Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[SWJED]

The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine - Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? (http://www.newsweek.com/id/171254) - Andrew J. Bacevich (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Bacevich)


In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.

[John T. Fishel]

analysis despite the overblown opening statement. The key question is what more US/NATO troops are expected to do. More troops may well be a necessary first step to getting where Bacevich desires. I certainly hope that GEN Petraeus' JSAT takes Bacevich's argument into account but there is more to the situation than can be stated in a brief article in Newsweek.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

It's almost an exact copy of Colonel Warden's plan that I posted here awhile back.

http://strategydevelopment.net/wordpress/

It actually goes back a lot farther than that, years as a matter of fact. I sat in his office just after we started bombing Astan and he said Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror. I know you guys are tired of hearing this but we better start listening to him or we are going to be in big trouble. He doesn't believe in COIN as we talk about it here but he certainly knows and believes in what we would call UW (By,With,and Through). Even General Van Ripper talks highly of him in his JEQ article on EBO which he points out Warden had nothing to do with in the crazy form it exists today. I will get off my soapbox now:wry:

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with John, I rarely agree with Bacevich but do to an extent concur with this analysis. I agree that infusing a large number of additional troops is not wise and I agree that we need a definition -- not of victory, there will be no victory -- but of our aim in that nation and in the region.

I do disagree with the Bacevich statement that
"No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security—today and for the foreseeable future—than Pakistan." Hyperbole, I believe. Further, he ends
"Rather than sending more troops to the region, the new American president should start withdrawing them and devise a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan." Not smart and seemingly in contradiction to his concern for Pakistan as a threat.

Withdraw precipitously and leave a vacuum in the region? Bad plan. We don't need to devise a realistic and affordable strategy for Afghanistan. We do need to determine what precisely is the US and NATO goal in Afghanistan. From that, a logical operational plan will flow. We do not need to spend the next 20 or 30 years there trying to obtain the mirage of an effective government and a happy productive nation but too rapid a withdrawal would be unwise.

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.

[jmm99]

(from Warden's webpage (http://strategydevelopment.net/wordpress/))
One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is “Execute Good Enough Plans.” The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.

The devil really seems to be in the details of the "good enough plan" - and how one gets there.

COL Warden's plan ends up with this:


This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.

Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted.

If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions.

[slapout9]

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.


You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time;)

And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.

[Ken White]

I agree with Warden in that first quote.

There is no devil in the detail of what constitutes a good enough plan; that's easy -- what's hard is convincing the risk averse to implement the plan instead of improving it until its too late or totally flummoxed... :mad:

The first quote from Warden contradicts his second quoted item. If he really believes
"an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation." that's worrisome because such an agreement (1) Wuldn't be worth the paper on which it was printed; (2) Could not be enforced by an Afghan government no matter how well meaning; (3) Could not be easily verified (he obviously has not been to Afghanistan and moved about on the ground a great deal); and (4) Deviance couldn't be addressed at all well; payments are good -- for the other, what strategic targets within the nation? Ludicrous. I say contradicts because that plan doesn't meet the 'good enough' test.

JMM said:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."Hopefully you said that in jest. 'Iron Clad' agreements mean nothing in the ME or South Asia. You can't enforce them and they know it. They will tell you what you wish to hear and do what they wish to do; the two will only rarely coincide.
"If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions." I wouldn't even bet on that. The area is too volatile and the religion is chameleon like in its ability to adapt and twist.

One cannot look at Afghanistan with western norms in mind and expect to achieve success.

There was a time when we could have insisted and they (they being not necessarily Afghanistan but most nations) would have complied but 58 years of conducting 'limited war's and not adapting our Armed forces to changing norms and times has shown the world that we can be safely defied. that cannot be undone. It can be rectified to an extent and if we're smart, we'll do that but I'm not too hopeful. I'm afraid Colonel Warden and too many still serving senior folks are living in the past. Sorta sad when someone older than all of 'em says that... :(

[Ken White]

You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time;)I can 'gree widdat. Howsomeever, I still think that the COG bit can lead one astray today in this era of niceness and excessive global mobility and ease of communication because -- using Pakistan as an example, it is the 'COG' in the area but we are powerless to do much more than we've been doing, bribe heavily -- you can't always get to the COGs... ;)
And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.If you mean a really long term effort with little progress or improvement, I agree. Same mistake was made going in, an idealistic, nice to have scenario was envisioned and realities on the ground were totally ignored.

We accrue a lot of benefits from our system of government. Or we used to; lately, I'm starting to wonder. Anyway, it's been pretty good but one of the really bad things is that due to big changes every four or eight years it does not at all lend itself to long term international projects.

Many today will tell you that a bipartisan foreign policy won the cold war. Heh. Dream on. There was as many missteps between 1947 and 1987 as there were forward steps -- maybe more. Everybody forgets the boo-boos because it turned out okay in the end and the chattering classes like to think we used to be nicer than we are today (we weren't, not at all). We just don't do long term well...

[Entropy]

I agree with Ken's comments almost completely (thanks for saving me some typing!), though I do tend to lean a bit more to Bacevich on the subject of Pakistan as potentially very serious threat. The threat of a destabilized Pakistan my not be the top potential threat, but I think it's easily in the top five and probably in the top 3.

One thing I will add is that the definition of victory as laid-out by our policymakers is not that muddled: An end to the threat of Al Qaeda's Astan sanctuary. We actually achieved that, but now the challenge is how can that success be sustained over the long term without a significant and enduring American presence. I've argued frequently here that our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons.

Additionally, in some ways I think many, including possibly Bacevich, are confusing means and ends - or rather the means have morphed INTO the ends, so that "victory" is redefined as successful nation-building and not the larger strategic goal of denying AQ a sanctuary in Astan over the long-term. In my judgment, this means-becoming-the-ends problem is preventing us and our policymakers from exploring other ways to achieve the strategic goal of preventing Astan from again becoming a terrorist (AQ or otherwise) sanctuary.

[jmm99]

JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."

Hopefully you said that in jest.

with a couple of layers of irony and sarcasm.

[John T. Fishel]

I know only enough about the cultures of Afghanisatan and Pakistan to be dangerous. As an old MI puke, I know that developing an effective ends, ways, and means strategy for them requires good basic intel. Which is why I have kept my mouth shut regarding what we should be doing there and continuously expressing the educated guess that GEN Petraeus and his JSAT are doing the required legwork.

So, now I will venture into dangerous territory and lay out what I think are the critical tasks in outline form:
1. Define the threat in the region and from the region to us.
2. Describe our desired end state in realistic terms.
3. Indentfy the objectives that must be achieved to get us there.
4. Develop the COA to achieve the objectives.
5. Determine the resources required to carry out the COA.
6. Determine if carrying out the cOA will get us to the end state.
7. Determine if the resources available or that can be made available will do it.
8. Decide if the costs are bearable or too great (both economic and scial costs).
9. a. If bearable go ahead
b. If too great, revisit and revise #2....

(I'm sure you all recognize this approach.;))

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

John, if you don't express your opinion I want ever learn anything :). Think of it as "Open Planning" no need to be right, just brain storm.

[slapout9]

Peter Bergens plan for Astan.

http://www.peterbergen.com/bergen/articles/details.aspx?id=364

[John T. Fishel]

The Bergen piece is a good one. But, after reading it, I still don't know what his desired end state is and, therefore, I don't know whether achieving the objectives he lays out will do that. i don't see anything I really disagree with regarding his COA, but I am not sure what resources are required to carry them out. (Perhaps, that is asking too much of a short article.:))

As I said, I don't know if what he proposes will achieve the overarching goal since I don't know what his end state is. I also don't know from what is given if the resources he hints at are sufficient or can be made availble in sufficient quantities. Finally, I don't know if the cost is too high - oneexample for the Afghans is the cost of reducing the drug trade even by the methods Bergen advocates.

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

Peter Bergen has his theory right - most of what he suggests is in line with classic COIN thinking. The problem is, as always, with applying that thinking to realities on the ground. A few caveats from my perspective:

1. Build the size of the Afghan army and police.
Right on. Has to be done. Bergen suggest roughly quadrupling the present force. However, keep in mind the following: the bill for training, equipping, and advising those folks is high...higher than amateur strategists generally realize. Moreover, the administrative infrastructure to support them - pay, schooling, housing, medical, etc. - doesn't exist. Building such a large Afghan Security Force implies a long-term (and I mean looooong-term) committment of men and money, or else they will do what they have traditionally done: sell themselves to the highest local bidder.

2. Solve the security shortfall in the short term.
Bergen's suggestion to establish tribal militias of 50 to 300 men for security at the district level is a good one. Though it does tend to conflict with the goals of Suggestion Number 1.

3. Reduce the size of the insurgency.
I agree that we shouldbe co-opting the Taliban. Just be aware the price will be high and will inevitably undermine any central government.

4. Embark on effective reconstruction.
I agree in principle, but I disagree with the emphasis on a few large-scale projects. In my opinion the way to go is micro-projects, in particular the reconstruction of the irrigation system. Three big problems, of course. First is you can't reconstruct without security, second is you are starting at absolutely ground zero, so we're talking a huge investment, third is the Afghans are entirely incapable of managing the aforementioned huge investment, so it will be another long committment of US government assets.

5. Hold a free, fair and secure election in 2009.

Even if one could be held, I don't think it would affect the course of events at all.

6. Decouple the Taliban from the drug trade.
Good luck. Bergen admits this would involve us taking over the Afghan judicial system and pretty much funding their entire agricultural effort. For a... all together now...long time. If you want Afghanistan to explode in violence, institute an effective anti-drug program.

7. Fix the problems in the NATO mission.
Everybody loves to beat up on our allies. Truth is, they inherited five years of US neglect, and frankly we haven't been doing that much better in the East than they have in the south. Yes, there is a lot of NATO deadwood, and yes we need to get more out of some of the big players in NATO. But things would be much worse today if the Canadians, Brits, Danes, Portugese, and Dutch hadn't been doing some of the heaviest fighting for the last two years or so.

8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.

Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.

[Ken White]

Entropy says:
"...our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons."

John mentioned that Peter Bergen did not posit an end state while Eden lays out the Bergen prescriptions quite accurately and ends with what anyone concerned about Afghanistan should be considering:
"Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long." (emphasis added / kw)Note that he correctly says "...for the foreseeable future..." How long will that be? More importantly, my fear is that too many are unaware of or deliberately eliding the almost certain fact that Eden mentioned and I highlighted...

