legislator48
11-26-2008, 05:09 PM
I recently saw a documentary called “Rape of Europa,” which is about the NAZI campaign against “inferior” art (usually Slavic or Jewish) during World War II, as well as the looting and consolidation of art from all over western Europe into their caches in Bavaria and Austria. The second half of the film was about the “Monuments Men” contingent of professionals and historians from the art world who were commissioned in the US Army as junior officers. Their task was to fan out across the European Theater and keep pace with front line units in order to identify, preserve, or recover priceless works of art and architecture during combat operations. Their efforts were of immense importance to the recovering populations in the post-war stability operation across Europe, garnering an appreciation for US forces and improving the conditions for occupation. After investigating the Monuments Men online, I discovered the Monuments Men Foundation ( http://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/ ) and learned that the president of the organization was a co-producer of the documentary.
During the film, I recalled reading a newspaper clipping sent to me in Iraq in mid 2003 describing the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, and the difficulty in containing its negative effects on both the Iraqi population and world public opinion on the war.
I wonder how feasible or successful it might be for the Department of Defense to cast a broad net to recruit art and artifact professionals into a kind of Inactive Ready Reserve force of Monuments Men to act in a similar fashion in subsequent wars, small or large. If we can embed press and interagency and work with NGOs, why should this be difficult?
Done successfully, this could accomplish two important civil-military objectives: 1) acknowledge the importance of cultural artifacts to a given population (a useful shaping operation oriented on the key terrain of popular support during stability operations) and put a face in front of commanders and planners to advocate these considerations, and 2) bridge the current social gap between the professional military and American academia.
During the film, I recalled reading a newspaper clipping sent to me in Iraq in mid 2003 describing the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, and the difficulty in containing its negative effects on both the Iraqi population and world public opinion on the war.
I wonder how feasible or successful it might be for the Department of Defense to cast a broad net to recruit art and artifact professionals into a kind of Inactive Ready Reserve force of Monuments Men to act in a similar fashion in subsequent wars, small or large. If we can embed press and interagency and work with NGOs, why should this be difficult?
Done successfully, this could accomplish two important civil-military objectives: 1) acknowledge the importance of cultural artifacts to a given population (a useful shaping operation oriented on the key terrain of popular support during stability operations) and put a face in front of commanders and planners to advocate these considerations, and 2) bridge the current social gap between the professional military and American academia.