Of Mice and Men: Gangs, Narco-Terrorism, and the USA

[MikeF]

Originally posted under the "The Switch" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6283) thread, I choose to begin anew given the circumstances...I'd appreciate your thoughts and comments, and if you are an interpreter, you can keep your mask on for safety.

v/r

Mike

Gentlemen,

Over the course of the last three weeks, my thesis research on Iraq has been distracted by a more pressing situation in Salinas, CA- the home of John Steinback. I believe that my observations are particularly relevant for this thread, and y'all may find the topic interesting and compelling for further discussion.

Salinas, along with many cities in Northern California (NorCal), are facing what they perceive to be as a gang problem. Levels of violence, drug use, and other criminal activity metrics have increased exponentially throughout the last decade. Some neighborhoods of Salinas are deemed no-go zones or ungovernable. Despite $5m invested by Congress to establish an anti-gang task force created to serve as "the local model for national level anti-gang task forces," Sen Boxer Press Comment (http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=226222) progress is fleeting.

Local officials are exasperated. Local law enforcement is exhausted. In their own words, the situation is dire.

Just like in Iraq circa late 2006. The frightening realization is that I've walked this dog before. Even more frightening is that this problem is now in my own backyard, and we seem somewhat oblivious to it. It took us many years of fighting in Iraq to collectively realize that AQI was merely a symptom of a greater problem.

From my initial observations, I do not believe that Salinas has a gang problem-the gangs are merely symptoms of a larger problem that includes transnational terrorism, the drug trade, illegal immigration, prison reform, civil rights and equality, education, and poverty. As the world "flattens," Salinas is an example of the negative side effects of globalization.

Before I explain a portion of the greater problem that transcends the local government of Salinas and potentially leads further south to Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, I would like to introduce local recruitment tools and propaganda used throughout NorCal: Generation of United Nortenos. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9SyC4RUKVw) In this video, you'll notice that they've successfully recruited Elmo and Mickey Mouse to become gangstas. In other videos, the children recruited are reminicent of the children we captured in AQI training camps in Diyala Province.

Switching gears...

As noted in a previous post, Plan Colombia has effectively demobilized the AUC and marginalized the FARC. We have had tremendous success in lower levels of violence in the country (95% decrease in kidnappings, 50% decrease in homicides, 70% decrease in oil pipeline attacks, and 80% increase in trafficability along roads). Furthermore, the big media success was the hostage rescue.

However, the drug production and exports are still escalating- the primary focus of the original Plan Colombia is a failure. Additionally, the Colombia military continues to be plagued with an image problem through continued Alleged Human Rights Abuses. CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS (http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32250_20080912.pdf)

Throughout Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, etc...), outside of the regular issues of governance, the mayan population continues to remain disenfranchised, second-class citizenry.

In Mexico, we're seeing a significant rise in drug wars- the national police force is either penetrated, corrupted, or marginalized and the army is doing the fighting. As linked throughout this thread, the drug wars are threatening the stability of the government as the gangs are allegedly reinforced and trained by transnational islamic groups (AQ, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc..).

Back to Salinas...

Maybe none of this is related. Maybe Salinas just has a gang-problem.

Or maybe it is all inter-connected. I don't know. I'm just putting it out there for discussion. I read the original constitution (circa 1968) of the Norteno familia, one of the gangs in Salinas. What I read was 2/3s Che Guvera, 1/3 Chairman Mao sprinkled with some Ghandi.

The original organization was not a gang or shadow government. Originally, it was a community organization focused on the social, political, and economic progress of the perceived disenfranchised latino/hispanic community.

During the 1980's, ex-Vietnam vets joined the famila and militarized it using the hard fought lessons learned in their war.

I've adapted a Kilcullen quote on Afghanistan to summarize this thread...

Well, I doubt that an Anbar-style “awakening” is likely in Salinas. The enemy is very different from Al Qaeda in Iraq and, in any case, Salinas’ gangs have a very different makeup from Arab tribes. So even if an awakening happened it would likely play out differently from Iraq. Rather than talking about negotiations (which implies offering an undefeated gang a seat at the table, and is totally not in the cards)

I would prefer the term “community engagement.”

The local families, neighborhoods, and communities in some parts of Salinas have been alienated by poor governance and feel disenfranchised...This creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the neighborhood level, that the gangs have filled. Rather than negotiate directly with the gangs, a program to reconcile with local communities who are tacitly supporting the gangs by default (because of lack of an alternative) would bear more fruit. The gang movement itself is disunited and fissured with mutual suspicion...

I'm interested in y'alls thoughts. While I'm stationed in NorCal, I think I'm gonna try to provide some help to the local officials.

v/r

mike

[slapout9]

MikeF, why don't you contact John P. Sullivan. He is a LT. with the L.A. County Sherrif's Department. And from his articles he knows what is going on, so look him up in the phone book and give him a call.

[MikeF]

Slap, I actually read Sullivan's article after I posted my initial thoughts. I plan on contacting him- he seems to "get it." I was suprised by his insight and the parallels to my initial observations.

Before we go Vic Mackey Shield style, I thought I'd ask for y'alls feedback.

The worst thing I could provide to this community is a narrow-minded, cookie-cutter approach to a messy or wicked problem. Thus, I'm throwing my thoughts out for your feedback.

As we debate the small wars abroad, we can help out our law enforcement brothers at home with a little perspective. Along a certain spectrum, we may find a midpoint where everything intersects.

So again, what are your thoughts?

Mike

[slapout9]

Slap, I actually read Sullivan's article after I posted my initial thoughts. I plan on contacting him- he seems to "get it." I was suprised by his insight and the parallels to my initial observations.

Before we go Vic Mackey Shield style, I thought I'd ask for y'alls feedback.

The worst thing I could provide to this community is a narrow-minded, cookie-cutter approach to a messy or wicked problem. Thus, I'm throwing my thoughts out for your feedback.

As we debate the small wars abroad, we can help out our law enforcement brothers at home with a little perspective. Along a certain spectrum, we may find a midpoint where everything intersects.

So again, what are your thoughts?

Mike


Let me think about it some.

[MikeF]

Slap,

BTW, I forgot to thank you for the excellent Sullivan article.

As I attempted to articulate earlier, there is a problem in NorCal that may proceed out of control. I don't have any answers yet, but I'm trying to redefine, frame, scale, or scope the problem in a way that has not been done before.

I'm not a stakeholder, so I'm very flexible...

Mike

[bismark17]

If your going to put together a Task Force you need to have aggressive people who know the players to get things rolling and they need to have the backing to allow them them to be proactive. They will naturally attract complaints to some extent if they are properly doing their jobs. The CRASH model seemed to work until they worked themselves out of a job and were no longer politically feasible. A good TF is also going to need to need various stakeholders like ICE and even Social Security officers to be effective. One of the ones we had up here paid major dividends. It turned out that some of the "participants" would rather go back to their respective homes of origin than to risk doing Federal time. It's all cyclical to some extant. Once the pressure is removed they come back.

[slapout9]

MikeF, here is a paper from the SWJ library you might to look at.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/urbanstreetgangs.pdf

Also can you give more details about what you are trying to accomplish?

[Jedburgh]

Back to Salinas...

Maybe none of this is related. Maybe Salinas just has a gang-problem.

Or maybe it is all inter-connected. I don't know....
Having worked as a member of the Monterey County Joint Gang TF a couple of years ago, I'll throw out a couple of observations - even though (as I said) I'm a couple of years out-of-date....

First, a huge contributor to the problem was the housing costs in the area. Average folks - cops, firemen, teachers, etc. couldn't afford homes, the cities couldn't afford to pay them enough to live decently there, and thus all of those occupations throughout the county were chronically understaffed - many critically so (50% or less).

The Hispanic community, bear with me as I generalize a bit here, continued to pour into the area due to demand both in the service and the agricultural sectors - and made do by cramming several families into single-family homes. Even with multiple contributors to the mortgage/rent, the adults tended to work at least two jobs to get by. This left the kids unsupervised the vast majority of the time. Think teens and nearly-teens, couple this with a very thin educator and law-enforcement presence, and.......

.....gang issues in all the public schools exacerbated by overcrowded classrooms and the plethora of other issues that result when public school finances are always in trouble (I bit the financial bullet and sent my daughter to RLS at the time, when I realized the nature of the problem). At night, there were some city jurisdictions with only one cop on duty, and the gang members who are all well aware of exactly how thin they're stretched across the county and have their own rat-lines they followed to avoid LE.

Then there's the uncomfortable fact that the Gang TF was simply ineffective, due to reasons beyond its control. One huge problem was the hard fact that none of the individual city jurisdictions could communicate with each other - no 'net connectivity at all, and extremely limited comms otherwise. Sharing information on gangs operating across jurisdictions was conducted the old-fashioned way - by physically going over to the other guy's office and comparing notes. Given the size of the county and the tempo of ops, this was a long way from being even minimally effective. And even a proposed solution wasn't in the works when I left.