[wm]

We might try to substitute "success," but I'm not sure that this much better. We would only be defining that success from our own frame of reference. As Eden notes in the following quote, either process is unlikely to yield much of a long term solution.
. . . the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long. A long term solution is a solution that is freely adopted by the conglomeration of folks that make up Afghanistan, not one that is forced down their throats by a bunch of do-gooder Westerners. If the US/NATO coalition can do things to help the local denizens achieve their goals, then that is what should be the way ahead for the coalition. If not, then the coalition troops need to redeploy to home station. I suspect we have overstayed our welcome. We have already done about as much as we can to show the "terrorists" that we can kick butt when we want and need to. All we now show them is that we are not as good at some other things (like nation building). The longer we stay, the more we will show them how small is the wardrobe of clothes that the emperor has for wear.

Separate point about the comments on airpower discussion below:

8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.
Airstrikes, the "easier wrong", are not the only way we have to attack. They are the only way we have to do so without putting too many of our own troops at risk. Maybe we ought to take the "harder right" of putting our forces (rather than the non-combatant locals) at risk and force our decision makers to see what it really costs to go do "nation-building" in oddball places. That might readjust the Washington bureaucrats' sight picture enough to make them rethink such adventures in the future.

(Yes, Ken, I know that is a forlorn wish. :()

[Ken White]

Having been one of said bureaucrats (who to me, are the career types), my perception is that they are not the problem, not at all -- the majority are far too cautious and self protective to take such risks. The problem is with the dolts we elect and the sub-dolts they appoint who believe their election has granted god-like powers to implement their Party's patented version of Nirvana -- world wide. :rolleyes:

I agree with all the rest...

[jmm99]

Bergen says upfront in the article (albeit, shifting from "challenges" to "goals") that:


... it is important to define the greatest challenges facing the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in order of importance. They are:

• Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border.

• Providing security to the Afghan population.

• Eliminating the growing tactical threat posed by the Taliban on both sides of the border.

• Providing tangible reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan and in the tribal border regions of Pakistan.

• Ending, or at least curtailing, the opium/heroin trade in Afghanistan.

• Expanding the legitimate, largely agricultural economy in Afghanistan.

• Holding fair and secure presidential elections in 2009 in Afghanistan.

To achieve these goals, ...

My question is, if the first "goal" ("Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border") were not at issue, would (should) the US have any national strategic interest in being the primary player with respect to all of the other "goals" ???

Seems that is the question (raised by JTF) that has to be answered before the "how to" questions are addressed.

[wm]

Having been one of said bureaucrats (who to me, are the career types), my perception is that they are not the problem, not at all -- the majority are far too cautious and self protective to take such risks. The problem is with the dolts we elect and the sub-dolts they appoint who believe their election has granted god-like powers to implement their Party's patented version of Nirvana -- world wide. :rolleyes:

I agree with all the rest...

Caught me on the terminology gaffe--I meant the elected and appointed mob that you referenced. Following a longstanding family tradition, I use bureaucrat as a derogatory term for those guys, saving the phrase "civil servant" for the long suffering paid employees forced to do the bidding of the dolts and sub-dolts.

And while we are picking nits :D, I'm not sure that the Party's patented version of Nirvana is what they are implementing. More likely it is the Nirvana aspired to by the finanacial backers who fund (and script the rhetoric of) the Party's mouthpieces and affiliated lobbyists/think tanks. But this is not a political board . . . :rolleyes:

[Eden]

My question is, if the first "goal" ("Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border") were not at issue, would (should) the US have any national strategic interest in being the primary player with respect to all of the other "goals" ???



You hit the nail on the head. If we were able to turn Afghanistan into a Muslim version of Switzerland, with plump farmers tending their arugula fields, children laughing merrily in the streets, and the first Wal-Mart going up in Kabul, there would still be that safe-haven just over the border in Pakistan.

On the other hand, if Pakistan became safe, prosperous, and well-governed from Kashmir to Khyber, Al Quaeda would have to decamp for the Horn of Africa or Guatemala or wherever - regardless of what Afghanistan looks like.

I would argue that we have, in fact, eliminated AQ safe havens in Afghanistan, for what good it has done us. It's just we have chosen about the most difficult, expensive way to do it.

[Ken White]

was really necessary as stated and further question whether that goal could ever be achieved by anyone other than Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.

However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me. :cool:

I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.

Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done and my perception is still that the US -- and NATO -- have no agreed answer to that question. As someone said, involving NATO was a political master stroke which precipitated a strategic and operational mess.

They need to implement John T's planning cycle... :G

[jmm99]

with the young chimps after you sold me the Erector Set Bridge. Yup, one of them has gone missiing; and taken my playbook with him. I suspect he has avoided our winter snows and has gone south to Florida.

Why else would you write this ?


I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.

However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me.

I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.

Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done ....

Which is a long round-about way to say that I agree with you.

----------------------
Now, you (and everyone else) can disagree with me on a few thoughts I have:

1. Primary focus on Afghanistan is misplaced because it is only part of the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem; and part of Afghanistan (the old Northern Alliance region) is not part of that problem.

2. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is a trans-national (cross borders) problem. More Pashtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan - as do more AQ since Tora Bora.

3. This problem is totally out of the book so far as "standard" COIN is concerned. The "book" there thinks in terms of a Host Nation (singular), which is assisted by another Nation (US) to control the sea in which the bad guys swim.

4. The analogous Host Nation in this case is Pashtunistan, which does not exist as we normally think of a nation state. It is not, in reality, anything close to a monolith. It is something akin to medieval France before the Crown consolidated, with multiple power centers. In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai resembles the early kings of France who were surrounded by a ring of "castle keepers" protective against foreign invasiion, but many of whom were as or more powerful than the king. In Pashtunistan, there is not even that semblence of a central power structure other than the Taliban.

5. In formal nation-state terms, we have two Host Nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, neither of which controls the sea in which we are interested. Application of the COIN "book", to the extent it can be applied here, would require both HNs to open the trans-national Pashtun region to us to perform COIN operations (assuming only for purposes of discussion, that we should be doing that); and also join in that effort with us.

6. While Afghanistan-Pakistan resembles Vietnam in its cross-border aspects (infiltration, etc.), it is quite different in most other respects. In Vietnam, the enemy was North Vietnam (the VC being the unconventional portion of the NVA, which also could be unconventional as suited); the Host Nation being South Vietnam; and we being caught between fighting an unconventional war on one hand and a conventional war on the other hand - a debate that still continues today.

7. The multiple Host Nation issue was avoided in Vietnam by the political decisions between 1958-1962 to remove Laos and Cambodia from our equation (they were not, of course, removed from Giap's equation). The 1964 election settled the issue of an aggressive roll-back strategy against North Vietnam and its "neutral" satellites Laos and Cambodia. What might be similar in Afghanistan-Pakistan is the existence of political constraints (albeit different from those in Vietnam), which could make a nullity of any comprehensive strategic plan before it gets on the ground.

8. Have there been counter-insurgency situations involving multiple Host Nations, where the target population (here, the Pashtuns) lived in both Host Nations and were a substantial population (here 42 million) ? My mind is presently blank on any such precedent.

9. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is compounded by the existence of AQ-linked and AQ-leaning groups thoughout Pakistan, which like Afghanistan is very much a composite nation (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and "Paki-Pashtunistan" being its major component parts).

10. Can anything resembling the COIN "book" help in this situation; or will application of what might well be sound COIN principles elsewhere cause us to take our eyes off the ball ? The ball here being the nightmare that AQ will obtain access to Pakistan's nuclear devices.

[sapperfitz82]

But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?

Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.

Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).

If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.

It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).

This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.

[Ken White]

JMM, I could quibble aout a comma here and there but essentially, I think you're correct. I'd only add that Afghanistan is not and has never been a COIN fight; there are insurgent aspects but it's far more complex than that and that it also consists of unconventional and conventional fights.

Sapperfitz 82 is on track I think. Right now our ratio is pretty favorable; one can never tell when such a ratio tips the opponents into a "We aren't getting anywhere with this..." mode. Some die hards will not tip but the majority may. Effectively, what he suggests is what we're doing. It lacks finesse but that doesn't mean it won't work. The flip side of that is how long the Congress and taxpayers will put up with us doing just what he suggests (and how long can the Army sustain it and at what rate).

The worst thing we could do is apply Iraqi lessons learned to Afghanistan; very different theaters, people, processes and potentials...

What's a word for 'theater' that starts with a 'p?' :D

[Devil's Advocate]

But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?

Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.

Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).

If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.

It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).

This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.

Playing global whack-a-mole is not the path to success. If we focus on one area then AQ central would shift their support to another franchise (i.e. AQ in the Mahgreb, Horn of Africa, etc.)

We follow because the govt will continue to react to contact. The govt and the population's attention will shift once the stories of growing AQ (or whoever's) influence in Whereisthatastan. In the end we further AQ's narrative because we come off as the bully.

Maybe I give to much credit to the enemy, but why would they fight when they can live to fight another day and further their message.

[Ken White]

I think he meant that, rightly or wrongly, we are in Afghanistan and Iraq whacking moles. We're doing that pretty well. We are not doing other things well in either place but we're doing okay on the whacking, the ratio is good so let's just keep whacking there.

He's aware, as are most of us here, that our efforts in the other areas you name and in many different parts of the world are better planned and executed than in those two theaters so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.

A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."

They have suggested that we should be initiating contacts instead of reacting. I agree but see three reasons why we aren't doing that.

First; we have not developed the equipment and transport mechanisms to allow stealthy ingress and egress even though the need has been known since 1979. I believe we have purposely not done that to preclude our initiating contact and the senior leadership in DoD (and Congress) has for many years tacitly supported that. Not an accusation of malfeasance, just of excess caution.

Secondly, we are trying to expand our SOF. I have no doubt that great pain will be taken to avoid dilution of quality. Having been around for the last big expansion, I also have no doubt that those efforts will not succeed and that quality will drop and this will offer further reasons for us to not initiate contact. Again, an excess of caution, not criminality.

Thirdly we have become a risk averse and litigation prone society; this has produced armed forces that are quite risk averse and very attuned to the legal niceties. I believe this and our very unwieldy bureaucracy will preclude our initiation of contact and keep us in the reactive mode.

So. What's your proposal to fix this, stop reacting to contacts -- and what's a coherent strategy?

[sapperfitz82]

I am sure you have heard of a mouse trap, usually used in a police manhunt. Basically, if you can't go find the guy, you find where he will go or intice him to go where you are. Then you get him.

