Violent Non-State Actors

[Jedburgh]

ISN, 25 Nov 08: Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security (http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=8EEBA9FE-478E-EA2C-AA15-32FC9A59434A&lng=en)
This paper seeks to explore this phenomenon of violent non-state actors, while recognizing that there are various sub-species, each with its own distinct characteristics. The analysis identifies factors, trends and developments that have contributed to the emergence of VNSA s. The focus then switches to the groups themselves, looking at different kinds of VNSA s. The paper draws on the pioneering work (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/casebeerMar04.pdf) been done by Troy Thomas and various collaborators as well as an important study (http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf) by Shultz, Farah and Lockard that argues very persuasively that armed groups have become a “tier-one” security threat......

[Bob's World]

Much focus seems to be on the "violent" aspect of these groups. States can be, and have been, far more violent than the non-state organizations have been.

Perhaps a better way to veiw this new side effect of globalization is through what is being described at USSOCOM as a "Competition for Sovereignty." The theory being proposed and taking on broad interest and acceptance is that, now, like no time in recent history, populaces have choices.

Non-state organizations take on many forms, from fairly altruistic NGOs, to greed-driven international corporations, to similarly profit motivated international crime networks, and to what we are most focused on today, networked terror organizations like Al Qaeda.

AQ has been widely described as leading a "global insurgency" and somehow bewitching otherwise happy, peaceful populaces with a Pied Piper-like use of ideology.

I would offer that a more constructive way to view this phenom is to instead look at AQ as waging a regional UW campaign. UW used to be the sole purview of states. Now, with the tools of globalization, non-states can wage UW also. (UW being the efforts of an external party to incite and leverage another state's populace to rise up against their government in insurgency).

As to Ideology, it is good to remember that the Pied Piper is a myth. People only act upon a message if they are in a circumstance that makes them open to it and its promised results. To merely defeat the Piper or destroy his pipe still leaves one with a populace ready to follow the next "piper" to come along.

This all plays into this competition for sovereignty. No longer can states simply order or expect the support of their populace, they now find themselves in competition not just with other states, but with all of these myriad non-state actors as well.

[Rex Brynen]

As to Ideology, it is good to remember that the Pied Piper is a myth. People only act upon a message if they are in a circumstance that makes them open to it and its promised results. To merely defeat the Piper or destroy his pipe still leaves one with a populace ready to follow the next "piper" to come along.

Well put. This is an absolutely essential point, and one that is too often overlooked.

At the same time, it is also important to recognize that even given a set of underlying sociopolitical conditions, even particular "tunes" have weaknesses that can be exploited—narratives and memes that can be disputed, reinterpreted, or redirected. Competing tunes might also appeal, given a certain set of underlying social conditions.

This all plays into this competition for sovereignty. No longer can states simply order or expect the support of their populace, they now find themselves in competition not just with other states, but with all of these myriad non-state actors as well.

Were they ever able to do this? They certainly haven't been in the Middle East since decolonization: political permeability isn't a new phenomenon, and indeed the threat of cross-border ideological delegitimation and political destabilization was substantially greater in the 1950s and 1960s (primarily, but not exclusively, radical Arab nationalist in character) than it is today. Middle Eastern regimes have been, since the early 1970s, the most stable on the planet—albeit at a high cost in terms of domestic repression.

While there are certainly aspects of globalization (ICTs, migration) that have enhanced the ability of radical NSAs to challenge power-holders, it is also the case that the state-building and development resources have been deployed by regimes to "harden" themselves with striking success.

Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes have also been able to use the challenge from armed, radical non-state actors to deflect pressures for greater political participation and inclusion of unarmed, non-radical non-state actors—ie, civil society. Egypt has been a perfect case in point, with Mubarak balancing the twin challenges of the Islamist opposition and the (short-lived) Bush Administration's democratization agenda to counterbalance and largely neutralize each other.