Secondly, GTF ops were constrained by the reporting requirements to maintain funding. This required a steady flow of reported statistics - so the GTF had to focus on ops that drove numbers. Of course, this ended up driving low-level actions - parole searches, field interviews, traffic stops, etc. Although this did results in arrests that disrupted the young'uns at the street level, it had zero effect upon the leadership or the broader operations of the gangs. Everyone who was picked up was immediately replaceable. And with this type of low-level focus, there was little time to plan and run effective investigations and cultivate well-placed CIs. Although all recognized that was the way to go to really hurt the gangs, it took time and did not result in the type of numbers that needed to be reported.

So, despite arrests that could make the papers (bad guys - kids - in handcuffs, drugs and weapons confiscated, etc.) none of it really meant anything, because the resources and capabilities did not exist to really run the gangs down. And due to the other socio-economic issues I mentioned, the future gang problem in the area was perceived to be darker - as the police force ages and begins to retire, there are far too few replacements for anyone's comfort......

To talk to your another point you made:

.....creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the neighborhood level....
I also worked as a volunteer mediator and mediation trainer with the Monterey County Victim-Offender Reconciliation Program, a program that worked with juvenile offenders. It had great results on recidivism compared with juvie court, and did lead some kids off the gang path, but, ultimately, it was a small program and could only impact a limited number of kids. It was just a finger in the dike. It too suffered from funding support and staffing challenges.

[MikeF]

MikeF,
Also can you give more details about what you are trying to accomplish?

Honestly, I dunno. I'm started investigating and compiling information b/c the subject intrigued me. I suppose that I'm trying to consider if certain lessons learned in OIF can help the boys back home.....

Maybe my thoughts are simpling a rambling...maybe my experience is valid.

Regardless, I'm simply struck by Jedburg....Typically, we go micro, and he counters with macro...In this case, we see a reversal.

I'm awestruck...As with the majority of my thoughts, I continue to learn more than I could ever possibly provide to SWJ.

I started with big thoughts to gain a response....

As I venture further, I will explain a bit further onto the tactics or micro-level that Jedburgh speaks....At this time, I still contend that it is a mere symptom of a greater dilemma-for better or worse....

Again, I'm asking y'alls thoughts before I explain further...

Keep em a coming and we can debate to futher our own understand.

i'm still waiting from a response from rob, neil, or gian....

As much as I consider to reconsider, this debate is as relevant as Bachevich's "Great Debate."

[slapout9]

Hi MikeF, have a better idea of what you want now. A couple of thoughts. LE can not solve the gang problem....they can surpress it, but they can not solve it. Kilcullen said the best weapons in COIN don't shoot. Same is true in how to deal with Gangs. Or as it has been said on other threads concentrate on the environment(community needs) and you will take care of most of the gang problem. The few hard core ones that are left leave to LE to handle.

[Ken White]

to dissuade anyone from volunteering to help. Having done so a couple of times, let me warn you a few things:

Be prepared for some of the locals to blow you off (or worse) because you're interfering or not local or will only be there a short time or for some other reason including just jealousy that you do not HAVE to cope with what they do on a permanent basis. Don't let that stop you, just don't let it get to you if it occurs.

Don't expect to see the changes you think important; look at it as planting trees. You can help and do good things but it may take months or even years to see a result.

Little will be done if it's your idea -- it has to be a local guys idea to get implemented and (this is important) become an embedded process. So plant the seed and let someone else take the credit. As you know, making it better is what's important.

Go for it and have fun (and no that is not an out of place thing to say regardless of the situation -- if you aren't having fun, you aren't doing it right...;) ).

[jmm99]

Ken's comments and caveats are most likely original, but they follow (precede ?) Saul Alinsky's Reveille for Radicals (and his other stuff too) on community organizing. I suppose many to the right of the political spectrum have tended to ignore Saul Alinsky because of his personal political views - leftist.

The techniques are useful regardless of whether one is an insurgent or a counter-insurgent (e.g., setting up a community organization a la Galula or Trinquier). So, a book worth finding.

Interestingly, Hillary Clinton wrote her senior thesis on Alinsky; was offered a job with him, bur rejected it. She concluded in her thesis that his approach was too local and too slow - we needed a big government solution. PE Obama seems to have gone the other way and tied in with the Alinsky Chicago tradition.

PS - Mike. Thinking about the nasty situations described by you and Ted, organizing the community against the gangs (assuming they have effective control) would seem more akin to being an insugent with external support and sanctuary areas (the police and the "safe areas").

[Bill Moore]

MikeF, I was asked to present some classes on COIN to a police department that had some troubling crime trends, but operations tempo and good ole Army bureaucracy prevented a formal exchange of information. It all started in an attempt to get information from the police on how they conduct counter gang operations, so we could apply those tactics in Iraq if applicable. It became apparent during the coordination phase we could learn a lot from each other, because while they were talented and experienced, I saw that very basic tactics and procedures weren't being implemented that would have helped (they would have been perfectly legal).

Part of that was a result of what Jedburgh addressed about tactics being driven by statistics (to justify funding), not because they were the right thing to do. Um? Sounds a lot like military operations.

Counterinsurgency students would tell you to focus on local solutions, and of course the police have attempted to do that with neighborhood watches, increasing ethnic diversity in their forces, etc. Taking it to the extreme, such as with the son's of Iraq, well I don't think America needs or is ready for armed vigilantes yet. They would further undermine the moral fabric of our society. However, if the conditions continue to worsen you may see the raise of vigilantes, which will eventually become gangs in their own right. I think you have to be aggressive, but you stay within the confines of the law. I know no one was suggesting otherwise, just making a point.

America is different from many traditional societies where we have been involved in counterinsurgencies, and one of those differences is that American society is now largely composed of smaller families that can and do move frequently to pursue better economic opportunities, and in some location you have a large percentage of recent immigrants, which may mean that local solutions are not as applicable as they may have been in Vietnam where a person was generally deeply rooted to his home village and family. I doubt they would have a high degree of motivation to defend their towns, since it is easier to relocate if they have the means.

Furthermore, I suspect that this frequent dislocation actually contributes to the problem. Folks, especially the teens are looking belong to something, self worth, etc., and a gang provides that sense of family and self worth that they may not get elsewhere. Just a random thought, and even if it is true, I'm not sure it gets us any closer to solving the problem at hand.

[slapout9]

Hybrid Gangs...scary!

http://www.nagia.org/Gang%20Articles/Hybrid%20Gangs.htm

[MikeF]

Thinking about the nasty situations described by you and Ted, organizing the community against the gangs (assuming they have effective control) would seem more akin to being an insugent with external support and sanctuary areas (the police and the "safe areas").

Word. True dat.

First of all, thank you for your comments and emails. I've yet to commit emotionally or physically to this problem. I suppose that I'm conducting an assessment. Several LG and LE officials came to us for some help. I'm trying to determine the parameters of how I can and want to help. As I began researching, I was struck by the similarities I saw from my own combat experiences. It is quite plausible I was simply naive and oblivious prior to actually fighting to win the nations wars...Regardless, I was intrigued by this perceived gang-problem, and I'm trying to consider how to help if I choose to...Moreover, I thought this particular case-study would be a good discussion point for SWJ.

I'll start with Bill's comments:


Counterinsurgency students would tell you to focus on local solutions, and of course the police have attempted to do that with neighborhood watches, increasing ethnic diversity in their forces, etc.

I'm gonna have to disgree with you on this...I don't see a gang problem with a local solution. From my initial research, I believe the gang issues are simply symptoms of the larger social, economic, and political problems.

As Slap suggested,
LE can not solve the gang problem....they can surpress it, but they can not solve it.

I recall reading (Galula in the 1962 Rand Symposium?) that the proverbial change must be simultaneously bottom-up and top-down.

Anyways, I've gotta give some more thought to the other comments, but I thought we could start there. As with my adapted Kilcullen quote, I think that Salinas is more akin to Afghanistan than Iraq. Regardless, it is something that we will eventually have to deal with.

Again, I'd like to thank y'all for your thoughts and comments...

Keep em coming....We may all learn something :)

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

MikeF, this is real close to how I was taught. This was posted awhile back by SGMGRUMPY. Well worth the read.

http://www.sandiego.gov/gangcommission/pdf/sanbernardino.pdf

[ODB]

In that wrongly wired portion of my brain I have my own thoughts on ending gangs very quickly. Small group of well armed men with big balls. Put us in the worse part of town, walk up to the first gang member you spot and shoot him in the face. Then follow that up with an ambush at his funeral where you eliminate the rest of them in one quick swoop. Suddenly they would get the hint we aren't playing and would quickly change their ways. Play the game they know.

Seriously though it needs to be a multi dimensional approach, IMO it starts with the adults, the parents and spreads from there.

[reed11b]

This is an unpopular opinion, but as I sit in the youth crisis shelter office and watch the kids idolize the "rappers" on TV that sell nothing but materialism and glorification of petty violence for the sake of petty violence, I can't help but think that finding a way to de-power these so-called artists would help greatly.
Reed

[davidbfpo]

Mike F,

Coming in late to ths thread and UK policing has some experience with policing gangs, mainly when inter-gang shootings attract attention, sorry invariably black on black deaths (see Operation Trident by Met in London) and some of our Northern Ireland experiences were gang related (or para military activity).

