Mumbai Attacks

[William F. Owen]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_pictures/7751360.stm

Probably worthy of our collective attentions

[Bill Moore]

The dust hasn't settled and it is hard to assess anything until the media gets past their sensationalism phase, but it may be helpful to put the attack in perspective.

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html

From a 2007 Assessment

2,765 people died in terrorism-related violence in India during year 2006. A review of the data indicates that nearly 41 per cent of all such fatalities occurred in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alone as a result of the Pakistan-backed separatist proxy war in that State. 27 per cent resulted from Left Wing Extremism (Maoism/Naxalism) across parts of 14 States, prominently including Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Karnataka. 23 per cent of the total fatalities in 2006 occurred in the multiple insurgencies of India’s Northeast.

By comparison, year 2005 witnessed a total of 3,236 fatalities in terrorism-related incidents across the country. The fatality index, consequently, registered a definite decrease in year 2006.

It would be interesting to see what the numbers were in 2007 and 2008 to date, although that metric in itself means very little. India is challenged by multiple insurgencies, terrorist groups and worrisome neighbors, yet they a do a remarkable job of maintaining relative stability in a country that is ripe for ethnic conflict. I suspect there is a lot we can learn from India and how they manage these complex problems, and hopefully we'll see more posted over the coming weeks on how they managed security challenges historically.

Reference today's attacks, we have seen this type of attack before in the airports of Tel Aviv, Rome and Vienna in the 70s and 80s where the terrorists used small arms and grenades, but they were not nearly as deadly as this Mumbai attack. This was clearly a sosphisticated attack on a number of levels, and the implications of foreign involvement is what is most worrying. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailed_news.asp?date1=11/27/2008#1

The terrorists reportedly came in by sea from Karachi in Pakistan. A boat laden with explosives was recovered later at night off the Gateway of India.

General Officer Commanding of Maharashtra, Goa and Gujarat, said. Speaking to NDTV, Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister R. R. Patil said, "There is no plan for talks with the terrorists." Claiming to have some "vital leads", he expressed confidence of a breakthrough soon. Intelligence sources said that a foreign hand is fully evident in these attacks. They have also reportedly arrested a Pakistan national from Chowpatty area in the city. Police chief A. N. Roy said, "There is no indication so far of the identity of the terrorists." He said that the terrorists were highly armed, level of weapons and training suggest that they are not locals.

Perhaps the intended objective is bigger than just India, and actually aimed at regional instability to counter the positive diplomacy between India and Pakistan, which in turn will lead to more effective operations in the FATA. First reports are generally wrong, but if the attackers did come from Pakistan, this would be an opportunity for Pakistan to show the world that it is serious about fighting terrorists]ism within its in borders by cooperating and assisting its neighbors (in this case India) in the fight against this common threat. That would be a major regional paradigm shift in favor of the counter terrorist coalition.

How probable is it that we'll this type of regional paradigm shift? Only time will tell, but this type of attack should further demonstrate to the populations that the terrorists are trying to influence how completely morally bankrupt the terrorists and their objectives are.

Again, looking past the hype, there was even a more deadly attack in Mumbai two years ago, yet Mumbai remains a striving city.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/

The incidents took place one day after the reported arrest of Lashkar -e-Toiba linked Raheel Sheikh by the Interpol in London. Raheel is one of the alleged masterminds of the conspiracy and was involved in the funding of the July 11, 2006, Mumbai serial train blasts that killed nearly 200 commuters and wounded over 500 people on that fateful day.

It is highly improbable (if not impossible) that an attack was mounted in one days time in response to this arrest. The good news is that they captured the prick.

[Jedburgh]

Wired, 26 Nov 08: Mumbai Attack Aftermath Detailed, Tweet by Tweet (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/11/first-hand-acco.html)
First-hand accounts of the deadly Mumbai attacks are pouring in on Twitter, Flickr, and other social media......

......The local bloggers at Metblogs Mumbai (http://mumbai.metblogs.com/) have new updates every couple of minutes. So do the folks at GroundReport (http://www.groundreport.com/article_list.php?region=100&region_state=). Dozens of videos (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Mumbai&search_sort=video_date_uploaded) have been uploaded to YouTube. But the most remarkable citizen journalism may be coming from "Vinu," who is posting a stream of harrowing post-attack pictures (http://flickr.com/photos/vinu/sets/72157610144709049/comments/) to Flickr.

[Rex Brynen]

Live IBN reports are streamed here (http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/video_streaming.php) (I wish CNN would run them directly, instead of talking over the Indian video and commentary).

[davidbfpo]

The incidents took place one day after the reported arrest of Lashkar -e-Toiba linked Raheel Sheikh by the Interpol in London. Raheel is one of the alleged masterminds of the conspiracy and was involved in the funding of the July 11, 2006, Mumbai serial train blasts that killed nearly 200 commuters and wounded over 500 people on that fateful day.

The good news is that they captured the prick.

Sorry Bill, Raheel Sheikh has not been detained in London or London Heathrow or Birmingham airport; as reported by the Indian press and websites after a comment in Mumbai by a senior police officer: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/CBI-denies-7-11-suspect-Raheel-s-arrest/390993

[Bill Moore]

David,

Thanks for the update, so we scratch the good news for the time being. Hopefully you'll have some better news in the coming days :wry: First reports are generally wrong, or at least not entirely accurate.

[Adam L]

CNN is now talking about Israeli advisors being sent to Mumbai. It's been mentioned to me over the years that the Israeli's have good relations with Indian special forces/counter terrorism units. Is this true? Can anyone give me some info on this?

Adam L

[Ken White]

Asia. A LOT of business, to include advice and indirect assistance. Same, surprisingly, applies to the ME, not with everyone but still a considerable amount.

With India, specifically, in addition to some training programs and a lot of direct sales, there are also some joint development programs. LINK (http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0707/news/150707_mrsam.htm), LINK (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_israel_01_07.asp).

[selil]

If you want up to the minute on the ground information/intelligence go here http://twitter.com/shloky/

Shlok is a phenomenon.

you can also go here http://search.twitter.com/search?q=%23mumbai and pick up some more. The noise to info level climbs though.

[William F. Owen]

CNN is now talking about Israeli advisors being sent to Mumbai. It's been mentioned to me over the years that the Israeli's have good relations with Indian special forces/counter terrorism units. Is this true? Can anyone give me some info on this?

Adam L

It's no secret. There is extensive military co-operations between Israel and India. Has been for over 50 years. Obviously there is a very big Indian community here in Israel.

One of the attacks in Mumbai was directed directly at Jews and Israeli citizens, and Israelis were taken hostage and killed. A Rabbi is amongst the dead so, as always, Israel has to get involved.

The performance of the Indian Army and Police is currently being strongly criticised here on the TV and in the Press, and as far as I can see with good reason.

[Adam L]

It's no secret. There is extensive military co-operations between Israel and India. Has been for over 50 years. Obviously there is a very big Indian community here in Israel.


I was unaware there was a large community in Israel. Of course, the important question is, "How is the food?"


The performance of the Indian Army and Police is currently being strongly criticised here on the TV and in the Press, and as far as I can see with good reason.

Yes, it looked pretty disorganized from what I saw. Does anyone know a site that explains how all of the units (police and military) fit into their system?

Adam L

[Cavguy]

All,

Good Summary and analysis at the Long War Journal (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/analysis_mumbai_atta.php):

Almost two days after terrorists attacked the Indian financial hub of Mumbai, the military is still working to root out the remnants of the assault teams at two hotels and a Jewish center. More than 125 people, including six foreigners, have been killed and 327 more have been wounded. The number is expected to go up, as Indian commandos have recovered an additional 30 dead at the Taj Mahal hotel as fighting has resumed.

The Mumbai attack is unique from past terror strikes carried out by Islamic terrorists. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Instead of one or more bombings carried out over a short period of time, Mumbai I entering its third day of crisis.

An attack of this nature cannot be thrown together overnight. It requires planned, scouting, financing, training, and a support network to aid the fighters. Initial reports indicate the attacks originated from Pakistan, the hub of jihadi activity in South Asia. Few local terror groups have the capacity to pull of an attack such as this.

While it is early to know exactly what happened in Mumbai as the fog of war still blankets the city, multiple press reports from India allow for a general picture to be painted. An estimated 12 to 25 terrorists are believed to have entered Mumbai by sea. After landing, he attack teams initiated a battle at a police station, then fanned across the city to attack the soft underbelly of hotels, cafes, cinemas, and hospitals. Civilians were gunned down and taken hostage, while terrorists looked for people carrying foreign passports.

