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xander day
11-27-2008, 04:45 PM
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).
here is my basic outline:

The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war. It will also look at the Jominian basis for the army over a Clausewitzian ‘politics by other means’ stance, and discuss how this influences the United States’ ‘Big War’ paradigm, although this description and analysis will be kept to a minimum for reasons of brevity.
Of major importance to this work will be the concept and ramifications of the so called ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. In itself the syndrome is incredibly significant in regard to the Big War paradigm, however the changes in doctrine that followed it, namely the ‘Never Again’ school, the Weinberger and Powell doctrines and the more recent ‘Decisive Force’ concept have damaged the U.S. Army’s small war fighting capability by codifying the idea that the expenditure of huge amounts of firepower can create a quick resolution to a conflict. This discussion will feature an analysis of the real impact of the Vietnam Syndrome, which Cassidy believes to effect the military’s willingness to fight wars far more than it effects the populations support of them: a paradoxical issue which may prove useful in discussing how cultural issues within the military may actually reinforce each other. The essay will widen this subject to include the ‘CNN’ and ‘bodybag’ effects in order to give a true account of the Vietnam Syndromes causes and strength as a concept, while referencing instances such as the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans to illustrate its impact. The war in Vietnam itself will be looked at of course, both to partially explain the Syndrome but also as a useful case study of how conventional warfare is inapplicable in a small war context. The war is again useful because the extensive amount of material regarding it has thrown up a number of cultural analyses which have exposed the Army’s cultural dedication to ‘Big War’ at the time.
As part of the essays investigation into the American Army’s devotion to conventional warfare the issue of doctrinal forgetfulness will be reviewed, with particular reference to the small wars that the U.S. has fought, such as the Indian wars, the war of independence and obviously Vietnam itself. It will draw the conclusion that because of this cultural devotion to a big war paradigm, small wars are not accepted as pertinent, and so the lessons that are learned while fighting them are forgotten as soon as the war ends. One of the instances linked to this is that even during the irregularity of the Indian wars, the American Army was developing itself as a reflection of the Prussian (conventional) model of organisation. This section may also include reference to the power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars.
As with any work regarding unconventional warfare, the essay will give an overview of what is required of a military to win a small war, such as force limitation, the use of native forces, the importance of legitimacy (Kaldor’s book: New and Old Wars is particularly useful in this regard) and the relevancy of the political campaign. It will also talk about the currently changing nature of small wars, with reference to Al Qaeda and in particular its religious motivation. The essay will talk about these changes only where they effect the chances of American success, such as how the increasingly religious nature of such conflicts is making the political aspect of the campaign harder to win. It will also talk about the paradox of a large power fighting a small one, and so will discuss the relevancy of support, means and aims in relation to each side of the conflict. The main area of this will be a discussion of the asymmetry of will which is inherent in every small war engaged in by a large power and its relevancy in regard to the Vietnam Syndrome and conventional warfighting in general. This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades to complete and that a conventional war stance is unprepared for such a time frame. It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect.
In explaining how American small war fighting methods can be improved, the essay shall feature an analysis of British examples of success in this field and why the British model is so effective. This will include an assessment of historical reasons for this effectiveness which will centre on the regimental system. The conclusion that will be drawn will be that the close nit nature of the regimental system serves as a home-away-from-home and as the support that American forces usually get from the public. It will also show how the colonial history of the British Army means that the public is more accepting of unclear missions and of casualties that occur in faraway places. An analysis of successful British unconventional missions will echo the tenets of the previous paragraph regarding what is required to win small wars, and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns. It will also look at how the British have traditionally taken a Fabian approach to warfare, with the Napoleonic wars and, again the colonial campaigns as the main instances of this. This approach, while lessening the Army’s effectiveness in conventional wars has made it more affective in unconventional confrontations.
An investigation into the problems that big powers face while fighting small wars shall be carried out by looking into the Soviet and Russian experiences of unconventional warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya. This section shall serve as a summary of many of the points that have already been made in the essay, but shall serve to show the similarities between the American problems and those of other large powers, and so shall support the asymmetry of will and paradoxes inherent within such confrontations. This section will be useful again because it will compare the cultures of each military and extrapolate relevant information from it, with particular relevance regarding the problems of big war when instigated in the wrong context.

rest to be added in a second....

xander day
11-27-2008, 04:45 PM
As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating. It will concentrate upon several distinct areas; technology, denial and self validation. In regard to technology the section will look at how such developments do not help the fighting of small wars. To do this it will look at a number of different authors arguments on the subject as well as drawing conclusions from previously successful irregular wars. Part of this will also look at the arguments for and against the relevancy of the current (disputed) revolution in military affairs (RMA), many critiques of which will prove useful not only for this section, but for the dissertation as a whole. The idea of self validation will look at how the first Gulf War ‘proved’ the relevancy of conventional warfare to the military leadership and is related to the previous assessment because the first Gulf War was enabled by technological superiority and is given by many as the evidence for the existence of the current RMA. This section will illustrate how the success of the Gulf War paradoxically weakened American military power and also how it relates to the military’s forgetfulness in regard to irregular war: President George H.W. Bush’s speech in which he claimed that America had finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome is the centrepiece for this argument and is a grand instance of denial.
The final section of my dissertation will be a discussion of the changes that are taking place within the American military, such as the ‘Modular Force’ concept, and their, and its, relevancy. This section will, like so many others, be intentionally brief so as to not dominate the piece, but must be included if my essay is to be an accurate account. It will feature a summary of the proposed changes and their foreseen effects, with particular reference to the culture of individual units of the Army and how this culture will be altered with the implementation of these changes. The marine corps shall serve as the personification of this change because of their developed unit culture and individual lexicon.

particular focus is upon the vietnam syndrome and the conventional warfighting stance of the U.S.

for those that have spent the time reading this and helping me out, i thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Xander

Ken White
11-27-2008, 06:19 PM
might be "Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?" I suggest that because I'm unsure that what you've posted here justifies your thesis. In any event, some thoughts for you:

Is the British model superior and if so what recent proof exists of that?

You might wish to be careful with "the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans..." The former was an aberration and a political miscalculation due to another political miscalculation; the latter was due to the misplaced belief that Europe could and would take care of a European problem of little concern to the US. I.e. both events were due to political -- not military -- errors and thus have little bearing on your thesis.

While this is true and deserves mention "...power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars." you should also consider that the US Congress has as much or more say in that seeming and nominal 'complex' than do the military and the industrialists.

Caution is needed with this as well: "This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades..." while that may historically be marginally correct; need it be that way? I'd say no.

Same here: "It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect." Unprofessional or just undertrained and poorly focused (for counterinsurgency small wars; one presumes you did not mean to apply that to large wars as well -- else you'll have a dichotomy... ;) ) -- the two are not at all synonymous. I do not disagree at all with your preferred paradigm statement but I do think the Viet Nam syndrome and bodybag effect can be and are overdone. The One Third Rule applies. I also believe that if you talk to the British Army today, they will not concur that the US army today (as opposed to five years ago) is either unprofessional or inexperienced with regard to small wars.

This statement: "and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns." is subject to serious question on many levels. For example if X force for Y years is minimal, then is X force for (Yx4) years still minimal? Far more importantly, be very sure you consider the fact that in both those operations, Britain WAS the government; a situation the US has not been involved with since the Indian wars of the 19th Century and the Philippine involvement in the early 20th. It makes a difference. A big difference. I think you need to be rather careful in the assumptions on this one...

When you complete your dissertation, I look forward to reading your treatment of this: "As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating."

My overall perception is that your effort is based on common wisdom (Heh) and perceptions. They're not totally incorrect but they do bear a great deal more thought than they seem to have been given thus far. Good luck.

I suspect you might attract a few more responses after the US Thanksgiving holiday -- which essentially lasts until next Monday. Gian may stop by...:D

John T. Fishel
11-27-2008, 07:07 PM
for me, I would be telling you to NARROW YOUR FOCUS! :D A common fallacy among new thesis writiers is to try to do too much. The second thing I would tell you is that you clearly believe that you know what the answer is so you should be developing this as a hypothesis to be tested. By testing I mean that you must state your tentative conclusion in a form such that you can collect and analyze data so that it could prove your hypothesis false or wrong. If you can't disprove your hypothesis then it will stand as a firmer conclusion.