Leaving aside the problems of political will, inter-agency working and resourcing here a few points:

1) Establish what is actually happening? LE stats and media stories provide only signposts.
2) What level of community engagement exists - with LE & LG. Is there any information from the community?
3) Establish robust methods for the community to provide information in confidence; Crime Stoppers has much to offer.
4) How effective is Local LE? That will affect community views and expectations. I base this on the contrast between New Orleans and Dallas policing - from an article I posted here sometime ago.
5) Specialist task forces have a role, possibly only short term, so ensure all LE have a role.
6) What are the key vulnerabilities of the gangs? I suspect LE will not know and will be reluctant to acknowledge that. In the UK LE there is little understanding of markets and business.

[John T. Fishel]

Mike, on the macro level, see Max Manwaring's work on gangs from SSI (online - Google SSI). Also his just published book from OU Press.

Note: MR 13 and 18th Street - two of the biggest Salvadoran gangs - started in Los Angeles and were deported home. In CENTAM, gangs are a mjor problem in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras - not so much in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. Of those countries, the only one with a largely Mayan speaking population (27 Mayan languages) is Guatemala. The rest are mestizo, mixed populations with the principal indigenous language being Nahuatl, the Aztec tongue. Mexico is obviously the other major gang problem country. One of the things Max does is tie gangs to larger political and criminal trends.

JMM, good on ya regarding Alinsky. Reveille for Radical should be required reading for all folk engaged in advisory efforts, SFA, COIN, etc.:cool: One doesn't have to accept Alinsky's ideology to make use of his techniques and his analysis of the woes of a particular population.

Cheers

JohnT

[Jedburgh]

Monterey County Herald, 3 Feb 09: NPS joins with city to fight crime (http://www.montereyherald.com/columnists/opinion/ci_11615871?nclick_check=1)

Salinas will be ground zero for a study on street gangs by federal and military security experts who have backgrounds dealing with terror cells, militant groups and other threats.

Though a collaborative effort announced Monday, faculty (http://research.nps.navy.mil/cgi-bin/vita.cgi?p=display_vita&id=1023567723) at the and city officials will work together to look at the root causes of gang violence and contributing factors.

Officials said it is the first time a city has reached out to high-level advisers in homeland security and military conflicts to help with a local gang issue. The result it may have is unclear......
The Californian, 3 Feb 09: [URL=http://www.thecalifornian.com/article/20090203/NEWS01/90203003]Navy school takes on Salinas gangs (http://www.chds.us/Naval Postgraduate School[/URL)

Federal violence and terrorism experts from the Naval Postgraduate School, who deal with the likes of Al-Qaida, have been recruited to help fight the deep-rooted gang subculture in Salinas. And agents of the federal office of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms have been assigned to gang-busting duty in the city.

“We need to break the back” of gangs, Mayor Dennis Donohue said as he announced the double-barrel help at a Monday press conference at City Hall. “Frankly, after three or four decades, we’re no longer interested in coexistence side-by-side with this subculture that has become embedded in our community,” Donohue declared. The mayor and other city and police officials have been under increasing pressure to deal with violence that has left 31 people dead since January 1, 2008, mostly in gang-related killings.......

[MikeF]

To compound the deteriorating securtiy situation, the local police are having a public relations issue in response to some police shooting civilians.

Few details in Salinas police shooting (http://thecalifornian.com/article/20090206/NEWS01/902060302/1002)
BY JACK FOLEY • The Salinas Californian • February 6, 2009


Police opened fire on an unarmed couple during a routine traffic stop late Tuesday night because one officer "thought he was shot," a high-ranking Salinas Police Department official said Thursday.

"He saw what he perceived as a threat and thought he was shot, and based on that both officers discharged their firearms," said Dino Bardoni, commander of investigations.

No one was hurt in the 11:24 p.m. incident at North Sanborn Road and Freedom Parkway, but the couple's SUV was riddled with bullet holes and its rear window was shattered.

Police are releasing few details about the incident or case and have characterized it as a "priority investigation," Bardoni said.

It's the fourth officer-involved shooting in the city in the past seven months, two of which were fatal.

Two issues in this specific case so far:

1. Escalation of Force. The civilians were unarmed.

2. Markmanship. The cops fired multiple rounds into the victim's car, but they did not injure the civilians. It was more suppressive fire.

v/r

Mike

[oblong]

"He saw what he perceived as a threat and thought he was shot, and based on that both officers discharged their firearms," said Dino Bardoni, commander of investigations.


This may be a dumb question. But how does someone who wasn't shot come to think he was shot? I can understand how someone might mistakenly think he was shot at, but shot?

[Ken White]

Got a Cop son who teaches in-service training and use of force. I sent him the link and I'll see what he says. But my reaction was not good. On either opening fire or marksmanship grounds.

Plus , as the ex-paratrooper kid says, "suppressive fire is NOT a police technique..."

[jmm99]

AUG. 31: At 11:20 p.m., Iraq war veteran Philip Michael Dorado, 21, of Castroville, is fatally shot by Salinas Police Officer Louis Plunkett outside a Wells Fargo bank in north Salinas. Police said Dorado had pulled a loaded AK-47 out of his waistband. The investigation is ongoing.

from the Salinas Californian article.

[slapout9]

What was the perceived threat? Dosen't say in the article:confused:

[Locke21]

Sad to hear its gotten that bad in Salinas/Monterey.


However, the drug production and exports are still escalating- the primary focus of the original Plan Colombia is a failure.

The situation is simply too complex to point to one factor and claim success or failure as many who cite the CRS report on "hectares of coca planted" as an ironclad indicator that Plan Colombia and by extension, "the war on drugs" have failed.

Roughly the same (estimated) amount of cocaine was shipped out of South America for 2007 as for 2006 (http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/cocaine_smuggling/cocaine_smuggling07.pdf) - but that includes significant increases in growth outside Colombia, record seizures, and more and more cocaine headed to easier-to-enter markets in Europe; the weak dollar had a vote too. The amount of coca growing may be on the rise, but that doesn't necessarily translate to an increase in the amount of product. If it did - a 20% increase in growth should translate to ~20% increase in product; but that isn't happening. A crucial fact here is the reference to shortages in US cities. I'll take cocaine shortages in the US as a good start for our investment.

In another article decrying the failure of the "War on Drugs" (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123439889394275215.html) we see reflections of ordinary market forces facing the drug cartels: an increase in violence as they fight to compete for a reduced commodity. Clearly there is enough to continue to fight over though. There has been drug violence in Mexico for a long time, but not like the violence we've seen in Mexico since 2007.


U.S. law-enforcement officials -- as well as some of their counterparts in Mexico -- say the explosion in violence indicates progress in the war on drugs as organizations under pressure are clashing.

"If the drug effort were failing there would be no violence," a senior U.S. official said Wednesday. There is violence "because these guys are flailing. We're taking these guys out. The worst thing you could do is stop now."

Over this same period, President Uribe's "democratic security plan," aided by Plan Colombia, demobilized huge numbers of paramilitary drug gangs (many of whose leaders were extradited to the US), and started putting the spurs into the FARC. As you stated - violence in all forms has been reduced drastically. Considering the paltry chump change of Plan Colombia compared to Iraq or even Afghanistan I'd say we're lucky to see any results, let alone the near-total turnaround of the Colombian state.

Narcotics and narco-terrorism, like terrorism, take time and a high level of engagement to address - regardless of the scale, municipal or global. Let this one stay in the cooker a bit longer to see what comes out.

In the context of gangs in the US though, I have two concerns about Mexico:
- how much worse will the gang problem get if/when will the forced migrations from Mexico begin as violence scales upward/continues, and the saturation level of the narco hero-worshiping kids increases in the border states?

Interesting thread :D

[Bob's World]

One of the "Big Ideas" we are developing at USSOCOM is that in a world freed from the Cold War and accelerated by factors of globalization there is in effect a "Competition for Sovereignty."

Essentially attempting to describe an environment where, while the State remains the primary holder/employer of sovereignty; that populaces are empowered as are non-state actors in new ways that change the old dynamic in significant ways.

One manifestation of this is populaces turning to non-state entities for things and services that their state is either unable or unwilling to provide. The rise of narco-gang activity in Mexico is an example; as is the rise of AQ to be able to conduct an effective UW campaign in the Middle East to leverage several diverse nationalist insurgent efforts, united by those things they hold in common.

The rise of gangs in the US mirrors this syndrom. As the economy worsens one can expect more and more of those segments of the populace that feel excluded or underserviced by the functions of the legitimate sovereign to turn to illegitimate alternatives for what they need.

[PK=COIN]

Firstly, I came upon this thread in search of conversations pertaining to insurgency and gangs. Coming from the thread titled "Commonalities and lessons learned between gangs and insurgencies"...

My thought was to find some leads as I try to compile reports, etc on possible lessons for COIN from anti-gang efforts. It has been really thought provoking to see a thread essentially going the other way and looking at how to bring COIN lessons to anti-gang efforts. Upshot for me...clearly many people who know better than I think there is sufficient commonality and potential for lessons learned, so I'm going to keep looking into this...any help is always appreciated, btw. Meantime, I'm going to follow some of the leads mentioned in this thread and read reports linked or referred to...

