Netfires - Tube Artillery - MLRS

[Distiller]

Been doubting the future of 155mm tube artillery for quite some time now. Think that the 120mm mortar on the one end, and MLRS on the other will take a considerable bite out of the 155's mission. Couple of thoughts below on how Netfires fits in:

M777 weight: 4400kg
Average Crew: 600kg
Typical pallet (45 shells, 60 MACS): about 2100kg (estimation)
Weight for one hour of sustained firing (@ 3 rounds/minute = 4 pallets): about 13500kg
Costs: USD3M for the M777, USD65k for a pallet of dumb ammo, USD80k for one Excalibur, USD260k for one hour of sustained dumb fire, or USD14M+ for one hour of Excalibur sustained fire (not including deployment and crew)
2D Mobility: MTVR
3D Mobility out: two CH-47 (gun, crew, ammo for one sustained hour)
3D Mobility back: one CH-47 hauling back gun and crew
Capabilities: traditional big boom shrapnel, cluster container, precision attack


Netfires CLU empty: 650kg
Netfires missile: 53kg
Loaded CLU: about 1450kg
Weight for one hour of firing (@ 3 rounds/minute = 12 CLU): about 17500kg
Costs: hard to say - Javelin USD75k, Hellfire USD60k, Spike USD5k, PAM shouldn't be more than USD20k per. CLU say USD350k per, USD4.2M for one hour sustained fire (not including deployment).
2D Mobility: MTVR with loader crane
3D Mobility out: three CH-47 (possibly with at small all-terrain forklift) to deploy the CLUs (CLUs for one sustained hour of firing); or six UH-60 with CLUs as ext load
3D Mobility back: one UH-60 with at least two guys to collect electronics packages
Capabilities: precision attack
Problem: sabotage, if unattended (same as with FCS' UGS)


That translates into:
# Role for 120mm Mortar: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area shrapnel fire, short/medium range; precision mortar rounds will have a hard stand against PAM costwise, as with Excalibur only interesting if used sparingly
# Role for M777: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area-shrapnelling, medium range, flexibly deployed; Excalibur cost effective only if not used more than ten times per hour or so (per battery)
# Role for Netfires: selective fire, precision attack, medium/long range, preferably road-deployed, optional unattended operation if airliftered to an unaccessible spot
# Role for MLRS++: massed technical targets, area targets, salvo assault, long range


Comments?

[Fuchs]

155mm is better represented by systems like PzH2000, M109A6 or Caesar than by the specialty gun M777.

---

Let's wait for what happens about the DPICM / cluster / dumb submunitions / explosive cargo round ban (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_Cluster_Munitions) in 2009.

Large calibres are less efficient for fragmentation effect per HE round weight than small calibres like 90-122mm and today also larger than necessary for guided munitions (which work fine in 120mm+ and probably already with 105mm+).

A loss of DPICM would badly degrade 155mm performance (and also 227mm performance) and might lead to smaller calibres at least for the towed gun role.

---

I expect MRLs to turn into missile weapons (guided & long range - both easier with rockets than with shells).

My expectation for Netfires (or whatever is its current name) is that it'll be cancelled to save money.

I'm not so sure about the future of guns - inertia will likely keep 155mm the premier calibre, even though that probably won't be optimal.

Motars will stay what they are - albeit more often mounted than before.

[Stan]

Got my doubts about replacing the M777 - The King of Battle.

We've got Brits making them, Canadians buying them, and the Swedes (with their Iron Sled Bofors ;) ) jealous of them.

Between the Excalibur guided projectile, the 777's reputation in Afghanistan, and the all too recognizable howitzer "report", she will never be replaced by a steel tube and grunts :cool:

[BayonetBrant]

don't forget that 120mm mortars live at the BN level, which makes one of their key attributes "responsiveness". It can take a while to get 155mm rounds - or anything else - fired as an immediate suppression mission. But the S3 can grab the mike and get mortar rounds in flight inside of 2 minutes.

[Stan]

Touché !
The 120 teams are quick and get to 6 clicks... The 155 to 24 clicks, albeit slower :)

You can Run but you'll only die tired !


don't forget that 120mm mortars live at the BN level, which makes one of their key attributes "responsiveness". It can take a while to get 155mm rounds - or anything else - fired as an immediate suppression mission. But the S3 can grab the mike and get mortar rounds in flight inside of 2 minutes.

[reed11b]

don't forget that 120mm mortars live at the BN level, which makes one of their key attributes "responsiveness". It can take a while to get 155mm rounds - or anything else - fired as an immediate suppression mission. But the S3 can grab the mike and get mortar rounds in flight inside of 2 minutes.

Which is why I feel that PGMM's for the 120 (even 81 and 60's for that matter) would have great real world utility, and cost less then excaliber rounds. The negative is that 120's have limited self sustainmant ability compared to an arty battery.
Reed

[Ken White]

...The negative is that 120's have limited self sustainmant ability compared to an arty battery.Do you mean in logistic support?

[reed11b]

Do you mean in logistic support?

Did I not just get done telling you to read what mean and not what I write? :confused:
Yes I mean logistic support, especially ammo resupply. Of course I was an 81mm mortar man and the 120 is vehicle based so they may have a more robust logistical support.

[Stan]

Reed,

A little sarcasm is OK, but a more thorough response from the beginning would have precluded what you have concluded to be obvious.

Not all of us were Eleven Charlies.

Thanks in advance for your consideration while posting herein.

Regards, Stan


Did I not just get done telling you to read what mean and not what I write? :confused:
Yes I mean logistic support, especially ammo resupply. Of course I was an 81mm mortar man and the 120 is vehicle based so they may have a more robust logistical support.

[reed11b]

Reed,

A little sarcasm is OK, but a more thorough response from the beginning would have precluded what you have concluded to be obvious questions.

Not all of us were Eleven Charlies.

Thanks in advance for your consideration while posting herein.

Regards, Stan
No precluding on my part Stan, I was dinging myself on that post. The sarcasm was in referance to joke I made to Ken a few minutes ago on another post. I agree that my military terminology needs some refresher work.
Reed

[Jason Port]

So, as a former 120 section sergeant in the cav, I posit that there is a home for each of these options. The 155 has an ability to drop some heavy heat from a fixed position, therefore giving it the ability to mass rounds and then pump them down range, especially in a FOB against an enemy without counterbattery.

Conversely, the heavier rocket artilllery at the above Brigade level provides heavy rounds against specific targets outside the range of the 120 or 155. Cost makes them a high-profile system, and really limits their usage to critical targets, and only used by folks with birds and stars, thus keeping it out of reach of the platoon, company, and battalion.

The 120, to Brant's point in the Infantry and the Cav are key tools to the lower echelons. In the Cav they are hip pocket close to the troop commander, and enable troops quick suppressive fires to assist the scouts keep from exposing their direct fire assets. Unfortunately, most RSTA/Cav troops have only two guns making it tougher to maneuver them. It is impossible to split the section and have security on the move, but it also means that during a route reconnaisance, the 1064 mortar carrier has to constantly be running like hell, emplacing and then running again, while the scouts and tanks outpace them. Further, it is harder to mass fires or do coordinated illumination missions with the two gun section as the resulting rounds pushed out are lower in count. Further, without a separate command vehicle in the heavy mortar section, coordination of vehicles, fires planning and fire direction computation is really an exercise in mental and physical gymnastics as the squad leader jumps into the drivers seat with the MBC and the section sergeant tries not to get in the way.

Conversely, the larger mortar platoon with 4 guns and 2 command tracks and a supply truck (this info might be dated) enables splitting into three gun sections, which enables one to maneuver, while the other is still emplaced, making a movement to contact with immediate suppression a reality. These guys can run a broad spectrum of missions, which you will never receive through a request to division for artillery, when working at the company level. Further, the ability to have an FPF for the battalion front brings the shooters a warm and fuzzy feeling when bad things otherwise abound.

Therefore, I submit that the home for the 155 can remain, the MLRS systems will always be in vogue because they are sexy to watch, but when you really want to lay some waste up close and personal, there is no better way than through the 120 mortar, with some kick ass fire direction control. My only recommendation to the current Table of Organization and Equipment would be to equip the two gun cav troop with a command vehicle (M113A3 or M577) in the mortar section to enable better fires planning, and better integration into the troop C2 cell under the XO. (if you want to know why the XO's 577 is a bad place, I will tell you later.) Assign the crew as the E-7, an E-5 FDC guy and an E-3 driver.

The last thing I might mention is the Future Combat Systems, Rocket in a Box which provides a modular, easily deployable rocket which fires on demand, from a box. I don't know enough about it, but everything I have read seems to make this another sexy product which replaces already fine pieces of equipment. However, I might have said the same things about UAVs, but they pretty much do some great work.

[Ken White]

Did I not just get done telling you to read what mean and not what I write? :confused:
Yes I mean logistic support, especially ammo resupply. Of course I was an 81mm mortar man and the 120 is vehicle based so they may have a more robust logistical support.and they are in the 120 Platoon itself and in the HHC Support Platoon. Poor Rifle Companies don't have that luxury -- though they did when we had the Mule (this one LINK (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2032/2454818103_11c28809d2.jpg%3Fv%3D0&imgrefurl=http://flickr.com/photos/rob-the-org/2454818103/&usg=__6fYjHv74zr9H0UP1aXlL1LnejK0=&h=375&w=500&sz=133&hl=en&start=4&um=1&tbnid=18zJaB3H-Lz6zM:&tbnh=98&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3DM274%2BMechanical%2BMule%26um%3D1%26h l%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26sa%3DN) and not this one LINK (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2133/2034665280_7636af13d5.jpg%3Fv%3D0&imgrefurl=http://flickr.com/photos/kansasexplorer3128/2034665280/&usg=__k5QkvisXqZAZ4CrUOM_yFXboS9o=&h=500&w=500&sz=153&hl=en&start=10&um=1&tbnid=tuxGVVVx5GVAvM:&tbnh=130&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3DMissouri%2BMule%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26 client%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26sa%3DN)). Those put the M-Gator to shame.

[BayonetBrant]

http://punditkitchen.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/political-pictures-here-liberty.jpg

[Stan]

Let's bring out the real guns :p

[Ken White]

Fun times in River City...

[Ski]

Eight inches of love right there boy...

I think the 155mm towed howitzer still has a place as do most heavy artillery pieces. Despite the talk about precision munitions, there is a real value in suppression, and that takes massing fires. It might not happen often in COIN, but for mechanized/maneuver warfare, I'd want to have some medium and heavy tubes behind me and making life miserable for the blokes in front of me.

[Ken White]

Eight inches of love right there boy...Shorter tube with muzzle brake.

[Distiller]

don't forget that 120mm mortars live at the BN level, which makes one of their key attributes "responsiveness". It can take a while to get 155mm rounds - or anything else - fired as an immediate suppression mission. But the S3 can grab the mike and get mortar rounds in flight inside of 2 minutes.

Yes, but one of the Netfires ideas is to have a couple distributed in the ops area and give the ground troops direct access, e.g. via relay-UAVs. Should be as fast as a Dragon Fire II mortar (or comparable system), but with longer range. Btw, Dragon Fire II without ammo is said to have the same weight as a Netfires CLU.

@ towed mortars for cavalry: Funny idea. Luckily these days there are vehicle mounted alternatives like AMOS and NEMO (not to forget Nona and Vena), and the mentioned future Dragon Fire II.