We have the distinct disadvantage in this war of having to respect a terrorist's host nation's sovereignty for the most part. We are not going to invade Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Saudia Arabia, and whole lot of other places for a bunch of good reasons. So how do we kill the terrorists there before they initiate action against us? We lure them to a nearby country and kill them there.

Seen in this light, the current fight is the exact opposite of react to contact, in fact it is closer to (sticking with tactical metaphors) a recon by fire. Point is, whatever we are doing strategically, this is getting a good target response and we are killing a lot of bad guys. Perhaps we don't publish body counts because it would be bad for business. Better we encourage them to come fight the infidel in Iraq and Afghanistan through Arab media.

Then we keep improving our ability to survive their action and kill them surgically in our "host countries."

Come into my web said the spider to the fly.

Piggybacking a bit on what Ken White was saying, we are also saddled (and getting more so) with a judicial burden of proof. Having a foreign national travel to a third country to attack you troops in uniform makes it real easy to justify killing him, even (espicially) if the FBI/CIA could apprehend him in his home country on criminal charges. Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.

The cost, as I said earlier, is that this comes across as a State Dept. nightmare. Which it is. Maybe we don't care any more how the rest of the world feels about this and decided to look out for number 1 by the most effective means possible. One could argue that we will make more terrorists by doing this. Perhaps. My answer is, then we had better get real good at killing them.

The long term (50 year) plan should include stability. For the countries we are doing this in and for those that sponsor terror. I would argue that a coalition insurgency to turn the Iraqi Army against Saddam would have pressured Iran more and helped stabalize Iraq sooner (might have taken three years to overthrow SH) and that would be my suggestion for nation/regime change in the future.

Given our current situation, what's really wrong with destroying AQ by having them come to us on a mountain in Astan?

[jmm99]

I've always loved maps, since geography helps reality sense. This one (a clip and shoop from the OP article here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6282)) illustrates why a multi-HN approach has to be employed in dealing with the Pashtuns- if we do COIN by the "book", which doesn't quite cover this situation, anyway. So, why do it by the "book" ?

The old Northern Alliance region is fairly secure as a base of operations. What if the yellow-outlined Pashtun area were regarded as an ungoverned area (not part of any sovereignty) ? - like the white spaces on old 19th and 18th century maps.

What ? - heresy on the part of a lawyer trained in modern I Law and its obligatory nation-state concept. You have to admit that it would change the outlook, even viewed from the standpoint of the Operational Law Manual.

Anyway, this map is food for thinking. If there were no legal constraints (we simply "deem" them away - hell, it's a hypothetical), what would you do in the Pashtun area ?

You might also consider what the Paki-ISI did when it approached that area from the other side of its border. The ISI had advantages we do not have - one, same religion; two, many of them were Pashtuns.

[jmm99]

Why Pakistanis should be nervous is the story of this map.

The major groups (Punjabis, 44.68% of the population; Pashtuns, 15.42%; Sindhis, 14.1%) amount to almost 3/4 of the total population. The two other major groups (another 15+%) are largely in the Sindh.


from Wiki - Seraiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seraikis)
The Seraiki or Multani people are an ethnic group from the south-eastern areas of Pakistan, especially in the area of the former princely state of Bahawalpur and the districts of Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Sehwan, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Sindh, Mirpurkhas, Multan, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, MuzafarGarh, Layyah, Bhakkar, Mianwali, Dera Ismail Khan, Karachi. A significant number of Seraikis also reside in India, with most concentrated in the state of Punjab, Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Seraikis maintain that they have a separate language and culture, but their language is often viewed as a dialect of Sindhi or Punjabi. While the majority of Seraikis follow Islam, a few also follow Hinduism and Sikhism.


from Wiki - Muhajir (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhajir_Urdu)
Muhajir is a diverse term used to describe the Muslim refugees who migrated to Pakistan after the independence in 1947. Traditionally meaning the Muslim refugees who migrated from regions other than the Punjab state of India at the time of Pakistan's independence, in recent years, the term has come to include refugees who've arrived from Burma, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Iran but for all intents, when the term Muhajir is used, it generally refers to the Muslim refugees from British India.

The term Muhajir itself is now gradually being replaced by the more politically acceptable term "Urdu Speaker" or "Urdu" because of its connotations. Even though 'Urdu speaking' term is still not the correct term to identify a group of people since many of these people claim Middle Eastern, Turkish, Afghan and Indian decent. Many can trace their family roots to the Middle East and Central Asia prior to migration to North and Central South Asia. Many of these claims cannot be verified. The one uniting factor for the people regardless of their origin/race is that their mother tongue is Urdu.
......
The majority of people who migrated after the independence were settled in the port city of Karachi in southern Sindh and in the cities of Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas.

As well as the above, many Urdu-speakers settled in the cities of Punjab mainly in Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi

Today, in Pakistan, 7.6% of the population, or around 12 million citizens identify themselves as 'Urdu-Speaking'. Of this number around 8 Million reside in Sindh and around 4 million reside in Punjab and Islamabad.

You can see why the ISI concentrated on turning Afghanistan into a buffer, finally using the Taliban as the vehicle. Their scheme worked fine, except for 9/11.

There have been so many good thoughts planted in this thread, I have to sit back and think about all of this.

PS: sapperfitz82 - you are preaching to this choir on the following:


Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.

The last few months of "pounding the War Crimes beat" are fully in agreement with you. Of the three options (convert, contain or kill), only the last seems applicable to hardcore AQ. Others may differ.

[sapperfitz82]

Seems we've been testing that with the cross-border ops recently. The predator attacks have softened the idea of sovereignty regarding the tribal areas in Pak., does anyone see that the raids will cause more problems than they solve?

I am a bit on the fence on this one. There is a definate danger in sparking a much wider movement against us in the area. I can see a contain/kill policy (pretty much what we've been doing) if we get a little better at the COP implementation and patrol a little more aggressively.

The onus in this senario is containing the pashtun/AQ problem in Pak. and that you have ID'd falls on the non-DoD types (3 letter guys/DoS).

To return to the thread topic, victory is when we have raised the price of being a terrorist to the point that it is no longer a viable option. This includes the cost in terms of life, money, sovereignty, and self-determination. When we are able to take these things away from our enemies at will, we will make other options more palatable.

[jmm99]

I don't want to turn this into an I Law thread; but here are the basics.

Our presence in Afghanistan is based on the UN Charter, Article 51 (Self Defense) and UN resolutions starting with:


(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 1-3)

f. UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority. Additionally, this Resolution authorized member States participating in the ISAF to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.”

As to cross-border incursions (by air or ground), the legal picture starts with the 1907 Hague Convention, which is here (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague05.asp).


Laws of War : Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V); October 18, 1907

V - CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS AND PERSONS IN CASE OF WAR ON LAND

With a view to laying down more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land and regulating the position of the belligerents who have taken refuge in neutral territory;

Being likewise desirous of defining the meaning of the term "neutral," pending the possibility of settling, in its entirety, the position of neutral individuals in their relations with the belligerents;
.....
CHAPTER I The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers

Article 1.
The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

Art. 2.
Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

Art. 3.
Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:

(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;

(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages.

Art. 4.
Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.

Art. 5.
A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.

Any fair reading of the facts requires an inference that Pakistan is in violation of Art. 5 because of AQ and Taliban activities there. The US position on neutrality violations is also clear:


(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 2-32)

XIV. NEUTRALITY

A. Neutrality on the part of a state not a party to an armed conflict consists in refraining from all participation in the conflict, and in preventing, tolerating, and regulating certain acts on its own part, by its nationals, and by the belligerents. In response, it is the duty of the belligerents to respect the territory and rights of neutral states. A primary source of law is Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 18 October 1907. The degree to which traditional “neutrality” has been modified by the Charter of the United Nations is unclear; it is generally accepted that neutrality law still provides some guidance, particularly regarding collective self-defense actions and jus ad bellum analysis. Historically, neutrality rights include the following:

1. The territory of the neutral state is inviolable. H. V. Art. 1. This prohibits any unauthorized entry into the territory of the neutral state, its territorial waters, or the airspace over such areas by troops or instrumentalities of war. Thus, belligerents are also specifically prohibited from moving troops or convoys of war munitions or supplies across the territory of a neutral state. H. V. Art. 2. In consequence, the efforts of the neutral to resist, even by force, attempts to violate its territory cannot be regarded as hostile acts by the offending belligerents. H. V. Art. 10. However, if the neutral is unable, or fails to prevent such violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent, that belligerent's enemy may be justified in attacking those troops in neutral territory.

Like most wonderful I Law agreements, there is no clear mechanism for enforcement of 1907 Hague V. In the bad, old colonialist days, the Power offended by the Neutral Power's violation of Art. 5 would simply tell the "neutral" to clean up its act or we will do it for you.

As I Law developed during the Cold War (which coincided with the end of colonial empires), a definite "anti-colonialist" trend developed in I Law - e.g., the ICJ case of Nicaragua v. United States, which is sourced here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=61161#post61161) at post #3, is a perfect example.

In short, the 600 lb. gorilla will be castigated by all the young I Law chimps - that is, until those young chimps are confronted by the same threat from another tribe of young chimps, when their tune will change.

The US position on Article 51 self-help is quite clear:


(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 1-6)

D. Anticipatory Self-Defense Under Customary International Law.

1. As discussed above, many States embrace an interpretation of the UN Charter that extends beyond the black letter language of Article 51, under the customary international law principle of “anticipatory self-defense.” Anticipatory self-defense justifies using force in anticipation of an “imminent” armed attack. Under this concept, a State is not required to absorb the “first hit” before it can resort to the use of force in self-defense to repel an imminent attack.

2. Anticipatory self-defense finds its roots in the 1837 Caroline case and subsequent correspondence between then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his British Foreign Office counterpart Lord Ashburton. Secretary Webster posited that a State need not suffer an actual armed attack before taking defensive action, but may engage in anticipatory self-defense if the circumstances leading to the use of force are “instantaneous, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” As with any form of self-defense, the principles of necessity and proportionality serve to bind the actions of the offended State.

3. Because the invocation of anticipatory self-defense is fact-specific in nature, and therefore appears to lack defined standards of application, it remains controversial in the international community. Concerns over extension of anticipatory self-defense as a pretext for reprisal or even preventive / preemptive actions (i.e. the use of force before the coalescence of an actual threat) have not been allayed by contemporary use. The United States in particular, in actions such as OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON (the 1986 strike against Libya) and the 1998 missile attack against certain terrorist elements in Sudan and Afghanistan, has increasingly employed anticipatory self-defense as the underlying rationale for use of force in response to actual or attempted acts of violence against U.S. citizens and interests.