In the case of your topic, the evidence is all over the map. There are cases which support your thesis and other cases which tend to disprove it. All the caveats theat Ken mentioned apply. Here are a few sources you could look at: the 4 colonels report on El Salvador, Schwartz's Rand study of the same, Chapter 7 of Max Manwaring and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which refutes both studies of El Sal, my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Also see John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict.

Good luck

Cheers

JohnT

RTK
11-27-2008, 08:06 PM
I agree with Dr. Fishel. You've thrown a lot of red meat on the grill. I wouldn't call it a disertation, I'd call it an epic novel.

xander day
11-28-2008, 02:07 PM
guys, i am amazed by both the speed of your replies and also the effort that you have all put in to help me with this! thanks so much!

Oh, before going any further, I am sorry about the unprofessional and inexperienced comment. This was a statement taken from an analysis of American experience in small wars, the inexperienced part was because of the lack of doctrinal information regarding small wars available to U.S. servicemen and women (at the time of writing, which I believe was the start of the 1980s). The unprofessional part (I groaned when I re-read that) was referring to the differences between the British Regulars and the American draftees of Vietnam and the high turnover of recruits – DEFINATELY not in any way trying to say that the U.S. Army is in any way unprofessional.

on to business:

one of the problems that I have with this dissertation is in sourcing material. I do not, unfortunately, have access to the most up to date books and journals, and as such I am having to rely upon many useful, but old, sources- of which the university library only has a limited number. Hence why what I have outlined may well sound re-hashed or done before. Also, being a 21 year old student, I rely upon firsthand accounts, and so the quotes that I use and my writing in general will reflect the points raised by their authors. Please note however that I am using only accounts from the most long-serving and respected men and women.
Since writing that outline (and it is very basic, for that I apologise) I have come across some more information to add in. Carnes Lord describes the role of Congress too, but the message of his article was rather confused; on the one hand he described how Congressional interference adds another voice to a large number of powerful voices and so splits small-war efforts (gave the CIA, Defence, Treasury and State Departments as other instances), but on the other presented the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Board as an area where Congressional ‘interference’ has helped America to wage low-intensity wars. He then later on described how (in 1992) the LIC was a ‘dead letter’ department and was essentially useless. Given that he is the only author that I have read so far that has talked about the role of congress in small warfighting, I am rather confused as to how in fact it does influence American capacity to wage such wars.
The Vietnam Syndrome will be, I think, the central area of my essay. I recognise totally the need for constant evaluation and questioning of authors comments and I am going to evaluate the significance and actual impact of the Syndrome using different viewpoints. Robert M. Cassidy raises the idea that the Syndrome had more of an impact on military leaders than Vietnam actually had upon the American people: that decision makers were so scared of the Syndrome that they treated it with more trepidation that it infact needed to be. I will evaluate this argument, but from what I have read, his argument seems valid and easily supportable, especially in relation to the pullout from Somalia after the ambush of the Quick Reaction Force.
Ken, what is the One Third Rule please?
Finally guys, I recognise that you are the experts about this. Alot of you seemingly have had first-hand experience and/or write books on the issue that I am but glimpsing and accordingly I am sorry if anything of what I have said in this outline sounds... well... ridiculous. But I am a student: being wrong and having those with experience tell me in detail how and why I am is what I do, and it is how I will make this piece of writing better, so please PLEASE keep it up (in particular any authors or works that may be useful), you have already been incredibly helpful.

William F. Owen
11-28-2008, 02:44 PM
Xander Day,

Having read what you have provided, I think you may be making a number of assumptions about the UK and COIN that are simply not supported by the historical and operational record.

Comparing US and UK performance, with reference to the US conduct of the Vietnam War(S) and UK colonial anti-terrorist operations is, in my opinion, an intellectual dead end. There are no useful grounds for comparison, bar that which is simplistic.

Why the US does not actually practice it's own doctrine and listens to the wrong folks may be a subject worthy of examination. IMO, US military thought is only applicable to the US and does not travel well.

However the same could be asked of the UK. Our post 1945 performance being far from stellar.

Having said that, well done for studying war and hopefully warfare as well.

xander day
11-28-2008, 02:57 PM
Mr Owen, could you go into more depth as to what parts of my planning are incorrect. From what you said it seems like you know a lot of information that I would find very helpful, and it seems as though I might have missed these ideas in my reading!
Thanks!
Xander

Ken White
11-28-2008, 03:15 PM
...Carnes Lord...described how Congressional interference adds another voice to a large number of powerful voices and so splits small-war efforts (gave the CIA, Defence, Treasury and State Departments as other instances), but on the other presented the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Board as an area where Congressional ‘interference’ has helped America to wage low-intensity wars. He then later on described how (in 1992) the LIC was a ‘dead letter’ department and was essentially useless.The LIC Board is a beautiful example of how our essentially dysfunctional Congress interferes with good intentions that go astray. Congress directed the board br formed in the NSC, it was -- but it was overcome by events as USSOCOM was activated and the Assistant SecDef for SO and LIC was established. It was an approach that was probably not needed.

The bigger impact of Congress is in the funding of the Army. While they really fund all of DoD, they hang their hat on the clause in the Constitution that charges them with the responsibility to raise Armies. They use that clause to force single year appropriations all too often for purchases even though billions could be saved by going to multi-year contracting (this allows them to tinker with the budget every year and write in obscure clauses that direct certain things -- like the LIC Board that was not needed); they do not like to fund training very heavily -- training does not provide financial benefit to more than a very few of the various States and Congressional electoral Districts.

Congress can force the purchase of major items of equipment (i.e. big war stuff like Tanks) which produce jobs for the voters in many districts. It is said, only partly in jest, that the C-130 has sub-contractors in every Congressional district. It's more about them buying votes than it is about what's really required. In fairness, they do force some good things on occasion but I'd guess that's about a fourth or less of the time.
The Vietnam Syndrome will be, I think, the central area of my essay...Cassidy raises the idea that the Syndrome had more of an impact on military leaders than Vietnam actually had upon the American people: that decision makers were so scared of the Syndrome that they treated it with more trepidation that it infact needed to be.It is my firm belief that Cassidy is absolutely correct -- and that the concern over bodybags also permeates the Armed Forces leadership to far too great an extent; we over emphasize force protection at the expense of mission accomplishment.
Ken, what is the One Third Rule please?Simply, it states that in the US for any given war, about 1/3 will support it, 1/3 will accept it OR oppose it based on how well it is going at the time (i.e. they're fickle) and the remaining third will strongly oppose it. While there are those that dispute it, it is historically borne out. I'd also suggest that the 1/3 in opposition is composed of a hard core of true anti-war types but many will go to that end of the spectrum depending solely upon ideology. Here in the US, many Republicans opposed the Democratic Administration's forays into the Balkans while many Democrats opposed both Bush Republican Administration's entries in the ME.

There is also a two (some say three) year rule -- Americans will support a war for two or three years and then just want it over so they can get on with other things. Many also dispute that but again, it is historically validated -- even in WW II, by early 1944, everyone was tired of it. We are an impatient bunch and just want to get it fixed and get back to barbecueing in the back yard. ;)

I personally am strongly convinced both 'rules' are valid and that this has a significant effect on your hypotheses. I also believe that the US can and should avoid small wars if at all possible for those reasons. That does not mean we should not know how to conduct them; we must and should be prepared to do so -- but they are not the US way of doing business so we should try to stay out of them if able. My sensing is that many in the US instinctively share this view but may not be able to or wish to articulate that.

William F. Owen
11-28-2008, 03:15 PM
Mr Owen, could you go into more depth as to what parts of my planning are incorrect. From what you said it seems like you know a lot of information that I would find very helpful, and it seems as though I might have missed these ideas in my reading!


A.) call me Wilf and B.) I may not know more than you, however...


'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'

I would suggest that in order to progress this effectively, you have to define small wars, and a measure of effectiveness.

A lot of criticism of the US conduct of Vietnam is based on the "if my mother had wheels, she would be a bus," line of thinking.