[Kiwigrunt]

Mine's the most sophistimacated.....

[William F. Owen]

That translates into:
# Role for 120mm Mortar: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area shrapnel fire, short/medium range; precision mortar rounds will have a hard stand against PAM costwise, as with Excalibur only interesting if used sparingly

FOG missiles like Spike also change the equation, as do cheap and effective 70 and 122mm GPS guided rockets.

[Distiller]

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/15schreyach.pdf
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/16challes.pdf

[reed11b]

# Role for 120mm Mortar: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area shrapnel fire, short/medium range; precision mortar rounds will have a hard stand against PAM costwise, as with Excalibur only interesting if used sparingly

Comments?

Where does this PGMM being more expensive then PAM or any other precision munitions come from? Mortars are already in the TO&E, training for them already exists, no restructuring to include PGMM capability and every cost analysis I have seen shows PGMMs to cost the least per round! Somebody please explain this to me, for I am obviously confused.
Reed
P.S. Thank You Fuchs, perhaps you are now un-confused..hehe

[Fuchs]

Where does this PGMM being less expensive then PAM or any other precision munitions come from? Mortars are already in the TO&E, training for them already exists, no restructuring to include PGMM capability and every cost analysis I have seen shows PGMMs to cost the least per round! Somebody please explain this to me, for I am obviously confused.
Reed

*confused*

Do you mean "Where does this PGMM being more expensive then PAM..."?

[Distiller]

Where does this PGMM being more expensive then PAM or any other precision munitions come from? Mortars are already in the TO&E, training for them already exists, no restructuring to include PGMM capability and every cost analysis I have seen shows PGMMs to cost the least per round! Somebody please explain this to me, for I am obviously confused.
Reed
P.S. Thank You Fuchs, perhaps you are now un-confused..hehe


Per round. You need 20+ 120mm mortars to cover the same area as one CLU, or ten+ 120mm mortars to cover a PAM perimeter.

Edit: As far as I'm aware, it was a requirement for PGMM to stay below USD20k per round?

[kaur]

I'm just thinking how Netfires would have changed the Georgian-Russian August war. I think those Russian columns exiting from Roki tunnel would look like road to Basra.

How would look like August 2006 war, if Hezbollah would use Netfire-type precision guided munition instead of Katyshas? No terror campaign against civilian targest, just precision strikes against conventional enemy ...

[Fuchs]

I'm just thinking how Netfires would have changed the Georgian-Russian August war. I think those Russian columns exiting from Roki tunnel would look like road to Basra.

That doesn't mean much.
The South Ossetia War was a 1960's war apparently. Pretty much all modern technology could have had a huge impact if applied properly in that conflict.

The primary lesson of that war is in my opinion the importance of the human element (again), especially morale and ability to keep fighting after loss of communication. The Georgians failed miserably and no affordable modern technology would have saved them.



Guided missiles (especially the subsonic ones) have a weak spot when facing a modern conventional opposition: They're expensive.
Their significant price and high effectiveness enable and justify a capable defense. You cannot defend very cheap munitions with high-tech equipment without going broke, but you can do so if you know that your adversary cannot buy huge quantities of the equally expensive offensive munition.

Missiles like Netfires will soon be (or are already) on the target list of battlefield air defense assets, just like all kinds of low and medium altitude drones.

The technology advance for offensive weapons will be countered by an improvement of defensive weapons and in the end there won't be much 'revolutionary' change and no silver bullet, but an even worse infantry/others ratio and a larger (so-called) defense budget.


How would look like August 2006 war, if Hezbollah would use Netfire-type precision guided munition instead of Katyshas? No terror campaign against civilian targest, just precision strikes against conventional enemy ...

They had long-range ATGM missiles and it didn't seem to change their methods. Their attacks were political, and they chose the correct tool for the purpose.
I doubt that their strategic thinkers want many dead Israeli at all. They win the PR battle much easier if the Israeli actions are disproportionate.

[kaur]

Fuchs said:


That doesn't mean much.
The South Ossetia War was a 1960's war apparently. Pretty much all modern technology could have had a huge impact if applied properly in that conflict.

As far as i understand Georgian artillery/air force pounded Russian armed forces during first 24h. The biggest problem was accuracy (quality), not quantity.


The primary lesson of that war is in my opinion the importance of the human element (again), especially morale and ability to keep fighting after loss of communication. The Georgians failed miserably and no affordable modern technology would have saved them.

This is true. I understand that Netfires is more compact (easier to manage) accurate and cheaper, than (this case Georgian) artillery/tank batallions and air force squadrons. Georgians started to fail due to the many reasons. My point is that US trained during several years hundreds and hundreds of Georgians. I understand that the purpos was counter-insurgency, but if just small part of this effort could be used to train Netfires batteries, the 2008 August would show different result.


Guided missiles (especially the subsonic ones) have a weak spot when facing a modern conventional opposition: They're expensive.
Their significant price and high effectiveness enable and justify a capable defense. You cannot defend very cheap munitions with high-tech equipment without going broke, but you can do so if you know that your adversary cannot buy huge quantities of the equally expensive offensive munition.

I was talking about using this weapon against Russians and Israel. First showed very poor skills. Israel reveived rocket pounding till the last day of conflict. Of course there are available several effective systems, but I suspect that they are not avaialble for every unit in the theatre of war.


Missiles like Netfires will soon be (or are already) on the target list of battlefield air defense assets, just like all kinds of low and medium altitude drones.

The technology advance for offensive weapons will be countered by an improvement of defensive weapons and in the end there won't be much 'revolutionary' change and no silver bullet, but an even worse infantry/others ratio and a larger (so-called) defense budget.

Here we talk about defence-offence capabilites cycle. I suspect that advancement in technology will soon make rocket fly faster, unpredictable trajectories etc. I think that Netfires 1. generation is more promising than present day anti-tank chopters.



They had long-range ATGM missiles and it didn't seem to change their methods. Their attacks were political, and they chose the correct tool for the purpose.
I doubt that their strategic thinkers want many dead Israeli at all. They win the PR battle much easier if the Israeli actions are disproportionate.

Burning Merkava company could be mental boost for whole generation of followers.

If your enemy has conventional superiority in the theatre of war, Netfires could be one of the best solutions of indirect fire to weaker side. You don't have to hide your MLRS/155mm artillery colums/logistical tails from enemy's air force. I suspect that signature of Netfires is much smaller than MRLS/155 and this is good concealment against enemy's CB/CF. For FCS Netfires is just one possible indirect fire weapons with precision munition, but for small states in small geographical areas this may be just only concept available (that can survive another day).

[reed11b]

I guess I just still fail to see the unmet need that NETFIRES fills. Using existing systems (155/excaliber, Mortars/PGMM, MLRS/G-MLRS) or even developed but unfielded system (E-FOGM) all seem to be capable of delivering the same effect while costing much less. Not just per munition, but in fielding cost and in speed of integration with the units using them. Shoe-horning new systems into the already diluted and scattered BCT concept are only going to further the BCT's logistical and manpower challenges. Existing systems already have an effective SOP that could handle precision fires support with very minor changes. SOP's and training and support for NETFIRES is going to have to be developed from the ground up. Worse, the very nature of NETFIRES is going to make centralized control (i.e micromanagement) more likely to happen then not. Am I mad man screaming in the wilderness or do others share my concerns?
Reed

[Fuchs]

It seems to be a redundant and therefore unnecessary program to me as well.
The mode of operation (launch from possibly even unattended containers) seems to be a NCW concept from a clean sheet, not like something that fits into an existing gap.

EFOG-M, Brimstone and 120mm mortars could do the same job without much development cost (and that are just the most obvious -not the only- hardware alternatives).

[Ken White]

that a new weapon with those capabilities has promise to do more than may be readily apparent at first glance. ;)

Thus I'm inclined to welcome the weapon while worrying about the micromanagement probabilities. :rolleyes:

However, not too much worry. Given our current over-officered Army, that micromanagement will occur in peacetime regardless -- you have too many smart guys with authority sitting around with too little to do. It will also occur in low intensity conflict like Iraq and Afghanistan * for the same reason but it will not be a problem in major conflict because the officer:enlisted ratio will change radically and everyone will be too busy to meddle. That's when Netfires will be valuable. Think of it as the F-22 for ground forces... :D

* With an apology to all who've been engaged in a heavy firefight in either place. When the bullets are cracking overhead or hitting your cover and you're getting splattered with body parts, there is no low intensity to it...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Reed, Fuchs,
In a previous life back in part of 2004 and 2005 I got to play at one of the operations officers within the FCS experimental element at the Fort Knox UAMBL (their battle lab). While I have some issues with the way the experiments played out, the people that were under the experimentation BDE itself - really spent some quality time thinking about how we'd put these various technologies to work. It was initially commanded by COL Roy Waggoner, a real no kidding Infantry leader with a great deal of operational experience (the 25th, the 75th and some other fine units). COL Waggoner demanded we do our best to influence the development of those technologies by being critical of the claims made be developers and by those (in uniform and out) who advocated for them. He also demanded that we scrutinize other claims and highlight what we believed were DOTMLPF shortfalls in the FCS O&O.

So myself and the other OPs officers and staff got to both do the planning and then fight the formations in the sim in a number of scenarios. We became pretty knowledgeable on the pros and cons of each system and its munitions. We accounted for all the systems you mention except for E-FOGM. We also had to account for the B-LOS (Beyond Line of Sight) munitions fired from the MCS, and the ARV.

There were indeed quite a number of shortfalls in FCS - and I think we've hashed them out on a number of threads - and I know down at Bliss they were still working hard to ensure the Army gets its money's worth. However some of the systems were useful no matter what the conditions. The rockets in a box Jason Port refers to was one such system. Netfires was what we referred to as the overarching fire control system which allowed you to do coordinated planning, deconflict & prioritize fires, get visibility on assets and inventories, and a host of other things (some of which I was not wholly keen on).

The rockets in a box though initially was going to come in a couple of variants. One got scrapped last I heard - it was in the "high technology risk" category. The other though, PAM (precision attack munition) promised to do things that no other artillery I'm aware of can do - if the developers pulled it off. I'm not sure if they did, so I will not comment further on PAM. The combination of overall system's characteristics opened allot of possibilities. While I like mortars and the big guns - I'd like to have a couple of boxes of these in my kit bag too. As Ken mentioned, I'm not worried about the micro-managing of these - that is largely a leadership issue, and if it were to occur it would occur regardless of the system. Or you could look at it this way - if the higher echelon CDR has something else to pad his reserve, he is less likely to be digging into your pockets:)

Best, Rob

[Gringo Malandro]

That translates into:
# Role for 120mm Mortar: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area shrapnel fire, short/medium range; precision mortar rounds will have a hard stand against PAM costwise, as with Excalibur only interesting if used sparingly
# Role for M777: sustained (mostly suppressive) "dumb" big boom area-shrapnelling, medium range, flexibly deployed; Excalibur cost effective only if not used more than ten times per hour or so (per battery)
# Role for Netfires: selective fire, precision attack, medium/long range, preferably road-deployed, optional unattended operation if airliftered to an unaccessible spot
# Role for MLRS++: massed technical targets, area targets, salvo assault, long range
Comments?

Why the 120mm when you have 105mm howitzers? Longer range, more shell-fuse combinations, more lethality, and you can tow with a HMMWV. If you need a few dumb booms to get somebody's attention you have 60's and 81's. Seems like reinventing the wheel.