4. It is important to note, however, that anticipatory self-defense serves as a foundational element in the CJCS Standing ROE, as embodied in the concept of “hostile intent,” which makes it clear to commanders that they do not, and should not have to absorb the first hit before their right and obligation to exercise self-defense arises.

Since this concept is accepted in the CJCS Standing ROE, special operations in Pakistan - to prevent anticipated belligerent operations launched from there - suffer from no general legal bar. In short, a "whack a mole" type approach is legally defensible. IMO: I Law here is not an impediment - it is more a question of national resolve and the confluence of other national strategic policies.

However, a legal stability operation in Paki-Pashtunistan would require the full consent and co-operation of the Pakistan government. So, if that consent is not forthcoming and if stability operations in both Astan-Pashtunistan and Paki-Pashtunistan are needed to call our campaign a "success", emphasis on stability operations (as opposed to "whack a mole") would seem to lead nowhere.

Karzai (who is a Pashtun) recognizes the fact that the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem cannot be addressed without dealing with the Pashtuns on a non-military level. So, we have seen the various attempts in the last few months to begin some wheeling and dealing with and among the Pashtuns.

Until the Pashtuns decide to "neuter" AQ (which Ken doesn't see happening any day soon), we are left with "whack a mole" in Pashtunistan on both sides of the border - and with a questionable stability operation on the Astan side of the border (because it can only deal with one arm of a back and forth flowing sea of fish).

[Devil's Advocate]

The problem is that despite our success we are not inflicting a prohibitive amount of casualties. We are not impacting the movement by killing scores of young zealots. Other movements, some related to our current enemies, have survived, and succeded against, far more repressive methods.

The lack of honest discourse has prevented the creation of a successful strategy. Empty slogans have replaced strategic principles.

I think that we would all agree that indigenous solutions are the only long term answers in the region. Anything we touch will be tainted (i.e. Karzai govt). What we must do is use selective incentives to force the hand of each respective government. If they do not support our policy goals, they do not receive the money they need to maintain their regimes. In short we find the guy who can deliver and support them.

However, the lack of clear strategy has forced us to go begging for supporters, with predictable results. Again, I see this as a direct result of the lack of intelectual rigor and a risk averse culture at the top.

Tactical success is great, but it is not the first step in developing a strategy. Until we have one, pass the ammo....

[jmm99]

Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=61434#post61434), but his comment below seems relevant here.


from Gentile article

There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds.

Food for thought.

[Ken White]

The problem is that despite our success we are not inflicting a prohibitive amount of casualties. We are not impacting the movement by killing scores of young zealots. Other movements, some related to our current enemies, have survived, and succeded against, far more repressive methods.First off, I didn't and do not claim any 'success.' I did say we were sustaining a good ratio of killed which is not a success in my book; it's a simple fact but it's not success.

I did say this: ""...so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.

A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."(emphasis added / kw)"

While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...

Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions. So you're preaching to the choir. ;)
The lack of honest discourse has prevented the creation of a successful strategy. Empty slogans have replaced strategic principles.Is it lack of honest discourse or simply the usual diplomatic interplay between nations with the added complexity of trying to manage coalition combat operations?
I think that we would all agree that indigenous solutions are the only long term answers in the region.True.
Anything we touch will be tainted (i.e. Karzai govt). What we must do is use selective incentives to force the hand of each respective government. If they do not support our policy goals, they do not receive the money they need to maintain their regimes. In short we find the guy who can deliver and support them.Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.
However, the lack of clear strategy has forced us to go begging for supporters, with predictable results. Again, I see this as a direct result of the lack of intelectual rigor and a risk averse culture at the top.You're partly correct, there is a lack of clear strategy but it exists because the problem was approached -- as you are approaching it -- in western terms. Won't work. The lack of intellectual rigor was in that vein, trying to westernize the issue. The risk aversion is correct and compounded (continues to compound) the problem.
Tactical success is great, but it is not the first step in developing a strategy. Until we have one, pass the ammo....No one said it was. We did say continue to pass the ammo until an achievable goal is determined.

Thus we seem to be in agreement... :D

[Ken White]

Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=61434#post61434), but his comment below seems relevant here...Food for thought.but we do not at this time have the capability required for dealing with AQ by other military means.

He's correct that many more troops won't make much difference and can do as much harm as good -- maybe more.

However, he forgets that AQ is not the only opponent there. Not by a long shot..

[Devil's Advocate]

While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...

--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.

Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions.

--Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;)

True.Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.

--Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.

Thus we seem to be in agreement... :D[/QUOTE]

--Good, now we can solve the next problem:)

PS-evidently I can't figure out the multipe "quote option". Sorry for the ugly post.

[Ken White]

--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:

(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;) (/quote)

In the above example, replace the parentheses with brackets -- or highlight the text you wish and enable the quote button above the message box, the one furthest to the right at top center. Then you get this:
Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;) No need to link, simply read
Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.Thus again we seem to be in agreement...
Good, now we can solve the next problem:)Uh, okay if you say so -- I wasn't aware we'd solved this one ... :wry:

[slapout9]

I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:


(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;) (/quote)

Testing 1...2...3...
yayayaya

In the above example, replace the parentheses with brackets -- or highlight the text you wish and enable the quote button above the message box, the one furthest to the right at top center. Then you get this:No need to link, simply read Thus again we seem to be in agreement... Uh, okay if you say so -- I wasn't aware we'd solved this one ... :wry:


Ken, splain that agin real slow?

[AmericanPride]

6. Decouple the Taliban from the drug trade.

Just talking crazy here, but I propose, in general, an effective strategy in regards to narcotics in Afghanistan would be to usurp, rather than destroy, control over the trade. The devil's in the details, of course, and it's probably "unethical", but if the trade could be directed towards an unspecified Afghan neighbor which poses a major risk to US security IOT destablize the regime and the subsequent funds invested in Afghan infrastructure, I'd be willing to consider removing the taboos on the drug trade.

[Ken White]

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

If I wanted to type and quote just your words without the rest of that, I'd type:

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

Then I'd highlight that by moving my cursor over it until what I wanted to quote was highlighted in green (in my browser) and then click on the 'quote' Icon up above the white message window; last on on the right in line, put your cursor on it and it pops up: Wrap [QUOTE] tags around selected text

OR

I could type this:


Ken, splain that agin real slow?[/quote ]

WITHOUT THE SPACE between the last 'e' and the bracket, like this: /quote] and that will produce this:

[quote]Ken, splain that agin real slow?

In your post at 12:32 AM if you'd put a [/quote ] without the space between the 'e' and the bracket behind the words "Here's how to selectively quote" you'd have gotten this:


Originally Posted by Ken White >
I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:


(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts (/quote)

[Ken White]

Just talking crazy here, but I propose, in general, an effective strategy in regards to narcotics in Afghanistan would be to usurp, rather than destroy, control over the trade. The devil's in the details, of course, and it's probably "unethical", but if the trade could be directed towards an unspecified Afghan neighbor which poses a major risk to US security IOT destablize the regime and the subsequent funds invested in Afghan infrastructure, I'd be willing to consider removing the taboos on the drug trade.but I can't think of any neighbors that we'd like to see less stable than they are. Quite the contrary, in fact -- and I'm applying that in all directions...

As for usurping the drug trade, apparently you aren't aware of the various loud screams and wails about the mere allegation of drug involvement by the CIA and / or others in South East Asia or Central America during either of those two dust-ups. I can hear the media and Congress now. Much less NATO...

Not to mention the fact that if you were in the drug trade, would you easily let someone interrupt your efforts...

Narcotics in Afghanistan are not a problem -- western agreement on what to do about them is a problem.

[jmm99]

Perhaps, I am reading too much of my own "inner voice" into what COL Gentile says. Anyway, your comments are my starting point.


(from Ken)
1. .... we do not at this time have the capability required for dealing with AQ by other military means.
(and)
2. ... AQ is not the only opponent there. Not by a long shot..

1. As I am reading Gentile, he is contrasting a large force engaged in "hearts and minds" (stability ops, "nation building", whatever) with "other military means". Since he doesn't define the latter term, I guess it's left to our imaginations. My image is mobile light infantry (conventional, special ops and extra-special ops) knowing where it's going and what it will do when it gets there. What did "other military means" mean to you and what capability is missing ?

2. I read Gentile as focusing on AQ as the "main enemy" in that theatre - similar to the KGB looking at the US and its intel agencies as being the Main Adversary in the Cold War. Since various groups are AQ-linked or AQ-leaning (e.g., Taliban), they also get in our way - so, they too may be opponents. Whom do you see as the opponents ?

[AmericanPride]

Narcotics in Afghanistan are not a problem

I agree. I was only advancing the idea that it is a possible solution to two separate problems.


I can't think of any neighbors that we'd like to see less stable than they are.

I think it would be beneficial for Iran to be less stable, should our credibility improve with the general populace in regards to our self-proclaimed political principles. Pushing drugs into Iran would, I imagine, force the government and people into confrontation. The Soviet transition to "democracy", however absurd or shallow, illustrates that certain conditions make it possible for a nuclear-armed state (which I assume would be one of the highest causes of concern) to more or less safely navigate changes in regime. I'm sure that statement contains many debatable assumptions also.


As for usurping the drug trade, apparently you aren't aware of the various loud screams and wails about the mere allegation of drug involvement by the CIA and / or others in South East Asia or Central America during either of those two dust-ups. I can hear the media and Congress now. Much less NATO...

Also agree here. But I think if a few bones were thrown to major campaign donors to receive some kind of cut in the policy, it could move its way around Congress. Maybe through agricultural contracts in Afghanistan? I don't have the expertise yet to pinpoint the details. I also don't remember Congress ever complaining about other "dust-ups" until they no longer perceived some kind of gain from it (i.e. intelligence supporting the Iraq War).


Not to mention the fact that if you were in the drug trade, would you easily let someone interrupt your efforts

True. But the relationship between 'us' and the 'enemy' would change as some of them buy into the policy. Our goal isn't to destroy the Taliban (or is it?) -- they're just in the way of some other ends we have in the country and region. Maybe co-opting them would lessen resistence. Maybe not.

[Entropy]

The opium "problem" in Afghanistan is a perfect example of taking our eyes of the strategic ball and mission creep. We should only be concerned as far as that trade benefits our opponents and even then we need to tread very carefully.