...but Vietnam was not a small war. It covered the whole spectrum of warfare from 1950 to 1979, and the US was only really there from 65-73 (well 56-75 for some!!)

When left to their own devices, the US are actually pretty/very good. ...and they do learn fast, and there is ample material to support this, but what they learn the do seem to forget. Why they do, may be worthy of some study.

I think a lot of US guys here would agree that they are constantly re-inventing the wheel and coming up with some very dubious concepts to support the latest fad, so that may be worth looking at.

Comparing the US to everyone else may not be useful and may be misleading. - but that's just my opinion.

Ken White
11-28-2008, 03:24 PM
reinventing the wheel -- that's due to massive egos and arrogance "I don't need help, I have all the answers" is as American as the proverbial apple pie. We're arrogant twits at times... :eek:

On the fads, that's our short attention span and constant search for quicker and better ways to do things (never cheaper...). :D

War is a very human endeavor; the attitudes and proclivities of people permeate it and will influence the way they go about it. While people are people the world over, Americans are rather different from Europeans in many aspects of collective psyche. :wry:

selil
11-28-2008, 03:51 PM
my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night."

Go ahead and JUST TRY and get that article (or journal). I've been plying our electronic sources librarian with adult beverages for two years and Purdue isn't exactly a small school.

selil
11-28-2008, 03:58 PM
As a person working on my PhD dissertation I would mention to the council in general that there is an underlying push to make the dissertation a book. It is all about the book. If you don't have a book when you are done you can't get the faculty job. I already have the vaunted tenured faculty job so I've told THREE book publishers no. BEFORE the dissertation is even done. I don't agree with the pressure for the book but I do understand where the pressure is coming from.

For the record my dissertation is a "sample" of the work I've done in the area. Right now I'm writing the methods section and really really really (x10K) struggling with an a-typical approach to reversing a representational model which is non-empirical.

Xander, there are a variety of resources published by Air University at Maxwell in the 1980s. The books are all about low-intensity conflict and perceptions post Goldwater-Nichols Act on how small wars can be fought. You can get them for.... FREE... via PDF or postage if you can find their resources person.

Entropy
11-28-2008, 04:57 PM
You might also want to do some searches of the DTIC archive (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/) as part of your literature review if nothing else.

John T. Fishel
11-28-2008, 07:18 PM
and for Sam, I believe that Taylor & Francis (who bought out Frank Cass) the publisher of LIC&LE and Small Wars & Insurgencies would reproduce all the articles in these journals (and their others) for a price. :rolleyes: I do suspect that the UK libraries will have the journals. In the US, I am sure that the libraries of the military graduate schools have these journals - CARL at CGSC (Leavenworth), the AWC, the NDU library. All work with interlibrary loan. Indeed, that is probably the best way to go (but you may have to tell your librarians where to look.

Cheers

JohnT

Bill Moore
11-29-2008, 03:49 AM
xander day wrote,
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so.

xander, like the others I applaud your efforts, but find your thesis statement flawed.

First, when you state that the American military has difficulty fighting small wars, that implies that other nations don't and are actually good at it. I would argue that most modern countries (especially democracies) have major difficulties waging small wars, especially small wars that endure over a long period. I'm sure you can list many failed European attempts to hold onto their colonies.

Furthermore, the recent trend to compare Malaysia to Vietnam is shamefully deceptive and unproductive. Put the Malysian Emergency in perspective, it was a British colony, and the Brits defined the rules, which gave them considerable freedom of movement. And while the emergency was serious, it paled in comparison to the problem set in Vietnam. As Owen stated the Vietnam War was not just a small war, combat with NVA regulars was as conventional as it got, and it was the conventional fight in the end that was decisive when NVA regulars rolled into Saigon.

Concurrently there was an insurgency, and some criticism directed against the U.S.'s early COIN efforts in Vietnam is deserved (although it frequently over hyped in my opinion). However, what seems to be overlooked is our many successes in Vietnam against both the NVA and the insurgency. GEN Abrams developed an appropriate COIN strategy, so we did learn, and we did concurrently while waging a conventional fight, and in a country where we didn't write all the rules. When we pulled out the VC were largely contained, at least to the point that they were not a vital threat to S. Vietnam, and the NVA was back in their box.

There are some new historical books coming out without the political agendas of the past, that shine a new light on our conflict in Vietnam. By all means criticize our shortfalls, but please keep it in perspective. If you want to compare America's performance to Europe's colonial wars, then I recommend you look at our conflict in the Philippines. We adapted rather quickly and in most respects did better than other modern countries.

Second, since your thesis is focused on the American Military's shortfalls, which there are many, but I think Ken put in perspective well when he explained the political and social factors on our homefront that shape our military policy and strategy.

I have to thank William Owen for this statement,
When left to their own devices, the US are actually pretty/very good. ...and they do learn fast, and there is ample material to support this, but what they learn the do seem to forget. Why they do, may be worthy of some study. We do have the doctrine for small wars, and we had it long before the new COIN manual came out a couple of years ago. Why we failed to adapt to the situations we were in sooner still confounds me, but we do adapt.

My final point is that some small wars are not winnable for America or anyone else because the objectives are too lofty, too expensive and take too much time, which means the social and political factors that Ken addressed will preclude success. That is not a problem unique to America.

selil
11-29-2008, 03:00 PM
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so.

I wouldn't call the above a thesis but more of a research motivation. On the social side of things there is a lot of academic literature that says we don't fight wars very well at all. That body of work tends to make the militant military types very uncomfortable because in reality what does a good war look like? Sun Tzu and Clausewitz both would say the one you don't have to fight.

Here are a few you could look up. None are going to have "THE ANSWER" I've found some value in reading them.

Barno, D. (2006). Challenges in fighting a global insurgency. Parameters(Summer), 15-29.

Dunlap, C. (1997). 21st century land warfare: Four dangerous myths. Parameters, Autumn, 27-37.

Fleming, B. (2004). Can reading Clausewitz save us from future mistakes. Parameters, 2004(Spring), 62-76.

Hooker, R. D. (2005). Beyond Vom Kriege: The character and conduct of modern war. Parameters, 2005(Summer), 4-17.

Meigs, M. C. (2003). Unorthodox thoughts about asymmetric warfare. Parameters, 2003(Summer), 4-18.

Szafranski, R. (1990). Thinking about small wars. Parameters(September), 39-49.

Gross, L. (1948). The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948. The American Jouranl of International Law, 42(1), 20-41.

Brubaker, J. R. (2005). Low-intensity cultural conflict: Critical art, terrorism and the neurolinguistic environment. Anthropology of complex societies, 2005(Spring), 1-7.

Low-intensity conflict and modern technology. (1986). Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press.

Blank, S. (2003). Rethinking asymmetric threats. Carlisle, PA: Stategic Studies Insitute U.S. Army War College.

Blank, S., Grinter, L. E., Magyar, K. P., Ware, L. B., & Weathers, B. E. (1990). Responding to low-intensity conflict challenges. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press.

Dean, D. J. (1986). The Air Force role in low-intensity conflict. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press.

Echevarria, A. (2005). Fourth-generation war and other myths. Strategic Studies Institute: United States Army War College.

Schmedlap
11-29-2008, 11:40 PM
The Utility of Force (http://www.amazon.com/Utility-Force-Modern-World-Vintage/dp/0307278115/ref=ed_oe_p/191-9637629-1953960) by General Rupert Smith

xander day
11-30-2008, 12:18 PM
thanks for all of your replies guys! each is very helpful!
reading the amazon book review for The Utililty of Force as linked by Schmedlap, the author of said review says the following:

a year ago, an outraged British brigadier wrote a slashing (and according to some American officers, deeply unfair) critique of the U.S. Army's conduct of the Iraq War, attacking everything from its jargon to its general officer culture, something remarkable happened. The U.S. Army published the piece in its premier tactical journal, Military Review, and the Army's chief of staff passed the article around to our general officers.

anyone know who this brigadier was and where i could get his critique (and responses if anyone knows where they are) other than in the Military Review?

also, Selil, you are my hero! thanks for all of those bib references, i am sure that they will be incredibly helpful.

in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangabley.

thanks! :D

William F. Owen
11-30-2008, 02:58 PM
in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangeably.