[Ken White]

Why the 120mm when you have 105mm howitzers? Longer range, more shell-fuse combinations, more lethality, and you can tow with a HMMWV. If you need a few dumb booms to get somebody's attention you have 60's and 81's. Seems like reinventing the wheel.120s which are (2) more accurate within their effective range and (3) have a far larger bursting radius / do more damage than the 105. Not to mention that in a dire emergency (4) the 120 can be hand moved and (5) can easily be deployed in a lighter and more mobile vehicle than a HMMWV [to include internal carriage in a CH47 or CH53]. Plus (6) there's a guided round, the M395 LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/pgmm.htm) [This is old, they've been deployed since then, 1m CEP w/ laser]. Other rounds are on the way.

With nr. (1) above being the big Kahuna of those reasons... :D

[reed11b]

120s which are (2) more accurate within their effective range and (3) have a far larger bursting radius / do more damage than the 105. Not to mention that in a dire emergency (4) the 120 can be hand moved and (5) can easily be deployed in a lighter and more mobile vehicle than a HMMWV [to include internal carriage in a CH47 or CH53]. Plus (6) there's a guided round, the M395 LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/pgmm.htm) [This is old, they've been deployed since then, 1m CEP w/ laser]. Other rounds are on the way.

With nr. (1) above being the big Kahuna of those reasons... :D

BINGO, nailed it one. It is one of the reasons I am a big proponent for developing PGMM's for the 120's the 81's and even the 60's.
Reed

[Stan]

Even in the age of precision weapons, real human beings -- complete and complimented with flaws -- are often left to fight the battles and, administer the peace.

[William F. Owen]

There are only 3 actual 120mm LG Bombs that I aware of. I am not aware of any that are in service or combat proven.

Point being, the Israelis have a whole family of very light and very easy to use laser designators, one of which is in service with USMC. I was looking at one the other day. Takes 30 mins of training to use!

[Fuchs]

There are only 3 actual 120mm LG Bombs that I aware of. I am not aware of any that are in service or combat proven.

Point being, the Israelis have a whole family of very light and very easy to use laser designators, one of which is in service with USMC. I was looking at one the other day. Takes 30 mins of training to use!

Wilf, there are dozens of projects - and have been since many years.
The today American PGMM effort has its roots in a German 120mm LG bomb project of the 80's and is the best known (together with Swedish STRIX and UK Merlin) guided mortar munition.

That's a language barrier and public relations issue.
Almost nothing happened in the U.S. about guided mortar bombs, but a search for "guided mortar" in google yields almost entirely U.S.-related results. That's ridiculous.

I've seen a list dating back to IIRC '99 that listed dozens of guided artillery and mortar munition projects, including from countries like Bulgaria and India.
Americans talk a lot about their weapons projects even years before they yield production examples or a cancellation - other countries work silently on their hardware. IIRC many munitions on the list (HDD search is working) had SAL guidance.

Here's a short and old list that I found with a quick search:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/ADHPM.htm

Even the Russians alone have two systems in in service allegedly (Kitolov and Gran) in 120mm with SAL guidance.

[Ken White]

Putting 'Guided 120mm mortar' in Google popped up on the first page entries from Sweden, India, China and the US.

The M395 is in limited operational service in Afghanistan. Both Sweden and Switzerland have adopted the Strix so it is in service though Ii suppose one can quibble about the operational aspect...

The M395 is an ATK product, derived from the Diehl and Lockheed Martin cooperation on the Bussard PGM -- that ouight to be common knowledge. No one is denying that Diehl was the originator (except the ATK company that would now like to sell it to anyone who'd buy it and is wary of German export controls...).

As Fuchs said:
"...Americans talk a lot about their weapons projects even years before they yield production examples or a cancellation - other countries work silently on their hardware. IIRC many munitions on the list (HDD search is working) had SAL guidance.Too true -- one of the many adverse impacts of a dysfunctional Congress... :rolleyes:

[Fuchs]

You cheated by adding "120mm" to your search ;)

I attempted to recover the table in .htm that I remembered with several google searches and found almost exclusively U.S.-related results.

[Ken White]

Your search should've turned up the British Merlin (81mm)...

[Fuchs]

Your search should've turned up the British Merlin (81mm)...

Yes, on the 10th page.

I get an automatic redirect to google.de.
(I enter the search at .com and get a result page like this:
http://www.google.de/search?hl=de&q=guided+mortar&btnG=Google-Suche&meta= )
Maybe their databases differ slightly.

Again; there's not only America. ;)

[Gringo Malandro]

120s which are (2) more accurate within their effective range and (3) have a far larger bursting radius / do more damage than the 105. Not to mention that in a dire emergency (4) the 120 can be hand moved and (5) can easily be deployed in a lighter and more mobile vehicle than a HMMWV [to include internal carriage in a CH47 or CH53]. Plus (6) there's a guided round, the M395 LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/pgmm.htm) [This is old, they've been deployed since then, 1m CEP w/ laser]. Other rounds are on the way.

With nr. (1) above being the big Kahuna of those reasons... :D

I have no doubt that #1 played a big (biggest) part in that decision. I'm not sure I understand why that's a good idea though. I'll take your word that the 120s are more accurate, though in practice mortars seem to be more prone to error.

The 105 has a much longer effective range, especially with the RAP round, which is 80% more lethal (not that I would want to shoot it rocket off). But let's be honest, when you really need to break things you use the DPICM round, which I don't think the 120 has, though I could be wrong.

I'd like to hear the argument for precision mortar rounds. Sure it might be fun to have, but with the HIMARS/MLRS and the Excalibur at seems like money better spent elsewhere. Especially since, and this may by due to the Copperhead, I'm not so psyched about laser designation. You can send grids from a cell phone, or a UAV. Not to mention you can do refinements with PSS-SOF and you don't have to worry about dust clouds, etc..

You make some good points and I'll admit I'm not totally up to date on what is actually being fielded with the 120, but with 60s and 81s it seems redundant to me. Whereas the 105 actually fills the gap between mortars and the 155s.

[jmm99]

depending on the country you are searching from. Found that out a few years ago when a Finnish cousin and I were searching for the same thing (in English). Has to do with databases and also filtering.

[Ken White]

I have no doubt that #1 played a big (biggest) part in that decision. I'm not sure I understand why that's a good idea though.It is a very good idea because the Artillery, like the AF is into control and if they don't want to support you, they will not. I've had that happen way too many times and generally for extremely poor reasons. It's a good idea even if you aren't a grunt because it's a more versatile weapon.
I'll take your word that the 120s are more accurate, though in practice mortars seem to be more prone to error.Wrong, mortars are generally less prone to error than the M101, M102 and the M119 -- however, due to micromanaging and nervous commanders, you find that of the three or four mortars in a platoon, only one gunner and one computer do most of the firing -- the best of each, 'to avoid error' (or embarrassment). Dumb, because it means the other gunners and computers don't get enough practice and therefor make a lot of mistakes -- that's your firing errors...
The 105 has a much longer effective range, especially with the RAP round, which is 80% more lethal (not that I would want to shoot it rocket off) Not really that big a range advantage and the 105 is absolutely not 80% more lethal, the 120 has a larger charge. IMI and ATK are developing the M971 DPICM round.
I'd like to hear the argument for precision mortar rounds. Sure it might be fun to have, but with the HIMARS/MLRS and the Excalibur at seems like money better spent elsewhere. Especially since, and this may by due to the Copperhead, I'm not so psyched about laser designation.You won't get it from me, I also am not a fan of PGM, particularly LGPGM. Too much money for too little benefit IMO.
You make some good points and I'll admit I'm not totally up to date on what is actually being fielded with the 120, but with 60s and 81s it seems redundant to me. Whereas the 105 actually fills the gap between mortars and the 155s. Not really, the 105 range isn't all that great -- 11,400m (charge 7); 14,000m (charge 8); 19,500m (M913 rocket assisted projectile -- and my spies tell me that has accuracy problems) and with the new 120 rounds edging toward a 13 click range and a RAP in the works, the advantage of the 105 is fading rapidly, my bet is that it'll be out of the inventory within 10 years, replaced by the M777 as production of that ramps up and it gets cheaper; that and the NLOS-C.

I won't even address what too many charge 8 and RAP shots do to your tube life... ;)

Of course, if we'd bought the British L118 instead of the 119, we'd have more range and bigger shells but we had a lot of old 105 ammo in the depots and it was a $$ based decision.

The Marines have already or are in process of ditching their 105s and are buying Thomson Brandt Rifled 120s with still more lethal ammo, even better accuracy and greater range -- and it weigh a ton less than an M119. The M119 is reasonably accurate but not as good as a 120 and it doesn't have that much more range -- plus, my Redleg friends tell me it's a maintenance headache.

As for the other mortars, the 60 is too little to do much damage but it does have its uses -- it sure beats the AGLs. The 81 is better for many things but it will not lay down the volume of explosive the 120 can and has only about 50-60% of the range of a 120.

The 120 will do more damage within its range than the 105, it is more accurate, requires little maintenance and is going to get more types of rounds. -- and it's controlled by the Infantry Battalion. In Viet Nam, more than one Inf Bn Cdr offered to give up 105s in DS to keep his mortars when the Base Camp defense guys wanted the then 4.2 inch / 107 mm M30 which also outperformed the 105, not least on rate of sustained fire. Sustained fire has not been an issue in our current wars; it was in Korea and Viet Nam and you can bet that it will be again, sometime, somewhere. You should grow to love the 120 because it's going to be around for a long time while I suspect the 105's days are numbered. :D

[ODB]

It is a very good idea because the Artillery, like the AF is into control and if they don't want to support you, they will not. I've had that happen way too many times and generally for extremely poor reasons. It's a good idea even if you aren't a grunt because it's a more versatile weapon.

I will take one more internal asset any day vs. support from an external source. Ask any of the guys who were part of the fight in the Shahi-Kot Valley back in March 2002 if they wish they would have had 120s. After this fight was over we suddenly were being fielded with 120s in country. I guarantee it would be a resounding yes. Hard to take 105s into that kind of terrain or even get them into a position they can support from in that terrain.

Another added benefit is the fire restrictions placed within an AO. Who has to clear those fires. When it is an organic weapons system, that ground commander has the authority to clear fires. I can get almost instant support, instead of waiting for the approval to come back down.

I am a huge fan of 60s as well. Did some studying a few years back in regards to firing them from the rear of HMMWVs to provide instant support and from the turret on a gun truck. Never got playing around with the turret idea but have heard rumor of someone actually fabricating a mount for the turret system and doing this. Granted out the back of the truck we never went above a charge 2, but it was effective.

I'm of the thought if I get a bigger bang with more flexibility and less red tape then why would I want something else.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, there are dozens of projects - and have been since many years.
The today American PGMM effort has its roots in a German 120mm LG bomb project of the 80's and is the best known (together with Swedish STRIX and UK Merlin) guided mortar munition.



IIRC Strix is militmetric IR and not laser guided. Merlin was IR LOAL as well. Neither is Laser guided that I know of.

I only know of 3 laser guided weapons that have achieved firing status.
Those are :

IAI Fireball
M395
Gran


Light cheap and easy to use LDs have only been around for the last 5 years, so it doesn't surprise me that there are not that many 120mm munitions that have actually fired.

However there are lot of other Laser guided munitions out there, all of which can use the Light weight LDs.