[Ken White]

I think it would be beneficial for Iran to be less stable, should our credibility improve with the general populace in regards to our self-proclaimed political principles. Pushing drugs into Iran would, I imagine, force the government and people into confrontation.In reverse order, you need to do some research -- Iran already has a massive drug problem. The people of Iran and the government are already in a 'confrontation' and that government still exists because it has enough force to cow the very unhappy majority into acceptance. Our credibility with the bulk of Iranians is good enough as is -- they generally like Americans and know we aren't the problem. They are less concerned about what you term 'our self proclaimed political principles' than are many in this country because they're more aware of how the world works and don't get trapped in a false sense of idealism that has never been and never will be -- not because we're Americans but because Americans are people; humans have foibles -- the Iraniha are cosmopolitan enough to know that and accept it without getting silly. The problem with an unstable Iran is that the Persians have a lot of pride and are rather xenophobic; make it less stable than it is today and little good will come of that.
The Soviet transition to "democracy", however absurd or shallow, illustrates that certain conditions make it possible for a nuclear-armed state (which I assume would be one of the highest causes of concern) to more or less safely navigate changes in regime. I'm sure that statement contains many debatable assumptions also.For openers, I'd suggest qualifiers like 'absurd' and 'shallow' make all that come after sort of inconsequential or at least questionable. I know many are worried about Iran having nukes; I'm not.
Also agree here. But I think if a few bones were thrown to major campaign donors to receive some kind of cut in the policy, it could move its way around Congress. There are few on this board who have said as many bad things about Congress as me but even I wouldn't go that far on their venality. I doubt you're correct on that assumption -- with the caveat that there are always a few but you're not at all likely to get the numbers you need. Part of the problem is that whichever party is in opposition will blow the whistle to the press on the then current Administration.
Maybe through agricultural contracts in Afghanistan? I don't have the expertise yet to pinpoint the details.Agricultural contracts? For what? The Afghans barely feed themselves and if the Poppy harvest were converted to a cash crop, there'd be no heroin problem...
I also don't remember Congress ever complaining about other "dust-ups" until they no longer perceived some kind of gain from it (i.e. intelligence supporting the Iraq War).I'm sure you don't; they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and I suspect you had other things on your mind then. Here is a LINK (http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/980507-l.htm) to a timeline; essentially, every time you see the initials CIA, there was much fury raised by Congress AND the Media -- I'm sure you can Google tons of specifics.
True. But the relationship between 'us' and the 'enemy' would change as some of them buy into the policy. Our goal isn't to destroy the Taliban -- they're just in the way of some other ends we have in the country and region. Maybe co-opting them would lessen resistence. Maybe not.Generally speaking, the Talibs are not involved in the heroin trade; some of their branches -- and there are many sub sets -- aid in the smuggling to earn money but nominally, the trade as opposed to just growing innocuous poppies is haram. Actually, the smugglers pay the Talibs to attack coalition or ISAF troops that might interfere with smuggling and to guard the smuggling convoys; that'[s sort of a no-no but the quest for power makes strange bedfellows --as it does in the west. The trade is run by the old line smugglers who've been plying their trade for centuries and do not wish to stop because they're making big bucks; they're mostly crooks, plain and simple.

The Taliban, in a sense are not really the problem, nor are the smugglers though both contribute to the greater goal. The problem is that Afghanistan has never been effectively centrally governed and simply does not wish to be. That's the greater goal -- to avoid that.

[AmericanPride]

Iran already has a massive drug problem. The people of Iran and the government are already in a 'confrontation' and that government still exists because it has enough force to cow the very unhappy majority into acceptance.

I'm aware of Iran's drug problem. What I don't think is that it's sufficiently "massive" to warrant the kind of political repression necessary as a catalyst for popular action. Opium is one of the few leverages potentially available to the US in regards to Iran's domestic politics IMO.


Our credibility with the bulk of Iranians is good enough as is -- they generally like Americans and know we aren't the problem.

I think the popular election of Ahmadinejad after we more or less alienated Khatami speaks against that assertion to some degree. Yeah -- the Iranians don't have a general negative opinion of Americans, but I've heard of few Iranians speaking positively of our policies; especially the ones targetted at Iran itself. How many Americans recognize that it's the government and not the people of Iran that's the problem? However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles. The consequent degradation of our credibility diminishes the already limited access we have with the Iranian people.


The problem with an unstable Iran is that the Persians have a lot of pride and are rather xenophobic; make it less stable than it is today and little good will come of that.

What is the relationship between what you describe as Iranian national traits and the stability of the country (and presumbly its impact on the region)? Some argument could be made that expansionism and aggression are consequences of instability, which I assume is your point.


I'd suggest qualifiers like 'absurd' and 'shallow' make all that come after sort of inconsequential or at least questionable. I know many are worried about Iran having nukes; I'm not.

The terms "absurd" and "shallow" were in reference to the Soviet transition to democracy, not necessarily that the Soviet government made a transition of some kind. My apologies for not being more clear. So I suppose again the question becomes: why do you think an unstable Iran would be negative for US policy? What if we included the assumption that Iran could potentially become a cooperative partner to US policy through a successful negotiation of said instability?


Agricultural contracts? For what? The Afghans barely feed themselves and if the Poppy harvest were converted to a cash crop, there'd be no heroin problem...

Again, my apologies. I should have been more clear: I believe US corporate cooperation in Afghan opium could be hidden in contracts; I assumed that said contracts would be in the category of agriculture. I'm not particularly concerned about the categorization; more concerned with how to make US involvement in the proposed policy less (1) transparant and obvious and (2) more acceptable to those elements of our society which have significant sway in our government. Maybe this part of the proposal is unworkable; I don't know. I'm only exploring ways in which to make the plan acceptable to those relevant in the decision-making process. And yes -- I'm assuming our politicians are realists and not idealists.


I'm sure you don't; they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and I suspect you had other things on your mind then

I wasn't born then since I really didn't have anything on my mind whatsoever. :) Since it's apparent we already have widespread involvement in the drug business, I don't see the objections against doing it again if done "right". By "right", I mean effectively for as long as possible since anything will eventually fail if run long enough. Yeah -- Congress will raise a fuss at some point, some heads will roll, and some other strategy will be found until that is compromised too. Isn't that how politics works anyways?


Generally speaking, the Talibs are not involved in the heroin trade

True. Got me. I admit mistakenly using "Taliban" as a synonym for "bad guys" in Afghanistan. I include the smugglers, whatever their identity, in the "bad guy" category for the reasons you cited. OK -- so we co-opt the "crooks" and the farmers involved in opium, make a few bucks, and, most importantly IMO, invest all that hard-earned cash in developing infrastructure for "[effective central government]" in a country which never has experienced it. That's my primary concern; I threw in Iran as a second goose egg, but I'm not really concerned where the opium would end up if it does not adversely impact US security interests. :)

So I suppose a rework of the presentation is necessary.

[Ken White]

I'm aware of Iran's drug problem. What I don't think is that it's sufficiently "massive" to warrant the kind of political repression necessary as a catalyst for popular action. Opium is one of the few leverages potentially available to the US in regards to Iran's domestic politics IMO. No, it's not that massive but it is massive enough. Nor would increasing the size of that problem increase the potential for overthrow of the Mullahs.
I think the popular election of Ahmadinejad after we more or less alienated Khatami speaks against that assertion to some degree.Not really. It speaks to the power of Ayatollah Khameini to keep any effective opponent of the ballot and to the power of the Pasdaran to ensure that turnput was low --as it was -- and that votes went where they were supposed to.
Yeah -- the Iranians don't have a general negative opinion of Americans, but I've heard of few Iranians speaking positively of our policies; especially the ones targetted at Iran itself.That's because our policies are dumb.
How many Americans recognize that it's the government and not the people of Iran that's the problem?Most I talk to and I suspect that's a more eclectic crowd in age, social status and experiences than most. Americans, collectively, aren't nearly as dumb as the media and academy like to think.
However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles. The consequent degradation of our credibility diminishes the already limited access we have with the Iranian people.The disconnect between our policies and our 'principles' is in the mind of those who select unrealistic principles IMO.

Just as an idle question, doesn't your concern for our principles sort of clash with your 'proposal?'
What is the relationship between what you describe as Iranian national traits and the stability of the country (and presumbly its impact on the region)? Some argument could be made that expansionism and aggression are consequences of instability, which I assume is your point.The cessation of 2.5M barrels per day of oil exports. We would REALLY like China and India to have all the oil they want. The relationship of that to what I said is that they would not want to accept any 'help.' They'd probably resist it and, trust me, we do not want to fight in Iran. I spent two years there ; it's not as bad as Afghanistan terrain wise but it's close; it's over 2.5 times as big and it has twice the population. So we mess up the world oil supply -- which was one thing we were quite careful NOT to do in going into Iraq...
The terms "absurd" and "shallow" were in reference to the Soviet transition to democracy, not necessarily that the Soviet government made a transition of some kind. My apologies for not being more clear. Not a problem, I knew what you meant. My point was that such words prejudice your following statement whatever it might be. With respect to the specifics, Russia and Iran are different. Russia is not totally western, there's some of the east in there but it is essentially western in most processes. Iran is totally Eastern, it is not at all western in thought processes.
So I suppose again the question becomes: why do you think an unstable Iran would be negative for US policy?As above.
What if we included the assumption that Iran could potentially become a cooperative partner to US policy through a successful negotiation of said instability?We aren't going to do that; though you certainly may. I don't like to deal in assumptions. :wry:
Again, my apologies. I should have been more clear: I believe US corporate cooperation in Afghan opium could be hidden in contracts; I assumed that said contracts would be in the category of agriculture. I'm not particularly concerned about the categorization; more concerned with how to make US involvement in the proposed policy less (1) transparant and obvious and (2) more acceptable to those elements of our society which have significant sway in our government. Maybe this part of the proposal is unworkable; I don't know. I'm only exploring ways in which to make the plan acceptable to those relevant in the decision-making process. And yes -- I'm assuming our politicians are realists and not idealists.Some of both -- however, what you propose is I believe a little much for most of them to accept.
I wasn't born then since I really didn't have anything on my mind whatsoever. :) That was obvious.
Since it's apparent we already have widespread involvement in the drug business, I don't see the objections against doing it again if done "right".Actually it's not apparent; while there was some, it was not as widespread as the media and some in Congress wanted to think. If you don't see any reason not to do what you suggest, you may want to reconsider any oaths you might have to take in the near future.
By "right", I mean effectively for as long as possible since anything will eventually fail if run long enough. Yeah -- Congress will raise a fuss at some point, some heads will roll, and some other strategy will be found until that is compromised too. Isn't that how politics works anyways?If you are a heroin user, then I suppose you're entitled to use the word 'right' in any effort that might enable the trade. If you aren't one, that's probably a bad word to use in deference to those it'll harm. The War on Drugs is not working and is a dumb idea but enabling a trade that does as much damage to people and nations is even more dumb.
True. Got me. I admit mistakenly using "Taliban" as a synonym for "bad guys" in Afghanistan. I include the smugglers, whatever their identity, in the "bad guy" category for the reasons you cited. OK -- so we co-opt the "crooks" and the farmers involved in opium, make a few bucks, and, most importantly IMO, invest all that hard-earned cash in developing infrastructure for "[effective central government]" in a country which never has experienced it. That's my primary concern; I threw in Iran as a second goose egg, but I'm not really concerned where the opium would end up if it does not adversely impact US security interests. :)

So I suppose a rework of the presentation is necessary.This from the guy who is derisory about "our self-proclaimed political principles." One who states "However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles" then advocates a totally unprincipled effort...