Ahhhh... welcome to our world! :rolleyes:

a.) 4GW is highly controversial. I know and respect both TX Hammes and Bill Lind, as intellects - and nice guys, but I will have nothing to do with 4GW. Some folks swear by it, but it is full of wholes, and states opinions as facts.

b.) The words "Small War" and "Unconventional" are not academically or doctrinally precise. 4GW refers to a "generation of warfare." If you think that's rubbish (which I do) then don't get caught up in the semantic slugfest which dogs the study of war and warfare.

if you look at 4GW like I, and others here, do then 4GW is not something you come across either in the study of war, or warfare, as it does not survive rigour in either discipline.

slapout9
11-30-2008, 04:53 PM
Jeffery Record from the Air War College has written quite a bit about this. He even did a whole book about it (have not read it) go to the Air University Link for his recent book review...."How David Beats Goliath".....or something like that.

slapout9
11-30-2008, 05:22 PM
Link from the SWJ Library to Jeff Records on article on why culture stops America from winning small wars.

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640

Ken White
11-30-2008, 06:42 PM
You'll note that the linked article he provides mirrors your beliefs to a great extent. I believe that reflects the common wisdom of academia, the political classes and the media -- however I and others disagree with that on several counts.

I'll use Record's words and give my counterpoint. I say 'my' because these words are mine however I've found a large number of people all over the country -- not members of the academy or media -- who essentially agree.

Quoth the abstract of Record's essay:
"Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Expecting that America's conventional military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success, Americans are surprised and politically demoralized when confronted by Vietnam- and Iraq-like quagmires."I strongly agree with his first point and more strongly disagree with his second. SOME Americans feel that way and they tend to move in the social circles in which Jeffrey moves; more Americans, I think are disappointed (not demoralized) that the armed forces have not succeeded and they are generally not surprised. The 'wisdom of crowds' syndrome applies; most are less surprised at failure or tedium than are the political and chattering classes.
"...Since the early 1940s, the Army has trained, equipped, and organized for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries, and it has traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies.He's showing his ignorance -- that's been true since 1787; that Prussian influence...It has been particularly true since 1900-17.

Having said all that, he's correct in his inference:
"Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation.but wrong, IMO, on three counts in the way he arrived at that inference; (1) his attribution of the risk aversion of the public is wrong as I stated above; (2) he does not understand or state all the drivers for the Army's predilection for avoiding small wars -- quite simply, they're very messy, very tedious and hard on the troops. That simple. Congress aids in this because of their misperception that the public is vehemently opposed (they are not, the 1/3 and two year rules apply) and their, Congress', desire to fund the big ticket procurement items as opposed to necessary training as vote buyers; (3) the statement that "the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation." is a left leaning ideological statement that is highly arguable if not downright ludicrous.

He ends with:
"The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security."I agree with that and again say he got the correct result but for the wrong reasons. :rolleyes:

The real reason to avoid such wars aside from the fact that they're messy and tedious (the Army position) is that we Americans are too impatient to prosecute them properly (the two year rule), too politically diverse and / or divided to develop unity of purpose in most cases (the 1/3 rule) and that most of them are, indeed, not necessary to secure US interests (Record's first and only accurate point...). IMO, of course. ;)

John T. Fishel
11-30-2008, 07:51 PM
Peter Feaver, a Prof of Political Science at Duke and a Naval Reserve officer, has done a lot of survey research on American public attitudes toward military interventions. Summarizing much of that, Feaver found that the American public is more than willing to sustain casualties in a conflict that they believe is important and that is being prosecuted effectively. Feaver's research tends to support the overly simplistic, but accurate in practical terms, 1/3 and 2 year rules (of thumb). But note that the public is willing to support a war longer and more willingly if the two stated conditions obtain.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
11-30-2008, 08:45 PM
The 1/3 and two year rules are of course nothing but very simplistic rules of thumb, shorthand for American diversity / divisiveness and impatience. I know the psych-folks say there's no such thing as a national trait. Perhaps, but those two things come close to disproving that idea...

The 'rules' are a convenient and concise way to express two phenomena for which as you say there is evidence -- and there's certainly some practical accuracy there, subject as always to the exceptions. My general observation has been that a majority of Americans will support the effort for far longer if they perceive it is being prosecuted as well as can be expected and see a real American interest in the outcome. :cool:

I'm also convinced that most Americans are little affected by bodybags -- provided they see a return or prospect of one for the loss. ADDED, for Xander -- that's the great unwashed, the American public. Politicians and Academia are affected by them; the former for unreasoning fear of voter turnoff, the latter due to ideological persuasion. The media here in the US will affect sadness and dismay while they revel behind the scenes at the thought of greater sales; "if it bleeds, it leads" being their watchwords.

The thing that has always bothered me is not the fickleness of that 1/3 of the public in the center who vacillate depending on how well things seem to be going (though they're mildly annoying; either the effort is worthwhile or it is not) but the large ideological component of either Yea or Nay sayers. :confused:

I am unable to understand people or politicians (not the same thing, I think...) who put party loyalty or personal ideology above the needs of the nation. I understand that 'good' is a relative and viewpoint dependent judgment but it seems to me that a large number of good and bad determinations pertaining to a particular war or military operation are based mostly upon political affiliation or leaning...

Allowing ideology to affect ones choices I can understand -- if one is inclined to dislike war, then non-support of most or all wars is understandable and even correct IMO -- to like this or that war dependent upon which party started it is particularly pathetic and borderline indefensible IMO. :mad:

Schmedlap
11-30-2008, 09:38 PM
I am unable to understand people or politicians (not the same thing, I think...) who put party loyalty or personal ideology above the needs of the nation.

Regarding the people, I think they see wars as a part of the political power struggle within the country and truly believe that the political power struggle is more important to the fate of the nation than the outcome of the war. Presidents get good approval ratings when the war kicks off (See 41 and 43). There is a political interest in the opposition party to remove public support so as to erode the political clout gained by the executive and his party. I think that many in the party truly think that this is in the country's long-term best interests.

Regarding the politicians, I think they (most) are just power-hungry sociopaths. The rest are probably motivated by sentiments similar to the people.

Ken White
11-30-2008, 10:51 PM
Regarding the people, I think they see wars as a part of the political power struggle within the country and truly believe that the political power struggle is more important to the fate of the nation than the outcome of the war.I'm sure this is true but still question the rationale for such a belief.
Presidents get good approval ratings when the war kicks off (See 41 and 43).That's the 1/3 rule kicking in. One could make the same comment about Clinton and the Balkans or Kennedy and Viet Nam. Initial support about 60% ±; then when things didn't go well, support declines to about 30% ± as the fickle, 'how well is it going' middle third abandon ship (then come back as things improve -- or not...). In all those cases, the bulk of the less than hard core Anti-war types in the 30% ± opposition to the war were supporters of the out of power political party of the time. Same thing has been true in most of our wars. That makes political sense but is still, to me, illogical and perverse.
There is a political interest in the opposition party to remove public support so as to erode the political clout gained by the executive and his party. I think that many in the party truly think that this is in the country's long-term best interests.I'm sure you're correct, I think pretty much the same thing but submit in the first case that is totally venal IMO and in the latter case, that's just dumb because both parties have done enough wrong along the same line that no one should have much faith in either of them to do much that's good for the nation. :rolleyes:
Regarding the politicians, I think they (most) are just power-hungry sociopaths. The rest are probably motivated by sentiments similar to the people.We can totally agree on that... ;)

As I said, you're probably, almost certainly, right -- but I'm still at a loss to really understand it. Maybe that's because I own more than one firearm??? :wry:

AmericanPride
12-01-2008, 02:21 AM
I'm sure this is true but still question the rationale for such a belief.

I think most people believe, knowingly or not, that what's "good" for them is also "good" for the country as a whole. Political factions are always busy rewriting history and reality to illustrate the significance and necessity of their own existence.