[Fuchs]

Merlin had mm wavelength radar.
Wilf, I listed the three munition as most well-known guided examples. They are really well-known, while many other munitions (some of which in service) are almost entirely unknown. SAL is the most common guidance principle among the rather unknown types IIRC.

120mm vs. 105mm:
The French 120mm mortars with rifled barrel are extremely close to the 105mm, there's not much difference (except low angle fire) any more.
120mm cargo (ICM) bombs (IMI, RUAG, TDA) are in production since years (not necessarily in the U.S.). I've even found an Italian 81mm ICM bomb in Jane's (Simmel Difesa S6A2, under development in 2004, 9 bomblets).

I see a challenge to adjust the understanding and organization of mortar units due to the increased range and capability. The longest-ranged 120mm mortars are now equivalent to standard WW2 field artillery.
My take on this is that -despite remaining organic support assets- they should provide horizontal support to neighboring units as well (the majority of lethal fires should be such missions) in a kind of NCW spin-off.

@ODB:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandt_60_mm_LR_Gun-mortar

[William F. Owen]

I see a challenge to adjust the understanding and organization of mortar units due to the increased range and capability. The longest-ranged 120mm mortars are now equivalent to standard WW2 field artillery.
My take on this is that -despite remaining organic support assets- they should provide horizontal support to neighboring units as well (the majority of lethal fires should be such missions) in a kind of NCW spin-off.


Well thanks to some goading by the member of this board, I have been working on some unit level concepts, and mortars keep in surprising me. I am not sure I share the idea of supporting neighbouring units, as that does produce several C2 problems, though not impossible.

If you match the capabilities of your mortar platoon with an STA platoon you do seem to fall into a very interesting "virtuous cycle."

[Fuchs]

I've got a concept in mind - technologies/concepts creep inside the armed services from big/heavy/expensive to compact/light/cheap and become useful to more and more units and lower levels of hierarchy.

The first use of an innovation is often clumsy and expensive and found in navy ships (think about AEGIS, for example) or stationary installations, followed by a still expensive but not so bulky anymore application in combat aircraft (think about the early days of radar). Next are often AFVs/artillery and then it trickles down to infantry when the tech is really cheap, light and compact.

The C2 challenge that you wrote about is no perfect example, but almost fits this pattern. Divisional artillery of whole corps was assembled to support single divisional attacks or Großkämpfe (essentially major battles) in WW2 (or earlier).
Artillery coordinators on corps level or higher coordinated that with their small staff's preparation (Arko, for example).

Divisional artillery was not meant to support neighbor divisions, but it did so - and the procedures for it were the hierarchical procedures of that time.
This can and should be done much lower in the hierarchy today - like on battalion/company level or (with some quite uncommon indirect fire armament) on platoon level.
Modern communication technology coupled with modern indirect fire control (which is quite automated) could be used to coordinate such horizontal supporting fires.
Wilf, maybe you've read a version of my skirmisher text that already had that feature. It's really mostly a matter of communication and good prioritization.

It would be wasteful to let one battalion/regiment fight its own fight when a neighbor unit has some support assets that could help but aren't prepared/ordered to do so.
The 'organic fire support' thinking should be replaced with a 'horizontal fire support' thinking.

Maybe that happens, and maybe the natural consequence would be an increase in range till we see integrated regiment-sized combat teams with their own SPH battery instead of heavy mortars.
That is btw something that resembles a concept of the 50's.


Classic artillery - separate from the direct fire forces - will remain necessary because we can't be sure about the survivability of forward indirect fire assets.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, maybe you've read a version of my skirmisher text that already had that feature. It's really mostly a matter of communication and good prioritization.



No not read it. Fire it across!

I agree about communication and priorities. It is doable and perhaps even desirable, but I'd only want to look at this once I start work on Formation Levels of organisation and I see myself stuck on units for some time yet.

[Gringo Malandro]

It is a very good idea because the Artillery, like the AF is into control and if they don't want to support you, they will not. I've had that happen way too many times and generally for extremely poor reasons. It's a good idea even if you aren't a grunt because it's a more versatile weapon.Wrong, mortars are generally less prone to error than the M101, M102 and the M119 -- however, due to micromanaging and nervous commanders, you find that of the three or four mortars in a platoon, only one gunner and one computer do most of the firing -- the best of each, 'to avoid error' (or embarrassment). Dumb, because it means the other gunners and computers don't get enough practice and therefor make a lot of mistakes -- that's your firing errors... Not really that big a range advantage and the 105 is absolutely not 80% more lethal, the 120 has a larger charge. IMI and ATK are developing the M971 DPICM round.You won't get it from me, I also am not a fan of PGM, particularly LGPGM. Too much money for too little benefit IMO. Not really, the 105 range isn't all that great -- 11,400m (charge 7); 14,000m (charge 8); 19,500m (M913 rocket assisted projectile -- and my spies tell me that has accuracy problems) and with the new 120 rounds edging toward a 13 click range and a RAP in the works, the advantage of the 105 is fading rapidly, my bet is that it'll be out of the inventory within 10 years, replaced by the M777 as production of that ramps up and it gets cheaper; that and the NLOS-C.

I won't even address what too many charge 8 and RAP shots do to your tube life... ;)

Of course, if we'd bought the British L118 instead of the 119, we'd have more range and bigger shells but we had a lot of old 105 ammo in the depots and it was a $$ based decision.

The Marines have already or are in process of ditching their 105s and are buying Thomson Brandt Rifled 120s with still more lethal ammo, even better accuracy and greater range -- and it weigh a ton less than an M119. The M119 is reasonably accurate but not as good as a 120 and it doesn't have that much more range -- plus, my Redleg friends tell me it's a maintenance headache.

As for the other mortars, the 60 is too little to do much damage but it does have its uses -- it sure beats the AGLs. The 81 is better for many things but it will not lay down the volume of explosive the 120 can and has only about 50-60% of the range of a 120.

The 120 will do more damage within its range than the 105, it is more accurate, requires little maintenance and is going to get more types of rounds. -- and it's controlled by the Infantry Battalion. In Viet Nam, more than one Inf Bn Cdr offered to give up 105s in DS to keep his mortars when the Base Camp defense guys wanted the then 4.2 inch / 107 mm M30 which also outperformed the 105, not least on rate of sustained fire. Sustained fire has not been an issue in our current wars; it was in Korea and Viet Nam and you can bet that it will be again, sometime, somewhere. You should grow to love the 120 because it's going to be around for a long time while I suspect the 105's days are numbered. :D

I'll grant you that the artillery at times has failed to remember "the customer" and that is unacceptable. But refusing to support for poor reasons sounds more like a C2 issue. We had nothing but good feedback about DS arty in OIF1. The artillery commander doesn't make the final call anyhow, and the FSCC can push that down to the subordinate unit. In the current environment (IZ) you need general officer approval to fart, so that's a moot point there.

And as someone pointed out, with a weapon having those capabilities, it wouldn't make sense for one unit commander to hoard it when it might be better employed supporting an adjacent unit, that's inefficient.

My original question was about why we would reinvent the wheel, though from what I'm reading here it sounds like it has already been reinvented. I'm not too stubborn to say if something is better than use it. But this seems to bleed into a discussion of the artillery's relevance in the fight. That may be a discussion worth having but going to the mortar seems like a back door way of avoiding it.

By the way, the Marines got rid of the 105s YEARS ago, which was a big mistake at the time. They are getting the 120s, but those will be fielded by DS arty batteries who will be trained on both the 120 and 777, fielding the one appropriate for the mission. At least the last time I checked. :)

P.S. Sorry about my poor HTML skills :(

[Gringo Malandro]

P.P.S - The 80% was just in relation to the original 105mm HE round, not the 120. I knew it had improved lethality but I just grabbed that figure off of GlobalSecurity.org. As far as the error in mortars, I assumed that was human error, and that's just my anecdotal experience, and a lot of THAT is from a training environment.

[Ken White]

My original question was about why we would reinvent the wheel, though from what I'm reading here it sounds like it has already been reinvented.It's what we do... :D
I'm not too stubborn to say if something is better than use it. But this seems to bleed into a discussion of the artillery's relevance in the fight. That may be a discussion worth having but going to the mortar seems like a back door way of avoiding it.I don't think so, not really -- there is the issue of control but as you point out, that's a C2 / leadership issue that usually gets sorted out quickly. Mortars just give commanders more tools and they are flexible, portable, less ammo weight for equivalent target effect, have good accuracy and great rates of sustained fire.
By the way, the Marines got rid of the 105s YEARS ago, which was a big mistake at the time. They are getting the 120s, but those will be fielded by DS arty batteries who will be trained on both the 120 and 777, fielding the one appropriate for the mission. At least the last time I checked. :)Depends on who you talk to, I guess. The Marine grunts I know have evinced no complaints. Though, having lived with Artillery operated Mortar Batteries in my misspent youth, I'm not a fan of the concept -- sometimes the Artillerist's proclivity for massing fires just because they can and whether its needed or not got in the way of DS support. ;)

Still, the Artillery and it's rules and relevance nor even the C2 stuff are the issues to me; the mortar's flexibility, availability and value are the important things.

[Distiller]

@ 105 vs 120: I'm not sure the superior range of the 105 is of any use in the real world. It really collides with a low-charged 155. And besides C2 there is the question of targeting. A 120mm mortar has a minimum range of 250 yards or so, a 105mm howitzer a multiple of that. That automatically makes the howitzer a centralized stand-off weapon, whereas a mortar can work with a unit-organic spotter/director.

I do actually see a job for the 105mm caliber, but as a cannon, not as a howitzer. Basically what the Stryker MGS is designed to do - direct heavy fire support.

[Fuchs]

@ 105 vs 120: I'm not sure the superior range of the 105 is of any use in the real world. It really collides with a low-charged 155. And besides C2 there is the question of targeting. A 120mm mortar has a minimum range of 250 yards or so, a 105mm howitzer a multiple of that. That automatically makes the howitzer a centralized stand-off weapon, whereas a mortar can work with a unit-organic spotter/director.

I do actually see a job for the 105mm caliber, but as a cannon, not as a howitzer. Basically what the Stryker MGS is designed to do - direct heavy fire support.

120mm mortar minimum range is more like 400 m.

105mm guns can usually be used in direct fire (some even have shields), so minimum range is not really an applicable concept unless you need to overshoot a short LOS obstacle.

Turret 120mm mortars (like BAe AMS, Swedish AMOS and Russian gun-mortars) are breech-loaders and can be used for direct fire on an AFV as well. Turret 60 and 81mm mortars exist as well (France).

[Distiller]

105mm mountain artillery.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/TalibanFearThedragon.htm

"The Regiment's fire planning staffs working at HQ level and its Fire Support Teams at company level, have directed the firepower of 3 Commando Brigade - Firepower provided by its own 105mm light artillery, 81mm mortars, Attack Helicopters, multinational fast jets and precision guided rockets fired by 74 (Battleaxe) Battery."

Hmm. So the author of this threat was wrong. There is justification for the 105mm howitzer after all. Or is it just because the British Army don't have 120mm mortars?

[Kiwigrunt]

105mm mountain artillery.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/TalibanFearThedragon.htm...

Hmm. So the author of this threat was wrong. There is justification for the 105mm howitzer after all. Or is it just because the British Army don't have 120mm mortars?