Either mediocre satire or bad taste, not sure which. Both ? ;)

Tilting at windmills is fun but I think I'll go sack out and rest my lance.

[Ken White]

As I am reading Gentile, he is contrasting a large force engaged in "hearts and minds" (stability ops, "nation building", whatever) with "other military means". Since he doesn't define the latter term, I guess it's left to our imaginations. My image is mobile light infantry (conventional, special ops and extra-special ops) knowing where it's going and what it will do when it gets there. What did "other military means" mean to you and what capability is missing?Partly what you said but a couple of other things not for an unclassified discussion. We do not right now have the full capability required in any of those things though all are being developed.
I read Gentile as focusing on AQ as the "main enemy" in that theatre ... Whom do you see as the opponents ?The various Taliban groups (there are a number) plus the Heroin smugglers and the many various warlords and tribes who very much do not want a strong central government * and, if we get dumb or too careless, most of the rest of the population who do not like foreigners but, so far, are being nice and polite as is their wont.

* They will be low key and play both ends against the middle but will fight if they feel too much progress is being made.

Gian is right, AQ is the main effort as far as I can tell, I just like to remind folks there's more to it than that. I also strongly suggest that any 'leaning' in Afghanistan is strictly a matter of convenience and is quite temporary unless there is heavy family involvement.

[AmericanPride]

This from the guy who is derisory about "our self-proclaimed political principles." One who states "However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles" then advocates a totally unprincipled effort...


Just as an idle question, doesn't your concern for our principles sort of clash with your 'proposal?

Not particularly. Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.


Nor would increasing the size of that problem increase the potential for overthrow of the Mullahs.

I disagree. Small communities are regularly "destablized" by the influx of drugs. So are a few countries. I think the same pattern can be generally applied to a state as a whole.


It speaks to the power of Ayatollah Khameini to keep any effective opponent of the ballot and to the power of the Pasdaran to ensure that turnput was low --as it was -- and that votes went where they were supposed to.

True -- hence the "to some degree" modifier. ;)


That's because our policies are dumb.

What makes the policies "dumb"?


If you are a heroin user, then I suppose you're entitled to use the word 'right' in any effort that might enable the trade. If you aren't one, that's probably a bad word to use in deference to those it'll harm. The War on Drugs is not working and is a dumb idea but enabling a trade that does as much damage to people and nations is even more dumb.

"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought. So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.


The cessation of 2.5M barrels per day of oil exports. We would REALLY like China and India to have all the oil they want. The relationship of that to what I said is that they would not want to accept any 'help.' They'd probably resist it and, trust me, we do not want to fight in Iran. I spent two years there ; it's not as bad as Afghanistan terrain wise but it's close; it's over 2.5 times as big and it has twice the population. So we mess up the world oil supply -- which was one thing we were quite careful NOT to do in going into Iraq...

Not sure if I agree with the initial assertion of China (and to lesser degree, India). Wouldn't the consequent rise in cost of Chinese/Indian exports make US companies more competitive, and therefore to some degree revitalize American industry? As I said earlier, the Iran portion of this idea is secondary to enfranchising some of the prime movers in Afghanistan by legitimizing their trade, and using it to build a stake in the subsequent development of government and infrastructure. It could also potentially separate the Taliban/AQ from an ally of conveinance. A State official once remarked that the military turns a blind-eye towards opium production -- my question is why not take that a step further and exploit it to our advantage?

[Entropy]

AmericanPride,


"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought. So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.

Your arguments here disturbingly appear to simply be "ends-justify-means." It's one thing to actively oppose the drug trade or to largely ignore it. It's something else entirely to promote it against foes, most of whom will be noncombatants.

By such reasoning we should ignore many other moral standards of conflict that stand in the way of inflicting the "necessary" damage on people and nations you seem to desire. Heck, why stop with just drugs? Lace them with lethal agents, or use a bioweapon to destroy the enemy's agriculture to cause destabilization through starvation. As you say, "right" is only about "the context of what objective is being sought."

What you seem to advocate here is not a slippery slope - it is a vertical ice rink straight into barbarity.

[AmericanPride]

Your arguments here disturbingly appear to simply be "ends-justify-means."

More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?


By such reasoning we should ignore many other moral standards of conflict that stand in the way of inflicting the "necessary" damage on people and nations you seem to desire.

Not necessarily. It's one thing to break "standards" which have no meaning and no power; but legal instruments, media exposure, and international perception, etc are all relevant variables to consider. Sometimes they're relevant -- sometimes not. Depends on the circumstances. Intangibles can be just as dangerous to our policy goals as the tangibles. So -- no -- I'm not advocating an "anything goes" policy. We simply do not have the power to dominate everyone all of the time; cooperation, give-and-take, is necessary more often than not.


It's one thing to actively oppose the drug trade or to largely ignore it. It's something else entirely to promote it against foes, most of whom will be noncombatants.

IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.

[Entropy]

More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?

The difference is that our means are recognized as legitimate, legal, are "best practices" and are in keeping with the standards and character of our nation. A policy that would have the US government become a drug lord for Iranians is none of those things.


IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.

I might suggest there's a huge difference between the kind of "lawyering" that creates some wiggle room inside a particular set of rules or standards, and completely tossing those rules and standards out the window in pursuit of some goal. In the case here you appear to be advocating for a policy where the US government facilitates the opium trade to Iran for the purpose of destabilizing Iran. In doing so, you would have the US government violate a host of its own laws as well as international law and various treaty agreements. That's only the most obvious of many problems. If violating the letter and spirit of the law, long-standing US policy, and American moral standards is not an "anything goes" policy, then what is?

Again, there is a world of difference between largely ignoring the drug trade in Afghanistan or usurpation by, for instance, buying raw crops then destroying them so the product does not reach the market, and actively participating in, colluding with, and providing profits for the elements running the opium trade.

[Ken White]

Not particularly. Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.Nice cynical and somewhat immature view of the process. Incorrect IMO because IF the principles are sensible (and most of ours are) then the disregard of those principles is a temporary expedient for short term gain. That almost invariably comes back to haunt. Witness Iran and our policies for an example.
I disagree.We can disagree on that as well.
What makes the policies "dumb"?I should think that would be obvious to a superior intellect -- the simple fact that after all these years, they have not worked.
"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought.Unfortunately, many politicians seem to agree with you. You'll find a few soldiers do as well. You'll also find that most of the latter do not agree; that for two very practical reasons. First, if something falls into the not 'right' category as viewed by most people, there's a reason for that and you ignore it at your own peril. Secondly, if one does something that is not 'right' then one invites the opponent to do the same thing thus creating a self defeating spiral. Most soldiers instinctively realize those two things and behave sensibly; the few that don't generally end up paying for their errors.
So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.There is IMO, your opinion may certainly differ. The real issue is whether the pain is being inflicted on the deserving recipients of pain or the innocents around them.
Not sure if I agree with the initial assertion of China (and to lesser degree, India). Wouldn't the consequent rise in cost of Chinese/Indian exports make US companies more competitive, and therefore to some degree revitalize American industry?Not IMO and in that of most economists -- but I'll acknowledge Economists are like Doctors, don't like what you hear? Get a second opinion.
As I said earlier, the Iran portion of this idea is secondary to enfranchising some of the prime movers in Afghanistan by legitimizing their trade, and using it to build a stake in the subsequent development of government and infrastructure.You're missing the major point that the smugglers are not prime movers (though they pay some of them) and, more importantly, that many do not want that government and infrastructure; ergo as soon as they tumble to what your scheme is, they'll resist.
It could also potentially separate the Taliban/AQ from an ally of conveinance. A State official once remarked that the military turns a blind-eye towards opium production -- my question is why not take that a step further and exploit it to our advantage?State officials say a lot of stupid things. The military does not turn a blind eye toward it; it does not have the wherewithal to do much about it and is leery of adding further instability -- a process you seem to espouse.

In a response to Entropy, you said
IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.You of course realize the cause of not consistently applying our principles is that smart guys like you come up with seemingly brilliant ideas that abrogate those principles as your proposal does -- and then the rest of us are stuck with the cleanup.

[wm]

Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.

A couple of aphorisms to remember:

1) Never fight with a pig--you both get dirty and the pig enjoys it.
2) Never argue with an idiot--it brings you down to his level and he beats you on experience.

If we do not take the moral high ground (and there is always moral high ground) when engaged in combat, we are almost certain to go the way of such wonderful "empires" as the Spanish in the Western Hemisphere, the Crusaders in the Holy Land, and the Mongols in Eurasia. Lasting solutions are built upon strong moral groundworks, not from slippery consequentialist calculations set in a future that is not really predictable.