Preparation

While the exact size of the assault force and the support cells is still not known, police estimate about 25 gunmen were involved in the attack. The number of members of the supporting cells that provide financing, training, transportation, and other services could be two to four times this number. Operational security for such a large unit, or grouping of cells, is difficult to maintain and requires organization and discipline.

To pull off an attack of this magnitude, it requires months of training, planning, and on-site reconnaissance. Indian officials have stated that the terrorists set up "advance control rooms" at the Taj Mahal and Trident (Oberoi) hotels, and conducted a significant amount of reconnaissance prior to executing the attack. If the news about the "control rooms" is accurate, these rooms may also have served as weapons and ammunition caches for the assault teams to replenish after conducting the first half of the operation.
Mumbai-attacks-11262008.jpg

A terrorist outside the train station in Mumbai.

The planners of the Mumbai attack appear to have chosen able military-aged males. Witnesses have described the men as young and fit. Some of the gunmen appear to have been well trained; some have been credited with having good marksmanship and other military skills.

A witness who saw one of the teams land by sea adescribed the gunmen as "in their 20s, fair-skinned and tall, clad in jeans and jackets." He saw "eight young men stepping out of the raft, two at a time. They jumped into the waters, and picked up a haversack. They bent down again, and came up carrying two more haversacks, one in each hand."

An Indian official claimed the attackers used "sophisticated weapons," however this may be an overstatement. Reports indicate the gunmen used automatic rifles, hand grenades, and some machineguns, as well as several car bombs. The terrorists did not have sophisticated weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles to attack helicopters supporting Indian counterterrorism forces.

More at the link.

[kehenry1]

First of all, the attackers went right to the local police station and attacked it. Clearly meant to reduce command and control of the counter. Whether by luck or by design, they were able to take out the top three terror cops at that station.

According to some sources, while there are many anti-terror groups within the security forces, they are not typically tasked together with any type of linear, interactive or interchangable leadership. Basically, city, province, state then military. Obviously, the city police are meant to be the first responders. With the local police assaulted and thrown off stride, their response time and efforts would be definitely thrown off and coordination with other units or up the line would be hindered. With the top cop and his two deputies gone, there would be a question of who takes over command as well, well before any other response teams could arrive and then as they appeared.

One has only to look at local law enforcement politics to understand that there would be a lot of people running around thinking they were now in charge and should issue orders. a bunch of which would be contradictory and possibly non-sensical. So, while the headquarters is in chaos and the LEO on the beat are out with limited instruction or communication, the terrorists get a nice little window of time to go about their business with little interdiction.

This is one factor that has me very sure that this was not a local group nor a "new group" accept to say a group claiming some other name as their "corps" name. LeT, probably, but I bet there is some higher org and experience that provided the training, facilitation and strategic planning.

[Bob's World]

Working with the Indians is delicate business for several reasons that make U.S. cooperation with them difficult:
1. They are EXTREMELY sensitive to anything that might be construed as them not being complete peers (regardless of how relatively lacking they may be in the topic at hand).
2. They demand quid pro quo reciprocation on engagement activities. 1 in India, then 1 in the U.S., repeat. While reasonable, our current authorities and funding lines don't support such a cycle.
3. They have a mind numbing bureaucracy. A request for engagement goes into a big folder. That folder then needs to physically move up and back through over 30 in/out boxes from initiation to approval.
4. Huge muslim populace, largest Shia populace outside of Iran, and a majority Hindu populace and caste system. Two guesses where muslims shake out. There is friction.
5. Indo-Gangetic Plain. From the "Gates of Islam" at the mouth of the Indus river in Pakistan (formerly India) to the mouth of the Ganges river in Bangladesh (formerly Pakistan, formerly India) is one broad, flat plain that spans the sub-continent and is home to over 450 M Muslims with a continental divide so low as to be imperceptable to the human eye. Talk about an "arc of instability."

We are really babes in the woods when it comes to understanding and effective engaging in this region. If the Isrealies have a spcecial bond/relationship that is good...but it brings it's own special challenges as well. A perception of US sponsored, Jewish CT activity is likely to have negative consequences that far exceed any immediate effect.

[Rex Brynen]

Whether by luck or by design, they were able to take out the top three terror cops at that station.

It would appear to have been luck:

Police say as the suspects moved from Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST, formerly Victoria Terminus) train station, they entered a lane which has access to important buildings like the Times of India office, Cama hospital and a school. They came onto the main road and went towards a multiplex cinema.
Mr Karkare was shot at near Cama hospital and soon after the other two officers were also shot near the multiplex.

BBC, 12:39 GMT, Saturday, 29 November 2008, Mumbai police mourn their dead (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7756369.stm)

[Bill Moore]

http://www.newsweek.com/id/170301

To get a sense of the shift, consider the BJP's candidate for prime minister this time around. Lal Krishna Advani is an aging rabble-rouser who in the mid-1990s helped gather a huge Hindu mob that tore down the 16th-century Babri Mosque, leading to riots that killed more than 2,000 people (Advani was later cleared of criminal charges). He is far more radical than his predecessor, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who served as prime minister from 1998 to 2004. And Advani's heir apparent is Gujarat's chief minister, Narendra Modi—who has been denied entry to the United States for his alleged role in the 2002 riots in Gujarat that killed more than 1,000. Not long after the riots, Modi warned a crowd that Muslims were trying to erode India's Hindu majority by having many children. "We have to teach a lesson to those who are increasing the population at an alarming rate," he said.

You might assume that such ties, unless repudiated, would hurt the RSS's popularity and the BJP's electoral chances in India, which is the world's largest democracy and a secular one at that. Unfortunately, that's not how things have transpired in the past. In fact, some of the BJP's prior electoral victories followed bouts of incendiary anti-Muslim hatred and actual violence. Vajpayee was first elected prime minister following the Babri Mosque riots, for example, and the mayhem in Gujarat in 2002 helped Modi win a thumping victory in that state, even though—or because—he was blamed for delaying police action to protect Muslims. Now, by casting the government's terror investigation as an anti-Hindu conspiracy, the BJP hopes to repeat this formula today and unite the faithful. "The various wings of the [RSS]—and it's a vast organization—will rally together," says Rangarajan.

India's reaction to these attacks will very much shape their future.

[Entropy]

I guess it's over now, the last attacker is dead. 10 guys with guns, grenades and explosives killed 195 and wounded several hundred. It looks like the attackers were Pakistani and the one that was captured said the goal was to create an "Indian 9/11."

[davidbfpo]

Yes, early days and much confusion, spin, prejudice and some insight. I was impressed with these two articles by Stephen Tankel, from Kings College London War Studies: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/27/mumbai-terror-attacks-india4 and http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/ first article there now.

Not heard of author before, so here is the first potted bio found: http://icsr.info/about/people/Stephen_Tankel

davidbfpo

[max161]

Here is some interesting analysis http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/world/11/29/08/mumbai-attacks-al-qaeda-methods-ideology

Maria A. Ressa is the author of Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia. She is senior vice president for news and current affairs of ABS-CBN and managing director of ANC (ABS-CBN News Channel). She was CNN’s correspondent for nearly two decades.

[JHR]

Steve Coll's comments were similar to Mr. Tankel's. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/

JHR

[Bill Moore]

We are really babes in the woods when it comes to understanding and effective engaging in this region. If the Isrealies have a spcecial bond/relationship that is good...but it brings it's own special challenges as well. A perception of US sponsored, Jewish CT activity is likely to have negative consequences that far exceed any immediate effect.

Great comments, we too often illustrate our lack of understanding by our desire to immediately run to the sound of gun fire and get involved so we can make things better. Historically our engagement in many countries has often failed to improve the situation for a number of reasons. A couple of them are posted above.

Partners need our support and cooperation, just as we need theirs. If they think they need our assistance they will ask for it. If we think they need our assistance, but they don't want it, then we continue to diplomatically pursue areas where we they may accept our assistance. The bull in the china shop approach hasn't worked well in the past.

[tpjkevin]

A Singaporean perspective on this issue.

Beware the fallout from Mumbai outrage

Editorial Desk
The Straits Times
Publication Date: 29-11-2008

The terror attacks in Mumbai have been strongly condemned by outraged people everywhere. The ruthless assailants sprayed bullets indiscriminately at people in the streets and trapped and wounded or killed others, including foreigners, in upscale hotels. The dead included a young Singapore lawyer, the first Singaporean victim of terrorism since Konfrontasi. Our hearts go out to her family. As Acting Prime Minister S. Jayakumar put it: 'This tragic event underscores the imperative for all of us to be constantly vigilant and the need for the international community to band together to combat this threat.' We are all in this together.