It appears to me that the 'secret' in this less than usual application of the light gun is indeed in the fact that is used in the direct fire role. A job that yesterdays 106 kickless canon may have been equally capable of (with a modern sight)....

The range is also well within the capability of the 81 mm mortar. But the mortar, with its high trajectory, would not have the guaranteed first shot accuracy of this gun (the article mentions firing at individual targets). I suppose a mortar can at best only fire 'semi direct'.

[GMLRS]

# Role for MLRS++: massed technical targets, area targets, salvo assault, long range
Comments?

I'm afraid we are long since removed from the duck hunter role. Our biggest delay in response time is AC, and besides being deadly accurate, who has a lower CDE in DoD?

[kaur]

IAI is developing his own "rockets in a box" version. Take a look at journal's page nr 8.

http://www.zinio.com/reader.jsp?issue=416099555

[William F. Owen]

GPS and Laser Guidance is now down to all most any ammunition below 70mm.
I had some good discussions as to the implications when I was at the IDF's Land Warfare Conference. The technology is there, but the thinking, as in implications has to be kept somewhat in check. 120 and 81mm Iron bombs still have great utility!

[kaur]

Wilf said:


The technology is there, but the thinking, as in implications has to be kept somewhat in check.

I think this kind of shooting platform is ideal for inferior force in small battlespace, which has to carry out territory defence. You will get best "weight per kill" ratio and this is really "shoot and forget" solution. You just empty your container (that may selfdestroy itself in seconds) and switch to another previously hidden platform. You don't have to drag all that logistical tale with you.

[Fuchs]

Why would you care about weight if you don't intend to move it much?
The price is much more important.

A container full of missiles is expensive enough to actually force an army to use it only at high value targets - and to avoid its loss.
It mus not be left behind, even if broken communications or other factors prevent timely use of the missiles before their position get overrun.

It makes sense to think of this as a container on a truck - a mobile launcher.

[kaur]

Fuchs said:


Why would you care about weight if you don't intend to move it much?
The price is much more important.

Good question. Maybe for consealment reasons (if bigger weight means bigger size) and cross country mobility questions ...
What price is right price? Some occasions quality triumphs quantity.


A container full of missiles is expensive enough to actually force an army to use it only at high value targets - and to avoid its loss.

The same thing can be said about other expensive stuff. You destroy your tanks, chopters etc that you can not evacuate. Last link with article about IMI rockets says that this is affordable at platoon level. My logic says that this must be cheaper than MRLS fire. Or not??


It mus not be left behind, even if broken communications or other factors prevent timely use of the missiles before their position get overrun.

If you work out TTP that says "Abandon container and swith to another one, you leave it." How destroy it is another question.


It makes sense to think of this as a container on a truck - a mobile launcher.

It depends how your forces control the battle space. Did Hezbollah drive around with their rocket plaforms during 2006 war?

[Fuchs]

WW2 is a better base for thought than Israel's meddling with paramilitaries in regard to Baltic defence, Kaur.

[kaur]

Fuchs, would you motivate you argument that WWII is better example that 2006 war? Why shouldn't we learn from Georgian war last year?

Soviets didn't know the remedy against ATGM's in the 1982, when they were in top condition. I doubt that they know this today. New technologies like Netfire is even more sophisticated to counter. Gareev admits this here. this page is from book "Field Artillery and Firepower".

garejev.jpg (768 KB) (http://a.imagehost.org/view/0465/garejev)

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs, would you motivate you argument that WWII is better example that 2006 war? Why shouldn't we learn from Georgian war last year?

Soviets didn't know the remedy against ATGM's in the 1982, when they were in top condition. I doubt that they know this today. New technologies like Netfire is even more sophisticated to counter.
You cannot limit your areas of study and you have to understand what you are looking at.
WW2 can lead you down a dead end road in exactly the same way the 2nd Lebanon War could. Based on even simple analysis, in 2006, the vast majority of ATGMs Hezbollah fired (80%+), missed!
ATGMs can be beaten. The issue is cost versus effect.

I don't see that NETFIRES brings much to the party.

[kaur]

Wilf said:


the vast majority of ATGMs Hezbollah fired (80%+), missed!

Quality of training, quality of weapon etc?


ATGMs can be beaten. The issue is cost versus effect.

IED's can be beaten, but they are not beaten.

I like Netfires type weapon because that you can hide it and it is precice against conventional armoured units. You are stupid if you chose dumb artillery with dumb munition and start to fight Cold war style artillery duel. Georgians tried and failed. Hezbollah used older generation rockets that demanded you to crawl to the line of sight of enemy tanks and they failed. Hezbollah rockets flew till the last day of war. In theory there is remedy against every tactics and every weapon. In practice it depends how many troops and what technologies it demands to root out different weapons. For example, if Taliban swarms all it's units to attack conventionally Kabul, this is like gift for US B-52 squadron. Taliban uses IED's and we need huge number of troops to root them out.

[William F. Owen]

Quality of training, quality of weapon etc?
Both and much more.

IED's can be beaten, but they are not beaten.
Being stupid is not an excuse. The British Army defeated (made irrelevant) the IRA's IEDs in South Armagh, by staying off the roads.


Hezbollah used older generation rockets that demanded you to crawl to the line of sight of enemy tanks and they failed.
Spike (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_(missile)) and specifically Spike-LR. Fraction of the cost of Netfires.

[kaur]

Wilf proposed:


Spike and specifically Spike-LR. Fraction of the cost of Netfires.

In tank batallion there is approximately 30 tanks. How many Spike-LR platforms and what time do you need to kill it? In some conditions time is precious thing.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0622/lahingkolonn.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0622/lahingkolonn)

[William F. Owen]

In tank batallion there is approximately 30 tanks. How many Spike-LR platforms and what time do you need to kill it? In some conditions time is precious thing.


Soviet Tactical doctrine states that a density of 20 ATGM post per kilometre and depth of frontage, will stop a Tank battalion (45 tanks) stone cold dead. I don't know where those figures come from but they date from about 1979, and have some semblance to Anti-tank numbers used in 1945.

It' not time! It's the employment in time. if a Soviet MR BN is advancing at 1 kilometre every 90 seconds, then OK, but that rate of advance is VERY rare, and you cannot do it through a minefield or when it costs you 30% of your force per kilometre driven.

[kaur]

Wilf said:


It' not time! It's the employment in time. if a Soviet MR BN is advancing at 1 kilometre every 90 seconds, then OK, but that rate of advance is VERY rare, and you cannot do it through a minefield or when it costs you 30% of your force per kilometre driven.

I prefer "mobility of fire" to "mobility of shooter". Spike fire is limited to max 8 km. Netfire has triple more. Instead of dragging Spike, sensors by the aveanue of approach are swithching to next. This means that enemy chooses the place of your ambush.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, would you motivate you argument that WWII is better example that 2006 war? Why shouldn't we learn from Georgian war last year?

Do you expect the Russians to fight like the Israelis of 2006? Even the Israelis of 2009 wouldn't do that.

Why should we emphasize the lessons of the South Ossetian War? It looked A LOT like WW2 to me - but just as a 1/10,000th particle of it.

All conventional wars post-195 were very short and can only offer fragmentary lessons.


Studying the art of war is about discovering the many individual mosaic pieces and learning about they add to each other and become one.

Think of a mosaic picture filling a 10x3m wall.
A few stones have been exchanged with new ones during the last two generations. Now what should you do?
Go very close to see the few new stones close-up, look at large parts of the picture that are of greatest interest or step back and look at the whole masterwork?

- - -

You don't need to "kill" a tank battalion, especially not with total kills.

It's enough to degrade its effectiveness, possibly up to the point of no direct effect (when they're kept in reserve because an employment would be too risky at the time).
You can alternatively succeed through Pyrrhic defeats. Sell them ground for hardware. That doesn't require a total annihilation either.


The range of guided missiles (Spike vs. Netfires) isn't very important in most terrains. There's rarely an opportunity to shoot and hit beyond 1.5 or at most 2 km. Long-range hits were historically only common in deserts and/or against incompetent opponents. Netfires won't change that by much.
More range simply doesn't add much net advantage to the table; the time of flight increases, the communication becomes less reliable, the munition becomes more expensive and heavier, target data becomes less reliable and the system tends to become allocated to higher echelons (Bde instead of Bn).

Netfires' greatest advantages (and it's very different to the apparently cheaper Israeli Jumper system) are
- its ability to engage 'rear' targets (jammers, CPs, mortars, artillery) and
- indirect fire (non line-of-sight advantage over most ATGMs)

Both is available in other systems that stay necessary anyway.


About the photo:
There was only one road and the terrain around it was mostly non-negotiable. The valley was a single long bottleneck that cold have been sealed easily with artillery, obstacles, mines and other tools for days - without a single RPG/bazooka/Panzerfaust or ATGM.

[Xenophon]

...I'll sink my teeth into the full thread later.


120mm is a great platform. Especially the ungodly accurate EFSS (although I was FDO for the test battery, so it may just have been my well-oiled FDC). However, 120's just don't have the range or the sustainability to take a big chunk out of the M777's job market. Great weapon for Direct Support, not so good for general support.

The M777 may not last long, but some 155mm Howitzer will. It's a good middle range weapon between mortars and rockets. There's a company working on a high speed piece of gear that creates a "vacuum" of hydrogen inside the bore and the tube of the gun. Since a round travels easier through 100% hydrogen than through normal air, you can get 30+ clicks with an unassisted projectile. Only problem is getting it small enough to mount on a gun. Should be good for business. Plus, nothing can do illum as well as cannon arty.

HIMARS are a great general support asset and can't be beat when you need dead balls accuracy.

Netfires. Limited utility that can't be more easily provided by other assets, not worth the money.

[kaur]

Fuchs said:


Netfires' greatest advantages (and it's very different to the apparently cheaper Israeli Jumper system) are
- its ability to engage 'rear' targets (jammers, CPs, mortars, artillery) and
- indirect fire (non line-of-sight advantage over most ATGMs)

Both is available in other systems that stay necessary anyway.

Those are the characteristics that I admire.

Also I agree that you don't have to "kill" the whole column of tanks to achieve good results. You just have to pick out commanders (in case of conscript army). Like sniper work.


About the photo:
There was only one road and the terrain around it was mostly non-negotiable. The valley was a single long bottleneck that cold have been sealed easily with artillery, obstacles, mines and other tools for days - without a single RPG/bazooka/Panzerfaust or ATGM

Here is another photo.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0180/pold.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0180/pold)

[Fuchs]

Those are the characteristics that I admire.

And yet; totally overpriced and easily substituted for with evolved traditional systems.

Also I agree that you don't have to "kill" the whole column of tanks to achieve good results. You just have to pick out commanders (in case of conscript army). Like sniper work.

Conscript armies like the Wehrmacht, of which some infantry divisions kept fighting and stalling attacks even after 40% loss of troops, 80% loss of heavy ordnance and around 60% loss of leaders?

You seem to overestimate the effect of leader losses as well. It may work fine at times, but it's not what I meant and certainly not reliable.

Here is another photo.

...

That photo was done AFTER the decision, after the breakthrough - south of the city. Terrain is almost irrelevant at that point.

Yet, it shows that even in that flat region there was little hope of even exploiting the full range of a TOW, much less of a Netfire missile.
2 km is a practical line of sight limit in normal cultivated/inhabited terrain - until you factor in smoke (direct and indirect), dust, fog and probably also mirage.