With regards to the questions surrounding the war on drugs, what has really happened in Colombia, etc, I thought the recent Economist has some pretty interesting stuff. (They contend COIN victory in Colombia, failure at anti-drug goal.) I don't have a dog in this fight, or perhaps more accurately I'm gonna keep my dog out of the fight. But the contention that many of the problems discussed here in this thread get fixed by starting with legalizing drugs...it is an idea seemingly dismissed out of hand. Is that a good thing?


Failed states and failed policies: How to stop the drug wars
from The Economist: Full print edition

Prohibition has failed; legalisation is the least bad solution

A HUNDRED years ago a group of foreign diplomats gathered in Shanghai for the first-ever international effort to ban trade in a narcotic drug. On February 26th 1909 they agreed to set up the International Opium Commission—just a few decades after Britain had fought a war with China to assert its right to peddle the stuff. Many other bans of mood-altering drugs have followed. In 1998 the UN General Assembly committed member countries to achieving a “drug-free world” and to “eliminating or significantly reducing” the production of opium, cocaine and cannabis by 2008.

That is the kind of promise politicians love to make. It assuages the sense of moral panic that has been the handmaiden of prohibition for a century. It is intended to reassure the parents of teenagers across the world. Yet it is a hugely irresponsible promise, because it cannot be fulfilled. ...

[davidbfpo]

.....the contention that many of the problems discussed here in this thread get fixed by starting with legalizing drugs...it is an idea seemingly dismissed out of hand. Is that a good thing?

PK=COIN,

IIRC the debate over legalising drugs has appeared before and on many threads. It is has had a good airing and this is a small 'c' conservative site, albeit with a variety of opinions that are not 'c'.

davidbfpo

[PK=COIN]

to do with the lack of that debate in policymaking circles. It was sort of an errant thought that popped into my head as I was reading through the thread, since I had just put down that particular Economist yesterday. I guess what I was thinking as I read the thread was that the legalization debate seemed like one of the sides in the discussion taking place in the thread.

But, of course, I see now it might have appeared I was suggesting legalization as an option, which wasn't my intention. :eek:

Upon reflection, I probably should have stuck to what I was interested in re: my comment....the gang and insurgency commonalities.

Ah, well.

[Majormarginal]

The elites of society have been at war with the forces of order for years. Some law firms do pro bono for gangsters for sport. Due to the witch hunt environment against the police today the forces of disorder are up in the game.

[selil]

The elites of society have been at war with the forces of order for years. Some law firms do pro bono for gangsters for sport. Due to the witch hunt environment against the police today the forces of disorder are up in the game.

I don't know if the current environment is a witch hunt against police. From what I have observed the corruption of law enforcement in the United States has increased at the same pace as militarization of the police. The type of corruption has changed from simple graft to contract killings and homicide. You list Chicago in your sig/block I don't have to mention the special unit that was recently broke up and had charges filed.

[Majormarginal]

I don't know if the current environment is a witch hunt against police. From what I have observed the corruption of law enforcement in the United States has increased at the same pace as militarization of the police. The type of corruption has changed from simple graft to contract killings and homicide. You list Chicago in your sig/block I don't have to mention the special unit that was recently broke up and had charges filed.

Police corruption is in the eye of the beholder. There are many standards and definitions of corruption. As far as I can tell every corruption article or academic paper has a different definition. IMHO a level of corruption is part and parcel of police work. It needs to be weeded out and dealt with but it will never go away. The special unit that was disbanded was brought back under another title. The unit has had eight names that I can think of. I don't know what this has to do with the "militarization" of the police? I have not seen us "Militarized". We have more restrictions on weaponry now than we ever have. These restrictions get tighter all the time. I carry a revolver just as I did when I started.

At the start of my career the chaplain told us to hold tight to our beliefs because we were going to be tempted. I am still waiting to be tempted. Some succumb.

It is also my experience that the police are the least corrupt unit of government.

[selil]

Police corruption is in the eye of the beholder. There are many standards and definitions of corruption. As far as I can tell every corruption article or academic paper has a different definition. .......The unit has had eight names that I can think of. I don't know what this has to do with the "militarization" of the police? I have not seen us "Militarized". We have more restrictions on weaponry now than we ever have. These restrictions get tighter all the time. I carry a revolver just as I did when I started.....

My experience may be slightly different..

In the 1980s when I became an LEO I carried a S&W686 (18 rounds total) and wore a uniform. In the 1990s when I left I was carrying a Ruger P85 (60 rounds total). We went from shotguns to carbines. Our uniforms changed to jump suits and fatigue pants. When I started the number of SWAT teams was unquestionably low. The number in the late 1990s exploded. All related to the war on drugs. Like his politics or not, Balko has a detailed exploration of the issue of domestic militarization (http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/balko_whitepaper_2006.pdf) of police and the effects. We have a tendency to dismiss that which we disagree but the data within the Balko paper is open source and verifiable.

In the question of narco terrorism there is a pretty good case to be made that the war on drugs has created the narco terrorism. Just like prohibition the criminal society will fill a need when the law is contrary to the general citizens desires.

[Majormarginal]

I'll read the Balko article. The executive summary looks interesting.
I carry a 686 and a 649.
I'll let you know what I think about the article.
Invictus Vae Victus

[MikeF]

Two interrelated articles here....

Salinas churches pray for peace 24/7 (http://www.thecalifornian.com/article/20090811/NEWS01/908110303/Salinas+churches+pray+for+peace+24/7)Seven pastors are hosting prayer sessions, which started Monday

SUNITA VIJAYAN
The Californian


In response to the spate of gun violence in the city, seven Salinas pastors are holding 24-hour prayer vigils at their churches...

Some of the pastors involved said they hope the effort will encourage residents to pray for peace. The prayer sessions are a direct response to the wave of violence that spanned 11 days since July 27, leaving seven people dead including a 15-year-old Salinas High School student on Thursday.


The community grassroots efforts in Salinas are a positive sign to provide a hollistic solution to the gang problem. The local police cannot tackle this problem by themselves, but I was suprised by the increasing level of violence. My assumption was that gangs would attempt to keep their violence under an acceptable limit in order NOT to gain too much attention thereby losing profits. It appears something has changed.

Mexican drug cartels smuggling oil into U.S. (http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/20090811/BUSINESS14/908110315/-1/RSS04?source=rss_business)


U.S. refineries bought millions of dollars worth of oil stolen from Mexican government pipelines and smuggled across the border, the U.S. Justice Department said — illegal operations now led by Mexican drug cartels expanding their reach.Criminals — mostly drug gangs — tap remote pipelines, sometimes building pipelines of their own, to siphon off hundreds of millions of dollars worth of oil each year, the Mexican oil monopoly said. At least one U.S. oil executive has pleaded guilty to conspiracy in such a deal.

If the drug cartels are adding oil as another business set, at what point do they become an insurgency? Is it possible that they are currently setting up shadow governments and controlling portions of territory?

I would welcome any feedback from the Council.

v/r

Mike

[Ron Humphrey]

If the drug cartels are adding oil as another business set, at what point do they become an insurgency? Is it possible that they are currently setting up shadow governments and controlling portions of territory?

I would welcome any feedback from the Council.

v/r

Mike

Just figured that nobody ever calls them insurgents because of all the political issues with needing to keep it a LE issue on our side. :confused:

[slapout9]

They are RICO Banditos. They will sell oil,drugs,guns,people,stolen cars,stolen car parts, used bass-o-matics it doesn't matter so long as it makes a lot of money. We should not be surprised at anything they sell,steal, or smuggle.


They are literally the modern version of The Comancheros.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hC2gThsfTqg

[slapout9]

Here is the modern version...yes this is Australia:eek::eek:



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERbKtjy_iG8

[William F. Owen]

If the drug cartels are adding oil as another business set, at what point do they become an insurgency? Is it possible that they are currently setting up shadow governments and controlling portions of territory?


They become an insurgency when they try to replace the existing government as that which exercises authority over them, and use violent means to secure that policy.

[Valin]

A very good blog following international criminal organizations
Friends Of Ours (http://bitterqueen.typepad.com/friends_of_ours/)

[jmm99]

Here is MikeF's question:


If the drug cartels are adding oil as another business set, at what point do they become an insurgency? Is it possible that they are currently setting up shadow governments and controlling portions of territory?

and Wilf's answer:


They become an insurgency when they try to replace the existing government as that which exercises authority over them, and use violent means to secure that policy.

which is correct as a military definition. However, it is not the final answer as to what law and rules apply in engaging them.

Drug cartels and criminal gangs in general are Violent Non-State Actors. In their present-day highly evolved form, they are usually Transnational Violent Non-State Actors. Calling them that does not necessarily tell us what to do with them - it only defines what they are.

Nor, does it necessarily help to define them solely in terms of an insurgency. A transnational gang may not be violent on its home turf (it may already own that government, for example). It may be very violent in another country, but not have either the intent or ability to overthrow that government.

Cutting to the "cheese" (because I have an 87 year old, WWII 82nd Airborne vet, waiting to sign some docs), under US law, a state of "armed conflict" can be "declared" against a Violent Non-State Actor, as in the case of AQ.

Normally, we (US) handle gangs under criminal law enforcement rules.