Ken White
12-01-2008, 03:09 AM
I think most people believe, knowingly or not, that what's "good" for them is also "good" for the country as a whole.what is good for Person no. 1 is slightly different for Person no. 2 which is slightly different fer Person no. 3 -- and so on to no.301,214,726. IOW, the sliding scale of what's perceived as 'good' is infinite -- and changes almost daily as the age, circumstances, locations and situation of people change in multitudinous ways. Ergo, there is no real thread of continuity or logic so I still question the rationale. Sorry. ;)
Political factions are always busy rewriting history and reality to illustrate the significance and necessity of their own existence.True. That's bad enough; they also tend when in power to write dippy laws based on those skewed perspectives and including some that they hope will cement their hold on that power -- thus I strongly question the need for their existence even if they don't. :mad:

Federal office holders, including elected politicians all seem to forget their oath of office:

"I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."

I see no mention of party -- or, indeed, of District or State in there (nor, for the Armed Forces, of Branch or Service... :D ).

AmericanPride
12-01-2008, 03:16 AM
Ergo, there is no real thread of continuity or logic so I still question the rationale. Sorry

That's because, I'd argue, people are not necessarily rational -- more like rationalizing. :)

Ken White
12-01-2008, 03:39 AM
We can agree on that...:D

jmm99
12-01-2008, 04:25 AM
is even simpler:


I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as an attorney and counselor of this Court I will conduct myself uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United States.

Interestingly enough, under Rule 8 (attorney discipline), a majority of the Court decides without an adversarial merits hearing whether "conduct unbecoming" (the standard for disbarment) has occured - the burden is then on the attorney to prove innocence. So it has been from the gitgo.

Schmedlap
12-01-2008, 06:54 AM
...That makes political sense but is still, to me, illogical and perverse... in the first case that is totally venal IMO and in the latter case, that's just dumb because both parties have done enough wrong along the same line that no one should have much faith in either of them to do much that's good for the nation... I'm still at a loss to really understand it.

Same here. It makes no sense to me. I just know that it is, regardless of whether it should be.

Holy crap, that kind of rhymes.

BayonetBrant
12-01-2008, 12:57 PM
one of the problems that I have with this dissertation is in sourcing material. I do not, unfortunately, have access to the most up to date books and journals, and as such I am having to rely upon many useful, but old, sources- of which the university library only has a limited number. Hence why what I have outlined may well sound re-hashed or done before.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/periodicals/dodelecj.htm


That links gives you a pretty comprehensive listing of US military professional journals. At a minimum, it should help alleviate the source material problem.

Steve Blair
12-01-2008, 02:23 PM
Linn's recent book "The Echo of Battle" gives a good, general overview of what he sees as US military culture. It's general, and I do have some quibbles with some of his points, but he does speak concisely to why the US military may appear to be poorly prepared for LIC in some instances.

Ken White
12-01-2008, 03:52 PM
Same here. It makes no sense to me. I just know that it is, regardless of whether it should be.

Holy crap, that kind of rhymes.Soldier Scholar, Honest Broker -- a man of many parts... :cool:

On the poetry though, keep your day job. ;)

CR6
12-02-2008, 02:01 AM
Feaver found that the American public is more than willing to sustain casualties in a conflict that they believe is important and that is being prosecuted effectively. Feaver's research tends to support the overly simplistic, but accurate in practical terms, 1/3 and 2 year rules (of thumb). But note that the public is willing to support a war longer and more willingly if the two stated conditions obtain.


JohnT

This article (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/05summer/darley.htm) by William Darley supports that contention, viewed through the lens of the effect of media on popular support for US military operations. It also includes decent end notes that Xander may find of use.

CR6
12-02-2008, 02:09 AM
Linn's recent book "The Echo of Battle" gives a good, general overview of what he sees as US military culture. I had a similar thought Steve. BTW your mention of Linn's work on the Philippines here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=60570#post60570) prompted me to check it out. Another good source for Xander for some context of how American forces have fought insurgents in the past.

Steve Blair
12-02-2008, 04:08 PM
Linn's work on the Philippines is indeed stellar. He's a "must read" when it comes to this period, and how the Army dealt with one of its first overseas COIN-type efforts.

xander day
12-08-2008, 03:35 PM
thanks for all of the help guys! am reducing the dis. down quite a bit and am reading (alot) of the sources that you lot linked me to. thanks a hell of a lot!:D :D :D

Sigaba
07-08-2009, 05:38 AM
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).

It is unclear to me in what field you're writing your dissertation. That piece of information is crucial in regards how one assess your thesis statement.

Regardless of the field, two recently published works that may be of interest to you are Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (ISBN-13: 978-0700615780) and Henry Cole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (ISBN-13: 978-0813125008). Dr. Trauschweizer addresses convincingly some of your points and may provide a good point of departure for additional discussion (this is, if you're looking for a historiographical framework).



The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
Although the dust is starting to settle, "culture" remains a highly contested term and basis for analysis in historical studies as well as other fields. I don't think one has to master this literature to write about culture intelligently. Still, it may be worth your while to develop your definition of "culture" and place it within the broader debate over the term. This suggestion is aimed at positioning your work so it can reach a broader audience.

The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war.
In regards to Upton, his reforms, and the "traditional division" in civil-military relations, I advise the utmost caution. The late Russell Weigley offered some observations on Upton and his reforms which were expanded by the late Stephen Ambrose in his biography of that troubled man. In tandem, the two raised questions about the efficacy of Upton's proposed reforms. I have explored some of those questions in my own research (as well as adding one or two of my own). The short version of my findings is that I do not believe that the U.S. Army's official account of Upton's reforms or of civil-military relations during the Gilded Age are supported by the documentary evidence.

If my interpretation is correct (I have evidence and a hunch that may lead me to a 'smoking gun'), many modern basic assumptions about civil military relations as well as the professionalism of the Army's officer corps may have to be re-examined.

As this project is well over the horizon, I think you will do well enough if you consult carefully Weigley's works on the U.S. Army and be wary of works that reference works by Upton, his biographer and friend Peter Michie, and, especially, Samuel Huntington. (I advise using Ambrose's biography of Upton guardedly. Regrettably--because he inspired me to study military history--Ambrose was exposed as a plagiarist towards the end of his life. As his lapses of judgment spanned his career, it is difficult to know which paragraphs of which of his books are reliable. Until that gets sorted out, why take unnecessary risks?)

In regards to your 'big war' versus 'small war' comparison, have you considered the preference you attribute to the U.S. Army (a conclusion with which I'm inclined to disagree) as a side effect of the quest for decisive battle?

HTH

Schmedlap
07-08-2009, 04:44 PM
Regarding the Army's culture in terms of fighting small wars - I may be overly paraphrasing this, but a few thoughts...

- I think the gist of Nagl's Eating Soup book was that out ability to prevail in COIN is dependent upon what kind of learning organization we are. How fast do we learn and are we sufficiently open to learning new things and, if so, how quickly can we implement those lessons?

- Consider (generally) how we learned in Vietnam. A guy deployed for a year, learned a bunch of stuff, came home, went to a professional school, shared those lessons (somewhat) with his peers, his peers returned to their units and hopefully passed along those lessons. The process took months. (If I'm off base with that, I'm sure one of the board's resident dinosaurs can correct me). Now, it occurs in almost real time. Soldiers go on patrol, return to base, hop online, and share lessons learned with anyone else in the Army (anywhere in the world) who cares to listen. The amount of web traffic on our knowledge sharing networks suggests that many do care to listen.

- Our online knowledge-sharing networks (PlatoonLeader.army.mil, CompanyCommand.army.mil, NCONet, S3-XONEt, etc, etc) help to facilitate this sharing of lessons learned directly among Soldiers. Our Center of Army Lessons Learned helps as well. The fact that the Army uses these networks effectively suggests that the Army culture is conducive to the change and learning necessary to win small wars that we were unprepared for when we first got engaged in them.

John T. Fishel
07-08-2009, 05:23 PM
off base if you think the system actually internalized the lessons from Vietnam. It recorded them and wrote them down and preserved them in doctrine. But it did not actually learn them. Oh, some folk did - SF, and what in the 80s would be called LICimites - but not the Army as a whole. The Marines, IMO, partially learned these lessons as a system but not the Army.

Cheers from one old dinosaur

JohnT

Schmedlap
07-08-2009, 06:06 PM
off base if you think the system actually internalized the lessons from Vietnam. It recorded them and wrote them down and preserved them in doctrine. But it did not actually learn them...