Who were the attackers? What was their objective? Some experts think Indian Muslim malcontents were involved. Identification of the perpetrators and authentication of their motives will not be easy. The scale of the assaults and the precision with which they were coordinated and executed suggest groups beyond India could have been involved. Kashmiri militants could have had a hand in this, but at least one of their groups, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, has denied responsibility........

http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=2903&sec=3


This is the second incident that Singaporeans have lost their lives to terrorism, and the fourth involving the taking of Singaporean hostages.

[SWJED]

I've placed numerous links to news and commentary concerning the Mumbai attack on the SWJ Daily Roundup

30 November Roundup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/30-november-swj-roundup/)

29 November Roundup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/29-november-swj-roundup/)

28 November Roundup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/28-november-swj-roundup/)

27 November Roundup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/27-november-swj-roundup/)

[bismark17]

From what I have read the terrorists level of confidence and individual skill with their weapons was very good. They were obviously highly trained. They also must have have done a good leaders' recon and knew the AO they were going to hit. All of their targets had significance.

I realize any innocent death is bad but my concern is if they are going to invest as much as they did in an op like this with this little return how many of them are out there in waiting to do something bigger in the bigger scheme of things? It's rather chilling. I can think of a lot other things men of this calibre could do that would produce far more casualties or impact.

Thanks for the all the links.

[Bill Moore]

With more information available now (still with loads of spectulation), I think we have enough to at least consider the implications of this type of attack on our own homeland security readiness. While there is some justification to criticize India for some its readiness shortfalls, especially the severe equipment shortfalls of its police and commando forces (no night vision devices, etc.), how ready are we (the U.S., Europe, other Asian nations) to respond to similiar attacks?

Obviously there is no pat answer as there are several variables that can impact readiness on any given day, and obviously some cities such as New York City is probably much more prepared for this type of attack than say a mid sized town elsewhere in the U.S., but it is still a question we should grapple with.

Assuming the press reports are accurate, and even if they're not, the type of operation that they outlined could easily be replicated anywhere in the world.

You have a mothership (any cargo ship), a handful of dedicated Jihadist lunatics who are very well trained and armed, a few rubber raiding crafts, and a limited support base in the target city to conduct your target reconnaissance and even guide you to your target(s) if required. There are large Muslim populations around the globe from Tokyo to London to Miami etc., and out of that population base it only takes a couple of converts to radical Islam to provide the required support.

Here's the scenario, you're the police chief, it's your town, it's 2230hrs, surprise, you now have 10-15 Jihadists running around executing a well rehearsed plan, now respond. Respond with what? Local police? Are they grossly overweight (indicates they are not dedicated) and poorly trained? The national guard? Normally not trained for this type of response, and it would take hours to mobilize them. Federal forces? How long would it take for a credable response?

You can excuse a government for reacting to a bomb attack and cleaning up the mess, then pursuing the culprits, but it is another issue all together when you're under attack in your home town, and the government can't mount an effective counter attack in a timely manner. The perception of failure jumps out, regardless of how unreasonable it may be to expect every city/town to have a capable response (think about the effect of school shootings, a much smaller scale problem). The Los Angeles police department is relatively well trained and equipped, and I think most of us remember the challenges they had responding to two bank robbers armed with high powered rifles and effective body armor. My point is that police forces, just like military forces, are trained and equipped (barely) for probable threats. The Mumbai attacks were not a probable attack until last week.

See the next post for India's initial lessons learned, and what they should mean to us.

[Bill Moore]

Police: Pakistani group behind Mumbai attacks

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27940231/

The gunman was one of 10 who paralyzed the city in an attack that killed at least 174 people and revealed the weakness of India's security apparatus. India's top law enforcement official resigned, bowing to growing criticism that the attackers appeared better trained, better coordinated and better armed than police.

As more details of the response to the attack emerged, a picture formed of woefully unprepared security forces.

"The way Mumbai police handled the situation, they were not combat ready," said Jimmy Katrak, a security consultant. "You don't need the Indian army to neutralize eight to nine people."

With no SWAT team in this city of 18 million, authorities called in the only unit in the country trained to deal with such crises. But the National Security Guards, which largely devotes its resources to protecting top officials, is based outside of New Delhi and it took the commandos nearly 10 hours to reach the scene.

Even the commandos lacked the proper equipment, including night vision goggles and thermal sensors that would have allowed them to locate the hostages and gunmen inside the buildings, Sahni said.

Singh promised to expand the commando force and set up new bases for it around the country. He called a rare meeting of leaders from the country's main political parties, hours after the resignation of Home Minister Shivraj Patil.

Sahni called for an overhaul of the nation's police force — the first line of defense against a future attack — providing better weapons, better equipment and real training.

The comments on the Commando's clearing tactics by their Israeli founder were brutal, but from what I could see correct. The Commando Commander said we executed the attack the way we like to, which unfortunately meant slow and ineffective.

India has a lot of work in front of it, and we should be willing to help to India with any assistance they may request, but we should also be looking at our own backyard and making the necessary adjustments to address similiar threats.

[J Wolfsberger]

You have a mothership (any cargo ship), a handful of dedicated Jihadist lunatics who are very well trained and armed, a few rubber raiding crafts, and a limited support base in the target city to conduct your target reconnaissance and even guide you to your target(s) if required. There are large Muslim populations around the globe from Tokyo to London to Miami etc., and out of that population base it only takes a couple of converts to radical Islam to provide the required support.

Or a terrorist group in the US obtains weapons from a drug cartel or organized gang. Their surveillance activities would be indistinguishable from daily, normal commercial activity.

Here's the scenario, you're the police chief, it's your town, it's 2230hrs, surprise, you now have 10-15 Jihadists running around executing a well rehearsed plan, now respond. Respond with what? Local police? Are they grossly overweight (indicates they are not dedicated) and poorly trained? The national guard? Normally not trained for this type of response, and it would take hours to mobilize them. Federal forces? How long would it take for a credable response?
...
The Los Angeles police department is relatively well trained and equipped, and I think most of us remember the challenges they had responding to two bank robbers armed with high powered rifles and effective body armor. My point is that police forces, just like military forces, are trained and equipped (barely) for probable threats. The Mumbai attacks were not a probable attack until last week.


The common misconception is that the police are there to protect you. In fact, most of their training is oriented toward cleaning up the mess afterward. I expect that's just as true in India as here in the US. The ordinary police in Mumbai who went up against the terrorists, matching pistols against grenades and assault weapons, deserve the highest regard for valor. The same would happen here.

In fact, I suspect it would be worse. The Indian government had the troops and processes in place (however efficient or not) to fairly quickly employ appropriately trained personnel in response.

We don't.

[Bob's World]

I think we should pull our analysis back to the operational/strategic level. Sure it is fun to discuss the tactics employed, but what really matters is how this event will shape the larger dynamics of the region.

1. India has tremendous friction with it's own Muslim popuace (some 150M, who are largely left out of the recent economic rise of the Nation. 13% of the total populace, they only represent 3% of government positions as an example).

2. With the pressure of the current global economic crisis, will India seek to shift the focus from their own faults and failures by attempting to blame Pakistan for this attack? (Ok, this is already happening)

3. With the U.S. already in a tenuous position in Pakistan as we attempt to sort out an effective scheme of engagement there that allows us to get a handle on a Pashtun problem that is slipping away, while at the same time not alienating the new government there; how do we play an escalation of animosity between Pakistan and India? (Particularly when both of those Governments have terrible policies in place that create tremendous frictions within their own populaces; both have Nukes; and both are looking for external parties to blame as the problems escalate; and they have in no way resolved the issues that keep these neighbors in a state of near-war)

4. Unlike the U.S., when we had an external terror attack on 9/11; we did not possess a large, disenfrancised local populace that was sympathetic to the causes of the attackers, India does. We could absorb a strategic disaster like launching a completely unrelated invasion of a traditional enemy's territory in the name of retaliation and national security. What happens internal to India if they try a similar gambit? What credibility do we have to talk them down from such a policy given our own recent actions?

Major terrorist attacks happen in India all the time. This one has succeeded in gaining the type of media attention and visibility that all such attackers seek as their primary goal for waging the attack in the first place. The attack itself has little relevance. What matters is how this is played from here.