[kaur]

Conscript armies like the Wehrmacht, of which some infantry divisions kept fighting and stalling attacks even after 40% loss of troops, 80% loss of heavy ordnance and around 60% loss of leaders?

You seem to overestimate the effect of leader losses as well. It may work fine at times, but it's not what I meant and certainly not reliable.

This is question about unit cohesion, motivation etc. If we talk about IIWW, I can bring you example about Estonians.


Estonian Rifle Corps in the Red Army

In June 1940, while the Estonian army was integrated into the Soviet military structure, where in June 1940 there were 16,800 men, was changed into "22nd Territorial Rifle Corps" 5,500 Estonian soldiers served in the corps during the first battle. 4,500 of them went over to the German side. In September 1941, when the corps was liquidated, there were still 500 previous Estonian soldiers

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia_in_World_War_II#Estonian_Rifle_Corps_in_th e_Red_Army

I'm 100 percent sure that Chechen Vostok batallion is more cohesive than any Pskov airborne division batallion. Due to the culture.


Yet, it shows that even in that flat region there was little hope of even exploiting the full range of a TOW, much less of a Netfire missile.
2 km is a practical line of sight limit in normal cultivated/inhabited terrain - until you factor in smoke (direct and indirect), dust, fog and probably also mirage.

My point is that you must leave minimum footprint on the most suspected area. It similar to German marksman job in Normandy hedged terrain, but with more efficent weapons. Oppositions artillery is covering most suspected areas and make locate sensor and shooter to different places. Take a look how Soviet artillery worked in Afganistan and Russians in Chechnya.

[kaur]

Soviet artillery in Afganistan.

http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/Go_to_War_Primer/pdf_files/Artillery%20and%20Counterinsurgency.pdf

Chechnya.

http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/1997/JAN_FEB_1997/JAN_FEB_1997_PAGES_42_45.pdf

http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:aVuDI0VVTy8J:www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/p31/P31.ch8/+Technology+and+The+Second+Chechen+Campaign&hl=ru&gl=ee&sig=AFQjCNEBK1rP3If7RET8TKQMre-HIsRIfQ

[kaur]

The U.S. Army's Non Line-of-Sight Launch System's (NLOS-LS) Precision Attack Missile failed to hit its target four out of six times during recent testing, according to a testing document.

The NLOS-LS Precision Attack Missiles (PAM) are slated to cost $466,000 apiece in 2011, according to budget documents submitted to Congress Feb. 1.

An ongoing Army precision munitions portfolio review is looking at scaling back the final number of PAM missiles purchased and possibly launching a new program to develop a cheaper alternative weapon.

http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=4509667&c=AME&s=LAN

[Fuchs]

It's too expensive because of the multi-mode seeker. That was known in advance. I've always said it's too expensive. :cool:

[Firn]

The U.S. Army's Non Line-of-Sight Launch System's (NLOS-LS) Precision Attack Missile failed to hit its target four out of six times during recent testing, according to a testing document.

The NLOS-LS Precision Attack Missiles (PAM) are slated to cost $466,000 apiece in 2011, according to budget documents submitted to Congress Feb. 1.

An ongoing Army precision munitions portfolio review is looking at scaling back the final number of PAM missiles purchased and possibly launching a new program to develop a cheaper alternative weapon.

Costly indeed, even when we not consider that at most every second missile hit the target.


Firn

[reed11b]

It's too expensive because of the multi-mode seeker. That was known in advance. I've always said it's too expensive. :cool:

What was wrong with the E-FOGM again?
Reed

[Fuchs]

Dunno, but I suspect there's a general problem with non line of sight fire optic guided missiles with infrared seekers.
All such projects seem to die.

An EuroSpike engineer claimed to me that the breaking fibre problem was long since solved with engineering trickery (a material applied to the surface fo the glass fibre itself), but I learned that some people opine that infrared seekers are poor for lock on after launch (= not a good missile sensor type for finding & identifying camouflaged targets).

[OfTheTroops]

You all make wonderful arguments and we all have our faves. It usually comes down to the good fast or cheap and you can have 1 or 2 of the 3
The MLRS family can do just about anything you want. Put it in a window or take out a grid square.

It seems the future of indirect fire weapons are unfortunately in the hands of politics, rivalries and St Barbara.

[William F. Owen]

An EuroSpike engineer claimed to me that the breaking fibre problem was long since solved with engineering trickery (a material applied to the surface fo the glass fibre itself), but I learned that some people opine that infrared seekers are poor for lock on after launch (= not a good missile sensor type for finding & identifying camouflaged targets).

Not sure about this. Spike pays out the cable, so it's never under tension in the way conventional wire guidance is. Using FOG you do not have to lock off the sensor. You just put the cross-hairs on what you want to hit. No thermal image is required. That is how Spike operators train to target hatches on the top of AFVs.
If the cable breaks without an operator cued lock off, the missile just continues on the last aim point. If the target image was locked, then it will guide.
There is a new 25km version of Spike (http://defense-update.com/features/2009/november/spike_nlos_301109.html)

[kaur]

Once the guidance malfunction is identified, then “we can figure out what it would take to fix it. Then the Army’s got the decision: Okay, do we modify the program? Do we cancel the program? Or do we continue?”

http://defensetech.org/2010/03/03/army-react-to-nlos-ls-missile-miss/

[Firn]

Not sure about this. Spike pays out the cable, so it's never under tension in the way conventional wire guidance is. Using FOG you do not have to lock off the sensor. You just put the cross-hairs on what you want to hit. No thermal image is required. That is how Spike operators train to target hatches on the top of AFVs.
If the cable breaks without an operator cued lock off, the missile just continues on the last aim point. If the target image was locked, then it will guide.
There is a new 25km version of Spike (http://defense-update.com/features/2009/november/spike_nlos_301109.html)

Such systems could be of use in mountain warfare especially it could be easily adopted to fire smaller and lighter version of the Spike range and be mounted easily on 4x4 trucks/jeep/bandvagns. A couple of NLOS and a load of ER/LR on a bandvagn would enhance the capabilities of the supported unit against armor, vehicles, heavy weapons and other important targets (maybe even helicopters, more likely in high altitudes) considerably. The bandvagn has been already outfitted with TOW and other systems, so it should be clearly duable.

Vehicles of that kind could form the tank-hunter company of the battalion and double as precision-guided NLOS support weapon. Large range, high accuracy and over-the-crest capability can be very important factors and greatly ease part of the supply problem. It is of course not in the least a substitute for a heavy mortar.

I will be interesting to see just how much the very longe range missiles cost.


Firn

[Fuchs]

Netfires is dead because of its idiotic costs and technical incompetence of its developer.

http://defensetech.org/2010/04/23/army-cancels-nlos-ls-missile-system/#axzz0lx7cXmIU

[kaur]

25-km Spike.

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0623/Spike_NLOS.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0623/Spike_NLOS)

http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/1026.pdf

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiYLn_etM6A

Here is Nimrod missile launch.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUVlE3vXiUQ&feature=player_embedded

[B.Smitty]

Not really, the 105 range isn't all that great -- 11,400m (charge 7); 14,000m (charge 8); 19,500m (M913 rocket assisted projectile -- and my spies tell me that has accuracy problems) and with the new 120 rounds edging toward a 13 click range and a RAP in the works, the advantage of the 105 is fading rapidly, my bet is that it'll be out of the inventory within 10 years, replaced by the M777 as production of that ramps up and it gets cheaper; that and the NLOS-C.

...

You should grow to love the 120 because it's going to be around for a long time while I suspect the 105's days are numbered. :D

Do new 105mm guns like the Denel G7 and the proposed BAE V2C2 gun, with their 32km range using BB rounds, change anyones thinking on the future of the 105mm howitzer?

[Ken White]

Do new 105mm guns like the Denel G7 and the proposed BAE V2C2 gun, with their 32km range using BB rounds, change anyones thinking on the future of the 105mm howitzer?I'd go with the V2C2 105, the 120 Mortar and MLRS with no 155. However, the US Army isn't headed that way.

The long range 105 offers lighter weight and lower cube for ammo, a significant advantage. The 120 Mortar offers Infantry Cdrs excellent firepower and reasonably decent range with a more capable shell than the 105. The MLRS offers volume of fire/ HE, far more range and better accuracy than any 155 is likely to reach. However, there are some 155 advantages and that seems to be the way the US is going.

[B.Smitty]

I'd go with the V2C2 105, the 120 Mortar and MLRS with no 155. However, the US Army isn't headed that way.

The long range 105 offers lighter weight and lower cube for ammo, a significant advantage. The 120 Mortar offers Infantry Cdrs excellent firepower and reasonably decent range with a more capable shell than the 105. The MLRS offers volume of fire/ HE, far more range and better accuracy than any 155 is likely to reach. However, there are some 155 advantages and that seems to be the way the US is going.

MLRS only offers better accuracy when using guided munitions right? Unguided MLRS is far less accurate than unguided 155mm. Also, isn't munition cube for MLRS much higher than for 155mm?

I'd like to see us develop a smaller, guided rocket for MLRS; essentially something permitting more shots per pod, with smaller effects and hopefully cheaper per shot. A GPS-guided Israeli LAR-160 might be one option. Or the LockMart P-44. Or even a guided-GRAD.

155mm and 105mm seem complementary. 155mm (in 52 cal) has greater range, and far more ongoing munition development than 105mm. OTOH, 105mm is useful when ammo cube/weight is of critical importance (e.g. Afghanistan)

[William F. Owen]

I'd like to see us develop a smaller, guided rocket for MLRS; essentially something permitting more shots per pod, with smaller effects and hopefully cheaper per shot. A GPS-guided Israeli LAR-160 might be one option. Or the LockMart P-44. Or even a guided-GRAD.


IIRC, IMI has developed GPS and laser guidance packs for all artillery rockets over 70mm. They certainly have the mature technology to do it.
Even their trajectory corrected stuff is pretty accurate and pretty cheap.

[B.Smitty]

IIRC, IMI has developed GPS and laser guidance packs for all artillery rockets over 70mm. They certainly have the mature technology to do it.
Even their trajectory corrected stuff is pretty accurate and pretty cheap.

I read about their trajectory corrected stuff. Do you know how this works? Does it use a modified rocket that accepts guidance commands in flight? Or is it just using radar data from the previous, unguided shot to refine the next, unguided shot?

The later would presumably be less accurate, but perhaps a better complement to GPS guided rounds than the former.

[Fuchs]

Assuming it's still the old course correction stuff:

1. radar tracks projectile/rocket
2. computer predicts miss, calculates required correction
3. radio tells projectile to brake
4. projectile begins to brake at perfect time to minimize range error (creating a roughly circular dispersion; dispersion left/right is usually smaller than in range for unguided munitions)

Sorry, don't remember the correct arty terms for "range" & "left/right".


The simple correction for follow-on munitions has been used with modern rocket artillery afaik since at least the 70's and merely makes registering unnecessary (the first rocket can be set to timed self-destruct in order to maintain surprise for the full salvo).

[B.Smitty]

Assuming it's still the old course correction stuff:

1. radar tracks projectile/rocket
2. computer predicts miss, calculates required correction
3. radio tells projectile to brake
4. projectile begins to brake at perfect time to minimize range error (creating a roughly circular dispersion; dispersion left/right is usually smaller than in range for unguided munitions)


Interesting.

I wonder how the cost of a course correcting rocket compares to one using GPS/INS guidance?