[slapout9]

Copy of RICO crimes to include terrorism. A RICO organization describes very clearly what we will be facing from Mexico now and in the future.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racketeer_Influenced_and_Corrupt_Organizations_Act

[Bill Moore]

http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_4_corruption.html

The Mexicanization of American Law Enforcement
The drug cartels extend their corrupting influence northward.


Far less widely reported is the infiltration and corruption of American law enforcement, according to Robert Killebrew, a retired U.S. Army colonel and senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security. “This is a national security problem that does not yet have a name,” he wrote last fall in The National Strategy Forum Review. The drug lords, he tells me, are seeking to “hollow out our institutions, just as they have in Mexico.”

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/26/british_muslim_gangs_and_the_chemical_jihad#commen t-89222

British Muslim Gangs and the “Chemical Jihad”


Some law enforcement officials believe the British Taliban fighters may have links to criminal gangs in Britain whose members are Muslim and who have been connected to selling heroin on British streets. At least one other captured Taliban fighter was found to have British gang tattoos on his arms, according to a western law enforcement advisor to the U.S. military, and there is evidence that various British Muslim gangs have sent fighters to Afghanistan, or sell Afghan heroin on British streets. Roughly 90 percent of the heroin sold in Britain comes from Afghanistan.


"The big bosses have Taliban and al Qaeda connections and we're often told only to deal it to non-Muslims. They call it chemical jihad and hope to ruin lives while getting massive payouts at the same time," said a street dealer quoted in this British tabloid.

While the word tabloid makes me immediately suspect, there are probably legitimate sources that can validate this.


Although the DEA says less than 5% of the heroin sold on U.S. streets comes from Southwest Asia, some U.S. law enforcement authorities nonetheless fear that Afghan heroin could be headed this way. Currently the vast majority of criminal gangs tied to smuggling heroin into the U.S. are Latin American, not South Asian, in origin. That said, Canada's Royal Mounted Police recently warned that more than 60 percent of the heroin sold in Canada now comes from Afghanistan and links have been established between Indian crime rings and that emerging trend.

Interesting to see the Indian crime rings tied to the Muslim run drug trade. I guess tribal identity and patriotism only go so far. Then again they could be Indian Muslims (they only have a few million).

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1932030,00.html

A Major Blow to Mexico's Masters of Meth


Whether or not La Familia is Mexico's most violent drug cartel, it is certainly the weirdest. Arguably, it is the world's first "narco-evangelical" gang. During this week's raids, U.S. officials found numerous religious images, "on fireplaces, in closets, everywhere," says one. La Familia members purport to be devout Christians who abstain from drugs themselves. In fact, they insist that while they sell meth and cocaine to the U.S., they keep it away from Mexicans. They also study a special Bible authored by their leader, Nazario Moreno, a.k.a. El Más Loco, or "The Craziest One." The cartel's profits have helped it build a large network of support among the poor in Michoacán, which is also the home state of Mexican President Felipe Calderón.

Insurgent like in that the cartel is attempting to mobilize the population using religion and money to in effect undermine the State's security forces.

All very interesting, and in my opinion this presents a very serious threat.

[davidbfpo]

An update on the NPS project to help the Salinas community:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/14/AR2009111400915.html?wpisrc=newsletter


In fact, the cavalry arrived in civvies, carrying laptops rather than M-16s and software instead of mortars. In this case, the most valuable military asset turned out to be an idea: Change the dynamic in the community and victory can follow.

Cites Mike F too.

[Bill Moore]

David, thanks for the post, good to see the intellectual capital of DoD being employed to help American towns solve tough challenges. I hope it works out.

[MikeF]

As discussed throughout this thread, the issue is more than a LE problem.


To secure Salinas, the mayor wants more boots on the ground, though finding the money to hire 84 officers became more problematic after local voters recently rejected a 1-cent increase in the sales tax, billed as "a penny for peace." More officers would mean less dashing from call to call and more time to demonstrate that police work for residents.

This sales tax was a county vote not just Salinas. It included Carmel, Pebble Beach, and Monterey. Frankly, I'm disappointed that it did not pass.

[slapout9]

Good job Mike. Can you tell us more of what you did?

[Jedburgh]

As discussed throughout this thread, the issue is more than a LE problem.

This sales tax was a county vote not just Salinas. It included Carmel, Pebble Beach, and Monterey. Frankly, I'm disappointed that it did not pass.
The Carmel and PB populations (Carmel includes Carmel-by-the-sea, Carmel Valley Village and Carmel Highlands, while Pebble Beach is part of the larger Del Monte Forest) especially tend to have a disproportionate influence on such county votes. They always turn out to vote against taxes for the local public schools as well as the policing improvements mentioned, whereas many of those who would most benefit from the measures don't bother voting.

The manning issue for LE in the county goes well beyond simply getting the money to hire additional officers. What also cripples staffing is county, city and town ability (or lack thereof) to pay salaries that will retain current officers and attract new recruits. Last I heard, many jurisdictions were understrength and more concerned with meeting existing organizational staffing levels than with increasing the number of approved positions. More rural areas like Gonzalez and Castroville have difficulty in maintaining a LE presence - and the gangs are well aware of this.

Then you have non-profit programs linking in the county justice system with the population that work - like the Monterey County Victim Offender Reconciliation Program, which targets juvenile offenders - that struggle to attain anything more than minimal effectiveness across the county due to lack of funding, support and participation.

[MikeF]

Good job Mike. Can you tell us more of what you did?

I didn't participate in the group. It was a bit too close to home at the time, and I was dealing with my own medical issues. Here's what they did.

They conducted FID- teaching, assisting, and advising

- Instructions on MDMP to help the local LE think smarter and learn new ways of problem solving.
- Social Network Analysis to define the problem set. Old school enemy and friendly templates using computers.
- Course of Action Development. Where should police stations be? How should one be patrolling (mounted/dismounted)? How do you flood an area with limited resources?
- Information Operations. How do you make residents feel safe and trust the LE?
- ROE and Fire Control Restrictions. "Dude, it's not okay to shoot up a car with two innocent teenagers in it b/c you were scared."

That's some of the basics to help LE reestablish security. As for the larger problem, it will require inter-agency cooperation, community involvement, and time.

[davidbfpo]

A week ago Bill Moore asked (Post 45) after some reporting on the British Muslim Gangs and the “Chemical Jihad” from: http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...#comment-89222


Some law enforcement officials believe the British Taliban fighters may have links to criminal gangs in Britain whose members are Muslim and who have been connected to selling heroin on British streets. At least one other captured Taliban fighter was found to have British gang tattoos on his arms, according to a western law enforcement advisor to the U.S. military, and there is evidence that various British Muslim gangs have sent fighters to Afghanistan, or sell Afghan heroin on British streets. Roughly 90 percent of the heroin sold in Britain comes from Afghanistan.


The big bosses have Taliban and al Qaeda connections and we're often told only to deal it to non-Muslims. They call it chemical jihad and hope to ruin lives while getting massive payouts at the same time," said a street dealer quoted in this British tabloid (Added - The Daily Star).

While the word tabloid makes me immediately suspect, there are probably legitimate sources that can validate this.

My limited response.

Heroin importation into the UK has had an Afghan / Pakistani link for over thirty years, sometimes with a strong Turkish community role. With many arrests and convictions - often from the 'Usual Suspects' and inter-generational in one family I knew of. I cannot recall any evidence of an overlap between heroin smuggling and radical / terrorist groups. Nor Muslim gangs sending members to fight in Afghanistan.

Yes the crime-terror overlap is on the "radar" and much of the commentary is alarmist, one reason why I have doubts over some US reporting. There is little to support the overlap in the UK and as my comments show there are good reasons for the radical / terrorist to be wary of such contacts.

Would the Taliban or others accept gang members, whose loyalties pose a number of security issues and what value is there in sending their members to fight.

There have been references by arrested heroin dealers to 'chemical jihad' as a justification, spurious post-event IMHO. Heroin dealers rarely have the scruples of only selling to unbelievers, indeed there is ample evidence that many Pakistani and other South Asian communities are alarmed over heroin and other drug abuse in their own communities - primarily within their young.

In fact there are several UK references to radicals opposing the use of heroin and one of the 7/7 bombers MSK actively oppposed drug dealing in his community in Leeds (covered in My Brother the Bomber thread).

Yes the big bosses may have links to Taliban and AQ leadership. Personally I doubt this, can such people be trusted? Or is there merit "playing both sides" and gaining some protection, even legitimacy, from saying it is for "the cause".

Fifteen years ago a major heroin distributor moved between his homes in the FATA and Afghanistan when external pressure for action was applied. He was a Pakistani Federal Assembly member and when a prosecution finally got to court in Quetta he arrived with thousands of armed followers, needless to say the case didn't start.

Incidentally
At least one other captured Taliban fighter was found to have British gang tattoos on his arms..This is very different to the original report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5538176/Taliban-fighter-found-with-Aston-Villa-tattoo.html
A Taliban fighter killed in Afghanistan was found with an Aston Villa tattoo on his body, British soldiers claim.

Curiously the story was not confirmed or followed up.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Davidbfpo,


A Taliban fighter killed in Afghanistan was found with an Aston Villa tattoo on his body, British soldiers claim.

Curiously the story was not confirmed or followed up.