[Ron Humphrey]

As to the "who will blame who" in efforts to sidetrack popular frustrations.
Can't see any way this won't happen considering historic practices which apparently noone likes to learn from(didn't that end up being a big part of what brought about WWI?); how about something different for a change.

Perhaps everyone could actually blame the idiots who keep pulling off these attacks. Extremists!

Maybe thats too much to ask for:confused:

[Ken White]

I agree with most of your postulations but question this one:...4. We could absorb a strategic disaster like launching a completely unrelated invasion of a traditional enemy's territory in the name of retaliation and national security. What happens internal to India if they try a similar gambit? What credibility do we have to talk them down from such a policy given our own recent actions?Three points.

A 'stategic disaster' is in the eye of the beholder -- I haven't seen one since the Brothers Kennedy decided to boost the US economy by sending me to Laos a long time ago.

Not at all a completely unrelated invasion, rather a very poorly publicly justified effort. It was a response to a large number of ME provocations, attacks and probes against US interests worldwide from 1979-2001 and it was sorely needed and long overdue; something needed to be done and do recall that Afghanistan is not in the ME. It may have been poorly planned (and whose fault is that?) and executed (same question?) but something was needed. While most of the west did not and does not understand that, the ME (and most of Asia) understood it for what it was; you will have noted that European hearth objections were heartfelt and different from the pro-forma mumbles out of the ME and Asia. The major problem with the action in Iraq as a totality and the rest of the world was an incredibly poor job of stating the rationale. The major problem with total effectiveness of the overdue response to probes from the ME was in the execution. That happens...

Back to the actual thread and point at hand. To answer your question quoted, no one including the Indians knows what would happen internally; and our credibility in the world has not been great since I started paying attention in 1947 or so. It has fluctuated over the years but it has never been adequate to jawbone other nations into doing much they they didn't want to do (unless we bribed them, that works -- sometimes). Been that way for years and I see no change in that.

Nor am I at all certain why we should be excessively concerned with 'talking them down' from a policy they are probably not going to adopt. In the unlikely event they adopt such a policy, it will be (as is too often true here) more a result of domestic politics than anything else -- and that milieu is a little too opaque for most of us to sort -- and I'm pretty sure that pressure would trump anything we tried.

[davidbfpo]

Yet to absorb the latest contributions. There are now coments on how any other city would have reacted and here is an ex-SAS CO's comments: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3535668/Britain-unprepared-for-Mumbai-style-attack-former-head-of-SAS-says.html

davidbfpo

[Icebreaker]

Attached is a link to a pretty good "To Do" List for changes in India to help them deal with future Mumbai-style attacks:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/01mumterror-26-things-to-do.htm

As a civilian I think they make good sense, but I would like to get other's prespective on two things:

1. What do others think of the above "To Do" List?

and

2. How can ten (10) men, even armed with automatic weapons and grenades, hold off hundreds of commandos and police officers for sixty (60) hours?

[Ken White]

...2. How can ten (10) men, even armed with automatic weapons and grenades, hold off hundreds of commandos and police officers for sixty (60) hours? but provide an answer to this. Easily.

What room or rooms in what buildings? Intelligence and / or technology available to the commandos and police to determine said locations? Their familiarity with each others work processes and ability to cooperate? Hostages involved? More importantly, respective levels of training. Most importantly level of dedication of the ten and their willingness to die to complete their mission.

Not at all difficult to do. Sixty hours is really pretty good time. Fighting in cities is never easy...

This LINK (http://images.google.com/images?q=Taj%20Mahal%20Hotel%20Mumbai&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&um=1&sa=N&tab=wi) was just one of the buildings involved, it alone could easily take over a day to clear after the assault team arrived (12 hours away) and got prepped (another 4-6 hours minimum).

[bismark17]

I can only speak to local oriented Law Enforcement in the U.S. but I don't think anyone is ready for something like this other than possibly Israel but their society tolerates a level of security that wouldn't work here. At least until we have something along these lines.

We are all about containment. For the most part we only carry sidearms and thin body armour. Our training is all about containing a situation to put the subject into a fixed place to allow the SWAT team to begin their operation. We don't really train for scenarios like this and it's assumed that our SWAT teams would be the ones having to run and gun with this kind of adversary. Obviously, if it does happen it will be the front line patrol officers having to do it. Active shooters are a major threat both from the operational and tactical perspective. Look at what happened with the former Ranger tabbed suspects that took on the FBI in that infamous shoot out in Miami.

I am fortunate to work for a Department that has an outstanding Firearms training unit that does look at current events and changes their training based upon them. We do train for multiple threats and active shooters trying to roll your flanks and such. But, it's still tough to be confident about dealing with something along these lines.

We are very risk adverse due to the amount of litigitation that is part of our day to day operations. This has changed to some extent due to our school or Mall shooter scenarios but it's an extreme command and control issue to deal with multiple entry teams running around in a fixed location. There is going to be extreme chaos and it's hard for me to imagine anyone could do much better under those circumstances. In this particular case the Police were directly targeted so their command and control was screwed from the get go.

On a positve level, I think we are better prepared than we were prior to the Hollywood shootout where the suspects were heavily armored and carried long guns. It spurred Departments across the nation to develop patrol rifle programs and improve active shooter training which are good things.

[bourbon]

Reports coming in are mentioning the role of Dawood Ibrahim in the attacks. Ibrahim is the head of D-Company, which is the leading group in the Mumbai underworld. He has strong connections to ISI, and was the facilitator of the 1993 attacks in Mumbai. Reportedly, D-Company controls Sasool dock where the attackers came ashore. One of the captured attackers has reportedly said in interrogation that Ibrahim owned the ship the attackers took from Karachi, and D-Company provided logistical support in the city.


This was not global jihad. Its roots are far closer to home: These attacks were born of local and regional hostilities, and it seems likely a part was played by a Mumbai crime boss (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/01/comment-and-debate-misha-glenny), by Misha Glenny. guardian.co.uk, December 1 2008.

Captured Mumbai attacker implicates Pakistani military, intel (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/captured_mumbai_atta.php), By Bill Roggio. The Long War Journal, November 30, 2008.

Captured Mumbai terrorist reveals plot to slaughter 5000 (http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,24730966-663,00.html). Herald Sun, December 01, 2008.

[carl]

I think American police department capabilities may be underestimated. In the area I worked in, in critical situations, we could call on one large and one small city pd, numerous sheriff's offices, the BLM cops, several tribal police departments, the wildlife guys, the local FBI office, the state police and if things really got bad, the state pen special guys. There were always a number of special trained officers on normal patrol and (I have been gone a few years) I would assume that now there are a number of officers who have been to Iraq and Afghanistan. Everybody had pistols and shotguns and all the state police had AR-15's. Given more time, swat teams from all over the state would be there too.

There would be tremendous confusion and hell to pay in the first few hours but there is more capability there than people may think. Those Mexican drug assassins in Arizona certainly didn't have things all their own way.

[Cavguy]

Made me chuckle from Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/12/heads-are-rolling.html) -

Look, if just 10 dudes rolled into my hometown and started shooting people, they would have been killed within the hour. I'm not kidding. (People still try to take their guns aboard planes in my hometown.) India's police has been caught out by these 10 gunmen as badly as U.S. intelligence services (and airport security) were caught out by the 9/11 hi-jackers. In both cases, there was no reason so many people were killed by so few. Unlike 9/11, though, heads are rolling in India. In case anyone is wondering,

I imagine the same in Slapout, AL. :D

[Uboat509]

I am still much more concerned about a Beslan type situation than something like Mumbai. I just don't think that a similar attack would have near the success in the US. Law Enforcement capabilities aside, there are an awful lot of people like me out there bitterly clinging to our guns. A Beslan type attack, say on a large inner city school, or schools on the other hand could be devastating, particularly if the attackers managed to start a rumor that there were other groups still out there ready to attack other schools. It is one thing to say that I will not let the terrorists scare me. I will live my life and go to work and do what I need to do regardless of the threat. It is quite another thing to send your babies into that. How many businesses would have troubles with production because terrified parents stayed home with their kids? What kind of effect would that many working parents staying home have on the economy?

SFC W

[slapout9]

I imagine the same in Slapout, AL. :D


You got that right....like 36-0;) My friend "Fat Tony" would make them an offer they couldn't refuse and they would never forget:wry:

The 1st US Redneck Special Forces Unit. Fat Tony is in the Red Shirt. Oh Yea there is some bad words in here but they go by so fast you can't hardly her them.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2597LTPgnc&feature=related

[Ken White]

from Texas...