[SethB]

I'd go with the V2C2 105, the 120 Mortar and MLRS with no 155. However, the US Army isn't headed that way.

The long range 105 offers lighter weight and lower cube for ammo, a significant advantage. The 120 Mortar offers Infantry Cdrs excellent firepower and reasonably decent range with a more capable shell than the 105. The MLRS offers volume of fire/ HE, far more range and better accuracy than any 155 is likely to reach. However, there are some 155 advantages and that seems to be the way the US is going.

What about the limitations of the smaller shell? Not only can you fit less explosive or payload, but the incremental modernization of the 155 means that M795 from the DPICM family has an ECR of about 100M while M1 for the 105 is still only 35 meters? (Accepting that ECR is a somewhat dated term).

Can the difference be made up with accuracy and near precision munition, or massed fires? Is that the kind of thing that MLRS and HIMARs should focus on and leave more flexible and responsive fires to DS and organic FA and MTR units?

And for that matter should we have an anti-tank projectile for the 120?

ETA: What do you think of the M119A3 with DFCS?

[SethB]

MLRS only offers better accuracy when using guided munitions right? Unguided MLRS is far less accurate than unguided 155mm. Also, isn't munition cube for MLRS much higher than for 155mm?

I'd like to see us develop a smaller, guided rocket for MLRS; essentially something permitting more shots per pod, with smaller effects and hopefully cheaper per shot. A GPS-guided Israeli LAR-160 might be one option. Or the LockMart P-44. Or even a guided-GRAD.

155mm and 105mm seem complementary. 155mm (in 52 cal) has greater range, and far more ongoing munition development than 105mm. OTOH, 105mm is useful when ammo cube/weight is of critical importance (e.g. Afghanistan)

Unguided MLRS isn't particularly accurate, nor is the range that far. Even the extended range munitions can't get much further than some of the newer 52 caliber pieces. That said, you can fit a lot of submunitions in a small number of rockets. A pack of MLRS weighs something like 5,000 pounds and isn't small at all.

A smaller rocket would be something like NLOS but if it was just a grid seeker then there might have been fewer developmental issues. I've yet to meet someone who is willing and able to explain the differences between rockets and shells when they impact, with regards to penetration and terminal effect. If anyone has any insight I would appreciate it.

[Sumtingwong]

Seth,

I was an MLRS gunner about 15 years ago. At that time, the MLRS had a couple of different munitions that we worked with regularly. One was a missile, the other were rockets--submunitions in each. Shells explode on impact, the rockets release the submunitions in an air-burst at a specified altitude. MLRS doesn't have to be accurate, it is an area weapon.

[SethB]

Check. I'm going to be an MLRS guy here in a few months.

DPICM isn't used in either theater right now, which marginalizes the system from the start. The M31 provides a 51.5 pound HE warhead and is a PGM, so it has more use in current operations. The dud rate on older DPICM systems was 4% and they are now going to >1% dud rates in order to prevent UXB on the battlefield.

Danger close on MLRS is 2,000 meters. That is more than three times are far as tube artillery. With M30 or M31 you can get a lot closer. M30 uses a guidance system and DPICM.

There are a number of missiles as well, but with a 70-300km range (depending on which missile we are discussing) they are in a completely different class and employed much differently.

Which brings me to my initial thought when I opened this thread several years ago. There are a number of different fire support systems that have different advantages, disadvantages and methods of employment.

[Ken White]

What about the limitations of the smaller shell? Not only can you fit less explosive or payload, but the incremental modernization of the 155 means that M795 from the DPICM family has an ECR of about 100M while M1 for the 105 is still only 35 meters? (Accepting that ECR is a somewhat dated term).have no idea what ECR stands for... :confused: :o

Comparing the M795 with an M1 shell is apple / kiwi fruitish. Compare the bursting radius of the 795 (roughly 50m kill, 100m casualty) and the newer M913, M915, M1130 and Denel LR 105 with prefragmented shell can equal that. However, bursting / casualty radii are very dependent on fuze type, ground type, angle of arrival and thus range as well as other things -- bottom line is that the 105 is generally less potent than the 155 all things considered. That applies not only to HE but to submunition carriers, PGMs, Illum, WP -- all of 'em...

The question is does that difference impact tactically enough to justify the added weight of gun and shells plus charges. My vote would be no, it does not -- but then I'm a light guy...:D

The difference is made up by using MLRS / GMLRS -- and to be developed MRS rocket / missiles and launchers. Which offer more range and damage potential than will any 155 shell or possible improvement thereof.
Can the difference be made up with accuracy and near precision munition, or massed fires? Is that the kind of thing that MLRS and HIMARs should focus on and leave more flexible and responsive fires to DS and organic FA and MTR units?Not an artillerist but my vote would be yes; perhaps if enough stuff is available to mass; yes.
And for that matter should we have an anti-tank projectile for the 120?Yes
ETA: What do you think of the M119A3 with DFCS?I think we should've bought the M118. ;)

[SethB]

Doctrinally ECR is twice the radius at which you can expect one shell fragment per meter. There are other measures of lethality now.

As for ammunition choice, I'm not entirely sure what is current for the M119/105MM. Saw some stuff on the Denel ammunition that was very, very impressive.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the M118 is just separate loading version the M119? And it looks like a longer tube...

The V2C2 is also an impressive piece of hardware (usual qualifiers about things that aren't finished yet apply) and it should be noted that none of the current 105MM shells are rated for the high MVs, which means new and hopefully improved rounds would have to be part of the package.

DPICM has pros and cons, but I think there is a lot of need for standard HE. The decision to prohibit DPICM use in Iraq and Afghanistan was apparently made not long after the wars started.

What did you think of the LAV III with a howitzer attached?

[Ken White]

Doctrinally ECR is twice the radius at which you can expect one shell fragment per meter. There are other measures of lethality now.Number of fragments is a poor indicator of lethality; too many other variables. The old bursting radius criteria was obtained by popping off rounds in the center of concentric circles of silhouettes and estimating potential kills versus potential wounds. All such estimates are just that; munition effects are too unpredictable to be precisely stated. Not a prob, really, the estimates are adequate for planning purposes.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the M118 is just separate loading version the M119? And it looks like a longer tube...Longer tube, different shell, greater range, British (original) version. We insisted on the shorter tube and the old chamber due to vast stocks of older 105mm Ammo on hand. Economic choice versus combat effectiveness choice. Logical on the surface but could have been better worked around IMO.
...but I think there is a lot of need for standard HE.Agree.
What did you think of the LAV III with a howitzer attached?Yes with the Denel 105 (or similar) in a turret, no for the M777 piggy back. Though I'm not a fan of the LAV. It was a stopgap purchase of the cheapest available system due to the US Army's failure to develop wheeled vehicles after WW II.

Our northwest Europe experience in 1944-45 left the Army with many bad legacies... :rolleyes:

[kaur]

(Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment.


Order of Battle

Regimental Admin and Logistics Center

Battalion HQ

Light Mechanized Infantry Company
6x 8x8 ATV w/QJZ8912.7mm HMG
3x 8x8 ATV w/W87 35mm AGL
3x 8x8 ATV w/PP93 60mm Mortar
9x 4x4 ATV

Heavy Mechanized Infantry Company
3x Type 96 Main Battle Tank
3x Type 86 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
3x ZBD97 IFV

Fire Support Company
1x Company HQ FAV
1x FAV w/Minigun
1x FAV w/HJ-8 ATGM FAV
3x FAV w/W99 82mm Automortar
3x FAV w/Type 87 25mm/SAM
3x FAV w/QJZ8912.7mm HMG
3x FAV w/W87 35mm
1x 4x4 ATV w/JS 12.7mm Sniper Rifle

Artillery Battery
Battery HQ/Fire Direction Center
3x 82mm Mortar
3x PTL02 105mm Wheeled Anti-Tank Gun
3x 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher ATVs

Recon Platoon
1x Command Jeep with 2x HN-5 MANPADS
2x Dune Buggy Jeeps w/Heavy Machinegun/HJ-73 ATGM
1x 4x4 ATV with PF98 120mm Recoilless Rifle
1x 4x4 ATV

Electronic Warfare Detachment

UAV Detachment

Medical Detachment (at least two 4x4 ATV ambulances)

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-6.html

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-3.html

[Fuchs]

A wheeled motorised infantry battle group with the greatest possible diversity of calibres and a large diversity of vehicles. Whoever invented this scheme didn't grasp the idea of commonality, standardization.

The small quantities of specialist vehicles also points at a lacking understanding of the effects of attrition and friction on army formations.

The "Recon" Plt doesn't seem to be one.
There's no R&R vehicle.


The whole thing looks like a bad idea of an airmobile infantry BG for swampy terrain.

[kaur]

The mix of heavy and light units that make up the experimental LMR raises many questions regarding the training and supportability of such a dissimilar force. It is unclear if the LMIC, HMIC, and FSC are each placeholders for a full maneuver battalion within a complete LMR, or if each maneuver battalion would have the mix of units seen in the experimental LMR. It may even be that each of the various types of units within the LMR represents a competing organizational design.

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-3.html

If Israeli engineers can mount Lahat missile containers to those ATV platforms, I think that those pieceses can make some serious damage against opponent. I recall French general Beaufre's Territorial Militia Organisation from the beginning of 1970's and those 21th century NLOS solutions could really extend the small units firepower to new level :)

[Fuchs]

It depends.

It's just a piece of hardware. Not all will be fired, not all fired missiles will hit. Not all terrains are suitable for their employment. Hardware-based protection is just as possible as tactics-based protection.
It's really just a piece of kit.


On the other hand - I already proved my inability to cure your extreme weakness for guided missiles, leaving little sense in a renewed attempt.

[SethB]

Technically all missiles (and some rockets) are guided.

Somehow he is on the topic of direct fire systems, which is very different from where this thread started.

[Fuchs]

I remember that even sling, bow, catapult and crossbow projectiles are typically called "missiles" in literature...

[SethB]

Probably an American thing.

I'm a huge fan of the guided stuff, but they take a lot more work. You have to have a small target location error which required a mensurated grid, or you have to uses a laser, of which there might be one per Company.

Then add that grid seekers (and the Army has only one laser guided surface to surface projectile) can't hit moving targets and take some time to get downrange, as well as requiring airspace deconfliction because Excalibur is fired high angle...

Dumb shells have a future. How much of one is more related to the fate of artillery in general rather than the shells in particular.

Now, PGK is cheap enough that it might be fired without the same care, and is fired low angle. It solves four of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire, the only remaining one being accurate target location. The hope is that greater accuracy will reduce consumption rates.

[kaur]

Fuchs said:


On the other hand - I already proved my inability to cure your extreme weakness for guided missiles.

For me it's pure fun to test my stupid ideas against your rational approach :)

About PGM. I do remember that after receiving "Stingers" from US, the mujahideens achieved considerable military success against Soviets. If Taliban etc irregulars could have today similar allies, that can supply 21th century top notch AT's, SAM's, radios, training etc and every missile attack is "one shot, one kill" instead of those "stupid" RPG, Chinese missile etc attacks and instead of "there was attack against US airbase with Chinese missiles. No casualties." there are headlines "Spike attack against base. 5 C-17 lost" how could the war look like since 2001?