Cheers from one old dinosaur
Johnosaurus Rex,

Understood. I was referring more to the process. The process being that lessons were learned by individuals who brought those lessons back after a one-year deployment and shared those lessons with whichever peers cared to listen, and then, in some cases, those peers spread those lessons by word of mouth (a very long delay between an individual learning and that lesson being shared). Did I get that part about right? It seems like what formerly took months now takes days. As for internalizing those lessons - agree - and I still wonder if we will internalize the lessons that we learn today or if we will try to forget it and revert back to preparing to fight an industrialized total war against some imaginary opponent who will be stupid enough to fight us on our terms.

I guess not only speed by openness is relevant, too. My impression is that much of the military started to be exposed to the right lessons by the end of Vietnam, but a lot of leadership still didn't want to hear it. So even if the lesson-spreading was quicker, it would have simply slammed into the brick wall at a higher velocity, rather than scaling it.

Ken White
07-08-2009, 06:08 PM
Dinosaurs have been attracted to fresh meat...:D

Ditto what John T. said. Schmedlap missed only one small thing with respect to Viet Nam -- repeat tours. The Officers and NCOs who learned good lessons the bad way were only able to impart them to a few others before they left for another tour in the land of opportunity. The casualty and KIA rates for NCOs and Co Grade officers meant that the lesson diffusion was not great. Still, basic point that lesson impartation during that war was poor is generally correct.

Lessons learned today indeed are proliferated rapidly and the Army has adapted far more rapidly and effectively than it did in Viet Nam. Organizations like the Asymmetric Warfare Group have been instrumental in pushing new techniques (and, equally or more importantly, reviving old ones) so that's correct.

Two points for consideration though.

While lessons learned do get rapidly disseminated and the system adapts more rapidly, everyone has to realize that the personnel system has NOT adapted and that personnel turbulence has a significant adverse impact on units, lessons learned and embedding those lessons in the units.

We were unprepared for this bout of Small Wars due to a POLICY, not doctrine, that decreed they should be ignored. Numerous people in the Army during the 1975-2002 period tried to reverse that policy to no avail. So there is a culture issue because the culture drove that policy and most within the culture subscribed to it. Culture is largely molded in organizations by personnel selection and promotion policies as well as by organizational education and training processes. If you do not fix those things, you will not change the culture. Point is that all the effective networks in being do not translate to effective training (ask the Troops...) and that they have not thus far affected the culture.

One can only hope they will...

Boom, boom, boom, ...., ...

P.S.

Sigaba is on to something with Upton. The US Army adopted all the bad aspects of the German General Staff and training systems and none of their good ones. We should have developed as US specific system and we did not; we pulled our usual trick with many things -- copied someone else's idea, engineered it until it didn't work as well, tacked on a few minor embellishments and called it our brilliant solution to the problem.

We are slow to learn...

IntelTrooper
07-08-2009, 06:47 PM
We are slow to learn...
So the working title of the dissertation is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'

Perhaps questions in the title of dissertations is more of the style in that part of the world, but if one were to write such a thing in the US it would probably be more along the lines of:
Lessons Not Learned: American Military Culture and Small Wars, 1950-2006

Steve Blair
07-08-2009, 06:55 PM
So the working title of the dissertation is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'

Perhaps questions in the title of dissertations is more of the style in that part of the world, but if one were to write such a thing in the US it would probably be more along the lines of:
Lessons Not Learned: American Military Culture and Small Wars, 1950-2006

Change the time period from 1950 to, say, 1792 or so and you might be onto something....

Vietnam is just a more recent example of our system failing to retain these lessons, or to emphasis the knowledge it did retain.

Ken White
07-08-2009, 07:22 PM
Change the time period from 1950 to, say, 1792 or so and you might be onto something....

Vietnam is just a more recent example of our system failing to retain these lessons, or to emphasis the knowledge it did retain.and you can add in large wars as well.

The problem is skill decay from non use between wars, varying opponents who suffer from the same problems and adopt different fixes for them thereby confronting us with different TTP / Operational methods and the (probably necessary) Momization, my term for excessive niceness, in civil society between wars.

ADDED:{The generational problem of rejecting all your parent's ideas is also involved -- each new generation of senior leaders seems to believe they should reject all that came before because they are better and smarter. That's not usually so but it is very American -- witness each new Administration totally rejecting all the previous Admin did and said -- and then adopting precisely the same methods and goals... END Addendum}

Add our process of one year or so tours since Korea and one is confronted with a massive 'unlearning' of muscle memory, dimming of senses and memories, fragmentation of corporate values and processes and culture and emotional switches between Momization and the particular fight of the day. Thus skill and competency shortfalls are embedded by practices designed for peace. Take that peacetime conditioned force and throw it into a fight and you have obvious problems.

Penalty of living in a democracy. It's worth it in my estimation but it is tough on those who have to fight. Luckily, enough people look at it as I did and do -- as a tolerable burden. So far...

Those problems could be fixed, obviously, by increasing Guard and Reserve strength and equipping and training them for MCO; having smaller active forces, more selective in recruiting, better trained and equipped to do the fire brigade stuff and by increasing significantly our intel and diplomatic abilities -- and, more importantly, our political will -- to preclude commitment to unnecessary and almost always counterproductive (and unduly costly in all senses) FID and SFA operations.

However, the political will to employ such a force does not exist nor is there political will to create such a force because there is no political courage to tolerate such a force. So we get to bumble along as usual. :(

It's the American way. Generally works out as most of our opponents are way more inept than we are. So far...

marct
07-09-2009, 01:16 PM
Hi folks,


So the working title of the dissertation is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'

Perhaps questions in the title of dissertations is more of the style in that part of the world, but if one were to write such a thing in the US it would probably be more along the lines of:
Lessons Not Learned: American Military Culture and Small Wars, 1950-2006


Change the time period from 1950 to, say, 1792 or so and you might be onto something....

You know, I would change the title to "Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively? American Military Culture and Small Wars, 1776 - 2006".

The real key, IMHO, is the word "effectively" (we can argue about the term "culture" latter on ;)). Over the centuries, the concept of what is "effective" has shifted, covering the spectrum from forced deportation (e.g "The Trail of Tears"), genocide including biological weapons (e.g. smallpox), to "Hearts and Minds". The problem is semantic: "effective" assumes a particular effect is desired - which is a policy / culture choice.

To my mind, phrasing the question in the dissertations as "How does...." implies that it is US military culture that is the primary source of ineffectiveness. Personally, while I would certainly agree that it is a factor, I do not view it as the primary (or even dominant) cause. Let me further note that US military culture is strongly embedded in the more general US culture, and that its options and actions are strongly controlled (in the sense of environmental influences and selection criteria) by the political culture of the US.

Steve Blair
07-09-2009, 01:32 PM
To my mind, phrasing the question in the dissertations as "How does...." implies that it is US military culture that is the primary source of ineffectiveness. Personally, while I would certainly agree that it is a factor, I do not view it as the primary (or even dominant) cause. Let me further note that US military culture is strongly embedded in the more general US culture, and that its options and actions are strongly controlled (in the sense of environmental influences and selection criteria) by the political culture of the US.

I would agree, Marc. US military culture in many ways was formed by American political culture, which was dominantly anti-military (at least in the sense of having a standing army) for about the first 150 years (give or take a few) of our history. Many of their responses, reactions, and methods of presenting information grew out of that relationship. It's also worth noting that the Army prior to 1900 was in many ways divided against itself, with the strong division between the Line and Staff components. It's a complex relationship, with many hands and minds over the years stirring the brew.

John T. Fishel
07-09-2009, 01:37 PM
1. Schmedlap, you are right as far as you go. Agree with Ken's reply. Would only add that sites like this bring debates into the open in ways that did not exist previously. Also, see Richard D. Downie's, LEARNING FROM CONFLICT. COL (ret) Downie's book is cited and credited by John N with inspiring his approach.
2. Ken, must disagree on one point. Throughout the 19th century, the officers who fought the big wars (1812, Mexico, Civil, and Sp-American) were mainly veterans of the Indian Wars or went on to fight in the Indian Wars. this same trend continued into the 20th century. The problem was that few of those officers internalized the lessons from their small wars or internalized the wrong ones. This is reflected today in the Nagl-Gentile debate (which never would have happened in any open and transparent way at any other time:D).