LINK (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.strangedangers.com/images/content/110683.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.strangedangers.com/content/item/110683.html&usg=__2fY0eLxE-tDiorzpyRLs3z7bQxE=&h=480&w=640&sz=97&hl=en&start=1&um=1&tbnid=wVSJ2hq10gmBMM:&tbnh=103&tbnw=137&prev=/images%3Fq%3DYou%2Bloot%2Bwe%2Bshoot%26um%3D1%26hl %3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26sa%3DN).

[carl]

I just don't think that a similar attack would have near the success in the US. Law Enforcement capabilities aside, there are an awful lot of people like me out there bitterly clinging to our guns.
SFC W

Agreed. I found people were extremely eager to help if an officer was in a fight or somebody went missing. If we had passed the word we needed armed volunteers...the numbers would have been large.

[Adam L]

Obviously there is no pat answer as there are several variables that can impact readiness on any given day, and obviously some cities such as New York City is probably much more prepared for this type of attack than say a mid sized town elsewhere in the U.S., but it is still a question we should grapple with.


I have really been surprised by just how much firepower the NYPD have. It seems as though every time I go down to the city they have new and more powerful weapons. There are a lot of officers carrying assault rifles these days. Also, it looks as though a lot of patrolmen are wearing heavier body armor.

Adam L

[bismark17]

I am concerned about the Beslan style issue myself or hit and run attacks on malls. That would be really great for the economy at this point. Or look at what those 2 weirdos, the father and son sniper team, did on the East Coast. The IRA already started that a long time ago with urban sniping from vehicles. Coming from both an Infantry and Police background it's amazing to participate or watch force on force situations with multiple search teams in active shooter scenarios. The command and control is brutal. Without getting too specific the usual history of these events is that the active shooter doesn't want to engage with us but will usually shoot themselves once they realize we are on scene.

Terrorists are not going to do that but will want to engage. These latest guys were very well trained and aggressive. The latest account I read claimed that they took turns to change their mags so that one of them could provide support. High speed. Think of how this went and what they could have done better because they are....




I am still much more concerned about a Beslan type situation than something like Mumbai. I just don't think that a similar attack would have near the success in the US. Law Enforcement capabilities aside, there are an awful lot of people like me out there bitterly clinging to our guns. A Beslan type attack, say on a large inner city school, or schools on the other hand could be devastating, particularly if the attackers managed to start a rumor that there were other groups still out there ready to attack other schools. It is one thing to say that I will not let the terrorists scare me. I will live my life and go to work and do what I need to do regardless of the threat. It is quite another thing to send your babies into that. How many businesses would have troubles with production because terrified parents stayed home with their kids? What kind of effect would that many working parents staying home have on the economy?

SFC W

[Entropy]

The problem with a Beslan operation and why I think it's unlikely is that it won't net the instigator good press with those they are attempting to influence. Symbolism is often more important for attackers than body counts (especially so for sophisticated attackers) and in Mumbai the decision on what to target was obviously based on symbolic value rather than maximizing a death toll. The symbolism associated with attacking a school and murdering children will not play well even among many Jihadists, so I think a sophisticated crew that can plan and carry out this kind of operation are unlikely to target schools - especially after Beslan, which didn't work out too well for the Chechens.

[slapout9]

I worry more about the Mexican/US border. An attack of that nature is a real possibility at one of the border towns.

[Icebreaker]

I worry more about the Mexican/US border. An attack of that nature is a real possibility at one of the border towns.

It has happened before in 1916 at Columbus, New Mexico (see link to wikipedia article):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pancho_Villa_Expedition

General Pershing command of the expedition helped to launch him on the path to being the Commanding Officer of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I.

[120mm]

I have really been surprised by just how much firepower the NYPD have. It seems as though every time I go down to the city they have new and more powerful weapons. There are a lot of officers carrying assault rifles these days. Also, it looks as though a lot of patrolmen are wearing heavier body armor.

Adam L

The prevalence of so-called and misnamed "assault rifles" in use by police is primarily because they're more accurate, and safer than pistols. High speed, low weight bullets tend not to overpenetrate as much as low speed, high weight bullets such as those fired by pistols.

Plus, the AR15 platform is handy, easily maintained, is easy to train on, and prior military experience police officers are familiar with the system.

It's not about the way the guns look, it's the functionality that really matters. If I had my druthers, all police officers would start out on the AR15 as their primary.

[Adam L]

The prevalence of so-called and misnamed "assault rifles" in use by police is primarily because they're more accurate, and safer than pistols. High speed, low weight bullets tend not to overpenetrate as much as low speed, high weight bullets such as those fired by pistols.

Plus, the AR15 platform is handy, easily maintained, is easy to train on, and prior military experience police officers are familiar with the system.

It's not about the way the guns look, it's the functionality that really matters. If I had my druthers, all police officers would start out on the AR15 as their primary.

I agree with you 100%. What I was commenting on was the amount of officers with select-fire rifles. This is mainly at high risk areas, but it's something I've noticed. I've also noticed that the cops make u-turns with their emergency command centers (big modified busses) on public streets at astonishing velocities (a civilian would lose his license) and in extreme close quarters (3-6 inches from car bumpers.)

Adam L

[slapout9]

I've also noticed that the cops make u-turns with their emergency command centers (big modified busses) on public streets at astonishing velocities (a civilian would lose his license) and in extreme close quarters (3-6 inches from car bumpers.)

Adam L

It's called SPS...Secret Police Stuff.:D

[Bill Moore]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28221884/

MUMBAI, India - When the attackers arrived on the shores of Mumbai last month, they had studied satellite images of the city, were carrying handheld GPS sets and were communicating with their handlers via the Internet and satellite phone.

Many of the Indian police they encountered did not even have walkie-talkies.

The Mumbai gunmen not only overwhelmed security forces with their weaponry and willingness to die, but also with their sophisticated use of technology, security experts said.

This is an overly simplistic conclusion, the attackers were able to overwhelm the police because they conducted a "surprise" attack, and quickly exploited the inherent confusion. They could have done this without the use of cell phone to some degree. Obviously the Indian police were not properly equipped, armed, nor trained, which reflects poorly on the government, but even if they were the first couple of hours of the attack would have still been chaos.

[Ron Humphrey]

Columbine, The Snipers, Recent School and Church shootings all very simplistic compared to the Mumbai tactical operation. One definately hopes quite a bit has been done in our LE communities to recognize and adapt to the possibilities of that sort of thing here.

[Rex Brynen]

Pakistan moves troops toward Indian border (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081226.wpakistanindia1226/BNStory/Front)

SEBASTIAN ABBOT
Associated Press
Globe and Mail, December 26, 2008 at 11:20 AM EST

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan began moving thousands of troops to the Indian border Friday, intelligence officials said, sharply raising tensions triggered by the Mumbai terror attacks.

India has blamed Pakistani-based militants for last month's siege on its financial capital, which killed 164 people and has provoked an increasingly bitter war of words between nuclear-armed neighbours that have fought three wars in 60 years.

The troops headed to the Indian border were being diverted away from tribal areas near Afghanistan, officials said, and the move was expected to frustrate the United States, which has been pushing Pakistan to step up its fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants near the Afghan border.

Two intelligence officials said the army's 14th Division was being redeployed to the towns of Kasur and Sialkot, close to the Indian border. They said some 20,000 troops were on the move. Earlier Friday, a security official said all troop leave had been cancelled.

[Bill Moore]

There were other scattered tidbits on various websites indicating that this situation is rapidly going from bad to worse. Pakistan allegedly arrested an Indian in the past couple of days who was tied to a terrorist attack in Pakistan. S. Asia is not the land of cooler heads. Unfortunately, it appears that the terrorists are about to achieve their strategic objective of diverting troops from the FATA to the Indian border, and they may get a bonus on top of that.