David, your points are well taken, but I would like to encourage the professional community to take a closer look at this "potential" nexus between street gangs and Takiri Terrorist groups/movements.

In the next few posts (later this weekend) I'm going to post some links that shed some additional light on this issue. Some of the sources have some degree of credibility and others are unknown. I very confident that there is a strong and growing nexus between organized crime and takiri terrorist organizations, so extending that relationship to street gangs doesn't seem like an unreasonable stretch.

Much like the communists infiltrated our unions, D.C. lobby groups, youth groups, universities (they're still there) and some cases different churches to facilitate spreading their propaganda, agitating these groups to take action, and in some cases to facilitate recruiting, the takiri terrorists in the West are infiltrating (or building) Islamic learning centers, youth groups, prisons, and most likely criminal gangs to include street gangs (most likely the connections were made in prison). If Kilkullen is right and the Takfiri violence is more about political Islam than extremist religion, it would only make sense to attempt to infiltrate and radicalize groups. I think the risk is low to their security, because many of the radicalizers are known to law enforcement, but they're not breaking any of our laws, so they can operate in the open. They're overt trouble makers recruiting or motivating a semi-overt guerrilla force (street gangs), and the most talented ones may be recruited into the elite underground for terrorist operations. The others are overtly selling drugs and conducting other illegal acts to raise money. The question is, are any of these groups giving money acquired by illegal means to Takfiri groups/charities? If not, then the activity is probably just encouraged to be corrosive or subversive in nature to Western society as a whole.

These are just thoughts or a hypothesis at best, I don't have evidence to support it, but I'm looking for it. As these thoughts evolve I'll continue to post them. More soon.....

[Bill Moore]

http://www.corrections.com/news/article/18629

Ideological Connections between Gangs and Terrorists


Gangs, like a wide variety of criminals, feel a sense of disconnection with mainstream American society. This disconnection manifests itself in anti-social behavior and rationalization of criminal acts against non-gang members and rival gang members. As with members of terrorist groups, these gangs see outsiders as a steady supply of victims, or as collateral damage. Islamic radical terrorists view non-believers as infidels and justify their killing as a way of getting their views across and getting through to their enemies.


Terrorists and terrorist organizations, domestic and foreign, utilize the services of criminals to carry out operations and obtain logistical support. In fact, it is standard operating procedure for many terrorist organizations to employ the skills of street gangs and other criminals in reaching their goals.

http://www.corrections.com/news/article/18674

The gang terrorist connection, part II


Prisons as recruiting grounds If there ever was a breeding ground for discontented Americans, feeling hatred for the U.S. government, it is our prisons and jails. Many American inmates are ripe for the picking by an intelligent terrorist bent on recruiting for his/her terrorist organization.

Terrorist groups such as Al Fuqra, found in several states across the U.S., have successfully recruited members among America’s inmate population. Even Richard Reid, a British citizen, also known as the ‘Shoe Bomber’ was recruited in a British prison and converted to radical Islam.


http://publicintelligence.net/u-us-based-street-gangs-a-potential-recruiting-pool-for-terrorist-groups/


(FBI Report) Several domestically based extremist organizations have demonstrated an interest in recruiting current and former gang members. No specific, credible intelligence indicates members of US-based street gangs are currently engaged in operational planning on behalf of terrorist organizations targeting the United States; however, former gang members have been arrested for terrorist plotting as recently as 2005. Terrorist recruitment patterns could potentially increase gang member involvement with terrorist groups.

More at each site.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.islam-watch.org/Europe/Current-Trends-in-Jihadi-Networks-in-Europe.htm


While the phenomenon affects only a minority of European Muslims, its dimensions and repercussions are more than noteworthy. In London, city officials are worried about the growth of an extremely violent gang commonly known as the Muslim Boys. Operating in the southern areas of the British capital, the gang is composed of several hundreds of members and is active in criminal activities ranging from robberies to drug trafficking. The members of the gang are mostly British-born black youth originally from the Caribbean or Africa who converted to Islam in British penitentiaries and bond over their newfound faith (Evening Standard, February 3, 2005). Yet, their interpretation of Islam is perverted. The gang members do not respect the most basic tenets of Islam, and their appearance and slang more closely resemble that of American ghetto culture than that of practicing Muslims. Tellingly, a gang member admitted to a reporter from the Evening Standard: "I pray twice a day: before I do crime and after. I ask Allah for a blessing when I'm out on the streets. Afterwards, I apologize to Allah for what I done [sic]." The gang is also involved in "forced conversions," compelling black youth at gunpoint to convert to Islam and join them; two years ago, they executed a 24-year-old for refusing to convert.


Jihadism is a global movement whose characteristics mutate rapidly. While today some of the abovementioned trends are still in a developing phase or can be noticed only in some European countries, it is likely that they will be replicated with greater intensity and in more countries in the near future.

Numerous other sites point to indicators, but "hard" facts/evidence is hard to find.

[slapout9]

Bill, I would add this point which all your references have missed. Many people are born into gangs......they are literally 4th generation or more gangsters/terrorist and they are the most difficult to fight. The newer the gang the easier it is to get rid of, once they begin to form strong formal and legal links into a society it is very difficult to deal with them because it becomes a way of life.

[Bill Moore]

Slapout, I agree, and we discussed the generation of gangs previously, which remains a fascinating subject for me; however, I was trying to narrow the focus this time to the nexus between gangs and terrorist groups.

However, taking your a point a step further, if you have an evolved gang (multi-generational) that becomes radicalized or at least partners with a radical group what are the implications? Is that a way to quickly deep dive the radicalization process into a culture where it was previously foreign?

[MikeF]

Listen to Col Jones (Bob's World).

Get rid of the terrorist label and look at it from this front:

1. Insurgents- use violence to try to take over the gov't.

2. Gangs/Narco-Terrorist- use violence to corner a market and make money.

[slapout9]

Slapout, I agree, and we discussed the generation of gangs previously, which remains a fascinating subject for me; however, I was trying to narrow the focus this time to the nexus between gangs and terrorist groups.

However, taking your a point a step further, if you have an evolved gang (multi-generational) that becomes radicalized or at least partners with a radical group what are the implications? Is that a way to quickly deep dive the radicalization process into a culture where it was previously foreign?

Best advice I can give you is to go in another direction. Start studying about Cults, Religious ones in particular. When I first got out of the Army I worked part time for a large security company in Florida while I was still in college. I ended up doing investigations because I used to help my Lieutenants write after action reports and they liked the way I wrote my reports. Plus I think I ony have one skill and that is finding.....anything, people,things,ides,the truth.

Anyway during the mid to late seventies alot of people started disappearing into religious cults and I was pretty good at finding them. It was an interesting journey to say the least. Many terrorist organization operate more along these lines then anything I have seen. That and they sometimes appear to have links to state run Intelligence agencies.

My first case involved a Jewish organization that wasn't Jewish at all:eek: they tried to convert people from the Jewish belief to Christianity. They all have a front organization that recruits people and they put them through a brainwashing program. A good book to read is called "The Green Ripper" by John D. MacDonald. The book is fiction but deals with cults and terrorism and is eerily close to how the Mumbai attacks were carried out, except I think they went to Airports instead in the book. They used the circle of death technique to shoot as many civilians as possible.

It took years before he admitted it but the author was OSS during the war and some say he never really left but who knows, anyway some really good info in the book. Anyway that is what I would be doing, just to many similarities based upon my experience. Later.

[j37]

Listen to Col Jones (Bob's World).

Get rid of the terrorist label and look at it from this front:

1. Insurgents- use violence to try to take over the gov't.

2. Gangs/Narco-Terrorist- use violence to corner a market and make money.

There has been a recent debate about applying COIN to LE in the US. The parallels between COIN and community policing are quite striking. One of the arguments is that gangs don't have a political agenda. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/11/counterinsurgency-to-fight-us-crime-no-thanks/#more-19759

And while I full heartedly believe that "Gangs/Narco-Terrorist- use violence to corner a market and make money," creating an ungovernable space where law enforcement and local/state/federal government can not exercise their full sovereignty is critical to their success in cornering a market and making money. Don't insurgents do the same thing?

[jmm99]

Please introduce yourself (Hint: go to Hail and Farewell) and give us some background. Welcome and thanks in advance.

There are three basic situations (some of the real situations we see will be consistent with the legalistic concept of the nation-state's "monopoly on violence"; some not):

1. Nation-state vs nation state.

2. Nation-state vs violent non-state actor.

3. Violent non-state actor vs violent non-state actor.

Much of the present construct is based on Westphalian nationhood, and is often too legalistic (e.g, where a "nation-state" exists de jure under I Law, but does not really exist de facto).

The extent of violence generally determines whether the situation is one of armed conflict or not armed conflict. A grey area does exist between armed conflict or not armed conflict, but usually we have a pretty good common sense of whether the situation is one or the other.

All situations involve a choice of violent and non-violent COAs to handle the situation. In armed conflicts, for example, we might see only a military effort, or a mix of military and political efforts.

Global Law, particularly with respect to violent non-state actors, is a mess; and anyone who attempts to solve present problems with present legalisms, is often standing on some very shifting sands.

When reality is not well-defined, law is often inadequate. Once a area becomes better defined, law usually manages to catch up - unless it becomes dogma-bound.