I'm really sad that Finnish guerilla tactics thinking stopped in the end of 1980's, right before the new wave of portable PGM's :(

It's all about METT of course :)

[Fuchs]

The actual count of "Stinger" kills in AFG was rather moderate, especially if seen in context of the county's size and the time period. Their effect was almost entirely a repulsion effect. The Soviets restricted their repertoire because of fear.

Whenever you begin to write about PGMs, I have a different interpretation of what you think about: You seem to think in terms of attrition - actual destruction, not tactical (psychological) effect.


An armour brigade on the attack can be shot at with PGMs, but the most promising approach is to consider PGMs as a niche component of the combined arms approach to defence (or offence, there's no law that forbids offence vs. offence). You cannot completely prevent/deter that a hostile ARM Bde goes on the attack - especially not if you keep pounding them as well if it's not attacking. At some point, the attack becomes the lesser evil - PGMs or not. There's therefore not much repulsing/deterring effect to be achieved with PGMs.

I can instantly provide you a rather long list of effective countermeasures to every kind of battlefield missile - even to hypervelocity missiles. And let's be honest - the hostiles will have at least as many ideas as I would have in a matter of minutes, likely many times as many.

Have fun. :p

[SethB]

Guided missiles in direct fire are very different from indirect fire...

We need not bounce back and forth between different kinds.

[Fuchs]

Who did it?

kaur and I discussed tactical indirect fire missiles such as Netfires, Lahat or Nimrod.

The employment of LAHAT in a direct fire role from this kind of vulnerable vehicle would be stupid, especially considering the availability of fire&forget missiles for that role..

[William F. Owen]

The employment of LAHAT in a direct fire role from this kind of vulnerable vehicle would be stupid, especially considering the availability of fire&forget missiles for that role..
LAHAT was developed to be low cost and give MBTs long range accurate fires. Having proved it could do that, it was then developed into a similarly low cost ATGM for use from helicopters, light vehicles and even boats.
It's just smaller, cheaper, more versatile and simpler Hellfire.

[kaur]

About Lahat.


Similar to the force protection Lahat concept, the 'trigger' will be activated by the supported unit, where the infantry calling for support will command the launch and designate the target to be attacked. Each vehicle could support units beyond line of sight, at ranges of up to eight kilometers, using anti-tank or multi-purpose missiles depending on the effect required. The missile unit could also attack targets within line- of -sight autonomously using its own sensors.

http://defense-update.com/products/l/lahat.htm

Fuchs said:


The Soviets restricted their repertoire because of fear.

Isn't this more safe when Su-25 and Mi-24 can't attack your unit from 50-500m? They have to go much more higher and their efficency drops considerably.


I have a different interpretation of what you think about: You seem to think in terms of attrition - actual destruction, not tactical (psychological) effect.

Idea about possible destruction is the basis of deterrence. If you don't have strategic depth, safe heavens, armoured back up, artillery formations, very limited resupply possibilities (dumb munition vs smart munition) etc; you just need to pack the power to small units and consider weight per kill variable.


I can instantly provide you a rather long list of effective countermeasures to every kind of battlefield missile - even to hypervelocity missiles.

It is about learning curve, TTP's etc. You just have to be flexible and find gaps :)

SethB said:


Dumb shells have a future. How much of one is more related to the fate of artillery in general rather than the shells in particular.

It depends on METT. If you manage to ask from Taliban, would they like to change their RPG's to NLAW's and Javelins and Chinese missiles to Spikes, Lahats, Nimrods, what they would say? Would you carry across mountains 1000 kg of iron or 1000 kg of gold?

[Fuchs]

It is about learning curve, TTP's etc. You just have to be flexible and find gaps :)

Almost incapable insurgents may provide years for trial & error, but modern land war is quick. Days or weeks suffice to break a medium-sized army. It has been like that for centuries, actually.


And you didn't get my point about the Su-25 and Stinger. The AFG scenario led to careful Soviets.
The Israelis and Argentinians did not become that careful when faced with a comparable battlefield air defence threat.

The Israelis had the guts to attack SA-6 batteries with A-4s despite 23mm AAA.
The Argentinians had the guts to attack the RN with low-level bomb runs.

A heavy Bde which faces one or two LAHAT-armed infantry battle groups will simply attack, behave like Israelis and Argentinians did - not like the Soviets did.

kaur, I actually wrote about this problem in January.

[kaur]

Fuchs, moderators will interupt us soon :) , but ...



Almost incapable insurgents may provide years for trial & error, but modern land war is quick. Days or weeks suffice to break a medium-sized army. It has been like that for centuries, actually.

My opionon is that that's why you should pack the best punchers to small unit level. They maintain punching power after first breakthrough and regrouping.


And you didn't get my point about the Su-25 and Stinger. The AFG scenario led to careful Soviets.
The Israelis and Argentinians did not become that careful when faced with a comparable battlefield air defence threat.


If we consider geography, then at least Israelis were much more better situation. They didn't have to control Afganistan-sized area and build the state. Mission duration was much more predictable and task was vital. The second variable makes biggest wonders of course :) "Stingers" pushed planes and chopters higher and if there were modern ATGM's available, I belive that Soviet columns would retreat to Uzbekistan earlier than 1989.


A heavy Bde which faces one or two LAHAT-armed infantry battle groups will simply attack, behave like Israelis and Argentinians did - not like the Soviets did.

I don't want to say that Lahat is remedy against all possible scenarios. I just push the idea that this kind of weapon gives better chances to resist against superior armoured opponent in very small theater of war. I stress the concealment and logistical variables. After emptying Lahat module, then enemy airborne units can even land directly on platform and capture it, but 5 km away there is already another platform ready to carry out fire mission. If this Lahat/Nebelwerfer Hummer carries 12 rockets and even half hit the target, this is 2 tank platoons. Good job! I suspect that even your light skirmishers concept can use those weapons :)

In my little homeland there were rumors that Estonian military will buy tank batallion and IFV's for 1 infantry brigade (the EDF's only one) for 250 000 000 EUR's. One argument that was used in discussion was that even Chechens had one batallion in the first war. The sad fact is that those tanks didn't achieve much. I just speculate if Chechens had to decide to buy tank batallion and IFV's or 12 000 SAAB's NLAW AT weapons, then they decided to buy the latter. They couldn't do this kind of choice because they just had to fight with weapons that Russians traded them. Georgian Army made decision to follow big army's model. And we saw the result in the beginning of August 2008.

For US military this is maybe out of context discussion, but for small armies with very limited budget, this may be vital. Sorry for spoiling the thread :o

[kaur]

APKWS II: Laser-Guided Hydra Rockets in Production At Last

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/apkws-ii-hellfire-jr-hydra-rockets-enter-sdd-phase-02193/

plus

http://www.combatreform.org/groundrockets.htm

[SethB]

While APKWS is a great idea, it is not indirect fire. It is very different than the systems that this thread was created to discuss.

[kaur]

It is very different than the systems that this thread was created to discuss.

SethB, after reading first page, thank you for your attention :)

Anyway, does anyone know if this is possible to launch those APKWS rockets from ground based MRLS launchers and direct them with laser designator on the ground? Do those rockets work like ground launched PGM or they must have constant contact with laser beam?

[SethB]

The larger issue is that we don't issue laser designators in large enough numbers to make these things viable.

[kaur]

Is SOCOM trying to copy Israeli Maglan unit (with small unit level long range precision capability)?

SUVs of Death: Commandos Want Missiles in Their Trucks

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/commando-missile-truck/

[Firn]

Three years ago the IDF revealed the existance and some of the service use of the Tamuz (http://www.jpost.com/Video-Articles/Video/IDF-unveils-special-guided-missile-used-in-Lebanon-Gaza), internationally known as the NLOS Spike:



The Artillery Corps established the guided weapons unit following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 when IDF tanks came under heavy antitank fire and the military had difficulty engaging Syria’s and Egypt’s tanks.

The Artillery arm of the IDF as a whole was greatly expanded after the bitter experiences. Mounted in 6 launchers on an M113 (http://defense-update.com/20110913_tamuz-eo-guided-missile.html#.U9u8M2M9BII) it was meant ot provide precise fire power at long ranges against echelons of armor, supporting for example thinly spread defenders over a large area against a surprise attack.


The Tamuz precision guided beyond line of sight (BLOS) guided weapon was developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems since the late 1970s and has been fielded by the Israeli artillery corps since the early 1980s. The weapon is operated from specially modified M-113 armored personnel carriers known as ‘Hafiz’. The system evolved into a larger family of EO weapons called Spike. In 2009 RAFAEL introduced the Spike NLOS, (Non Line of Sight) considered to be an advanced export version of the Tamuz.

Tamuz was designed as an anti-tank weapon, equipped with a powerful shaped-charge warhead. Similar to other EO guided weapons in Israeli inventory, Tamuz can be autonomously guided with ‘man in the loop’ control, enabling maximum control and flexibility through the engagement. The missile operates in both day and night time and under limited visibility conditions. The advantages of the EO targeting and guidance system is the ability of the weapon to acquire the target in flight, based on partial targeting information. The operator can acquire the desired target as it becomes visible via the missile’s seeker, as the missile approaches the target area.


Helicopters (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/ariel-view/2014/05/missile-gives-iaf-helicopter-pilots-needed-flexibility/) and possibly ships were over the years added as missile platforms:


Since then the Spike NLOS has been further developed and now it is considered one of the most efficient combat-proven weapon systems for helicopters.

While trying to make the most of this special weapon system the IAF has tested it against aerial targets. It did not surprise the pilots when they launched it against a small drone and hit the target. So the missile is now considered an optional weapon against enemy helicopters and unmanned air systems (UAS).

The Tammuz was the main weapon system of the IAF’s Cobra helicopters and is now carried by the IAF’s Apaches and Apache Longbows.


Instead of helping to stock massed armor it was increasingly used against targets in Lebanon and Gaza. In those relatively small theaters a unit can cover most of it. The British army used Israeli launchers (http://www.janes360.com/images/assets/640/27640/Special_report_EXACTOR.pdf) named 'Exactor' in Afghanistan. It is important to point out that the IDF stated at that time that it had replaced them with something new. This year pictures surfaced of a (fromer) MBT 'Magach 5' (http://www.armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/israeli_army_uses_main_battle_tank_magach_5_fitted _with_12_spike_anti-tank_missile_launchers_2107143.html) tranformed into missile launcher. Needless to say that the gun barrel shouldn't be quite what it looks.


The Magach Spike is fitted with 12 Rafael Tamuz (Spike -NLOS) missile launchers mounted at the rear of the turret.

A curved Spike NLOS antennna is mounted on the top of the turret, which is lowered in road position.

The front part of the turret and the hull are fitted with add-on armour to increase protection against anti-tank missile. More stowage box are fitted to each side of the turret.

Spike NLOS is a multi-purpose, electro-optical missile system with a real-time wireless data link for ranges up to 25km. The Spike NLOS weapon system is a member of the world renowned Spike Family.

So the IDF has decided on a far more heavily armored unit with twice as many ready missiles and possibly more ammunition on board to replace the 'Hafiz', with possibly other platforms using the missile system. The British army on the other hand seems to have had a strong interest a version for 'expeditionary operations'. South Korea (http://www.janes.com/article/27835/south-korea-shows-off-spike-nlos-ballistic-and-cruise-missiles) has also (or plans to) aquired the NLOS Spike for air and land platforms.

So over the years this type of missile has indeed expanded slowly from it's niche. It will be interesting to look back at the current devlopments in a couple of years.