[Surferbeetle]

From todays Pakistan Daily Times (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\12\26\story_26-12-2008_pg1_2)

Pakistan troops move to Indian borders

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan troops were deployed on Thursday to protect vital points along the Line of Control in Kashmir and the international border with India, defence sources told Daily Times. Reports in Indian media said Pakistan moved its 10th Brigade to Lahore and ordered the 3rd Armoured Brigade to march towards Jhelum, following a heavy concentration of Indian troops on the borders. Pakistan’s 10th and 11th divisions have been put on high alert, Indian media said, and troops had been stationed in Rajouri and Poonch sectors of Kashmir. Sources in the Defence Department declined to give details of any fresh movement but did not deny reports that Pakistan was moving certain brigades towards Lahore. Indian TV channels also reported that Pakistan Air Force continued its state of high alert and started aerial surveillance of the Chashma power plant and other sensitive sites on Thursday amid fears of a ‘surgical strike’ by India. sajjad malik

From todays Spiegel (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,598425,00.html)

Pakistan übt sich in Drohgebärden und lässt Truppen an der Grenze zu Indien aufmarschieren. Die Regierung in Delhi wiederum bittet China und Saudi-Arabien um Vermittlung. Nun versuchen die USA, im Konflikt zwischen den Atommächten zu vermitteln.

My translation...

Pakistan is practicing threatening gestures and letting troops march to the border with India. The Government in Dehli is again asking China and Saudi-Arabia about mediation. The USA is now trying to mediate the conflict between the atomic powers as well.

And a KUNA (http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1962907&Language=en) report as a third source...


ISLAMABAD, Dec 26 (KUNA) -- Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi Friday said that China and Iran are perturbed over the current Pak-India tension and would play their role to defuse it.
The ongoing tension between the two neighboring countries would benefit only the terrorists who are hell-bent upon sabotaging the normalization process, he said while talking to news reporters in eastern Multan city.
He said he received telephone calls from his Chinese and Iranian counterparts today (Friday) and they expressed their deep concern over the Indo-Pak tension.
"Both the countries are affected if Pakistan is affected as they are our best friends", he said, adding that the Chinese FM would visit India soon to play his mediatory role to ease the tension.
Pakistan is a peace-loving country and does not want tension with India, said the Foreign Minister. He said political stability in the region is in the interest of all. (pick up previous).

[Bill Moore]

Some articles to expand awareness of the growing tension. Note the spin factor in most of the articles, and that they frequently quote unnamed sources, none the less those who want to throw gasoline on the flames are crawling out of the wood work.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=19147

PESHAWAR: Baitullah Mahsud, central head of the banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Monday announced full support to the army against archrival India if it makes any aggression against the country.

He said the time had come to wage a real jihad they had been waiting for. “We know very well that the visible and invisible enemies of the country have been planning to weaken this lone Islamic nuclear power. But the “mujahideen” will foil all such nefarious designs of our enemies,” said the top militant commander.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/_Pak_had_definite_links_with_LeT_Report/articleshow/3880992.cms

"It's (LeT) a monster we created and now we can't get it back in the bottle," the official told the daily commenting on ISI's links with Lashkar.

The ISI had forged ties with jihadist groups throughout the 1980s when the CIA used it to support the Mujahidin against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and when it saw an opportunity in 1989 to weaken India by creating trouble in Jammu and Kashmir the militants of the outfit were infiltrated into India, the newspaper reported.

General Asad Durrani, ISI chief from 1990-92, denied supporting LeT in his tenure, but admitted that Pakistan had an interest in supporting such groups.

"Given Kashmir's history, we can't be expected to remain uninterested,"

http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=NLetter&id=19e61cfc-7053-4a7e-8e51-01b516f4b83c&&Headline='Pakistan+arrests+Indian+spy+for+Lahore+b last'

Intelligence agencies late on Wednesday arrested "an Indian secret agent and two others who were allegedly involved" in a bomb blast in Lahore on Wednesday morning, a media report said.

http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/NewsStory.aspx?cpath=20081226/ACQRTT200812260211RTTRADERUSEQUITY_0029.htm&&mypage=newsheadlines&title=Taliban%20Group%20Nails%20Pakistan's%20Lie

Efforts by the Pakistani government to implicate India in the car-bomb blast in Lahore on December 24 backfired when a little-known Taliban group claimed responsibility, for which four men whom Pakistan claimed to be "Indians" were arrested, media reports said.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-pakistan-crackdown_barkerdec26,0,5582486.story

For alleged supporter of terror in Pakistan, it's business as usual
Despite officials' vow to crack down after Mumbai, Islamic charity Jamaat-ud-Dawa still operates unfettered

But militant Lashkar leaders arrested separately have not yet appeared in court. And the fact that the Muridke headquarters is still open highlights how ambivalent the government is about targeting Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is highly popular because of its relief work.

Besides relief camps, Jamaat runs 160 schools, 50 Islamic boarding schools, 153 clinics and eight hospitals. If the government clamps down too hard, it risks a backlash. Already, there have been anti-government and pro-Jamaat protests, including by a group of Hindu women in Sindh province.

Interesting description, it is beginning to sound like the Hezbollah model.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/25/lashkar-e-taiba-draws-well-educated-youths/

Lashkar-e-Taiba draws well-educated youths

LAHORE, Pakistan | The profile of those joining the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba is changing to include more young, educated men, some of whom even hold advanced degrees.

"The big change is that until a few years back most of the militants were hailing from the [Afghan] frontier, but now the scenario has changed and young men from all over Pakistan are joining," said Brig. Gen. Mahmood Shah, who served the Pakistani army in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the border with Afghanistan.

Brendan O´Duffy, a researcher from the University of London who has studied militant organizations in Britain, said he has found members are "mostly of working class origins but a large minority achieved relatively a high education, tending towards engineering and science degrees, including medicine in the case of the failed [June 2007] London and Glasgow attacks."

Kashif Alam, senior superintendent of police in the northwest city of Peshawar, said the profile of the average militant in Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan, has changed but that the number of educated Pakistanis was actually decreasing.

"We´re seeing an increase in the number of criminals who are working for these militant organizations," he said. "More and more of their operations are being carried out by criminals. Some of the people we have captured were found with thousands of rupees in their pockets."

This report is a gem, it is actually balanced, it presents two sides to the story and doesn't lead the reader to a conclusion.

[davidbfpo]

Given that snow lies seven feet deep in the mountains of Kashmir the deployment of extra Pakistani troops into the border region is questionable; any campaigning can only start in March at the earliest. There is a thread here on the Kargil operation, which may explain more.

I don't know where the quoted 14th Division is normally garrisoned, but moving a division into snowclad mountains seems unwise - even if they are mountain warfare trained and equipped.

Yes the Pakistani Army has deployed extra troops into the FATA, I've seen nothing to suggest these are the first rate divisions normally deployed on the Indian border. The bulk of the fighting has been b formations like the Frontier Corps and second line reinforcements.

Following Zadari's responses to the Mumbai attacks, in which he (reportedly) acknowledged Pakistan's national weakness, a weakness caused by the current instability (economy, FATA fighting etc) did not endear him to the Pakistani Army. Add in the Indian air incursions and the usual assortment of 'Great Game' activity - all makes a potent mixture.

Pakistan's national security and national defence belongs to the army, not politicians. Former president Musharraf was given a departure from Islamabad airport, on a trip to Europe, as if he still was the head of state and on his return this week spoke publically on the situation (Google News for the reporting, which I'd not seen here).

I would suggest that the current reported Pakistani military movements have more to do with the Pakistani Army asserting itself - assuring the nation it remains on guard.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

The Hindu - Jan 7, 2009 (http://www.hindu.com/nic/dossier.htm)

This is a scanned copy of the 69-page dossier of material stemming from the ongoing investigation into the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 26-29, 2008 that was handed over by India to Pakistan on January 5, 2009:

Part 1 (http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-1.pdf), 3.13mb

Part 2 (http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-2.pdf), 4.16mb

Part 3 (http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-3.pdf), 1.99mb

Part 4 (http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-4.pdf), 5.40mb

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 16 Jan 09: The Lessons of Mumbai (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf)
This study of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008 is part of the RAND Corporation Occasional Papers series. The research for this report was completed in December 2008 and updated as of January 9, 2009. Much of the information available for this necessarily preliminary analysis comes from reporting by the news media, which in such circumstances is
often inaccurate, and from information provided by well-placed Indian and U.S. government sources, which sometimes is incomplete. For a thorough, and hopefully accurate reconstruction of events, we must await an official inquiry or government-sponsored independent investigation. With these caveats, this paper
Identifies the operational and tactical features and technical capabilities displayed by the terrorists—the extent to which the means employed in the attack were innovations or built on previous experiences.
Evaluates the response of the Indian security forces.
Draws out the implications of the incident for India, Pakistan, and the international community.
Derives the lessons learned from the attack and the Indian response.

The goal of the study is to develop findings that may be helpful to counterterrorism authorities in India and elsewhere in preparing for or countering future terrorist attacks on urban centers.
Complete 37-page paper at the link.

