdiction of combatants must fall under the authority of the Combat Commander (no matter who they work for in country).

If we had in-country Unity of Command, your logic would be true. We do not.

Let's take Marines serving as security at a diplomatic mission. All corrections cheerfully accepted, but my understanding is that they normally (1) are not COCOM under the regional combatant commander; (2) are OPCON under the diplomatic chief of mission; and (3) ADCON is retained by USMC. Since they are under the UCMJ, jurisdiction is clear - which is why I like Marine guards.

In the case of Blackwater guards, they cannot be COCOM under the regional combatant commander - they are civilians. I am not familiar enough with their contracts and ROEs, but OPCON and ADCON have to be in DoS and/or Blackwater.

Congress, in facing the contractor issue, ended up going two ways for DoD contractors and their employees: (1) Title 18 (MEJA) jurisdiction in the Federal courts; and (2) UCMJ jurisdiction (as to which, some constitutional questions remain unsettled - and so, perhaps, a bridge too far).

As to contractors and their employees of non-DoD departments and agencies, UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians (even if combatants) seemed about two bridges too far. Congress could have set up an independent court system to try civilians who are combatants; just as it set up the MCA system for the Gitmo detainees (also civilians who are combatants). It did not.

Instead, it extended Title 18 (MEJA) to contractors and their employees "supporting" the DoD - in effect, supporting the regional combatant commander. While Congress could have extended Title 18 (MEJA) to all contractors and their employees, regardless of department and agency hire, it did not do so.

So, Title 18 (MEJA) has a loophole for all non-DoD contractors and their employees who are not supporting the DoD. Since DoD has taken the position that Blackwater security folks are not supporting the DoD, the DoJ has some explaining to do about why the judge should find them "supporting".

I have no problem with your logic - as an argument to Congress that it should amend the statutes. As a legal argument, it will fail in these cases under the current statutory set-up.

jmm99
02-06-2009, 08:30 PM
Very much agreed that lower court judges have been impreached and convicted. In fact, several over the last 200 years were convicted on charges that amounted to incompetence in office and bad decisions.

My guess is that, since Congress can establish and abolish lower Federal courts, impeachment and conviction of wayward judges is less of a hill to climb - even though the constitutional tenure standard is the same for both SCOTUS justices and lower court judges.

Polarbear1605
02-09-2009, 11:24 PM
I have no problem with your logic - as an argument to Congress that it should amend the statutes. As a legal argument, it will fail in these cases under the current statutory set-up.

JMM, I agree with everything you state. I guess the next question is why these types of arguments have not been made to date? We seem to have significant gaps in both the Laws of War and Rules of Law when it comes to the war on terrorism. In a lot of ways I thing the troops are the ones paying the price for those gaps. Seems like we have the Executive Branch trying to solve the issue with the Judical branch helping when necessary (Rasul vs Bush, Hamdi v sRumsfeld, etc.). The folks that should be solving this issue seem to be ignoring it. I once had a staff NCO comment about expecting things from Congress. " CONGRESS?!, Sir those folks can screw-up free beer!" If he got to read MEJA I am sure he would repeat that quote.