Cheers

JohnT

Steve Blair
07-09-2009, 01:52 PM
2. Ken, must disagree on one point. Throughout the 19th century, the officers who fought the big wars (1812, Mexico, Civil, and Sp-American) were mainly veterans of the Indian Wars or went on to fight in the Indian Wars. this same trend continued into the 20th century. The problem was that few of those officers internalized the lessons from their small wars or internalized the wrong ones. This is reflected today in the Nagl-Gentile debate (which never would have happened in any open and transparent way at any other time:D).

Cheers

JohnT

My one comment here is that prior to Root's reforms many of those lessons could be preserved at the unit level. In other words, for each regimental officer who internalized the wrong lessons there was another close by who had the right lessons on call...or there were a handful of older enlisted men who could help out. Once the personnel system changed that internal knowledge bank went away. Yes, there were some very interesting debates in the Army&Navy Journal and Journal of the Military Service Institution (I may have the last title slightly incorrect...working from memory) about the conduct of wars small and large during this time, and it carried over into early editions of the Cavalry Journal. And they were somewhat similar to the Nagl-Gentile discussions. But most of the small wars knowledge never became official or part of any instructional cirriculum. Officially the Army remained focused on major conflict during this time, understanding (perhaps at an unconscious level) that it could count on those with experience in small wars when the need arose.

Most of that changed, in my opinion, when assignments became shorter and based on the individual instead of the unit. Officers rotated before they could learn from those with that experience, meaning that as the "old timers" retired their knowledge went with them. In some cases that was good, but in others it meant that many hard lessons disappeared. The expansion of the Army also played a role here, obviously. One possible reason that the Marines remained pretty capable in small wars throughout the interwar period was the small size of the Corps, although the author of Mars Learning makes the point that the Marines might also have latched onto small wars competency as one reason (along with amphibious landings) to justify their numbers during a time of cuts.

Ken White
07-09-2009, 04:04 PM
2. Ken, must disagree on one point. Throughout the 19th century, the officers who fought the big wars (1812, Mexico, Civil, and Sp-American) were mainly veterans of the Indian Wars or went on to fight in the Indian Wars. this same trend continued into the 20th century. The problem was that few of those officers internalized the lessons from their small wars or internalized the wrong ones. This is reflected today in the Nagl-Gentile debate (which never would have happened in any open and transparent way at any other time:D).I'm not sure we have a disagreement. I agree with your statement above except that last sentence. That only because I can recall similar debates in the old Armed Forces Journal (less assertive in tone, to be sure) and the Cavalry and Infantry Journals. That's a minor quibble, I agree with you that the 19th (and early 20th) Century folks did swap back and forth. My point was that even so, the gear switching was obvious in the minor glitches that occurred and we have, in every war; Mexican, Civil, Spanish American, World Wars I and II, Korea, Viet Nam and today had an initial period of major and minor errors. You can even toss in Grenada and Panama, Small Wars with many errors -- that's not a knock; error is inevitable in war -- my comments were aimed at the 'why' they are inevtiable

I meant to apply my problem of generational dissension and "The problem is skill decay from non use between wars, varying opponents who suffer from the same problems and adopt different fixes for them thereby confronting us with different TTP / Operational methods and the (probably necessary) Momization, my term for excessive niceness, in civil society between wars" mostly to the post WW I Army and I'm remiss in not being clear on that.

I did slightly better with the one year tours for Korea and afterwards... :wry:

John T. Fishel
07-09-2009, 05:09 PM
quite the dinosaur I imagined. The earlier journal arguments were before my time and I did not do the historical research. :p My reading of military journals began in the 70s with Military Review which rarely got into the kind of controversy that, say, Marine Corps Gazette regularly promotes. Still, I wonder if the openness of the e-world hasn't really made debate more transparent and been, as suggested by others here, more successful in making lessons learned as opposed to merely recorded.

Cheers

JohnT

marct
07-09-2009, 05:17 PM
Hi John,


Still, I wonder if the openness of the e-world hasn't really made debate more transparent and been, as suggested by others here, more successful in making lessons learned as opposed to merely recorded.

I suspect that it isn't more "transparent" per se - just more widely spread :wry:. If anything, I suspect that the debates are less transparent now that, say 100 years ago, simply because of a) the size of the populace involved in them and b) a greater technical specialization creating independant "semi-disciplinary" languages that have different assumptions.

In odder werds, t'er ontologies don't mesh :p:D!

John T. Fishel
07-09-2009, 06:31 PM
Let's just drop back a generation. The MR, Parameters, Proceedings, Gazette audience was pretty narrow. Mostly, it was service specific and sometimes even rank specific. (Majors and below tended to read MR; COL tended toward Parameters in the Army - not perfectly correlated....) Then, this stuff was available by subsription, military library, military distribution, and in some civilian research libraries. Today, it is nearly all available online as well as in all the traditional places. Here, in SWJ, we debate pretty esoteric stuff and, as we all know, have made the Rolling Stone Hot List as well as Foerign Policy online. Indeed, all our stuff is transparent in ways that it never was before. The interested population has expanded at a rate, I would hypothesize, much greater than the population as a whole.

Cheers

JohnT

marct
07-09-2009, 06:39 PM
Hi John,

I think we're saying pretty much the same things, at least as far as the general readership is concerned, and you've certainly illustrated the spread as a result of 'net technologies. My point, and it is related, is that more people in the general population are now tossing around parts of the debate with little or no understanding of it, and for totally different (usually political) purposes. While I would agree that sites such as SWJ/C and the CAC blog have increased the "transparency", I suspect that once it hits the 'political' (loosely construed) audience, it gets increasingly misunderstood and manipulated.

Cheers,

Marc

John T. Fishel
07-09-2009, 08:04 PM
The interesting aspect of your comment is what happens when the hoi poloi get hold of it. Of course, boobs make hay for political purposes which cheapens the debate. But other new players are not part of the boobocracy - they are serious amateurs and even professionals in realted fields. I wonder if we would have found you a couple of decades ago, assuming you were olde enough to play at that time. ;) More to the point, do the serious new players ourweigh the boobs?

Cheers

John

Sigaba
07-10-2009, 12:38 AM
My point, and it is related, is that more people in the general population are now tossing around parts of the debate with little or no understanding of it, and for totally different (usually political) purposes. While I would agree that sites such as SWJ/C and the CAC blog have increased the "transparency", I suspect that once it hits the 'political' (loosely construed) audience, it gets increasingly misunderstood and manipulated.



The interesting aspect of your comment is what happens when the hoi poloi get hold of it. Of course, boobs make hay for political purposes which cheapens the debate. But other new players are not part of the boobocracy - they are serious amateurs and even professionals in realted fields. I wonder if we would have found you a couple of decades ago, assuming you were olde enough to play at that time. More to the point, do the serious new players ourweigh the boobs?

I don't know if there's ever been a time in American history where the lines of debate were not blurred, the topics not bowdlerized, and the facts not manipulated for one political purpose or another. Americans' hostility towards professionals is as old as America itself.

Were I more articulate, I'd describe concisely the debate as taking place in four interlocking/overlapping spheres.

strategic culture--which includes civilian policymakers, actively involved law makers (i.e. those who sit on relevant committees), academics, and civilian experts (e.g. members of think tanks). This concept is borrowing from a formulation offered by Michael Geyer, a historian, but I'm offering the following nuance by suggesting a distinct sphere for:
service culture--which includes professional servicemen and women up and down their respective chains of command (in this model, each service has its own sub culture and each sub culture is broken down into other spheres such as branch of service)
political culture--this would be the sphere John T. Fishel and marct discuss in their posts quoted above.
popular culture--this sphere includes products mass produced by the entertainment industry but also other popular cultural practices as well (e.g. the gaming community, the re-enactment community, and so on).

MOO, present-day debate over national security policy works better when the first two spheres exert the majority of the influence shaping the discussion. However, my reading of history suggests instances where the debate has been reshaped by the latter two spheres.

Sometimes, this reshaping has proven disastrous. The "longing" anticipation with which many Europeans viewed the approaching storm clouds of World War I is a good example. One might also point to America's experience in Vietnam where the political and popular debate negatively impacted opportunities for more careful debate and, perhaps, victory.