[davidbfpo]

A short balanced commentary by the London-based IISS: http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-10/terror-in-mumbai/

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Stephen Tankel has written a paper on LeT: http://icsr.info/paper.php?id=19
He is a UK based analyst and writes very well on the group (Cited before No.18). On a quick read takes a broad view.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

As the trial of the lone Pakistani terrorist moves along at an Indian pace, a new BBC report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5661920/Mumbai-What-really-happened.html . Part of a programme due to be shown tonight. Interesting comments on whether observers were present giving updates, the BBC dismiss tactical knowledge was vailable from watching TV reporting.

(Added 6th August 2009). The lone terrorist has pleaded guilty by surprise, the trial goes on IIRC.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Found when reading an Indian news website and offers a glimpse inside Indian intelligence (or lack of it): http://www.tehelka.com/story_main41.asp?filename=Ne170109coverstory.asp

No idea how reliable source is, India is not in focus.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

At the time of the Mumbai attack it was reported that Raheel Sheikh, a suspect for an earlier (2006) bombing attack was arrested in Birmingham, UK (Posts 2 & 5). A local paper has recently reported Sheikh who'd fled to the UK in 2006, to B'ham at one point, had in fact returned to India at some point and had been arrested in India a month ago.

From: http://www.sundaymercury.net/news/midlands-news/2009/09/20/birmingham-based-mumbai-terror-suspect-arrested-66331-24742628/ Note the story was picked up by news agencies, but cannot find an Indian coverage or confirmation.

davidbfpo

[gh_uk]

Also a new article in Vanity Fair

http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/11/taj-hotel-siege-200911?

Focuses a lot on the human element, but brings across the chaos of the response and the poor command and control of security forces.

One wonders how police forces in the West would have handled this? David - how would the Met police in London have coped if 10 heavily armed men had gone on the rampage in Canary Wharf? I struggle to think of any instances where police firearms teams in the UK have had to face well-armed, serious opposition. How many Armed Response Units could they have mustered, deployed and coordinated? I'm sure they would have had to ask for military back-up also - though I guess it would not take eight hours to get from Hereford to London.

[davidbfpo]

GH_UK,

Your question:One wonders how police forces in the West would have handled this? David - how would the Met police in London have coped if 10 heavily armed men had gone on the rampage in Canary Wharf? I struggle to think of any instances where police firearms teams in the UK have had to face well-armed, serious opposition. How many Armed Response Units could they have mustered, deployed and coordinated? I'm sure they would have had to ask for military back-up also - though I guess it would not take eight hours to get from Hereford to London.

I suspect that even the Met (MPS) would struggle to respond and rely on containment in the first hour. Containment of the scene would be from a distance, choosing Canary Wharf as your example would help the MPS, rather than say another symbolic target in London, say a major railway station. This first response would absorb all the 24/7 three-man response cars (last figure was eight on duty) and others available e.g. Diplomatic Protection (far larger numbers). Even they would IMHO be quickly be outgunned and run out of ammunition; H&K machine pistols being standard issue. Back-up from better armed and trained full SWAT-like teams would follow, from planned operations and training. Even with those teams deployed it would be containment.

After the MPS come other police SWAT teams, e.g. Ministry of Defence Police (usually on guard duty) and the London-based Special Forces contingent (for VIP protection etc).

Any 'well armed, serious opposition' would need the deployment of the Army, primarily the Hereford-based Special Forces and anyone else available (Windsor based light armour, seen years ago at Heathrow Airport in a terror alert).

After the July 2005 bombings one would hope co-ordination has improved at the centre (Scotland Yard) and for the on the ground tactical commander. Then add on Mumbai and horizon-scanning e.g. school massacres. Not my field this, so opinion and open sources only.

In support are these comments from another recent thread.

From Wilf's posting on another thread: My understanding is that SWAT = Special Weapons and Tactics, was implicitly developed for the minimum use of force, so it is ROE dependant, and that was explicit in the original concept. The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff. For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.

Wilf also reminded us of the last example of a heavily armed man going on a rampage, the Hungerford incident in 1987: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungerford_massacre

I responded: Some years ago I asked our local SWAT equivalent what happens if the "bad guys" do not stay still i.e. in a premises and go mobile. There was a pained reaction and invocations of "Trust us, we know they will". Bearing in mind the 24/7 capability was six firearms officers, so I asked will front and rear entrances be covered? "Trust us, we practice a lot". I assume "bad guys" have learnt, "stay still, you lose". Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.

Hope that helps.

davidbfpo

[gh_uk]

David,

Very enlightening - thanks for the comprehensive (and swift) answer.

gh

[davidbfpo]

Once more Stephen Tankel has provided an update on LeT (the group blamed for the Mumbait attack):http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss11.pdf

LeT is emerging as a global actor in terrorism.

[davidbfpo]

Some commentary on Mumbai:

1) a long journalistic piece, mainly eye-witnesses and a short update on the changes since:http://www.vqronline.org/webexclusive/2009/11/19/motlagh-mumbai-attacks/

2) a short comment by Stephen Tankel:http://icsr.info/blog/Retrospective-introspective

[Schmedlap]

Folks over at the al-Sahwa (http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/02/emerging-threats-active-shooter.html) blog have posed the question (Emerging Threats: Active Shooter Scenario (http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/02/emerging-threats-active-shooter.html)) of how to cope with the threat of active shooters who seek to pull a Mumbai here in the US.

My comment is here (http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/02/emerging-threats-active-shooter.html?showComment=1267309929651#c1494831884 351044789) (I still don't understand why it hasn't happened, given how easy it would be).

[davidbfpo]

Schmedlap,

A good catch this "peering into the abyss" link:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/02/emerging-threats-active-shooter.html

We have briefly looked at a Mumbai incident in the UK and the former US CT czar Richard Clarke wrote a long article in January 2005 on what could happen - with multiple target themes in the USA. See:http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/01/ten-years-later/3659/

We have been lucky that AQ to date has devoted such attention in attempts to attack a hardened target - passenger aircraft in the air; a point discussed elsewhere on SWC, IIRC on the Detroit attack thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9331

Not to overlook the Zazi plot with an attack on another hardened target NYC.

The hard reality for CT response planning is that we live in a target rich environment, where guarding a static target can be criticised as uneconomic and deflect the attacker to easier targets (known as 'Prepare' in the UK CT strategy). Hence the resources allocated to first responders and follow-on services.

A point that is easily overlooked in the Mumbai attack is that the attackers kept mobile; moving on foot and at one point in a hijacked police Jeep to other targets.

I am mindful that such scenarios can easily increase fear - after all one of the key aims of terrorism - and maybe this has precluded the state / government raising the issues with the public.

What about the attack on traffic entering the CIA HQ at Langley, many years ago in 1983 and the lone attacker was eventually arrested. See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_shootings_at_CIA_Headquarters

What about the non-AQ enemies following these options? "Home grown" terrorists. IIRC there have been sporadic gun attacks on abortion clinics, Federal buildings and the like.

Scary - Yes
Tell the public now of the possibility - Unwise
Prepare for the possibility - Yes within other contingencies

[Schmedlap]

David,

In my opinion, the silver lining on this issue is that I think terrorist strikes in this country are not intended to really instill fear among Americans. I really think they are intended to provoke us. I think it would be far more frightening if terrorists started hitting "soft targets" such as shopping malls, gridlocked interstates (such as in the hypo I cited), or a high school sporting events. Instead, they want to attack symbols of American financial, economic, military, or cultural significance in order to draw us into a fight on their turf.

Could it be that the "flypaper theory" is actually playing out (albeit not for the reasons often cited)? Rather than us being proactive and "fighting them over there so that we don't fight them here," the terrorist motivation might be precisely to fight us over there because they don't want to fight us here. Hitting soft targets might just result in greater inward-looking domestic security measures. But hitting major symbolic targets, for some reason, seems to stir us to anger more easily. If their intent is to "fight us over there" then they seem to have chosen their targets wisely and maybe this means that we don't have to fear attacks on soft targets.

[Cavguy]

David,

In my opinion, the silver lining on this issue is that I think terrorist strikes in this country are not intended to really instill fear among Americans. I really think they are intended to provoke us. I think it would be far more frightening if terrorists started hitting "soft targets" such as shopping malls, gridlocked interstates (such as in the hypo I cited), or a high school sporting events. Instead, they want to attack symbols of American financial, economic, military, or cultural significance in order to draw us into a fight on their turf.