[reed11b]

The more I read into this thread, the murkier things become. Allow me to articulate my thought process so far, so that I can have some help in summarizing what is being stated on this and other afghan threads. One, I reject the claim that this is an un-winnable quagmire. It is an insurgency and can be defeated. Victory will be defeating AQ and the Taliban so that they never offer an armed threat to the US. It is complicated in that it is a cross-border insurgency but winnable all the same. There are things that we have all ready done well. Making the effort multi-national was good even if it made for a tactical C&C mess. Using "kid gloves" until a plan is formulated has also been wise, though the "plan" has been overly slow in coming. The reason I state these as good is because they keep the insurgency an insurgency without the support of the majority of the population. Not focusing on infrastructure has been wise as well. While it is good that we have put some effort into this since it is the "right" thing to do, it is not a strategy for winning COIN. We have focused on quality and long term training of the ANA and allowed them to lead in operations as early as permissible. What we have done poorly is to not "roll up or sleeves" and come up with a plan to defeat the Taliban and AQ. They have means of financing and re-supplying and a method of C&C, and these can be attacked if they can be identified. Their freedom of movement is another viable target. Attacking the opium trade to hurt the Taliban and AQ makes sense. Attacking it everywhere, whether or not it supports them does not. We also need to create a tactical line of C&C that is more then US forces. The big confusing question for me regarding A-stan is Pakistan and India. I want to say support Pakistan and coordinate with them in destroying Taliban and AQ elements in Pakistan. My support for this is eroded by the constant actions on Pakistan's part that suggest they are not working in anybodies best interests. I had thought about supporting India as a counterbalance and a central effort in the region for fighting terrorism (with the added bonus of helping to keep China in check) but the idea just doesn't pass the sniff test. So now what?
Reed

[AmericanPride]

The difference is that our means are recognized as legitimate, legal, are "best practices" and are in keeping with the standards and character of our nation. A policy that would have the US government become a drug lord for Iranians is none of those things.

"Acceptability". That's what "legitimate", "legal", "best practices", and "standards and character" come down to. And all of those things are interpreted differently by whomever so happens to be making the decision at the time. They certainly have a place in politics; that I have no doubt. But their place, I would argue, is purely instrumental. Is it unacceptable by those terms? Absolutely. But we're talking about what is essentially a political decision, not a moral one.


Again, there is a world of difference between largely ignoring the drug trade in Afghanistan or usurpation by, for instance, buying raw crops then destroying them so the product does not reach the market, and actively participating in, colluding with, and providing profits for the elements running the opium trade.

There is a moral difference, certainly. But the realist and classical theories of political power do not contain moral considerations as ends of themselves. The final and greatest consideration is whether or not the course of action advances the position of the state relative to its adversaries (which is everyone else).

If violating the letter and spirit of the law, long-standing US policy, and American moral standards is not an "anything goes" policy, then what is?

It depends on the context. The context is defined by state objectives. Even the same exact act has moral variation depending on its context.


Nice cynical and somewhat immature view of the process. Incorrect IMO because IF the principles are sensible (and most of ours are) then the disregard of those principles is a temporary expedient for short term gain. That almost invariably comes back to haunt. Witness Iran and our policies for an example.

What I described is essentially the realist position on morality and principles in politics. Your second sentence in the quoted statement reinforces that view. Destroying one's own credibility is not in one's own interest. Therefore, one should at least maintain the appearance of credibility. "Sensible" principles would be a way to construct an appearance of credibility.


Unfortunately, many politicians seem to agree with you. You'll find a few soldiers do as well. You'll also find that most of the latter do not agree; that for two very practical reasons. First, if something falls into the not 'right' category as viewed by most people, there's a reason for that and you ignore it at your own peril. Secondly, if one does something that is not 'right' then one invites the opponent to do the same thing thus creating a self defeating spiral. Most soldiers instinctively realize those two things and behave sensibly; the few that don't generally end up paying for their errors.

I agree. Politics and soldiering are completely different. One requires deception, manipulation, and exploitation. The other requires absolute trust, courage, and exertion. It's why I'm involved in one and not the other. ;)


You're missing the major point that the smugglers are not prime movers (though they pay some of them) and, more importantly, that many do not want that government and infrastructure; ergo as soon as they tumble to what your scheme is, they'll resist.

Which of course leads to the question of the extent of influence enjoyed by those in the opium trade.


You of course realize the cause of not consistently applying our principles is that smart guys like you come up with seemingly brilliant ideas that abrogate those principles as your proposal does -- and then the rest of us are stuck with the cleanup.

That's one cause, certainly. Another, perhaps, is that we really have no national concensus of what consistute our values.


If we do not take the moral high ground (and there is always moral high ground) when engaged in combat..... Lasting solutions are built upon strong moral groundworks....

I agree but I'd like to understand your perception better if you would be so kind as to provide a short explanaition of your meaning.

[Ken White]

I'll just address those points you made with respect to my comments.
...What I described is essentially the realist position on morality and principles in politics.No, what you described is the textbook version of that position. Reality has a very different take.
Your second sentence in the quoted statement reinforces that view. Destroying one's own credibility is not in one's own interest. Therefore, one should at least maintain the appearance of credibility. "Sensible" principles would be a way to construct an appearance of credibility.Again you promote academic theory; we have numerous examples of bright young things doing that over the years, Bundy, Wolfowitz... As the Actress said to the Bishop "You not only shouldn't do anything that's wrong, you should not even give the appearance of doing anything that's wrong..." Unfortunately, the very bright are not inclined to listen to an actress.
I agree. Politics and soldiering are completely different. One requires deception, manipulation, and exploitation. The other requires absolute trust, courage, and exertion. It's why I'm involved in one and not the other. ;)Interesting. May I ask which you are involved in?
Which of course leads to the question of the extent of influence enjoyed by those in the opium trade.Directly contingent upon family ties (which your scheme cannot replicate) and secondarily the amount of money flowing, I'm quite sure.
That's one cause, certainly. Another, perhaps, is that we really have no national concensus of what consistute our values.I disagree, aberrant schemes have caused most of our foreign policy gaffes and deviations from principle. They have almost always been dreamed up by bright young things who see no problem in just a little deviation from principle for impressive gains. Such idiotic thinking put us in Viet Nam and put us in Iraq in a less than satisfactory mode. The slight deviations from principle have invariably caused more problems than they solved and as one who spent over 45 years cleaning up after those kinds of dipwad screwups, I'm not at all in favor of them. I've got a son who's now doing cleanup work -- he's not in favor of them either.

You're also incorrect in your assertion there is no national consensus on what constitutes our values. There is one -- the problem is that the values (and I use the term loosely) of academe and our national media do not sign on to that consensus -- which is essentially, do what's right. In any nation of over 300 million, there will always be many views on any topic -- but a consensus of a slight majority is pretty well convinced of what is right and what is wrong; the quibbling voices arguing other positions do not change that, nor does the matter that the educational and media establishments also differ alter the fact.

You earlier asked this:
More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?.No, it is not how we operate -- again regardless of the jaundiced view of many in the halls of ivy and the media. It is, regrettably, how we have on occasion operated, thus the partial justification for their view -- and we are still paying the price for most of those aberrations everyday. No, the end does not compel us to do what you or others suggest; we have sometimes done so not because of compulsion but simply because it seemed easier at the time. It was not. It never is.

[Entropy]

AmericanPride,

To be honest, I'm not sure what you're arguing anymore. At first it was about the US pumping opium into Iran to destabilize the regime. Now it seems to be a relativistic philosophical argument about something completely removed from the reality of Afghanistan or Iran. Since this is a thread about Afghanistan, I'm not really interested in discussing political theories.

So the only thing I'll say is that a US attempt to destabilize Iran with heroin is a terrible idea, even if it were an honorable course of action (which it isn't). It's questionable the attempt would do much, if anything, to the Iranian regime, while the downsides an negative consequences are both severe and quite likely. So it doesn't even pass a simple cost/benefit test. No amount of theorizing will change that.

[Ron Humphrey]

some of the things you suggest PRIDE,

But since others are doing such an excellent job of addressing that I'll limit myself to something simple that I can handle without possibly breaking my brain:wry:

Principles when looked at as prisms may very easily be confused as having no more solidity then traditions. In so far as ones ability to pick and/or choose in order to facilitate actions in order to attain given goals.

Fortunately for the human race mankind does have the inherent knowledge that right and wrong do exist and as such conscience can and should play a prominent role in decisions.

A principled man will make mistakes both ignorantly or by choice, he will however if he knows what those principles are have to ability to judge himself in such a manner as to hopefully not continue along foolhardy paths.

For he that chooses to manipulate those principles in such a way as to legitimize his own wants without regard to others life will be very painful in both the short and the long term.

This goes doubly for a govt. These exist for a purpose and as such interact for a purpose. When these interactions take place without attention and consideration for those whom govt represents then you can take what the unprincipled man gets and multiply it by about a million.

There will always be "easier" ways and the right way, as Ken pointed out the former more oft than not results in great sorrow and burden for many and rarely achieves that which it sought.



On the Iran thing-

A race car driver wants to win the race so he does everything he can to make his car the fastest, then for good measure he tampers with the opponents car.

HE wins:D

The rest of the story-

half way through the race the opponents car breaks down, and in doing so runs into the car next to him. This causes the opponent to spin into the wall where he is then run into by twenty other cars. He survives but three others in the pile up don't, one of which was the younger brother of the driver who won.

And the first car that was hit by the opponents vehicle was run off the racetrack over the barrier into the pit crew areas where 4 are injured and the father of our winner was crushed .

Long story short, you may get what you want but more often than not you probably won't like what you got. :(

[jmm99]

are acting in someone's best interest - their own, as perceived by them.


(from Reed)
The big confusing question for me regarding A-stan is Pakistan and India. I want to say support Pakistan and coordinate with them in destroying Taliban and AQ elements in Pakistan. My support for this is eroded by the constant actions on Pakistan's part that suggest they are not working in anybodies best interests.

1. The AQ, AQ-linked groups and AQ-leaning groups (you could put the Taliban here) are useful to Pakistan in giving the Indians a rough time in Kashmir - and apparently in Bombay, as well.

2. Astan is a huge Paki problem unless it is controlled by a Power acceptable to the Pakis - the Taliban fit that bill.

3. The Pakis are afraid of major powers coming into Astan - Russians for a couple of centuries, now US; and, nightmare to them, India taking control of the old Northern Alliance area.

4. The Pashtuns are considered (and have been) Paki allies - hard to deal with allies, it's true.

5. If we (US) were in Pakistan and not in Astan, with their consent, their and the Pashtuns' attitude (including some Taliban) might be different - as it was when the Russians occupied Astan.

I've something of a pro-India bias, but I believe the above is a fair summary of the Pakistanis' problem.

[slapout9]

On the Iran thing-

A race car driver wants to win the race so he does everything he can to make his car the fastest, then for good measure he tampers with the opponents car.

HE wins:D

The rest of the story-

half way through the race the opponents car breaks down, and in doing so runs into the car next to him. This causes the opponent to spin into the wall where he is then run into by twenty other cars. He survives but three others in the pile up don't, one of which was the younger brother of the driver who won.

And the first car that was hit by the opponents vehicle was run off the racetrack over the barrier into the pit crew areas where 4 are injured and the father of our winner was crushed .