At other times, the reshaping has proven quite timely and ultimately beneficial. For instance, historians of the American Civil War have begun to focus on the role African Americans played in reshaping the nature of that conflict. These arguments political and popular in nature, meant that a war that began to preserve the union ended up being a war fought for more profound goals.

Returning to the OP.

Xander Day, I respectfully suggest that the conversation about your topic is a strong indication that your dissertation would greatly benefit from a clearer definition of terms, terms of debate, and refinement of your topic.

This suggestion is not meant as a criticism. On the contrary, it is to your credit that you can pose a question that can lead to such a sprawling discussion. [And wouldn't it be something if Xander Day never returns to this BB.:wry:]

But take it from one who knows--narrowing your focus and clarifying your terms can make your project more manageable.

My specific suggestions are:


Define an interval for your study.
Pick one armed service and one armed service only.
Look before you leap. When considering your time period and service, do some advance research to gauge the availability of primary source material.
Define your terms. What do you mean when you say "culture"? What is your vision of "effectiveness"? (On this last point, you may the three volume work Military Effectiveness edited by Millett and Murray useful--if you can find a copy. On the former point, volume 57, no, 5 of The Journal of Military History may help shape your thoughts on culture and war. [The issue in question is has a section devoted to that topic.]
Define what you mean by "small wars." I think most members of this board understand what you mean, but will your audience? The U.S. has fought eleven wars. (Twelve, if you include the Indian Wars, and not everyone does.) How many of these conflicts were actually "big wars"? Who decides which war is big and which war is small?
Look at other factors besides culture. As has been suggested above, an armed force's preferred method of fighting often takes a distant back seat to the direction of civilian leaders. If these considerations trump the board, does culture even matter? Or are we talking about a contest of cultures (as my four sphere model suggests)?
Change your question. This suggestion is especially worthy of your consideration if you're writing in the field of history or you have historians in your audience. In its current configuration, your question suggests that there were clear answers at the time that the U.S. Army needed to do certain things and they didn't. This teleological approach is an open invitation for grumpy historians to play "stump the band" with you. If you don't know already, take my word that that's not a fun game to play when you're the stumpee.:eek:
Document your sources and cite your references until your HDD and your committee screams "ENOUGH." At that point, do more documentation. Liddell Hart has made a terrible mess of things for those who study war. A part of cleaning up that mess means we've got to dot every "i" and cross every "t".
Don't worry if it is right, just write. (This suggestion is from the do as I say, not as I do category.;):rolleyes:)

HTH

John T. Fishel
07-10-2009, 02:53 AM
good suggestions and comments. I might quibble with a few - since I am a political scientist, not a historian - but they are quibbles. Regarding comments, I would put both Marc and me in your strategic culture rather than your political culture. There is, of course, some overlap here. Where do we put John Nagl - or Michelle Flournoy both in and out of office?

Cheers

JohnT

Sigaba
07-10-2009, 04:39 AM
good suggestions and comments. I might quibble with a few - since I am a political scientist, not a historian - but they are quibbles. Regarding comments, I would put both Marc and me in your strategic culture rather than your political culture. There is, of course, some overlap here. Where do we put John Nagl - or Michelle Flournoy both in and out of office?

Cheers

JohnT
JohnT--

Thank you for the compliment on my suggestions.

I agree that you and Marc would fit into the sphere of strategic culture as would Mr. Nagl and Ms. Flournoy.

My rule of thumb is that if one's goal is to advance the understanding, discussion and formulation of policy, I'd be inclined to think that person is situated in strategic culture. If one is looking to advance a political agenda and to trade horses, one's in political culture.

As noted, the spheres overlap and one's position can shift over time or on a given issue. All four spheres bring something to the table. (For what my two cents are worth, I have questions about the CNAS that will be answered over time.)

John T. Fishel
07-10-2009, 11:24 AM
had, as one of its goals, to find jobs in the national security sector of the next Democratic Administration for its founders, a goal in which it succeeded admirably!;) That it survived and florished with new top leadersip is a credit to its founders. But where it goes will, of course, be determined by the actions it takes over time. I know that John N wants to be a policy player - he told me so before he joined CNAS.

Cheers

JohnT

marct
07-10-2009, 05:24 PM
Hi Sigaba,

I would agree with John that most of your comments and suggestions are spot on. As for the overlapping spheres model of culture, it is certainly one way of looking at it although I prefer Malinowski's version based on institutions, but that's the Anthropologist in me speaking ;).

I hope that Xander is following this discussion :D!

I did want to add on to some of your specific suggestions - more elaboration than anything....

1. Use operational definitions: either adopt someone else's definition of a key term or create your own definition.

2. Draw a flow chart / systems model of your argument: this is useful for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it helps you clarify the sections in your argument. I'll note that it is usually quite acceptable to "black box" some of the nodes in such a model, defining them as "beyond the scope of this study".

3. Get your committee to sign off (in writing) on the model including the inevitable changes that will happen.

4. Drink lots of beer / scotch / wine with your committee members: This may sound like a joke, but it isn't - you will learn a lot more from them in an informal setting and a free-flow discussion over a few pints than you will in formal meetings.

5. Build yourself a support group crossing disciplines and, specifically, including people in the service you are studying. These people are your safety net that will (hopefully) stop you from making an idiot of yourself when you write (believe me, I know how easy that is to do :o!).

Cheers,

Marc

John T. Fishel
07-10-2009, 07:09 PM
one or more of your committee members object to alcohol, in which case only drink with the others:D

JohnT

marct
07-10-2009, 07:19 PM
one or more of your committee members object to alcohol, in which case only drink with the others:D

Doesn't sound like any academics I'd want on my committee, John :D. Then again, I hang with archaeologists, anthropologists and security studies people - a scruffy crowd :cool::D!!!!

xander day
01-27-2010, 12:38 PM
Thanks very much for the help guys! Sorry that this reply has taken so long: handed the dissertation in 6 months ago and so i wasnt able to use some of the help that you have all given me. For issues of brevity i had to reduce the title of the piece to 'Does America’s subscription to the Big War paradigm damage it’s capacity to wage small wars?' The good news however is that i am now doing a masters, and am expanding upon this topic back to what it originally was, so i can utilize the info that was put forward :D
aaaaaanyway: replies.

Sigaba: I like what you said about the usefulness of investigating Upton, that is: possibly unuseful. I still want to (feel that i have to) discuss him as Cassidy and Weigley both give him quite a role in the formulation of american military culture. Any advice other than 'be careful!'?
I cannot find the books that you suggested in my university library, which is a result of its non-military specialisation. Will carry on looking because they sound really useful, especially Ingo Trauschweizer's book, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War.

Intel trooper: I like the title change! think that i will have to do that.

Steve blair: yeah will expand the date range from what intel trooper said. Given that I am looking at military (and political culture) it will need to be from the very start. Worried that my 20k word limit may be utterly breached by such an expansion, but will give it ago.

John Fishel- what is this Nagl-Gentile debate? I get who Nagl is and pretty much what his position is, but what of Gentile? Sounds like a perfect counter-point. though.

Oh yeah, and with you guys talking about transparency- if it wasn’t for this board I would have missed out on alot of useful stuff. and given that i am a total non-military type sat in a university with no military specialisation, i would say that it is somewhat easier to get access to this sort of information. :D

Thanks again!

Hacksaw
01-27-2010, 02:08 PM
A simple google search on Gian Gentile will give you plenty ot chew on.... Gian Lurks (not used in a pejorative sense) so he may contact you directly...

Best of luck...

Gian where have you been.... giving additional instruction to the women's basketball team???

Hacksaw

William F. Owen
01-27-2010, 03:21 PM
Gian where have you been.... giving additional instruction to the women's basketball team???


He mostly comes at night.... mostly (http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4dbcx_aliens-mostly-at-night_fun).

Xander Day chap

As opposed to 'Does America’s subscription to the Big War paradigm damage it’s capacity to wage small wars?'
you might try,
"Does the US Army's focus on regular threats damage it's ability to fight irregular threats." - Big War and Small War are both excellent, valid and coherent terms, but this subject does demand some semantic precision, which to date is sadly lacking both in military and academic writing on the subject.