A good monograph, worth reading and then studying to induce independent thinking, is Mark O'Neill, Confronting the Hydra (http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1159) (2009).

Cheers

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Nathan Hodge's article in 'The Wired':http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...ks/#more-19759 is an interesting commentary on the 'COIN can help LE' debate, mainly applied to Washinton DC. I would have thought there were many other placesin need in front of DC; taking a longer view the Mexican border states.

He cites:
Want to see what a place looks like when counterinsurgency starts to seep into policing? For a softer example, take a look at the United Kingdom...has a pretty expansive surveillance system that in part was developed in response to IRA terror. (It also has a more robust Official Secrets Act.)

Yes some of the surveillance the UK has can be traced back to Ulster and IRA attacks, such as automatic number plate readers (ANPR) and CCTV. A lot more weight should be added to the massive changes in IT, data management and technology is running far ahead of customer, public and political understanding.

The surveillance - which I am sure could, maybe is happening in the USA and elsewhere - has to be looked at in different ways:

1) pre-incident or preventive surveillance (mainly CCTV)
2) post incident use evidentially
3) matching suspects to crimes (from CCTV, DNA, official documents)
4) providing a starting point for intelligence gathering / investigation

The curious fact is that much of the CCTV surveillance system here has little deterrent value, the vast majority of the imagery is useless and countermeasures are simple.

There are also whole community sub-groups that are largely beyond it's "eyes", young black males and illegal immigrants to cite two.

[j37]

Thanks for the tip jmm99. I posted a little bit about myself. To save you the hassle though, my name is John and I study criminal justice and international relations at the University of North Texas. I will actually be graduating in the spring of 2010. This semester though, my focus has been on IR and in particular conflict in the Middle East.

I will be reading Confronting the hydra: big problems with small wars in the next few weeks. I've got to finish reading Peace Process by William B. Quandt (and a few assorted articles on varying topics) for finals in two weeks first.

Davidbfpo- you're exactly right. Technology has gotten far ahead of public and political understanding.

CCTV does seem to have very little deterrent value, especially in its current incarnation;however, that could change. I hate to use another danger room article ( I read many other things, I swer :) ): http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/pentagon-spy-cams-to-find-threats-in-weak-evidence/#more-17293

The idea is to design software that, on its own, can detect a threat. That would make CCTV a very effective tool when it comes to preventing some sort of negative event.

[MikeF]

There has been a recent debate about applying COIN to LE in the US. The parallels between COIN and community policing are quite striking. One of the arguments is that gangs don't have a political agenda. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/11/counterinsurgency-to-fight-us-crime-no-thanks/#more-19759

And while I full heartedly believe that "Gangs/Narco-Terrorist- use violence to corner a market and make money," creating an ungovernable space where law enforcement and local/state/federal government can not exercise their full sovereignty is critical to their success in cornering a market and making money. Don't insurgents do the same thing?

John,

Thanks for the article. It's good commentary, but it also shows some misinterpretation over what we call COIN. For example, in the Salinas project, no one was suggesting to treat an American city like Baghdad and enforce strict population control measures- checkpoints, walling off neighborhoods, entry/ID cards, etc. Instead, the volunteers were mostly teaching basic military problem solving methods and good policing skills learned in small wars- ID your area of operations, determine where the enemy is at, figure out where you should be patrolling (mounted/dismounted), learning how to better communicate with your people, tightening your rules of engagement so you're not harming innocent civilians, etc.

To answer your question, gang use violence and political influence to make money. Insurgencies use violence, money, and drugs to achieve political goals.

Mike

[slapout9]

John,

Thanks for the article. It's good commentary, but it also shows some misinterpretation over what we call COIN. For example, in the Salinas project, no one was suggesting to treat an American city like Baghdad and enforce strict population control measures- checkpoints

Mike

They tried that in Montgomery not to long ago. It was successful from a decreasing crime standpoint but there were some howls from the citizenry. The whole concept (checkpoints) is where the word "Dragnet" comes from. It does work but you can not do it for a long period of time in the USA before voters will get pissed about living in a Police State.

[davidbfpo]

There is an EU-funded project that is looking at the issues involved in Detection Technologies, Counter-Terrorism, Ethics, and Human Rights called DETECTER, see their website:http://www.detecter.bham.ac.uk/ . This has some fascinating links. Some of the technology on offer, at R&D stage, was bizarre and needed some reality injected into discussions.

[jmm99]

My impression (about which, I'm asking your views, and those of anyone else who cares to comment) is that, besides sound crime scene workups and sound situational awareness, one of the primary LE tools (and I hope it continues) has been and is informants and infiltration - as to which specific, targeted surveillence technology certainly comes into play. I prefer that to setting up high-tech, "dragnet-type" McNamara Lines in every community.

Thoughts from you all ?

Mike

[slapout9]

My impression (about which, I'm asking your views, and those of anyone else who cares to comment) is that, besides sound crime scene workups and sound situational awareness, one of the primary LE tools (and I hope it continues) has been and is informants and infiltration - as to which specific, targeted surveillence technology certainly comes into play. I prefer that to setting up high-tech, "dragnet-type" McNamara Lines in every community.

Thoughts from you all ?

Mike

1-A good jobs/education program.

2-Better Neighborhood watch program.

3-Police cell phone communications system.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by slapout,


1-A good jobs/education program.

2-Better Neighborhood watch program.

3-Police cell phone communications system.

I agree with all of these, but do we really need good jobs and a good education system to prevent crime? The reason I ask is that both of these may not be politically feasible based on the available tax base, so if we can't get good jobs and a good education system (I'm thinking Hawaii), will that automatically lead to an increase in crime?

A better neighbhorhood watch program may be best described as mobilizing the populace to take action against crime (by alerting law enforcement) and developing trusting relationships between the residents and law enforcement. The residents know if they call, a police officer will respond relatively quickly. Over time the zeros (crooks) will get the word not to operate in this area.

Jmm99, in addition to infiltration (enemy centric) and good crime scene work ups (enemy centric) the police need to maintain a presence by active patrolling (foot, horse, bike, motorcycle, vehicle, and undercover) to deter and if deterence fails to quickly react. Amazing how quick crime rates drop when the police are actually out on the streets. That is getting tougher now due to the economic crisis. If they can use technical surveillance to augment their efforts without being overly intrusive I'm all for it. Not sure where that line between augment and too intrusive is though.

[jmm99]

Two of Slap's programs:


1-A good jobs/education program.

2-Better Neighborhood watch program.

could work together if, with respect to the common link (a solid, independent community organization, whether formal or informal), Bill's KISS principle would be followed.

The folks in the community know what is really needed re: jobs, education and security. Their solutions, I expect, would be better and cheaper than those imposed from above.

All of this fits into active patrolling and establishes a personal link between the cop and the community (as long as the cop doesn't act like an Imperial Storm Trooper and the community is not a bunch of knuckleheads).

The "friendly local cop" (who ain't going to be that if he locks himself up in a vehicle) can then explain technical surveillance measures (a video camara looking up and down the street) as being "my backup" and "your backup too".

The "political elites" (of whatever political spectrum) would hate this setup because they would lose a large measure of control over both the community organizations and the cops. And, it would kill a lot of their pet programs and controlled organizations. This paragraph a bit of a mini-rant.

Cheers

Mike

[j37]

The problem with stepped up enforcement is that crime becomes displaced. In other words, it just moves from one geographical location to another. There are tools that help LE identify where crime is occurring so that they can focus their efforts. One such tool that comes to mind is http://crimereports.com/

To address the better education system/better jobs:
They help, but I think law enforcement needs to be careful. LE can't just assume that the reason people commit crime is because they are uneducated or lack good jobs. It's not that I don't think the education system and economy don't play an important role;however, it's better to study the populace one polices to make sure you are truly getting down to the roots and sources of the issue.

Just to throw this out there, what can a police department do about lack of jobs and a bad education system?

Checkpoints:
I would have to wonder what good they would do here in the United States. LE can set up checkpoints;however, the stops can not be random. Before the start of the check point, LE has to come up with a pattern. For example, we will stop every fourth car. I do believe the Supreme Court set up a few exceptions to that rule.

MikeF - would gangs that do things for the community start to cross the line between money and political goals? For example, motorcycle gangs participating in toy runs during the holidays.

[jmm99]

Let's leave the law about checkpoints on the shelf and consider the public reaction to them. I'd suggest that it depends on the purpose of the checkpoint, and the reactions of individuals. Let's take two examples: prison escapees and drunk drivers.

1. Prison escapees.

Because I live in God's Country (it's so far from everything earthly, it must be Heaven :) ), we have and have had, near the route between Hancock and Marquette, two state correctional facilities (one at Marquette and one at Baraga). When I was a kid (late 40s and early 50s) we traveled that route quite a bit. Several times, we ran into State Police checkpoints which did a thorough search of interior and trunk and ID'd occupants because prisoners had escaped. The primary thought was not that the drivers were likely to be accomplices of the escapees, but that an escapee might take a car hostage. Looking at it from that standpoint (obviously, my dad's standpoint), the checkpoints were for our protection and to get the bad guys - and some were very bad guys.