Long story short, you may get what you want but more often than not you probably won't like what you got. :(


Sounds like EBO:eek:

[Ron Humphrey]

Sounds like EBO:eek:

With political definitions of Effects:(

[AmericanPride]

At first it was about the US pumping opium into Iran to destabilize the regime. Now it seems to be a relativistic philosophical argument about something completely removed from the reality of Afghanistan or Iran. Since this is a thread about Afghanistan, I'm not really interested in discussing political theories.

The Iran thing was one part. The second part was/is exploiting a trade IOT to enfranchise a segment of the population and use their resources to develop the country's infrastructure with the further aim of consolidating, in the long term, the government by granting them a stake in that system. I entered the "philosophical" portion of the argument because others addressed those assumptions and inferences underlying the proposal; i.e. the ethical/legal/moral aspects of (specifically) using opium to undermine the stability of a hostile state.

[jmm99]

Headline looks good until you get to the actual agreement - to set up committees.


Afghanistan, Pakistan to fight al-Qaida together
Afghanistan and Pakistan to create joint strategy in their battle against al-Qaida
MURAD SEZER
AP News
Dec 05, 2008 12:40 EST

The leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed they need to fight terrorism together in Turkish-sponsored talks Friday aimed at reducing tensions over militant attacks along the countries' lawless border.

"We're decided to draw a joint strategy to fight al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations" Afghan President Hamid Karzai said after meeting Pakistan's new president, Asif Ali Zardari, in Istanbul.

Afghanistan has long accused Pakistan of failing to take action against Taliban militants based in the tribal region along the border — and even colluding with them.

"Both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan are affected seriously by terrorism," Karzai said.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul said the three countries have agreed to set up committees to cooperate in politics, economics, military cooperation as well as security to build confidence.
....
In 2007, Karzai met with Musharraf in the Turkish capital, Ankara, and the two declared their intent to cooperate against the Taliban.

http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=478073

Nice to see Turkey lending its good offices.

The shift from 2007 "against the Taliban" to 2008 "against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations" may imply a shift in policy expressed in diplo-speak.

[AmericanPride]

So the only thing I'll say is that a US attempt to destabilize Iran with heroin is a terrible idea, even if it were an honorable course of action (which it isn't). It's questionable the attempt would do much, if anything, to the Iranian regime, while the downsides an negative consequences are both severe and quite likely. So it doesn't even pass a simple cost/benefit test. No amount of theorizing will change that.

You say you are not interested in a "philosphical" argument, yet you claim the proposal is "[dishonorable]", which is a morally subjective judgment. While I'm inclined to agree with that judgment on the basis of my own personal beliefs, I am compelled to address it as it is a component of the proposal's acceptability/validity, even if you're not interested in discussing philosophy. Is it honorable? No, by most standards of judgement. Is that relevant? That's the argument.

Anyway, as for it being a "terrible" idea -- perhaps it is. But that depends on the purpose in question, what assumptions being made about its effects, and what consequences we're willing to accept/predict. It's very clear that the idea is driven by an entirely different purpose than what most other posters have; which goes all the way back to the original post asking questions about "our" definition of "victory".

[AmericanPride]

As for Ron's analogy, which I appreciate and is very clear in its meaning, it is making the fundamental assumption that personal relations (specifically blood relations) are comparable in some capacity to power relations. The last 60 years of the Middle East, IMO, demonstrate that even blood relations on a personal level are subordinate to the driving interests of states and their elites (as far as said elites are concerned, and I use "states" loosely when applied to the ME and Central Asia). The al-Assad family of Syria has been particularly adept at that game, I think. Same with the Saudis, and to a lesser degree Mubarak and even Saddam. When any of those leaders, or any other, make a decision to say, for example, exile or alienate a family or tribe member, I think we make the mistake of referring to said relation as familial or tribal rather than political (i.e. measured by power). Anyway, my point is that all of us, rightly or wrongly, are making significant assumptions pertaining to morality, "honor", ethics, etc and how that effects our mission and goals. And I would posit that our collective assumptions are not in sync with the assumptions made by those in living in the region (specifically those in the power-broking business).

[Ken White]

Is it honorable? No, by most standards of judgement. Is that relevant? That's the argument.A bigger question remains; is the proposal feasible. I submit the answer is no as several have pointed out.
...It's very clear that the idea is driven by an entirely different purpose than what most other posters have; which goes all the way back to the original post asking questions about "our" definition of "victory".So? Does the fact that is driven by a desire to have an academic exercise make it a viable suggestion? I think not.
... The al-Assad family of Syria has been particularly adept at that game, I think. Same with the Saudis, and to a lesser degree Mubarak and even Saddam. When any of those leaders, or any other, make a decision to say, for example, exile or alienate a family or tribe member, I think we make the mistake of referring to said relation as familial or tribal rather than political (i.e. measured by power). Anyway, my point is that all of us, rightly or wrongly, are making significant assumptions pertaining to morality, "honor", ethics, etc and how that effects our mission and goals. And I would posit that our collective assumptions are not in sync with the assumptions made by those in living in the region (specifically those in the power-broking business).That is about the only correct statement you've made concerning honor etc. -- and it suffers from one flaw. What they do there and what you can do here are very different things. You are absolutely correct that their perceptions of honor and morality, even of what constitutes a lie differ markedly from ours. The philosophical flaw in your proposal was that you envisioned involving the Congress in your plan; thus you were importing their ethic here and that's what will not work on moral or ethical grounds. You might find a few here and there that would go along with it but most will not and the media would eventually tumble to it and have a field day.

The larger problem remains that it is impractical with respect to destabilizing Iran due to the problems that would create -- if indeed it did destabilize that nation which I doubt. It is highly unlikely to be successful in 'taking over' either Poppy growing or the smuggling; the amount of money raked off by local players wouldn't generate nearly as much money for reconstruction as you think because the drug business is a really flat pyramid.

You may of course do what you wish but I think we've bored others enough on this gambit and I'd recommend returning to regularly scheduled programming.

Academic games are nice I suppose but reality always intrudes...

[Norfolk]

Only ever having been a junior soldier (and a reservist at that, long ago), and never having been on any operational or overseas tours, I am not remotely as familiar or even acquainted with the real-world limitations that Western policies and the troops that try to carry them out encounter, have to overcome, find themselves blindsided by, or simply have to endure.

Still, Iran questions aside, what strikes me most about the war in Afghanistan, much more so than the war in Iraq, is how from the start, and for years afterwards, so many Western policy-makers and senior military authorities persistently failed to observe or even to recognize the practical limitations they faced or may have had to face when intervening abroad. Or, recognizing them, found themselves having to downplay them or to pretend they didn't exist because it wasn't politically acceptable or possible to do so. Mercifully it has taken only half a decade for this to be recognized, more or less, and for the right people to be elevated to senior policy-making and military command and staff appointments, and who know what they are doing. Hopefully there is now a solid strategy in mind and an achievable end-state in sight for Afghanistan.

To be sure, as wm stated earlier in the thread, whatever is to be done has to be the right thing, not just the expedient thing - such as in wm's example of having to be willing to suffer casualties instead of risking inflicting civilian casualties through resort to airstrikes - and that in turn has to be tempered by what can be done, not what we would like to do.

Following wm's example, if it is not possible to dig out insurgents in a given location without having to resort to airstrikes (or whatever additional fire support may be on hand) where civilians are in the way, then other means have to be resorted to. Go after the enemy at another time, in another place, and in a different way, if possible.

Counterinsurgency is a long process, and having to scrub some tactical operations that run up against such obstacles instead of risking civilian casualties is both the right thing to do, and an approach that seems to offer the "best" possibility of success over the long term. Best not to risk actions that can undo the work of months or even years in a given area with just a single mistake.

All of the above is obvious enough, I know, and is far clearer to very many of the other members on this board than it is to me.

sapperfitz82 wrote:


But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?

Agreed, and no arguments that it is probably the best possible outcome. But also agreed with Ken and others (if I am reading them correctly) that the sort of Imperial Expeditionary mindset that is required to make that really work is not the American (or for that matter, the modern Western) way anymore -though it would seem something like that may still be possible with some difficulty. Little more than two generations ago, it was still perfectly natural for some Western Armies (or Marines) to set out on an annual campaigning season (Brits in the NWFP being the classic example), or to engage in repeated expeditions to the same regions to cut local threats down to size from time to time as they emerged or re-merged. Granted in some cases they also stayed for years or even decades, but normally only in modest numbers.

None of this is likely to be very palatable to policy-makers scared of the media trumpeting for the umpteenth time how the umpteenth expedition to put down such-and-such local threat reveals a failure of national policy. That such a national policy (and whatever military strategies that arise from it) may well be just fine, and in fact may be the best possible way of dealing with threats that are both persistent and perennial, of course runs headlong into the practical political limitations imposed by a generally uniformed media and often career-oriented policy-makers, amongst others.

It's interesting that most of the additional U.S. troops going to Afghanistan will apparently be heading to positions in and around Kabul's approaches and environs. I hope it it buys enough time to enable the National Government in Kabul to emerge as the strongest out of all the many players in Afghanistan, and one that is able to establish useful ties, more or less, with at least some of the other more critical players within Afghanistan. And perhaps, trying to get around the above mentioned political limitations on resorting to an Imperial Expeditionary mindset, to also allow for a (modest and discreet) future Western presence or temporary base that is also available to deal with Al-Qaida when and where it pops up in the area.

If the strategy is for NATO to secure the cities while the ANA and ANP build up their strength, fine enough, but if the Taleban are able to succeed in turning the population, if not exactly in their favour, then at least against NATO and the Government, time may run out before the Afghan Government is able to stand on its own and then take the fight out into the country. It is not entirely clear that the Afghan National Police can be made into anything like an effective paramilitary police force, and the long-term survival of the National Government will depend at least as much upon the success of the National Police as upon the success of the ANA.

If this is the strategy that is now possible, and the desired end-state is one in which Kabul will be able to at least survive on its own, and hopefully be able to exert some degree(s) of influence in other parts of the country, okay. Not great, but good enough.

[Norfolk]

To set the record straight: On one of these threads some months ago (and in a PM to one of our members some weeks ago in which I stated that 1RCR had a bad experience with a particular US SF officer in 2006), I stated or alluded to the Canadians having suffered battle reverses on Operation MEDUSA in 2006 as a result of a senior US officer (particularly SF) or leaders; I have since been corrected on this matter, and my reading of the sources was negligent and utterly mistaken. I should not have impuned or infringed upon the reputation of any US officer or officers or troops. I am sorry, and offer my sincere apologies.