Could it be that the "flypaper theory" is actually playing out (albeit not for the reasons often cited)? Rather than us being proactive and "fighting them over there so that we don't fight them here," the terrorist motivation might be precisely to fight us over there because they don't want to fight us here. Hitting soft targets might just result in greater inward-looking domestic security measures. But hitting major symbolic targets, for some reason, seems to stir us to anger more easily. If their intent is to "fight us over there" then they seem to have chosen their targets wisely and maybe this means that we don't have to fear attacks on soft targets.

Perhaps. I also think a scenario as outlined above (multiple sustained attacks over time) would cause this country to lose its mind. Take a look at what Malvo caused in NOVA.

I used to think this movie was over the top, but honestly I think we would turn to a solution like the one in "The Seige (http://www.amazon.com/Siege-Martial-Law-Denzel-Washington/dp/B000OT6V0K/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1267416565&sr=1-1)" faster than we would like to admit. Especially with the partisan talk show climate out there.

[Ken White]

Perhaps. I also think a scenario as outlined above (multiple sustained attacks over time) would cause this country to lose its mind. Take a look at what Malvo caused in NOVA.However, I have no doubt the media would -- and would do their level best to drive the country to emulate them. :eek:

Folks I know who lived in DC and Northern Virginia at the time of the Great Sniper Hunt were mostly dismissive of the idea of major panic though they acknowledged at the time the media hype was heading things that way. One friend living in Chevy Chase called it the 'Charlie Moose show.' :wry:

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps. I also think a scenario as outlined above (multiple sustained attacks over time) would cause this country to lose its mind. Take a look at what Malvo caused in NOVA.

I used to think this movie was over the top, but honestly I think we would turn to a solution like the one in "The Seige (http://www.amazon.com/Siege-Martial-Law-Denzel-Washington/dp/B000OT6V0K/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1267416565&sr=1-1)" faster than we would like to admit. Especially with the partisan talk show climate out there.

The movie "The Siege" is often discussed in Israel, as to what US reaction would be if their population was to experience the same frequency and magnitude of either suicide bombings seen in 2002, or rocket attacks.

For example, in 2002, had the US lost the same % of it's population to suicide attacks, the number would be in excess of 6,000 dead.

[Schmedlap]

The movie "The Siege" is often discussed in Israel, as to what US reaction would be if their population was to experience the same frequency and magnitude of either suicide bombings seen in 2002, or rocket attacks.

For example, in 2002, had the US lost the same % of it's population to suicide attacks, the number would be in excess of 6,000 dead.

I think you've also got to consider how big our country is. Let's say there are 50 suicide attacks within the span of a month (one in each state). The odds of me knowing any of the victims or feeling threatened is much lower than if I'm in Jerusalem and some guy blows himself up in Tel Aviv. The distance between those two locales is shorter than many people commute to work in the US.

I used to think this movie was over the top, but honestly I think we would turn to a solution like the one in "The Seige (http://www.amazon.com/Siege-Martial-Law-Denzel-Washington/dp/B000OT6V0K/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1267416565&sr=1-1)" faster than we would like to admit. Especially with the partisan talk show climate out there.

Am I completely out of touch? The movie sounds absurd to me, as does the notion of "the partisan talk show climate" adding to the possibility of it. I'll even throw in the partisan TV shows and internet sites and I still think it's absurd. This only struck a chord with me because I read the recent blog posts of Bernard Finel who seems to think that one party is good, one party is evil, and Sarah Palin is going to be President. I am amazed to see how much this fear-mongering from both sides of the political spectrum is gaining traction. How many of the people who fear Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck have actually listened to their shows while stuck in traffic? It's a mix of flawed history, nonsensical and outlandish attacks against their political enemies that only appeal to a small slice of the population, jokes, and random callers who are even more poorly informed and poorly educated than the hosts. There are no demands to overthrow the government, wage violence, or spread hate. It's a bunch of harmless nonsense, just like the crap on cable TV and the partisan internet sites. It appeals to the fringes, yet many seem to be convinced that it is going to take over the country. I don't get it.

[omarali50]

As a Pakistani-American, I have more than a passing interest in this subject, and I do think that the movie scenario ("the siege") is overblown. I have no doubt that if there is a mass-casualty terrorist attack there will be a backlash and so on, but I dont think the country will slip into martial law or any other nonsense like that.
I think the concept "Mumbai style attack" needs to be defined better for this discussion. The Mumbai attack was NOT some small group of demented Indian Muslims who decided it was their duty to avenge XYZ offenses by going postal on a massive scale. It was a well planned terrorist operation, meticulously put together by a professional terrorist organization (possibly with the support of a certain state agency). The equivalent of that in the US would imply that there is an identifiable foreign-based terrorist group carrying out the attack. In such a situation, how long would it take for anger to be focused on said foreign organization and its sponsors/hosts/friends and away from some sort of mindless arrival of jackboots in the White house?
Personally, I dont see such an attack as very likely because I think organizations capable of such planning and execution are known entities and calculate their moves carefully and will not chose to do something like this at this time.

A "spontaneous jihadi operation" in which some morons in Virginia get together, decide they need to avenge the blood of their brothers in Marja or whatever and go to I-95 and start killing people is a very different matter. Its not out of the question (my guess is that a small but non-zero number of such morons does exist) but its even less likely than Lashkar E Tayyaba deciding to raise their jihad to thermonuclear levels. And there is a very good chance that said morons will give themselves away (possibly to FBI flypaper operations) before they ever buy their guns and drive up to the interstate. And its likely that if they DO get to the interstate, they will not do as much damage as Schmedlap's scary scenario because they are morons, not trained terrorists.
But if it does happen, what would the response be?

[davidbfpo]

Omarali50,

Partial quote:A "spontaneous jihadi operation" in which some morons in Virginia get together, decide they need to avenge the blood of their brothers in Marja or whatever and go to I-95 and start killing people is a very different matter....But if it does happen, what would the response be?

Replace 'I-95' with the UK's busiest highway and I can comment. Chaos and fear if the attackers are not caught. A national state of high alert for the security forces, military aid - notably reaction forces with helicopters - and if there is a second attack a state of emergency. Grim for isolated minority and Muslim communities with attacks on mosques etc. A series of vigilante actions on ''suspects", e.g. Bangladeshi waiters driving home at night.

In a bizarre way if Muslims are amongst the casualties, as they were in 7/7 bombings, then less anger amongst the general population.

[Cavguy]

The equivalent of that in the US would imply that there is an identifiable foreign-based terrorist group carrying out the attack. In such a situation, how long would it take for anger to be focused on said foreign organization and its sponsors/hosts/friends and away from some sort of mindless arrival of jackboots in the White house?
Personally, I dont see such an attack as very likely because I think organizations capable of such planning and execution are known entities and calculate their moves carefully and will not chose to do something like this at this time.

...

But if it does happen, what would the response be?

I think I was thinking about the reaction to a sustained terror campaign inside the USA - as described in the article linked by David above - http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/01/ten-years-later/3659/

Thirty days of attacks on soft targets would make us crazy. I hope I'm wrong.

[omarali50]

I think I was thinking about the reaction to a sustained terror campaign inside the USA - as described in the article linked by David above - http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/01/ten-years-later/3659/

Thirty days of attacks on soft targets would make us crazy. I hope I'm wrong.

I am sure 30 days of attacks would drive a lot of people crazy, but that sounds like an implausible scenario. Israel is not a good comparison. Israel has occupied Palestinian land for 50 years, they live next door, they have been fighting for decades, they know each other's capabilities (more or less) and attacks and counter-attacks are all part of a given pattern that both sides can make sense of (even when they dont like it). Who would launch this sustained campaign against the US? You would pretty much have to be in Mexico to do that (Canada is presumably off the radar after yesterday's game) and what Mexican organization is working on any such campaign?
"lone wolf" actions by individual Muslims suddenly seized by the urge to practice jihad are certainly possible, but that's not the same thing as a sustained campaign.
LET (to take one example) could probably launch ONE well coordinated attack if they wanted to (meaning they have the ability, but not necessarily the motivation), but they are not crazy and such an attack would be a crazy undertaking (the US is not India and so on).
David, England (unfortunately) does have a bigger pool of Islamist nuts than the US does. An attack is more likely there than in the US, but even there, I dont think its very likely. My guess is that it is becoming LESS likely with every passing year. I firmly believe that "lone wolf" actions are not that important or that likely. The really serious threats always come from organizations and those are under pressure in Pakistan and too remote from the modern world in Somalia...