2. Drunken drivers.

Here, the sole purpose is to nail drunken drivers (let's say everybody agrees that drunken drivers are bad guys - degree of bad will vary). Now, some in the line of cars three miles long (seen that in WI) will say: "Hey, I'm not a drunk driver, and we should do everything to nail those buzzards." Others will say: "Hey, I'm not a drunk driver either, but I resent being classified as a possible drunk driver where there is no probable cause to think I am."

In the first case, most people will take it as a "we-we" situation. The State Trooper is on our side. In the second case, some will see it as "we-we"; but others will see it as "us-them". In that case, the State Trooper becomes an adversary.

Tricky things, cordoning off villages and interrogating the villagers. There are more subtle methods, but they take skill, time, patience and a bit of showmanship.

My take.

Mike

[MikeF]

Just to throw this out there, what can a police department do about lack of jobs and a bad education system?

One firm conclusion that I've come to is that gangs are not a police problem just as insurgencies aren't a military problem. They are societal problems that must be addressed holistically.


Checkpoints:
I would have to wonder what good they would do here in the United States. LE can set up checkpoints;however, the stops can not be random.

Checkpoints have limited value regardless of the restrictions.

Static/Fixed Checkpoints. Think of a toll road. If you have the time, you will choose to bypass a toll road in order to not have to pay to drive.

Snap/Temporary Checkpoints. Think of a DUI checkpoint. You may get lucky and catch the first of a group, but a single cellphone call can alert the others of the location of the CP.



MikeF - would gangs that do things for the community start to cross the line between money and political goals? For example, motorcycle gangs participating in toy runs during the holidays.

Certainly yes. Remember Robin Hood and his merry band (gang) of thieves robbing from the rich and giving to the poor? In civilian terms, this is good Public Relations (PR). In military terms, we would call this good psychological operations or the "narrative."

In theory, it's easy to differientiate between gangs and insurgencies. In practice, it can become more difficult particularly when the group morphes or evolves. My recommendation is to consider both gangs and insurgencies as social networks.

Mike

[slapout9]

1-Jobs/education are a lot cheaper than LE. LE can have a long tail. There are the cops....then court....then prison.....then parole and probation gets very expensive when it is viewed as a whole system. Jobs/education create productive tax paying citizens. It is no a panacea but it is a vital element.

2-Everybody and there brother has a cell phone and most have a camera built in. 911 systems should be able to collect video not just audio.


3-More cops......we need them!


4-Future technologies......Air Policing, as in ISR capabilities with UAV's would be incredible. If they were just half as good as what you see on TV from Iraq that would be a game changer. They would not be as intrusive as fixed surveillance either. A camera would be able to respond faster than any police car. A great big Amber alert system:wry:

[Bill Moore]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34466436/ns/world_news-americas//

U.S. drug cartel crackdown misses the money
Criminals find a variety of ways to funnel billions into Mexico each year


"This is the brilliance of the drug cartels. They pay ordinary people to get cash across the border for them, and then easily launder it into working capital to build and expand their violent and illicit operations," said Louise Shelley, who directs the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at George Mason University.

Interesting article


They seized $16 million in 10 years? That's absolutely nothing. That doesn't amount to a deterrent. That is an unsuccessful effort," he said. "We haven't begun to curtail the flow of illicit money generated by the cartels, and as a consequence of that we have not begun to curtail the drug trade." Out of an estimated 25 billion a year.

The problem that prevents the problem from being solved,


Once the money gets to Mexico, the cartels put it to work. About 10 percent of Mexico's economy — the world's 13th largest — is based on cartel operations, analysts say.

As a result, lawmakers have refused to pass anti-laundering laws such as reporting requirements when people pay cash for mansions and luxury cars or regulations for salaries paid in cash.

[Ski]

The cartels - specifically, the Zetas - are also tapping into oil pipelines, stealing the oil, shipping it northward into the US, and then selling it to various businesses. There was a Washington Post article last week on this activity, which is estimated to net over $700M a year...and it's particularly painful to the Mexican state which relies on oil revenues to fund the Federal Budget.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/12/AR2009121202888_pf.html

The shadow economy is growing like wildfire in Mexico. Also note the one Mexican minister stating that there is a "parallel government" within the state.

[Bill Moore]

Sunday morning quarterbacking...


The theft is both a symbolic and financial blow to the Mexican government. Taxes paid by Pemex account for 40 percent of the federal budget.

Mexico's oil industry is already in the hurt locker due to their fields becoming less and less productive, so any additional dents in this business which accounts for 40% of their federal budget is a significant risk to Mexico's National Security.


Mexico has launched an all-out campaign to defend the pipelines, drawing in the army, the attorney general's office, the Interior Ministry and the customs service. During the past two years, the government has conducted helicopter overflights, installed electronic detection devices inside the pipelines and beefed up Pemex's private security force.

Security forces guarding pipelines are not chasing drug cartels, so this is a double win for the cartels (oil profits and diverting security forces)


Suárez estimates that Pemex will spend hundreds of millions of dollars over the next three years defending its pipelines. With the company's maintenance staff overwhelmed, Pemex assembled 20-man teams this year to repair breaches caused by theft.

Who pays for this in the long run? Oil prices will have to go up, so the Cartels will even make more money.


Pemex sent out a call for help to the federal government in 2007. In June that year, Mexican customs officials informed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that they had discovered dozens of Mexican companies that appeared to be conspiring with U.S. firms to export stolen petroleum products across the border.

Working closely with the Mexican customs service, ICE investigators said, they soon uncovered a network of Mexican and American companies that shipped stolen oil to the United States in tankers, stored it in aboveground containers in Texas and then shipped it in barges to end users in the United States.

With oil prices then at record highs, the scheme allowed U.S. companies to buy petroleum products at below-market value.

Of course oil prices are not currently at record highs, and they have been falling (although that is forecasted to stop soon), so I wonder if oil prices decrease enough if it will make illegal sells unprofitable, or not worth the risk? However, decreased oil prices would probably hurt the government of Mexico even more.

U.S. companies in bed with organized crime? Who is really surprised?

[Ski]

Bill

The more I read and understand about Mexico, the more I worry.

[MikeF]

Interesting increase in acts of intimidation.

v/r

Mike


Booby traps targeting California police lead to $200K reward offer (http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/19/riverside.gangs.attacks.reward/?hpt=Sbin)Emanuella Grinberg, CNN


On December 31, 2009, the unmarked headquarters of the Hemet Gang Task Force was targeted by someone who redirected the natural gas line on the roof into the building, filling up the office with deadly gas. Two task force members entering the office smelled gas and backed away before flipping the light switch and potentially causing the building to explode.

On February 23, a task force member at the Hemet headquarters opened a security gate outside the building, which launched a homemade zip gun attached to the gate. The weapon fired, missing the officer's head by inches.

The headquarters has since been moved to an undisclosed location, where extra security precautions are being taken, Hall said.

On March 5, 2010, criminals targeted a task force member who had parked an unmarked police car in front of a convenience store in Hemet. The officer found what appeared to be a homemade pipe bomb hidden underneath the vehicle.

[SWJ Blog]

Splinter Gangs Wage War in Acapulco (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/splinter-gangs-wage-war-in-acapulco)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/splinter-gangs-wage-war-in-acapulco) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Could Central American Gangs Usurp the Role of Mexican Cartels? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/could-central-american-gangs-usurp-the-role-of-mexican-cartels)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/could-central-american-gangs-usurp-the-role-of-mexican-cartels) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

U.S. Army War College "Panel V - State Sponsored Crime and Non-State Actors: Gangs, Guns, and Graft" Conference Video (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-army-war-college-panel-v-state-sponsored-crime-and-non-state-actors-gangs-guns-and-graft-con)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-army-war-college-panel-v-state-sponsored-crime-and-non-state-actors-gangs-guns-and-graft-con) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Studies in Gangs and Cartels (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/studies-in-gangs-and-cartels)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/studies-in-gangs-and-cartels) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

In Honduras, Rival Gangs Keep a Death Grip on San Pedro Sula (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/in-honduras-rival-gangs-keep-a-death-grip-on-san-pedro-sula)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/in-honduras-rival-gangs-keep-a-death-grip-on-san-pedro-sula) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Street Gangs in Central America (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/street-gangs-in-central-america)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/street-gangs-in-central-america) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Latino Gangs in Catalonia: Latest Police Operations Expose Extent of the Problem, Signal Policy Shift (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/latino-gangs-in-catalonia-latest-police-operations-expose-extent-of-the-problem-signal-poli)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/latino-gangs-in-catalonia-latest-police-operations-expose-extent-of-the-problem-signal-poli) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

America’s Unacknowledged Insurgency: Addressing Street Gangs as Threats to National Security (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/america%E2%80%99s-unacknowledged-insurgency-addressing-street-gangs-as-threats-to-national-security)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/america%E2%80%99s-unacknowledged-insurgency-addressing-street-gangs-as-threats-to-national-security) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Charting Out the Digital Ecosystem of Gangs in the U.S. and Mexico (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/charting-out-the-digital-ecosystem-of-gangs-in-the-us-and-mexico)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/charting-out-the-digital-ecosystem-of-gangs-in-the-us-and-mexico) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.